



The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U. S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$8.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students, unemployed members, and retired members are \$5.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$125.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Beverly Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings in each issue of the **Newsletter**.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

WILLIAM L. LANGER

by

Ronald E. Coons*

When William L. Langer died at the age of eighty-one on December 26, 1977, plans were well under way to publish in the **Newsletter** selections from his autobiography, **In and Out of the Ivory Tower**. The first of two articles based upon this, his last book, appears below and serves as a memorial to a distinguished historian and teacher. Mr. Langer was not a member of SHAFR, and his major field of inquiry was European rather than American history. Nevertheless, his contribution to the study of United States foreign relations was not only significant but also, as the excerpts from his autobiography indicate, controversial.

Shortly before his death, Professor Langer summarized his career in copy he wrote for the dust jacket of **In and Out of the Ivory Tower**:

"William L. Langer is the Archibald Cary Coolidge Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University. In this memoir he traces his career from his boyhood with immigrant parents through the education that led him to an early professorship at Harvard and to the writing of a number of authoritative works in diplomatic history, such as **The Diplomacy of Imperialism**. He also edited **An Encyclopedia of World History** (now in its fifth edition) and the twenty-volume series **The Rise of Modern Europe**.

"His recognized position in the field of international relations led to his call to Washington even before Pearl Harbor and to five years of service as the chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of Donovan's Office of Strategic Services and later as special assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State. His wartime contributions to the development of foreign intelligence won him the award of the Medal for Merit by President Truman and an honorary degree by Harvard and later by Yale.

"In the post-war period Mr. Langer again divided his time and efforts between teaching and government service. He took an active part in organizing the National War College and returned to Washington in 1950 to set up the Office of National Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency. Eventually, in 1961, he was invited by President Kennedy to join the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, a position from which he resigned only in 1969.

"Mr. Langer, for all his activities and responsibilities, was never forgetful of the lighter side of life. As an adult he took up the study of the viola and after several years of systematic study played regularly as a member of an amateur quartet. Always devoted to the outdoors, he loved gardening at his summer home overlooking Ipswich Bay and never really abandoned hope of some time defeating his wife at golf or candlepin bowling."

Professor Langer's memoirs reveal a scholar of exceptional energy, an unusual breadth of vision, and conservative values. Those who studied with him did not necessarily share his conservatism, but it was one of his greatest strengths as a teacher never to impose his own views upon others. In exchange for the freedom he gave his students, however, he expected them to share his own commitment to the highest standards of historical scholarship. Professionally active until the end of a long and productive career that began in 1919 with the publication of his first book, **With "E" of the First Gas**, he was a model and an inspiration for many. As his colleague Ernest R. May observed on the day Professor Langer died, "He was by a long margin the best there was."

WASHINGTON BUREAUCRAT AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORIAN

by

William L. Langer

(William L. Langer, the author of this two-part article, died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on December 26, 1977. At the time of his death he was Coolidge Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University. The memoirs upon which the article is based were written in 1975 and were initially distributed privately to members of Professor Langer's family and to friends under the title "Up from the Ranks." On December 23, 1977, they were published in book form under a new title, **In and Out of the Ivory Tower: The Autobiography of William L. Langer**. In the early chapters of his memoirs Professor Langer recalls lower-middle class life in South Boston before World War One and describes his education at the Boston Latin School and at Harvard. Later chapters concentrate upon his professional and public career and will be of special interest to readers of the **Newsletter**. In the excerpts from the book published here, Professor Langer discusses his service with the OSS during World War Two and the writing of three contributions to the history of American diplomacy: **Our Vichy Gamble; The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940**; and **The Undeclared War, 1940-1941**. The article has been edited for the **Newsletter** by Professor Ronald E. Coons of The

University of Connecticut. Reprinted from **In and Out of the Ivory Tower** by William L. Langer, Neale Watson Academic Publications, Inc., New York, 1977).

The downfall of France in June 1940 was a hard emotional blow for many Americans who had traveled in France and for many others who remembered, from the First World War, the traditional comradeship in arms. Even more severe, however, was the realization that Britain might next succumb to the ferocious air attack of the Nazis. President Roosevelt, convinced that such a catastrophe would be a direct and immediate threat to American security, persuaded his fellow citizens, in intimate radio talks, that all possible aid, short of military intervention, should be accorded the embattled British.

Among other things the President, in the spring of 1941, sent on a mission of inquiry Colonel (later General) William J. Donovan, a hero of the First World War, a defeated Republican candidate for the governorship of New York, and at the time a successful corporation lawyer. Both an astute politician and a master of men, Donovan had a profound interest in and an exceptional knowledge of world affairs. After visits and professional discussions in many countries, the colonel reported favorably on Britain's chance of survival, provided it could count on unlimited aid from the United States. In addition, Donovan urged upon the President the crucial need for organizing a coordinated foreign intelligence service, without which the government could not hope to keep abreast of the world situation or formulate sound policies in time to make them effective. He proposed the establishment of a new agency, responsible directly to the White House, which could draw on the universities for experts with long foreign experience and specialized knowledge of the history, languages, and general conditions of various countries. The President was quickly convinced of this need. In the summer of 1941, that is, before Pearl Harbor, he set up the Office of the Coordinator of Information and appointed Donovan the first coordinator. He was directed to bring together and analyze the vast and diverse volume of foreign intelligence constantly flowing into Washington agencies from all parts of the world.

Donovan's was a truly charismatic personality. He had an exceptional gift for arousing the interest and enthusiasm of others and of enlisting their loyalty and devotion. Prominent among his early associates were Colonel Edward Buxton, Donovan's deputy, a quiet, kindly, and understanding business man, and General John Magruder, who had had long experience in military intelligence work and was completely won over by Donovan's plans. For the rest there was soon formed a veritable galaxy of prominent lawyers and bankers, manufacturers, foreign service officers, and merchants.

His first move was to name President James Phinney Baxter, III, an expert in American diplomatic history who was president of Williams College, as chairman of a select board of analysts, who in turn were to direct a larger staff of experts in various foreign fields. This program was submitted to a small luncheon group at the Tavern Club in Boston in July 1941. The response was decidedly favorable. To me the notion appealed as innovative and full of promise. Baxter, an old friend and former colleague, invited me to serve as chairman of the board and director of research. He and I promptly set to work to invite or persuade outstanding scholars in the social sciences to join the board and begin enlisting a staff.

Anyone at all acquainted with official life in Washington knows that the establishment of a new agency demands endless effort and unremitting determination. The existing agencies are quite naturally convinced that they are fulfilling their function and that the intervention of inexperienced interlopers will not only diminish their own position, but will also lead to duplication and confusion. All recognized the fundamental principle that knowledge is power, which they had no inclination to share with an upstart.

This being so, as founders of the Research and Analysis branch, we spent much time running hither and thither, explaining our objectives and our hopes, petitioning for toleration and cooperation, and waving our presidential order. All this was of little avail. In fact, we were badly hampered by our own ignorance about the details of our mission. No one would or could enlighten us as to what we should do and how to go about it.

We decided before long that our wisest course would be to collect and evaluate such information as came to us from the State Department cables, the newspapers, radio intercepts, and the military. We began to issue an attractive pamphlet, "The War This Week," which consisted of a succinct review, ably edited by the late Donald C. McKay. Although the most critical intelligence, such as the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence, was, of course, withheld from us and from just about everyone else, "The War This Week" proved a useful digest, and we soon built up a considerable clientele among high officials of the government, who alone were eligible to receive it. But the very success of this initial effort provoked opposition. The matter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the argument that important information was being bandied about town. The chiefs thereupon ordered its discontinuance, and Donovan for once lost his temper. Talking to me, he asserted that scholars no doubt were smart, but they were not discreet: "They are like chorus girls, who have beautiful legs and like to show them." I know that he felt the liquidation of "The War This Week" to be a serious setback to his basic plans, but he could console himself that it was abolished only because it was too good, too striking an example of the rightness of his concept.

As other branches of the Office of the Coordinator began to develop and impinge upon existing agencies, there was more and more surreptitious agitation in high places for its abolition. I must not say too much on this subject, because my knowledge of the detailed maneuvering is so fragmentary. But it is clear that after Pearl Harbor the situation changed drastically. No one will ever forget the shock of the Japanese surprise attack. It was a Sunday afternoon, and my wife Suzanne and I were visiting the Corcoran Art Gallery. On leaving at dark we were met by newsboys hawking the latest reports. I hurried home, and then drove to the office, where Colonel Donovan and the chief staff members were assembled. With the utmost gravity he gave us a full report of the catastrophe and the American losses in men and material. None of us needed to be told that thenceforth all efforts on our part would have to be redoubled.

Under the direction of General Marshall, plans were soon being made for a counterblow to the Axis position by the invasion of North Africa. Much of the crucial undercover work was carried out under Donovan's direction. As a result of the useful studies made by the Research and Analysis (R and A) branch of the logistics of a landing and invasion and the invaluable role played by "consuls" such as Robert Murphy and William Eddy, the agency was renamed in June 1942 the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and placed directly under the guidance and protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Donovan was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, and I took over as chief of the R and A branch when reasons of health obliged Baxter to withdraw.

Although I served as chief of R and A from September 1942 until the dissolution of the OSS in 1946, I find it difficult to recount its work and accomplishments. My chief claim to leadership was the extent of my published work in international relations, but I found myself for the first time in a strictly administrative position, which became ever more burdensome as the organization grew. By the end of the war, the staff comprised some hundreds of trained professionals, including men of such outstanding ability as Ralph Bunche. There was also a large number of able secretarial and clerical personnel.

I went to England in September 1942, in the company of the late Conyers Read, our learned and energetic chief of the British Empire section, and S. Wilmarth Lewis, the director of the already huge collection of published and unpublished materials that was being assembled on the most diverse problems of the war. At this time the OSS already had a substantial office in London, directed by William Phillips, a Foreign Service officer of ambassadorial rank. Colonel Donovan arrived for a few days of consultation with the divisional chiefs of the OSS and with their British counterparts. Like him, I visited British installations, discussed with American and British officials all aspects of the intelligence analysis problem, and made countless friends. Among these I cannot refrain from mentioning especially Colonel Alfred

Gruenther and General Walter ("Beetle") Smith, with both of whom I was to work intimately in later years. These and other American officers had heard me lecture at the Army War College and treated me as a friend. Smith had just been appointed General Eisenhower's chief of staff, and Gruenther was one of his right-hand men.

