



The Society for Historians of American  
Foreign Relations

# *NEWSLETTER*

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## SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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**MEMBERSHIP:** Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member. Annual dues are \$5.00, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Membership fees for retired members and for students are \$3.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$10.00. Life memberships are \$75.00.

**MEETINGS:** The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

**PRIZE:** The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the spring meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U. S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

**ROSTER:** A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.



Walter V. Scholes

by

David M. Pletcher\*

Walter V. Scholes, who died January 24, 1975, was a respected senior member of our subfield, although he would have laughed at such a dignified term. Born July 26, 1916, he was reared in a small town of northern Illinois, but he received all his graduate training at the University of Michigan. He first specialized in colonial Latin American history, following his distinguished uncle, France V. Scholes, who took him to Mexico on research trips while he was still a student and gave him a feel for the country which he always retained. Walter wrote his dissertation under Arthur S. Aiton on the **visita** (inspection tour) of Diego Ramírez in sixteenth-century Mexico; this was eventually published. Soon after obtaining his Ph. D. in 1943, however, he shifted his research from colonial Mexico to the nineteenth century. His **Mexican Politics during the Juárez Regime, 1855-1872**. (1957), long a standard work on the period, was intended as a pilot study, but by the late 1950s Walter was already becoming interested in American foreign relations. Rather abruptly he abandoned research on Juárez and began a reconnaissance of American diplomatic history between about 1890 and 1930 which resulted in a number of articles and finally led him to write **The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration** (1970), his principal work in the field. His wife, Marie V. Scholes, was co-author of the Taft study by his insistence; she had long been a partner in research and an unremitting critic of his writing.

Except for an occasional research trip or visiting professorship, Walter lived his whole professional life in Columbia, Missouri. For two years after obtaining the doctorate, he was an instructor at Stephens College and then moved across town a few blocks to the University of Missouri, where he went up the familiar academic rungs at approximately five-year intervals. Imperceptibly he changed from a "young Turk" to an "elder statesman" but never completely suppressed his earlier impulses to break china and deflate stuffiness. He was at his best in small graduate discussion courses, where he cheerfully assigned students the task of defending a historian or a viewpoint of which they knew he disapproved. At conventions one usually found him surrounded by former students, friends, and friends of friends. Unlike many other aging professors, he kept up his contacts with his younger departmental colleagues.

I first met Walter and Marie one hot summer in the late 1940s at the University of Texas, where we were all working on nineteenth-century Mexico in the Latin American Collection, at that time still without air conditioning. When the library closed in the evening, we would adjourn to a German beer garden, where it was a little cooler under the trees, to drink beer and talk. While I lived in western Illinois, I used to visit them

\*Dr. Pletcher, professor of history at Indiana University, was a longtime friend of Dr. Scholes, as this memorial sketch indicates.



in Columbia twice a year, spring and fall, for a weekend of almost continuous conversation and argument. (A common Scholes gesture was a slow shake of the head followed by a sudden broad grin and the exclamation, "The bastards!" It was suitable to a great variety of contexts.) Some summers we all went on research trips to Berkeley or Austin, where I suffered the chronic frustration of trying to keep up with two typewriters grinding out notes. After a time I moved farther away from Missouri, and our contacts were less frequent and close, for alas! Walter regarded letters as a medium for practical communication--not an end in themselves, like conversation. (It was not at all unusual to get a two-line inquiry or response after several months of silence).

My last meeting with Walter was characteristic. The second or third day of a convention we had had all we could stand of crowded lobbies and stale tobacco smoke. About nine o'clock or so in the evening we got a bottle of Scotch, settled ourselves in my room, and talked for about four hours. Next morning I could not remember a great deal of what we said, but I shall never forget the conversation. It was a fitting end to a long friendship.

## CONFESSIONS OF A DIPLOMATIC HISTORIAN

Thomas A. Bailey

Old men are listened to with reverence in certain societies but not conspicuously in one whose youth are urged to trust no one over thirty. Yet my claims to seniority are so gilt-edged that I may be forgiven a little statistical boasting. My lengthening years span more than one-third of the life of the republic whose diplomatic history has claimed my attention for considerably more than half a century. I am not suggesting that a historian who lives through a given era knows what is going on behind the diplomatic curtains, but he can hardly avoid sensing the mood of his environment.

Foreign affairs were of little concern to me in my grammar school years. The wedding of the waters at Panama occurred in 1914, and I well remember that the boys at our two-room, eight-grade establishment celebrated this red-letter day by unmercifully beating with sticks an abandoned sheetmetal stove. As for the Yellow Peril, I was a second generation Californian, but I did not share the current animus against the Japanese, partly because my best friend was a lad named Bill Yamamoto. Little did I know when I almost got into a fist fight with him over the relative merits of the Japanese and American navies that his namesake would one day be an architect of the assault upon Pearl Harbor.

The guns of August in 1914 left no lasting impression on my mind. I did absorb the pro-Ally sentiments of most Americans, and recall how



shocked I was when one girl in our grade flaunted her pro-German sympathies. Before the end of my freshman year in high school, the United States was officially at war with Germany but not yet really in it.

How glorious those days seemed to be! We drilled with old Springfield rifles; we sang the blood-tingling "Over There" and various hang-the-Kaiser songs; we promoted the sale of bonds. My miniscule contribution to the great conflict was serving as a Liberty Loan orator, as the "Four Minute Men" were called, only I was a beardless boy and my harangue lasted much longer than four minutes. It consisted of a series of blasts at the Kaiser and his goose-stepping minions, and it embodied a long list of indictments that my English teacher had helpfully written for me. I remember accusing the Hun of demolishing cathedrals, bayonetting babies, and violating women, but the only staccato sentence that sticks in my mind is "The Hun has masticated Mother Earth." In that age of innocence "rape" was a four-letter word.

In retrospect I am thoroughly ashamed of this trained-seal performance. Later, in my college days, I was shocked to learn that some of our most distinguished American historians patriotically prostituted their pens in writing anti-German propoganda. I then resolved that if a World War should erupt again, as it did, I would steel myself to retain a reasonable degree of historical objectivity. If perverted history is needed for victory, there are plenty of hack writers around to do the job.

My senior year in high school coincided with the great debate over the League of Nations. In my youthful zeal I enthusiastically championed the cause of Woodrow Wilson. I recall one formal school debate in which I naively announced to the judges that my opponents would no doubt quote Senators Lodge and Borah, both of whom should be ignored because they were prejudiced witnesses. To my mortification, the judges evidently thought that I was prejudiced.

The popular stereotype stuck in my mind that Lodge, practically single-handedly defeated the League of Nations out of spite for Wilson. Moreover, the world seemed to be hellbent for another great war because the defection of America had irreparably weakened the League of Nations. In more mature years I learned that history is seldom this simple. The truth is that Lodge, a Republican, had long been a foe of internationalism, and had earlier assisted in the defeat of the arbitration treaties proposed by a fellow Republican, President Taft. When the crunch came, Lodge was trying to get the League approved, with his reservations attached, while Wilson, whose brain had been damaged by a severe stroke, stubbornly demanded his way or nothing. He got nothing.

My formal education in diplomatic history, in fact all history, was hit and miss. If we only knew what port we were destined to reach when we set sail, how differently we would chart our course. When I entered Stanford as a freshman in the autumn of 1920, I indicated law as a probable major, in accord with aspirations long cherished--by one of my parents. By my sophomore year I decided on my own to prepare for the Baptist ministry, and to this end ultimately received an A.B. in the Greek



language, with enough elective units in history to qualify for a degree in that department also. Greek is not all Greek to me, but I temporarily attained enough facility with the language to savor the undiluted beauty of Homer, as well as to enjoy in the original the New Testament and Herodotus, the so-called Father of History. If a knowledge of Latin and Greek taught me nothing else, they clarified my English grammar.

As for my preaching career, I shifted from the pulpit to the lectern, the printed page, and occasionally radio and television. Through these media I have reached tens of thousands of sinners. I can also boast of more than twelve disciples, including two presidents of SHAFR, Alexander DeConde and Armin Rappaport, both of whom have atoned for the sins of the master by writing high quality books, including surveys.

