



The Society for Historians of American  
Foreign Relations

# *NEWSLETTER*

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## SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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**MEMBERSHIP:** Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$7.00, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for retired members and for students are \$4.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$12.00. Life memberships are \$125.00.

**MEETINGS:** The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

**PRIZES:** The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Beverly Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings in this issue of the **Newsletter**.

**ROSTER:** A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

**PUBLICATIONS:** The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.



A Worcester County Student in Wartime  
London and Paris (via Harvard): 1915-1916  
Samuel Flagg Bemis

(This is the second, and concluding, instalment of a portion of the memoirs of the late Dr. Bemis. The first part was carried in the September issue of the **Newsletter**).

By the time I returned to Harvard in 1915 from my summer tutorial employment, my parents and younger brothers had moved down to Medford. I now enjoyed the Ozias Goodwin Memorial Fellowship and could devote all my time to my studies and preparation for my "generals." I could walk the three miles at least one way: across the Medway, over Winter Hill to East Cambridge, and to Harvard Square. After a hard day I could ride back on the subway and elevated to Sullivan Square and home, all still for a nickel, but it took, with changes, almost as much time as walking. More questionable exercise was walking for hours at night in the Fellsway, rehearsing and memorizing for my oral examination, an ordeal so dreaded by students that some of them collapse out of sheer anxiety.

At last came the day when I was to prove myself, whether I would be dropped out of the University or permitted to go on and present a thesis for the doctorate. I was not too scared or nervous until I saw Assistant Professor R. M. Johnston and Dr. Robert H. Lord around the examiners' table; the others, as I remember, were Edward Channing, Roger B. Merriman, and Charles H. McIlwain. Somehow I got through with McIlwain and Merriman. Then came Johnston's turn.

He asked a few questions about the significance of the French Revolution; then he wondered whether I might review the historiography of that great upheaval. I had read Mignet and Taine, a lot of Aulard, and some of Jaurès. Mr. Johnston himself had published a short volume for the aid of students summing up the subject, so I was able to run over the whole gamut of historians, not neglecting to mention Albert Sorel. The committee was impressed and Professor Johnston's eyes brightened. I should have stopped there, for he didn't seem to have any more to ask. "Then, of course," I added by way of a crowning touch, "there is your own little volume if I may mention it in the same list with these masters." Too late I realized what I had said, but my chagrin was lost in general laughter that went around the table; even R. M. Johnston joined in. "You may," he said, and I came back from the edge of the abyss and smiled sheepishly myself.



Then Channing turned to the youngest examiner, who had been called in as a man who had never had anything to do with my instruction and could size me up impersonally! "Any questions, Dr. Lord?" Dr. Lord had not gone to sleep during the session, as I had once done in my visit to his seminar, not for one second! He asked me a few questions, not all vindictive, but I was by then so terrified by remembrance of my own snooze that I didn't field them very well, whatever they were. I knew by then I must be sunk.

It was Channing who ended the exam and came to my rescue. He asked me some questions as easy for me as pop flies for a third basemen, though perhaps a little recondite to the committee.

I passed—over Dr. Lord's dissenting vote. His negative voice was not undeserved, if only on the basis of my answers to his questions.

"What did you have against me?" Channing asked me a little gruffly, next time I saw him. "We were only trying hard to pull you through."

I had nothing but the greatest gratitude! I guess that I must have looked a little truculent after Lord had got through with me.

Anyway, I had passed, and I was granted a Parker Fellowship of \$750 to enable me to finish up my thesis on Jay's Treaty with a visit to English archives during the following year. What funds I had left over from the Ozias Goodwin Scholarship and what I picked up from my summer tutorial work in Ontario enabled me to set forth for England in good physical trim and sufficed to carry me through the third, non-resident, year of Harvard, and get me home again somewhat the worse for wear albeit not from archival research and preparation, for my final exam, the "special" on one's own field, in my case American history.

At first glance Jay's Treaty, that Channing had assigned me, must seem to be a rather unattractive and uninspiring subject. Actually it lay at the very heart of the new nationality of the United States under the Constitution of 1787, when American foreign policy was taking shape and party politics were crystallizing under the rival leadership of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson during the administrations of President George Washington. It was, in fact, the first treaty, aside from a consular convention with France, to be ratified by the Senate of the United States. The negotiation involved the whirlpool of international politics during the wars of the French Revolution and the attitude of the United States toward them: isolation and neutrality under sufferance of the British navy for the benefit of American commerce and tariff revenues so indispensable to the support and credit of the new national govern-



ment of the United States under the Hamiltonian system. Jay's Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain therefore exposed the very foundations of American foreign policy soon to be spelled out in Washington's Farewell Address of 1796.

Though I did not realize it then, the preparation of this doctoral dissertation launched me on a career at home and abroad of historical writing and teaching nothing less than the history of the foreign policy of the United States, from the beginning, where I started my research, to —I will not say to the end—to the present year 1970 of this terrible yet magnificent twentieth century. Before the First World War it was quite possible for a young man to encompass everything that had been written on the diplomatic history of the United States up to and including his own times. Channing had hitched me up to something big while I was still in my early twenties.

At the time of Jay's Treaty, and indeed until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, foreign policy ruled American politics. For a century afterward American domestic politics ruled foreign policy, so far as the Old World was concerned, during a hundred years of peace on the great oceans. As I set forth for Europe, in October 1915, on the neutral Dutch liner **Nieuw Amsterdam**, Europe was again convulsed on the Continent and engulfed in war at sea. Foreign policy again was agitating and would soon dominate American politics during the Great War of 1914-1918. Another passenger on the **Nieuw Amsterdam** was the Austrian Ambassador Constantine Dumba, whom President Wilson had just expelled from the United States for saying that the President's **Lusitania** notes to Germany were only intended for domestic consumption.

Where I spent the first night in darkened London I cannot remember, but next day an advertisement in the **Times** took me to a boarding house in Finsbury Park at 30 Adolphus Road, the home of a Mr. and Mrs. Kay and their two amiable daughters, Jennie and Lettie, one of whom, Jennie, the elder, succeeded in advancing my German to an imperfect speaking ability. The elder Kays were naturalized British subjects born in Germany, as Mrs. Kay was careful to explain before I engaged room and board. The family, with the possible exception of Mrs. Kay, were violently anti-German. They had changed their names legally from Kaiser to Kay, just as our good neighbors back in Worcester were to change Hamburg St. to Genesee St. after the United States entered the war, and American schools dropped the German language from their curricula. Probably, this was one reason why I obtained such reasonable rates at the Kay's, the sterling equivalent of about five dollars a week. I lived pleasantly with this family all the time I was in London. It was within twenty minutes by tube from the Public Record Office and the British Museum.



Next morning I betook myself to the Record Office, equipped with the required introduction from the American Ambassador. At the head of Chancery Lane was a huge hole, the size of my bedroom in the street, about six or eight feet deep, made by a Zeppelin bomb dropped the night before I arrived in London. A recruiting officer was signing men up from a scaffolding that had been erected over the hole. The Zeppelins did not do much real damage during the First World War—aerial bombardment was in its infancy and the huge ships were easy targets for anti-aircraft guns. There was not another raid all that winter, but there was many an alarm and blackout, the night sky constantly criss-crossed by searchlights, and much toing and froing in the obscured streets by clanging fire apparatus and mobile artillery, bedlam on foggy nights.

I now had my fill of London fogs—then at the thickest in their history, I am willing to believe. The Kays had cautioned me how to feel my way step by step from the Finsbury tube station across Seven Sisters Road, then up that artery across six streets that turned into it ("be sure to count them right"), with final right and left turns to Adolphus Road, then to make my way along the iron fence palings to No. 30. On good days I practised this ambulation every morning and evening on the way back and forth to the tube station, counting the crossings religiously like beads. The practice finally paid off: there came some fogs where I had to feel, count, and listen like a blind man; one couldn't even see all the way across a street.

Once one is registered at the Public Record Office or British Museum, one remains qualified to consult these archives all one's life; I was surprised in 1927 that I did not need to be introduced again; there even were some old hands there who remembered me. The talented Hillary Jenkinson, later to become Deputy Keeper, was then in charge of the Round Room. I can remember him toasting himself on cold mornings by the coal grate fire. The documents were quickly available, and I set to work immediately, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.; after that I would walk up Holborn to pass a couple of hours consulting books at the British Museum.

Aside from friendly but casual acquaintances I did not make many real friends in England. Occasionally I went to the evening theater or cinema—those were the days of the never-ending "Perils of Pauline" and Charlie Chaplin. Weekends I saw the sights of London—art galleries, historical monuments, and parks still open to visitors. From the gallery of the House of Commons I heard Winston Churchill make his speech of resignation upon the disastrous failure of the Gallipoli campaign. "As for myself," he concluded, "I have an unexceptionable course ahead." He straightway joined the army and went to the front in France.



The solemn music and grave ceremony of a wartime service at Westminster Abbey still haunts my mind.

At Christmas time I took a week's walking trip to Oxford and wandered about the University as a solitary tourist. I also spent a weekend at Cambridge calling upon Professor J. Holland Rose, then the leading diplomatic historian of Great Britain. Elsewhere I made the acquaintance of L. F. L. Oppenheim, Professor of International Law, and had arguments with Mr. G. W. T. Omond on neutral rights in maritime law.

