

Brexit: An Analysis of Eurosceptic Mobilisation and the British Vote to Leave the European
Union

by
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Abstract

In June 2016, Britain narrowly voted to leave the European Union in an in/out referendum on membership. Undoubtedly, the implications of such a vote are unprecedented. Recent mobilisations of Euroscepticism across the European Union have culminated with the first decisive move: Britain's vote to leave the EU. In the following paper, the implications of Euroscepticism in Britain, as well as briefly discussed in Europe, will be placed contextually in an analysis of Britain's vote to leave the European Union. The analysis does not intend to argue for or against Brexit, nor does it intend to be a comprehensive and fully-detailed account. In regard to the timing of the vote, many aspects of this paper are transforming and changing as events unfold. As a result, this paper intends to rely heavily on historical implications of Euroscepticism as well as a recent literature on the theories of Eurosceptic voting, demographics, and the history of the relationship between the UK and the EU. The conclusions of the paper wrap up the overall analysis of Euroscepticism, arriving at the conclusion that populist and anti-globalist sentiments driven by political parties such as United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) mobilised Euroscepticism, allowing for a philosophy to transform into effective policy change.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Brexit, European Union, EU, Eurosceptic, UKIP, globalisation, EU Referendum

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List of Abbreviations and Key Terms

Article 50: Provision of the Lisbon Treaty that states how a EU Member State can withdraw from the European Union

Brexit: Portmanteau of Britain + Exit, refers to Britain leaving the European Union

Common Market: EU group of countries imposing few or no duties on trade with one another and a common tariff on trade with other countries.

Euro: the single European currency, which replaced the national currencies of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands in 2002. Seventeen member states of the European Union now use the euro.

Euro Zone: the group of European Union nations whose national currency is the euro.

European Commission (EC): is the executive body of the European Union responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the treaties and managing the day-to-day business of the EU.

European Community/European Economic Community (EC/ECC): The European Economic Community was a regional organisation which aimed to bring about economic integration among its member states. It was created by the Treaty of Rome of 1957

European Parliament (EP): EU citizens elect its members once every five years. Together with the Council of Ministers, it is the law-making branch of the institutions of the Union.

European Referendum: Refers to 2016 vote on EU Membership, “Referendum”

European Union (EU): The European Union is a politico-economic union of 28 member states that are located primarily in Europe.

Euroscepticism: The general scepticism of the EU or the complete rejection of the EU.

Member of European Parliament (MEP)

Member of Parliament (MP)

Single Currency: The Euro

Single Market: The Common Market

United Kingdom (UK): England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland

Chapter I: Euroscepticism – Implications and Application

Since the inception of the European project, Britain has usually been considered an awkward, lukewarm, and hesitant partner. Discourse on the evaluation of the United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union deemed the UK as a Eurosceptic state to varying degrees. In fact, some scholars note the uniqueness of British Euroscepticism in its own regard, noting that Euroscepticism was once initially perceived as solely an element of British politics (Gifford 2010; Condruz-Bacescu 2014).

Section 1.1: Euroscepticism as a Conceptual Variable

The term “*Eurosceptic*” has differing connotations and definitions. Generally, the term denotes a sense of disillusion from the Europe, the European Union, or the EU's aims and goals (usually further integration), or EU institutions such as the European Parliament or the European Commission. Scholars further defined Euroscepticism as a “barometer that measures non-adherence to the European Union,” as “hostility to participation in or the entire enterprise of the EU,” and as an “expression of doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in general” (Condruz-Bacescu 2014, 53; George 2000, 15; Hooghe and Marks 2007, 42.) Foundational research into Euroscepticism by Drs. Szczerbiak and Taggart creates a hard-versus-soft dichotomy which essentially allows for comparisons and categorisations of the identifiable variations of Euroscepticism (2003).

HARD EUROSCEPTICISM: There is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration that can be seen in parties which propose that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived. Furthermore, it is a principled objection to the current form of integration in the European Union on the basis of contradiction of national wishes.

SOFT EUROSCEPTICISM: There is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that “national interest” is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory.¹ Furthermore, it may express itself in terms of opposition to specific policies or in terms of the defence of national interest.

¹ Emphasis added.

Additionally, there are four types of Euroscepticism based on specific subsidiary issues of economics, sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, and political criterion.² These criterion are reflected in discourse on British Euroscepticism, especially in relation to the recent debate on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union. While Euroscepticism is not solely a British issue and Britain’s relationship with the EU is not wholly contentious, Britain has made the ultimate “hard Eurosceptic” decision to leave the European Union.

Table 1. Types of euroscepticism

Euroscepticism based on economic criterion	Euroscepticism based on the criterion of sovereignty	Euroscepticism based on democratic criterion	Euroscepticism based on political criterion
Quantifies pragmatically the major benefits and costs arising from EU membership, resulted or not from a cooperative process.	Considers that, at EU level, cooperation should not be a challenge to national sovereignty. These eurosceptics support supranational cooperation in matters that the state can not manage alone (such as environmental issues and the fight against organized crime), but wish to preserve national skills for socio-cultural policies.	Perceives the current institutional structure of the Union as inadequate in terms of representation and democratic participation of citizens.	Assesses EU action based on the doctrine of belonging to a political family; analysts believe that the dominant form of this disproof is social.

Section 1.2: Uniqueness of British Euroscepticism

In order to understand why British Euroscepticism has been prevalent through the history between the UK and the EU, it is important to consider its inherent uniqueness. British Euroscepticism is hypothesised as stemming from several defining characteristics of the United Kingdom: geography, the cultural notion of ‘Britishness,’ preferred political system and style of governance, media, and history (Grant 2008; Gebbes 2013). Most of these elements fall under one of the four categories of subsidiary issues within Eurosceptic

² See *Table 1. Types of Euroscepticism*, Condruz-Bacescu, M., 2014, 55, as adapted from Chalmers, 2013; Habermas, 2013.

discourse. In the following section, British Euroscepticism's prevalence will become apparent through a discussion and analysis of Britain's history with the European project leading up to the 2016 membership referendum.

Geography and Britishness

The United Kingdom is only approximately twenty miles apart from Calais, France, an area of contentious feelings during the EU referendum due to immigration. The UK shares a border with one EU member state, Ireland. Other than Ireland, the UK is separated by the oceans. In his essay "*Why is Britain Eurosceptic?*" Charles Grant spoke of Britain:

When I travel around Europe and people ask me why the British are Eurosceptic, I offer four explanations – three of which are easily understood. The first of these is geography and the effect it has had on British history. The British people live on an island on the edge of the continent and have always been inspired by the oceans. The British talk of Europe as another place (as the Finns, Irish and Portuguese sometimes do) (2008).

Sometimes, the British refer to Europe as "the continent," implying distance and separation. For example, a publication on British Euroscepticism by the Bruges Group, a notably Eurosceptic group getting its name from the famous Bruges speech by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, immediately begins with a reference to the separation between the United Kingdom (specifically England) and "the continent" as followed:

The English suspicion of Europe (its Christian Transcendentalism and Universalism) sprang naturally from multiple sources. To locate the ambivalence and disbelief of the idea of Europe, we must go back to the Reformation and beyond. From the time when Britain became an island of the European continent, she experienced continual traffic and movements of people and ideas, including those from Rome. However, these interactions with mainland Europe, however, did not lessen the continuous impact of an offshore island location (Kasonta 2015).

For some, geography is not necessarily a negative feature contributing to British identity. Britain's orientation has historically been toward Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Due to its proximity to Europe, Britain has often found itself intertwined in European affairs historically, including numerous wars and conflicts; however, as a result of the proximity to Europe and an intertwined history, Britain has been shaped substantially and positively by its interactions with "the continent." In "*Being British*", Bhikhu Parekh wrote on the implications of British history and identity:

Britain's orientation to the world is complex and layered. Thanks to its geography, it has for centuries been deeply involved in European affairs and shares a common European heritage. For obvious historical reasons, Britain also has close ties with the US whose political culture reflects its own in many respects. And thanks to the empire, large parts of the world too are an integral part of [British] history and continue to shape [British] political consciousness, not least in the shape of the post-world immigrants and the Commonwealth of over fifty countries. Britain's global identity is not only a precipitate of its history but also a necessity in an increasingly global world. A country with its kind of economy and worldwide interests cannot define itself in isolation from the rest of the world. Britain is thus at once European, Atlantic, and global, and none of these alone fully captures its identity. It is a bridge, if we must use that tired and rather mechanical metaphor, between all three and not just the first two (2009, 38).

Conversely, some authors suggested geography alone is not a sufficient explanation for Britain's Euroscepticism. For example, in *Britain and the European Union*, Andrew Geddes noted that geographical implications are not a factor in nations such as Ireland, which is not on "the continent," but remains a steadfast member of the European Union and does not exhibit the same Euroscepticism as its neighbour, Great Britain (2013, 29). Even still,

Eurosceptics tend to quote Winston Churchill's famous quip that Britain is "with but not of" Europe:

Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European system. We feel we have a special relation to both, expressed by prepositions: by the preposition "with" but not "of" – we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire (Foreign Affairs 1953).

In *The Saturday Evening Post*, Winston Churchill further elaborated on his view of the separation of identities:


[We] have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed. [...] The scheme of the British Empire economically self-conscious, a commercial unit, even perhaps a fiscal unit, can never be widely expressed in exclusive terms (Churchill 1930, 51).

Despite these particular quotes from Churchill, he stood by the "United States of Europe" dream and imagined a Europe with trade, union, and peace. He noted that the idea of a "European identity" was not to be feared. Yet, it is important to note the uniqueness of the "Britishness" versus "European."

In the report entitled "*Do We feel European and Does it Matter?*" published in 2015 by NatCen Social Research in conjunction with *The UK in a Changing Europe*, the study of national identity from the British Social Attitudes data from 1996 – 2014 to map a trend of social attitude toward the European Union is depicted in Chart 1 on the following page. In this report, one of the main conclusions is that while identities are difficult to measure, as some may hold multiple identities with different importance, most respondents do not see

themselves as Europeans. Less than 1 in 5 described themselves as European, and in 2014, only 1 in 7 described themselves as European (Ormston 2015).

Chart 1: Percentage of People in Britain Who Describe Themselves as European (1996 – 2014)



Source: British Social Attitudes. See also Curtice, (2015a).

As noted in the report, British identity is comprised of four different countries with subsidiary identities within each. The British Social Attitudes surveys measured the “extent to which people in Britain identify with multiple national (and in the case of European, supranational) identities that are commonly associated with Great Britain and/or Ireland” (Ormston 2015).

The survey is given to the respondents with the following choices: British, English, European, Irish, Northern Irish, Scottish, Ulster, Welsh, Other (specify).

As individuals can hold multiple identities, this raises the question of how strongly “Europeanism” can compete with the British and subsidiary identities. Thomas Risse remarked on this notion, stating that individuals can hold multiple identities that are contextually-bound, and membership of a group can lead to distinctions from other groups e.g. British, French, or German (Risse 2001, 198-200; Risse 2003). Furthermore, the

cohesiveness of member groups is “often based on emotional ties” to the group linked closely to ideas about nationality, nation state, and sovereignty (Gebbes 2013, 33; Risse 2001, 201).

