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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U. S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$8.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students, unemployed members, and retired members are \$5.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$125.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Beverly Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings in each issue of the **Newsletter**.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

What's Wrong (and Right) with American Diplomatic History? A Diagnosis and Prescription

by

David S. Patterson*

Some of you here today may have heard the first SHAFR presidential address given in 1969 by Alexander De Conde on the theme, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History?" I wasn't present on that occasion, although I must have read his remarks soon after they appeared in an early **SHAFR Newsletter**.¹ In any event, the title of his talk must have remained in my subconscious; for when I was asked to provide a title for my own talk, I immediately repeated Professor De Conde's of nearly ten years ago, even though I neither then recalled his paper nor even rediscovered it until later when I began to prepare these remarks.

De Conde's address, you may recall, was sharply critical of the state of American diplomatic history. He chided American diplomatic historians for sticking to "the surface of events" and lavishing extreme care on minute matters while avoiding "the challenge of large problems." Moreover, he deplored their elitism and self-satisfying patriotism. The result, he charged, was that they "have been condescending, and even racist, in their attitudes" and "have been uncritical believers in the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon, of Protestantism, and of their own way of life." He further complained about their lack of training in foreign languages which resulted in ethnocentrism and one-dimensional works. He called for "the diplomatic historian to become something of a new breed of scholar, one who understands and embraces intercultural relations, who know something about comparative history, and who thinks of foreign relations in the broadest of terms." His pleas for new areas of research included studies of emotional and nonrational aspects of diplomatic history and the utilization of the social sciences.²

***As the recipient of the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship for 1978, Dr. Patterson delivered this paper at the SHAFR luncheon (April 14) during the OAH annual convention in New York City. When he read this paper he was the visiting associate professor of history at Colgate University. During the present fiscal year (July, 1978-June, 1979) he is--and will be--a contract historian in the Historical Office of the Department of State.**

De Conde's paper was not entirely an isolated event. It appeared in fact almost simultaneously with criticisms of diplomatic history written by Thomas J. McCormick, Laurence Evans, Peter Paret, and Gordon Craig.³ While some of their criticisms paralleled De Conde's, they also stressed other weaknesses in the field. McCormick, for example, charged: "American diplomatic history . . . is trapped in increasingly sterile modes. Only a rethinking of the processes and the very meaning of diplomatic history will rescue it." He criticized diplomatic historians' preoccupation with "the isolated event, with inadequate regard for the evolving long term social setting within which that event took place." He further complained that if the larger context was introduced at all, it was described by "aggregate characterizations [which] are exceedingly vague and amorphous; [and] are not so much descriptive terms that enable us to understand the past as they are rhetorical conveniences for historians to impose their normative judgments on the past."⁴

II

These critiques offered nearly a decade ago can serve as a benchmark from which to appraise the present state of American diplomatic history. Specifically, I propose to demonstrate in this talk that I don't think past critical evaluations of our field have had much effect on the kind of scholarship produced in the past few years. To be sure, historians of American foreign relations appear, at least from a surface perspective, to be establishing their field successfully as never before. Membership in SHAFR, though founded only a decade ago, has climbed steadily until it now totals 835.⁵ That figure is quite large and compares favorably with all other historical societies limited to one subject area. The Society's decision to start its own journal, **Diplomatic History**, when there is uncertainty over inflation, as well as a plethora of other historical journals serving as outlets for publication in the field, attests to its confidence in the future.

A survey of the present state of the field of American diplomatic history also suggests some healthy developments. Diplomatic historians have come a long way since the first decades of this century when American diplomatic history was just emerging as a separate field of historical study. The focus of research has continued to broaden from the early, rather limited emphasis on international law, treaties, and formal note exchanges between governments to a lively interest in the role of ideology, domestic influences, multi-archival research (which is not really so new since Samuel Flagg Bemis pioneered in this area a half century ago) and cross-cultural perspectives, and stimulating treatments of the economic dimension of American foreign policies.⁶ More generally, the publication of numerous monographs in the past decade or so indicates that the field is becoming less parochial and nationalistic and more closely related to a much wider context of cultural, economic, and political forces. An especially hopeful sign has

been the growing number of studies on America's relations with the developing Third World.

The recent upsurge of revisionist studies critical of American foreign policy is another encouraging development. Though usually narrowly focused (in part because foreign, especially Russian, documents are unavailable) and often contentious in nature, these students are valuable for their critical perspectives, and they provide a healthy antidote to the reputation of American diplomatic history as dominated by "court" historians articulating the official government line on many foreign policy questions.

Moreover, my own survey of doctoral dissertations confirms that the field continues to attract a large number of doctoral students. In the past few years, one-eighth of all dissertations in progress or completed in American history were in American diplomatic history, and the proportion has held steady in this period and may be increasing.⁷

These cumulative achievements have been so impressive that even Professor De Conde now writes admiringly about the "transformation" of the field. In 1976 in a comprehensive review of books by American diplomatic historians, he concluded: "As the recent literature shows, their field, in its thematic assumptions, its interpretations, and its subject matter, has broken out of its formerly narrow political confines and is now more broadly humane than it has ever been."⁸

III

While conceding some advances, I find more remarkable the limitations of progress in my supposed speciality. Let me be clear on what I'm **not** complaining about. I'm not worried about ethnocentric or "court" historians dominating the field. I'm not even particularly bothered by the restricted scopes of many studies, although the titles and abstracts of most doctoral dissertations seem to indicate a concern with an investigation of a specific theme for a short time period.⁹ What does concern me is the conventional research methods, or methodology, practiced by diplomatic historians and their failure to utilize, let alone experiment with, new research strategies. Most important, the emphasis, it seems to me, is still on conventional narrative-analyses of specific episodes or themes, a preoccupation with facts and the existential uniqueness of events, and the linear development of accurate descriptive accounts. The emphasis on factuality over concepts and the uniqueness of historical events has derived from Leopold von Ranke's principles of scientific history and French positivism, both of which began to flourish in the nineteenth century. These principles overwhelmed historical scholarship for much of the twentieth century and gave it a distinctive collective identification. The consequences of this legacy for American diplomatic history, I maintain, have been particularly extreme.¹⁰ Indeed,

the best thing that can be said about many works in our field is that they have been limited to modest contributions to knowledge in correcting or elaborating on previous works.

Unfortunately, however, another of von Ranke's dicta--objectivity--has often suffered at the hands of contemporary historians. Their findings have led to unorthodox conclusions which in turn have provoked historiographical controversy. In the latter case, it is often not the facts that are at issue but the historians' interpretations of them. Sometimes the evidence clearly sustains one interpretation over another, but in some cases competing interpretations may have equal merit. Whether the reader approves of one or another may ultimately depend on his agreement with the political bias of the author.

The reasons for this multiplicity of views may involve the lack of long-term perspective conducive to a more dispassionate analysis, plus the incompleteness or unavailability of official records. In the past two decades, for instance, a historiographical debate on the origins of the Cold War has produced at least four major interpretative schools--conventional, liberal-realist, moderate revisionist, and radical (or New Left) revisionist--and several studies have blended elements of two or more of these interpretations. Not surprisingly, these diverse perspectives have thrown the subject into historiographical confusion; and, as a partial solution to this confusion, to exalt the maxim, "Every man is his own historian." Indeed, the wide variety of interpretations may make one wonder whether the pursuit of historical truth is worthwhile. It is now even fashionable for historians to complain that the debate over Cold War origins has become "nearly pointless" and "intellectually flabby."¹¹ Yet graduate students' fascination with the Cold War persists & may even be increasing in importance. My survey of recent doctoral dissertations at any rate indicates that nearly two-thirds of the dissertations listed as "in progress" or "completed" in American diplomatic history deal with the years since 1941.¹²

The unavailability of documents, however, is only one reason for this historiographical chaos. More important has been American diplomatic historians' ignorance of all but the most simple historical methods. Their methodological concerns have been intuitive or common sensical at best and preconceived prejudices at worst. In general, their continuing preoccupation with factual knowledge and the particular have resulted in works notable for their inevitable flatness, which a forceful prose style and judicious organization have only partially remedied in certain cases. Most dissertations and published works in the field as well lack intellectual rigor and tend to be analytically narrow and methodologically old-fashioned. Indeed, several dissertations seem merely to rehash in more detail multiple previous accounts.

SHAFR reflects this disinterest in methodological innovation. Of the nine presidential addresses of SHAFR (ten if Thomas A. Bailey's is

counted),¹³ all but two talked about their careers or some aspect of their own research interests which they described in conventional terms. The other exception (besides De Conde) offered some interesting reflections on recent developments in his field but concluded modestly: "We need more multiarchival work, many biographical studies of leading figures and lesser ones. We need examinations of the interplay of policy and economics as long as they are not . . . 'economically reductionist.' We need studies, both critical and understanding, of ideology, for example, the attitude toward revolutionary movements."¹⁴

Perhaps partly in response to this last suggestion, SHAFR organized two sessions at its 1976 summer conference on American responses to foreign revolutions, but neither the audiences nor those presenting papers expressed interest in developing a typology for understanding American rhetoric and behavior on these revolutions. The papers debunked grand theories of revolution and instead stressed the uniqueness of the revolutionary experiences and American responses to them. One commentator remarked that it was "fun" to use Crane Brinton's **The Anatomy of Revolutions** (1938, 1952) for comparing revolutions in the classroom, but that his book was still unsatisfying.¹⁵ His remark reminded me of an earlier comment by the sociologist, Robert Nisbet: "As one who, when [Brinton's] book appeared, sat daily at lunch in the Faculty Club at Berkeley with historians, I have a vivid recollection indeed of the scorn that could attend perception of a fellow-historian's betrayal of the fellowship."¹⁶

There is other evidence of a reluctance to chart new directions for the field. A poll conducted among the SHAFR membership two years ago on whether to broaden its scope to include all historians of foreign relations resulted in only 24% of the respondents favoring a change in name and scope, although another 19% voted to keep the name while in practice broadening the constituency.¹⁷ That a poll was actually taken is a healthy sign, and plausible arguments can be and in fact were advanced for opposing any change--in particular, the desire to retain a clear focus and sense of direction for the Society--but the results were nonetheless discouraging to those anxious to start a dialogue with non-American diplomatic historians and perhaps neighboring disciplines as well.

In sum, with a few exceptions historians of American foreign relations have avoided excursions into psychohistory as well as quantitative and comparative studies. Professor De Conde's survey of the field in 1976 argued that "[s]tudents of diplomacy . . . now self-consciously explore nonrational as well as rational, extreme as well as conventional, sources of individual and group behavior. Their study of aggression, conflict, and tension takes them into the principles of psychology, and social sciences. Few knowledgeable historians now see the cause of any war in terms of basically isolated political events."¹⁸ While this assertion may be true in the limited sense of utilizing

borrowed insights from social scientists on an **ad hoc** basis, diplomatic historians have barely begun to experiment with psychobiography, although their emphasis on the personal qualities of individual diplomats makes their field ideally suited for such an approach. The diplomatic historian, William L. Langer, called for the application of psychoanalytic theory to historical studies twenty years ago, but diplomatic historians have been slow to respond to this "next assignment."¹⁹ De Conde likewise argues that "the New Left emphasis on economic motivation" and "[t]o a greater extent the work of political scientists and social scientists in behavioral theory, decision making, quantification, and integrated social systems has been affected by this concern for theory. Historians could possibly immunize theory, but they could no longer ignore it."²⁰ Again, there is some truth in this statement, but what studies by diplomatic historians have been published in these areas? Indeed, it could be argued more persuasively that diplomatic historians are far behind other social science disciplines in the techniques of hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-testing.

IV

Thus far my diagnosis may have revealed a sick patient, but fortunately he is far from terminally ill. There are in fact a few preliminary indications of possible prescriptions for the present malady. Take, for instance, the area of quantitative international politics. The political scientist, J. David Singer, and diplomatic historian, Melvin Small, have written several studies using quantitative techniques in studying wars, alliances, and the national-state system. (A political scientist writing a preface to a book which Singer edited on quantitative international politics marveled at the "almost unbelievable" fact that some of the contributors were historians.)²¹ One of the Singer-Small studies attempted to ascertain the extent to which alliance aggregation caused wars between 1815 and 1945, and they tested two hypotheses: the greater number of alliance commitments in the system, the more war the system will experience; and the closer to pure bipolarity the system is, the more war it will experience.²² Similarly, they have tried to calculate the ranking of the diplomatic importance of nation states between 1816 and 1970 and to make explicit the criteria by which system membership and status ranks were established.²³ One aim in compiling this index was to test a variety of hypotheses regarding the relationship between the diplomatic importance of a state and its foreign policy behavior. They have also studied patterns of international violence between 1816 and 1965 in order to generate dependent variable data which was scaled, compared, and ranked on several dimensions: duration, location, participants, armed force size, battle-connected fatalities, identity of initiators, and victors for each of the wars. Their ultimate goal is ambitious.