In rereading the little diary I kept during my three weeks in England, I find an interesting reference to "Beetle Smith." "A pretty young man, very alert and very positive. . . I am sure that we shall get along very well with him. His opinion of the R and A is flattering in the extreme, but he reminded me that the prejudice of the military against civilians is a hard thing to overcome." These remarks, from so high a military officer, help to explain Smith's attitude as director of Central Intelligence in 1950, when he insisted that the Office of National Estimates was the crux of all intelligence work and did so much to establish cooperation among the various agencies. Of all this, and also of Gruenther's role in founding the National War College, more will be said later.

London, although partly demolished and in strict blackout after dark, made an excellent impression on the visitor. It was an unique example of voluntary austerity. Restaurant prices were appallingly high, yet the meals were frugal and unexciting. But people took it all in good spirit and even ignored air-raid warnings on the plea that most of them were futile.

By and large I found as much confusion among the British agencies as among the American, due no doubt to the pressure under which all were working. An exception was the British Joint Intelligence Committee, which met weekly to coordinate information acquired by the various agencies and was presided over, not by the traditionally influential Admiralty, but by the Foreign Office. The British have always had a greater understanding of and respect for international relations than Americans, who tend to regard the State Department as at best a necessary evil. There was no question that the Americans had much to learn of secret intelligence operations from the more experienced and adept British.

Most of my work took me to Oxford, which was almost devoid of students and dons and had been given over to government work. The nearest agency to the R and A was the Interservice Topographical Division, a much smaller organization, and I think never as effective as its American counterpart. Another agency at Oxford was the press-reading group at All Souls, which culled what intelligence it could from foreign newspapers and broadcasts. I was astounded to find in its ranks some of my very good friends, whom I regarded as the most qualified students of international affairs: men such as Charles K. Webster, Alfred Zimmern, H. A. R. Gibb, David Mitrany, etc. I have never understood why the British failed to assign these men to crucial posts in the war effort. Clearly Donovan had a high opinion of scholarship and made far

greater and better use of the country's academics than did our British allies.

I returned home at the end of September, after several delays due to weather. I might interject here that though the Secret Intelligence branch of the OSS never became a major source of intelligence for our studies, we were infinitely obliged to it for the effective work of its representatives in Stockholm and Lisbon in obtaining for us German, Russian, and other newspapers, journals, and books without which many of our operations would have been impossible. Donovan's hunch that most of the needed information could be obtained from printed materials (often from quite aged books) was proved altogether correct. The strength of R and A lay in the research training and experience of its personnel.

As the war progressed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned more and, indeed, even more difficult operational assignments to the OSS. These fascinated Donovan and gave full scope to his imagination. More and more of his attention was focused on these tasks, many of which required him to be abroad. Compared to plans for sabotage of enemy installations, aid and supplies to resistance groups, the penetration of enemy positions, etc., the work of the R and A lacked drama and excitement. Hence, the books that have been written on the OSS have little to say of it and devote themselves to the narrative of adventure and heroism. But Donovan never lost his interest in R and A and its work. On the contrary, he rated it highly and interfered little, though he never failed to have visiting notables shown around, if only to see men and women busy at desks or typewriters.

The work of the R and A was so varied and so conditioned by the requirements of the war that it is extremely difficult to give a coherent account of it. At first we were ignored, if not opposed, by other agencies, and most of our reports were unsolicited. Our Projects Committee decided which problems were important or apt to become so, and directed and criticized the product. The staff complained that first-rate studies never reached the people who should know of them. It is quite possible that instead of devoting myself to the organization and standards of the work, I should have made more of an effort to get around town and solicit customers. But this was simply not my nature, and I recalled, from my World War I experience, that if one shell in ten struck anything worth striking, the batting average of the artillery could be considered good. Like Donovan, I believed that if we could effectively fill a need which certainly existed, customers would eventually beat a pathway to our doors.

And so it was. In the planning of the invasion of North Africa, all sorts of abstruse information was required and the contributions of our African section, headed by Sherman Kent, who for many years was to play a key role in foreign intelligence work and actually wrote a book on the subject, were gratefully received. The landing in Sicily and the

Italian campaign were to tax our Italian section, and here, if I am not mistaken, we first began to make careful target studies for Air Force bombardment.

By 1943 our staff had outgrown its Library of Congress quarters. The headquarters of the OSS, including the R and A, had been moved to the other end of town to a group of buildings evacuated by the Public Health Service at 23rd Street and E. A few blocks from there was an abandoned skating rink into which I agreed to move our staff, despite protests and jeers. Actually it was a great convenience to have the staff nearer at hand, and after much remodeling, the new quarters were fairly well adapted as well as airy and light. I forget how long the R and A was housed there, but it was not for long. Presently the entire branch, administration as well as staff, was moved into an apartment house at the corner of 23rd Street and E, not too far from the rest of the OSS. Naturally, such quarters, no more air conditioned than our previous lodgings, presented many inconveniences. But there was ample space, and we gradually adapted to it. I might add that the research units of the State Department and then of the new Central Intelligence Agency continued to be located in this apartment house until, years afterward, it was demolished to provide space for the extension of the State Department itself.

I hesitate to detail the many-sided work of the R and A over several years, partly because I carried away no records whatever when I resigned in 1946, partly because in advanced age my memory has become dim and often untrustworthy, and finally because it is more or less invidious to speak of one activity while omitting others. It stands to reason that R and A reports were classified and therefore limited in circulation. But after some thirty years, all restrictions were removed, and they are now open to public inspection in the National Archives.

As the war progressed the burden of my work grew constantly as special units were sent to perform needed tasks abroad. By the end of the war there were R and A units in London, Caserta, Cairo, and Kunming. Fortunately, I was well supported in what needed to be done. The chief administrative officer, Louis Ream, was experienced and efficient. He took the entire budgeting process off my hands which, as anyone conversant with government knows, can be very time consuming indeed. My successive secretaries, Mrs. Mildred Brockdorff and Miss Frances Douglas were all that one could ask for and warded off many queries and complaints that could only have worried me. As it was, we were working six full days a week, on hot days and cold. If I remember correctly, it was only when the temperature rose above 90° that we were permitted to dismiss the staff and close shop. On many occasions, when urgent work had to be done, staff members would return to work in the evening, and, I should add, staff members of other agencies would come to assist in matters within their competence. I recall that my Harvard colleague, Alexander Gerschenkron, the

eminent economic historian, who was then with the Federal Reserve Bank, could always be relied upon. Since he had complete command of Russian, he gave invaluable support on several projects. I cannot refrain from commending the devotion, loyalty, and spirit of cooperation among staff members, at least among those of the war agencies. These "Indians" are definitely the forgotten men in all histories of high policy and grand strategy.

Speaking of Russian affairs I need hardly emphasize the importance of every last shred of intelligence that could be secured on that secretive country. Almost anyone would admit that the outcome of the war hinged largely on the success or failure of the Russian forces, which in turn depended largely on the availability not only of tanks, airplanes, and trucks, but also of munitions. How were we to form an independent judgment on Russian capabilities and needs? Very few of our economists, even among the ablest, had any knowledge of the organization and workings of either the Soviet or the Nazi economy. The economics of the New Deal, which had brought many of them to Washington, were too fascinating and immediately important to study the functioning of the dictatorships.

Our economics section, headed by my distinguished colleague and life-long friend Edward S. Mason, was extraordinarily able, imaginative, and dynamic, staffed by a number of brilliant young scholars, who were for many later years to play important roles in Washington. They had no difficulty in recognizing the problems and mapping out approaches to their solution. There was only one serious obstacle--ignorance of the Russian language and hence inability to read many of the crucial materials.

According to Geroid T. Robinson, professor of Russian history at Columbia and author of a well-known study, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime*, ignorance of the language vitiated the value of the reports on Russian affairs produced by the economics section. The latter replied that such work could not be abandoned to the Russian section because it knew no economics. Actually, I think Robinson and some of his staff knew more of Russian economics than the economics section knew of the Russian language; but fortunately, it never became necessary to rule apodictically on this important issue. Both Mason and Robinson were outstanding men, whose prime interest was in getting the work well done. It was soon arranged that on Russian problems appropriate members of each section should work together. This was the natural and successful solution. The R and A studies on Russian needs and productive capabilities were among the most effective of our products. Towards the end of the conflict, various sections working together produced an extended analysis of Soviet capabilities and intentions that may justly be called the first national intelligence estimate. In the budding "cold war," it was highly regarded by General Embick and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and may well be described as the very acme of intelligence analysis.

Before leaving the economics section, more than mere mention must be made of its contributions on the German side, where the economists had a better command of the language and where, too, close collaboration with the German section was gradually established. Using captured Nazi material, the economists discovered the key to the serial numbers of captured truck tires, engines, and other Nazi industrial products. Presently they could tell with astonishing accuracy which factory was producing what amount of what product, where the bottlenecks were (as with ball bearings), and which plants it was urgently necessary to destroy by bombardment. Similarly, by the careful analysis of the local Nazi press (collected in Stockholm), it became possible to determine, through the officer obituaries, where different Nazi units were and sometimes what their losses were in recent engagements. I submit that these items were military intelligence of the highest order, attained by altogether new and ingenious methods. No other nation during the war was, or so far as I know, has since been able to bring such concentrated intellectual power to bear on wartime problems as did Donovan's R and A.

During the concluding year of the war, the German section had the crucial role of studying for the occupation and military governments of territories conquered from the enemy. This section was peculiarly fitted for this assignment because it had on its staff a number of German refugees with considerable firsthand knowledge about conditions and procedures. I think here of the late Hajo Holborn, professor of history at Yale, the late Franz Neumann, of the New School for Social Research, and Herbert Marcuse, whose later revolutionary role was then indiscernible. These senior scholars were supported by younger men, almost all of whom were eventually to fill chairs at our major universities. To mention Franklin L. Ford, Carl E. Schorske, Robert L. Wolff, H. Stuart Hughes, and Paul Sweet is only to cite those whom I knew best. Holborn was later to write an excellent book on occupation policies and military government, and all that need be said here is that by dint of hard and sustained work the R and A was able to make a major contribution in a difficult and troublesome field.