In 2015, a Eurobarometer poll indicated that 64% of British respondents only saw themselves as British, which was the highest percentage amongst all responding countries, followed by Cyprus and Greece (Eurobarometer Report May 2015). Furthermore, in “*Britain and Europe: Are we all Eurosceptics now?*” published with British Social Attitudes data by NatCan Social Research concluded with the following passage:

Yet, few of us feel a sense of European identity, and as a result the European Union is perhaps always having to justify itself in the eyes of British voters. And on that score we are not as convinced of the practical benefits of membership as we were in the 1990s, while more recently opposition to the EU has become closely intertwined with concern about levels of immigration, a subject that many voters have long felt should primarily be a matter for national governments. Between them these considerations appear to have helped intensify Britain’s Eurosceptic mood (2015, 32).

The identity debate, while multifaceted, has implications far beyond that of answering the question of who is British, especially in light of Brexit. In regards to Brexit, the identity question stretches over into immigration and migration, globalisation, and Britain’s future with the European Union and the world. As written in “*Englishness in Contemporary British Politics*,” former Prime Minister Gordon Brown noted that the identity debate affects public policy issues and can only be “fully addressed through a politics that is not only framed in terms of Britishness, but is willing to engage positively with an increasingly conscious Englishness” (Hayton, English, & Kenny 2009, 131). In subsequent chapters, the effect of Britishness, social attitude toward “being European,” and national identity will be further explored as an element of Brexit specifically.

Governance

An important tension between Britain and the European Union since its inception was the conflict between preferred styles of governance. The European Union, as currently conceived, is a supranational entity, meaning that its member states have pooled sovereignty to an overarching institution of decision making. The decisions made at the supranational level bind all member states. In addition to political integration, there is also economic integration in the European Union, mostly notably the free trade area in which there are no tariffs or trade barriers within member states and an Economic Monetary Union with a single currency, the Euro, although some have opted out. The United Kingdom is not a member of the Eurozone and has opted out of the single currency provision.

Supranationalism means also that EU law supersedes law made at the national level. Britain, on the other hand, prefers a system of governance with intergovernmental cooperation, intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism, as noted by Gebbes, places power in “unanimity as the basis of decision making” and “allows a veto to be exercised to protect national interests” (Gebbes 2013, 24).

When the European project’s founders were structuring what would eventually result in the EU, intergovernmentalism was not at the forefront of the framework. As a result, British politicians, for the most part, rejected the notion of supranational integration as idealistic, not practical (Beloff 1970).

In modern Britain, the EU’s supranationalist tendencies seemed to exacerbate Eurosceptic attitudes, even amongst pro-Europeans. According to British Social Attitudes data, 43% of British respondents who feel European said that they want the European Union’s powers to be reduced (2015, 1). From 1992 – 2014, respondents indicated that they want to stay in the EU and reduce its powers with an overall average of 34% (British Social

Attitudes 2015, 32). Respondent's most popular choice when presented with options regarding EU membership was to stay in the European Union, but reduce its powers with 38% in 2015 (British Social Attitudes 2015).

Media

British media is undeniably unique in its ability to shape Eurosceptic opinion. According to Grant, the British media is "uniquely powerful and Eurosceptic" (Grant 2008, 3). Furthermore, Grant posed that three-quarters of the 30 million individuals who read British newspapers are reading Eurosceptic material (Grant, 2008, 3). He justified his claim by noting that British newspapers often print falsehoods about the European Union because journalists are "allowed" to do so, and often newspapers' owners encourage or demand anti-EU material (Grant, 2008, 3).

One of the most influential and widely circulated newspapers in Britain is *The Sun*, which boasts a circulation of approximately 1.8 million and is owned by media giant Rupert Murdoch. According to a post directly by *The Sun*, the outlet urged readers to "beLEAVE in Britain and vote to quit the EU" and "free ourselves from dictatorial Brussels" (*The Sun* 2016). Further into the article, *The Sun* said:

To remain [in the European Union] means being powerless to cut mass immigration which keeps wages low and puts catastrophic pressure on our schools, hospitals, roads and housing stock. In every way, it is a bigger risk. The Remain campaign, made up of the corporate establishment, arrogant europhiles and foreign banks, have set out to terrify us all about life outside the EU. Their "Project Fear" strategy predicts mass unemployment, soaring interest rates and inflation, plummeting house prices, even world war. This is our chance to make Britain even greater, to recapture our democracy, to preserve the values and culture we are rightly proud of (*The Sun*, 2016).

Following *The Sun* in circulation figures, *Daily Mail* secures second place with 1.6 million in circulation in 2016. *Daily Mail* supported Britain's withdrawal from the European Union with a headline: "Lies. Greedy elites. Or a great future outside a broken, dying Europe... If you believe in Britain vote Leave" (*Daily Mail* 2016). The *Daily Mail*'s sister paper, *The Mail on Sunday*, was in favour of remaining in the European Union.

Perhaps less ostentatiously, the *Daily Telegraph*, which has approximately 472,000 in circulation in 2016 and 490,000 in 2015, was seen as neutral. Yet, the *Telegraph* eventually posted on 20 June 2016 in support of Britain leaving the European Union, noting that there was a "benefit from of world of opportunity" in voting to leave (*Telegraph View* 2016). Member of Parliament and former Mayor of London, and a leader of the Brexit campaign, Boris Johnson was often a star columnist for *The Telegraph*. Yet, *The Telegraph* also published the opinion piece by United States President Barack Obama which urged for a vote to remain in the European Union, with the headline: "Barack Obama: As your friend, let me say that the EU makes Britain even greater." *The Sunday Telegraph*, the sister paper, also supported Brexit.

While many of the top media outlets in Britain were backing Brexit, there were several news entities that were in favour of remaining in the European Union: *The Times*, *The Daily Mirror*, *The Guardian*, *Evening Standard*, *The Financial Times*, *The Observer* (Spence 2016).

During the EU Membership campaigns, complaints of biased news coverage from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) were delivered by both the Remain and Leave camps. In October, *The Daily Mail* formally accused the BBC of bias and "reverting back to its Europhile roots" (*Daily Mail* 2016). University of Cardiff research indicated that of the 571 BBC reports on the EU referendum "just over one in five statistics used were challenged either by a journalist, campaigner or other source. But most of this questioning – 65.2% –

was carried out by rival politicians, with 17.6% of statistical claims challenged by journalists” (Martinson 2016).

In response to accusations of bias during the EU referendum, the a BBC spokesperson replied as followed:

BBC news is covering events following the referendum vote and the impact of sterling’s revaluation in a responsible and impartial way – we have reported on the upsides as well as downsides and other key economic indicators, like the FTSE’s strength, consumer confidence and manufacturing and services sectors rebounding (Martinson 2016).

Section 1.3: Euroscepticism in Other European Union Countries


Euroscepticism is not strictly a British phenomenon. Following the Eurozone debt crisis, trust in the European Union as a functional institution has fallen in debtor countries, creditor countries, Eurozone members, and opt-outs like the United Kingdom (Bechev, et. al 2013). For example, in Greece, a debtor member state, about 92% of Greeks polled in Pew Research Center’s 2016 report “*Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit*” disapprove of how the EU dealt with the Eurozone economic crisis³, compared to the United Kingdom’s 55% (84% of which were supporters of the prominently anti-EU political party United Kingdom Independence Party) (Stokes 2016). Comparing this single-issue based poll across different member states (both creditor and debtor), disapproval still seems to be inching toward or over a majority in most countries surveyed, with the two outliers being Germany and Poland, both with 47% approval.

³ Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Q50a, Pew Research Center. Survey Question: “Do you ___ [disapprove/approve] of the way the European Union is dealing with European economic issues?”

Chart 2: Disapproval/Approval Rating of EU's Handling of Economy (2016)

Europeans generally disapprove of EU's handling of economy

Do you ___ of the way the European Union is dealing with European economic issues?



Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50a.

"Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit"

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Founding EU nations which serve as de facto leaders, such as France and Germany, have been just as susceptible to Eurosceptic trends. EU favourability is down by double-digits in France with 38% and down by eight points with 50% in Germany (Stokes 2016).

Germany

In Germany, far-right political parties have seen an increase in support. Specifically, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland), identifying as a right-wing, populist, and anti-immigration party, celebrated Brexit.

German Eurosceptic MEP Beatrix von Storch of the AfP sent out the following message in support of Brexit:

The 23 June is a historic day. It is Great Britain's independence day. The people were asked – and they decided. The European Union as a political union has failed (Storch 2016).

The AfP, which is notably an anti-refugee party, rose to the forefront of challenging Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christian Democrat party and its “open-door” policy on refugees from Syria, the Middle East, and Africa. Initially, AfP was established in 2013 by economists aiming to abolish the Euro single currency. Written off, AfP was often seen as “temporary phenomenon” by Merkel (Oltermann 2016). However, AfP received 14.2% in the Berlin state election in September 2016, overtaking Merkel's party in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with 10 seats out of the available 16 in the state assemblies in Germany (Goulard 2016; Welt 2016).

After the Brexit vote in summer of 2016, Merkel's approval rating grew by from the 46% reported in February, 56% in April, 50% in June, to a high of 59% in July (Ehni 2016). Thirty-four percent of respondents indicated that they would vote for Merkel's party if elections were held the week of the survey (July 2016), and support for far-right wing parties like AfP dropped by three percentage points (Goulard 2016).

Within that same month, August, Germany suffered several domestic terrorist attacks including a mass shooting in Germany with 9 victims, an axe attack on a train in Wuerzburg, a suicide blast in Ansbach injuring 15, and a deadly machete attack by a Syrian migrant in Reutlingen. Support for Merkel and her immigration policies declined to 47% overall, and two-thirds of respondents indicated that they opposed Merkel's handling of the refugee crisis (Buergin 2016).

France

Currently, the president of France is François Hollande of the Socialist Party, having been elected since 2012. Ultimately, most mainstream politicians support the European Union and France's membership. However, France has recently seen an uprising of a right-wing, nationalist, and anti-immigration party Front National led by Marie Le Pen.

In France, right-wing movements and extremism has had a longer history, dating back even to the French Revolution. The modern extreme right-wing group that has the most influence in French politics is the Front National (FN), which was founded in 1972 with leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. The rise of FN has influenced public discourse, ethnic relations, and social class relations in France. Similar to far-right groups in the United Kingdom, United Kingdom Independence Party and British National Party, Front National's electorate base is the working class, has a strong opposition to the European Union, socially conservative, nationalist, and favours a strong anti-immigration stance.

Le Pen has conveyed Front National's beliefs on some of the most pressing cultural issues in Europe. For example, Le Pen has likened multiculturalism to Nazi occupation and the imposition of cultural tolerance to be a contradiction of French values (Shorto 2011). Her party has anti-immigration stances, as evident through her condemnation of the European Union's dealings with migrants from Northern Africa (Squires 2011).

Her feelings toward the European Union were made clear when she told Bloomberg Television:

I will be Madame Frexit if the European Union doesn't give us back our monetary, legislative, territorial and budget sovereignty (Holehouse & Riley-Smith 2015).