The price that I ultimately paid for my misdirected education was to have to pick my diplomatic history and ancillary disciplines off the bushes. To my lasting regret, I never took a course in American diplomatic history, although at Stanford the distinguished professor, E.D. Adams, was then offering work on Anglo-American relations. I have never had formal instruction in disciplines ranging from international law and international finance to mass psychology. But time is fleeting, and much if not most of our education is necessarily self-education.

My entrance into diplomatic history came through the back door by happenstance. American political history was my first love, and my doctoral dissertation analyzed party irregularity in the United States Senate, 1869-1909. Much of the labor consisted of charting yea and nay votes by primitive computerized methods, that is, pen and pencil. The end product was so dull and statistical that I never offered it to a publisher, although I did extract what little meat it had for a much-traveled article that finally found lodgement with a social science journal deep in the heart of Texas.

Dissertation completed, I accepted a position as an instructor at the University of Hawaii. I had declined an invitation to teach European history at Duke University, primarily because I wanted to continue with my American field. The relaxing climate in Hawaii, both physical and intellectual, did not conduce to research and publication. The saying was that at first you sat and thought and then you just sat. But I was ambitious enough to want to get ahead in the profession, to the distress of some easy-going colleagues, and looked around for manuscript materials in which I could pursue original research. I found none in my field of American political history, and I did not want to tackle the localism of dusky Hawaiian potentates. A happy solution offered itself when I discovered that there was a gold mine of documents in the archives of Hawaii relating to diplomatic relations with the United States. The result was two articles, one in the **American Historical Review** and the other in the **Journal of Modern History**. And that is how I got into American diplomatic history.

After three years in Hawaii, I came to the Pacific Coast for a second visit in the summer of 1930 and happened to be involved in some



research in the Stanford library when Professor E. D. Adams, then sixty-four years of age, fell critically ill. Someone was needed to help him through the next year with general courses. I was asked to assist on a temporary basis, and then managed to hang on for some forty-five years. This was the biggest single break of my professional life, and I shall never cease to be grateful to those who gambled on me.

By this time I had published a few articles and had completed several more. I have never been able to determine how many of such efforts equal one book in the eyes of the front office, but they do provide excellent training in reducing one's bulky notes to manageable compass. The essential new material in many books and most dissertations could best be compressed into article form. But I became keenly aware that hard covers provide a better foothold on the rungs of the academic ladder than a scattering of articles. This, be it noted, was deep in the depression era, when the bottom rungs were most insecure.

My first book, drafted in 1932 but published in 1934, dealt with Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese crises centered in California. The antics of the hyperthyroid Rough Rider fascinated me, and I had long had some first-hand familiarity with the Japanese problem. The relevant Roosevelt papers in the Library of Congress had not yet been opened to researchers, but I was fortunate enough to secure approval to use this exciting collection in the summer of 1932. The Roosevelt correspondence and documents in the Department of State proved richly rewarding, despite the dispiriting presence in Washington of the shanty-town Bonus Army.

The years 1932-1934 were among the worst of the Great Depression and certainly no time to bring out a heavily-documented monograph. I sent the manuscript to Doubleday and then to Putnam, but it kept bouncing back. The Stanford University press finally took it, but not until I had rattled the tin cup and come up with a subsidy of \$500 in Rockefeller money--a name that still has a strong affirmative ring in my ears. Although I was generally pleased with the subsequent reviews, the book did not sell out all 530 copies until seventeen years had passed.

This humiliating experience had a traumatic effect on me. I have produced a dozen or so books since then but I have never been completely confident in any one case that my brain child would see the light of day. Rather than perish I decided to write something that people would want to read, and this decision led me to detour into the textbook field with my **A Diplomatic History of the American People**, first published in 1940 and recently brought out in its 9th edition (1974). By thus selling my soul to the Devil I hoped that publishers would be suitoring me, rather than the reverse, and this is what happened.

I have never thought of the **Diplomatic History** as a conventional textbook, although it is used for that purpose. My conception of a text is a lifeless, fact-laden, mini-encyclopaedia, based entirely or almost entirely on secondary works. I have heard of textbook writers who made their "original" contributions by laying open three or four competing



books and preparing a synthesis that rose no higher than the sources from which it came. My plan was to incorporate, with three or four footnotes to the page, the original research, much of it in manuscripts, that would represent in bulk the work of three or so monographs. The actual writing and publishing consumed about five years, aside from the earlier forays into manuscript collections and the labor that went into the preparation of a course on diplomatic history that I offered for almost ten years prior to the appearance of the book. My encompassing thesis was that within broad limits American public opinion, either in the long run or short run, determines the foreign policy of a democracy. Hence the title, **A Diplomatic History of the American People**, adapted from John Bach McMaster's eight volume **A History of the People of the United States**. The nation's leaders initiate programs that they think the masses will welcome or tolerate, and they back down from policies that the people overwhelmingly condemn. We have only to recall the reluctance with which President Nixon ended the bombing of Cambodia, but he did end it--so far as we now know.

Another feature of the **Diplomatic History** was the attempt to make it readable by inserting some lighter touches. I wrote the book primarily for the students rather than their professors, and I have a quaint theory that a speaker or a writer has a primary obligation to his audience to make himself heard and understood. This obligation is all the greater if the audience happens to be a captive one, such as is normally involved with a textbook. I have long since observed that we remember best that which holds our attention and interest. Contrary to some historians, I do not believe that dullness or obscurity are guarantees of profundity or greatness, or that a book must necessarily be superficial or otherwise untrustworthy if it can be read without strain or pain.

Feeling youthfully insecure and aware of the pervasiveness of error, I sent a chapter or two of the manuscript to a number of professional friends for their critical reactions. Most responses were helpful, but two old-guard respondents frowned upon the evident attempt of a young whipper-snapper in his early thirties to introduce a degree of sprightliness into a normally stuffy subject. One elderly professor at the University of California at Berkeley earnestly admonished me not to publish a book written in this vein: I would ruin my reputation as a scholar before I even had one. An eminent authority on Castlereagh at Cambridge University, whom I had known during a summer at Stanford, returned my chapter on the Monroe Doctrine with no covering letter or comment except for the single sentence written in large letters on the first page, "I do not believe that history can be written in this slapdash fashion." Though somewhat shaken, I persisted in my belief that simplicity, directness, clarity, and good humor constituted the wave of the future, especially in dealing with a subject as dynamic as an aroused public opinion. The generally friendly reception accorded the published book, even by a scholarly reviewer in the **American Historical Review**, seemed to justify my decision. Yet I am confident that I should enjoy more stature as a scholar in some quarters if I had sought to imitate the somnolent prose of Gibbon's **Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire**, and if all of my books had sold as poorly as the first one.



In 1941 I delivered the Albert Shaw Lectures at the Johns Hopkins University, ultimately published as **The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918**. This was an exercise in revisionism, as are most if not all of my books. The myth is that after the United States forsook pro-Ally neutrality and entered World War I, the Wilson administration turned against the neutrals and violated international law more outrageously than the Allies had yet done. The lectures I fear, were insufferably dull, and the book is the dullest I have ever written. It bored even me. Yet it was probably the most favorably reviewed of all my efforts; its dullness may have saved it in the eyes of real scholars--and also the fact that Wilson appears to good advantage. Yet the monograph sold fewer than a thousand copies. It deals with economic warfare, and economics is still the dismal science, especially when a devastating shooting war is capturing the headlines. My subject, though important, seemed by comparison to be unimportant, and it certainly involved minor-league countries. I have somewhat cynically concluded that a scholar is more likely to secure a publisher if he writes an unneeded book on an overworked major subject rather than a needed book on an unworked topic of secondary importance.

After Pearl Harbor, I was confronted with the problem of what I should do to help with the war effort. Too old for the fighting front, I taught classes of soldiers and continued with my commitment to educate public opinion to its responsibilities in foreign affairs, especially the prospective peacemaking. An opportunity arose to go to the State Department and prepare digests of the dispatches coming in from abroad, but I concluded that there were others who could do this work. Besides, there was little point in shuffling papers upstairs that would be reshuffled, if not ignored, downstairs. A historian friend of mine, after such an experience, conceded that I had a point.