To put it simply, we want first to discover what sorts of conditions and events are most regularly associated with periods and places characterized by the highest and lowest incidence of such violence. Once those patterns have been satisfactorily ascertained, we can move on to the more fundamental question: what events and conditions most

sharply differentiate between those international conflicts of the past 150 years which terminated in war and those which found another and less violent resolution.²⁴

Whatever the specific methodology, a major purpose of all such studies is to generate data for facilitating comparative analysis. Ultimately, they contend that the application of comparative methods should lead to the validation, modification, or invalidation of various theories of foreign policy behavior.²⁵

Recent issues of the **SHAFR Newsletter** indicate that a few diplomatic historians have responded positively to these developments. They have suggested a few research topics where simple as well as more sophisticated cliometric techniques can be used in diplomatic history.²⁶ Perhaps most interesting has been the awareness that individual quantifiers working in isolation can't do it all. Diplomatic historians will not succeed in achieving theoretical sophistication or higher standards of validity in their discipline unless they adopt a staged strategy of investigation in which historians, theorists, and computer specialists cooperate.²⁷

A cooperative strategy may in fact be imminent. Only a little more than a year ago came the announcement that the Social Science History Association (SSHA) had formed a steering committee composed of political scientists and historians interested in the application of theories and methods of the social sciences to the study of diplomatic history. This committee proposes to devise activities to "facilitate interchange between political scientists who perceive the need for more longitudinal work in the study of international politics and historians who appreciate the need for greater rigor and reproducible evidence in the study of diplomatic history."²⁸ A start in this direction was made in organizing panels at the SSHA meetings at Ann Arbor, Michigan, last October.²⁹ These developments will surely encourage those diplomatic historians interested in learning new methodologies in their field, and the recent burst of interest suggests that networks may be in the process of forming for further interchange between social scientists and historians.

But are they sufficient? A closer look shows that only a handful of diplomatic historians have articulated their interest in the value of quantitative techniques or other methodologies. Moreover, the diplomatic historians on the steering committee of SSHA, with a few exceptions, do not appear to be active in SHAFR.³⁰ Perhaps more important, historians' remarks in this area have been very general, even vague, and one senses a pervasive bewilderment among diplomatic historians at the immensity of the task ahead. They have given at best only a few examples of the kind of research projects that might be undertaken in the future.

V

What then is to be done? I believe, perhaps naively, that a broad-based, if hitherto latent, interest exists among American diplomatic historians for exploring new avenues for research, and they would welcome a strategy for broadening their exposure to social science research techniques. In any event, it would be worthwhile to test the prevailing sentiment. This can be done by holding an entire SHAFR summer conference around the theme of new research perspectives in American diplomatic history. Such a conference should be carefully

planned, though the actual sessions might be organized informally as workshops. All those planning to attend could be sent packets of materials in advance providing basic information on the program, a core of readings, abstracts of position papers to be given at the conference, & questions on the topics. The first session might include short papers and discussion by historians of American foreign relations on the present state of American diplomatic history and conclude with an attempt to arrive at a consensus on the strength and limitations of the field. The second session might include papers and rejoinders by political scientists (and perhaps economists) on recent trends in international relations, their critiques of American diplomatic history, and their suggestions for integrating their findings with the history of American foreign relations. The two groups could then meet & engage in a dialogue on previously agreed upon agenda of a few central topics—cliometrics, psychobiography, and public opinion are obvious topics—which might also include analyses of participants' written answers to an elaborate questionnaire filled out in advance on definitions, conceptual aspects, and the like. Discussion could focus on these written comments and hopefully lead to a tenuous consensus on several points and a clear articulation of differences on the remaining issues. The result should be a better understanding of the vocabulary and research methods of social scientists and a keener appreciation of how hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-testing might be implemented in American diplomatic history. Finally, the conference could get beyond generalities to specific applications of new methodologies to American diplomatic history.³¹

Such a conference is not necessary because the traditional research procedures are incorrect. Rather, the point is that the predominant research techniques in American diplomatic history are simply inadequate and should be supplemented. The time element is another good reason for such a conference. I am well aware of the many demands of academic life—preparing courses, teaching, grading, advising, committee work—and it is unrealistic to assume that my (or others') zealous championing of new methodologies will result in widespread conversion of nonbelievers. A conference carefully organized by a committee, however, could bring together those diplomatic historians as well as social scientists who are willing to contribute their special knowledge and argumentative talents.

It may be that other social scientists, especially those in international relations, will resist such overtures. Whatever explanations they may offer for their disinterest, the real reason may be their confidence in their own research strategy and goals. Their concerns appear to be directed toward obtaining material resources to finance their projects rather than exchanging ideas with historians.³² Indeed, I have so far received the distinct impression that they believe they have little to learn from diplomatic historians.

Whether or not other social scientists balk at cooperation, diplomatic historians can still make a positive contribution. One of the reasons for the present shambles in the historical profession, I contend, is its midway position between the

humanities and social sciences. This position is uncomfortable; and, in a time when methodological options cover a wide spectrum, has facilitated the process of specialization, fragmentation, schizophrenia, and alienation. It is wishful thinking, however, for traditional historians to believe that they can ignore the "fad" of new social science methods. These research methods are not a fad. Rather, they are a reflection of larger cultural norms and will be with us as long as these values predominate. But properly viewed as both an "art" and a "science," American diplomatic history **can** help to serve as a bridge between humanists and social scientists in two ways. First, we can utilize theory, model-building, and quantification of the social sciences to widen the parameters of our research and to find structures, patterns, and processes in events perhaps unknown to the participants themselves. Since almost all diplomatic historians are incorrigible humanists, they will continue to assert the value of more conventional studies and may not be sufficiently adjustable to try to develop new research designs. But they can borrow profitably in certain areas. They can use quantitative techniques, for instance, to simplify the tedious work of classifying and summarizing information, which is not controversial, while avoiding quantification in the controversial realm of advancing basic causal theories.³³

They can also draw upon the insights of social scientists in their teaching. A few examples will suffice here. One involves the investigation of public opinion on foreign policy questions. We now have an extensive literature on the inherent difficulties and pitfalls as well as possible benefits from a scientific analysis of public opinion.³⁴ We also have many public opinion polls sampling mass opinion since the mid-1930s. Instead of merely recounting in an impressionistic fashion the evolving relationship between President Roosevelt and public opinion in response to Axis expansionist policies between 1935 and 1941, as so many diplomatic historians have already done, the instructor might more profitably introduce evidence of Roosevelt's deep and continuing interest in at least certain aspects of public attitudes, material on Roosevelt's multiple sources of information, including polls, on public opinion, and the influence of opinion on his policies. Students could also be encouraged to utilize the polls as well as secondary materials on public opinion and foreign policy for a mini-research paper.³⁵ Alternatively, the same problem could be advanced for documenting more precisely deteriorating United States--Russia relations in the 1940s as Cold War tensions surfaced.³⁶

The Cuban missile crisis is another topic. Students could be assigned a conventional account lauding the Kennedy administration's handling of the crisis--say, Robert F. Kennedy's **Thirteen Days**--and for class discussion could first cite revisionist views questioning Kennedy's diplomatic "triumph."³⁷ Then the instructor could introduce the relatively simple but stimulating communication model developed by Ole R. Holsti and others which considered the involved nations' actions as well as the national leaders' perception of the other nations' attitudes and behavior toward their own nation. Holsti **et al.** also submitted to content analysis all publicly available documents by Russian and

American leaders during the missile impasse and then compared and contrasted these findings with other crises, such as the one of July-August 1914, that escalated into general war. Their conclusions are not particularly surprising, but they provide an interesting theory for the individual and comparative analyses of "crisis management."³⁸ Still a third approach would utilize the insights contained in Irving Janis' discussion of the role of group psychology among policy makers in foreign crises. Janis provides several examples of foreign policy disasters resulting from "groupthink," and the Cuban missile crisis epitomizes the model of successful avoidance of "groupthink."³⁹ Finally, the instructor could familiarize students with Graham Allison's alternative perspectives on the crisis.⁴⁰ The point is not to confuse the students with all these different approaches but to break away from exclusively conventional narratives of unique events to comparative analysis and interdisciplinary perspectives for enlivening the study of diplomatic history.

In the second place, our position of being located strategically on the fringes of the social sciences can be employed to criticize the methodology and conclusions of social scientists utilizing materials in diplomatic history. It is here that diplomatic historians can assert what is, and always has been, "right" with their field. One does not need to launch a full-scale broadside against "the dehumanizing methods of social sciences" or to admonish the faithful never to "worship at the shrine of that Bitch-goddess Quantification" to realize that the application of quantification to diplomatic history has serious limitations.⁴¹ Thomas J. McCormick pointed out nearly a decade ago some of the conceptual weaknesses of quantification. A more recent example of this kind of incisive criticism is Paul Schroeder's exposure of the methodological flaws in quantitative studies of the balance of power developed by the Situational Analysis Project at Cornell. This critique, which included responses from international relations' quantifiers and a final rejoinder by Schroeder, filled up almost an entire issue of **Journal of Conflict Resolution**.⁴² More generally, as Schroeder implied, diplomatic historians' humanistic perspectives should make them instinctively skeptical of intellectual certainty. This skepticism should lead them to point out how the mathematical models of the social scientist, far from empirically "proving" something, are often faulty in design, very narrow in scope, and totally divorced from reality. We can still mine the archives and draw upon our special skills in textual analysis of the documentary evidence to fill in the gaps of social scientists' explanatory models in international relations.

In summary, I am arguing that diplomatic historians need to be sensitive to the contributions of social scientists and utilize their insights in our teaching and research. John Higham has written on the differences between the product-oriented scholars interested in theoretical models and methodological debate and the product-oriented scholars whose main concern is the writing of complete, coherent works on specific subjects.⁴³ Though historians of American foreign relations fall overwhelmingly in the latter camp, we should be tolerant of process-oriented scholars and pick and choose those methods that

enhance our ability to generalize more confidently in our field. We will know better how to pick and choose and assert what is "right" about our craft if we are willing to meet with social scientists and discuss each of our strengths and weaknesses.

We live in an exciting time. Significant developments in many research areas relating to the history of American foreign relations are all around us, and breakthroughs may be imminent. Can we respond to these developments and perhaps contribute to further progress in the making of a more scientific discipline? I, for one, hope so. To ignore the challenge will be a confession of intellectual stagnation, but to meet the challenge will be a broadening, even exhilarating experience.

NOTES

¹Alexander De Conde, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 1 (May, 1970), 1-16.

²*Ibid.*, especially 6, 7, 8, 10-11.

³Thomas J. McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," in **The State of America History**, ed. Herbert Bass (New York, 1970), 119-141; Laurence Evans, "The Dangers of Diplomatic History," In *ibid.*, 142-156; Peter Paret, "Assignments New and Old," **American Historical Review**, 76 (February, 1971), 119-126; and Gordon A. Craig, "Political and Diplomatic History," in **Historical Studies Today**, eds. Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard (New York, 1971), 356-371.

⁴McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," 120-121.

⁵Remarks by the president, Akira Iriye, at the SHAFR luncheon, April 14, 1978.

⁶For recent treatments of literature in the field, see Charles E. Neu, "The Changing Interpretive Structure of American Foreign Policy," and David F. Trask, "Writings on American Foreign Relations: 1957 to the Present," in **Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy**, eds. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus, Ohio, 1971), 1-57, 58-118.