Le Pen noted that she would hold an in/out referendum on France's membership of the European Union if she was elected as president of France. Front National currently holds two


seats in National Assembly, 2 in the Senate, 21 in the European Parliament, 358 in regional councils, 61 in general councils, and 1,545 in municipal councils.

Section 1.5: European Union Response to Brexit

While disapproval with the European Union’s policies and handling of economic and immigration issues was observed among many of the EU member states, including Greece, Italy, France, Germany, and Spain, there was little support for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. According to Pew Research Center’s report, of the ten European Union countries surveyed, 70% indicated that that the UK’s departure from the Union would be a “bad thing” for the EU. Moreover, despite increases in national Eurosceptic parties in two of the founding members of the European project, 62% in France and 74% in Germany said UK’s departure would hurt the EU (Stokes 2016, 10).

Chart 3: European Views of EU and Brexit (Unfavourable/Favourable) (Good/Bad)⁴

European views of the EU and potential Brexit



⁴ Stoke, B. “Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit.” *Significant opposition in key European countries to an ever closer EU.*

		Q50N. If the UK were to leave the European Union, do you think this would be a good thing or a bad thing for the EU?			
		Good thing	Bad thing	DK/Refused	Total
France	Spring, 2016	32	62	7	100
Germany	Spring, 2016	16	74	10	100
Greece	Spring, 2016	14	65	21	100
Hungary	Spring, 2016	10	70	20	100
Italy	Spring, 2016	23	57	20	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2016	17	75	8	100
Poland	Spring, 2016	11	66	23	100
Spain	Spring, 2016	16	70	14	100
Sweden	Spring, 2016	8	89	3	100

Table 2: Data Set for Chart 3, Respondent Data for UK Leaving the EU (Good/Bad)⁵

Despite data pointing to a decline in trust and approval with the European Union’s institutions, no member state, other than the United Kingdom, has put forth meaningful effort to leave the Union. Considering this, several questions arise surrounding the circumstances of Brexit, each of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters:

- To what extent has Euroscepticism transcended its philosophical roots and transformed into a vehicle of policy change vis-à-vis withdrawal from the European Union?
- Is Brexit better explained as a result of a different phenomenon, such as populism or anti-globalism, rather than Euroscepticism? Conversely, is populism or anti-globalism Euroscepticism in its ultimate application?
- Is Brexit a result of Britain’s unique Euroscepticism? Are there other contributing factors, such as cues from political parties and the media or the current events surrounding the vote, which played more substantial roles than historic sceptic attitudes toward the EU?

⁵ Stokes, B. 2016, Pew Research Center Brexit Report, Final, June 2016. <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2016/06/Pew-Research-Center-Brexit-Report-FINAL-June-7-2016.pdf>

Chapter II: Britain's History with the European Union

After World War II, Europe faced the economic and political challenge of rebuilding. The United States aided significantly in the rebuilding of Europe with Marshall Aid worth \$13 (US) billion distributed between 1948 and 1952 (Geddes 2013). In addition to this financial aid, the US contributed to the political reestablishment of a unified Europe. As the US was keen on Western Europe's capitalist and liberal-democratic cooperation, the Americans helped craft the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948 in order to integrate Marshall Aid countries into one political unit. Similarly to the modern European Union, the OEEC functioned as a facilitator for intra-European trade and economic co-operation by reducing tariffs and trade barriers, studying the feasibility of creating a customs union and/or free trade area, and promoting better conditions for utilisation of labour (OECD 2016). The United States wanted Britain to play a leadership role in this organisation. Instead, Britain advocated for intergovernmental cooperation in the OEEC, rather than the institution of supranational structures with overarching powers over the member states (Geddes 2013).

In 1952, political and economic cohesion of European countries was born through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) via the Treaty of Paris (signed in 1951). The ECSC was comprised of "The Six" founding countries of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The creation of the ECSC was spearheaded by France and Germany, as the two raw materials (coal and steel) were the basis of industry and power of the two countries (EUR-LEX 2010). As a result, the underlying political objective was to strengthen Franco-German solidarity post-WWII and invigorate the European economy (EUR-LEX 2010). During this time, Britain was hesitant to join up with an emerging supranational organisation. Britain was not opposed to the ECSC, but it did not

want to join. While the British did not join the ESCS, they signed a treaty of association in 1954 under which there was a permanent British delegation to the headquarters in Luxemburg and continued communication with European counterparts over common problems (Fogarty 1957).

In addition to other internal factors at play, Britain's political hesitation came alongside post-war nationalistic pride. The Foreign Office's view toward European integration was in so much that 'Great Britain must be viewed as a world power of the second rank and not merely as a unit in a federated Europe' (Ellison 2000). According to Max Beloff in *The Intellectual in Politics and Other Essays* (1970) and *Britain and the European Union* (1996), the British government held the view that supranational integration was idealistic and an inevitable failure. Beloff based this claim on the British refusal to join the ECSC. For the time being, it seemed as if Britain would reject Sir Winston Churchill's call for a "[recreated] European family" through the establishment of a "United States of Europe" (European Commission, nd; Helm 2016).

In 1949, however, Britain joined with European counterparts in forming the Council of Europe. Winston Churchill's call for a "United States of Europe" in his famous speech in 1946 was animated by the creation of the Council of Europe. In 1948, delegates from various European countries met at the Congress of Europe, with Churchill presiding, and eventually created the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949.

In 1953, a draft for what would be called the European Political Community, following the call for the United States of Europe was formulated. The draft left for "all degrees of association with the Community by countries not actually willing to join it" (Fogarty 1957, 91), and yet, the British did not want to join. Despite this, Britain all but reassured European counterparts of their steadfast, albeit distant, commitment in the following statement:

We shall certainly work as closely as we possibly can with the new Community. We are happy that the door to association has been left as wide open as possible... I can foresee endless possibilities with regard to association, and he would be a bold man who could predict limits to it. Great Britain will never turn her back upon Europe. That is our determination, fixed and irrevocable (Hope, J., 1953, 162-163).

In 1955, the British were formulating a plan for a free trade association without supranational implications in the hope that the alternative would urge the European nations away from further integration. The creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established after the acceptance of the Stockholm Convention in 1959 with seven signatories (Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). Simultaneously, Britain was overseeing the Commonwealth and the Empire. The rest of Europe, known as the “Inner Six” (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany), was establishing the European Community/European Economic Community with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The Treaty of Rome reduced custom duties, created a customs union, and essentially created a common market across member states for goods, services, labour, and capital. The Treaty of Rome is one of the core documents for the foundation of the European Union. By the 1960s, the economies of the European Economic Community countries were booming; Britain was forced to rethink their stance toward the European Community if they wished to ever keep up with the prosperity.

Section 2.1: Britain's First Application to Join Europe

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan: 1957 – 1963

Harold Macmillan was an “enthusiastic participant” since the European project’s inception in 1949 until he entered government two years later in 1951, and an “ideal delegate to the Council of Europe Assembly” (Catterall 2002, 93; 95). As a Conservative, Macmillan was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1957 – 1963 and oversaw the first application to the European Community. Macmillan said of the change of heart over membership:

For the first time since the Napoleonic era, the major Continental powers are united in a positive economic grouping, with considerable political aspects, which, though not specifically directed against the United Kingdom, may have the effect of excluding us, both from European markets and from consultation in European policy

Shall we be caught between a hostile, or at least less and less friendly, America and a boastful powerful empire of Charlemagne, now under French, and later bound to come under German control? Is this the real reason for joining the Common Market if we are acceptable, and for abandoning the seven, abandoning British agriculture, abandoning the Commonwealth? It is a grim choice (Greenwood 1996, 118).

When Macmillan made the first application to join the European Community, the French President Charles de Gaulle rejected and vetoed the application, opposed the development of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and feared United States influence through the involvement of Great Britain as a “Trojan horse into Europe” (Gebbes 2013, 54). De Gaulle’s vision for the European project was to be a force between the United States and the Soviet Union. While Britain, on the other hand, was hand-in-hand with the United States, as per the “special relationship” alliance coming out from the World Wars and shared globalist outlook. In 1962, the United States called for an Atlantic partnership with the European Community, including Britain as a part of it (Gebbes 2013, 55).

In 1963, de Gaulle said the following of his decision to reject Macmillan's application to join the EC:

Britain is insular, maritime, bound up by its trade, its markets, its food supplies, with the most varied and often the most distant countries. Her activity is essentially industrial and commercial, not agricultural. She has, in all her work, very special, very original, habits and traditions. In short, the nature, structure, circumstances peculiar to England are very different from those of other continentals. How can Britain, in the way that she lives, produces, trades, be incorporated into the Common Market as it has been conceived and functions?... It is predictable that the cohesion of all its members, which would soon be very large, very diverse, would not last for very long and that, in fact, it would seem like a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and that is not at all what France wanted to do and is doing, which is a strictly European construction (Grant 2008).

In short, the decision to reject Britain's application to join the European Community was due to de Gaulle's belief that Britain was fundamentally too different than the rest of Europe, did not fit the vision of the Economic Community, and posed a threat to the overall aims of the Community with its ties to America. After Macmillan left office, he was followed by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. During this time, Britain was dealing substantially with its overseas territories, colonies, and the Commonwealth.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson: 1964 – 1970

Prime Minister Harold Wilson took office in 1964 under a changing economy. Britain was seen as trailing the European Community in economic output. For example, between 1958 and 1968, real earnings in Britain rose by 38% compared to 75% in the European Community (Gebbes 2013). However, historians state that a substantial shift in British policy toward the European Community occurred during the 1960s. After a failed application under

Prime Minister Macmillan, Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson made a second attempt in 1966-7. This application was also vetoed by President de Gaulle in 1967.

Prime Minister Edward Heath: 1970 – 1974

In 1973, Britain finally entered the European Economic Community under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, but it did not come without stringent negotiations. Negotiations began in 1970 and were led by Geoffrey Rippon. In 1971, the PM's government published a White Paper with some disadvantages of membership of the EEC. Both main parties, the Conservatives and the Labour Party, were split on the idea of European membership. Heath, though, was a supporter of British membership of the EC. Another factor weighed heavily into the application: de Gaulle was no longer President in France. French President Georges Pompidou supported Britain's application to join the EC. This is further reflected in statements made by Pompidou:

Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become European, and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it or divert it from its objectives... Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced to the contrary (Cited in Heath, 1998: 372).

Seemingly, Pompidou was making an allusion to de Gaulle's staunch disapproval of British involvement in the EC. Following, the 1972 European Communities Act and the Treaty of Accession legislated the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community and the Common Market, and mandated the EC law to be in effect nationally (direct effect of EC law). Britain's admittance into the EC came alongside Denmark and Ireland's, and the total number of EC countries was then nine. However, Britain's admittance to the EC did not come without intense political division between the Tory and Labour parties (Helm 2016). The Treaty of Accession was signed in Brussels in January 1972 after

UK Parliament vote in October 1971 of 365 to 244 in favour of joining the Community. The House of Lords voted 451 to 58 in favour.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson: 1974 - 1976

Harold Wilson became Prime Minister again in 1974 after a bad bout with British economic decline saw Prime Minister Heath out of power. In a turn, Wilson's political move was to challenge the Heath government over EC membership. The Labour Party was not holistically in favour of joining the EC; in fact, there was a deep division within the Labour Party, even though 69 of its members voted to support accession under Heath. Renegotiations started in 1974 by Foreign Secretary and eventual Prime Minister James Callaghan. The demands, in and of themselves, were seen as ineffectual, and little gains that could have been made through "normal Community channels" (Geddes 2013, 64). Yet, there was something coming that was substantial: a referendum on membership. The pledge to hold a referendum helped PM Wilson heal the divisions in the Labour Party.