My most pretentious effort to alert public opinion involved two books on President Wilson and what had gone wrong at the end of World War I. The first one was entitled **Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace**, which I submitted to Little, Brown and Company. The editor chose as the expert reader a well-known historian from a large New York university, and after many weeks of delay, his report was unfavorable. The critic concluded that the manuscript smelled of isolationism, and that Little, Brown, after publishing Charles C. Tansill's book in 1938, could not afford another such transgression. He argued that the "Lost Peace" part of my title was irrelevant because I had not proved that the peace was lost--and this was when World War II was reaching its D-Day climax. He wrote "Bosh" with heavy lead pencil beside the first paragraph, and continued with numerous unhelpful and sometimes erroneous comments. After spending some hours erasing such jottings, I sent the manuscript to Macmillan, who accepted it with enthusiasm in about a week.

While the first Wilson book was in manuscript, I presented a paper to the American Historical Association in New York in December, 1943. I examined the 21 mistakes or **alleged** mistakes of Wilson in connection with the Peace of Versailles, pointing out that only about 13 of the 21 supposed errors of judgment could properly bear that label. **The New**



**York Times** published a fair summation of my remarks, but **Time** magazine made a big point of the 21 glaring "blunders" in its news columns. A pro-Wilson professor at a college near Boston, wrote to the editor saying that I was all wrong and that most academicians did not agree with me. Oddly enough, after having publicly prejudged the book he consented to review it, with severely limited enthusiasm, for the **American Historical Review**.

The second Wilson book, **Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal**, was written primarily in the hope that we could avoid some of the mistakes made in connection with the aborted ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. I was able to demonstrate, to my satisfaction at least, that the responsibility for the deadlock must be shared by both Wilson and Lodge, among others. This view was extremely unpopular with Wilsonians at the time, and my choice of a title, which was admittedly designed to bring sinners in off the street, aroused the ire of isolationists, including Charles A. Beard. In the first chapter of his next-to-the-last book, he lambasted me in nine pages for having claimed that the United States "betrayed" anybody. The word "betrayal" possesses several connotations, one of which is to raise high expectations and then disappoint them, as America obviously did in connection with Wilson's sponsorship of the League of Nations. But Beard seized upon the harshest connotation, despite my transparent intention. He had been a master of the English language, and consequently I was forced to conclude that he had either deliberately misread me or that with advancing years he had lost some of his mental acuity. By this time his hatred of Roosevelt had become so extreme that the second of these explanations may be the more charitable.

My next major venture in diplomatic history was **The Man in the Street**, which attempted to spell out topically the impact of public opinion on the shaping and execution of foreign policy. Published in 1948, the book had to lean heavily on the Gallup polls, which were much less trustworthy then than now. The historian is forced to rely on what is available, not on techniques yet unborn. But I am prepared to argue that a properly-conducted opinion poll is a better index to nationwide trends than the traditional three or so editorials in the New York metropolitan newspapers.

**The Man in the Street** was almost murdered in the review columns of the **American Historical Review** by a New Deal political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley. Among other slings and arrows, he misquoted me. What set this gentleman off may have been my slightly deprecating reference to Harry Truman as an ex-haberdasher. Fortunately, the badly-mugged **Man in the Street** was more gently treated by my peers, some of whom have anthologized it, perhaps for whipping-boy purposes. The wrathful political scientist later apologized to me.

In 1947, partly to atone for not having taken a more active role in the war, I taught for the autumn semester at the National War College, in Washington, D. C. Preparatory to holding classes, I traveled that



summer as a V.I.P. under Army auspices in occupied West Germany, Berlin, and Austria. My temporary and unofficial rank was equated with that of a major general. Especially memorable was an interview with Jan Masaryk in Prague, shortly after the Soviets had forced Czechoslovakia to back away from the Marshall Plan. He spoke sorrowfully though eloquently of his nation being in the impossible position of a rabbit trying to stand up to an elephant. Several months later he was dead, presumably murdered. I also talked with numerous American and foreign officials, chiefly at the American embassies in London, Paris, Rome, and Prague and kept careful diary notes on their observations. Everywhere I found fear of Russian westward aggression, whether by ballot or bullet. In Berlin I was told by one of the junior American officials that they were all living with a knife at their throats because all of the lines of communication could be cut by the Soviets. The next year came the Berlin blockade and the first Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Cold War revisionists claim that the Communists had no aggressive intentions, and this may be so, but Stalin succeeded admirably in giving the opposite impression.

The subsequent semester of teaching at the National War College was a cost-free education in itself. Some of the lectures and class discussions were devoted to the strategic implications of the atomic bomb and how it could be used, not to intimidate Stalin, but to prevent the Soviets from sweeping over all Western Europe. George Kennan delivered a half dozen or so brilliant disquisitions; the men who had fabricated or helped fabricate the atomic bomb also spoke, including General Leslie R. Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer. Only once did I hear the suggestion, in this case from a junior officer, that the answer to the problem was preventive war on Russian with atomic weapons. He was quickly argued into silence. Gar Alperovitz and others to the contrary, I do not recall having heard the faintest hint that the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan primarily to show America's muscle to the Soviets. There were clearly other more pressing objectives. William A. Williams and others to the contrary, I never once heard the suggestion that America was facing up to the Russians because she was trying to preserve the relatively tiny trade of Eastern Europe on the Open Door basis. The truth is that we were then having more trouble with London than with Moscow over free access to lucrative markets.

Prior to my contact with the War College, I had believed that the Russians, while pathologically suspicious allies, should be given a chance to demonstrate their good faith as co-partners in preserving postwar. peace. Along with a number of other Americans, especially those who had been propagandized by the movie "Mission to Moscow," I became disillusioned. What the Russians were obviously doing spoke so loudly that one could hardly hear their protestations of innocence.

During the years of World War II the best survey of Russian-American relations was Foster R. Dulles' useful **The Road to Teheran**. He argued that while there had been some friction under the Tsars, we had moved hand-in-hand with the Communists to the glorious heights of Teheran in 1943, from which a bright future seemingly stretched ahead.



By at least the time of the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade in 1948, such dreams had become nightmares, regardless of who was to blame. As a frustrated preacher, I felt the old call to educate the public opinion with a book that would demonstrate that America had often experienced unpleasant relations with both czars and commissars. My book, **America Faces Russia**, was published by the Cornell University press, after three trade publishers had expressed their disinterest. It probably received better reviews than it deserved in this country, but I am told that it did not please the Soviets, one of whom attacked a certain Bailey Thomas. I am quite willing to perpetuate this **nom de plume** against that day when the Russians might be coming.

My latest and probably last concentrated attempt at preaching on diplomatic history was the **Art of Diplomacy**, which set forth scores of maxims for the guidance of the American people and their diplomatic servants. This didactic approach did not have the appeal I had hoped for, and the book was much less than a success. But my publishers informed me that a Russian emissary showed up and bought three copies, presumably for official guidance. I do not suppose that the Kremlin was unduly influenced, but by the indulging in the fallacy of **post hoc ergo propter hoc** I can point out that so-called **détente** came not long after.

As a long-time evangelist of American diplomatic history, I have developed a credo, which may be of some interest to those who are unconverted. Herewith are a few of my strongest convictions.

I believe, with the late Samuel F. Bemis, in multi-archival research, and that the dirt-farming researcher should make every effort to secure all relevant and available documents. One of the handicaps of the Cold War revisionists is that while they can examine the once-secret American manuscripts, the top-secret material in the Soviet Union is closed to them and to all other scholars.

I believe that the primary duty of the historian is to tell what demonstrably happened, not what he guesses may have happened or should have happened. This in turn means that we should make no final judgments without having available all the relevant facts of significance.

I believe that if the historian knows that an historical myth or hoax is being perpetrated or perpetuated, he is duty bound to cry out against it. If he does not, he is in some degree an accessory after the fact. I believe that deliberate falsification by an historian is both a betrayal of a sacred trust and a heinous sin.