⁷The totals for dissertations in progress and completed in American diplomatic history and American history are as follows:

	U. S. Diplomatic	U. S. History	Percentage
May 1973-June 1975	144	1177	12.23%
July 1975-December 1975	21	221	9.50%
January 1976-December 1976	50	333	15.01%
January 1977-December 1977	42	296	14.19%
Totals: May 1973-December 1977	257	2027	12.68%

This information was derived from **Doctoral Dissertations in History, May 1973-June 1975** (Washington, D.C., 1976); **Doctoral Dissertations in History, July 1975-December 1975** (Washington, D. C., 1976); **Doctoral Dissertations in History, January 1976-June 1976** (Washington, D. C., 1976); **Doctoral Dissertations in History, July 1976-December 1976** (Washington, D. C., 1977); **Doctoral Dissertations in History, January-June 1977** (Washington, D.C., 1977) and **Doctoral Dissertations in**

History, July-December 1977 (Washington, D. C., 1978). Entries were checked for multiple listings, and duplicate entries were counted only the first time they appeared.

⁸Alexander De Conde, **American Diplomatic History in Transformation** [AHA Pamphlets 702] (Washington, D.C., 1976), 48.

⁹A few samples of narrowly-conceived dissertations (if their titles are any guide) include studies of the Marshall mission to China, 1945-1947; William Rufus Day, 1897-1898; and James F. Byrnes, 1945-1946.

¹⁰For the most recent interpretation, see Leonard Krieger, **Ranke: The Meaning of History** (Chicago, 1977), especially chs. 7 and 8.

¹¹Robert D. Schulzinger, "Moderation in Pursuit of Truth is No Virtue; Extremism in Defense of Moderation is a Vice," **American Quarterly**, 27 (May, 1975), 222.

¹²Cf. note 7 above.

¹³Bailey, the first president of SHAFR, did not give an address, but he later submitted a paper which he said he would have given in 1968 had been seen given the opportunity. Nolan Fowler, editor, **SHAFR Newsletter**, to the author, February 9, 1978. Bailey's paper was later published as "Confessions of a Diplomatic Historian," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 6 (June, 1975), 2-11

¹⁴Bradford Perkins, "What's Good for the United States is Good for the world, and Vice Versa: Reflections of a Diplomatic Historian," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 6 (March, 1975), 11.

¹⁵Robert Quirk, "The American Response to Foreign Revolution," unpublished paper delivered at the Bicentennial SHAFR Foreign Policy Conference, Columbus, Ohio, August 14, 1976.

¹⁶Jerome Demoulin and Dominique Moisi, eds., **The Historian between the Ethnologist and the Futurologist: A Conference Sponsored by the International Association for Cultural Freedom, by the Giorgio Cini Foundation, Venice, April 2-8, 1971** (The Hague, 1973), 116-117.

¹⁷"Minutes, SHAFR Council," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 7 (June, 1976), 9-10.

¹⁸De Conde, **American Diplomatic History in Transformation**, 48.

¹⁹William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," **American Historical Review**, 63 (January, 1958), 283-304.

²⁰De Conde, **American Diplomatic History in Transformation**, 40.

²¹Heinz Eulau, Preface, in J. David Singer, ed., **Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence** (New York, 1968), viii.

²²J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945," in *ibid.*, 247-286.

²³Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator," **World Politics**, 25 (July, 1973), 577-599. This "research note" updated and modified the procedures and rationale behind their earlier essay, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815-1940," *ibid.*, 18 (January, 1966), 236-282.

²⁴J. David Singer and Melvin Small, **The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook** (New York, 1972), 377.

²⁵Other essays in a similar vein by Singer and Small include "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," **Journal of Peace Research**, 3 (1966), 1-32; "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data," *Ibid.*, 6 (1969), 257-282; and "Patterns in International Warfare, 1816-1965," **The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, 391 (September, 1970), 145-155.

²⁶Thomas D. Schoonover, "How Have State Department Officials (or Diplomatic Historians) Behaved? A View from the Computer," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 7 (September, 1976), 12-17; Robert L. Beisner, "Diplomats, Diplomatic Historians, and Computers: A Note," *Ibid.*, 7 (December, 1976), 24-25.

²⁷Reservations and suggestions are developed in Harvey Starr, "The Quantitative International Relations Scholar as Surfer: Riding the 'Fourth Wave,'" **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, 18 (June, 1974), 336-368; and Stephen E. Pelz, "Caveat Computer: Beware of Drowning in the Fourth Wave," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 8 (March, 1977), 19-21. Starr accepts Karl W. Deutsch's division of the advances in international relations studies in four waves: international law, diplomatic history, insights in psychology, anthropology, and sociology, and quantitative methods.

²⁸"Other Announcements," *Ibid.*, 39-40. The formation of the steering committee has also been announced in "Diplomatic History and World Politics," **AHA Newsletter**, 15 (April, 1977), 8.

²⁹Two sessions participated in by both diplomatic historians and international relations scholars were entitled "Early Warning Indicators in Diplomatic History: From Post-Diction to Pre-Diction," and "Foreign Policy Decision Making in the European State System."

³⁰The exceptions include Alexander De Conde, Thomas D. Schoonover, and David F. Trask.

³¹One model for a format of a conference might be the two-day conference for peace researchers in history organized by Warren F. Kuehl at the Center for Peace Studies, The University of Akron, in May, 1974.

³²The preoccupation with funding was clearly articulated at the SSHA Conference at Ann Arbor in October 1977 by the University of Michigan political scientist, Warren E. Miller, in his comment on Lee H. Benson's presidential address, and I received the same impression at the sessions and meeting of the diplomatic history network. Melvin Small has also noted these differing perspectives on finances. "When the author tells historians about the amount of money the University of Michigan's Correlates of War project has spent since 1964 (\$244,500), they are astounded at such profligate waste. When he tells the same story to political scientists, they are usually surprised at the way the project has gotten along on a 'shoestring.'" Melvin Small, "The Applicability of Quantitative International Politics to Diplomatic History," **The Historian**, 38 (February, 1976), 286, Note 14.

³³See McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," 123-127; H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and the Social Scientist," **American Historical Review**, 66 (October, 1960), 23, 34-40.

³⁴See, for example, Lee H. Benson, "An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion," **Public Opinion Quarterly**, 31 (Winter, 1967-68), 522-567; Melvin Small, Ed., **Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives** (Detroit, 1970).

³⁵A bibliography on the subject would include Hadley Cantril, **Public Opinion, 1935-1946** (Princeton, 1951); George H. Gallup, ed. **The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971** (3 vols., New York, 1972), vol. 1 (1935-1948); Ernest R. May, "An American Tradition in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion," In **Theory and Practice in American Politics**, ed. William H. Nelson (Chicago, 1964); Richard W. Steele, "The Pulse of the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gauging of American Public Opinion," **Journal of Contemporary History**, 9 (October, 1974), 195-216; Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech," **Political Science Quarterly**, 72 (September, 1957), 405-433; Leila A. Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," **Public Opinion Quarterly**, 20 (Spring, 1956), 5-16; David H. Culbert, **News for Everyman: Radio & Foreign Affairs in Thirties America** (Westport, Conn., 1976). Of Bernard C. Cohen's many books on public opinion and foreign policy, the best introduction for the researcher is his **The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy** (Boston, 1973).

³⁶Two recent books exploring this theme are Michael Leigh, **Mobilizing Dissent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947** (Westport, Conn., 1976), & Ralph B. Levering, **American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945** (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976).

³⁷A recent review of the literature on the Cuban missile crisis, including revisionist critiques, is James A. Nathan, "The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now," **World Politics**, 27 (January 1975), 256-281.

³⁸Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, and Robert C. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis," **Journal of Peace Research**, 1 (1964), 170-190.

³⁹Irving Janis, **Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decision and Fiascoes** (Boston, 1972).

⁴⁰Graham T. Allison, **Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis** (Boston, 1971).

⁴¹Carl Bridenbaugh, "The Great Mutation," **American Historical Review**, 68 (January, 1963), 326.

⁴²Paul W. Schroeder, "Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power," **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, 21 (March, 1977), 3-22; Melvin Small, "Doing Diplomatic History by the Numbers: A Rejoinder," **Ibid.**, 23-34; Alan Alexandroff, Richard Rosecrance, and Arthur Stein, "History, Quantitative Analysis, and the Balance of Power," **Ibid.**, 35-56; and Paul W. Schroeder, "A Final Rejoinder," **Ibid.**, 57-74.

⁴³John Higham, "Comment 6," in Small, ed., **Public Opinion and Historians**, 175-179. Higham gives a more thorough discussion of this issue in his essay, "The Schism in American Scholarship," **American Historical Review**, 72 (October, 1966), 1-21.

WASHINGTON BUREAUCRAT AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORIAN

(II)

William L. Langer

(The first portion of this article, excerpted from the late Dr. Langer's memoirs **In and Out of the Ivory Tower**, appeared in the June issue of the **Newsletter**. The latter is privileged to reprint it through the courtesy of Neale Watson Academic Publications, Inc., of New York City. Professor Ronald E. Coons, University of Connecticut, has edited both parts of the article for the readers of the **Newsletter**, and, in the June number, supplied an obituary of Dr. Langer).

It had always been my intention, once the war was over, to return to my university, resume my teaching, and devote all available time to my projected volume on the early nineteenth century for the Rise of Modern Europe series. Indeed, I had no desire to continue with studies in diplomatic history. The Vichy study was a sort of "extra-tour," dictated by circumstances.

But fate determined otherwise. Well before I left Washington to rejoin my family at Annisquam in August 1946, I had allowed myself to be lured into another historical enterprise, and one of major dimensions. The Council on Foreign Relations had obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation a substantial four-year grant to finance the writing of a scholarly history of American policy during the entire war. I was the obvious man, it argued, to do the job, which would be of national interest and importance. I protested, but not too much, because the assignment was challenging and because, frankly, I was relieved not to have to lecture for some years. Having found that, as in the case of the Vichy study, the official papers would be available to me, and having been promised access by Admiral Leahy to such Chiefs of Staff documents as had a bearing on policy, I proceeded to enlist the full-time collaboration of Dr. S. Everett Gleason, whom I had known and liked for years and with whom I had been associated in the R and A.

I then discussed the matter at lunch with President Conant of Harvard, only to find him lukewarm at best. He doubted whether the Harvard Corporation would agree to grant me another four-year leave and seemed to think that, with my great knowledge, I could conduct my undergraduate work with my left hand, leaving the guidance of graduate students and the writing of the history to my right hand. I pointed out that in the social sciences even the preparation of lectures in an undergraduate course required constant reading and study and that the new project would involve a tremendous amount of research and even travel. But he remained essentially unconvinced and finally suggested

that I discuss the matter with Provost Paul Buck, who was largely handling matters of this kind during the president's absence in Washington.

Buck was a professional historian and a specialist in American history. My conference with him was a relatively simple matter, for he saw at once the great value of making available to the public a competent and coherent account of the war. He was worried about my graduate students, but completely satisfied when I blithely said that I would offer a full-year seminar, each year, at no expense to the university. I entered upon this commitment without realizing all its implications. With the return of young men from the war, the universities were quickly swamped by students at all grades. I found that instead of the usual eight or nine students, I had for several years as many as eighteen qualified and serious students, which meant an altogether unexpected burden of discussion meetings and grading of reports.

Without losing much time, Gleason and I managed to rent office space in Harvard Square just behind Widener Library. For a few months at least, I had the added services of my excellent secretary Frances Douglas. We collected all kinds of published materials and occasionally felt obliged to interrupt our work by prolonged visits to the Washington archives and consultations with officials. These visits alternated with stays in New York City to examine the voluminous Morgenthau Papers, and to Hyde Park to exploit those Roosevelt Papers that had been ordered and catalogued. It was not long before we realized that we had been entirely too optimistic in thinking we could complete the work in four years, especially since we were determined to produce more than a diplomatic chronicle and to attempt to set American policy in the political, economic, and military framework of four years of war.

Meanwhile, my favorite editor, Alfred A. Knopf, was busy producing the Vichy study, which we decided to call *Our Vichy Gamble*, reflecting the chance we took in preferring the hated Vichy regime to the glamor of De Gaulle's Free French movement. My reading of the proceedings of the Pétain and Laval trials only reinforced my earlier conclusions. It would have been pleasanter for me to have been able to join the chorus praising De Gaulle, but I was forced to conclude that Pétain, for all his political predilections and obvious senility, did what he could under trying and dangerous circumstances, to protect the French people from the worst aspects of Nazi domination. Even Laval, while he committed the stupendous blunder of publicly wishing for a Nazi victory, seems to have thought he was working for the best of his country. Fully convinced of the coming German victory, he thought a friendly though defeated France might fare better than the recalcitrant victims of Hitler's fury.