In 1975, the United Kingdom European Communities membership referendum was held in order to reaffirm support or withdrawal of support for British membership of the EC. In Labour's manifesto the previous year, the referendum was promised to the general public after renegotiation of terms of membership. The main areas of concern in the 1974-75 renegotiations regarded the Common Agriculture Policy, Britain's contribution to the EEC budget, the goals of the economic and monetary Union, harmonisation of VAT, and the sovereignty of Parliament (Miller 2015, 1). In the Labour Party, there was a lifting of the "collective responsibility" normally precluding members of the party from deviating from collective opinion.


After significant debate, including a six-hour HoC Adjournment debate, a Referendum Bill was introduced and received a split 312 votes in favour and 248 votes against (Miller 2015, 4.2: 21). The language of the referendum question was hotly debated, but eventually was as followed: "Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the

European Community (the Common Market)?” (Miller 2015, 4.2: 21). The results were a resounding positive for the pro-Europeans. Approximately 62% of the votes cast were in favour of Britain remaining in the EEC, with just two Scottish regions of Shetland Islands and Western Isles voting no. Moreover, nearly every voting council area in England and Wales returned over 60% vote in favour of remaining in the EEC, with one Labour council (Mid Glamorgan) in Wales. The overall results of the referendum overall are listed in the following Table 3: Results of the EC Membership Referendum 1975 are as followed.

<i>Table 3: Results of EC Membership Referendum 1975⁶</i>		
	Votes	Percentages
Yes	17,378,581	67.23%
No	8,470,073	32.77%
Valid Votes	25,848,654	99.79%
Invalid or Blank Votes	54,540	0.21%
Total Votes	25,903,194	100.00%
Registered/Turnout	40,456,8677	64.03%

⁶ UK Parliament Briefing Paper Number 7253, July 2015. Page 25: <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7253#fullreport>

Chart 4: 1975 EC Referendum Results Map



In the chart to the left labelled “1975 Referendum,” the percentages for support of remaining in the European Community are depicted. The chart depicts the results regionally, taking an aggregated percentage for each. As noted, only two regions voted “no” to EC membership: Shetland Islands and Western Isles in Scotland.

After Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Labour PM James Callaghan and former Foreign Secretary took over until 1979. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher, an iconic Prime Minister, changed the way Britain dealt with

Europe and international affairs.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: 1979 – 1990

Following the 1975 referendum and the obvious support of the British public for continued European integration, Margaret Thatcher took over as Conservative Leader, replacing Edward Heath. Eventually in 1979, Thatcher took office with a pro-European Conservative party. Initially, Thatcher was not entirely opposed to Europe, and her first two terms (1979-83; 1983-87) did not see much of a debate on the topic of European integration. Perhaps the most notable debate in the 1979-84 period was over the Budget, as thrifty ‘Thatcheronomics’ expelled superfluous spending. By the end of the 1970s, Britain had become the second largest contributor to the EC budget with contributions of over £1 billion a year, despite having the third-lowest GDP per capita of the nine members (Geddes 2013,

67). As the EC's scope widened, Thatcherites saw the EC as a "stultifying bureaucracy" and proposed for increasing free market vigour (Geddes 2013, 67). The remaining years of the Thatcher premiership were spent fighting against the integrative affinity of the EC's ever growing expansion, which eventually led to her political demise.

Thatcher made a famous speech about the European project which came to be known as the Bruges Speech. Some of the most pertinent excerpts establish Thatcher's Eurosceptic affinities, harken back on the tension between identities of Britishness versus European, and recall the important aspects of British Euroscepticism which were discussed in the previous section:

The European Community is *one* manifestation of that European identity, but it is not the only one. Britain does not dream of some cozy, isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community. That is not to say that our future lies only in Europe, but nor does that of France or Spain or, indeed, of any other member. The Community is not an end in itself. Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept. Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation. The European Community is a practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there are many other powerful nations and groups of nations (Thatcher 1988).

In perhaps one of the most animated and infamous speeches given by Thatcher over the topic of European integration and involvement, Thatcher made the following points:

Yes, the Commission does want to increase its powers. Yes, it is a non-elected body, and I do not want the Commission to increase its powers at the expense of the House, so of course we are differing. Of course, the President of the Commission, Mr. Delors,

said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the Community; he wanted the Commission to be the Executive, and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the Senate. No! No! No!

Perhaps the Labour party would give all those things up easily? Perhaps it would agree to a single currency: to total abolition of the pound sterling. Perhaps, being totally incompetent with monetary matters, they'd be only too delighted to hand over full responsibility as they did to the IMF, to a central bank. The fact is they have no competence on money and no competence on the economy—so, yes, the right Honourable Gentleman would be glad to hand it all over. What is the point in trying to get elected to Parliament only to hand over your sterling and the powers of this House to Europe? (BBC News Video 2014).

In-party arguing over Britain's future in Europe eventually led to the political demise of Thatcher's reign as Prime Minister, as she was ushered out for a more modern approach to Europe. During her premiership, Thatcher's chancellor John Major persuaded her to link the pound sterling to the European exchange rate mechanism, and eventually, Major took over as Prime Minister.

Prime Minister John Major: 1990 - 1997

Prime Minister John Major took over as Conservative leader and Prime Minister in 1997 after Margaret Thatcher's premiership. Major's premiership saw the entrance of the United Kingdom into the European Union as it is conceived today; however, the UK's membership of the European Union came with political tension, a series of renegotiations, and ultimately laid the foundation for eventual rise of hard Euroscepticism in Britain.

During Thatcher's premiership, Major had convinced her to join the European exchange rate mechanism. Even so, many Conservatives believed that the rate was too high

for British industry (White 2016, 2). In Europe, however, there was a significant increase in the desire for further economic and political integration. As a result of the collapse of communism in the east and central European countries, political integration was a greater possibility for a united Europe. In 1991 - 1992, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union was formulated. Combined with external events in the remainder of Europe, internally the member states desired to capitalise on the success of the Single European Act, which resulted in the Intergovernmental Conferences and Maastricht Summit in 1991. Ultimately, the Maastricht Treaty resulted in the creation of the European Union, committed all its member states to the single currency (Euro) with some eventual opt outs and a common foreign policy, and created the notion of “European citizenship.” Additionally, the Common Market requirements of the freedom of movement of goods, workers, services, and capital as the four fundamental freedoms of the European Union were reaffirmed.

John Major led British negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conferences. For Eurosceptics, such as The Bruges Group, Major failed to lead in a genuinely Eurosceptic position, instead falling to domestic political pressures (Holmes, nd.). In fact, Dr. Martin Holmes, writing for The Bruges Group, went on to declare Major’s European policy as an “unequivocal failure” with the following:

The final verdict must be that John Major had the great opportunity to have led the country toward a fundamental renegotiation of Britain’s relationship with continental Europe. He could have raised the possibility of outright withdrawal had he not been obsessed with the reaction of the Conservative Eurofanatics. He could have accepted the truth that Britain was incapable of changing the European Union from within, because continental interests and values are profoundly different from our own. He could have led his party rather than managed it. John Major had the chance to have broken free from the shackles of compromise which bound him in 1990. He could have built on the foundations of his predecessor’s 1988 Bruges speech. But he did none of these things. On Europe, John Major blew it. As Neville Chamberlain is remembered as the Prime Minister of Munich, so will John Major be remembered as the Prime Minister of Maastricht. Major’s European policy was an unequivocal failure, the legacy of which the Conservative party will wrestle with in Opposition for perhaps too long (Holmes, M., nd.).

For others, Major's negotiations and relationship with Europe was seen as a compound of a variety of elements such as domestic pressures, preference formation of policies for Britain, and the desire to keep party cohesion in order to keep the Conservative Party in power. The Conservative backbenches' support was wavering, Michael Howard's resignation signaled disapproval with Major's handling of the European negotiations, and a looming fear of an approaching election kept much of the tension at bay. The political tension, however, developed even more so through the dichotomy of ideological direction of the Conservative Party following the end of Thatcher's iconic premiership which shaped a substantial part of the elements of the Conservative Party's direction. Reflected in much Eurosceptic discourse, the tension over how the Conservative Party would continue in regard to moving into Europe headfirst was evident through the reluctance to sign over to the social policies set forth by the European Union.

Uniquely, building on the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism constructed by Dr. Andrew Moravcsik of Princeton University, Dr. Anthony Forster critiqued the notion of liberal intergovernmentalism in regard to Britain and the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty. Drawing from these critiques, a valid discussion of the political, economic, and domestic implications of the Major negotiations was made; more interestingly, based on these critiques, comparisons to that of the David Cameron renegotiations before the European Union membership referendum in 2016 can be made and substantiated by the claims of Forster's paper.

According to Forster's interpretation of Moravcsik's work, liberal intergovernmentalism combines domestic and system-based on how governments behave during bargaining situations, a theory on preference formation in policy, rejects neofunctionalism and neorealist theories, and operates on the following assumptions:

Moravcsik Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory

1. The assumption of rational state behavior;
2. The assumption that as far as government preferences are concerned, “groups articulate preferences and governments aggregate them,” and economic interest of producers shape national preferences;
3. The assumption that policy preferences of a government are shaped by the following factors:
 - a. The magnitude of benefits to be gained from cooperation;
 - b. The certainty of costs and benefits;
 - c. The relative influence of producer groups on policy formation;
4. The assumption that governments have little flexibility in making concessions beyond their own objective interests;
5. The assumption that issue areas are discrete and unconnected; linkage occurs only as a last resort;
6. The assumption that the nature of the issue imposes important constraints on the options available to a government and hence generates predictable patterns of bargaining (Forster, A., 1998, 347 – 350; Moravcsik, 1993, 481, 488, 483, 491 501,504, 517).

Based on this framework, Forster analysed the sections of the negotiations in categories:

social policy, foreign and security policy, and the European Parliament (EP). Forster indicated that these three areas of policy resulted in three distinctive outcomes for Britain in regard to the negotiations of the Treaty: resisting negotiation on social policy, agreeing to a compromise on foreign and security policy, and conceding position entirely on the European Parliament (1998, 348).

According to Forster, the cost-benefits of the social policy initiatives from the British perspective were motivated by political rationale rather than economic rationale (1998, 348). Moreover, domestic influence on the British government from private groups was weakened as a result of the Government insulating European discussions from its own domestic groups and isolating political opponents from access to information on the matter (1998, 349). As a decision maker, Major was receiving pressure instead from other governments, notably the French, and was restricted by his own policy decisions outside of the EU negotiations (1998, 349-350). Moreover, Thatcher’s previous policy decisions played a role in Major’s view on his own European policy concessions. Essentially, he believed that he could sell his version

of policy as an “incremental adjustment” which “codified existing procedures in operation during [Thatcher’s] premiership” (Forster 1998, 352).