I do not remember that members of our staff had any important part in the studies for the organization of the United Nations. These were firmly controlled by Leo Pasvolosky of the State Department, who drew on his own staff for support. I was one of a small group of Donovan's staff that accompanied him to the San Francisco Conference in the spring of 1945, but my function was primarily to be available if R and A help was required. Actually Robinson and I spent most of our two weeks working out memoranda on our relations to the Soviets. General Embick laid these before a select group of high army officers and we had an exciting afternoon of discussion with them.

Wartime in Washington meant mostly hard work in often inadequate quarters and frequently in unbearable humidity and heat. In the early part of the war my wife and I were divorced after having drifted apart for some time. In 1943 I remarried, my bride being Rowena Morse Nelson, the divorced wife of a professor at Duke University. She brought me four additional children of varying ages. We were fortunate to rent a comfortable, middle-aged house on Newark Street, just above 34th, where we remained until our return to Cambridge in 1946. The children liked their schools and easily made friends and once or twice a year we were able to get away for ten days to Capon Springs, a mid-nineteenth century resort most of which had burned down years ago. The surroundings were beautiful and the accommodations comfortable but simple. The spring water was as good as I have ever tasted, and since the inn had a farm attached to it, we had enough meat to eat, which was not always true in Washington.

My career as a bureaucrat was interrupted before long by the intrusion of novel, but nonetheless genuine, historical problems. In autumn 1943, I received an invitation to call on Secretary Cordell Hull at his apartment. I was baffled but, of course, accepted. I found him alone and at leisure, and we had a pleasant cup of tea together. He spoke to me at length about American policy towards Vichy France, which had from the start been distasteful to the American public.

Despite the public clamor, Hull was convinced that our policy had been wise, that we had derived many substantial advantages by maintaining contact with Vichy, and that, if the American public had any notion of the complexities involved, it would see the situation in a different and more favorable light. He asked whether, as a professional historian with all the records placed at my disposal, I would undertake a retrospective analysis of the past few years of our relations with France. While much intrigued by the suggestion, I reminded the secretary that I already had a full-time job and at best could work on the proposed study only in the evenings, which would delay completion considerably. Moreover, I could not, as a professional historian, undertake to write an apologia. I would have to be free to demand any and all records, to consult all those who were directly involved, and above all to express my own conclusions.

Hull's reply was that he had not been thinking of an apologia nor had he supposed that I would undertake one. He simply thought that greater knowledge of the facts would influence American opinion. If, he remarked, the government's policy had been wrong, it was important to know how and why. I might interject here that the secretary was unwittingly touching on a problem that was to be of overriding importance in the future. It seems to me that if the government had taken the country more into its confidence on South Vietnam and had relied less on secrecy and subterfuge, one of the worst crises of recent American history might have been alleviated if not obviated.

Having agreed to the secretary's proposition, I began thenceforth to live a double existence. Each day the State Department arranged to have what records I desired deposited in a locked room where I could work in the evening undisturbed. My day shaped up in this way: My wife was good enough to make the tedious trip to town by bus each day to join me at lunch and so provide a break in the day's business. I tried to get home for dinner by six, after which my wife and I went off to a driving range and practiced golf for half an hour before I hurried back to my nocturnal assignment. At times she would return with me to the State Department and, while I studied the official dispatches, would scan the printed newspaper and magazine material. We aimed to get back home by 10:30.

I need hardly say that the job, while arduous, was intensely interesting. It is not often that a historian has a chance to work with such recent materials. Furthermore, Admiral Leahy, now back in Washington, supported the project wholeheartedly and discussed many matters with me at length. Ray Atherton, in the department, gave me all possible aid, as did Robert D. Murphy, who was deeply involved with the preparation for the invasion of North Africa.

By dint of hard and systematic work, I was able to present Secretary Hull and Admiral Leahy with a first draft of my study towards the end of 1944. This draft was read by a number of the top officials of the department, all of whom were delighted with it. One might conclude that their pleasure reflected relief at my generally favorable conclusions. But I think it derived chiefly from my demonstrated conviction that our Vichy policy had given us an invaluable listening post on the continent, an opportunity both to maintain contact with a traditional ally and to use our influence to restrain the forces making for collaboration with the Nazis, and a certain hold on the French navy and colonial empire.

This completes the first phase of my trials and tribulations with our Vichy policy. The question at once arose whether this enlightening account of our problem should not be published. The decision was decidedly in favor, but I could not hope to act on it for some time, because after the liberation of France in 1944, Petain, Laval, and other Vichy leaders were put on trial for treason. The published records of the trials were extremely voluminous, and it was no simple matter to analyze them and also keep up with the numerous volumes of recollections and experiences that began to multiply. The eventual publication was, therefore, delayed.

The six months just before and just after the end of the Japanese War were for me a period of such confusion that I search in vain for any guiding theme. The R and A was at the height of its power and influence and so busy that it constantly demanded more of my time. My own university was the first to honor it by conferring upon me at commencement, 1945, the honorary degree of LL.D., with a most appropriate citation making me the representative of the numerous

members of the Harvard faculty who had gone to Washington and contributed to the outcome of the conflict.

Hard upon this happy event came an invitation from General William J. Donovan to join him and a few of his staff in a hasty mission to China, where preparations were being made for secret operations against the Japanese occupying forces. I think the general thought of this as a useful break in a stiff routine, for the R and A contingents in various places were all, so far as I knew, operating smoothly and effectively. That was largely the work of William Applebaum, a member of our staff and an unusually capable efficiency expert. Applebaum had just returned from an extended visit to all R and A outposts, where he had effected many valuable improvements in organization and operation. The outpost chiefs invariably congratulated themselves on having survived the "Apple-Bombing."

I found all in order at the R and A posts and for the rest immensely enjoyed seeing some of the gorgeous scenery at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, the great oil refineries at Abadan, the tea plantations on Ceylon and the brief glimpse of India and China.

Just as we were leaving China, news came of the Japanese surrender. I think I should say that the R and A and I believe the OSS as a whole, had no important part in the war in the Pacific. At the beginning, after the loss of the Philippines, every effort was made to assemble all possible information about the islands, and General MacArthur had vast quantities of intelligence collected from former American businessmen, educators, etc. for his planners. But the general had, from the outset, determined to have his own intelligence staffs and had insisted that everything in the Pacific theater should be under his control. On several occasions he or his subordinates made efforts to enroll R and A personnel, but always on the condition that they sever all connections with the OSS and allow themselves to be integrated with his own intelligence unit. To this Donovan would never agree, so we heard little of the war against Japan, except from the Chinese angle.

The situation started to change after the surrender of Germany when all efforts became concentrated on the Pacific. The R and A was gradually brought into the picture through the intervention of General S. W. Embick, who had been recalled from retirement by General Marshall to serve as chairman of a political strategy group, with the mission to study such political problems as might confront the armed forces as they advanced into new territories. Embick, a highly educated and keenly intellectual man, had almost immediately recognized that the R and A could do invaluable background work toward the solution of his problems. So far as the Pacific was concerned, his question was whether it was essential to bring the Soviet armies into the war against Japan at any cost, or whether, if cut off entirely from the home islands, the huge Japanese forces in China could long resist surrender.

The reply of R and A was anything but Delphic: It was quite unnecessary to offer the Soviets any concessions to induce them to intervene, for it was unthinkable that a great power with a high stake in East Asia would allow itself to be excluded from the peace settlement. Intervene the Soviets certainly would, but only at the last possible moment, so as to minimize their losses. And as for the second part of the question, we were convinced that if the Japanese Islands could be completely blockaded and all connections with the Chinese mainland severed, the armies in China, deprived of essential munitions and supplies, could not possibly hold out.

It is common knowledge, of course, that none of these arguments persuaded the military authorities. One can easily understand their fear of massive losses if an amphibious invasion of Japan should become necessary. Hence the unexpected dropping of the first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No one will deny that they accomplished their purpose and probably saved countless American lives. But in R and A the general opinion prevailed that Japan could have been effectively blockaded by sea and land and would, for that reason, have been forced to surrender before long in any case. The thought of the new atomic age filled us with horror, and we wondered whether in the circumstances the game was worth the candle. Possibly, the atomic age was coming anyway, from one direction or another, but it would have been at least some consolation if the first step had been taken by others.

Almost one of the first moves made by President Truman after the surrender of Japan was to order the dissolution of the OSS. General Donovan was allowed to resign without much expression of gratitude, and a committee was set up to decide on the division of the carcass. I was not one of those who were brought into the deliberations of the judges, nor had I expected to be, for I never had the slightest interest in the jockeyings for influence and power. Without having specific knowledge of all the maneuverings of the autumn, I was given to understand that the President acted on the advice of the Bureau of the Budget, but I suspect other powerful influences were also brought to bear.

Some months later the President quite unexpectedly conferred on me the highest civilian award, the Medal for Merit, "for extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct." The citation, over the President's own signature, noted that as chief of the Research and Analysis branch of the Office of Strategic Services Langer "was charged with the collection, intensive analysis and dissemination of social, political, economic, and topographic intelligence concerning many regions of the world. At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the War Department, the Navy Department and various other agencies, he directed and led in pioneering the production of vast quantities of studies, surveys, handbooks, and guides which were of inestimable value in the prosecution of the war. Few operations of such

scope have ever been carried out in time of war by the research brilliance and prodigious effort of one man. He distinguished himself by the manner in which he discharged his responsibilities and his accomplishments reflect great credit upon himself and upon the United States Government."

No one could ask for more lavish praise than this. Yet it seems likely that when, in the autumn of 1945, the President precipitously ordered the liquidation of the OSS, he had but little knowledge of the organization and possibly even less of the R and A. The one redeeming feature was that among the ruins of Donovan's great agency, one wall was left standing intact--the R and A. The Bureau of the Budget recommended its assignment in toto to the State Department, the agency that in peacetime needed its services most and yet had no comparable establishment of its own. Colonel Alfred McCormack, an official with long experience in military intelligence, was appointed as special assistant to the Secretary of State to coordinate all intelligence operations within the department. I, who had never even met Colonel McCormack, was to continue to serve under him as chief of R and A. So far as my branch was concerned, everything went on much as before, except that the top personnel left in ever-increasing numbers to return to their universities.