One firm and comradely friend I did make: another Harvard traveling Fellow, Frederick C. Dietz, who was working at the Record Office on Tudor finance. He had spent the earlier months of the academic year studying in Germany, and could see two sides of the war. Every noon we walked down Chancery Lane to Groom's Coffee House on Fleet Street, to ingest a roll and sausage, with steaming hot coffee, amid the vapors and loud chatter of that busy eatery for law clerks and newspapermen. War was uppermost in the atmosphere, but civilian life was still normal. Shops and theaters were all open and crowded, prices had not gone up much, the Anglo-American exchange was steady. London in khaki was still the old London, proud and comfortable. The morale of the English people was as firm as the gallantry of their soldiers across the channel and their sailors on the high seas.

Fred and I became fast friends. We talked about the war; that of course concerned everybody. We compared notes about academic life in the Old World and at home. We agreed that Harvard was unsurpassed by any university elsewhere. Fred is today one of my oldest living friends. We both got our Harvard degrees in the same June 1916.

In a few months I finished my work in London and mailed to Professor Channing a typescript of my dissertation. It could still be touched up by some investigation in the archives of the French Foreign Office, at the Quai d'Orsay. That part of my requirement for the degree was over, as I booked passage for France and checked my steamer trunk through to Paris. With me I carried a suitcase and a leather Boston bookbag stuffed with the notes I had taken in England.

Those were the days of diplomatic debate between President Wilson and the German Imperial Government over submarine warfare, which had subsided a little, at least in respect to "unarmed passenger vessels."

"Any trouble lately with submarines?" I asked at the London ticket office.



"Not on this line," replied the impassive agent at the window.

The cross-Channel ship **Sussex**, on which I embarked early on the afternoon of March 24, 1916, was a small, unarmed passenger vessel flying the flag of France, on the route Dover to Calais. I had a second-class ticket. For such a short passage I could wait for dinner until we got in to Calais, although the **Sussex** had a dining room up forward, where some passengers were already taking tea. I had not become wholly addicted to the English custom of afternoon tea, so I went back to the stern deck.

The sea was very calm. The flag had been taken down from the rear mast. As I looked out over the water from the port side, I noticed that we were wallowing through drifting bales and flotsam that looked like remnants of wreckage. Suddenly a passenger exclaimed, excitedly, "What's that?"

I was looking in the right direction. "That" was the straight and swirling wake of something just beneath the surface, rapidly shooting toward the ship. I realized what it meant, but before I could shout "torpedo!" it had crashed into the port bow. The submarine never surfaced. According to the log of the submarine commander, preserved in the German archives, it was exactly 2:55 p.m. European time.

A tremendous explosion threw to the deck some of those who happened to be standing. The ship began slowly to sink forward. Crew and passengers scrambled toward the lifeboats. The boats had not been swung out on their davits to be let down quickly in case of emergency. There had been no lifeboat drill. The ropes were all gummed up and difficult to loosen. I and others tore at them in vain with our cold fingers. Finally the crew were able to lower some boats, loaded principally with women. I don't remember having seen any children about. In one case the ropes stuck at a davit, letting one end of the boat go down while holding up the other. The occupants simply slid into the sea, some with lifebelts that could hold them up for possible rescue.

By this time I began to look about for a lifebelt for myself. All those stored in and about the deck had been taken during the rush, but inside the second-class saloon I found a rotten fragment of one and managed to tie on that much with a chance piece of rope. The boats were all away by now. I resolved to get into a position from which I could swim for something as the ship went down bow first. I took off my shoes, climbed over the rail, and found a temporary perch above the propeller on a cleat that ran around the stern just above the water line. A few minutes before I had seen a man in the sea clinging to the end of



the log-line like a fish on a hook; he was no longer there; the rope payed out slack behind the slowly sinking ship. In a moment a lifeboat crowded with people warped around the stern and I stepped off into it. I stepped from the lifeboat to an emergency liferaft, good for one person, that was floating along in touch. Astride this thing, about the size of a child's coffin, I gradually floated out to sea. After a while the ship stopped sinking. The lifeboats remained clustered around her, their occupants waiting to see what would happen. By a miracle the explosion that blew away the bow and perhaps the forward third of the vessel had blasted the remainder inwards, so that it kept afloat in the calm weather. But there was I, drifting farther and farther away from a chance of rescue. I caught hold of some wreckage including a steamer chair, from which with my jack-knife I cut the canvas into strips and tied things together to make a raft of sorts, big enough to hold me mostly out of the chilling water.

Riding along in this jolly way, I noticed a singular, almost ridiculous, little coincidence of traffic in the English Channel. Floating close along, bobbing up and down in the easy sea, never quite within reach, was one of my shoes that I had abandoned on the deck of the ship, sailing quite upright, nicely enough to please Old Mother Hubbard herself. I never did recover it, nor its mate wherever that was.

As I looked back at the slowly receding **Sussex** and its cluster of lifeboats I saw on the horizon another ship: a three-masted, full-rigged sailing vessel, sails spread wide to catch the breeze. It soon disappeared. Soon I met a fellow navigator, not too lucid, a Swiss about my own age, who like me was astride a raft of his own. We came within reach of each other and I tied our two seahorses together, so that in that quiet sea we were fairly well out of the water.

It was now getting dusk. We were perhaps a mile or so from the ship. Suddenly we spied a lifeboat making our way. The captain of the **Sussex** has sent it out, manned by two sailors, to pick up anybody still afloat. What a noble Frenchman, to whom we certainly owed our lives!

"Gee!" said my new-found companion, in impeccable English, "I hope they see us. If they pick us up I'll give them five dollars in gold each."

As I have suggested, he was a little delirious.

Back on the **Sussex** when we arrived, people were cheering up. The vessel was floating securely, at least for the time being, though nobody knew for how long, or whether to expect another torpedo, and the wireless was busy. Several bodies were laid out on the starboard deck.



I found my suitcase and bookbag of notes intact where I had left them. From the suitcase I got a pair of beaded Indian moccasins, put them on my cold feet, and sat down on the bench inside the saloon, to wait and see. Beside me was a young woman, sad and still dry-eyed. Just before the crash her husband had left her momentarily for some purpose forward. He never came back. Forlornly in her lap she held his Belgian officer's cap. They had just been married and were on their way to Belgium for their honeymoon.

Presently some of the lights turned on, enough to see about the cabin. I began to shiver in my wet clothing. A woman with a lunchbox offered me a leg of chicken, which I accepted, not knowing where or whether the next meal was coming from. Attracted by a warmer current of air, I found my way to the boiler room. The boilers were still warm and I sat down above them. My clothes dried and I stopped shaking.

Some hours after dark we survivors were all rescued. Some eighty-four lives were lost, including that of the famous composer, Granados, whom I had seen walking about the ship in his coat and cap of Astrakhan fur. A British minesweeper came alongside to take us off. What crisp and rapid commands that officer snapped out, how the crew responded promptly: "Aye, aye, sir!"

"Passengers will come on without baggage!"

I had my bag of precious notes in my hand when I joined the line to go down the ladder. It was only a little bag, but I treasured it more than my trunk and suitcase. I stepped out of line, went a few yards to the right or left, and tossed it, well strapped up, down to the deck of the minesweeper. In the preoccupation and excitement of the moment nobody noticed, and I stepped back to another place in line. Later I found the bag safe and intact on the rescue ship and hugged it to myself all the way into the port of Boulogne.

How and when we passed the rest of the night ashore I forget completely, and indeed everything until we got off the train at the **Gare du Nord** in Paris. At the platform to greet us was a young attaché from the American Embassy, where Ambassador William Graves Sharp took me into his own residence. I have been a guest in many embassies since, but this first experience was the most welcome of all. A valet conducted me to a guest room on the top floor and equipped me with shoes from the wardrobe of the Ambassador's own son. They fitted me just fine.

"The Ambassador will be expecting you down to lunch right away," said the valet, as he left me to my own devices for a moment.



I didn't know what to do with those soggy moccasins. The room opened on an inside balcony that ran around an ornamental central hallway rising four stories from the first floor below, where the dining room and reception parlors were. I stepped to the banister and dropped the moccasins overboard, hoping some servant would pick them up and take care of them. They hit the marble floor below with a squishy sound. When I got downstairs they were nowhere to be seen, but the Ambassador was standing by the entrance to the dining room. "I know what that plomp was," he said jovially, as he took me in to luncheon and introduced me to Mrs. Sharp. "It was those moccasins!"

Before I got through with the Embassy, Mr. Robert Bliss, then the Counselor, took my affidavit describing the disaster and testifying to the fact that I had plainly seen the wake of the torpedo as it hit the ship. This affidavit played some part in the **cause célèbre** of the **Sussex**, for the Germans at first claimed that the vessel had hit a mine, only much later to admit, after the report of the submarine commander himself, that he had torpedoed the ship thinking it a different vessel. During the war the Germans indemnified the neutral Swiss and Spanish Governments for damage and loss of life suffered by their nationals as a result of this violation of neutral rights, but not the United States Government.