I believe that every human being has built-in biases, but that he or she should try to rise above them. I do not believe, as Beard apparently did, that because we cannot be entirely objective, we should throw adjectivity out of the window.

I believe that in any complex international situation, including the Cold War, human motives seldom come singly, whether they be economic, political or otherwise.



I believe that in every tangled international dispute the right is seldom, if ever, completely on one side, particularly in Soviet-American relations.

I believe that history does repeat itself, with variations, and that consequently there are lessons to be learned from the past, with proper regard for changed conditions. By now most of us have surely concluded that the United States cannot be the World's Policemen.

I believe that all historians worthy of their name are revisionists at heart and should experience the joy, as Dexter Perkins has pithily put it, of "revising their conclusions." I am disturbed by the implication that only Cold War revisionists are involved in revisionism. Actually there are few if any major epochs in American history that have not spawned revisionists or revisionist schools.

I believe that the obvious explanation is often the correct one, and I deplore the tendency of historians, for whatever reason, to engage in a "flight from the obvious." As regards the War of 1812, we have gone from the free sea to the frontier and back again. As regards blaming Polk, we have gone from the White house to Mexico City and back again. As regards 1917, we have gone from Wilson and the submarine to the "merchants of death" and back again.

Traditionally, every generation rewrites its history, but let us do so in the knowledge that the fads of today tend to become the fancies of tomorrow.

#### THE ARCHIVES AND MANUSCRIPTS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

David F. Trask\*  
and  
Thomas H. Etzold\*

The United States Naval War College, located on the grounds of the Naval Education and Training Center in Newport, Rhode Island, houses an archive and manuscripts collection of a sort more and more important to diplomatic historians. At present the collection is small, but it is well-organized and growing. As it expands it will become indispensable for work on topics mentioned below in connection with detailed discussion of the collection.

There are two reasons why materials pertaining to military affairs are important to diplomatic historians. One is obvious: for years a considerable proportion of the military--and especially the naval--history

**Doctors Trask (SUNY at Stony Brook) and Etzold (Miami U, Oxford, O.) were visiting professors in the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College during the past academic year.**



written in this country has come from scholars trained as students of foreign relations. Military history as an academic specialty is rather new, and many universities, perhaps most, as yet do not have a military historian. Another reason why collections such as the one at the War College will be of increasing interest to diplomatic historians relates both to trends and standards of scholarship in the discipline. In recent years as diplomatic historians have extended their studies into new subject matter, one of the first areas brought into prominence has been the area of military affairs as they appertain to the formation of policy and attainment of national objectives. Further, standards of scholarly inquiry have steadily risen; the books which increase scholarly reputations and those from which flow substantial progress in professional discussions manifest an increasing breadth of material and occasionally some real ingenuity in developing evidence from unconventional sources.

There are three divisions of the collection at the Naval War College's Mahan Library: archives, manuscripts, and oral history. For the first two categories of records finding aids are available--preliminary inventories which researchers can obtain by mail on request, and extensive card files at the War College Historical Manuscripts Division which catalog documents in major collections according to subject as well as, when appropriate, sender and receiver. In describing the collection in more detail, the authors will indicate with this symbol--(PI)--those individual collections or record groups for which preliminary inventories are available.

The first main division of the collection, the Naval War College Archives, contains material related to the history and work of the college and some of the people associated with it--past presidents, faculty, students, curricula and the like (PI). These records extend all the way back to 1885, just one year after the Secretary of the Navy ordered the founding of the college, and they are open through 1968 with only those restrictions necessary to protect classified or personal information. In separate record groups the archivists have assembled material on the lives, careers, and accomplishments of War College presidents and staff members for periods other than those of their service at Newport. There is, finally, a subject case file on matters relating to the founding and development of the college.

With all the records kept and arranged for scholarly use, the Naval War College becomes a prime candidate for careful study as an illustration of higher military education in the United States. Surprisingly, although much has been written about aspects of the War College, no one has yet undertaken to prepare for publication a full-length or definitive history of the institution, which is, incidentally, by far the oldest of the senior service schools. The Manuscripts Division and the War College library maintain an up-to-date list of writings about the college, both published and unpublished. This listing, entitled "A Chronological Bibliography of the Naval War College," opens with Stephen B. Luce's article in the **Proceedings** of the United States Naval Institute calling for the establishment of such a school (1883), and concludes with entries for 1973. Several items deserve mention because they are either



widely accessible, important, or necessary to consult for any further study of the history of the War College. Peter Karsten has considered the War College in articles as well as in his book **The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism** (New York, 1972), especially pages 332 to 355. On the way to completing his well known book, **The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance** (Boston, 1974), Thomas B. Buell wrote two articles about Spruance and the War College which were published in the **Naval War College Review** in March and April, 1971. Ronald Spec- tor, now a historian for the Department of Defense, wrote his dissertation at Yale University in 1967 on " 'Professors of War,' the Naval War College and the Modern American Navy."

Several record groups in the War College archives contain material pertaining to topics much broader than the history of the War College. In addition, some of these record groups include items such as military attaché reports which are, as many historians have found to their dismay, often unnecessarily classified as far back as the First World War. Record Group 7, Intelligence and Technological Archives, includes materials relating to naval warfare, attaché reports, war gaming data, and many other types of information collected or produced for use at the college from 1894 to 1945. It is one of the largest collections at the college--84 cartons. Record Group 8, 23 cartons of records, contains naval attaché reports for two critical periods, 1916-1918 and 1944-1945, dealing with local military situations. These records originated in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Record Group 6, another relatively large collection (37 cartons), includes copies of documents from many government archives relating to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, assembled from 1946 to 1956 by the World War II Battle Evaluation Group.

Finally, the archives holds several record groups which could permit exploration of various untouched but potentially important topics. For some years the War College has sponsored annual symposia on sea power and global strategy, and the archive has retained a large amount of related records, some of which are still classified. Similarly, each year since 1962 the Directors of the War Colleges of the Americas have convened, often in Newport. At these meetings the Latin American counterparts of the War College's top officials have conferred on topics of military education and hemispheric problems. Wherever the meeting, the War College archives has preserved the records. These conference records are the tip of an iceberg, for the War College each year since 1956-1957 has included in its student body naval officers from many foreign countries and thus has figured prominently in the education of naval officers around the globe. Officers from 53 different countries have attended the Naval War College at one time or another over the seventeen-year period. This development has imparted to the old idea of naval diplomacy a new and exceedingly important dimension. Each of the foregoing topics deserves attention--sea power symposia, global strategy forums, relations among the War Colleges of the hemisphere, and the role of the War College in educating foreign naval officers; each can be studied through records maintained in the War College archives.



Another major division of the Naval War College Historical Manuscripts Division is the Naval Historical Collection (PI), which has two components: manuscript collections and individual documents or artifacts. The former division is much the more important to historians; the latter is used primarily to enhance the aura of historicity pervading Pringle, Luce, and Mahan Halls, the granite-faced buildings which housed the War College from 1894 until the spring of 1974. As the college has grown, a new quadrangle has been constructed in which Spruance, Conolly, and Hewitt Halls house most War College offices and activities. The Historical Manuscripts Division soon will move from its present cramped quarters into Mahan Hall, a location both authentic and appropriate for the division's work.

Historical Manuscripts has two premier collections of papers, those of Admiral William Veazie Pratt (PI) and those of Admiral Richard G. Colbert. Admiral Pratt served on active duty from 1891 to 1933, and was Chief of Naval Operations during his last three years of duty. His papers span that interval, with additional correspondence, memoranda, writings, and correspondence of his wife up to 1963. Pratt's papers contain especially interesting information on the Washington Naval Conference, the Senate investigation of the Navy in 1920, and disarmament and the China question from 1920 to 1931. Gerald E. Wheeler points them out for further research in his excellent **Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U. S. Navy: A Sailor's Life**, published in 1974 by the Naval History Division. The recently-accessioned papers of Admiral Colbert amount to seven large cartons and span his career beginning in 1937 to his death in 1973. Colbert served on the staff of the War College from 1956 to 1958, and as its president from 1968 to 1971. He held other positions of considerable importance during his career. Since papers in his collection extend to recent times, some classified and personal materials are restricted. These papers have been fully indexed in the master card catalog at the Historical Manuscripts Division.