McCormack's assignment was no sinecure. Few officials of the State Department welcomed the incursion of intelligence specialists, since they were firmly convinced that, reading the diplomatic traffic, they knew all they needed to know about foreign affairs. McCormack soon became involved in an epic organizational conflict. While he insisted that all the intelligence work of the department should be consolidated, the secretary finally yielded to the permanent officials and decided that the R and A staff should be broken up, and its regional sections assigned to the various regional desks. McCormack, who felt deeply on the subject, resigned at once, and I was appointed to succeed him. My sympathies were all with his views, but I agreed to serve for six months from February 1946 and make a real effort to get the program to work. I was well acquainted with many of the chief officials of the department, and I think succeeded reasonably well in establishing coordinated action through an Intelligence Committee. But I did not flatter myself that a real solution had been found and was anything but sorry when my term as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence ended and my good friend, Colonel William Eddy, agreed to take over and wrestle with the problem.

(The second portion of the article will appear in the September issue of the **Newsletter**).

ANNUAL REPORT (1977) OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

The Honorable
Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
United States of America

May 2, 1978

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

As chairman of the Advisory Committee on **Foreign Relations of the United States**, I take pleasure in enclosing the twenty-first annual report of the Committee, which includes representatives of the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, and the American Society of International Law. The Committee met on November 11, 1977, with officers of the Bureau of Public Affairs to discuss the current status and prospects of the distinguished **Foreign Relations** publication.

Sincerely yours,
Lloyd C. Gardner
Professor of History
Rutgers University

PERSPECTIVE

This is the 21st year in which an Advisory Committee broadly representative of the interests of the scholarly communities in the United States has met with officers of the Department of State concerned with the publication of **FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**. As usual the Committee has considered the course, pace, problems, and prospects of this publication and then met separately to begin preparation of its report for the attention of the Secretary of State and his staff. An important innovation of this year's meeting was the opportunity members of the Advisory Committee had for meeting separately with the staff of the Historian's Office. The members of the Advisory Committee were pleased with this innovation and hope it will be continued at future meetings. The importance of these discussions with Dr. David F. Trask's professional staff will become apparent in the remainder of the report. We would like to express at this point, however, our appreciation of the Historian's willingness to broaden the Committee's contacts with the professional members of his staff.

Because of the important subjects discussed at this year's meeting, and the concern felt by the Committee for the future of the **Foreign Relations** series perhaps it would be in order to repeat certain points made in the preamble to last year's Committee report. That Committee, chaired by Dr. Covey T. Oliver, prefaced its report with the following statement: "There is need for a sense of mission as to **Foreign Relations** to be developed throughout the government, without, however, diminution of the Department's leadership role."

Other general points were:

1. "**Foreign Relations** supports in a significant, equitable, and enduring way the principle of openness in government, which the American people have clearly shown they desire."
2. "Exponential increases of source materials require, as a general systems management principle, adequate, incremental increases in budgetary support for **Foreign Relations**. **The service function performed by this publication is not one that should ever be curtailed for lack of funds, as such curtailment inevitably would result in damage to the quality of the product.**"

These statements taken from last year's report are indicative of the continuing concern the Committee feels about the future of the **Foreign Relations** series and they inform the discussion of specific points presented below.

THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES

Throughout the meeting with members of Dr. Trask's senior staff and those with his regular professional staff one theme dominated: the future of the **Foreign Relations** series. Last year the Committee was presented with the plan to move to a triennial set of volumes instead of the current twelve volumes per calendar year. The reasons given for this decision stressed economic and bureaucratic efficiency. The triennial series will begin with the years 1952-1954. Additional triennial series are planned for the years beyond that date. It is difficult to speak with certitude about unpublished volumes as far away as the 1955-57 triennial set but from information given to the committee members the publication in letter press editions would look something like this:

1951	7 volumes averaging 1600 pages or a total of 11,000 pages for one year.
1952-54	17 volumes averaging 1600 pages for a total of around 25,000 pages for three years, or 8,500 pages for one year.
1955-57	12 volumes averaging 1,100 pages each or a total of 15,200 pages for three years, which will average out to 4,400 pages for one year.

The Committee notes with great concern that the curtailment in pages in the last triennial volumes means that for those years the series will be down to approximately 40%, in letter press, of the level established in 1951, which was already a large reduction from the number of pages for 1950 and previous years. It should also be noted at this point that the "special" volumes, for example the "Yalta" and "Potsdam" volumes of past years, would be included in these figures. Dr. Trask has assured the Committee both on the day of the meeting and in a subsequent letter that the impression given by these figures is misleading. As he stated at the meeting, the Department is contemplating an extraordinary increase in the total by adding microform supplements. The most obvious reason for resorting to that form of publication is cost. Admittedly the cost of reproducing documents in microform is a fraction of the cost of letter press editions.

The Committee members listened with great attention to Dr. Trask's presentation of budgetary and research problems connected with the **Foreign Relations** series which have led to this tentative decision. We are also aware of the tremendous increase in available documentation and with the Historical Office's role in securing declassification of documents for the series from other government agencies. Under any system of publication the problem of selectivity has become the crucial element in the continued success and quality of the **Foreign Relations** series. On these points the Committee finds itself in full agreement with Dr. Trask. The historian is to be congratulated in his desire to modernize production of the **Foreign Relations** series.

But in other areas, members of the Committee find themselves much more troubled and concerned about the direction in which the Historical Office seems inclined to go.

1. We are not convinced that the severe reduction of 60% and more of the letter press totals per year has been adequately justified. Various new savings pointed out by Dr. Trask have yet to be fully evaluated before a grim decision is made that the cost of the letter press series is prohibitive.
2. From our meetings with the professional staff we learned that the key element, selectivity, takes about as long for either form of publication. Thus the desire to bring the publication lag down to twenty years may not depend, after all, on instituting an alternative and/or supplementary form of publication. Indeed, many members of the professional staff felt that more stringent page limits would **extend** the time required to make defensible choices of documents and/or reasonable summaries of them.
3. There is no question but that publication in microform reduces the **immediate** usefulness of the **Foreign Relations** series.
4. The Committee also learned that the decision to adhere to a usual page limitation of 1,100 pages for each volume of the

triennial series 1955-57 was not imposed on the Historical Office from higher authorities, but was a limitation undertaken on its own initiative supposedly for budgetary reasons.

The Committee feels that many academics have used the letter press editions for teaching purposes and that scholars also use them as an important source index into the files of the Department of State. It should be remembered, as one member of the Committee pointed out during the discussion, that decisions made today will affect not only immediate budgetary matters but will have a potentially serious impact on scholars and other interested students of American foreign policy twenty or thirty years hence.

As was the case last year, the Historian, Dr. Trask, explained that his office is concerned not only with publication of **Foreign Relations** but with general research projects assigned by other branches of the Department of State, or generated internally within the H. O. One of the reasons given for trying to get down to the twenty-year gap was so that the Office could better perform its responsibilities in completing these research assignments. This Committee repeats with added emphasis last year's admonition against allowing the **Foreign Relations** series to decline in quality because of these other obligations.

To sum up: this year's Committee was given a much fuller presentation concerning the future of the **Foreign Relations** series under the triennial system. We are not completely satisfied by this presentation and indeed some of us are fearful that the future of the **Foreign Relations** series is not as secure as in past years. Those well-known budgetary considerations, which cropped up at every point, have apparently set in motion the search for alternative means of publication. The Committee feels, however, that before a commitment is made to microform publication further research should be done into ways and means of reducing costs by other means. Once adopted as a "supplementary" alternative, it may be that some future choice will amplify that decision so that the entire **Foreign Relations** series would be presented in this fashion except for index books. The Committee would be very unhappy with that prospect and joins with members of the professional staff in urging that a reconsideration of the letter press volumes for the triennial series be undertaken so that the seeming financial or budgetary constraints are not allowed to overwhelm other factors in arriving at a long-range decision.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES TO RESEARCH PROJECTS OF THE HISTORICAL OFFICE

Another theme which ran through the day's discussion concerned the parallel matter of the proper commitment to a continuation of the letter press volumes in the **Foreign Relations** series as compared to

other research projects. It was logical that these two problems should be considered together because, of course, they are interrelated. The Committee heard from various members of the professional staff about their own concerns that the **Foreign Relations** series not be shorted compared to research projects. The Committee's scope has been extended to cover these research projects but so far we have not really had any opportunity to engage in a full-scale discussion with the Historian or his staff concerning the implications of the Committee's responsibility or the Historical Office's plans and projections in this direction. Presumably, a lengthy or fuller discussion would allow us to form a more definite opinion about the work in this area. As it stands, however, we sense an important division between the Historian and the members of his professional staff as to what effort should be given to each area of responsibility. It was often said that one reason for an attempt to get down to the twenty-year gap was to permit the Historical Office to devote more man-hours and support facilities to research projects. The Committee can only repeat once again what was said last year that it trusts that no reduction in the Historical Office's commitment to the **Foreign Relations** series will result from these now additional duties. Some members of the Advisory Committee do wish this report to stress the positive aspects of the H. O.'s involvement in policy-related research, and to express the hope that in the future it will be improved and expanded.

Several times the question came up of whether or not in this regard, therefore, as well as for other reasons it would not be wise to have more frequent meetings of the Advisory Committee. The Committee at the present time believes that the meeting hours are too short and infrequent, with the result that much of the day's work is spent listening to briefings by the Historian and senior members of his staff. This does not allow for a satisfactory discussion of all the issues involved in the **Foreign Relations** series and the other projects of the Historical Office. The Committee would, therefore, formally recommend to the Historian a suggestion voiced informally several times that either more frequent meetings and/or lengthier meetings should be held.

PROBLEMS OF SECURITY CLEARANCE AS THEY RELATE TO PUBLICATION OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES

Last year and again this year the Committee was informed that a volume or volumes in the **Foreign Relations** series have been held up because the necessary clearance for a few documents has not been obtained. The Committee reports once again that it does not feel the national security requirements of the United States would be jeopardized by the publication of one or two "sensitive" documents in a volume of documents pertaining to U. S.-China relations back in 1949.* If, however, this consideration continues to hold up this or subsequent

volumes in the series, the Committee would recommend that it (they) be issued without including the document(s) in question.