I also forget where I slept that night in Paris or how it was I found myself in a rented room on the fifth floor of 3, Rue Soufflot, a stone's throw from the front facade of the Pantheon. While waiting for a response to the Embassy's introduction of me to the Archivist of the Foreign Office at the Quai d'Orsay, I attended some lectures at the University of Paris, in the neighborhood, and began reading general American history in the library of the **Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques**, about a kilometer distant, in preparation for my final exam at Harvard.

My garret room was unheated and it was still cold at the end of March, but there was a little fireplace. I bought and lugged firewood stick by stick from a woodyard, two or three blocks from the Rue Soufflot, and carried it up the five flights so I could have an occasional fire in the evening. My immersion in the Channel had resulted in a heavy, lingering cold on my lungs. I had a deep hacking cough and began to expectorate bloody phlegm. My sympathetic French landlady used to bring coffee in the morning, and began to ply me with nostrums: "**Je guéris mes clients.**" But to no avail. The cough kept up and the five flights seemed higher and higher. By then I had begun to get scared in recalling the **Sussex** business, though I had not been unnerved at the time. An unexpected noise would make me jump. Finally I looked up a list of physicians in the Paris city directory, and spotted the name of one Dr. Chauvain with what I took to be the symbol of an officer of the



Legion of Honor after it. I consulted him three times during the month of April 1916. "Tuberculosis, quite possibly," he said gently, prescribed mustard plasters and sedatives, and finally advised me to get home and take care of myself at my early convenience. I tried to pay him. He surmised I had little left to get back to Harvard and refused to take a **sou**. This kind and fatherly Frenchman invited me to come to his home for Sunday dinner and meet his family: wife and sister. I shall never forget them, nor cease to be grateful.

I gave up my chilly garret in the Rue Soufflot and found a place in a pension on the Rue St. Jacques nearby, right behind the University buildings inhabited then by Belgian refugees and soldiers on leave from the front. These were the fateful weeks when the French were holding the line at Verdun.

As bright and sunny days came on late in April, my cold wore off and I began to feel better and to enjoy Paris in the spring; but I booked passage Bordeaux to New York on the **S. S. Chicago**, another unarmed French passenger vessel. In the Bay of Biscay a periscope poked up near the ship but the submarine didn't release anything. It was said that German capital had been heavily invested in the French line.

I showed up in Dean Haskins' office the day after the Battle of Jutland. "It looks as though **Der Tag** had come," I remember him exclaiming. Happily he was wrong. The German High Seas Fleet never put to sea again, except to surrender and scuttle at Scapa Flow thirty months later.

The Dean immediately fixed a day for my final exam. It was a breeze. It was fun. The degree followed at the June Commencement, 1916.

What with home rest and cooking, summer coming on, and relief at the end of the long years of schooling, I seemed to feel better. I consulted our family doctor. He advised me to rest and get as much outdoor life as possible: maybe the eight weeks as tutor at the Keewaydin Camp at Lake Timagami would fix me up.

Summer in Ontario forestland and lakeside did not give me the snap-back I usually got there after a year's hard study. Returning home, I weighed less than when I had left at the beginning of summer. The fact that my Worcester sweetheart Ruth Steele had turned me down added to my troubles, and I had no job in sight. Weight began to drain off in heavy afternoon and evening sweats and fever. My mother was indignant that any girl should be so blind and cruel as to reject **her** son! But my father was more philosophical: "There are better fish in the sea than have ever been caught." I could not agree and continued to wilt.



This time the doctor was positive: incipient tuberculosis. Those were the years when they sent early cases West: some had recovered and lived active lives. My mother's Sturbridge cousin Franklin Brooks had gone out to Colorado with his plunky bride Sarah, got well, raised a family, and had become a member of Congress when Teddy Roosevelt was in the White House. My father scraped the barrel and "loaned" me two hundred dollars.

Ill in body, sick at heart, completely disconsolate and discouraged, I bought a "tourist" ticket and set forth for Santa Fe and an unknown, probably brief future, almost wishing that the train would run off the track and end up a grand wreck like me.

Little could I then realize that this departure would begin a seven-years' interlude which, after various "pedagogical and historical peregrinations and reflections," was to bring health and happiness together with a broadened appreciation of American history that comes with life in the Great West. And for once my piscatorial father was to prove mistaken: the dear incomparable Ruth, the lovely beautiful girl, later came out West alone to join me, a very brave thing for her to do! We were married at Mrs. Franklin Brooks' home on June 20, 1919. Ruth and I steered our wandering matrimonial craft for over forty-eight years until the end of her life on October 30, 1967. She now lies in the Bemis family lot in Sturbridge north cemetery, waiting for me. But those forty-eight years are another story, ranging far beyond Worcester County.



## THE NAVY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

by

Raymond G. O'Connor\*

The navy has been a microcosm of American life and a product of the nation's values, a reflection of the times and a response to the policies that administration and Congressional decision-makers adopted in an effort to protect and promote what they conceived to be paramount national interests. As an institution the navy has had a determining effect on the development of the nation, and its role in the anarchy of international competition has been its most notable contribution. An investigation of the navy's function in American history reveals the following: (1) the composition and distribution of the navy have reflected government priorities in foreign policy; (2) the navy has provided a flexible response to challenges to American interests at virtually every step in the escalation ladder, and has enabled the President to employ the appropriate amount of force commensurate with the "requirement, cost, and gain" formula; (3) the navy has served as an indispensable agent for stability and peace, and as a catalyst for adventure-some pursuits and imperialist ambitions. The evidence to support these conclusions is found in the record of the past.

The American colonies were spawned in an era of unbridled European struggle for overseas possessions that the contending nations perceived as the major factor in the balance of power, in both the New World and in Europe itself. The thirteen colonies, spread along the Atlantic coast, developed in the womb of England's mercantilist system and survived and thrived on the umbilical cord of maritime preeminence in trade and the sea lanes guarded by the Royal Navy. The Founding Fathers, nurtured in the environment of rivalry for empire, were acutely aware of the role that sea power had played in the destiny of nations. Most recently they had witnessed the outcome of the Seven Years' War, where the stakes had been the future of North America, a war that might well have ended differently had Britain not controlled and maintained the lines of communication with the Western Hemisphere.

\*Dr. O'Connor is professor of history at the University of Miami (Florida). As the official guest of the Society he read this paper at a dinner meeting of SHAFR, held during the annual convention of the SHA in Washington, D. C., November 13, 1975. Because of a lamentable three-way breakdown in communications, this paper is only now being offered to readers of the **Newsletter**.



Soon after the rebellion began in April, 1775, the Second Continental Congress responded to the increased military demands by authorizing a navy to interdict British supplies and support land operations, then expanded its activities and included privateering to harass enemy shipping. The escalation of the American Revolution from a civil conflict for a "redress of wrongs" to a war of national liberation was determined to a considerable extent by the course of hostilities and an awareness that French military support was necessary to ensure success. General George Washington's conviction that sea power was essential for victory on land was vindicated when Admiral de Grasse's fleet made possible the British surrender at Yorktown.

This further object lesson seems to have had little impact on the infant Confederation government which was heavily in debt and striking out on its own. Deprived of imperial preference and British protection, with a miniscule army and a disbanded navy, many leaders perceived that the future of this experiment in republicanism depended on a restoration of previous channels of trade. Such a resumption, in turn, could be achieved only through obsequious negotiations, for the American diplomats had no "force in being" to sustain their efforts. The disparity between objectives and capabilities was glaringly revealed by the Barbary states in the Mediterranean that captured and confiscated American ships and enslaved or held for ransom American citizens. John Adams as minister to England, and Thomas Jefferson, serving in the same capacity in France, differed as to how this costly and humiliating situation should be remedied. Jefferson, rankled by British depredations on American commerce while he was governor of Virginia, advocated building a navy to compel the corsairs to accede to the government's demands. Adams, convinced that Congress would not appropriate the funds to establish a navy, cited the European experience in urging negotiation and tribute. Finally, after some ten years of enduring the Barbary atrocities, a more affluent federal Congress, under President Washington's prodding, enacted legislation providing for the construction of six vessels. Perhaps influenced by this evidence of American intent, Algiers, the most persistent of the Mediterranean predators, agreed to a treaty incorporating acceptable tribute. President Washington, under the Congressional mandate to cancel ship construction in the event of an agreement, requested and received permission to continue building three frigates and thereby launch the first peacetime American navy. In this as in many subsequent cases, it was not a matter of trade following the flag but the reverse, since the protection and preservation of existing seaborne commerce had spurred the legislation for warships.



Moving backward to the period of the Confederation, the attitude of certain leaders toward the merits of a navy was clearly revealed. Washington, in his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," written in 1783, advocated "building and equipping a Navy, without which, in case of War we could neither protect our Commerce, nor yield that Assistance to each other which, on such an extent of Sea-Coast, our mutual safety would require." Prophetically, in light of the events of the War of 1812, he emphasized the importance of controlling the Great Lakes. Jefferson thought that a small navy would be effective against whatever portion of a European fleet could be sent across the Atlantic, and he, with James Madison, believed that a navy, unlike a standing army, would not pose a threat to the liberties of the people, a belief endorsed by the constitutional limitation on two year appropriations for the army. Writing in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay joined Madison in extolling the advantages of a navy. To Hamilton, a navy would act as a makeweight between contesting powers and as leverage in bargaining for commercial privileges. Jay envisioned the role of a navy in the overall maritime development of the nation, and as an essential element in the equation of power and greatness. The Constitution, as did the Articles of Confederation, provided for a navy, but it appears that sectional differences on the subject emerged in the deliberation at the Constitutional Convention, and they surfaced repeatedly in subsequent Congressional debates on naval policy.