Our Vichy gamble was published in April 1947 and at once created a sensation, for it was the first study of a wartime problem based on the official records. Just about every commentator reviewed it at some length. I was all ready for a general and severe panning, so was rather gratified by the general tone of the commentaries. Few writers tried to label it an official apology. On the contrary, many noted that my views could be refuted on the basis of the material I so generously supplied.

Most of the critics thought it a well-written, exciting book, interesting whether one accepted its conclusions or not. Even Eric Sevareid, who saw nothing persuasive in the argument, held it to be "a completely fascinating account," and *Time*, which published my picture with the famous caption "Expediency First," conceded that the book was "the most thorough and respectable defense the United States policy had had." There were, of course, those like Lewis Gannett and Leon Edel who found little if anything to say in its favor. But my historical colleagues rated it highly. Carlton J.H. Hayes of Columbia, recently American ambassador to Spain, wrote: "It is authentic *history*, fully documented, objectively presented, lucidly phrased. It is as illuminating as it is interesting and sane." Lindsay Rogers praised it and Leo Gershoy declared that I had made "a monumental historical contribution," while Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. thought "Langer fully established the essential correctness of our Vichy policy." Even at a later date, so competent a critic as Eugene V. Rostow (writing in *World Politics*---I, 1949) could not overcome his ambivalence. He thought I had seen everything through the eyes of a small collaborationist clique at Vichy and had failed to appreciate the degree of support for De Gaulle. His conclusion was strange to say the least: "All the standard reasons advanced in defense of our Vichy policy turned out to be wrong. Yet," he argued, "the policy was right, not for the reasons given by Langer, but because at the time of our weakness it seemed the least dangerous of alternatives."

Since I was never arrogant enough to think I had found the answer to even the less thorny problems, I took what adverse criticism there was in my stride. But I became genuinely disturbed when, within a couple of months of publication, several French banks and a few individuals began to challenge statements in the book and threaten me with libel actions. To this end they sent a special agent to New York who discussed with prominent corporation lawyers the ways and means to set things right.

It so happened that the French agent turned to two of the leading law offices of New York, namely Sullivan and Cromwell and Coudert Brothers, and, to my great good luck, were then referred to Allen Dulles and Henry Hyde, respectively, who were partners in the firms and had been my associates and friends in the OSS. These gentlemen, after reading the voluminous records of the two French banks during the war and producing the judgments of three high French courts (especially that of the National Commission of Purification) to the effect that their conduct had been "above reproach," set themselves to explain that I was a professional historian in good standing, had been a high official of the government, had based my account on official documents supposedly trustworthy, and that I had no interest nor intention to denigrate the reputation of any Frenchman.

Letters passed frequently between New York & Paris, and I went to New York for personal conferences with the French agent. I explained that the sources of my information were war-time reports of several important American agencies, reports which must have been planted by enemies of the banks or of the Vichy regime. I agreed to make the necessary changes in any future editions and in the forthcoming French

edition. I promised further to publish in the *New York Times* and in two Montreal newspapers an explanatory statement.

The agent expressed himself as well satisfied with my response to his charges and the matter was closed on the above basis. But the affair dragged on from June to December 1947, when the *New York Times* finally printed the statement, with my regrets that misleading reports had led me to malign a number of patriotic and incorruptible Frenchmen. But I may as well mention here the quite unpleasant aftermath. In May 1948, while my wife and I were enjoying a short stay in Paris after a strenuous lecture tour in England, I received a cable from my colleague Gleason saying that plans were still afoot to start a libel suit, and that my New York lawyer thought it best that I should be warned. Knowing that the French police regularly scanned all incoming message, I took this almost as notification that the police would soon be on my trail. I must say that I did not relish a further stay, even in beautiful Paris, or a trial in courts with which I was quite unfamiliar. My wife and I spent a couple of uncomfortable, not to say apprehensive days until we were safely aboard the steamer at Cherbourg and heard the engines turning over. Perhaps the whole episode was based on a misunderstanding. In any event, nothing more was heard of this alleged threat.

While I was still engaged with the French in the controversy over *Our Vichy Gamble*, an even more violent though less dangerous storm of words was brewing in our own country. By way of preface I should say that while, in the 1930s, the question of responsibility for World War I was becoming quiescent, a new form of "revisionism" was flourishing in the United States. The erstwhile isolationists found new arguments in the revelations of congressional investigations and other materials, which, they alleged, demonstrated the stupidity and futility of United States intervention in 1917. Woodrow Wilson had been taken in camp by British propagandists and had been lured into active participation in the war by American munitions makers, bankers, and businessmen with a high stake in an Allied victory.

On June 9, 1947 Walter Trohan, of the *Chicago Tribune*, the chief organ of the neoisolationists, happened to read in the annual report of the Rockefeller Foundation of the substantial grant made to the Council on Foreign Relations to arrange for the writing of a history of American policy before and during the recent war "calculated to offset any debunking of war aims and policies." In the exact words of the Rockefeller Studies: "The Committee on studies of the Council on Foreign Relations is concerned that the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I should not be repeated and believes that the American public deserves a clear and competent statement of our basic aims and activities during the Second World War." Trohan saw in this passage a concerted plan to choke off journalistic comment or criticism. The passage was admittedly badly worded, but it only meant that controversy and recrimination might be put on a sounder footing, if more of the facts could first be presented by competent historians.

Trohan's opening gun was presently followed by a heavy artillery barrage opened by no less a person than Charles A. Beard, whose

article "Who's to Write the History of the War?" appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* on October 4, 1947. Beard, a senior member of the historical profession, had long taught at Columbia, was active in many reform organizations, & had authored numerous books on American politics & American life. I do not remember ever having made his personal acquaintance, but I had read a number of his publications & was well aware that he had a large and devoted following among those who were critical of the political, military, and social institutions and policies of the administration. A later generation of youth clubbed all these institutions together under the term "The Establishment," so perhaps one might call Beard an early pioneer of anti-Establishmentarianism. He had been dead opposed to President Roosevelt's policies and especially to our intervention in the war. The same was true of the *Saturday Evening Post*, so author and publisher were entirely congenial.

Beard's article was directed chiefly against government agencies and officials who made their records available to some well-disposed individual, who was then expected to write something akin to an apologia. It was clear to him that the Rockefeller Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations were intent on getting the official account before the public in order to head off hostile criticism, and Langer was their man. He had already had privileged access to State Department and other records in writing his *Vichy Gamble*. "Presumably," he would again enjoy special favors denied to others. In Beard's opinion "subsidized histories of this kind, prepared to serve a purpose fixed in advance, are more likely to perpetuate errors than to eliminate them..Official archives must be open to all citizens on equal terms, with special privileges for none; inquiries must be wide and deep as well as uncensored, and the competition of ideas in the forum of public opinion must be free from political interests or restraints."

Beard's plea was at once supported by the *Washington Post*, the *New York Sun* (in which George E. Sokolsky described the Council on Foreign Relations as "a stuffed-shirt affair of highbrow internationalists who meet occasionally to discuss the affairs of the world"), and, of course, by other isolationist papers. The ensuing debate was too lengthy and acrimonious to be repeated here. I wrote a letter to the editor of the *Saturday Evening Post* pointing out that Gleason and I had not been given a monopoly of State Department records and that there was not and could not be any question of censorship of our conclusions. I suggested that if Beard's search for the truth had carried him even so far as the State Department Bulletin, he could have read, in the May 25, 1947 number, that "It is the policy of the Department that its records be made available to persons not officials of the U.S. Government as liberally as circumstances permit" and lays down the procedures to be followed by applicants. I might interject here that one of Beard's stoutest supporters and one of the most active isolationist writers, Charles Tansill, had in fact been allowed to see State Department records and, what is even more astounding, that Beard himself had never once in his long career, asked to see even a single document. Incidentally, he had accepted a subsidy of \$25,000 from the

Social Science Research Council to write an earlier book on the national interest, but, he argued--though on what basis remained obscure--that his subsidy was an entirely different matter from ours. So, no doubt, was the \$500,000 subsidy given James T. Shotwell for his multivolume *Economic and Social History of the War*. It evidently mattered greatly who got the subsidy from whom and for what.

These points seem to have made little impression on the editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, who had throughout the war been a bitter opponent of the Roosevelt policies. He replied to me that he would gladly publish my letter if reduced to about 150 words, and to this Beard might then respond as he wished. This offer I rejected out of hand: If the *Post* could afford to give Beard half a printed page for his original attack, it could certainly allow me space for an adequate reply. Pleading that his journal was really anxious to publish my reply, the *Post* editor offered to give me perhaps an additional fifty words. It was clear that this great organ with its huge circulation was not going to publish anything contrary to its own editorial views. I turned elsewhere, and had no difficulty in getting the *Washington Post* (Nov. 9, 1947) to publish my letter in reply to Beard in extenso. To this, Beard published in the same paper, a feeble and evasive reply a week later.

This rather disagreeable episode might be closed by referring to Beard's address to the American Political Science Association as reported in the *Washington Evening Star* on December 30, 1947, when he went out of his way to say that he had no objection to Professor Langer but thought that the materials should be made available to all. This was the last that was heard of the redoubtable Beard, but the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, in a long article on January 16, 1948 entitled "A Hired Liar" launched a violent attack on *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, in which an article by me appeared in company with others such as Mr. Stimson, Mr. McClary, Sumner Welles, and Anthony Eden. Here was sufficient evidence of an interventionist, Anglophile clique. The anonymous writer ended by expressing confidence that Langer would give them their money's worth.

While Beard's charges bordered on the ridiculous, based as they were on "presumptions" and on practically condemning a book before it was written, to say nothing of the errors and misleading statements, I would not want to suggest that there was not then and still is a serious problem of access to government documents. In my opinion *Our Vichy Gamble* did serve to enlighten public opinion about the objectives of our French policy and so headed off much speculation and futile argument. Despite the unfortunate phrasing in the Rockefeller Annual Report, the objective of the Council on Foreign Relations (which existed for the free exchange of all sorts of ideas) was simply to provide the basic facts on which judgment could be passed. Gleason and I were asked to do the job, because we were known to be well qualified, independent, and objective historians. No one in or out of the State Department would have thought for a moment that we would lend ourselves to a whitewash or even that it would be possible to influence our opinion--and no one ever did.

But this still leaves the question of whether public records should be made available to all on equal terms, and after what interval they should be opened to scrutiny. I am sure that if Beard had applied he would have been given the same privileges as we had. It was simply a question of professional competence and of purpose. Obviously, no government wants to have hack writers rummaging in its records in the hope of making a scoop.

Recently, most major governments have reduced the traditional fifty-years closure of archive material to thirty or even twenty years, and they have been far more ready than before to publish important documents. Unfortunately, the publications usually lag far behind the present, and the thirty-year rule is still excessive. In the United States the controversies evoked by the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair have resulted in massive leakages of government records, often leaving the administration in a position far more compromising than if the materials had been made available much earlier.

To find the remedy is not easy, because governments must of necessity keep certain information secret for security reasons, if for no other. Unfortunately, it is far easier to have a document stamped "secret" or "top secret" initially than it is to have the classification reduced or abolished later. If the mountains of government archives were to be systematically declassified, a team of hundreds of highly qualified personnel would be required over a period of many years.

Something can be learned from the procedure adopted for Gleason & me while writing the volumes that so aroused the ire of Beard & others. It was decided at the outset that the manuscript should be reviewed only for security considerations. For the rest, the innumerable unpublished documents that we adduced were to be declared automatically declassified and open to any qualified historian. Since we were writing about events roughly ten years after their occurrence and since not a single objection was raised to this procedure, even by foreign governments whose papers had found their way into our files, I submit that a sound solution would be to generalize this rule. It would not be unreasonable to expect applicants to submit two or three letters supporting their competence and purpose and their willingness to submit their manuscript for a security check. The interests of the United States extend over an entire, fast-moving world. Even if matters of importance in a democracy could be kept secret for twenty or twenty-five years—and we know that they cannot—it is wise not to keep the country in the dark. Policy makers and other officials will probably be more circumspect if they can no longer reckon on the protection of prolonged secrecy, & the public is apt to have greater confidence in its government if it is better informed about the course of events.