In this regard the Committee was interested to learn of the possibility of a publication of a retrospective volume in the **Foreign Relations** series. Several of the volumes published for the late 1940s would have profited greatly from the inclusion of documents not available at the time the volumes went to press. A retrospective volume might be an excellent solution for the inclusion of documents which were not available for any number of reasons at the time of publication of the original volume. It urges the Historical Office to consider favorably the publication of such a volume on the late 1940s. The Committee understands that the papers are readily available now and can be collected without undue effort. But while it recommends this solution it does not in any way lessen its concern about undue delay in clearance of incidental documents for inclusion in the **Foreign Relations** series.

Also in this regard the Committee expressed interest in the possibility of the resumption of something like the old **Current Documents Series** which was abandoned in the 1960s for budgetary reasons. It would like to suggest that the Historical Office take this under consideration and provide an opinion on the feasibility of resumption of this series by the next annual meeting. It was hoped by members of the Committee that not only would public documents be included in a resumed series but also as many declassified documents as possible. The pending presidential executive order on declassification might, in fact, make such a series even more feasible than under the present declassification system.

*Since the Committee met, the problem in this instance has been resolved, although the general policy question remains unsatisfied.

INTRAGOVERNMENT DIFFICULTIES

For the second straight year the Committee closely inquired about the speed of general declassification of documents for scholarly research. The specific issue seems to be the way in which the State Department files are organized for the years 1950-1954. In earlier times the files could easily be separated or broken down year by year and opened as the **Foreign Relations** volumes appeared. The Historian has pointed out that the opening of the files is no longer tied to the publication of the **Foreign Relations** series. Unfortunately, this has had a very adverse affect on the files for the years 1950-1954. The National Archives and the Department of State seem to be at an impasse over how to deal with these files. The Committee recommends that at the next meeting of the **Foreign Relations** Advisory Committee

representatives of the National Archives be present so that some sort of discussion of this very serious problem be undertaken. As matters now stand, the documents for the years 1950-1954 may not be open for a considerable time, and for the first time the United States may fall behind other nations in terms of availability of materials for scholarly research. The Committee believes this to be an unacceptable situation.

There is also the matter of interpretation of the pending new executive order on declassification. It is clear that the executive order is regarded by the Historical Office as a very important advance over the present situation and one which will permit a speedier publication of the **Foreign Relations** volumes. Other members of the Department of State, other members of the Historian's professional staff, and other members of the government feel that there are loopholes in the executive order which may permit not earlier declassification but added delays in declassification of documents for publication. Once again the Committee feels that it would be very important to have a full-scale discussion of the executive order undertaken by members of the Historian's Office as well as representatives from the National Archives. In each of the instances stated above as well as those pertaining to earlier sections in this report the Advisory Committee feels that it could have been of some help in backing up any effort by the Historical Office to achieve speedier publication of the **Foreign Relations** series. It is useful to remind ourselves that the members of the Committee represent several professional societies with a vested stake in the **Foreign Relations** series and that by their reports and advice to the professional organizations which nominate them they might indeed be able to offer critical support at crucial moments for the Historical Office whether it is a matter of budget or some other technical problem.

SUMMARY

It is always less than satisfying to end a committee report on a note of uncertainty, but it is a mark of our concern and appreciation of our responsibility that we find ourselves troubled by much that was said at this year's meeting. The **Foreign Relations** series has long been established as the preeminent series of its kind in the world. Scholars do look to this series for their first research source when preparing monographs, but the real importance of the **Foreign Relations** series lies outside the academic community. There is, as last year's committee report stressed, the consideration of openness in government. The **Foreign Relations** series, produced as it has been in recent years by a highly professional and dedicated staff, is a demonstration that the principle of openness continues to take top priority in our government's attitude towards the public and indeed toward world opinion. The willingness to present these documents for extra-governmental scrutiny demonstrates a faith in democracy and a willingness to run a

few risks in its name. The decision in 1978 to shift to a less accessible form of publication, no matter how many additional documents might be presented, represents the kind of issue which should be decided not on budgetary grounds but on a much higher level of policy-making. It is the feeling of the Advisory Committee that a long-range commitment should be made now and reaffirmed from time to time to the continuation of the **Foreign Relations** series and to the publication of volumes both in size and quality which will match those currently being produced.

Respectfully submitted

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 5, 1978

Professor Lloyd C. Gardner
Department of History
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N. J.

Dear Professor Gardner:

The Secretary has received the twenty-first annual report of the Advisory Committee on **Foreign Relations of the United States**, and has asked me to thank you for it in his behalf, and to consider its comments carefully.

I note that most of your comments relate to the size and form of volumes published in the **Foreign Relations** series. The question is important, and we are giving it a good deal of study. We will have your counsel in mind as we continue this review. I can assure you that we intend to continue to make available in printed form a substantial, representative, and objective selection of the records of U. S. foreign policy.

At the same time, we intend to accelerate publication of the series, in response to long-standing scholarly and official demand; and we must address the facts of rising costs of printing and of rising quantities of documents, particularly other-agency documents, which are part of the foreign policy record.

We expect that new declassification procedures in the Department, in response to a forthcoming Presidential order, will greatly facilitate the process of reducing the **Foreign Relations** publication lag, from the present 27-28 years toward 20 years. These procedures will also mean that over the next few years, most of our records should begin to become available to the public at the National Archives years earlier than at present.

As a means of expanding the volume of publication at minimal cost, we are beginning as you note to consider developing microform supplements. Other organizations have turned to this expedient, notably the National Historical Publications and Records Commission.

We have made no decision on this as yet; a feasibility study is now under way by the Office of the Historian.

I do want to correct one misapprehension which appears to have arisen. Far from diverting resources from the **Foreign Relations** series to support official research, over the last several years we have reduced our research work in support of current policy and administrative functions to the lowest level in memory, in order to devote every possible additional man-hour to **Foreign Relations**. We are continuing to limit our research efforts very strictly, because the earliest possible publication of the record in **Foreign Relations**, on its own merits and as an essential step toward the earliest possible opening of the full record at the National Archives, remains a first priority objective.

On another point in your report, we will review the policies and procedures governing your Committee with a view to enhancing its ability to meet its responsibilities.

We were pleased that in the rigorous Administration review of advisory bodies last year, our recommendation for the continuation of your Committee was accepted. We also are pleased that the Committee now includes women members, in accordance with the President's desire for fully representative membership.

It is a pleasure to join you in acknowledging the important work of the historians who produce the **Foreign Relations** series, and in recognizing the continuing interest of the public in the historical program of the Department, an interest which the work of your Committee reflects.

Sincerely,

Hodding Carter III
Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs and
Department Spokesman

KENNAN AND CONTAINMENT: A REPLY

by

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University)

Writing about George Kennan, I have discovered in the past few months, has its hazards: one tends to spend a fair amount of time responding to colleagues whose concern to point out exceptions to generalizations is exceeded only by their zeal in finding them. At least the critique by Professors John W. Coogan and Michael H. Hunt in the March, 1978 **SHAFR Newsletter** had the merit of relative brevity compared to its predecessor (Eduard Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," **Foreign Affairs**, 56 [January, 1978], 430-440). I would encourage such other potential critics as may exist to emulate, or even surpass, their healthy example.

It did not occur to me when I described Kennan as having shown "a degree of foresight and consistency of strategic vision for which it would be difficult to find a contemporary parallel" (John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," **Foreign Affairs**, 55 [July, 1977], 886) that I would be understood as ruling out the possibility of finding in the vast body of Kennan's writings inconsistencies, anomalies, even curiosities, wonders, and prodigies. I even pointed out a few of these myself in the article that seems to have steamed so many sets of eyeglasses (pp. 881-884). I must say, though, that I have been surprised by the avidity others have shown in pouncing on these trophies and bearing them triumphantly into the pages of our scholarly journals.

Coogan and Hunt have given us three curiosities: a July, 1949 memorandum by Kennan suggesting the possible use of American military forces to eject the Chinese Nationalists from Taiwan; a March, 1948 memorandum (also cited by Mark) in which Kennan seems to be advocating military intervention in Italy; and a passage from NSC 20/1 of August, 1948 (which Kennan played a large part in drafting) favoring "by every means possible the development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples."

But Kennan canceled the recommendation on Taiwan the day it was issued, a fact Coogan and Hunt neglected to mention (FRUS: 1949, IX, 356n.). They might also have noted that Dean Acheson, whom they describe as having favored a "more modest" policy, had warned the National Security Council in March, 1949, that the United States might have "to employ modest military strength in Formosa in collaboration with other friendly forces." (FRUS: 1949, IX, 296). Kennan's

observations on Italy are not very surprising since he had never ruled out the possibility of military intervention under certain circumstances (see PPS 39, November, 1948, in FRUS: 1948, VIII, 208). All I had said in my article was that he did not place **primary** emphasis on it as a means of implementing containment. Nor is the reference to the Baltic States all that astounding in light of the fact that the United States still officially recognized the independence of those territories.

In using the term "consistency of strategic vision" I, of course, had in mind the general trend of Kennan's thinking over the years on the question of how national objectives were to be related to national capabilities, not his day-to-day pronouncements on specific issues. I regret that Coogan and Hunt focused on the latter at the expense of the former, for I would be the first to acknowledge (and indeed did in my article) that Kennan's thought has by no means been free of contradictions, misjudgments, and impracticalities. I would still maintain, though, that among prominent commentators on strategic and diplomatic issues since World War II, his overall record for both consistency and foresight would be difficult to match.

Finally, let me say that I share the concern of Coogan and Hunt regarding access to the Kennan Papers and government documents--after all, I wrote my article from precisely those sources. I would also reinforce their warning about the "peculiar power" of "former policymakers. . .who write felicitously." Where would the government (not to mention the historical profession) be if everyone did this? Trends like this need to be nipped in the bud at once.