The new United States, impoverished, weak, underdeveloped, and anxious to survive and prosper, was not looked on kindly by many of the European monarchies, who wished to quarantine the "Republican Disease." The Congress, anticipating future European wars, incorporated the provisions of the "Plan of 1776" in its "Treaty Plan of 1784," which prescribed the rules for the rights of neutrals, including a definition of contraband and a refutation of "paper" blockades. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, warning the Congress that the United States would lose trade to other neutrals unless it became a "maritime power," found the members unable to resolve the question because of financial distress and sectional disputes. The controversy between those who foresaw national development in the exploitation of the sea and those who were continentally-oriented continued as factionalism developed following the formation of a new and stronger government. The Barbary depredations overcame some opposition to a permanent navy, but the outbreak of war between England and France in 1793 provided the circumstances which led to a resolution of the issue.

John Adams, who prided himself on his role in creating the Continental Navy, was president when French violations of America's concept of the rights of neutrals became most acute. Believing that "the trident of



Neptune is the sceptre of the world," and projecting his Massachusetts attitude of maritime preeminence to the nation, he exploited a delicate situation to produce a crisis. Releasing the XYZ papers and taking advantage of the uproar that followed, he secured Congressional authority to establish a Navy Department, expand the fleet, commission privateer's, and wage war first against French armed vessels in American coastal waters and finally anywhere in the world. Then he almost lost control of the crisis, and in his efforts to retain control he lost the presidency. Whether he would have secured a better settlement from France if he had continued fighting or expanded the war, as some politicians believed, is conjectural. But Adams conducted the new nation's first war with a major power and successfully resisted all attempts to escalate a limited naval conflict. Objectives were correlated with the commitment of resources, and while neither hostilities nor diplomacy was orchestrated to everyone's satisfaction, the compromise Convention of 1800 with France subsequently was approved by the Senate.

So, in the first decade of the fledgling government the prospect of a navy had influenced negotiations with Algiers, and the existence and employment of a navy in retaliation to French activities had induced the Directorate to make substantial concessions. Adams could report to the House of Representatives on 27 November 1800 that ". . . a navy, well organized, must constitute the natural and efficient defense of this country against all foreign hostility . . . . The great increase of revenue," he added, "is a proof that the measures of maritime defense were founded in wisdom. This policy has raised us in the esteem of foreign nations." The side effects of this response to French incursions were, in Adams' opinion, far-reaching.

The United States, it should be noted, has gone to war with European nations on three occasions ostensibly because of a violation of the American concept of neutral rights. The provisions incorporated in the Congressional "plans" of 1776 and 1784 persisted through the quasi-war with France, the War of 1812 with England, and the first war against Germany. Paradoxically, some political leaders who had been eager to adopt these neutral principles were opposed to fighting for them in 1812.

The preparations for hostilities with Algiers and the resort to war against France demonstrated to all nations that this pre-adolescent country was willing and ready to resort to that ultimate arbiter, armed force, to defend its interests. A perceptive, or perhaps more docile Congress, accepted an administration recommendation to reduce but preserve the navy, which was to consist of thirteen frigates, six active and seven in reserve. Adams signed the bill the day before he left office, and it remained for Jefferson to implement the act and deal with the problem of renewed Barbary raids.



Jefferson has been portrayed as a man of strong moral convictions who, upon becoming chief executive, rose above principle to practice his concept of what was best for the country. Also, depicted at times as a foe of the navy, his maritime enthusiasm seemed at times as inconsistent as his principles. John Adams, writing in later years to his former adversary, said that he "always believed the navy to be Jefferson's child." Parentage aside, presiding over naval reduction and faced with the earlier dilemma of what to do about the Barbary corsairs, Jefferson was now in a position to act. After wrestling with his conscience, his interpretation of the Constitution and two Supreme Court decisions arising from the quasi-war with France, and advice from his cabinet, Jefferson ordered the Navy to take the offensive in the Mediterranean. Apparently the first president to exercise this sort of discretionary power as Commander in Chief, subsequently he sought and obtained congressional authorization for the deployment of the navy against Barbary "piratical" behavior. Other presidents have followed this example of committing armed forces to combat without the permission of Congress, although it is not clear whether Jefferson's precedent was cited as justification. The instructions to Commodore Matthew C. Perry for the Japan expedition bade him "bear in mind that . . . the President has no power to declare war," but allowed "self-defense" to protect the ships and crews under his command. President James Buchanan, a rigid constructionist, contended that he could not permit the navy to defend merchant vessels from attacks by Latin American nations without the consent of Congress, whereas Franklin Roosevelt directed the navy to go from the defensive to the offensive against German submarines.

The latitude granted the president as commander in chief has often been debated but was never legislatively circumscribed until the War Powers Act of 1973. Perhaps some presidents were aware that a proposal advanced at the Constitutional Convention designed the president as "Admiral of the Navy." Evidently John Adams took this position, for it is said that during his presidency he lay awake nights devising strategy and tactics, and overruled Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, on a number of occasions.

As the services grew and the administrative hierarchy proliferated the role of the secretary often appeared ambiguous. President Madison found it necessary, on 12 June 1815, to clarify the relationship between himself, the Secretary of the Navy, and the newly-created Board of Navy Commissioners, with the latter subordinate to the secretary who was "the regular organ of the President for the business belonging to the Department." Some presidents later, Franklin D. Roosevelt, writing to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson about a proposed reorganization of the



War and Navy Departments, cautioned against any structure that would interfere with the direct link between the president and the chief of staff or the chief of naval operations. Military or naval planning and execution were evidently too important to be left to the secretaries. The well-known altercation between the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations during the Cuban missile crisis was more an indication of the political delicacy of the operation than the case of a civilian attempting to exercise tactical control.

The way that a president uses the navy as a means to secure objectives abroad is most clearly revealed by its employment in peacetime where the strategic and tactical professional intricacies of naval engagements are less likely to be involved. During much of the American experience the chief executive has utilized the navy to apply "force without violence" in order to influence the behavior of other nations. As a sanction or coercive device it has provided the greatest degree of flexibility in support of responses to anticipated or prevailing threats to American interests. The mere existence of a navy that had proved itself in combat may have been enough to induce Britain to refrain from taking a more aggressive stance in the Maine and Oregon border disputes, the "visit and search" rights in suppression of the slave trade, the Honduran, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan controversies, the forays into Canada, the recognition of the Confederacy, and the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It was not necessary for the United States to possess a navy comparable to that of Great Britain in order to affect the policies of that government. The British, in weighing the cost of pursuing a policy unpalatable to the United States, considered liabilities other than Canada as a hostage or the interruption of a lucrative trade. Spain's reaction to America's gradual acquisition of the Floridas was tempered by an awareness of the hazards in conducting military operations dependent on maritime support against a navy that had displayed its prowess against France, the Barbary states, and the Royal Navy; while after Appomattox Louis Napoleon saw the expanded, steam-powered, battle-trying Union fleet as a formidable obstacle to his dreams of empire in the Western Hemisphere.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's contention that "The surest way to maintain peace is to occupy a position of menace" may not be universally valid, for it can contribute to insecurity and increase tensions to provoke preventive or preemptive strikes. But during most of the nineteenth century the American Navy did not "menace" the European nations; it simply provided a counterweight in tipping the scales toward a peaceful solution of outstanding issues, issues that otherwise could have led to hostilities or the defeat of American policy. Statesmen customarily considered all of the factors involved in coping with problems long



before the term "systems analysis" was coined, although a mathematical solution probably eluded them. To use a computer analogy, many statesmen were programmed different ways and attached more importance to certain factors than to others. Sea power, however, was never absent from the deliberations that preceded judgment, and the value assigned to this variable often contributed to the final decision.

The navy has not always been able to meet American commitments abroad, but its composition and assignments have reflected the prevailing interests of the government if not the nation. Following the War of 1812 America experienced a surge of intense nationalism and devoted itself to domestic and internal development. Yet the Naval Act of 1816 was designed to provide for a "balanced" navy, and the decades that followed witnessed the assignment of warships to implement policies abroad to an extent never approximated for more than a century. The United States, moving from the status of a have-not, developing nation, sought to alter its role in world affairs and share in the exploitation of the available natural and human resources. The task assigned the navy was the projection of American influence and the protection and promotion of American interests throughout the globe. Priorities in foreign affairs were revealed not merely by voyages to distant lands but by the stationing of naval vessels in what were designated key areas. The establishment of the Mediterranean squadron in 1815 indicated a primary concern with the Barbary threat, although these units helped conclude a treaty with Turkey and coerce the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into paying an agreed-upon debt. The founding of the West India squadron coincided with the acquisition of the Floridas in 1821 and the acceleration of piratical activity in the Caribbean. The Pacific squadron, authorized in 1818, was also a response to former privateers commissioned by revolting Spanish colonies, and to the war between Peru and Chile. It and the Brazil squadron, formed in 1826, were also to protect whalers operating in these waters and serve as a possible warning against attempts to restore Spanish rule in South America. The East India squadron was ordered to station in 1835 to protect merchantmen and impress Asian countries. The Home squadron, formed in 1841 during altercations with Great Britain, was to defend Atlantic coast ports; while the African squadron was assigned in 1843 to carry out the provisions of the Webster-Ashburton treaty in suppressing the slave trade and to reveal a continued regard for the fate of Liberia.