The Manuscripts Division holds two collections pertaining to Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance, another past president of the War College (1946-1948), perhaps best-remembered as the "carrier admiral" under Chester Nimitz's command at Midway in mid-1942, the turning point of the Pacific war. One group is manuscript collection 12 (PI), 7 boxes and 5 volumes of various materials extending from 1905 through 1966, which has primary importance for Spruance's naval career. It includes a large amount of material on the battle of Midway. More important for the study of Spruance, according to War College archivists, is the Thomas B. Buell Collection. This latter collection, 5 large cartons in bulk, contains considerable information not used in Buell's book on Spruance mentioned above. The collection is open to scholarly researchers, but with restrictions, again because of personal material therein.

Two of the War College's manuscript collections will soon receive public notice because of the appearance of the first two monographs in a series bearing the War College imprint supported by the War College Foundation. (The War College Foundation is a private, non-profit organization which actually owns most of the manuscripts housed at War



College.) Material in Manuscript Collection 23, Publications of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce (1827-1917), the first president of the War College, will soon be published as **The Writings of Stephen B. Luce**, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, Monograph Number One of the Naval War College Historical Monograph Series. Rear Admiral Hayes has also made available his collection of Luce correspondence. Also, Manuscript Collection 10 includes a half box of Luce papers--correspondence, published articles, and book reviews. Craig Symonds has been editing for publication as Monograph Number Two some material drawn from the 20 volumes of the papers of John B. Marchand (PI), a naval officer on active duty from 1834 to 1874. These papers are especially noteworthy for the detailed journals concerning the blockades off Charleston, Mobile, and Galveston during the Civil War. Also to be utilized in a publication project under the auspices of the United States Naval Institute at Annapolis is the modest collection of Alfred Thayer Mahan's papers (PI) held at the Naval War College--14 volumes and 15 folders--of which the most interesting single item is a journal of a cruise aboard the **USS Turquois** in the Asiatic Squadron in 1868-1869.

For various reasons, four other items among the 40 or so manuscript collections in the War College Historical Manuscripts Division deserve individual mention. In Manuscript Collection 14 there are 13 boxes of the papers of Manley O. Hudson (PI), a well-known international lawyer during the second quarter of this century. Most of his papers are at the Widener Library of Harvard University, where Hudson was professor of law, but the War College's collection contains items of interest on the development of American oil policy 1943-46, the Anglo-Egyptian disputes of the latter 1940's, and on international law studies at the Naval War College. Manuscript Collection 22 is composed of one box of papers left by Edward Durgin, who served as assistant naval attaché in Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia from 1937 to 1940, and then in destroyers during World War II. It is another fragmentary group of military attaché records, interesting despite its small size. The papers of Wilma S. Miles make up Manuscript Collection 26 (PI); it includes the correspondence and reports of her husband, Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, from 1922 to 1939. Mrs. Miles accompanied her husband on many trips through the Far East during the turbulent twenties and thirties, and her papers provide colorful glimpses into scenes, localities, and conditions of that period. They include also an unpublished biography of Vice Admiral Miles through 1939. Finally, there are the papers of Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates (PI), who graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1915 and served on active duty until 1957. This collection, number 28, includes correspondence from 1937-1973; it is important for Bates' work as commander of torpedo boats in the Pacific War and for his long post-war work with the World War II Battle Evaluation project (1946-57). The second component of the Naval Historical Collection includes individual documents of varying types, (PI), from Chester Nimitz's one-page commission as an Ensign in the United States Navy, signed March 11, 1907 by Theodore Roosevelt, to the 413-page transcript of an oral history reminiscence by Vice Admiral Charles L. Melson, prepared at the United States Naval Institute.



The last section of the Naval War College's historical preservation program, oral history, is just beginning to develop, and now covers three main topics. One is the history of the Naval War College. Another important topic is the history of war gaming at the Naval War College, where the Navy's most sophisticated facilities for this purpose are still housed. The third oral history project deals with Milton E. Miles and the Rice Paddy War.

With its three components--archives, manuscripts and documents, and oral history--the Historical Manuscripts Division of the United States Naval War College will reward its users over the coming years. Few smaller archival collections have more materials of interest to historians of American foreign relations as well as of naval and military history. Newport, long important as a seat of colonial culture, a seaport, and a naval base, now promises to become important as the location of a fascinating manuscripts collection. And no one is happier about that prospect than the archivists of the Naval War College. Anthony Nicolosi, and his assistant Evelyn Cherpak, will respond promptly to inquiries addressed to them at the War College, Newport, RI, 02840, and will provide on-the-spot help to visiting scholars.

#### NEW STUDY AREAS FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE CASE OF RUSSIAN GOLD

by

James K. Libbey\*

William E. Leuchtenburg has written that recognition of Russia in 1933 "was an event of monumental unimportance."<sup>1</sup> Obliquely, his conclusion explains why only a handful of scholars have published book-length monographs concerned with Soviet-American relations in the period 1917-1941. Revolution, civil war, economic upheaval, and purges accentuated the relative weakness of pre-war Russia in contrast with her superpower status following the end of World War II. The dramatic and controversial Cold War has drawn innumerable scholars to this exciting era. Now that Cold War battles have been refought by an army of contentious historians, it seems likely that the pre-1941 period will be inundated by eager scholars looking for Cold War origins.<sup>2</sup>

Before this invasion occurs, it might be instructive to note that the **effect of American ideology and policy in regard to Soviet Russia may have been equally, if not more, important to third party countries.** The classic example, Japan invading Manchuria without fear of restraint

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from US-USSR collaboration, has been explored. In the 1920's non-recognition and fear of Communism also contributed to America's impotence in China, reduced US flexibility in Latin America and muddled US associations with West European oil interests in the competition for Russian petroleum. Furthermore, Germany's financial structure depended heavily on US and USSR trade and banking connections. Finally, the USSR used England as a base to penetrate American markets and the unbalanced pattern of Anglo-Soviet trade to buy US goods. A myopic study of American ideology and policy *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia as an end in itself tends to neglect the very real influence dismal US-USSR relations had on these other nations. The careful researcher will discover new dimensions to this problem of Soviet-American antipathy. An event in 1928, the case of Russian gold, illustrates the point.

In February 1928, the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) had its German correspondent ship \$5,000,000 worth of Soviet minted gold bars from Hamburg to New York.<sup>3</sup> It proved a test case for the US decision in 1920 not to accept Russian gold. The policy's premise lay with the concept that Communist gold had been confiscated from tsarist Russia and was thus subject to controversy and litigation over its proper title. The policy tended to ignore the fact that America had unofficially accepted Soviet gold through third party countries and had officially received Soviet gold during the Russian famine (1921-22). In addition, Soviet Russia was a major gold producer and acquired even more precious metal in the normal course of trade.<sup>4</sup> Before the shipment arrived on February 21, press reports led the Treasury Department to seek clarification of the 1920 decision. The State Department confirmed the long-standing policy.<sup>5</sup>

Commentators on Soviet-American relations have used this interesting incident to underscore the influence of American ideology. The US government repeatedly disavowed placing impediments in the path of Russo-American trade, yet refused the gold. Since the USSR had a perennial American trade deficit, Russian inability to pay for US goods dampened exciting trade forecasts.<sup>6</sup> The contrast between US actions and words revealed a serious contradiction in American policy towards Soviet Russia.

Perhaps the Cold War prompted historians to ignore the fact that the more important aspect of this affair may not have involved Soviet-American, but Franco-Soviet and Franco-American relations. During World War I, France bought millions of francs worth of gold from tsarist Russia. The gold remained in the Imperial Russian Bank as a reserve for the Bank of France. War conditions and the Bolshevik seizure of power kept France from receiving the metal. Despite an exchange of representatives (1924) Franco-Soviet affairs remained clouded by the gold dispute. Preceding the US statement, issued publicly March 6, on the 1928 shipment, the French ambassador informed State Department officials that Bank of France would sue whatever party claimed ownership with the Assay Office.<sup>7</sup> Historians have avoided answering several key questions regarding this communication and the subsequent effort by France to take possession of the Soviet gold.