MINUTES, SHAFR COUNCIL

April 12, 1978

The Council convened at 8:00 p.m. at the Albany Room of the Statler-Hilton Hotel in New York City. Present were President Akira Iriye, Vice-President Paul A. Varg, Council Members: Raymond A. Esthus, Joseph P. O'Grady, Armin H. Rappaport, Thomas G. Paterson, Betty Miller Unterberger, and the Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer Lawrence S. Kaplan and Warren F. Kuehl. Also in attendance were Warren I. Cohen, Neal Peterson, Milton O. Gustafson, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Richard W. Leopold, Leon E. Boothe, Nolan Fowler, Nina Noring, Harriet Schwar, Robert L. Beisner, Dorothy Borg, David M. Baehler, and David A. Rosenberg.

The Secretary-Treasurer's report opened with an observation of an error on the SHAFR letterhead. The expiration date for the terms of Council members Unterberger and Kimball should have been 1980

rather than 1981. The correction was the product of the always watchful eye of Ray Esthus. Warren Kuehl noted that Scholarly Resources, Inc., after a survey had turned down the proposal to publish the presidential addresses of the former chief executives of SHAFR; other publishers will be approached. The satisfactory condition of the budget reflects the appreciable rise in the number of members. When and if 79 delinquents renew their membership, the total will be 835 as of April 15, 1978.

The winners of the various Bernath prizes were announced. The Committee for the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize (Warren Kimball, chairman) selected as its winner James R. Leutze's **Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration**, published by the University of NC Press. The Article Award Committee (Robert L. Beisner, chairman) chose an article by a former Bernath Book Prize winner, Michael Hunt, "Americans in the China Market: Economic Opportunities and Economic Nationalism, 1890-1931," which appeared in the **Business History Review** in the fall of 1977 as the best of those submitted. Beisner then shared a concern of his committee about the terms of eligibility for the article award. They appear to be too vague. It was agreed that the committee should have a recommendation in time for the August meeting of SHAFR which would address itself chiefly to the problem of authors with distinguished articles but whose record also includes book publication. The chairman was also perturbed because of the low number of articles which were submitted--thirteen. He stated that the members-at-large were not making nominations. All articles submitted had been done by the authors themselves.

Nolan Fowler stated that the contract with Tennessee Technological University relevant to publication of the **Newsletter** expires at the end of this year, coincident with his retirement. This melancholy news was brightened somewhat by two considerations: first, Tennessee Tech was willing to continue its support of the **Newsletter** provided that its quality was maintained, and second, that Nolan himself would be willing to continue as editor for another year (through 1979) in order to initiate his successor at Tennessee Tech. William Brinker, an Indiana Ph. D. and a former student of Bob Ferrell, would take over the reins after Nolan steps down. Because of budgetary factors the university needs to know the SHAFR decision by August. Joe O'Grady proposed that the following arrangement be made with Tennessee Tech--a four year continuation which would include Nolan's final year as sole editor. There was unanimous approval by the Council along with a hope that Nolan's service would not end in 1979.

A similar loss in **Diplomatic History** became imminent when Armin Rappaport, editor, announced his resignation, effective February, 1979. At that time the University of California at San Diego will no longer provide the necessary financial infrastructure to support the journal. Armin will be in Europe on sabbatical leave that year, but it would have

been a comfort to know that he would resume the editorship upon his return. The Council decided that a notice of the impending editorial vacancy and loss of institutional sponsorship would be carried in the next issue of the **Newsletter**, coupled with the request that candidates for the position should contact the chairman of a special search committee at once.

Dr. Rappaport disclosed that he was recommending to his editorial board the addition of a couple of features to **Diplomatic History** which are found in some of the other historical journals. One would be the allocation of a section of the journal, hopefully in each issue, which would be devoted to a review of the current literature in a particular field of U. S. foreign affairs. Some of these essay-reviews would be solicited while others would be from volunteers with expert knowledge in a special area. Since **Diplomatic History** does not carry book reviews such a feature would be a most beneficial substitute. He also stated that once a year an annotated list of recently-completed dissertations in U. S. diplomatic history would be published in the journal. All present agreed that the proposed additions were excellent ones and commended the editor for his perspicacity.

The results of the questionnaire concerning the use of the **Foreign Relations** series which was recently sent to the Society membership by the National Office were discussed at some length. (See summary of this poll, and two others, on p.51). In the light of these figures, the question arose as to the role which the committee established in December and chaired by Dr. Richard W. Leopold should play. (The task of this committee was/is to explore the problem of "the future content and format of the **Foreign Relations** series"). Dr. Leopold affirmed that the members of his committee felt it should take action only if the Advisory Committee on the **Foreign Relations** series, half of whose personnel are members of SHAFR, is unable to perform effectively. This statement led to a query concerning the status of the 1977 report of the Advisory Committee. Betty M. Unterberger, a member of that body, disclosed that the report had been written and that it was being circulated to its personnel for comments before it was put into final form and submitted to the Secretary of State. (See pages 16-25) for the report and the comments of Hodding Carter III, Assistant Secretary, thereon).

Although it was quite clear from the results of the poll that the Foreign Relations series was deemed to be very important to members of SHAFR, the Council agreed that more statistical work would be necessary in order to refine the results of the survey. Since there was a clear consensus upon the questionnaire for support of published volumes of **Foreign Relations**, even if diminished in size, rather than the use of microforms, the Council was interested in a copy of a proposed amendment (authored by Sen. George S. McGovern and distributed to

members by Warren I. Cohen) to a bill being considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee relative to publications by the State Department.

AMENDMENT

HISTORICAL PUBLICATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Sec. (a) Congress finds that--

- (1) the Department of State publication, **Foreign Relations of the United States**, plays an important role in making the documentary record of U. S. foreign relations available to the Congress and the American public;
- (2) although alternative forms of preserving such record could afford modest cost savings, such savings are outweighed by the importance of continuing to make such record fully and widely available to the American public for practical and ready use; and
- (3) a generally-specified minimum size for such publication would endure such availability of such record.

- (b) The Secretary of State shall ensure that the number of printed pages in the volumes in the **Foreign Relations of the United States** series for all three-year periods beginning with 1955-57 shall be no fewer than two-thirds the number of pages in the volumes for the years **1946-49**.

Since this proposed amendment left a number of questions unanswered, such as whether it would preclude funds for microform reproduction, the Council did not endorse it. Instead, it authorized a letter to Senator McGovern, offering SHAFR's availability in helping to draft a document that would assure the continuation of the published volumes without foreclosing opportunities for alternative forms of reproduction.

SHAFR has long been interested in becoming the agent of the AHA in nominating members from the latter body to serve upon the Advisory Committee for the **Foreign Relations** series. Last August the then-president of SHAFR, Raymond A. Esthus, had been designated to raise this topic with the AHA. It was announced tonight that Mack Thompson,

Executive Director of the AHA, had responded in a polite fashion to the proposal, but had declined to obligate that organization to accept SHAFR's recommendations.

Samuel Wells summarized the unavailing efforts which he and Waldo Heinrichs had made to induce the State Department to continue the publication and distribution of the **Biographical Register** and the **Foreign Service List**. He declared that a request to the State Department would be filed soon under the Freedom of Information Act, asking that the **Biographical Register** be opened to scholars. If this request were denied, and Wells was certain that it would be, then a suit would be instituted against the Department. It was agreed that in that eventuality SHAFR would cooperate with a group of active and retired diplomats, the Committee for the Study of Diplomacy, in prosecuting the case.

In the absence of Warren F. Kimball, SHAFR representative to the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, Warren Kuehl stated that the sum of \$200.00 had been sent to that organization. The money had not come from the regular SHAFR treasury but from earmarking revenue derived from the sale of the Society's mailing list. An additional \$75.00 had been contributed through the generosity of Dr. Jerry and Myrna Bernath. (At a meeting of the NCC the next morning, it was announced that as a result of an anonymous donation of \$33.00 SHAFR had met the minimal figure asked of it for this year). The NCC, Kuehl said, was considering a request to its constituent bodies that a tax (special assessment) of fifty cents be levied upon each member in order to help finance its activities.

Milton O. Gustafson (Chief, Diplomatic Branch, National Archives) spoke at some length on the disposition of non-current records and the problems involved in the transfer of documents from the State Department to the Archives. He asserted that the Archives does not want materials unless they can be freed from major restrictions respecting their use. The new Executive Order, expected to be effective next month, is relevant to this question. It offers on the one hand the possibility of blanket declassification of materials after twenty years, but on the other hand the probability that documents originating in foreign governments will be kept closed for thirty years. The issue in part, he said, is a matter of definition. The Council agreed that President Iriye should write to the Department of State, asking for a definition of "foreign-originated information" and how the Executive Order is to be implemented.

President Iriye introduced a request from several members who are specialists in American-East Asian relations that an ad hoc research group on American-East Asian relations be established within SHAFR to promote scholarly activities and facilitate communication among the specialists. The Council approved unanimously the formation of the new group.

The Council reflected briefly upon the possibility that the National Archives would be separated from the General Services Administration, in accord with the recommendations of the AHA and OAH. Milton Gustafson pointed out, however, that even if this separation were effected, it was highly unlikely that the Archives would function independently; it would merely find itself under some other agency. "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!"

SHAFR is now fully committed to the task of revising S. F. Bemis and G. F. Griffin's long-outmoded **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States** (1921), and has approved an overall editor for the undertaking, Dr. Richard D. Burns (California State U, Los Angeles). The latter announced to the Council in December that he had prepared and submitted to the appropriate U. S. governmental agency a proposal for funds to finance a portion of the work. The Council tonight, though, was the recipient of a warning from Gregg Lint, one of the editors of the John Adams papers, that as the National Historical Publications Commission took on new projects they were added at the financial expense of the older ones. The trouble in large measure seems to be the unwillingness of Congress thus far to match its authorizations with appropriations.

The meeting adjourned at 10:30 P. M.

At the luncheon on April 14, Akira Iriye presided over the largest such gathering in SHAFR's history, 115 paying guests, joined by some twenty auditors who had come for the speech. Warren F. Kimball presented the Bernath Book Award to James R. Leutze, Robert L. Beisner the Bernath Article Prize to Michael H. Hunt, and Jonathan Utley introduced the Bernath Memorial Lecturer, David S. Patterson, who spoke on "What's Wrong (and Right) with American Diplomatic History: A Diagnosis and a Prescription." (This paper will be a feature of the September issue of the **Newsletter**).