While Gleason and I were working at top speed against an impossible deadline, the international situation degenerated to the point where our efforts might well prove meaningless. The first Arab-Israeli war ended in the establishment of an Israeli state, yet was fraught with all kinds of dangers for the future. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia raised the question of how communism was to be contained. The Berlin airlift, one of the really heroic episodes of modern

history, suggested the virtue of persistence. On the other hand, the Soviet atomic bomb put an end to Western monopoly of the horror of horrors. In these times of unknown dangers a short visit to Europe under pleasant circumstances promised a welcome break. My good friend and fellow historian, Dame Lillian Penson, had been named vice-chancellor of the University of London and joined with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in inviting me to come to England to deliver a few lectures. I accepted with enthusiasm, and my wife and I sailed on the *Queen Mary* early in April 1948. The Marshall Plan was then being debated in Congress. I therefore chose as the subject of my three lectures "The American Attitude towards Europe," the very reverse of the subject frequently treated in other books. For my Chatham House lecture I decided on "The Mechanism of American Foreign Policy," attempting to trace the complicated committee systems through which Congress eventually arrived at a decision. The sixteen European powers which had drafted the European Recovery Plan were following the debates in Congress on the necessary funds. I assured my audiences that after all that had gone before it was unthinkable that the United States would turn its back on Europe. I was more than a little gratified when events bore out my assurances.

After my London lecture, we went to Paris for something over two weeks, where I had conferences with many of my French colleagues--Renouvin, Girard, Donant, etc.--as well as with military men such as General Weygand (who seemed old and taciturn), General Bergeret, and Admiral Fernet. The high point of our stay, however, was a lunch given by the Count and Countess de Chambrun at their beautiful home near the Invalides. The Countess is the daughter of Pierre Laval and her utter faith and devotion to her father and unshakable conviction of his patriotism were really quite moving. The company, then, was strictly Vichyite, including M. Isorni, the chief counsel of Marshal Pétain at his trial and now, twenty-five years later, one of the leading French jurists. I was told by the Count de Chambrun that Madame la Maréchale, the wife of the imprisoned Marshal Pétain, would like to make my acquaintance; so one afternoon my wife and I appeared at her apartment for tea. It was a strange experience: The Maréchale sat as though enthroned with all the leading lights of the Pétainist group around her listening to her complaints against the heartless French government, which refused to alleviate the lonely lot of "the hero of Verdun."

On my return to Cambridge I found my collaborator working long hours on our study of American foreign policy. I pitched in, and never was able to work further on my London lectures, although *The Mechanism of American Foreign Policy* was presently published in England and soon also in Germany.

By this time the first volume of our book, later published under the title *The Challenge to Isolation*, was all but complete. It took American foreign policy and world developments from about 1937 to the conclusion of the Destroyer Deal in September 1940. But when our four-year grant expired in 1949, we were still struggling with the draft of the second volume, which appeared eventually as *The Undeclared War* and ended with the Pearl Harbor attack. We regretted that we had not been

able to do much more than half our assignment. The Council on Foreign Relations was eager to have us continue and would no doubt have found the necessary funds, but neither Gleason nor I had the courage and strength. The writing of contemporary history is like the work of Sisyphus. The constant flow of new materials makes it almost impossible to arrive at any conclusion.

The Challenge of Isolation was published in 1952, while *The Undeclared War* appeared in September 1953. To discuss the reviews of the second volume would be otiose, for they obviously had little to add to the reviews of the first. The great majority were favorable, not to say enthusiastic. While they did not all subscribe to every conclusion of the authors, they commended in the highest terms the comprehensiveness of the account, making it "a world history of a critical time." They had nothing but praise for the solidity of the scholarship, for the cool and dispassionate style, for the readiness to criticize as well as approve American policy. Leading experts stamped it a monumental contribution to scholarship. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (in the *New York Post*, September 3, 1953) called it a "stunning exercise in professional history at its best"; Samuel F. Bemis (in the *New York Times*, September 6) thought it "a work of which America scholarship and men of good will everywhere may justly feel immensely proud"; while Lindsay Rogers (in the *Saturday Review*, September 26) declared that it "will long remain a monument of American historical scholarship."

But just as the first volume had its Beard, so my erstwhile "friend," Harry Elmer Barnes led the pathetically feeble assault on the second. Barnes, now on the staff of the *Chicago Tribune*, published several pamphlets. The first was a classic exposition of the thesis that President Roosevelt and his henchmen knew of the coming attack on Pearl Harbor and permitted it to take place as an excuse for leading the country into war. This preposterous notion, according to most reviewers of our book, was not supported by even a scintilla of evidence. A second pamphlet reviewed all the maneuverings and deceptions by which the minions of Wall Street gradually led the feckless Americans into the war to save the wily British.

But the third pamphlet, published, probably in 1954, without identifying place or publisher, was entitled *The Court Historians versus Revisionism* and was largely a personal attack on me for having sold my skills for vile pelf. Despite what he considered the wrong-headedness of the authors, Barnes had to admit that the book was probably "the most elaborate example of the work of court historians in the whole history of historical writing and the smoothest and most adroit job ever turned in by a court historian, from Sallust to Robert Sherwood. . . . The excellence of this exercise in court historiography is exactly what an informed person would expect of a man possessing the great intellectual ability, amazing industry, vast learning, and high literary talent of William Leonard Langer." What a tragedy that such gifts should be employed for such sordid purposes! I could not possibly, in brief scope, review Barnes's entire invective, laced as it was by errors and by

amazing information acquired at second or third hand. Surely one of the most ludicrous of Barnes's notions was that after my return to Harvard in 1927, I had come to move among "the best people" in Cambridge and Boston, whose Anglomania knew no bounds. The Harvard atmosphere was no longer congenial to a stalwart revisionist, especially one of German descent, so I decided to shift my ground by "parachuting to safety" by becoming a confirmed interventionist. It must have been at least a consolation to the author that the Langer-Gleason books would supply enough material to stimulate revisionist writing and publication, and "provide a great armory of ammunition for Revisionists, who can take these facts and give them their logical and realistic historical application."

Barnes could not resist ending his abuse on a sad note. Great were his lamentations: "As I recall the William Leonard Langer of 1923 to 1940, I still would like to believe that, although he has now attained riches and eminence as a result of his voluntary servitude, nonetheless, he has moments of acute nostalgia for the old Clark [University] days when, even if he earned only \$4,000 a year [I never had more than \$3,700], he eagerly searched for historical truth, independent, and unafraid, and breathed the fresh air of scholarly freedom, as befitted a brilliant and rising young craftsman."

Fortunately, I never suffered the nostalgia nor pangs of conscience which Barnes so vividly evoked. Both Gleason and I felt that we had done a creditable, honest job and were happy to be awarded one of Columbia University's *Bancroft Prizes* for American history. Barnes and his fellow isolationists continued their assaults on Roosevelt and his policy, but I am sure I am right to say that for American and foreign scholars the basic account of the critical years before Pearl Harbor is still that of *The Challenge to Isolation* and *The Undeclared War*.

WAR-BENT DEMOCRATS?

by

Thomas A Bailey

(Professor Bailey hardly needs any introduction to the members of SHAFR. Now professor emeritus of history at Stanford University, he has had a most enviable record both as a teacher and writer in the area of U. S. diplomatic history. [Dr. Bailey outlined his career in a humorous fashion in the June 1975 issue of the **Newsletter** under the title, "Confessions of a Diplomatic Historian"]. To the Johnny-come-latelies of our Society--and they comprise well over a majority of the membership--it may come as a surprise to know that Professor Bailey was the first president of our organization).

In the **Newsletter** of March 1977 we find a stimulating article by one of our most respected members. [Presidential address of Robert A. Divine: "War, Peace, and Political Parties in 20th Century America"]. It argues with considerable persuasiveness that since 1900 Democrats have been much more prone to involve the nation in war than Republicans. This is one of the most enduring bits of American folklore, and is often coupled with the countercharge that Republicans are more likely to get the country into depressions.

Statistically, there is much to be said in support of both propositions, but the bare figures alone do not tell the whole story. No administration ever welcomed a vote-killing depression and none ever really wanted to leap wholeheartedly into a bloodbath. The conclusion follows that circumstances beyond the control of the incumbents have often helped to bring about the undesired results. The inexorable business cycle is no respecter of political parties. And every one of our foreign wars of any consequence since the Republican party first took office in 1861 was the result of getting sucked into a war of some sort that already existed or, as in the Philippines, was merely dormant.

As for the Republicans, why begin with 1900? This approach omits entirely the Civil War, which the Republican Abraham Lincoln forced on the South rather than permit the Union to dissolve peacefully. Over 600,000 lives were lost, roughly as many as in all of America's foreign wars combined. Also, by beginning our analysis in 1900 we can neatly skip the (Republican) Spanish-American War and the subsequent (Republican) Philippine insurrection, which erupted in 1899 and lasted well into the next century--at a cost of perhaps 200,000 Filipino lives.

The article in the **Newsletter** points out that from 1900 to 1977 there have been four more years of Republican than Democratic

administrations. Yet, we are told, under the Democrats there have been thirteen years of war and only four under the Republicans (Richard M. Nixon). Superficially, this evidence seems damning until we note that the "peaceful" Eisenhower years set up war-fraught situations that bore bitter fruit under Democrats. Have we so soon forgotten Secretary John Foster Dulles' "brinkmanship" and his good fortune (and Dwight D. Eisenhower's) in being able to bequeath to the Democrats the Bay of Pigs debacle and the Indochina quicksands? If Dulles (and Eisenhower) had not sabotaged the Vietnam armistice achieved at Geneva in 1954, there probably would have been no Vietnam War for Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to embrace with gradualism.

The pacific Republican President, Richard M. Nixon, while a candidate, promised in 1968 "to end the war" and "win the peace." Yet he actually enlarged the Vietnam conflict by blasting Cambodia, first secretly and then openly, thus prolonging hostilities until 1973--obviously a longer period by several months than America's official participation in World War II. And Republican President Gerald R. Ford was no cooing dove of peace when he assaulted the Cambodians at the time of the **Mayaguez** incident. Nor should we forget that a major criticism of President Lyndon B. Johnson by many Republicans, after they had unanimously voted in both houses of Congress for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, was that he did not plunge in promptly with both fists and bomb the elusive enemy back to "the stone age."

Lady Luck at times has smiled more on Republicans than on Democrats. Under Eisenhower a half dozen or so explosive situations developed, including Dienbienphu, Quemoy and Matsu, the Suez blowup, the U-2 affair, and Lebanon. Yet Ike emerged without smelling too much of gunpowder. The peaceful warrior actually "ended" the Korean War more than six long months after his inauguration by reportedly threatening to use the nuclear bomb, only he did not end it. A quarter of a century later there is still only an uneasy armistice line, stained by the intermittent bloodshed of scores of casualties, and the North Korean intervention was a UN war, strongly supported at the outset by the Republicans in Congress. The Democratic Harry S. Truman was fighting, at least ostensibly, to contain Communism (a hard-line Republican objective) and to save a peace-keeping organization, the successor to the League of Nations. Wilson's organization had failed and World War II had come, partly because Republican partisans had managed to keep the United States in outer darkness.

President Woodrow Wilson, hating war passionately, did not purposely drag the United States into war in 1917. German U-boats began to sink American merchant ships on the high seas, thus defying his **Sussex** ultimatum and forcing the Republic into the conflict. Republicans and Democrats in Congress alike strongly supported the war resolution. Also in a strict sense Franklin Roosevelt did not take the United States into World War II. Japan, Germany, and Italy all declared war on the United States first, and in Congress Republicans and Democrats both responded with virtually complete unanimity. The lone,

one-time dissent came from Republican Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, which proved nothing important.

The article in the **Newsletter** further suggests that Democrats are prone to get us into war because they are idealists on fire to remake the world with busybody organizations like the League of Nations or the United Nations. In the cases of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, both atypical Democrats, the creation of these bodies emerged as a primary objective only **after** America had entered the two wars. The natural hope then developed that some vehicle for averting future global conflicts ought to be salvaged from the costly turmoil. And let it not be forgotten that in the campaign of 1916 Republican candidate Charles E. Hughes, backed by a frothing Theodore Roosevelt, was much more "hawkish" toward Germany than was Wilson, who had really "kept us out of war" up to that point.

Another bothersome question, obviously unanswerable, naturally arises. How differently would the Republicans have acted if they had occupied the seats of the mighty during any of the wars they had to view restlessly and critically from the sidelines? Their cry, "Who Lost China?" actually helped to prod Democratic presidents into Korea and Indochina.