First, why did France initiate litigation in the US? According to Gosbank President, A. L. Scheinman, Soviet Russia's turnover in gold exceeded \$100,000,000 from 1925 to 1928; yet France did not lift a single legal finger in other countries accepting gold from Soviet Russia.<sup>8</sup> Second, did France knowingly assist America in maintaining an embarrassingly contradictory policy? The Assay Office pretended it would accept gold from Gosbank's American agents, Chase National and Equitable Trust. In view of assured litigation, though, these American banks declined the offer of changing their status from agents to owners of the gold. The tactic permitted the Treasury Department to blame the banks rather than the government for the failure of the gold exchange.<sup>9</sup> Third, what role did the Soviet-American gold controversy play in the concurrent Franco-Soviet talks concerning the same subject? Did France hope to improve her bargaining position by fanning the flames of controversy in America?

The case of Russian gold is not an isolated one. Several of America's (and USSR's) international maneuvers, involving other nations, hinged on the US view of Soviet Russia. As historians delve deeper into Cold War origins, it is hoped they will not discard as extraneous important information about the effect Soviet-American relations had on third party countries.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>William E. Leuchtenburg, **Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal** (New York, 1963), 207.

<sup>2</sup>Simon Jay Ellison, "On the Question of the Origins of the Cold War: A Reminder," **SHAFR Newsletter**, vol. VI (1975), no. 1, 17-18.

<sup>3</sup>Copy of legal brief and copy of "A Statement by Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, Counsel for the State Bank of the U.S.S.R.," April 6, 1928, Alexander Gumberg papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Box 6A.

<sup>4</sup>Joan Hoff Wilson, **Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918-1933** (Columbia, 1974), 41-44; Benjamin M. Weissman, **Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921-1923** (Stanford, 1974), 101-102.

<sup>5</sup>Undersec. of Treasury Ogden Mills to Sec. of State, Feb. 14, 1928; Assistant Sec. of State William R. Castle to Mills, Feb. 17, 1928; see also, Undersec. of State Robert E. Olds to Mills, Feb. 24, 1928; **FRUS**, 1928, III, 827-829.

<sup>6</sup>Copy of 1928 resolution of American-Russian Chamber of Commerce in Gumberg papers, Box 6A.

<sup>7</sup>French Ambassador Claudel to Sec. of State, March 5, 1928, **FRUS**, 1928, III, 829-830.

<sup>8</sup>Amtorg Trading Corporation, **Russian Gold** (New York, 1928), 37.

<sup>9</sup>Treasury Department press release, March 6, 1928, **FRUS**, 1928, III, 831.



## MINUTES

Council Meeting, April 16, 1975  
Boston, Massachusetts  
Statler Hilton Hotel

The meeting began at 7:40 P.M. Members of Council present were Dorothy Borg, John Gaddis, Joseph O'Grady, David Trask, and President Armin Rappaport. Also in attendance were representatives of various committees and the joint secretary-treasurer, Lawrence Kaplan and Warren Kuehl. The latter reported briefly that the Society's financial picture is strong, that various programs are developing well, and that the Society has been approved by the American Historical Association as an affiliated organization.

Thomas Paterson spoke for the Program Committee, noting that plans for the First National Conference are complete and that programs have already been printed. The OAH has accepted one SHAFR-generated program for its 1976 meeting. A new Program Committee is being organized under the Chairmanship of Frank Merli of Queen's College. While he doesn't assume that role officially until September 1st, persons with suggestions for papers or programs should send them to him.

Joan Hoff Wilson reported that the Nominations Committee had held one meeting and asked that members be reminded to submit names for nomination to the various offices. These include nominees for vice-president, the Council, and the Nominations Committee. They should be sent to Lawrence Gelfand at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52240 before the end of August.

Leon Boothe provided welcome news that persons have been joining at an excellent rate with over 500 members now on the rolls.

There was no report regarding the project to update the Bemis and Griffin **Guide**.

Theodore Wilson disclosed that the Bernath Prize Committee had selected two persons to receive the award for 1972 and that the names would be announced following the luncheon on April 18. He observed that twenty-nine books had been submitted and wondered whether existing channels to inform publishers of the award were adequate. The Committee was requested to examine other ways of circulating notices and to offer a report. President Rappaport announced that he has named Warren Kimball to the Bernath Committee for a three-year term. Ernest May will serve as chairman for 1975 and John Gaddis will also continue on the committee.

Warren Kimball stated that the 1974 **Roster** had been distributed and that an addendum is planned for 1975.



Nolan Fowler indicated that the **Newsletter** had no special problems but reminded Council that long-range funding is not guaranteed and that the Council should begin to think about the future with respect to the editorship.

Under Old Business, it was noted that illness prevented the attendance of Jules Davids who reported indirectly that local arrangements for the August 15-16 National meeting were complete. The Social Hour at 6:00 p.m. on August 15 will be complimentary with SHAFR acting as the host.

A discussion ensued about future summer programs. Larry Kaplan reported on discussions with representatives from the Ohio Bi-Centennial Committee which he and SHAFR member John Gaddis have had for a program in Columbus, Ohio, in 1976. The Council approved the submission of an application for a \$10,000 grant and cooperation with the Ohio Bi-Centennial Commission if funds are approved. Joe O'Grady suggested the suitability of a Second Annual Conference in Philadelphia at LaSalle College in 1976, and President Rappaport asked him to explore the possibilities.

The subject of a journal was again considered. The chairman of the committee to study this matter, Robert Ferrell, reported that he has been conducting negotiations with three universities which have expressed an interest. These are Southwestern Louisiana State University (Thomas Schoonover), Youngstown State University (Joseph May), and Princeton (Richard Challenger and Martin Sherwin). Joe May appeared briefly to indicate the stage of discussions at Youngstown. The Committee will continue its efforts.

Council next discussed the idea of creating a committee to study the Freedom of Information Act and to determine whether SHAFR members have had difficulties. Since only a few letters have been received it was decided to continue to gather information and that the **Newsletter** carry a reminder. It was agreed that while the current atmosphere appears to be greatly improved, the situation merits further study. It was suggested that members of SHAFR inquire about materials they wish to consult to see what responses they received.

Armin Rappaport disclosed that William-Franklin will retire as Chief of the Historical Division of the Department of State and that a decision had been reached to fill the position with an established scholar. The Advisory Committee to the Foreign Relations Series has been asked to submit nominations. Since SHAFR members are well-represented, the Society hopefully should be influential in the selection process.

Under New Business, the question of overseas membership was discussed, especially in regard to inquiries about creating branches of SHAFR or some type of affiliated agencies. It was suggested that the President name a committee to study the problem and report to Council, and to formulate specific guidelines to accompany its recommendations.



Those appointed were Borg, as chairman, O'Grady, Trask, and Boothe (ex officio).

A suggestion from the Secretary-Treasurer's office that SHAFR contemplate a long-range investment program for accumulated funds from life-memberships and possible future gifts or bequests was referred to the officers with instructions to prepare specific recommendations.

The joint-secretaries raised the subject of rising costs of smokers and luncheons at conventions. They reported that they make efforts to schedule luncheons outside the headquarter hotels where possible, and at the Southern Historical Association they have already explored that possibility even though members will have to find transportation to a suitable restaurant. They also suggested that they be authorized to institute new procedures for the smokers. At the SHA drinks are set at \$1.75, which is self-defeating since it will drive members away. Furthermore, there are often additional expenses for the room and bartenders amounting to \$30 to \$50 each time. Council agreed that for the future where costs are exorbitant the Society should either rent a large suite and host a smoker at no charge, or it should underwrite part of the cost of drinks under any cash-bar arrangement.

The Council also was informed that Georgetown University has expressed interest in becoming the depository for the archives of the Society. It is building a collection of materials of associations with an interest in foreign relations and has acquired the records of the American Political Science Association. Council instructed the officers to negotiate with Georgetown for the final disposition of its files, to formulate any rules of access, and to determine what restrictions should apply. Joe O'Grady volunteered to review all material deposited which covered his tenure as Executive Secretary-Treasurer.