These dispersals of American naval power occurred at a time when the steam propulsion system was being introduced and the need for bases and coaling stations assumed an added significance. Secretary of the Navy, Abel Upshur, in a report of 7 December 1842, "respectfully suggest[ed] that too little attention has heretofore been paid to the important interests of our country in the Pacific ocean," but the need



for support facilities was not appreciated by other Washington authorities. After expressing deep gratitude for Commodore Matthew C. Perry's success in opening Japan through "coercive suasion," the administration disavowed his arrangements for rights and holding on various Pacific islands.

The alleged decline in the post-Civil War expansionist urge has been coupled with the rapid deterioration of the navy, and the period of the 1870's and 1880's has been interpreted as an interlude or a gestation stage in preparation for a determined outward thrust. Continued interest in non-contiguous territories, the modernization of European navies, and burgeoning industry and agriculture, found ever-increasing demands for a navy that would enable the United States to compete in the New Imperialism era's contest for land and markets. President Chester Arthur, considered one of the fathers of the Modern American Navy, in his annual message of 1881 urging approval of a naval construction bill, declared, "We must be prepared to enforce any policy we think wise to adopt," without specifying what those policies might be. When Haiti offered Mole St. Nicholas for a naval base, Secretary of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, opposed acceptance on the grounds that the navy was not prepared to defend it, while Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, was proposing the acquisition of some fifteen bases and coaling stations ranging over much of the world. Bases constitute both assets and liabilities, providing support and having to be defended. President Arthur, stung by criticism of his "big-navy" program, defended himself in his third annual message by claiming that he did not want a navy able "to cope with that of the other great powers of the world." During the 1880's a number of Congressmen and publicists were clamoring for a modern navy and expounding on the uses to which it could be put. But at the executive level there seemed to be a hiatus, an unwillingness or inability to articulate a rationale for a navy to achieve first rank status in the world. So the new American navy began to grow like Topsy, but it grew exceedingly fast, and soon was able to perform some of the functions envisioned by those who sought an enhanced role for the United States in world affairs.

The controversy over American expansion abroad was to some extent endemic in the debate over naval strategy, namely, the respective merits of commerce raiding versus fleet action. Mahan, in his virtual obsession with the "command of the sea" concept, denigrated the "gunboat diplomacy" function of the navy in projecting American influence abroad. Yet Mahan was writing when the nation was in the process of deciding which direction it should take on the international scene, and this state of flux was reflected in the debates over naval policy. The adoption of a fleet action, control of the sea strategy, eventually determined the



composition of the navy and was a manifestation of the expansionist sentiment that came to prevail in the government. Both the naval strategy and the foreign policy seemed to be vindicated when together they, in the words of William Graham Sumner, "knocked to pieces a poor, decrepit, bankrupt old state like Spain." Under Theodore Roosevelt the navy rose to rank second only to that of Great Britain, and he brandished this big stick in the Caribbean, at Gibraltar during the Algeciras Conference, and around the world to alert other nations to the new status of America as a "great" world power. The newly-elected William Howard Taft, basking in the light of this accomplishment, declared in his inaugural address that a strong navy was "the best conservator of our peace with other nations, and the best means of securing respect for the assertion of our rights, the defense of our interests, and the exercise of our influence in international matters." In his first annual message, Taft could boast of "the beneficial and far-reaching effect on our personal and diplomatic relations in the countries which the [Great White] fleet visited." Taft's abortive efforts to penetrate Manchuria and Persia witnessed no invocation of naval force that permitted intervention in Nicaragua to ensure a stable government, and President Woodrow Wilson followed the Nicaraguan precedent to implement the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Just how much influence these incursions had on other Latin American governments in promoting stability and fiscal responsibility is problematical.

Woodrow Wilson, often portrayed as the "pacifist" president, utilized overt armed force more often than any of his predecessors. His tardy conversion to the preparedness movement helped spur the concept of a "navy second to none," and the construction program of 1916 was designed to match Great Britain or whichever nation emerged victorious from World War I. Why Wilson, faced with German unrestricted submarine warfare, did not first resort to an embargo or a limited naval conflict is beyond the scope of this paper. But his naval policy was not predicated on the assumption that combatting undersea craft would be the navy's mission in any possible forthcoming war. His postwar naval plans reveal his concern that Britain not become the enforcer for League of Nations sanctions, especially in Latin America, which would have constituted a violation of American interests. Theodore Roosevelt had indignantly rejected the contention that Britain had protected the Monroe Doctrine, and Wilson did not intend to see it ignored under the guise of collective security.

The naval limitation conference during the 1920's and 1930's were, to a great extent, a reaction against the competitive building after the First World War which stemmed from uncertainty about the ambitions of the victorious powers. The political and naval agreements reached at Washington in 1922 were based on an understanding to maintain the



status quo, an understanding which the major naval powers confirmed at London in 1930 by extending controls to all categories of warships. Prospects for future attempts to alter the status quo were initially revealed by the reception of the London treaty in Japan and the refusal of France and Italy to adhere to the pact. As aggression erupted and spread in the 1930's, accelerated building programs reflected the policies of those who wanted to change the existing situation and those who wanted to resist such change. The invocation of the "escalator clause" by the United States and Great Britain was a response not just to Japanese construction but to the increasing international turmoil and the position that each nation was taking to promote or resist change through the use of force. Franklin D. Roosevelt could write in 1928 that additional cruisers were not needed, but later the joint compulsions of economic recovery and aggression led him to realize that the assumed equilibrium of naval power which these conferences sought to establish had failed to maintain the peace.

Of course the navy has not always served as an instrument for peace. At times its existence has led the decision makers to embark on courses of action which resulted in war. Would President Madison, in 1812, have made his appeal to Congress if one of his assets had not been a navy tempered by service against France and the Barbary states? Would President William McKinley have asked Congress for a free hand in resolving the Cuban insurrection if the modern steel, steam, and rifled-gun navy had not been at his disposal, a navy that made practicable an invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay, and the support of land operations in the Philippines? Not that war with Spain was spurred by a desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of a navy that had cost a good deal of money, but its control of the sea enabled the army to prevail on Spanish soil and provide victories for the acquisition of an overseas empire. Wilson may have been deterred from fighting Germany if the preparedness program had not been underway, and, conversely, the German high command, gambling on the time factor, might have refrained from launching its submarine offensive if the American maritime posture had been more formidable.

The naval balance in the Pacific during the 1930's contributed to Japan's decision to wage war against China and to America's muted response, for both Tokyo and Washington realized that the United States fleet was incapable of waging a successful campaign in the western Pacific. Did President Roosevelt take a more adamant stance toward Japan beginning in 1939 because he wanted to fill the vacuum in the Far East left by Britain's concentration on Hitler, or because he had more confidence in the effect that a reconstituted navy would have on the Japanese? Annual fleet maneuvers had continued to be held in the



central Pacific in spite of protests from Tokyo, but the ultimate form of intimidation was the retention of the fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1940. This projection of the only force available to the President, intended as a deterrent to restrain Japan, has been criticized for placing the fleet in a position of less readiness and greater vulnerability. Roosevelt, who complained that he simply did not have enough ships to go around, was trying to use the navy most effectively in support of American policy without placing it in a hazardous and untenable position or subjecting it to accusations of provocation. The decision involved that perennial dilemma of political and military leaders, namely, in assessing the adversary's possible or probable reaction to initiatives, should the assessment be based on an estimate of intentions or capabilities? Granting that both factors must be considered, which should predominate? In retrospect it seems that the American planners relied primarily on their prediction of intentions, whether from strategic convictions or a misreading of the Japanese. Surprisingly, what appears to have had little impact on the thinking of American leaders was the effect of the transfer of substantial units to the Atlantic in May 1941. This reduction lessened the value of the Pacific fleet as a deterrent and made it a more feasible target for attack. Perhaps without this diversion of strength to assist Britain the visionary proposal of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto would have been rejected, in which case the American fleet probably would have been sunk in the southwest Pacific in deep water with no prospect of recovery.

Japan may have been provoked to attack by the prospect of imminent, overwhelming, American naval superiority, as has been suggested by Stephen Pelz in his **Race to Pearl Harbor**. In which case the "two-ocean navy" program of 1940 contributed to the outbreak of war and frustrated whatever may have been Roosevelt's attempt to employ naval force as an instrument for peace. Ensuing events demonstrated the validity of Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery's contention that "The lesson is this: in all history the nation which has had control of the seas has, in the end, prevailed." Naval strategy during the conflict was designed to subdue the enemy and allow the diplomats a free hand in determining the peace. Campaigns were not based on or synchronized with detailed foreign policy objectives, and the navy carried out its assigned task of providing the government with options abroad.