Ultimately, John Major signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. He received opt-outs for the Euro single currency and the social chapter. As part of “variable geometry” strategy, Britain was allowed to opt out of the social chapter covering workers’ rights (White 2016, 2).

On the signing of the treaty, Major concluded with the following:

However, despite that satisfactory outcome, no one in the House should assume that that argument has been settled for all time. Some Community member states will go on pressing for a united states of Europe, with all co-operation within one institutional framework. We shall continue to argue forcefully against that proposition, and I believe that we will win the argument in the future as we have thus far.

The treaty on political union was a challenge as well as an opportunity. The challenge was to ensure that we checked the encroachment of the Community’s institutions. The opportunity was to make the Community work better. In the event, a large number of the agreements that were reached stemmed specifically from proposals that were put forward by the United Kingdom. It is worth stating the extent of those proposals. Our proposals were for stronger European security and defence co-operation, making the Western European Union the defence pillar of the European Union, while preserving the primacy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. For us, the prime importance of NATO was a vital national interest, and that has been secured.

Our proposals were also for a common foreign and security policy going beyond the Single European Act, but remaining outside the treaty of Rome and beyond the reach of the European Court. They were for co-operation on interior and justice matters, but also for co-operation outside the treaty of Rome and the jurisdiction of the European Court. They were also for co-operation for greater financial accountability, for a treaty article on subsidiarity--an article that specifically enshrines the crucial concept that the Community should undertake only those measures that could not be achieved at a national level--and for the right of the European Court of Justice to impose fines on those member states that fail to comply with its judgments, or with Community law, having previously signed up to it. We won agreement to all those proposals, and it was vital to the interests of this country that we did (Major 1991).

Demands starting coming up in 1992 for an in/out referendum on UK’s membership in the European Union, followed by economic problems which forced Britain out of the ERM (White 2016, 2). The United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) came out of this period, starting as the Anti-Federalist League opposed to the Maastricht Treaty. In 1993, Anti-Federalist League was renamed as the United Kingdom Independence Party. Additionally, Eurosceptic parties such as the Referendum Party were established. Economic problems in

Britain seemingly pushed Major out of the premiership, leading to Tony Blair's Labour government election in 1997.

1997 – 2016: Blair, Cameron, and the Build-Up to 2016 Referendum

Looking to the recent premierships of the 1990s and into the late 2000s, Euroscepticism has still played a major factor in Britain's policies toward the European Union (established in 1992 with ratification of the Maastricht Treaty). As controversial as membership of the EC and EEC, Britain's membership of the European Union proved to be yet another divisive issue within the Conservative and Labour parties. After a shaky EU-prone Tory government under John Major post-Thatcher, Labour Leader Tony Blair committed to strengthening UK-EU relations in 1994 (Helm 2016). Following Tony Blair, Gordon Brown was pro-EU, but did not support the Euro single currency. Tories grew more anti-EU with leaders such as William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith leading charges against Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Lisbon, which brought deeper integration to the EU member states (Miller 2009, 2). As a result of the increasing integration, Tories started to talk openly of European Union exit. In 2005, Conservative Party Leader and eventual Prime Minister David Cameron promised to lead with Eurosceptic tendencies (Telm 2013). Now, in 2016, David Cameron brought the United Kingdom to the ultimate Eurosceptic culmination: a referendum on exiting the European Union.

Chapter III: The European Union Referendum - Before the Vote

In 2013, David Cameron pledged for an in/out referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union if the Conservative Party won the general election. Similarly to Major in optimism for his ability to successfully renegotiate terms with the European Union, Cameron noted that he would first renegotiate in key areas of concern regarding the UK's membership of the European Union. The then Labour Leader Ed Miliband accused David Cameron of placating in fear to the Eurosceptic right-wing group United Kingdom Independence Party, whose polling numbers were steadily rising. At the time, Ian Watson of BBC News wrote that Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party would be "pleased" with the idea of a referendum, but noted several key aspects of its potential success:

- Cameron's Conservative Party would have to win the election in order to act on the referendum promise;
- European partners would have to be willing to renegotiate the key elements of Cameron's renegotiation proposals (Watson 2016).

Additionally, Cameron would have to overcome the disapproval of many in opposition, including members of his own party, the opposition parties, and of his counterparts in Europe. At the time, Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats and then deputy prime minister, indicated that he thought pursuing a "wholesale renegotiation" of the UK's membership of the European Union would cause "years of uncertainty" and was not "in the national interest" (BBC News 2013).

In January 2013, David Cameron gave a speech on his plans for a referendum on British membership of the EU. In conclusion, Cameron said:

If we left the European Union, it would be a one-way ticket, not a return. So we will have time for a proper, reasoned debate. At the end of that debate you, the British people, will decide. And I say to our European partners, frustrated as some of them no doubt are by Britain's attitude: work with us on this. Consider the extraordinary steps which the Eurozone members are taking to keep the euro together, steps which a year ago would have seemed impossible. It does not seem to me that the steps which would be needed to make Britain – and others – more comfortable in their relationship in the European Union are inherently so outlandish or unreasonable. And just as I believe that Britain should want to remain in the EU so the EU should want

us to stay. For an EU without Britain, without one of Europe's strongest powers, a country which in many ways invented the single market, and which brings real heft to Europe's influence on the world stage, which plays by the rules and which is a force for liberal economic reform would be a very different kind of European Union. And it is hard to argue that the EU would not be greatly diminished by Britain's departure.

Let me finish today by saying this. I have no illusions about the scale of the task ahead. I know there will be those who say the vision I have outlined will be impossible to achieve. That there is no way our partners will co-operate. That the British people have set themselves on a path to inevitable exit. And that if we aren't comfortable being in the EU after 40 years, we never will be. But I refuse to take such a defeatist attitude – either for Britain or for Europe. Because with courage and conviction I believe we can deliver a more flexible, adaptable and open European Union in which the interests and ambitions of all its members can be met. With courage and conviction I believe we can achieve a new settlement in which Britain can be comfortable and all our countries can thrive.

And when the referendum comes let me say now that if we can negotiate such an arrangement, I will campaign for it with all my heart and soul. Because I believe something very deeply. That Britain's national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open European Union and that such a European Union is best with Britain in it.

Over the coming weeks, months and years, I will not rest until this debate is won. For the future of my country. For the success of the European Union. And for the prosperity of our peoples for generations to come (Cameron 2013).

In 2015, David Cameron and the Conservative Party unexpectedly won the General Election with a 330 seat majority. Thus, the onus was on Cameron to follow through with his manifesto commitment to renegotiate membership terms followed by an in/out, yes/no membership referendum. That promise led to the creation of the European Union Referendum Act in 2015. During the Queen's Speech in 2015, the announcement was made regarding the Government's intention to introduce a bill on UK membership in the European Union. The bill was introduced and sponsored by Phillip Hammond, then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in late May 2015. The Act laid out provisions and guidelines for the Referendum that would take place no later than the end of December 2017. A copy of the pertinent pages of the European Union Referendum Act 2015 are available in the appendix of this paper.

European Union Referendum Act 2015

2015 CHAPTER 36

An Act to make provision for the holding of a referendum in the United Kingdom and Gibraltar on whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union.
[17th December 2015]

BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

The referendum

1 The referendum

- (1) A referendum is to be held on whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union.
- (2) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, appoint the day on which the referendum is to be held.
- (3) The day appointed under subsection (2)—
 - (a) must be no later than 31 December 2017,
 - (b) must not be 5 May 2016, and
 - (c) must not be 4 May 2017.
- (4) The question that is to appear on the ballot papers is—

“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”
- (5) The alternative answers to that question that are to appear on the ballot papers are—

*“Remain a member of the European Union
Leave the European Union”.*
- (6) In Wales, there must also appear on the ballot papers—
 - (7) the following Welsh version of the question—

“A ddylai’r Deyrnas Unedig aros yn aelod o’r Undeb Ewropeaidd neu adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd?”, and

 - (b) the following Welsh versions of the alternative answers—

*“Aros yn aelod o’r Undeb Ewropeaidd
Gadael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd”.*

2 Entitlement to vote in the referendum

- (1) Those entitled to vote in the referendum are—
 - (a) the persons who, on the date of the referendum, would be entitled to vote as electors at a parliamentary election in any constituency,
 - (b) the persons who, on that date, are disqualified by reason of being peers from voting as electors at parliamentary elections but—
 - (i) would be entitled to vote as electors at a local government election in any electoral area in Great Britain,
 - (ii) would be entitled to vote as electors at a local election in any district electoral area in Northern Ireland, or
 - (iii) would be entitled to vote as electors at a European Parliamentary election in any electoral region by virtue of section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1985 (peers resident outside the United Kingdom), and
 - (c) the persons who, on the date of the referendum—
 - (i) would be entitled to vote in Gibraltar as electors at a European Parliamentary election in the combined electoral region in which Gibraltar is comprised, and
 - (ii) fall within subsection (2).
- (2) A person falls within this subsection if the person is either—
 - (a) a Commonwealth citizen, or
 - (b) a citizen of the Republic of Ireland.
- (3) In subsection (1)(b)(i) “local government election” includes a municipal election in the City of London (that is, an election to the office of mayor, alderman, common councilman or sheriff and also the election of any officer elected by the mayor, aldermen and liverymen in common hall).

3 Further provision about the referendum

Part 7 of the 2000 Act (general provision about referendums) applies to the referendum but see also—

- (a) Schedules 1 and 2 (which make, in relation to the referendum, further provision about campaigning and financial controls, including provision modifying Part 7 of the 2000 Act), and
- (b) Schedule 3 (which makes further provision about the referendum, including provision modifying Part 7 of the 2000 Act).

4 Conduct regulations, etc

- (1) The Minister may by regulations—
 - (a) make provision about voting in the referendum and otherwise about the conduct of the referendum, which may include provision

- corresponding to any provision of Schedules 2 and 3 to the 2011 Act (with or without modifications);
- (b) apply for the purposes of the referendum, with or without modifications—
 - (i) any provision of the 1983 Act, or
 - (ii) any other enactment relating to elections or referendums, including provisions creating offences;
 - (c) further modify the 2000 Act for the purposes of the referendum;
 - (d) modify or exclude any provision of any other enactment (other than this Act) that applies to the referendum.
- (2) The Minister may by regulations make provision for and in connection with the combination of the poll for the referendum with any one or more of the following—
- (a) the poll for any election specified in the regulations;
 - (b) the poll for any other referendum specified in the regulations.
- Regulations under this subsection may amend or modify any enactment (but may not alter the date of the poll for any such election or other referendum).
- (3) The reference in subsection (2) to any enactment includes—
- (a) the definition of “counting officer” in section 11(1),
 - (b) section 11(2), and
 - (c) Schedule 3,
- but does not include any other provision of this Act.
- (4) The Minister may by regulations make such amendments or modifications of this Act or any other enactment as appear to the Minister to be necessary because the referendum is to be held in Gibraltar as well as the United Kingdom.
- (5) Regulations under this section may, in particular—
- (a) make provision for disregarding alterations in a register of electors;
 - (b) make provision extending or applying to (or extending or applying only to) Gibraltar or any part of the United Kingdom;
 - (c) make different provision for different purposes.
- (6) Before making any regulations under this section, the Minister must consult the Electoral Commission.
- (7) Consultation carried out before the commencement of this section is as effective for the purposes of subsection (6) as consultation carried out after that commencement.