From 1861 to 1970 the armed forces of the United States conducted scores of invasions of sovereign foreign countries, chiefly by landing Marines on the shores of the banana republics. Fourteen of these undeclared interventions came under the theatrical Theodore Roosevelt, a Republican who loved war as no other president ever has. After considerable friction with Japan, he gambled recklessly in 1907-1909 by sending the fleet of battleships around the world into Japanese waters, where it almost certainly would have been wiped out if Japan had chosen to attack. But "Roosevelt luck" held. Even "Cautious Cal" Coolidge, Republican president, 1923-29, had a "private war" going in Nicaragua that involved 5,000 United States troops.

From 1688 to 1945 there have been nine world wars. The American people, whether as colonials or as citizens, have been sucked into all of them. The odds are not good that we shall be able to keep out of World War X, regardless of what administration happens to be in Washington, whether bellicose Democrats or pacifistic Republicans. The eruption of a great global conflict bears some resemblance to the inevitability of explosive natural phenomena, and there is little point in encouraging quantifiers to discover whether there were more sunspots or great natural disasters under one party than another. The Republican years from 1900 to 1913 were particularly bad from this standpoint, and would include the great San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906. Not even President Theodore Roosevelt's busy Big Stick could stir up this much distraction or destruction.

As long as we are involved in the statistics of bellicosity, let us take a quick look at the Indian wars from 1861 to 1900, when they approximately ended. There were fourteen armed clashes or campaigns of some significance under Republicans and only two under Democrats. During these three decades there were seven Republican presidents and only one Democrat, Grover Cleveland, elected twice.

Dark-colored horses injure many more riders than white horses. Is this because color makes them more fractious? No, it is because there are many more of them.

The administration in Washington at any given time is American, whether Democratic or Republican. Both parties are vitally concerned with acting in what they conceive to be the national interest, if for no better reason than winning re-election. We have no way of knowing with certainty how the other party would have performed in a given situation if it had been in power. Probably, about the same course would have been followed, sooner or later.

Sir Edmund P. Hillary, the conqueror of Everest, was asked why he had climbed the towering peak. "Because it was there" was his reported response. "Because it was there" could well be the answer from the ghosts of the American political leaders who fought Britain in 1812, Mexico in 1846, Spain in 1898, the Kaiser in 1917, the Fuehrer in 1941, the North Koreans in 1950, and the North Vietnamese in 1965. Wars may not be inevitable, but their combustibles are ever present, regardless of party.

KENNAN AND CONTAINMENT:

A SURREJOINDER

Eduard Mark

(The following paper is the third of a series in the **Newsletter** upon the general topic of what George F. Kennan said, implied, or meant in his writings upon foreign affairs of some three decades ago. The first, by John W. Coogan and Michael H. Hunt and titled "Kennan and Containment: A Comment," appeared in the March issue. It was critical of an article by John L. Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," that was carried in **Foreign Affairs** of July, 1977. Gaddis replied in the June number of the **Newsletter**, not only to the Coogan-Hunt paper but also to one by Eduard Mark, published in **Foreign Affairs** last January. Now, as stated above, comes the third instalment of the exchanges. Since the problem has had as of this issue a thorough ventilating, the **Newsletter** will not be open to a further discussion of this topic.

The editor is regretful, to a degree, that the pages of the **Newsletter** were opened to this controversy. This is not to be construed as meaning that this publication shuns criticism, rebuttals, or even acrimony. (See, for example, elsewhere in this issue an article by Dr. Thomas A. Bailey which is quite critical of a former SHAFR presidential address). But "storms brewed in other men's worlds"--in this case **Foreign Affairs**--should, we firmly believe, be settled in those "other worlds." The initial article in this series (Coogan-Hunt) was accepted only because its authors made a strong plea, in closing, for the early release to the scholarly community of the public papers of those individuals who have been prominent in U.S. governmental affairs. Since this objective has

long been a cardinal one with SHAFR it was felt that publication of the article would help significantly in achieving that goal. That desideratum seems, however, to have been lost sight of in the later exchanges).

In his reply to John W. Coogan and Michael H. Hunt in the June, 1978 issue of the SHAFR **Newsletter** John Lewis Gaddis asserts that I, together with Coogan and Hunt, have been led by a misplaced zeal to find "exceptions to generalizations" into misinterpreting both his reading of containment and the policy itself. By coupling the claim that all he had said in his article was that George F. Kennan "did not place **primary emphasis**" on military intervention as a means of implementing containment with the cheerful admission that neither did Mr. "X" rule it out, Gaddis implies in unmistakable fashion that his three critics unfairly minimized the role of military power in his interpretation of containment while exaggerating its importance to Kennan. In his rejoinder to my article in **Foreign Affairs** he was explicit: I had written that containment was "primarily military" or at least "equally military and political".

After our initial exchange I sent Gaddis a letter of clarification, which he duly acknowledged, in the belief that he had merely failed to understand my essay. But now that he has misstated my position for the second time, I am reluctantly led to the conclusion that he has attempted to score debating points by using as a foil the extreme and simplistic position which he inaccurately attributes to me. Gaddis's claim that his conclusions relative to the military dimensions of containment represent the mean in this debate is hardly more correct.

In his article Gaddis allowed military power only a small and inherently passive role in containment. Kennan valued it, Gaddis wrote in his only reference to the subject, as a factor that would facilitate negotiations with the Soviets--but chiefly by bolstering American "self-confidence". The military aspect of the Soviet threat was given equally short shrift; Kennan believed that fears of military action by the USSR were "groundless", but was eventually "forced to admit" that military guarantees by the United States would facilitate the reconstruction of Western Europe by easing the unjustified fears of its inhabitants. Here again a subjective need for "self-confidence", which had no objective relationship with Soviet intentions or methods, was the sole justification for military measures that Gaddis ascribed to Kennan. (John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment", **Foreign Affairs**, 55 [July, 1977] 880, 882).

My fundamental criticism of Gaddis was that his exposition of Kennan's analysis of Soviet motives was so incomplete as to be inaccurate, as a consequence of which he consistently minimized Kennan's fears of the Soviet Union, I then proceeded to demonstrate how this shortcoming affected his treatment of both the means and the scope of containment. With respect to the former I observed that Gaddis had slighted the military facets both of the policy itself and of the bid for world conquest that it was to counter. Contrary to what he seemed to have assumed from his reading of the diplomat's memoirs, Kennan did not believe that Soviet expansionism was **intrinsically** "political", but

only that it had assumed "political" form because of the military superiority of the United States. He warned, indeed, that if the Soviets gained strategic military superiority they would not shrink from using it "for a moment". Repeatedly, therefore, Kennan called for the maintenance of American military superiority to deter overt Soviet aggression as well as to assure America's allies. I then explained that he believed the Soviets, thus deterred, would pursue their hegemonic designs covertly through subversion. This would sometimes take violent forms--Civil Wars, insurrections, etc.--and in certain instances the United States would--as Gaddis now concedes--be obliged to intervene militarily. (Edward Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis", **Foreign Affairs**, 56 (January, 1978), 430 - 435).

A moment's reflection on the distinction between containment as deterrence and containment as intervention will suggest that there is no simple answer to the perennial question, how much of containment was to be "military" and how much "political"? Insofar as the policy entailed the deterrence of open aggression by the armed forces of the USSR it was consistently "military", but in a sense more potential than actual as Kennan **generally** foresaw no difficulty in forestalling rash moves by the Soviets. But to the extent that it contemplated armed interventions against the minions of Soviet expansionism it was partially "military" in an active sense.

Whether such interventions were to be more numerous than those of a strictly "political" character I did not attempt to say, Gaddis's allegations notwithstanding. It was not my purpose to establish a simplistic equation of "military" to "political" containment. My objectives were rather (1) to call attention to the two "military" dimensions of containment, deterrence and intervention, that Gaddis failed to discuss, and (2) to suggest that much of the controversy about the degree to which containment was "military" has stemmed from a failure to distinguish between the two. The present debate has developed not because I--or Coogan and Hunt--have overemphasized the importance of military power in Kennan's scheme but because Gaddis all but ignored it in his article.

* * * * *

FINALE

John L. Gaddis

Whatever the merits of Eduard Mark's views on containment, there is certainly no question about the tenacity with which he pursues them. I find in the views expressed above, however, little that Mark has not said elsewhere. Rather than take up further space here, I would simply refer those few readers whose interest in this controversy persists to my original observations on Mark's argument, published in the January, 1978 (number of) **Foreign Affairs**.

Minutes of SHAFR Council

The Council met at George Mason University, Fairfax, Va., August 5, 1978, in conjunction with the Fourth Annual Convention of the Society with Akira Iriye, Paul Varg, Raymond Esthus, Warren Kimball, Betty M. Unterberger, Lawrence Kaplan, and Warren Kuehl in attendance. Other members of SHAFR appeared to report on specific matters.

A written report regarding eligibility of scholars for the Bernath Article Prize, prepared by Robert L. Beisner immediate past Chairman of the Article Prize Committee, was adopted with one negative vote.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 19... The author must be under forty years of age, or within five years after receiving the Ph. D., at time of publication. The article must be among the author's first five (5) that have seen publication. In addition, only those authors who have not published a book (excluding edited works or compilations) are eligible. The author need not be a member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

This clarified the meaning of "younger scholar" in terms of specific years and also extended the concept of older persons who may have entered the profession late. Discussion centered on whether this still constituted discrimination against older persons. It also changed from 7 to 5 the limit on the number of articles a person has written. In addition, the Council reviewed administrative procedures by dropping the requirement that nominators supply five copies of the essay and by stating that articles may be nominated by any member of SHAFR and by the Bernath Article Prize Committee itself.

The search for an editor of **Diplomatic History** is proceeding smoothly according to a communication from Robert Divine who is chairing the search committee. At least four individuals have shown an interest in the position, but there is still time for other members of the Society to express their inclination by writing to the chairman.

The Council again pondered the implications of Executive Order 12065 relating to the opening of U.S. Government records in foreign affairs after the passage of twenty years and of foreign-originated materials after thirty years. Akira Iriye presented responses from his correspondence regarding the latter, and various Council members reported on discussions within government circles regarding the 30-year ruling. The president was authorized to write a letter to the proper authorities, again asserting the interest of SHAFR to have the broadest possible implementation of the Order. The Council agreed, too, that a summary of the Executive Order should appear in the **Newsletter**.

A discussion was held on pending Congressional legislation concerning the fixing of the number of printed volumes in the **Foreign Relations** series. Wayne Cole reported on various drafts of bills and committee considerations and noted that during the week of August 6 a House-Senate conference committee would seek an agreement on terms and wording of a bill. The Senate appears friendly to the publication of a considerable number of volumes, but the House has raised questions on this issue.

The Council received the resignations of Larry Kaplan and Warren Kuehl as the joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer and talked about procedures to be followed in finding their replacement. It was agreed that an announcement of the resignation should be printed in the **Newsletter** along with a job description & in this way elicit responses from members who might be interested in the position. It was likewise determined that the Council would act as a committee of the whole in conducting a search for, and in approaching, qualified persons for the post.

Betty Unterberger, speaking of the concern of women members of SHAFR, introduced three resolutions regarding the Equal Rights Amendment. Reservations were expressed about the Society becoming involved in political issues. It was pointed out, however, that SHAFR's primary aim is to support and promote scholarship in diplomatic history and this matter affects a substantive number of members who would feel constrained not to attend meetings in states which have failed to ratify the amendment. In three separate tallies, with two negative votes each time, the following resolutions were adopted in the order of their consideration:

RESOLVED, that after meeting its present convention obligations, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will not schedule any future conventions in states which have not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment.

RESOLVED, that the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations endorses ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution.

RESOLVED, that the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations endorses House-Senate Joint Resolution 638 which calls for a seven-year extension of the ratification deadline for the Equal Rights Amendment.

Theodore Wilson personally reaffirmed the invitation extended last year to have SHAFR's Fifth Annual Convention in Lawrence, Kansas, early in August, 1979, and the Council formally accepted the offer. He noted that members should send suggestions for papers or sessions at the Convention to him at the U of Kansas.

Waldo Heinrichs declared that a request which had been submitted to the State Department for access to the **Biographic Register** under the Freedom of Information Act had been ignored. He asserted that he and Sam Wells are continuing to pursue the matter with the possibility of legal action increasingly likely.

VALEI

May 17, 1978

Dr. Akira Iriye, President, SHAFR
5603 South Dorchester
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Dr. Paul A. Varg, Vice President, SHAFR
Department of History
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan 48824

Dear Akira and Paul:

This is to inform you of our intention to relinquish our joint position as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR. We have derived considerable satisfaction from being able to serve the Society, but a number of factors, not the least of which are our own pressing commitments, makes this decision necessary.