When World War II ended, the American Navy dominated the oceans, and maritime supremacy coupled with possession of the atomic bomb promised a virtual **Pax Americana**. The battleship **Missouri** and other units sent to stabilize a situation in the Middle East were followed by the establishment of the Sixth Fleet to project American power into the Eastern Mediterranean and counter anticipated Soviet pressure. The naval presence in various portions of the globe influenced governments



and provided that control of the sea which permitted military intervention in Korea, Lebanon, and Vietnam. President Dwight D. Eisenhower could speculate on what he might have done during the 1956 Hungarian uprising if access had been possible from the sea, for the logistics of warmaking and peacekeeping in distant places has demanded control of the ocean highways. This ability to appear on short notice anywhere in the world with credible force has proved a major factor in the preservation of American interests, and, as previously indicated, has enabled the United States to indulge in highly controversial ventures. The massive Soviet maritime offensive with each segment carefully synchronized has led some to prophesy a **Pax Sovietica** and highlights the struggle for the remaining most exploitable area of the globe.

The justifications for a navy articulated by early American statesmen have prevailed throughout the nation's history, but the naval mission has expanded in keeping with technological change and broadened aspirations and commitments. Basically, the magnitude of naval implementation of foreign policy has been increased phenomenally in recent decades by the ability to bring destruction to any point on the earth's surface. Gerald Graham has written that "In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sea power was probably most influential when it was least conspicuous." The entire American experience leads to the opposite conclusion, for the presence of "proximate" power, as manifested by warships, often has proved decisive in achieving American objectives. The navy consistently has covered, in almost every dimension, the entire spectrum of risk incurred by the nation. From the frigate protecting commerce, the gunboat intimidating a small country, the fleet defending American rights, to the impending **Trident** missile-launching submarines, correcting the strategic balance, the navy has been an indispensable adjunct to diplomacy. The navy has been an agent of imperialism--political, economic, and ideological imperialism. It has stifled revolutionary upheavals as in Panama and Nicaragua, and has enabled liberation movements to succeed as in Cuba and Panama. It has provided that ingredient "without which" both desirable and undesirable steps in external affairs would not have been taken. The presence of American naval vessels abroad has reassured some and alarmed others, a clear indication of naval effectiveness. The navy has given statesmen the option of applying force as gently, moderately, or excessively, with or without violence, as the occasion warranted. The navy has been a symbol of America from the first sighting of the flag in a foreign port, and there is every reason to believe that it will continue to function as the all-purpose right arm of American foreign relations.



## DIPLOMATS, DIPLOMATIC HISTORIANS, AND COMPUTERS:

## A NOTE

Robert L. Beisner (American U)

I would like to commend Professor Thomas Schoonover for his recent piece in the SHAFR **Newsletter** (VII, No. 3 [Sept. 1976], 12-17). Though Professor Schoonover used my **From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900** (N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co.; now Northbrook, Ill.: AHM, 1975) as the basis for some observations critical of my methods (as well as generously crediting me with raising some important questions), I really have no serious quibble with what he has written.

Noting that I had urged the importance of studying "Behavior, not occasional rhetoric," he also states that I have not proved anything myself about behavior but have "merely assert[ed] it forcefully." I would agree and merely point out that the purpose of the series, of which my slender volume was one entry, is fundamentally historiographical, synthetic, and interpretative, hardly allowing for the kind of "proof" preferred by Professor Schoonover.

But, with that apologia aside, I want to endorse fully Professor Schoonover's remarks and to add a few observations and suggestions. It would appear that he and I share some common research interests, and, though only a "closet" quantifier myself, I strongly agree that it is time for diplomatic historians to take advantage of quantitative techniques where they can. I would also add that they should profit from what they can learn from other disciplines about model-building, hypothesis-forming, and hypothesis-testing.

An incorrigible humanist myself, I also believe that none of this is intrinsically contrary to writing diplomatic history that is literate, graceful, and appealing.

I should also like to suggest that not only quantitative techniques but other methodologies accessible to historians from the social sciences can be useful in explaining historical behavior (hypothesis-testing), as well as establishing research designs (hypothesis-forming, which is not the same thing).



Finally, it seems useful to point out that none of the specific tasks suggested by Professor Schoonover actually requires treading the path to the computer center; they are fundamentally complicated exercises in counting and sorting. Considerably more sophisticated and complex tasks might be framed—even on the subjects suggested by Professor Schoonover—that would be susceptible of solution by more sophisticated and complex quantitative techniques that would indeed lead us to the computer center.

I have discussed some of these issues, though not with important emphasis on quantitative methods, in "Change and Constancy in American Foreign Affairs," a paper read 8 April 1976 at the OAH meeting in St. Louis. I have copies available for those interested (write me at Department of History; The American University; Washington, D. C. 20016).

## MINUTES

### SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

August 14, 1976

The Council met during SHAFR's Second Annual Conference in Columbus, Ohio. Those present were Robert Divine, Raymond Esthus, John Gaddis, plus Lawrence Kaplan and Warren Kuehl. Also attending were Frank Merli, Roger Trask, David Trask, and Daniel Helmstadter of Scholarly Resources, Inc.

A discussion on whether to change the title of SHAFR's new journal from "Diplomatic History" to "Journal of Diplomatic History" as proposed by Armin Rappaport, the new editor, was concluded with a decision that the shorter title was still preferred.

Details of the promotion of the journal were discussed with Daniel Helmstadter, who is the Marketing Director of Scholarly Resources. It was decided to include an additional notice in the **Newsletter** and also send an announcement to all members with a request that they enter a subscription for their libraries.

The question of a Third Annual Conference arose when it was revealed that Norman Graebner had extended an invitation for SHAFR to meet at the University of Virginia in the summer of 1977. Frank Merli, the outgoing chairman of the Program Committee, and Roger Trask, who is assuming that post, noted the difficulty of arranging a program in the



short time remaining. It was decided to issue an announcement, via the **Newsletter**, to members that a Third Conference will be held and that it is incumbent upon them to submit topics for sessions or titles of papers by December 15 if there is to be a successful meeting.

The subject of a new **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States**, supplanting the old one by Bemis and Griffin, was next considered. (See page 26 for additional information).

Warren Kuehl noted that a survey of members five years ago had indicated an overwhelming desire to have SHAFR initiate such a project. Acting on that mandate, he had contacted a publisher who wishes to negotiate a contract. This means that SHAFR must develop a specific proposal. Negotiations have been based upon the concept of a one-volume work covering the entire chronological spectrum and topical range of U. S. foreign relations but obviously selective in nature. The publisher would be interested in doing supplements every three years to keep the **Guide** current. It was agreed that the president would name a committee to work out details and submit its recommendations, plus nominations for persons to serve on the Editorial Board, at the December meeting of the Council.

#### UPDATING

### THE GUIDE TO THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

Members will recall that SHAFR has long been interested in replacing the outdated (1921) **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States** by S. F. Bemis and G. G. Griffin. The Council considered the subject in 1969, subsequently appointed a committee to explore the feasibility and scope of the undertaking, surveyed SHAFR members on the subject, and supported the recommendations of the committee chaired by Lawrence Gelfand of the University of Iowa. It proposed a multi-volumed project, a full and complete reference tool to all aspects of American foreign relations. Efforts at funding this imaginative and ambitious project were unsuccessful, and Professor Gelfand withdrew as chairman early in 1975 to allow SHAFR to explore other options.

No action was taken then by Council to appoint a new chairman or to continue the committee, which had been inactive for several months. Operating on the assumption, though, that a revised **Guide** was still considered a vital need and a key project for SHAFR, contact was made with a press by the National Office, reasoning that if a suitable contract



could be negotiated we could then proceed with detailed planning and at that point possibly solicit some grant-in-aid money if the project required it.

This idea necessitated these assumptions:

1. That the essential need was for a compact guide covering the entire period and range of America's foreign relations. This meant an abandonment of the ambitious approach proposed by the Gelfand committee and a focus on basics.
2. That the main work would be done by SHAFR members on a voluntary basis. This too departed from the Gelfand Committee proposal that compensation should be included for the contributors. It is assumed that each person asked to contribute would be a specialist in a particular area and that he or she already has the essential data in a working bibliography. Thus contributing should not be burdensome.

The publisher who responded to our initiative is willing to sign a contract as soon as possible so the project can start. Several options are open. The **Guide** can appear by sections as each is ready or it can wait until everything is complete. We can also plan for periodic updating as part of the contractual arrangement.

President Divine has named a committee consisting of Norman A. Graebner, John L. Gaddis, and Raymond Esthus whose task it is to make suggestions by December 27 which can be incorporated into a contract. It is also charged with nominating a Board of Advisory Editors which will be representative of broad chronological, topical, and interpretive aspects of U. S. diplomatic history. Board members will in turn review the structural nature of the volume, make recommendations regarding the role and duties of a Supervisory Editor or Editors, select the Contributing Editors, set the guidelines for the contributors, and review the copy received. The intent is to involve as many members of SHAFR as possible so this can be viewed as a cooperative endeavor.