SHAFFR'S GOVERNING BODIES (1978)

The date following a person's name indicates the year (at the end of December, in most cases) when that individual's term expires. Members of ad hoc committees are not listed here.

COUNCIL (Elected Members)

Joseph P. O'Grady (La Salle) 1978
 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
 1979
 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) 1980
 Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M)
 1980
 Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers, Newark)
 1980

(Past Presidents)

Armin H. Rappaport (U of Cal., San
 Diego) 1978
 Robert A. Divine (Texas) 1979
 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane) 1980

EDITORIAL BOARD, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Armin H. Rappaport (U of Cal., San
 Diego), editor
 Judith Hughes (U of Cal., San Diego)
 1978
 Michael H. Hunt (Yale) 1978
 Akira Iriye (Chicago) 1978
 Kinley J. Brauer (Minnesota) 1979
 Paul S. Holbo (Oregon) 1979
 Robert F. Smith (Toledo) 1979
 Thomas D. Schoonover (S W
 Louisiana) 1980
 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) 1980
 Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State) 1980

COMMITTEES

The person listed first in each instance is the chairman/woman of that particular committee.

BERNATH ARTICLES

Charles E. Neu (Brown) 1978
 Arnold A. Offner (Boston U) 1979
 Lester D. Langley (Georgia State U)
 1980

BERNATH BOOK

Ronald Steel (Yale) 1978
 Walter F. LaFeber (Cornell) 1979
 Robert Dallek (UCLA) 1980

Jonathan Utley (Tennessee) 1978
 Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
 1979
 Keith Nelson (U of Cal., Irvine) 1980

Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State) 1978
 Paul S. Holbo (Oregon) 1979
 Milton O. Gustafson (National
 Archives) 1980

PROGRAM

Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M)
 Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas)
 Leon E. Boothe (George Mason)

MEMBERSHIP

Ralph E. Weber, chairman
 Department of History
 Marquette University
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

Sadao Asada
 Department of Political Science
 Doshisha University
 Kyoto, Japan

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 Department of History
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Gerald E. Wheeler
 Dean, School of Social Sciences
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 San Jose, California 95192

Joseph M. Siracusa
 Department of History
 University of Queensland
 St. Lucia, Brisbane, Australia 4067

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
 DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of fifteen (15) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

Stuart Anderson (Claremont Graduate School), "1861: Blockade vs. Closing the Confederate Ports," **Military Affairs**, XLI, 4 (December 1977), 190-193. This article discusses the opposition of a number of prominent Americans, led by Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, to Lincoln's decision to blockade the Confederacy in 1861. Opponents argued that the blockade proclamation led directly to Great Britain's recognition of Confederate belligerency, because international law recognized blockades as legal only in time of war. Welles and his followers argued that Lincoln would have done better to have simply closed the Southern ports to commerce, and treated violators of this edict as smugglers.

The evidence shows that Lincoln made the right decision, however. A closure of the ports probably would have been regarded by Great Britain and France as a "paper blockade." Also, Britain's recognition of Confederate belligerency was as much due to Confederate activities, and to the reality of war, as to the blockade proclamation. As it turned out, the blockade was acceptable to both the British and the French; but a closure of the ports might have led these two powers to intervene in the conflict to secure Confederate independence.

Glen St. J. Barclay (U of Queensland), "Why the Best? A Plea for Regional Defence," **Pacific Defence Reporter**, IV, No. 8 (March, 1978), 53-58. Australia's longstanding preoccupation with the American alliance has encouraged that country's defense planners to acquire highly sophisticated but also highly expensive ships and aircraft from the United States. On all counts, however, the most likely military confrontation awaiting Australia would be with Indonesia, in circumstances which would probably not invoke the ANZUS Pact, and for which more expendable and more rudimentary weapons systems than, say, the F-15 Eagle or the **Perry**-class FFGs would be more appropriate. The United States Government might deplore the loss of defense contracts, but the actual utility of Australia as an ally could only be increased if that country were to acquire a genuinely credible regional defense capability, rather than continuing to purchase token quantities of weapons actually designed for fighting the Russians in Europe or the North Atlantic.

John M. Carroll (Lamar U), "A Pennsylvanian in Paris: James A. Logan, Jr., Unofficial Diplomat, 1919-1925," **Pennsylvania History**, XLV, No. 1 (Jan., 1978), 3-18. During the 1920s, the Republican administrations relied heavily on unofficial agents to conduct diplomatic relations with the League of Nations-sponsored

organizations which were set up under the Versailles Treaty. Refusing to join the League, the Republicans depended on unofficial diplomats to protect American interests in Europe. One of the important unofficial diplomats was James A. Logan, Jr., who served as an American observer on the Reparation Commission, 1920-1925. This essay is a case study of the important role played by Logan as a quasi-official representative of the United States during the 1920s. It traces Logan's career as an observer on the Reparation Commission and attempts to show the importance of unofficial American diplomats as a link by which the Republicans remained active in European politics despite their refusal to join the League.

James W. Harper (Texas Tech University), "The El Paso-Juárez Conference of 1916." Paper presented at the annual convention of the Texas State Historical Association, March 3, 1978. It examined the April-May 1916 meeting between Mexico's Minister of War Alvaro Obregón and United States generals Hugh Scott and Frederick Funston which had been called to ease tension between the two nations. Although the agreement fashioned by Scott and Obregón in a marathon session was ultimately rejected by the Mexican government, the conference provided time for the disposal of the **Sussex** crisis and temporarily relaxed the warlike mood on the United States-Mexican Border.

William O. Walker III (California State U, Sacramento), "Control Across the Border: The United States, Mexico, and Narcotics Policy, 1936-1940," **Pacific Historical Review**, XLVII, 1 (February, 1978), 91-106. By the mid-1930s the traffic in illegal narcotics from Latin America to the United States reached previously unprecedented levels. Especially in the case of Mexico, United States narcotic officials made overtures to their Mexican counterparts to deal more effectively with the situation. Although prior Mexican experience with drug control was unlike that of the United States, by 1940 officials in the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics persuaded Mexican authorities to adopt a policy nominally conforming to the legalistic-punitive policy of the United States. That this was possible without further straining already sensitive relations between the two countries was a testimony to the perseverance of Josephus Daniels and the Mexican public health department.

James A. Zimmerman (Tri-State University, Indiana), "Who Were the Anti-Imperialists and the Expansionists of 1898 and 1899? A Chicago Perspective," **Pacific Historical Review**, XLVI, No. 4 (November, 1977), 589-601. To historians, leaders of the anti-imperialist movement at the turn of the twentieth century were of an older, more conservative, generation than leaders of expansionism. They base this profile on a small sample of the "most influential" or the "opinion elite." This study, which focuses on the social and political characteristics of 227 Chicago anti-imperialists and expansionists, reveals that expansionism did not pit aging anti-imperialists against youthful expansionists at all levels of leadership. While competing leaderships in Chicago had much in common, the anti-imperialists were younger, less socially prominent, newer in residence, less Republican, less affiliated with Methodist and Presbyterian churches, more independent in political and religious affiliations, and more identifiable with reform activity than the expansionists.

PUBLICATIONS IN U. S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Phillip J. Baram (Boston State College), **The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919-1945**. 1978. Pennsylvania. \$27.50.

Alexander De Conde (U of California, Santa Barbara, and former president of SHAFR), **A History of American Foreign Policy**. 3rd ed. 1978. Scribner's. Two vols. Vol. I: **Growth to World Power, 1700 to 1900**. Vol. II: **Global Power, 1900 to Present**. Each volume is \$13.50 cl. or \$6.95 pb.

Thomas H. Etzold (Naval War College), ed., **Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784**. 1978. New Viewpoints (Division of Franklin Watts, Inc.). \$5.95 pb. All six chapters are by members of SHAFR.

Thomas H. Etzold (Naval War College) and John L. Gaddis (Ohio U), eds., **Containment: Documents on American Foreign Policy Strategy**. 1978. Columbia. \$6.95 pb.

Norman A. Graebner (Virginia and ex-president of SHAFR), **Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1975**. 1977. D. Van Nostrand Co. \$5.95 pb.

Lester D. Langley (Georgia State U), **The United States, Latin America and the Panama Canal**. 1978. Forum Press. 16 pp. \$1.25 pb.

James R. Leutze (North Carolina), **Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941**. 1977. North Carolina, \$17.95. Winner of Bernath Prize for 1978.

Ralph B. Levering (Western Maryland), **American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945**. 1976. North Carolina. \$17.95.

James K. Libbey (Eastern Kentucky), **Alexander Gumberg and Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1933**. 1978. Kentucky. \$13.50.

Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Tech), **The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 1941-1945**. 1978. Tennessee. \$12.50.

Lisle A. Rose (Historical Office, State Dep't), **The Long Shadow: Reflections on the Second World War Era**. 1978. Greenwood Press. \$16.95.

Donald S. Spencer (Montana), **Louis Kossuth and Young America; A Study of Sectionalism and Foreign Policy, 1848-1852**. 1977. Missouri. \$12.50.

Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas), ed., **WW2**. 1977. Scribner's. \$4.95 pb.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has available a large supply of its "Historical Series" of printed executive session hearings transcripts. The Committee will send copies, without charge, to those who request them. Scholars have found these volumes useful, not only for research in post-war foreign policy, but also for classroom use, giving students experience in primary source materials. A review of volumes I, II, and III appeared in **The Journal of American History**, 64, No. 4 (March, 1978):1070-73. The following volumes are available: I (1947-48), II (1949-50), III (1951), IV (1952), V (1953), and VI (1954). Persons interested in receiving copies for later years, as they appear, should request that their names be placed on the committee's "Historical Series" mailing list. Direct all inquiries to Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., 20510.

Richard S. Patterson (deceased) and Richardson Dougall (Historical Office, Department of State, retired), **The Eagle and the Shield: A History of the Great Seal of the United States**. 1976 (released 1978). Department of State Publication 8900. U. S. Government Printing Office. \$12.00. Has a considerable amount of information upon U. S. diplomatic practice.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

David E. Kyvig (Akron) and Myron A. Marty (St. Louis Community College at Florissant Valley), **Your Family History: A Handbook for Research and Writing**. 1978. AHM Publishing Corp. Pb. \$2.95.