Having said this, we recognize that it may take some time to find our replacement, and we are thus providing ample notice for a satisfactory canvass to be conducted. There is no logical best time for a transfer of the reins, but we presume it will correspond with the academic budget year. Thus a logical date would be midsummer or fall, 1979.

Attached is a "job description" for applicants to consider. It includes estimates of what costs must be assumed by the sponsoring university. We suggest the appointment of a committee to search out and evaluate applicants. Of course, we will assist in every possible way, especially in weighing applicants in relation to the institutional support provided.

We are addressing this letter to you jointly, because it raises a matter which will involve the presidencies of both of you.

Sincerely,

Warren F. Kuehl
Department of History
University of Akron
Akron, Ohio 44325

Lawrence S. Kaplan
Department of History
Kent State University
Kent, Ohio 44240

Joint Executive Secretary--Treasurer of SHAFR

WANTED: A MULTI-PERSON!

I. Duties of Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR:

A. Coordinate the operational details of the National Office:

1. Take care of daily correspondence in all areas.
2. Make up and mail agendas for Council meetings.
3. Prepare certificates for life members and Bernath prize winners.
4. Work with all committees of Society.
5. Superintend preparation of name labels for mailing the (a) annual **Roster & Research List**, and (b) quarterly **Newsletters**.
6. Frame and mail notices of meetings and ballots.
7. Tally and record results of ballots and other survey data.
8. Arrange for conventions and conferences:
 - a. Plan activities for members of SHAFR at the AHA, OAH, SHA, and PCB. Also help in planning annual SHAFR conference.
 - b. Secure facilities for these meetings.
9. Oversee printing:
 - a. SHAFR stationery--letterheads & envelopes.
 - b. Brochures for recruitment of members.
 - c. Programs for SHAFR annual conferences.

B. Execute specific obligations with respect to members:

1. Respond to inquiries.
2. Receive and deposit dues.
3. Acknowledge new memberships.
4. Compile statistical data from time to time concerning members.
5. Work closely with Membership Committee, especially in providing lists of delinquent members.
6. Keep up-to-date list of members and addresses.

C. Maintain liaison with **Diplomatic History :**

1. Provide mailing labels each quarter to Scholarly Resources, Inc., for both regular and recent members.

2. Attend to correspondence with editor of **Diplomatic History** and with Scholarly Resources, Inc.
 3. Pay invoices as received from Scholarly Resources, Inc., and report periodically upon membership totals to that company.
- D. Oversee SHAFR budget and finances:
1. Savings and endowment funds.
 2. Checking account.
 3. Bernath prize resources (2).
 4. Bernath Living Trust.
 5. Income tax reports.
 6. Annual balance sheet of Society's finances.

II. Institutional support necessary for Executive Secretary-Treasurer:

A. Money:

1. **\$3,000.00 per year for secretarial help.**
A secretary who can devote at least one-third of his/her working hours to the task is a must. (During a certain portion of the year--in January--this person would be working half-time). This secretary should work closely with the Secretary-Treasurer. The maintenance of mailing lists, supervision of bank deposits, and the general overseeing of files and books make it illogical to use anyone from a secretarial pool, unless that person can be specifically assigned to the SHAFR work.
2. **Student assistants.** One or two students who would work 10-15 hours a week. These could be work/study people. They would thus constitute no direct expense to SHAFR's operations.
3. **\$500.00 per year for photocopying and duplication.** At the University of Akron this cost has been assumed by the Department of History, and this would be the case in most institutions.
4. **\$250.00 for computer time.** This is, obviously, an important aspect of the mailing list operation. No charge is currently assessed to the Department of History at Akron, but at schools where such is the custom the above sum would be the minimum.
5. **\$500.00 per year for travel by the Secretary-Treasurer.** This official's presence is quite important at three annual meetings of the Society--AHA, OAH, and SHAFR's summer conference. The incumbent has thus far been able to qualify for full reimbursement. The amount necessary for travel each year would depend, of course, upon the locations

of meetings and the method of travel, but the estimate of \$500.00 would, in most cases, be upon the the conservative side.

B. Released Time. The Secretary-Treasurer must devote at the minimum an average of ten hours a week to the tasks of the position. This estimate, however, is based upon having a highly efficient staff secretary--a situation which has been quite true in the case of the incumbent. But without such help one could easily double the time required for the performance of the specified duties. The position is an up-and-down affair: There are times, especially when deadlines have to be met, when more hours are needed "to get the job done;" at other periods a lesser number of hours will suffice. The holder of this position should at the minimum have a released time varying from one-fourth to one-third of his/her normal academic load.

Individuals (and institutions) who are interested and feel that they are qualified for the above-described position of Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations should send their letters of application, dossiers, and supporting data to--

Dr. Akira Iriye, President of SHAFR
5603 South Dorchester
Chicago
Illinois 60637

The individual chosen for the position should expect to assume his/her duties at the start of the academic year 1979-80.

MAIL CALL!

Now is the time for all good men and women to come to the aid of the Society! The fifth SHAFR summer conference will be held upon the campus of the University of Kansas, probably the first weekend in August of 1979. Dr. Theodore A. Wilson, Department of History at the U of Kansas and SHAFR Program Chairman for 1979, has an open ear--and mind--to suggestions regarding this conference. Members who have ideas with respect to papers, panels, or colloquia which might be presented at this gathering, or who know of distinguished figures in the field of diplomacy who might be induced to participate, should write Dr. Wilson at the above school, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

Dr. Wilson wishes to remind the research-minded members of the Society that "business can easily be combined with pleasure" by attending this conference. The Eisenhower Library (in Abilene) is a little over 100 miles to the west on I-71, while less than half that distance to the east is the Truman Library at Independence, Mo.

PERSONALS

James L. Gormly has become a member of the Department of History at Pan American University, Edinburg, Texas, with the rank of instructor.

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Jonathan G. Utley was one of four members of the faculty at the U of Tennessee who this summer received \$500.00 each from the UT National Alumni Association for outstanding teaching.

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Louis M. McDermott has been appointed Acting Commandant of Midshipmen (Dean of Students) at the California Maritime Academy, Vallejo, California.

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Lloyd E Ambrosius (Nebraska-Lincoln) spent the past academic year in Ireland as the Mary Ball Washington Professor of American History at University College Dublin where he conducted a lecture course and supervised a research seminar on Twentieth-Century American foreign relations. Additionally, he delivered lectures upon various aspects of U.S. diplomacy at off-campus locations in Ireland, plus three cities in Belgium. He also attended the conferences of the European Association for American Studies in Norwich, England, and of the German Association for American studies in Berlin.

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Bradford Perkins (Michigan and former president of SHAFR) has been named by the Nominating Committee of the AHA as a candidate for a position upon the Council (three-year term).

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The September issue of the History Book Club **Review** stated that a number of new reviewers has been added to its staff. One of these is Martin Sherwin (Princeton, and winner of the Bernath Book Prize in 1976) who will handle books dealing with "current affairs and American political history."

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The halls of academe have lost a good man as Frederick B. Hoyt, formerly at Illinois State U (Normal, Ill.), has accepted a position as Management Development Coordinator with the Peter A. Berger Co., a major retailer in Illinois.

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Harold Josephson has left the Foreign Policy Association to return to the U of North Carolina--Charlotte with an advance in rank to that of

full professor in the Department of History. He has not severed all connections with the FPA, however, but will do part-time work for the organization as Director of Education.

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Glen St. J. Barclay (U of Queensland, Australia) has been notified by the President of the American Military Institute that he has been awarded a Moncado Prize for his article, "Singapore Strategy: The Role of the United States in Imperial Defense," which appeared in the April 1975 issue of **Military Affairs**.

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Albert Norman (Norwich U) is on a sabbatical from June 1 of this year to January 15, 1979. He is working upon a book whose subject concerns the constitutional merger of church and state in England's Anglo-Saxon centuries as part of the larger international European movement of church-state integration.

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Norman B. Ferris (Middle Tennessee) has been elected president of the Tennessee Conference of the AAUP for the term 1978-80.

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Mary P. Chapman, a long-time employee in the Office of the Historian, Department of State, retired on December 31, 1977. Members of SHAFR will recall that Dr. Chapman was the co-compiler (with Richardson Dougall) of that marvelous reference work, **United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973** (1973), and the supplement thereto (1975).

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Dr. Carole Fink (North Carolina-Wilmington) has received an ACLS fellowship for the period July, 1978--January 1979, so that work may be done upon a book dealing with the Genoa Conference of 1922.

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The first J. Franklin Jameson Fellowship, to be awarded annually by the AHA & the Library of Congress, has gone to SHAFR member, Dr. J.C.A. Stagg, U of Auckland, New Zealand. The award is designed "to support significant scholarly research in the collections of the Library of Congress by young historians." The burden of Dr. Stagg's research will be upon the political aspects of the War of 1812. Dr. Stagg seems "to have a thing" about **firsts**, for the initial (1977) S. L. Bernath Article Prize also went to him.

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Robert A. Divine (Texas-Austin, and ex-president of SHAFR) was in

charge of an NEH seminar for college teachers during an eight weeks term the past summer at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

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David M. Kennedy (Stanford) has received an ACLS grant-in-aid to assist him in work upon the topic, American foreign economic policy in the World War I era.

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As the result of grants from the American Philosophical Society and the Center for the Study of American Catholicism, David J. Alvarez (Saint Mary's College--California) was enabled to finish research recently in the diplomatic archives of London, Madrid, and the Vatican upon a study titled, "The Papacy in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War."

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James L. Gormly (Pan American U) received a grant from the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute so that he might do research recently at Hyde Park upon the topic, the growth of American civil aviation to Europe and the Middle East following World War II.

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Ralph E. Weber (Marquette) spoke upon the topic, "American Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers," at St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana, in April.

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The recent work, **Alfred Thayer Mahan; The Man and His Letters** (1977) by Robert Seager II (Kentucky), has received the following recognition: (a) the Hallam Book Award (1976-77), Department of History, U of Kentucky; (b) the Literary Award of Merit (1978) of the U.S. Naval Institute; (c) the Award for Literary Achievement (1978) of the Navy League of the United States, and (d) the John Lyman Memorial Book Award (1978) of the North American Society for Oceanic History.

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Hans Günter Brauch (Heidelberg, West Germany) is the author of two recent articles, "Enhanced Radiation Warhead; a West German Perspective," **Arms Control Today** (June, 1978), pp. 1-4; and "The Neutron Weapon--Arms Control Prospects" in **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists** (October, 1978).

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of fifteen (15) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts, of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

David L. Anderson (Sam Houston State University), "The Diplomacy of Discrimination: Chinese Exclusion, 1876-1882," **California History** (formerly **California Historical Quarterly**), LVII, #1 (Spring, 1978), 32-45. Politicians in search of votes in the 1870s began to seek ways to satisfy the increasing demands on the Pacific Coast for the exclusion of Chinese immigrants. The issue created potentially serious legal complications, however, for maintenance of the so-called "unequal treaty system" in China. If, as the exclusionists wanted, the United States unilaterally abrogated specific treaty provisions that protected Chinese in America, China might have similarly voided onerous treaty provisions that protected foreigners in China. Motivated by this diplomatic concern as well as by political considerations, American negotiators gained Chinese agreement in 1880 to a treaty which not only authorized the restriction of Chinese immigration but also sought to maintain the international legitimacy of the entire system of unequal Sino-Western treaties.

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James W. Cortada (Private industry), "The Undiplomatic Mission to Spain of John P. Hale, 1865-1869," **Lincoln Herald**, 79, #3 (Fall, 1977). The article deals with the incompetent diplomatic behavior of John P. Hale in Spain during a period of time when the U.S. was mediating the end of a war between Spain and Chile/Peru, experiencing the Spanish and Cuban revolutions of 1868, and was undergoing difficult European relations in general. A large part of the article goes on to show that Hale violated a number of Spanish laws, creating embarrassing situations for both governments. Material for this piece was drawn from U.S., Spanish, and French archival data.