The role of SHAFR is implicit in this undertaking. It will be done in SHAFR's name, and all royalties will go to SHAFR.



## PERSONALS

At the recent Duquesne University History Forum Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State U and Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR) was a commentator at one of the sessions, while Leon E. Boothe (George Mason U and Chairman of the SHAFR Membership Committee) was a moderator at another of the meetings.

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Raymond G. O'Connor (U of Miami-Florida) will be visiting professor of history at Arizona State University during the spring semester in 1977.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia) has received sabbatical and research grants from the University of Queensland for the purpose of completing work in the United States upon a prospective book, titled **The Intellectual Origins of the Cold War.**

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Arnold A. Offner (Boston U) received the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Award for Excellence in Teaching for 1976 from the Trustees of Boston University at the June Commencement.

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The Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, which provides grants for doctoral and post-doctoral research that are based upon the holdings of the Roosevelt Library, has announced that Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. (Ohio State U) and Calvin L. Christman (Mountain View College, Dallas, Texas) were recent recipients of grants from the Institute.

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The Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs has awarded the annual \$10,000 Tom L. Evans research grant to Robert F. Smith (U of Toledo) for a study of the Truman Administration and the reinvigoration of the Good Neighbor Policy. Lorraine M. Lees (Penn State U), has also received a grant from the Institute.

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Many members of SHAFR will remember Reinhard R. Doerries of West Germany who spent considerable time in the United States doing research upon problems connected with the Irish and German immigrants to this country. Now at Hamburg University, West Germany, he has been quite busy professionally the past summer and this fall. In June an article by him, "Die Mission Sir Roger Casements in Deutschen Reich 1914-1916," appeared in **Historische Zeitschrift**. On August 7 he delivered a paper, "German Catholics in the New World: The Immigrants' Struggle for Faith and Ethnic Identity," at the International Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia. Then on October 6 at the annual meeting of the European Association for American Studies, held in Heidelberg, he read a paper, titled "Comparative Study of Acculturation: Americans of Irish and German Descent."

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Frank X. J. Homer (U of Scranton) delivered a paper, titled "Black-List and White-List: The British Foreign Office and the Blockade," at the annual meeting of the Middle Atlantic History Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, held in Philadelphia last spring.

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ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS  
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

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Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "Lessons of Viet-Nam and the Future of American Foreign Policy," **Australian Outlook: The Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs**, 30 (August, 1976), 227-237. This essay dealt with the kinds of lessons drawn from American involvement in Viet-Nam, with particular reference to the manner with which they will probably guide and shape the course and content of United States foreign policy for the next generation of policymakers. Thus far, the Viet-Nam debate has had a salutary effect on the shaping of future policy, the end product of which has been the introduction of a large measure of much-needed sophistication into foreign policy formulation--a more pragmatic approach to international relations. Equally important, the debate has enlarged and encouraged Congressional participation in the foreign policy process, a long-overdue adjustment to the "Imperial Presidency."

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Joseph M. Siracusa and Leopold Launitz-Schurer (both of University of Queensland, Australia), "Some Recent Trends in the Study of United States History in Australia: A Bicentennial Note," **Australian Journal of Politics and History**, 22, (Aug. 1976), 179-186. With specific attention paid to American studies in general and to American foreign policy in particular, this essay attempted to survey the state of United States history in Australia. The results were encouraging. Australian and Australian-based scholars have been making and continue to make important if not significant contributions to American historiography. In this and numerous other ways, the study of United States history in Australia now occupies a solid position both in the teaching and research of most history departments.

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Geoffrey S. Smith (Queen's University, Canada), "'Harry, We Hardly Know You': Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945-1954," **American Political Science Review**, LXX (June, 1976), 560-582. As demonstrated by recent writing on the Truman years, America's thirty-third President was neither the hero of the Cold War, as pictured by liberal historians during the 1950's, nor the *diabolus ex machina* portrayed by most revisionists during the 1960s and 1970s. Events and personalities of the Truman era are too complex to analyze in a facile manner, as many recent books make clear. The direction of historians of this most contentious era in American historiography is toward eclectic interpretations based on variants of liberal, realist, and radical hypotheses.

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Geoffrey S. Smith (Queen's University, Canada), "The Intractability of History: Reflections on a Bicentennial," **Queen's Quarterly**, LXXXIII (Autumn, 1976), 388-401. Americans need to reexamine their past in light of the domestic and international developments of the past three decades. The Bicentennial might have concerned itself with reassessing what Walter Lippmann in 1955 termed "the public philosophy"--that amalgam of common principles, traditions of civility, and inherited cultural values that made the United States a free and vital nation. Instead the event became an exercise in unwarranted self-congratulation and an excuse for politicians and businessmen to sell their respective products.

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C. Ben Wright (Chatham College), "Mr. 'X' and Containment," **Slavic Review: American Quarterly of Soviet and East European Studies**, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March, 1976), pp. 1-31. The purpose of this essay, based largely on the George F. Kennan Papers and official State Department documents, is to examine the record of 1944-1947 to determine what Kennan meant by "containment" **at that time**. Despite ambiguities in his thought, the conclusion is that Kennan contributed to the Cold War mentality which evolved during the immediate postwar period. Containment was a truly global policy, with both military and nonmilitary features, and it invited the kinds of interpretations its author would later deplore. Mr. Kennan's response to this thesis immediately follows Mr. Wright's article (see **ibid.**, pp. 32-36); Mr. Wright's counter-response appears in the subsequent issue of **Slavic Review** (see Vol. 35, No. 2 [June, 1976]), pp. 318-320.

PUBLICATIONS IN U. S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Calvin D. Davis (Duke), **The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899-1914**. 1976. Duke U. Press. \$16.75. Favorably reviewed in **History**, October, 1976.

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Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers, New Brunswick), **Wilson and Revolutions: 1913-1921**. 1976. J. B. Lippincott Co. Pb. \$3.25. The America's Alternatives Series.

\* \* \* \* \*

Alexander De Conde (U of California at Santa Barbara and former president of SHAFR), **This Affair of Louisiana**. 1976. C. Scribner's Sons. \$12.50.

\* \* \* \* \*

George C. Herring's (Kentucky) **Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War**, published in 1973 by Columbia U Press at \$15.00, is now available from the same source, paperbound, for \$5.50.

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Akira Iriye (Chicago), ed., **Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations**. 1975. Harvard U Press. \$15.00. Reviewed in **Journal of American History**, September, 1976.

\* \* \* \* \*

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers, Newark), **Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946**. 1976. J. B. Lippincott Co. Pb. \$3.25. The America's Alternatives Series.

\* \* \* \* \*

Jules Davids (Georgetown), ed., **Perspectives in American Diplomacy: Essays on Europe, Latin America, China, and the Cold war**. 1976. Arno Press. \$20.00 (\$18.00 to members of SHAFR). This work contains thirteen papers, most of them by members of SHAFR, which were selected from those delivered at the first annual meeting of the Society, held at Georgetown University, August 15-16, 1975.

#### OTHER PUBLICATIONS

**Doctoral Dissertations on Japan and Korea, 1969-1974: A Classified Bibliographical Listing of International Research** is the latest guide to academic work on Asia compiled and edited by Frank Joseph Shulman. This publication contains nearly 1500 entries for research undertaken at universities throughout the United States and in fifteen other countries. The entries provide detailed bibliographical data including information about the availability of the dissertation typescripts and the location of published thesis summaries in **Dissertation Abstracts International**. Three indexes--by author, degree-awarding institution, and subject--are included. The entire volume constitutes the first supplement to Shulman's **Japan and Korea: An Annotated Bibliography of Doctoral Dissertations in Western Languages, 1877-1969** (Chicago: American Library Association, 1970). Copies of this 78-page supplement may be obtained FREE OF CHARGE directly from the publisher. Write to: Ms. Gloria Worrell, University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

\* \* \* \* \*



The House Committee on International Relations has announced publication of a series of eight volumes which present hitherto unpublished transcripts of selected executive session hearings of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations). The hearings were selected from the committee's files in the National Archives and cover the period 1943-50. They are grouped under four main topics; Problems of World War II and Its Aftermath; Foreign Economic Assistance Programs; Military Assistance Programs; and U. S. Policy in the Far East. Particular subjects covered include the evolution of policy concerning the future of Palestine, assistance to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Defense Assistance Programs, and military assistance to Korea and China.

Publication of the historical series was authorized by the committee in April 1975 under an arrangement with the University Center for International Studies of the University of Pittsburgh. Faculty members and research assistants from the University prepared introductory and background material, and annotation for the transcripts. The project director was Dr. Harold L. Hitchens. Published with the hearings are copies of the legislation under consideration, the committee's reports on it, and other selected documents related to the hearings. Except for the correction of typographical errors and the insertion of appropriate subheads, the hearings are published in complete form, as they were taken down at the time. A limited number of volumes in the historical series are available from the Committee on International Relations. The volumes may also be secured from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402, at the prices ranging from \$4.00 to \$6.50 each.