Albert Norman (Norwich U) wrote four articles that collectively might be termed "The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977: A Critique" which were published in the Northfield (Vt.) **News and Advertiser** between December 1, 1977, and February 2 of this year. The titles of the articles were: (a) "What's This about a Canal?" (b) "To Keep or to Give Away a Canal?" (c) "Is it Canal Philanthropy or Canal Statesmanship?" (d) "The Panama Canal: Neutrality and the Burden of Responsibility." Photocopies of one, or all, of the articles may be ordered from the Norwich U library.

Stephen G. Rabe (U of Texas at Dallas) and Richard D. Brown (Connecticut), eds., **Slavery in American Society**. Second ed. 1976. D. C. Heath and Co. Pb. \$3.50.

Arnold H. Taylor (Howard U), **Travail and Triumph: Black Life and Culture in the South since the Civil War**. 1977. Greenwood Press. Cl. \$15.95; pb. \$4.95.

PERSONALS

The Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs has recently made grants-in-aid awards to these members of SHAFR: Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Tech), Stephen G. Rabe (U of Texas at Dallas), and Randall B. Woods (Arkansas).

Richard H. Bradford (West Virginia Institute of Technology) was recently promoted to a full professorship of history.

Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green) has received an NEH fellowship for 1978-9, and will be doing research, principally in Washington, D. C., and in London, for the purpose of completing a study of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1940 to the Korean War.

Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) will be a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D. C., during the academic year 1978-79. He will investigate, with respect to recent Administrations, the topic, "The Geographical Perspectives and Perceptions of American Foreign-Policy Makers."

Samuel F. Wells, Jr., has resigned from the U of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) so that he may remain at the Woodrow Wilson Center for the completion of the International Security Studies Program which he directs.

Effective in January of this year, Sister Rachel West was elevated to the position of associate professor of history and political science at Marian College (Indiana).

Wilton B. Fowler (U of Washington) is currently a visiting professor at Yale and will be there for another year. He's editing Col. Edward M. House's diary for publication.

Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton, and winner of the S. L. Bernath Memorial Book Award in 1976) has received a Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Fellowship for the academic year 1978-79, and will be working upon a political biography of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Charles De Benedetti (Toledo) has also been the recipient of a Rockefeller fellowship for the same period in order that he may complete a study of the topic, "The Antiwar Movement in America, 1961-1975."

Gregg F. Herken (Oberlin) will be at Lund University (Sweden) on a Fulbright this fall. While there he will direct a research seminar on "Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy." He will also be visiting professor at Yale next spring.

Irvine H. Anderson (Cincinnati) will use an NEH grant this summer as an aid in writing a book on the subject, "The Arabian-American Oil Company and American Middle Eastern Policy, 1941-1950."

Richard H. Bradford (West Virginia Institute of Technology) has received a grant from his school in order to do research on the topic, "United States and the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1926-27," a portion of which will be presented at the SHA convention this fall.

This summer Albert H. Bowman (Chattanooga), helped by a grant from the U of Chattanooga Foundation, will be investigating the subject of foreign affairs during the Jeffersonian era in the French Archives (Paris).

Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State) was recently elected as a member-at-large upon the Council of the American Studies Association.

Stephen G. Rabe (U of Texas, Dallas), aided by a grant from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, will be working this summer upon the project, "The United States and Venezuela, 1908-1976."

William Woodward (Seattle Pacific) was recently selected by his colleagues for the fourth annual university-wide Winifred Weter Faculty Award Lectureship.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Annual Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and is administered by SHAFR. The Bernath Lectures will be the feature at the luncheons of the Society, held during the conventions of the OAH in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lectures will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will concern himself not specifically with his own research interests, but with broad issues of concern to students of American foreign relations.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1980 Lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee not later than December 1, 1978. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Jonathan Utley, Department of History, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee 37916.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the Society's **Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1977 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute) |
| 1978 | David S. Patterson (Colgate) |
| 1979 | Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) |
-

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1979

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U. S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1978. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Ronald Steel, 204 Wooster Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1979.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1979, in New Orleans.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- | | |
|------|---|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
|------|---|

- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina)

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U. S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY DURING 1978**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U. S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1978. The article must be among the author's first seven (7) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1979. The Chairman of that Committee for 1978 is Dr. Charles E. Neu, Department of History, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02906.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the

successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1979, at New Orleans.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.).
1978	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)

SHAFR ANNOUNCEMENTS

Editorship of **Diplomatic History**

Because Armin Rappaport is relinquishing his editorship, SHAFR is soliciting statements of interest from suitable candidates.

Individuals interested should be able to demonstrate some competence in editorial work, either through publications or previous editorial experience. Institutional support is also necessary. The editor should be relieved of teaching responsibilities for at least one-fourth of his or her time. Some assistance is also needed, either through the assignment of a graduate assistant or the allocated help of a faculty colleague. In addition, the History Department should be able to absorb mailing costs (up to \$500 per year), photocopy work (up to \$500 per year), and whatever clerical/secretarial help is needed. Persons interested should contact the chairman of the Search Committee, Robert A. Divine, History Department, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712.

Prompt responses are necessary so that a selection can be made at the earliest possible date.

Individuals and/or firms who wish to advertise in SHAFR's **Diplomatic History** should keep these deadlines in mind:

	Fall Issue	Winter Issue	Spring Issue
Copy to be set:	August 15	November 15	February 15
Camera-ready copy:	August 29	November 29	February 28

For data concerning rates and mechanical requirements, call (302) 654-7713, or write to Daniel Helmstadter, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1508 Pennsylvania Ave., Wilmington, Delaware 19806.

OTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament is interested in obtaining bibliographies for its POLITICAL ISSUES SERIES. Topics that we are interested in include:

- a) Chemical/Biological Warfare
- b) Terrorism
- c) Nuclear Energy (Civil)
- d) Pacifism (Non-Violence)
- e) Scarcity (Energy and other Resources)
- f) Indo-China Crisis since 1973
- g) Military-Industrial Complex

Bibliographies should contain between 300 and 500 citations, be arranged topically, and include a brief introduction. Only typed manuscripts will be considered. For further information, please contact Susan Hutson, Series Editor, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University (Los Angeles), 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, California 90032.

Anyone having a bibliography (not necessarily limited to the topics above) that might fit into the above series, should contact the editor.

Books for Asia, a project of The Asia Foundation, has over the years provided many thousands of American titles to institutional libraries in Asia. The objective of the project has been to strengthen research resources in a dozen institutions which are interested in emphasizing American studies such as the American Studies Research Centre in Hyderabad, India; the Institute of American Studies at Seoul National University, Korea; the University of Islamabad, Pakistan; and several universities in Japan.

This project has existed by virtue of donated books and journals which have come from a variety of sources in the United States: scholars, special libraries, publishers, bookstores, and professional

organizations. Donations of materials, which are tax deductible, or questions about the program, may be addressed to: Books for Asia, 451 Sixth Street, San Francisco, California 94103. Phone: (415) 982-4640. All donations are formally acknowledged.

SHA FR'S 1978-79 CALENDAR

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|------------------|--|
| August 1 | Deadline, material for September Newsletter with publication one month later. |
| August 3 - 5 | SHA FR's fourth summer conference at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA. |
| August 17 - 19 | The 71st annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch, AHA, will be held at the University of San Francisco. SHA FR will hold a reception at this convention. |
| November 1 | Deadline, material for December Newsletter with publication one month later. |
| November 1 | Deadline, additions and deletions for SHA FR's Roster & Research List . |
| November 8 - 11 | The 44th annual meeting of the SHA will be held in St. Louis with the Chase-Park Plaza Hotel as headquarters. SHA FR will have a reception at this convention. |
| December 1 | Deadline, nominations for 1980 Bernath memorial lectureship. |
| December 28 - 30 | The 93rd annual meeting of the AHA will take place in San Francisco. SHA FR will have a full round of activities at this convention. With a few exceptions, all SHA FR officials begin their tenure during, or at end, of this convention. |
| January 15 | Deadline, nominations for 1979 Bernath article award. |

- February 1 Deadline, material for March **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for 1979 Bernath book prize.
- April 11 - 14 The OAH will hold its 72nd annual meeting in New Orleans with the Hyatt Regency as headquarters. SHAFR will host a full complement of "doings" at this convention. Among other things, Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) will deliver a paper in her role as winner of the Bernath memorial lectureship for 1979, and the announcement of the victors in the Bernath book contest and the Bernath article competition will be made.

RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRES SENT TO MEMBERS
BY NATIONAL OFFICE
(243 REPLIES)

I. **Foreign Relations** Series

	Never	Occasionally	Regularly	In Teaching
I have used the Foreign Relations	3	82	158	96
I have used microfilm	14	127	110	25
I have used microfiche	67	107	22	4
I prefer 114 microfilm		I prefer 33 microfiche		

I prefer **119** books over microform even though the number of documents is limited

I prefer **60** microform with a printed index volume over books if it provides substantially more documents

I prefer **91** a combination of books and microform

II. Membership

I am a member of **185** Organization of American Historians

166 American Historical Association

81 Phi Alpha Theta

69 Southern Historical Association

33 American Committee on History of Second World War

21 Conference on Peace Research in History

20 American Military Institute

20 Association for Asian Studies

20 Conference on Latin American History

9 Society of American Archivists

8 U. S. Commission on Military History

Eleven other historical bodies were listed with one or two members.

III. Suggested Needs and/or Programs for SHAFR

- 26.0%** 1. A subsidy for the publication of manuscripts, perhaps a series.
- 25.7%** 2. A prize for the best manuscript, probably annually, separate from the Bernath award.
- 25.0%** 3. Research grants to younger scholars.
- 22.5%** 4. Research grants to younger scholars engaged in multiarchival work.
- 18.5%** 5. A subsidy to a publisher for a series to encompass manuscripts between article and book size.
- 16.7%** 6. Financial support to the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History.
- 16.0%** 7. Publication of a list of dissertations in U. S. diplomatic history with a brief description of each.
- 13.7%** 8. An annual prize for the best article in **Diplomatic History**.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 50¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 75¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California - Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California - San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)

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