Council voted resolutions of thanks to Arnold Offner (Boston U) for his help in local arrangements and to the OAH in arranging facilities for SHAFR and instructed the Secretary-Treasurer to submit these to the respective persons.

On Friday, April 18, seventy-six persons attended SHAFR's luncheon where Professor Selig Adler of the State University of New York, Buffalo, spoke on "The United States and the Middle Eastern Dilemma, 1917-1939." Theodore Wilson, the chairman of the Bernath Committee, then presented the 1975 award.



Presentation: 1974 Stuart L. Bernath Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Prize, presented for the best first or second book "on any aspect of American foreign relations," has been awarded annually by SHAFR since 1972. The Prize commemorates Stuart L. Bernath, a promising young diplomatic historian whose life was tragically and prematurely ended at age thirty-one by bone cancer. The Prize was established and continues through the beneficence of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, and SHAFR and all historians of United States diplomacy owe a great debt to Stuart Bernath's parents for their generosity and interest in encouraging the further study of American foreign relations.

I know about Stuart Bernath only through his book, **Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and American Diplomacy**, and information about him obtained from colleagues in the field and Jerry and Myrna Bernath during my three year tenure on the Prize Committee. It is especially fitting that a prize, which is given for a work that demonstrates impressive multinational, multiarchival research, significant contributions to understanding of American foreign relations, and lucid writing, is bestowed in memory of Stuart L. Bernath.

On behalf of my colleagues on this year's Prize Committee, John Gaddis and Ernest May, I am pleased to announce that the Bernath Prize for 1974 is awarded for two works: **The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945** (Princeton University Press), by Frank D. McCann, Jr. and **Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II** (Harvard University Press) by Stephen E. Pelz. The Bernath Committee believes these two works, model monographs which deal with important topics in new ways and which use an enormous variety of sources drawn from the archives of several nations, precisely reflect the criteria and purposes embodied in the Bernath Prize.

I have checks and congratulations for each of the winners. Before they come forward, I would like to express appreciation to my co-workers on the Committee and to my secretary at the University of Kansas, Mrs. Arlene Chiovetti. It has been an interesting if arduous experience, one that has provided me with insight into the astonishing variety (perhaps confusion is a better word, but I won't use it) of emphases and interpretations in the field of scholarship in American foreign relations at present.

Theodore A. Wilson  
 Chairman  
 1974 Bernath Prize Committee



ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS  
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Thomas A. Bryson (West Georgia College), "Admiral Mark L. Bristol, An Open-Door Diplomat in Turkey," **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, 5 (1974), 450-467. This essay demonstrates that the U.S. employed the open door policy in the Middle East in the post-World War I era in the traditional framework of American diplomacy. It is a critique on the revisionist position which posits that the open door was the stepping-stone for the building of an American empire overseas.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Florida), "Harry Elmer Barnes: Prophet of a 'Usable' Past," **History Teacher**, 8 (February, 1975), 265-276. Barnes is shown as a forerunner of the "New Left" school of American historians. Common to both were groundings in Marx, pleas for "relevant" social thought, faith in human rationality, and skepticism towards formal democracy. Although Barnes placed greater stress on the role of the historical actors than does today's New Left, both groups warned of globalism, called for concentration upon domestic reform, and assailed historians who consistently defended United States' foreign policy. In the 1930s Barnes attacked America's "non-colonial empire," in the 1940s he claimed that World War II was rooted in Axis failure to secure markets and raw materials, and in 1946 he claimed that the Truman Doctrine would turn the United States into "the new Byzantine empire."

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Reinhard R. Doerries (Hamburg, West Germany), "Geheimdienste im 20. Jahrhundert", **Neue Politische Literatur**, (1974), 353-364. Scrutinizing a number of studies in various countries on the organization, function and activities of intelligence services, the essay is mainly concerned with the role of intelligence-gathering organizations in the course of the two World Wars. So-called secret services have always existed, and they continue to play an important part in the conduct of international diplomacy. Although evidence supports the view that at times the services tend to cancel each other, considerations of security would appear to require nations to maintain an efficient intelligence apparatus.

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Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts U), "The Map as an 'Idea': The Role of Cartographic Imagery During the Second World War," **The American Cartographer**, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1975), 19-53. A detailed study, with illustrations, of the revolution that



occurred during the early 1940s in the way Americans visually imagined the earth and represented it cartographically. The traditional "seaman's view" and "landsman's view," exemplified by the conventional Equator-based Mercator's projection, was replaced by a new "airman's view," typified by various North Pole-centered azimuthal projections. The increased use of these and other map forms, most notably by President Roosevelt, resulted from, and at the same time helped to promote among Americans, a new world outlook, termed "Air-Age Globalism," which profoundly shaped the conduct of the war and the planning of the peace. Continentalism and hemispherism were superseded by Atlanticism and North Polarism. The new real and imagined global setting, it is suggested, was an underlying cause of the Cold War.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia), "Progressivism, Imperialism, and the Leuchtenburg Thesis, 1952-1974: An Historiographical Appraisal", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 20 (December, 1974), 312-25. Originally delivered as a paper before the Australian and New Zealand American Studies Association at the University of Newcastle, New South Wales, on 29 August 1974, the aim of this article is to demonstrate the extent to which American historiographical studies of Progressive foreign policy published during the past generation have jointly shattered William E. Leuchtenburg's paradigm of the Progressive warrior who, "with few exceptions, ardently supported the imperialist surge or, at the very least, proved agreeably acquiescent." Historians of varying ages and political persuasions have effectively dismantled Leuchtenburg's popular image of "imperialism and progressivism flourishing together." Progressives, and progressive Republicans especially, have instead emerged as highly complex figures, who, to use Emerson's allusion, were reformers in spring and summer and conservatives in autumn and winter. In this and a number of other ways, the historiographical dialogue over the alleged imperialism of the Progressives has witnessed a changing concept of the relationship between domestic and American foreign policy goals. Professor Leuchtenburg clearly implied in his seminal essay in 1952 that in supporting aggressive foreign policies, otherwise liberal Progressive reformers had shown themselves for what they really were--unwitting imperialists. But by the late 1960's and early 1970's and in a manner that underscored Carl L. Becker's belief in historiography as "a phase of intellectual history", New Left historians had rehabilitated Leuchtenburg's fallen heroes and given isolationism--or more precisely nonintervention--a new hearing.



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 PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR
 

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Robert L. Beisner (American U), **From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900**. 1975. Crowell. Pb. \$3.50. In the Crowell American History Series.

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Thomas M. Campbell (Florida State U) and George C. Herring, Jr. (Chairman, Dep't. of History, U of Kentucky), eds., **The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.: 1943-1946**. 1974. New Viewpoints. Cl. \$12.50; pb. \$5.95.

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Edward P. Crapol (William and Mary), **America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Late Nineteenth Century**. 1973. Greenwood Press. \$12.50. Reviewed in **The Historian**, February, 1975.

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Reinhard R. Doerries (Hamburg U, West Germany), **Washington-Berlin, 1908-1917**. 1975. Schwann: Duesseldorf, WG. Pb. DM 38.00. A history of German-American relations over the crucial decade, detailing the activities of the German ambassador to the U. S., Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff.

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Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana U; former president of SHAFR), ed., **America in a Divided World, 1945-1972**. 1974. Harper & Row. Pb. \$4.95. This work is the third which Dr. Ferrell has done in the Harper series, "Documentary History of the United States." The first was **Foundations of American Diplomacy, 1775-1872** (1968), pb. \$2.95, while the second was **America as a World Power, 1872-1945** (1971), pb. \$3.95.

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E. Wilson Lyon (president emeritus, Pomona College), **Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804**. Rev. ed. 1974. U of Oklahoma Press. Cl. \$8.95; pb. \$3.95.

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E. Wilson Lyon (president emeritus, Pomona College), **The Man Who Sold Louisiana: The Career of Francois Barbe-Marbois**. Rev. 1974. U of Oklahoma Press. Cl. \$3.95; pb. \$2.95.



Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley (Curator of Naval History at the Smithsonian and Professor of History at Catholic U), and Manfred Jonas (Union College, N. Y.), eds., **Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence**. 1975. Dutton. \$17.50. Featured Selection of the History Book Club for May, 1975. Reviewed in **N. Y. Times Book Review** of May 4, 1975.

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Arnold A. Offner (Boston U), **The Origins of the Second World War; American Foreign Policy and World Politics, 1917-1941**. 1975. Praeger's. Cl. \$11.50; pb. \$4.95.

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Ernest N. Paolino (New York U), **The Foundations of the American Empire: William Henry Seward and U. S. Foreign Policy**. 1973. Cornell U Press. \$9.75. Reviewed in **Pacific Historical Review**, Feb., 1975, in **The Historian**, Feb., 1975, and in **History**, Feb., 1974.

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Armin Rappaport (U of California-La Jolla, and President of SHAFR), **American Diplomatic History**. 1975. Macmillan. Pb. \$6.95.

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Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (U of North Carolina), Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana U; former president of SHAFR), and David F. Trask (SUNY at Stony Brook), **The Ordeal of World Power: American Diplomacy Since 1900**. 1975. Little, Brown. Pb. \$5.95.

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## PERSONALS

On April 30 Dr. William M. Franklin retired as Director of the Historical Office of the Department of State, one month after Richardson Dougall retired as Deputy Director. Mrs. Margaret G. Martin also recently stepped down after forty years of government service. Dr. Fredrick Aandahl was appointed to succeed Dr. Dougall, and will also serve as Acting Director, pending appointment of a successor to Dr. Franklin. Dr. William Slany has succeeded Dr. Aandahl as editor of "The Foreign Relations of the United States."

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J. K. Sweeney has recently been promoted to the post of associate professor of history at South Dakota State U.

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Thomas H. Etzold (Miami U--Ohio) is in the first year of a two-year appointment as associate professor of strategy in the Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

\* \* \* \* \*

Warren F. Kimball, editor of SHAFR's **Roster & Research List**, has been elevated to the rank of full professor of history at Rutgers U (Newark).

\* \* \* \* \*

Gerald E. Wheeler, Chairman, Dep't of History, San Jose State, and formerly editor of the SHAFR **Newsletter**, is a new member of the Membership Committee of SHAFR, taking the place of Charles Campbell (Claremont Graduate School) who found it necessary to relinquish the position.

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Thomas Schoonover (U of SW Louisiana) has been awarded a German Academic Exchange Service Grant for the purpose of traveling, studying, and doing research in West Germany this summer.

\* \* \* \* \*

Richard F. Grimmett, formerly in the Dep't of History at Kent State U, is now serving as Analyst in National Defense with the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service in the Library of Congress.

\* \* \* \* \*

F. M. Carroll (U of Manitoba) will be upon a sabbatical in the next academic year. He will be doing research in Washington, D. C., Ottawa, and London, preparatory to writing a monograph upon the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.

\* \* \* \* \*

Frank Merli (Queen's College--Flushing, N. Y.) will assume the position of Chairman of the SHAFR Program Committee as of September 1.

\* \* \* \* \*

Selig Adler (SUNY at Buffalo) was recently honored by selection as one of two Distinguished Service Professors for the current academic year in the State University System of New York.



Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers U-Newark) will be a Fulbright lecturer at the U of Madrid for the 1975-76 academic year.

\* \* \* \* \*

Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern U, and former president of SHAFR) was chosen as vice president of the prestigious OAH in the recently-concluded general elections. ("Nobody had the temerity to run against me!" the good Doctor affirmed). Barring some calamitous happening, he'll be president of that body in another year.

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## ANNOUNCEMENTS

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Any member (or non-member, for that matter) who wishes a copy of the program setting forth the details of SHAFR's first national convention, scheduled at Georgetown U, August 15-16, may have it by writing to the National Office.

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Since October 1974, with the expansion of the contents of **Intellect**, Dr. Richard H. Heindel, professor of international relations, Pennsylvania State U (Capitol Campus), has been editor of the section on international affairs, doing a column, "State of the World." Among the topics handled have been the following: "UNESCO in Politics," "Is World Opinion Worth Worrying About?" and "Global Screech," the latter being on the subject of the multinational corporations of the U. S. Dr. Heindel will be on leave from June 1975 until March 1976, principally in Washington, D. C., in order to develop further his long-projected survey of the American impact abroad. He would be delighted to hear from SHAFR members who are interested in the varied aspects of this topic.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Thirty-Third Institute: Introduction to Modern Archives Administration, will be held at the National Archives Building, September 15-26, 1975. The next two institutes are tentatively scheduled for January 12-23, 1976, and May 17-28, 1976. While emphasizing public records and archives, the Institute deals with all phases of work with archives and manuscripts, and is offered by the National Archives and Records Service as a professional service. It is directed by Frank B. Evans, NARS Commissioner for General Services Administration Region 3 and Adjunct



Professor at the American University, with C. F. W. Coker, Chief of the Printed Archives Branch, editor of the **American Archivist**, and formerly State Archivist of North Carolina, acting as assistant director. The Institute is offered for three semester hours credit by the Department of History at American University, and is co-sponsored by the Library of Congress and the Maryland Hall of Records. Inquiries and requests for application forms should be addressed to:

Department of History  
 Thirty-Third Archives Institute  
 The American University  
 Washington, D. C. 20016, or  
 Telephone (202) 686-2401

\* \* \* \* \*

In the fall of 1973 the G. P. O. published that most valuable reference work, **United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973**, co-authored by Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Chapman of the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The publication is still available from the U. S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State Building, Washington, D. C. 20520, for \$2.70.

The cutoff date for this work is March 31, 1973. The Historical Office has recently completed a supplement which carries the subject matter through December 31, 1974. This supplement also contains addenda and corrigenda to the original publication. Copies of the supplement, titled **United States Chiefs of Mission, 1973-1974**, are available on request, while a very limited supply lasts, from the Historical Office.

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A few openings remain for scholars who wish to attend the "open house" arranged by the Historical Office of the Department of State on the afternoon of Thursday, August 14, the day prior to the SHAFR meeting in Washington. The session will include tours of the Department's Operations Center and of the Central Files, and a discussion with members of the Office's Foreign Relations and Historical Studies Divisions concerning their work. Because of the number of participants is limited to thirty, scholars interested in attending the session should request a reservation as soon as possible by writing to the Director, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.



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## THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1976

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1976 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomatic relations.

### CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

**ELIGIBILITY:** The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1975. It must be the author's first or second book.

**PROCEDURES:** Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Ernest R. May, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize Committee, Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02178. The works must be received not later than December 31, 1975.

**AMOUNT OF AWARD:** \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1976, at St. Louis, Missouri.

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1974	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts - Amherst)



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 SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST
 

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Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. This **List** is stored upon computer tapes so that information may be quickly retrieved. In order for the system to work, though, two things are necessary from the members: (a) simple, concise, obvious titles should be used in describing projects; (b) a key word should be specified for each project. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since it will be much easier to keep the files up to date and avoid a rush in the fall. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to addresses should be sent to the Executive Secretary, and he will pass them on to the editors of the **List** and the **Newsletter**. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated.

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 Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Title: \_\_\_\_\_

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(if different from address) \_\_\_\_\_

General area of research interest: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Key word \_\_\_\_\_

Current research project(s): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Key word(s) \_\_\_\_\_

If this is pre-doctoral work, check here \_\_\_\_\_

Mail to: Dr. W. F. Kimball, editor  
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## THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

**SPONSOR:** Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

**EDITOR:** Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

**ISSUES:** The **Newsletter** is published on the 15th of March, June, and September, and on the 1st of December. All members receive the publication.

**DEADLINES:** All material must be in the office of the editor not later than six (6) weeks prior to the publication date.

**ADDRESS CHANGES:** Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

**BACK ISSUES:** Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 35¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 50¢ per number.

**MATERIALS DESIRED:** Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.



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