5 Gibraltar

- (1) Regulations under section 4 which extend to Gibraltar may extend and apply to Gibraltar, with or without modifications, any enactment relating to referendums or elections that applies in any part of the United Kingdom.
- (2) The capacity (apart from this Act) of the Gibraltar legislature to make law for Gibraltar is not affected by the existence of—
 - (a) section 4, or
 - (b) anything in any other provision of this Act which enables particular provision to be made under section 4,

and in this Act “Gibraltar conduct law” means any provision of law made in and for Gibraltar which corresponds to any provision that has been or could be made for any part of the United Kingdom by regulations under section 4.

- (3) Subsection (2) does not affect the operation of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 in relation to Gibraltar conduct law.

6 Duty to publish information on outcome of negotiations between member States

- (1) The Secretary of State must publish a report which contains (alone or with other material)—
- (a) a statement setting out what has been agreed by member States following negotiations relating to the United Kingdom’s request for reforms to address concerns over its membership of the European Union, and
 - (b) the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom on what has been agreed.
- (2) The report must be published before the beginning of the final 10 week period.
- (3) In this section “the final 10 week period” means the period of 10 weeks ending with the date of the referendum.
- (4) A copy of the report published under this section must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State.

7 Duty to publish information about membership of the European Union etc

- (1) The Secretary of State must publish a report which contains (alone or with other material)—
- (a) information about rights, and obligations, that arise under European Union law as a result of the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, and
 - (b) examples of countries that do not have membership of the European Union but do have other arrangements with the European Union (describing, in the case of each country given as an example, those arrangements).
- (2) The report must be published before the beginning of the final 10 week period.
- (3) In this section “the final 10 week period” means the period of 10 weeks ending with the date of the referendum.
- (4) A copy of the report published under this section must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State.

8 Power to modify section 125 of the 2000 Act

- (1) In this section—
- (a) “section 125” means section 125 of the 2000 Act (restriction on publication etc of promotional material by central and local government etc), as modified by paragraph 38 of Schedule 1, and
 - (b) “section 125(2)” means subsection (2) of section 125 (which prevents material to which section 125 applies from being published by or on

behalf of certain persons and bodies during the 28 days ending with the date of the poll).

- (2) The Minister may by regulations make provision modifying section 125, for the purposes of the referendum, so as to exclude from section 125(2) cases where—
 - (a) material is published—
 - (i) in a prescribed way, or
 - (ii) by a communication of a prescribed kind, and
 - (b) such other conditions as may be prescribed are met.
- (3) The communications that may be prescribed under subsection (2)(a)(ii) include, in particular, oral communications and communications with the media.
- (4) Before making any regulations under this section, the Minister must consult the Electoral Commission.
- (5) Consultation carried out before the commencement of this section is as effective for the purposes of subsection (4) as consultation carried out after that commencement.
- (6) Any regulations under subsection (2) must be made not less than 4 months before the date of the referendum.
- (7) In this section—

“prescribed” means prescribed by the regulations;

“publish” has the same meaning as in section 125.
- (8) This section does not affect the generality of section 4(1)(c).

Supplemental

9 Regulations

- (1) Any power under this Act to make regulations, apart from the power of the Electoral Commission under paragraph 16(10) of Schedule 3, is exercisable by statutory instrument.
- (2) Subject to subsection (3), a statutory instrument containing regulations under this Act may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
- (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a statutory instrument containing only regulations within subsection (4).
- (4) Regulations within this subsection are any of the following—
 - (a) regulations under section 13;
 - (b) regulations made by the Minister under paragraph 16 of Schedule 3.
- (5) Regulations under this Act, other than regulations under section 13 or paragraph 16 of Schedule 3, may contain supplemental, consequential, incidental, transitional or saving provision.
- (6) Section 26 of the Welsh Language Act 1993 (power to prescribe Welsh forms) applies in relation to regulations under this Act as it applies in relation to Acts of Parliament.

10 Financial provisions

- (1) The following are to be paid out of money provided by Parliament—
 - (a) expenditure incurred under this Act by the Minister;
 - (b) any increase attributable to this Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.
- (2) There is to be paid into the Consolidated Fund any increase attributable to this Act in the sums payable into that Fund under any other Act.

“registered party” and “minor party” have the same meaning as in the 2000 Act (see section 160(1) of that Act);

“registration officer” has the meaning given by section 8 of the 1983 Act;

“responsible person”, in relation to a permitted participant, means the responsible person within the meaning given by section 105(2) of the 2000 Act (as modified by paragraph 5 of Schedule 1);

“voting area” has the meaning given by subsection (2).

- (2) Each of the following, as it exists on the day of the referendum, is a “voting area” for the purposes of this Act—
 - (a) a district in England for which there is a district council;
 - (b) a county in England in which there are no districts with councils;
 - (c) a London borough;
 - (d) the City of London (including the Inner and Middle Temples);
 - (e) the Isles of Scilly;
 - (f) a county or county borough in Wales;
 - (g) a local government area in Scotland;
 - (h) Northern Ireland;
 - (i) Gibraltar.
- (3) References in this Act to a named Act (with no date) are to the Gibraltar Act of that name.

Final provisions

12 Extent

- (1) This Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom and to Gibraltar.
- (2) For the purposes of the referendum, Part 7 of the 2000 Act (whose extent is set out in section 163 of that Act) extends also to Gibraltar.

13 Commencement

- (1) The following provisions come into force on the day on which this Act is passed—
 - sections 9

to 12; this
section;
section 14.

- (2) The remaining provisions of this Act come into force on such day as the Minister may by regulations appoint.
- (3) Different days may be appointed for different purposes.

14 Short title

This Act may be cited as the European Union Referendum Act 2015.

Analysis of the EU Referendum Act

Acknowledging the fact that this is only an excerpt from the *Act*, there are remaining sections which are not included, but will be discussed. The *Act* in total has fourteen sections and three schedules.

Section 1: *The Referendum*

“A referendum is to be held on whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the European Union.

The Secretary of State must, by regulations, appoint the day on which the referendum is to be held.

The day appointed under subsection (2) –

- A. Must be no later than 31 December 2017
- B. Must not be 5 May 2016, and
- C. Must not be 4 May 2017.”

Hammond tabled an amendment to the Bill indicating that the referendum vote could not be held on May 5 because of regional elections in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

In *Subsection 4*, the ballot language for the referendum is dictated. Before the Bill was accepted, the language was challenged and ultimately changed. Before the alterations, the ballot language was as followed: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?” This necessitated a “yes” or “no” response, rather than a “remain” or “leave” answer. On the assessment of the ballot language, Jenny Watson, Chair of the Electoral Commission said the following:

Any referendum question must be as clear as possible so that voters understand the important choice they are being asked to make. We have tested the proposed question with voters and received views from potential campaigners, academics and plain language experts. Whilst voters understood the question in the bill some campaigners and members of the public feel the wording is not balanced and there was a perception of bias. The alternative question we have

recommended addresses this. It is now for parliament to discuss our advice and decide which question wording should be used (Syal and Watt 2015).

Cameron accepted the language alteration to the ballot, and the ballot question was changed in September 2015. In Wales, the question was available in both English and Welsh languages.

Section 2: *Entitlement to vote in the referendum*

- (1) Those entitled to vote in the referendum are—
 - (a) the persons who, on the date of the referendum, would be entitled to vote as electors at a parliamentary election in any constituency,
 - (b) the persons who, on that date, are disqualified by reason of being peers from voting as electors at parliamentary elections but—
 - (i) would be entitled to vote as electors at a local government election in any electoral area in Great Britain,
 - (ii) would be entitled to vote as electors at a local election in any district electoral area in Northern Ireland, or
 - (iii) would be entitled to vote as electors at a European Parliamentary election in any electoral region by virtue of section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1985 (peers resident outside the United Kingdom), and
 - (c) the persons who, on the date of the referendum—
 - (i) would be entitled to vote in Gibraltar as electors at a European Parliamentary election in the combined electoral region in which Gibraltar is comprised, and
 - (ii) fall within subsection (2).
- (2) A person falls within this subsection if the person is either—
 - (a) a Commonwealth citizen, or
 - (b) a citizen of the Republic of Ireland.
- (3) In subsection (1)(b)(i) “local government election” includes a municipal election in the City of London (that is, an election to the office of mayor, alderman, common councilman or sheriff and also the election of any officer elected by the mayor, aldermen and liverymen in common hall).

In as early as 2012, some British politicians were calling for allowing 16 and 17 year-olds to vote in “any referendum on the UK’s future in the EU” (BBC News 2012). Many of the supporters of the age extension cited the Scottish independence referendum, which would allow 16 years of age as a minimum. However, in 2015, the House of Commons and the House of Lords rejected the notion of an extension of

franchise to 16 and 17 year olds (Wintour 2015). Voting rights were extended to those with British, Irish, and commonwealth citizenship over the age of 18, and to British nationals who lived overseas for less than fifteen years at the time of vote.

Additionally, peers were allowed to vote if they were allowed to vote in local government elections. Those citizens in Gibraltar were also allowed to vote as per Subsections 1(c) and 2.

In Section 6, there is a mandate for the Secretary of State to publish a report which includes a statement setting out the plan for renegotiation of the membership of the European Union. The report included the Government's opinions, and it should be published and sent before Parliament for approval. Leading into Section 7, the duty to publish information about the membership of the European Union, including but not limited to the rights of member states, obligations under EU law, and reports of arrangements that other countries have with the EU despite not being members of the EU. The Government published reports such as *The best of both worlds: the United Kingdom's special status in a reformed European Union*, *The process for withdrawing from the European Union*, and circulated a EU vote pamphlet, as seen on the following page (43). The following is the cover of the pamphlet circulated by the Home Office.

Image 1: UK Government Pamphlet for Remain (2016)



HM Government

Why the Government believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the UK.

The EU referendum, Thursday, 23rd June 2016.

An important decision for the UK

On Thursday, 23rd June there will be a referendum. It's your opportunity to decide if the UK remains in the European Union (EU).

It's a big decision. One that will affect you, your family and your children for decades to come.

The UK has secured a **special status** in a reformed EU:

- we will not join the euro
- we will keep our own border controls
- the UK will not be part of further European political integration
- there will be tough new restrictions on access to our welfare system for new EU migrants
- we have a commitment to reduce EU red tape

The Government believes the UK should remain in the EU.

This leaflet sets out the facts, and explains why the Government believes a vote to remain in the EU is in the best interests of the people of the UK. It shows some of the choices the UK would face if there were a vote to leave.

If you would like further information, please visit the Government's EU referendum website at EUReferendum.gov.uk

The Government-circulated pamphlets cost nearly £9.3 million pounds to produce. Many Eurosceptic politicians, such as former London Mayor Boris Johnson, declared the pamphlets as a waste of government money and a scare tactic. The Government was able to spend money on the campaign ahead of the purdah period, 28 days before the referendum on June 23.