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James W. Cortada (Private industry), "España y Estados Unidos ante custión mexicana, 1855-1868," **Historia Mexicana**, XXVII, #3 (Jan.-March, 1978). The problem of European-U.S. rivalry in Mexico is the subject of this article, paying particular attention to the role of Spain. While the affairs of France and Britain have been explored in the past,

little has been said about Spanish-U.S. rivalry in Mexico. The article argues that the Mexican episode was just one of many that took place in the 1850s and 1860s involving a political and cultural battle for the balance-of-power in the New World between Spain and the U.S.A. Drawing on Spanish and U.S. archival data, the article shows that both sides viewed the other's interest in Mexico as important and part of much broader attempts to expand influence throughout the New World at the expense of the other.

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Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), "Thinking Historically," **The Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs**, II, #2 (May, 1978), 225-232. An essay, illustrated by examples from diplomacy, on what it means to "think historically," as contrasted with "thinking economically" and "thinking legally."

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Mark A. Stoler (University of Vermont), "What Did He **Really** Say? The 'Aiken Formula' for Vietnam Revisited," **Vermont History**, XLVI, #2 (Spring, 1978), 100-108. Former Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont is famous for supposedly having suggested on October 19, 1966, that the United States terminate the Vietnam conflict simply by declaring a victory and getting out. In actuality, however, Aiken did not call for a complete withdrawal of American forces on this date or at any other time, and the "Aiken formula" for Vietnam is thus a recent myth of American history. Aiken did call for a declaration of "victory," but only as part of a revised "enclave" strategy, as originally proposed by General James Gavin, which would enable the United States to de-escalate the conflict and reach a negotiated settlement in the future.

PUBLICATIONS IN U.S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State), **The Chinese Connection and American-East Asian Relations**, 1978. Columbia U Press. \$16.50.

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James W. Cortada (Private industry), **Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States, 1776-1977**. 1978. Greenwood Press, Inc. \$22.95.

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Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo), **Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929**. 1978. KTO Press, Milwood, N.Y. \$15.00

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Ralph B. Levering (Western Maryland), **The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978**. 1978. William Morrow and Co. Cl. \$7.95; pb. \$3.95. Favorably reviewed in **Perspective**, June, 1978.

Leonard P. Liggio (Cato Institute, San Francisco) and James J. Martin, eds., **Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy**. 1976. Ralph Myles, Colorado Springs, Colo. Cl. \$10.00; pb. \$3.95.

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Sheldon B. Liss (Akron), **Diplomacy and Dependency: Venezuela, the United States, and the Americas**. 1978. Documentary Publications. \$16.95. The book covers the period from 1810 to the present.

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James A. Nathan (Delaware) and James K. Oliver, **United States Foreign Policy and World Order**. 1976. Little, Brown & Co. \$10.95. Reviewed in **The Historian** of May, 1978.

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Edward B. Parsons (Miami U, Ohio) **Wilsonian Diplomacy; Allied-American Rivalries in War and Peace**. 1977. Forum Press, Inc. \$9.95.

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Thomas D. Schoonover (Southwestern, La.), **Dollars over Dominion: The Triumph of Liberalism in Mexican-United States Relations, 1861-1867**. 1978. Louisiana State U Press. \$17.50.

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Ralph E. Weber, (Marquette), **United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 1775-1938**. 1978. New University Press, Inc., c/o Follett Publishing Co. \$49.95.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

John M. Carroll of Lamar University (along with Charles Bussey William MacDonald, and John W. Storey) has/have edited the work, **America's Heritage in the Twentieth Century**. 1978. Forum Press. Pb. \$5.95. Carroll and Frank W. Abbott (U of Houston, Downtown) have essays in the book dealing with U.S. diplomatic history.

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Michael G. Fry (Carleton U. Canada), **Lloyd George and Foreign Policy: Vol. I--The Education of a Statesman, 1890-1916**. 1977. McGill-Queen's University Press. \$18.50. Favorably reviewed in **History**, July, 1978.

Fred L. Hadsel (Executive Director, George C. Marshall Research Foundation) wrote the preface for **The Evolution of the American Military Establishment since World War II**, edited by Paul R. Schratz. 1978. Select Press Book Service, Inc., Contoocook, N. H. Pb. \$4.00, plus 48¢ postage.

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Alonzo L. Hamby (Ohio U) and Edward Weldon, eds., **Access to the Papers of Recent Public Figures: The New Harmony Conference**. 1978. Organization of American Historians, Bloomington, Ind. \$4.00. Three of the papers were done by members of SHAFR: Hamby, Blanche W. Cook, and Barton J. Bernstein.

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James K. Libbey (Eastern Kentucky), "Chamber of Commerce for the West," **The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History**. 1978. Academic International Press. VI, 197-199.

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E. Wilson Lyon (President Emeritus, Pomona College) provided a 52-page introduction and an index to a reprint (1978) of the 1830 edition of François Barbé-Marbois's **The History of Louisiana, Particularly of the Cession of That Colony to the United States of America**. The book is one of six works in the Louisiana Bicentennial Reprint Series, and is available from the Louisiana State U Press at \$14.95.

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Michael Glazier, Inc., has announced the publication of an elaborate new series of studies on cassettes. A special section, called **Voices of History**, will be devoted to American and European diplomatic history. Dr. Gary May (Delaware) is the general editor, and Dr. Jules Davids (Georgetown) is the chief consultant to the program. Dr. Davids will also undertake a series of specialized studies for the program. For further information, contact the above firm at 1210A King Street, Wilmington, DE 19801.

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John A. Schutz and Richard S. Kirkendall (Indiana U and Executive Secretary of OAH), **The American Republic** (textbook). 1978. Forum Press. One volume, \$14.95.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Advance Notice of the Mary Ball Washington Professorship of American History at University College Dublin

Applications are invited from well-established historians in the field of American History for appointment to the above Chair which is endowed by the Alfred I. Du Pont Foundation, and other donors. This will be a one-year appointment. It is expected that the candidate appointed will take up duty in October, 1979.

For the guidance of applicants, it should be mentioned that the courses offered by the holder of the Chair will include the history of American foreign relations and a history of the American presidency.

Prior to application, further information and details of application procedure should be obtained from Mr. J.P. MacHale, Secretary and Bursar, University College, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.

The latest date for receipt of completed applications is Thursday, November 30, 1978.

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SHAFR member Lt. Colonel (Dr.) David R. Mets has been appointed editor of the **Air University Review**, effective August 10, 1978. The **Review**, a government publication, is the professional journal of the USAF and its 20,000 bimonthly copies are distributed worldwide. Every general and colonel in the service is authorized his own copy as are many high-level DOD civilians. It also has a considerable circulation in academia, both here and abroad. Its purpose is to stimulate innovative thought on international relations, military doctrine, strategy, tactics, leadership and related national defense matters. Colonel Mets would like to encourage the SHAFR membership to consider the **Review** as a possible outlet for its ideas. Though no fixed payments are made for articles, small cash awards are made. For further information, or an Author Guide Sheet, write to: Editor, **Air University Review**, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Annual Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and is administered by SHAFR. The Bernath Lectures will be the feature at the luncheons of the Society, held during the conventions of the OAH in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lectures will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will concern himself not specifically with his own research interests, but with broad issues of concern to students of American foreign relations.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1980 Lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee not later than December 1, 1978. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Jonathan Utley, Department of History, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee 37916.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the Society's **Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|------------------------------------------------|
| 1977 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute) |
| 1978 | David S. Patterson (Colgate) |
| 1979 | Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1979

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U. S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1978. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Ronald Steel, 204 Wooster Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1979.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1979, in New Orleans.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U. S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY DURING 1978

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U. S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1978. The article must be among the author's first seven (7) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1979. The Chairman of that Committee for 1978 is Dr. Charles E. Neu, Department of History, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02906.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1979, at New Orleans.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|-----------------------------------------|
| 1977 | John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.). |
| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |

SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since that would make it much easier to keep the files up to date and thereby avoid a rush in the fall at the time of publication. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to address should be sent to the National Office, Department of History, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325, and they will in turn be passed on to the editors of the **List**, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**. Unless new data is submitted, previously-listed research projects will be repeated.

Name: _____

Address: _____

Institutional Affiliation (if different from address): _____

General Area of Research Interest: _____

Current Research Project(s): _____

If this research is of a pre-doctoral nature, check here: _____

Mail this completed form to:

Dr. Warren F. Kimball, editor
SHAFR Roster & Research List
Department of History
Rutgers University (Newark)
Newark, New Jersey 07102

SHAFR'S 1978-79 CALENDAR

- November 1 Deadline, material for December **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- November 1 Deadline, additions and deletions for **SHAFR'S Roster & Research List.**
- November 8-11 The 44th annual meeting of the SHA will be held in St. Louis with the Chase-Park Plaza Hotel as headquarters. SHAFR will hold a reception in this hotel on Thursday, November 9, from 5:00 to 7:00 P.M. (Check at Information Desk for room location).
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for 1980 Bernath memorial lectureship.
- December 28-30 The 93rd annual meeting of the AHA will take place in San Francisco with the Hilton Hotel as headquarters.
- December 27 SHAFR Council will meet in Diablo Room, Hilton Hotel, 8:00-10:30 P.M.
- December 28 Editorial Board meeting, **Diplomatic History**, 4:00 P.M., Parlor B, St. Francis Hotel.
- December 28 SHAFR reception, 5:00-7:00 P.M., Georgian Room, St. Francis Hotel.
- December 29 SHAFR luncheon, 12:00 noon, Savoy Hall, Holiday Inn, Union Square. Akira Iriye will give his presidential address: "Culture and Power: Intercultural Dimensions of International Relations." With a few exceptions, SHAFR officials begin their tenure during, or at end, of this convention.
- December 29 Editors and contributors to a revision of S.F. Bemis and G.G. Griffin's **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States (1921)** will meet, 7:30-9:30 A.M., in Olympian Room of St. Francis Hotel.

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|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| January 1 | Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the National Office of SHAFR. |
| January 15 | Deadline, nominations for 1979 Bernath article award. |
| February 1 | Deadline, material for March Newsletter with publication one month later. |
| February 1 | Deadline, nominations for 1979 Bernath book prize. |
| April 11-14 | The OAH will hold its 72nd annual meeting in New Orleans with the Hyatt Regency as headquarters. SHAFR will sponsor a full complement of "doings" at this convention. Among other things, Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) will deliver a paper in her role as winner of the Bernath memorial lectureship for 1979, and the announcement of the victors in the Bernath Book contest and the Bernath article competition will be made. |
| May 1 | Deadline, material for June Newsletter with publication one month later. |
| August 2-4 (Tent) | SHAFR's Fifth Annual Conference at University of Kansas. |

LOST AND FOUND COLUMN

Dr. Robert H. Ferrell of Indiana University reports an oddity that came his way while in attendance at the recent SHAFR summer conference on the George Mason U campus. As he was getting into his station wagon just prior to his departure he discovered that someone had left thereon a pair of trousers ("blue, with a one-inch vertical striping"). His station wagon, he says by way of identification to the absent-minded one, is "rather nondescript" and "pretty old." The loser of this piece of male apparel may recover it by contacting Dr. Ferrell in the Department of History at the above institution, Bloomington, Indiana 47401--unless that person chose this method to give the Professor a not-so-subtle hint that he should get out of academia and into the haberdashery business!

MEA CULPAI

Even at their best, excuses are sorry affairs indeed. As Korczak Ziolkowski, famed sculptor of the gargantuan relief statue of Crazy Horse in the Black Hills, has often said: "The world cares absolutely nothing about excuses. It wants to know only one thing: Did you get the job done?"

Well, the editor and his helpers "didn't get the job done" with respect to this issue of the **Newsletter**. This is by far the latest ever for a number, and the membership deserves an explanation (or, **excuse**, if you wish!). This summer has seen an unparalleled (for us) number of setbacks. First, the director of our printing services resigned, and some time was lost before his successor was chosen. Next, the phototypist (the person who actually puts all this material together in its ultimate form) left, and over a month elapsed before her place-taker was upon the job. Then a piece of equipment in a new, \$16,000.00 typesetting machine broke, causing a holdup once more. Finally, the fall quarter got under way, and the editor had other responsibilities to meet, thus creating even more delay in publication.

But all of these problems are behind us--we hope! We'll do our best to make amends by getting the December number out on time. So, if you have material which belongs in the next issue, don't wait but send it to us---NOW!

It's Unanimous Now!

Within the last six months SHAFR has gained members in Nevada and Alaska. Consequentially, for the first time in the organization's ten-year history it has representatives in every state of the Union (not to mention a large foreign contingent).

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 50¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 75¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California - Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California - San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)

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