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The Public Record Office of Great Britain proposes to offer for sale a set of microfilm of files of the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office for the period 1939-1945, selected to illustrate the progress of Anglo-American cooperation during the Second World War. If there is a sufficient demand, it will be possible to sell each set at the current price of 16.50 pounds per reel for film made from existing negative. This set will consist of approximately six reels of microfilm. Although all of the Prime Minister's Office files for this period are available on microfilm, this special set extracts records which deal specifically with Anglo-American relations, and adds new film of Cabinet Office files.

A catalogue of the master negatives held in the film library of the Public Record Office is available upon request to history departments and university libraries. It contains a brief description of the records covered by each set of film, with the Public Record Office reference numbers and



the number of reels of film. Any scholar or librarian who wishes to receive a copy of the catalogue should write to the Photo Ordering Section, Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1LR. All orders for film should also be directed to this address.

\* \* \* \* \*

The **Asia Mail**, subtitled "American Perspectives on Asia and the Pacific," began publication with the October 1976 issue. The monthly, in tabloid newspaper format with 24 pages per issue, aims at Asia-interested Americans within the United States. Articles are written by academic specialists, journalists and businessmen active in U. S.--Asian relations. Attempts will also be made to include articles by undergraduate Asian studies majors.

Advertising in the publication will include books upon Asian topics and jobs and executive positions open to persons with Asia area interests and backgrounds. Charter subscription rates are offered through Dec. 31, 1976. This rate is \$9.00 for one year (\$11.00 after Dec. 31) within the United States and \$15.00 in foreign Countries. The charter rate for students is \$7.00 per year. Orders should be sent to **Asia Mail**, Subscription Dep't, P. O. Box 942, Farmingdale, N. Y. 11735.

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## SHAFR ANNOUNCEMENTS

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The SHAFR Council at its December, 1974 meeting discussed the question of access of scholars to materials under the Freedom of Information Act. At the business meeting following the luncheon that year only a few members responded orally, but those who did respond expressed some dissatisfaction with the results. Subsequently, the **Newsletter** of March, 1975 requested reports from the membership on the experiences with the Freedom of Information Act, both successful and unsuccessful. Only a few responded. Conceivably, the liberalization of the Freedom of Information procedures has solved whatever problems scholars may have encountered earlier. The secretariat would be interested in reactions today to the workings of the Freedom of Information Act. Please communicate with Lawrence S. Kaplan, Department of History, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44242.

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## OTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS

The OAH will hold its 1978 convention in New York City the second weekend in April. The deadline for submitting proposals for the program of this convention is **March 15, 1977**, and they should be sent to Professor Mary E. Young, Chairwoman of Program Committee, Department of History, University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y. 14627. All projects, whether they be papers, panels, workshops, or other, should be described in a two-page summary which gives the thesis, methodology, and significance. (Joan Hoff Wilson, California State U, Sacramento, is a member of the Committee).

\* \* \* \* \*

A one-week lecture and laboratory course on using the National Archives will be presented at the Archives, Jan, 10-14, 1977, for graduate students, historians, social scientists, and curators. Staff members from the Archives and the Library of Congress will serve as teachers in this introduction to archival resources.

Lecturers will deal with the organization of archival collections and how it affects the researcher, printed aids to locating records and how they are used, and National Archives resources and how to approach them. Archivists, all experienced in working with researchers, will discuss the National Archives's holdings of film, photographs, maps and drawings, as well as the research possibilities of written records. Workshops will introduce participants to original documents and the problems they present, to microfilm, and to archival finding aids.

Sessions will be held in the National Archives Building, 8th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. The cost, including all materials, is \$35.00. Enrollment is limited to 25 persons. For more information, write Elsie Freivogel, Education Division, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C. 20408, or call 1-202-523-3298.

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The Great Lakes History Conference will hold its third annual meeting at the Pantlind Hotel in Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 28-30, 1977. Scholarly topics in all fields of history are welcome, and historians working in international or non-American fields are encouraged to take advantage of this forum, as are those engaged in American, regional and



local history. A special Latin-American forum is open. Send proposals to Prof. John Tevebaugh, Dep't of History, Grand Valley State Colleges, Allendale, Michigan 49401, by January 5, 1977.

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The **American Historical Review** is making an effort to update and broaden its file of book reviewers. The editorial office of that publication is, therefore, asking that all SHAFR members who are at all interested to send that office "three complete 5 x 8 cards, indicating their names, home and office addresses (including telephone numbers), three principal specialties as precisely defined as possible, the date on which they received their Ph. D., and the institution from which they received their degree." The editorial offices of the AHR are now located in Ballantine Hall, Indiana U, Bloomington, Indiana 47401.

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THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST  
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY DURING 1976

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1977 competition for the best published article on any aspect of American foreign relations is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

#### CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

**ELIGIBILITY:** Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1976. The article must be among the author's first five.

**PROCEDURES:** Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be submitted to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1977. The chairman of the committee for the coming year to whom the articles should be sent is Dr. Martin Sherwin, Department of History, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540.

**AMOUNT OF AWARD:** \$200.00. If two or more works are deemed winners, the prize will be shared. The award will be announced simultaneously with the Bernath book award at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held in April, 1977, at Atlanta, Ga.



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 THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1977
 

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1977 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomatic relations.

## CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

**ELIGIBILITY:** The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1976. It must be the author's first or second book.

**PROCEDURES:** Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. John L. Gaddis, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize Committee, Department of Strategy, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02840. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1977.

**AMOUNT OF AWARD:** \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1977, at Atlanta, Georgia.

## PREVIOUS WINNERS

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)



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## GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO **DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

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**Diplomatic History** is a new quarterly journal, sponsored by SHAFR and published by Scholarly Resources, Inc., which is devoted to scholarly articles in the field of American diplomatic history broadly conceived. The journal will include contributions that deal not only with the foreign policy of the United States but with the extensive foreign relations of the American nation--cultural, economic, and intellectual. Priority will be given to articles that make a significant scholarly contribution either by presenting new evidence and exploiting new sources or by offering new interpretations and perspectives. Preference will be given to manuscripts that illuminate broad themes in the American diplomatic experience, but articles that deal intensively with specific historical events are welcomed if they cast light on more central issues.

The journal is not designed to reflect any single ideological viewpoint. Articles by those who consider themselves traditionalists, revisionists, realists, moralists or generalists will receive an equally impartial reading. The sole objective is to further scholarly discourse among diplomatic historians and to provide them with a new outlet for their research and writing.

All manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate, with the author's name, affiliation and address on a separate cover page. Each manuscript should be typed in a double-spaced fashion on standard size paper, and the notes should be typed separately, in sequence, at the end of the manuscript. All the notes should follow the style of the **Journal of American History**.

All manuscripts should be submitted to:

Dr. Armin Rappaport  
Editor, **Diplomatic History**  
Department of History  
U of California (San Diego)  
La Jolla, California 92093



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 SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST
 

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Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. This **List** is stored upon computer tapes so that information may be quickly retrieved. In order for the system to work, though, two things are necessary from the members: (a) simple, concise, obvious titles should be used in describing projects; (b) a key word should be specified for each project. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since it will be much easier to keep the files up to date and avoid a rush in the fall. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to addresses should be sent to the Executive Secretary, and he will pass them on to the editors of the **List** and the **Newsletter**. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated.

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 Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

State: \_\_\_\_\_ Zip Code \_\_\_\_\_ Institutional Affiliation

(if different from address) \_\_\_\_\_

General area of research interest: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Key word \_\_\_\_\_

Current research project(s): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Key word(s) \_\_\_\_\_

If this is pre-doctoral work, check here \_\_\_\_\_

Mail to: Dr. W. F. Kimball, editor  
 SHAFR R & R List  
 Department of History  
 Rutgers University, Newark  
 Newark, New Jersey 07102



## BULLETINS

In the recently-concluded election for officials of SHAFR, Akira Iriye (Chicago) was chosen as vice president. Lawrence Gelfand (Iowa) was elected to the Council, and Paul S. Holbo (Oregon) became a member of the Nominations Committee. Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane), currently the vice president, will assume the duties of the presidency at the conclusion of the SHAFR-AHA meeting in Washington, D. C., in late December.

SHAFR will meet in conjunction with the annual convocation of the American Historical Association at Washington, D. C., December 27-30. The Council will convene at 7:30 P.M., Monday, December 27, in the Holmes Room of the Sheraton-Park Hotel. The next day the Board of Editors of SHAFR's new journal, **Diplomatic History**, will meet at 8:00 A.M. in the Directors Room of the Shoreham-Americana Hotel. That evening (Tuesday, December 28) SHAFR will hold a reception (cash bar) in the Blue Room of the Shoreham-Americana, 5:00-7:00. SHAFR's official activities will conclude with a luncheon on Wednesday, December 29, in the Richmond Arlington Room of the Sheraton-Park Hotel, 12:15-2:00. The feature of this meeting will be the presidential address by Dr. Robert A. Divine, "War, Peace, and Political Parties in Twentieth-Century America," and the disclosure of the winner of the first Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship in American Diplomatic History.



## THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

**SPONSOR:** Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

**EDITOR:** Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

**ISSUES:** The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

**DEADLINES:** All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

**ADDRESS CHANGES:** Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

**BACK ISSUES:** Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 50¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 75¢ per number.

**MATERIALS DESIRED:** Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

## FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California - Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California - San Diego)



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