While the Conservative government was creating pamphlets and campaigning, as well as dealing with the running of the United Kingdom, something special was occurring in the background. A rising, populist movement was brewing behind David Cameron's back. Meanwhile, the other parties were mobilising to campaign for Leave or Remain. Little did the British realise that a smaller, less prominent party would make such a large impact on one of the most historical votes in British history.

Section 3.1: The Campaigns

During the campaigns before the EU referendum, there were essentially two sides: Remain and Leave. Each political party, as well as organisations, celebrities, and international figures, supported either Remain or Leave. The following section will give an overview of the activities of each of the political parties in the United Kingdom, events that took place during the campaigns, and it will lead into a discussion of each of the UK's countries' relationships with the EU.

The following chart the amount of Members of European Parliament and Members of Parliament each party has at the time of publication. Additionally, the MEP chart has brief notes on the party's stance on the EU, which will be detailed in further sections or country profiles.

United Kingdom Independence Party	24 MEPs	Complete withdrawal from the EU
Green Party	3 MEPs	Opposed EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty, Euro
Scottish National Party	2 MEPs	Critical of EU's fishery laws
Democratic Unionist Party	1 MEP	Opposes Euro, wants fishing to be locally controlled
Conservative Party	19 MEPs	Opposes further EU integration, Euro, holding referendum
Labour Party	20 MEPs	Positions uncertain on Euro, seemingly pro-EU
Liberal Democrats	1 MEP	Pro-EU, advocate for reforming budget
Sinn Fein	1 MEP	North Irish, advocates for sovereignty
Plaid Cymru	1 MEP	Wants independent Wales within EU
Ulster Conservatives & Unionists	1 MEP	Opposes further extension of EU power & Euro

Table 4: Members of European Parliament and Brief Notes on EU stance⁷

⁷ Sources: Interpretation of Party Manifestos

Table 5: Composition of UK Parliament during EU Referendum Debate	
Conservative Party	329 (Majority < Party in Power)
Labour Party	230 (Party in Opposition)
Scottish National Party	54
Liberal Democrats	8
Democratic Unionist	8
Sinn Fein	4
Plaid Cymru	3
Social Democratic and Labour	3
Ulster Unionist	2
United Kingdom Independence Party	1
Green Party	1
Independent	5

Blue: Party in Power

Red: Opposition Party

Conservative Party

The Conservative Party has 19 Members of European Parliament, had 330 Members of Parliament awarded in the 2015 election, and was the party in power during the EU referendum campaigns. The Conservative Party was led by Prime Minister David Cameron of Witney. The Conservatives, while historically Eurosceptic, adopted a pro-EU stance and backed the Remain campaign. However, over fifty Conservative MPs stated intentions to vote to leave the European Union. In the Appendix, there is a data set with MPs grouped by party and intended vote.

During the campaigns, the issue of suspending collective responsibility, just as it was in the 1975 EC Membership referendum, arose. Collective responsibility is a convention under which decision makers (Members of Parliament) collectively speak

as one unit; cabinet decisions are shared as a group. For Cameron, collective responsibility was more than just a parliamentary procedure. The command of the Conservative Party's collective responsibility to act as a unitary body was essential in order to maintain the perception of a cohesive goal: remain in the European Union. In London School of Economics and Political Science's Brexit Blog, Chris Malone wrote the following on collective responsibility:

As the government's supreme decision-making body the Cabinet needs to give clear direction and exert leadership over the parliamentary rank and file, not to mention the country at large. A cabinet prone to regular public disagreement over major policy issues would be both ridiculed and practically ineffective (Malone 2016).

Before the vote, Conservative MPs such as notoriously Eurosceptic Iain Duncan Smith told Cameron to be decisive on the issue of suspending collective responsibility, followed by former party leader Michael Howard in December, and Leader of the Commons Christ Grayling and Northern Ireland Secretary Theresa Villiers in January amongst others (Bennet 2016, 192). The Conservative Party's Eurosceptic members were growing frustrated with Cameron's lack of position on the matter, and some threatened resignation. Weighing the points, Cameron feared the resignation of Eurosceptic cabinet members as a sign of the Conservative Party's weakening and disarray. Ultimately, Cameron said the following, reassuring those Eurosceptics:

As I indicated before Christmas, there will be a clear government position, but it will open to individual ministers to take a different personal position while remaining part of the government (Bennett 2016, 193).

While trying to keep the frays of his party intact, Cameron was also dealing with his ambitious renegotiation plans with the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. In late January, Cameron met with President Juncker over the proposed “emergency brake” for allowing the United Kingdom to stop paying benefits to new EU migrants if public services were under excessive strain (Bennett 2016, 194). Two days later, Cameron left the Commission with no deal; yet, later on Cameron met with European Council President Donald Tusk to discuss the timeline of the emergency brake and its immediate effect after the UK’s referendum would be held (Palmeri 2016). After the dinner, Tusk sent out the following Tweet from his personal Twitter account:



Image 2: European Council President Donald Tusk Tweet

Cameron, on the other hand, was rather optimistic about the discussion. A few minutes before Tusk, Cameron tweeted from his personal Twitter account the following message:



Image 3: United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron Tweet

Negotiations with the European Union

Prime Minister David Cameron led renegotiations with the European Union. In an attempt to receive a “special status” with the EU, Cameron went in with several key sectors of the UK’s membership in mind. The BBC published a report comparing the draft proposals by European Council president Donald Tusk and the final text compared to what David Cameron asked for. The following are summarised versions of each alongside contextual information on the issue.

Sovereignty: David Cameron wanted to Britain to opt out of the “ever closer union” with no more additional political integration. He also wanted greater powers to the national parliaments, so that they might block EU-level legislation.

Cameron secured a commitment to exempt Britain from the “ever closer union” of continued political integration into the European Union. His inclusion of the “red-card

mechanism,” which is designed to effectively block or veto Commission proposals also was considered. Key areas in repatriation of EU social and employment law, for example, is no longer on the table (BBC EU Referendum 2016).

Migrants and Welfare Benefits: In the Conservative Manifesto, the following was noted: “We will insist the EU migrants who want to claim tax credits and child benefit must live here and contribute to our country for a minimum of four years.”

Cameron had to compromise on the aspect of the overall deal, especially in regard to child benefits, due to opposition from Poland. The four-year emergency brake, part of his plan, on in-work benefits, but new migrants would have had tax credits phased in over four years. The maximum would have been set at seven, rather than the thirteen he asked for. His demand to ban migrant workers from sending child benefit money back home failed.

Economics, Eurozone, and Safeguards for City of London: Cameron wanted an explicit recognition that the Euro is not the only currency of the EU in order to protect the countries outside of the Eurozone. He wanted safeguards on the steps toward financial union imposition on non-Eurozone members, and he wanted reassurance that the UK would not have to contribute to Eurozone bailouts. He got guarantees that countries outside the Eurozone would not be required to pay euro bailouts, but France put up resistance against UK on financial regulations.

Competitiveness: Cameron wanted a “target for the reduction of the ‘burden’ of excessive regulation and extending the single market” (BBC EU Referendum, 2016). This was deemed one of the least controversial of Cameron’s negotiations. Promises were made for working on the issue.

The Rogue Conservatives

In February 2016, there were 110 Conservative MPs who wanted to leave the European Union. One of the most famous rogue Conservative was Boris Johnson, who had served as MP for Uxbridge and South Ruislip, MP for Henley, and Mayor of London. In March, Johnson wrote in an exclusive column of *The Telegraph* a 2,000 word op-ed on Brexit. His conclusion concisely ended his piece in support of leaving the European Union:

This is a once-in-a-lifetime chance to vote for real change in Britain's relations with Europe. This is the only opportunity we will ever have to show that we care about self-rule. A vote to Remain will be taken in Brussels as a green light for more federalism, and for the erosion of democracy (Johnson 2016).

In May, a few weeks before the vote, Boris Johnson made an impactful speech on the EU referendum. Before which, Johnson was under scrutiny for his offhanded comments about President Barack Obama's pro-EU sentiments, which some people deemed racist and inappropriate. Seemingly alluding to the overall sentiment that Leave was a racist group, Johnson said the following:

So I find it offensive, insulting, irrelevant and positively cretinous to be told – sometimes by people who can barely speak a foreign language – that I belong to a group of small-minded xenophobes; because the truth is it is Brexit that is now the great project of European liberalism, and I am afraid that it is the European Union – for all the high ideals with which it began, that now represents the ancient regime.

It is we who are speaking up for the people, and it is they who are defending an obscurantist and universalist system of government that is now well past its sell by date and which is ever more remote from ordinary voters.

It is we in the Leave Camp – not they – who stand in the tradition of the liberal cosmopolitan European enlightenment – not just of Locke and Wilkes, but of Rousseau and Voltaire; and though they are many, and though they are well-funded, and though we know that they can call on unlimited taxpayer funds for their leaflets, it is we few, we happy few who have the inestimable advantage of believing strongly in our cause, and that we will be vindicated by history;

and we will win for exactly the same reason that the Greeks beat the Persians at Marathon – because they are fighting for an outdated absolutist ideology, and we are fighting for freedom (Johnson, 2016).

For the Conservatives, the biggest problem other than MPs inside the party dissenting was the splinter far-right group, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which initially sought solely to have the UK leave the European Union. As the years progressed, UKIP's policies did as well. UKIP became a viable threat to the Conservatives, gaining momentum in Eurosceptic areas, a majority in the European Parliament, and receiving one Member of Parliament. Some scholars have noted UKIP as a “mutiny” within the Conservative Party, noting its appeal as serving as a new party for Conservatives who disapprove of Cameron's political leadership (Ford and Goodwin, 278; Parris 2014). For UKIP, however, the downfall was in-party fighting, political tensions, and mismanagement of the party and its aims. In United Kingdom Independence Party: Euroscepticism's Penultimate Moment, right wing extremism will be explained in further detail, including but not limited to its effects on the Brexit vote, the implications for other right-wing groups in Britain and Europe, its motivations and motivators, and key figures.

Labour Party

The Labour Party was the party in opposition during the EU referendum; Labour had 20 MEPs at the time of the EU referendum. Jeremy Corbyn was the leader of Labour at the time, and led the Labour campaign for Remain. Labour were more ambiguous on their campaign aims than the Conservatives. While the Conservatives were rather open about division, the Labour Party seemed to pretend theirs did not exist. Some Labour MPs accused Corbyn, who has historically been Eurosceptic, of not leading Labour's Remain campaign full-spiritedly. Furthermore, MPs accused Corbyn of being “out of touch” and “lacking enthusiasm” for the cause (*Guardian*

Politics Letters 2016). Labour had a leadership crisis during the EU referendum. Corbyn maintained control of the Labour Party, but still did not ever solidify himself as a stronghold for Remain. Jeremy Corbyn, while leader of the Labour movement to Remain in the EU, had ties with Eurosceptic MPs, voted against membership of the EC in the 1975 Referendum, voted against the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and voted against the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. To some, this caused the question of Corbyn's ability to lead the Remain campaign; to others, this was indicative of political motivations to keep cohesive party unity. However, Corbyn's views transcend that of simple political party motivations shielding his "true" intentions. Corbyn is indeed a leftist leader, one which identifies as a democratic socialist. His career has highlights in union advocacy, Socialist societies, journalism, political activism, and eventual election to Parliament. If his views are as leftist as some analysts would claim, it could be so that Corbyn still sees the European Union, in and of itself, an exemplification of an economic entity which undermines the Social aspect of Labour's policy goals. Despite these assumptions, Corbyn managed to stand his ground on the EU referendum debate, however unconvincingly.

The Labour Party had a campaign group called Labour In for Britain with the slogan: Britain is better off in Europe. MP Alan Johnson set up Labour In for Britain with the guiding support and authorisation of the Labour Party (BBC 2015). Sharing similar names, it was independent of Britain Stronger in Europe. Alan Johnson said of the EU referendum, "There is nothing patriotic about condemning this country to isolation. The first duty of any government is to keep our country safe and I firmly believe that leaving the EU would fail that test" (BBC 2015).

On 16 June 2016, just days before the EU referendum, the Labour Member of Parliament for Batley and Spen was murdered in West Yorkshire by a local

constituent, Thomas Mair, who reportedly had ties to British nationalist and neo-Nazi groups. Some witnesses reported that Mair screamed “Britain first!” (BBC News 2016) during the attack. The murder of Cox was the first against an MP since 1990.

The murder occurred one week before the EU referendum took place. The campaigns suspended activities. Each of the biggest political parties in Britain reported intentions to not contest for the seat; however, a British National Party’s former member controversially announced intentions to run under the Liberty GB party banner. EU chief Martin Shulz blamed the “nasty referendum” for Cox’s murder. Support for the EU reportedly weakened after Cox’s murder, with some polls indicating the week of Cox’s murder that 57% of respondents saying they would vote to leave the EU (Hjelmgaard 2016).

Liberal Democrats

Liberal Democrats were once part of the Coalition government alongside Conservative Party which promised the EU referendum. However, the Liberal Democrats were mostly in agreement that EU membership was preferred over leaving, and solidly backed Remain. Lib Dems indicated that they respect the results of the referendum, backed lowering the voting age to 16 and 17, back a Parliamentary vote on Article 50 (which starts the withdrawal process), and believes the campaigns were unfair and lied (Liberal Democrats 2016).

Green Party

Caroline Lucas is the MP from Brighton Pavilion for the Green Party in England. Unequivocally, Lucas and the Green Party backed remaining in the European Union. The Green Party’s slogan was: We’re fairer, safer, and greener in Europe. After Britain voted to leave the European Union, Lucas called for a second referendum due to the perceived misleading campaigns and slim majority win.

Scottish National Party

The Scottish National Party were the third largest party in Parliament and had 2 MEPs at the time of the EU referendum. The SNP were ardent supporters of Remaining in the European Union. Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the SNP, wrote of the referendum on the SNP official website:

I want to see a majority Remain vote in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as well. But given the potential strength of the pro-Europe sentiment in Scotland, I want to maximise the ‘in’ vote here in Scotland.

I support an independent Scotland, but I also support Scotland being in the EU - whether as an independent country or as part of the UK. However, this referendum is not about independence – it is about our continued place in Europe, with all the many benefits that brings (Sturgeon 2016).

On the SNP’s official website, its stance on the European Union was as followed:

The SNP believes that membership of Europe Union is in Scotland’s best interests. There are a huge number of benefits for Scotland from EU membership including that the EU is the main destination for Scotland’s international exports and as citizens of the EU we are able to travel freely throughout Europe – for work, study or travel – without the need for visas. The SNP doesn’t believe the EU is perfect and agree that it needs reform, however we want Scotland to have a louder voice in Europe, an increased contribution to EU policy making and an opportunity to be part of discussions about reform, rather than becoming even more distant by removing ourselves altogether.

We hope and believe that people in Scotland and across the UK will vote decisively to stay part of the EU. But we take nothing for granted. So we will campaign passionately and positively for an “in” vote, to remain in the EU (SNP 2016).

In May 2016, Sturgeon prioritised Scotland remaining in the EU as a top priority.

Based on opinion polls coming before the EU referendum, Scotland had the highest

reports of positive feelings for the EU (BBC Scotland 2016). Sturgeon warned of a rekindling of nationalist tendencies against the United Kingdom if Scotland's voice on the EU referendum was not heard. In 2014, Scotland voted with its own referendum on independence from the United Kingdom, with 55% voting to stay in the UK.

Plaid Cymru

Plaid Cymru is a nationalist party in Wales led by Leanne Wood. Plaid Cymru had 3 MPs and 1 MEP at the time of the EU referendum. In a joint statement alongside SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon and Green Party MP Caroline Lucas, the cross-national trio supported the UK's continued membership of the European Union (Johnston, J., 2016). Plaid Cymru wrote on its official website that it supported Wales staying in the EU's Common Market. In March 2016, Carwyn Jones, Labour First Minister of Wales, warned of a possible rise in support of Welsh independence from the United Kingdom (Campbell, P 2016).

Section 3.2 Country Profiles

Wales

For the other countries in the United Kingdom, their respective relationship with the European Union consists of different factors and cultural significance. England may receive the predominance of the attention politically and economically, but the additional countries in the United Kingdom have their own relationship with the European Union and see their futures as differently and separately.

The Government of Wales Act 2006 established that the UK's EU obligations are also Welsh obligations. In accordance with EU mandate, Wales implements EU directives, complies with EU law, and has subsidiary monitoring of issues with Westminster Parliament (Dickson Ch.8, 110). Wales implements regulations, directives, and decisions based on EU legislations. Estimates on how much Welsh legislation has European influence varies. According Dickson, given the extent of Wales's powers over key EU areas such as agriculture, the UK figure for EU influence over secondary legislation, 14%, is likely to be a good estimate for Welsh legislation with EU origins (Dickson 111). Wales has several invested interests in European funding programs, such as structural funds, funding from the CAP (£400 million per annum) (Dickson 111).

Wales has MEPs, various political influences in Europe and European affairs in England, and there is a European Commission Office in Cardiff since 1975. According to Dickson, there is a question as to how much Wales's civil society can benefit from being in Europe, posing that Cardiff does not benefit from the same international environment and supporting institutions as Edinburgh in Scotland or London in England (112).

Scrutiny of the European Union is different than that of in Scotland and England. According to Dixon, the importance of other roles, such as encouraging participation in debates and the policy making process itself is easily identified, rather than a scrutiny process (112). Welsh authorities, though, seem to recognise the importance of Europe, especially in areas with profound impact on Wales such as the Common Agricultural Policy (Dickson, 119).

In regard to Brexit, First Minister Carwyn Jones of Wales established an expert advisory group, the European Advisory Group, in order to ensure Wales's future and a positive relationship with the EU and UK. Jones also chaired a Cabinet Sub-Committee on European Transition which works intergovernmentally with the other Devolved Administrations and England (Welsh Government, 2016). First Minister Jones also indicated his concern over the possible constitutional implications of Brexit, telling the Financial Times in March 2016, "The UK cannot possibly continue in its present form if England votes to leave and everyone else votes to stay" (Campbell 2016).

Scotland


Since the announcement of a possible EU referendum on membership, Scotland has been playing on two courts: defensively and offensively. Defensively, Sturgeon, alongside SNP and other parties, made a priority to defend Scottish interests in staying in the EU. For example, Sturgeon left no question about her policies with the EU referendum, indicating that Scotland's membership of the European Union was, essentially, non-negotiable and threatened conjuring up another rally for Scottish independence if Scotland's wishes were not heeded. Offensively, Sturgeon promised no chance of Scottish MPs taking action to trigger Article 50, thereby activating the provision for Brexit. The calculations surrounding Brexit were multifaceted. In 2013, the Scottish Government published a report entitled *Scotland in the European Union*. Within the first sentence of the Executive Summary, Sturgeon's government's paper declared its intention entirely: "Independence will allow Scotland to take its place as a full Member State within the European Union" (Scottish Government 2013, iv. Executive Summary). Moreover, Scotland's invested interest in continued membership of the EU was reaffirmed by the reassurance of a belief that the "EU provides the best international economic framework within which to optimise the economic and social gains from independence and to tackle global challenges" (Scottish Government 2013, iv. Executive Summary). Ambitiously envisioning independence outside the UK and full membership of the EU, Sturgeon was willing to take Scotland's political and economic future into a flux marked with different outcomes, not all of which met perfectly with the goals established by the SNP.

In "*Brexit: The View from Scotland*," John MacKenzie wrote that Brexit is highly likely to increase tensions between Scotland and England (2016, 579).

Moreover, MacKenzie noted that Scottish identity has been more closely related to

being European than that of English identity (578). In 2015, however, Scottish Social Attitudes survey data had Scotland’s Euroscepticism at 60%, just 5% lower than that of England. The graph below was made with “*What Scotland Thinks*” data on national identity choice, where following a review of data from 2000 – 2014 established a slight decrease in reports of Scottish overall and a very low report of European stagnated over the years.

Chart 5: National Identity in Scotland⁸



⁸ I took data from the ‘Forced Choice’ national identity data set and placed it into a line graph to demonstrate the trend from 2000 – 2014. The question for this survey was, “National identity that best describes the way respondent thinks of themselves? (Asked if they choose more than one from the list)” and each sample size was over 1,000 respondents.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland's clinging relationship with the EU is one which stems from a fear of revived violence and conflict. As a nation riddled with a history of conflict with its "neighbour" Ireland, Northern Ireland is well aware of the implications that Brexit would bring for establishing a hard border between itself and Ireland. Northern Ireland also benefits greatly from the EU, receiving £2.5 billion in funding.

Paradoxically, the leading political party in Northern Ireland (Democratic Unionist Party) campaigned for Northern Ireland (and ultimately the UK) to leave the European Union. Previously mentioned Northern Ireland secretary Theresa Villiers was adamant about the Leave campaign's success, the EU referendum rules, and making suggestions about Northern Ireland's future outside the EU.

However, the implications are sour for Northern Ireland. Kathryn Gaw wrote in *The Guardian* on her view which stated that the installation of hard borders would undermine stabilised peace between the two countries, especially in border towns of Newry, Omagh, and Derry. In *The power of geographical borders: Cultural, political, and economic order effects in a unitary nation*, Bowon Chang of Iowa University wrote that borders have significant implications beyond that of a geographical barrier; instead, they also serve as "political creatures" and play a significant role in cultural, political, and economic behaviour of states despite the "borderless world" contention (Chang 2010). In essence, it is arguable that Northern Ireland could see the tensions between itself and Ireland increase, but more likely the economic effect of securing hard borders (those with border controls, tight policing, and possible militarisation) will have larger implications.

Section 3.3: United Kingdom Independence Party: Euroscepticism's Penultimate Moment

Arguably the most impactful political upset in modern British history, a political party which started with a meagre group of 20-something and operated out of a Caffe Nero for months managed to usher in the ultimate Eurosceptic dream: a decisive victory to leave the EU in a referendum vote. The United Kingdom Independence Party, known as UKIP, is that such party. Drawing upon populism, right-wing exacerbation with “political elites” in both Parliament and the European Union, and British unionism, UKIP are an interesting yet categorically indescribable. Starting in 1991, Alan Sked founded the Anti-Federalist League which would eventually turn into UKIP in 1993. For many years, UKIP remained in the shadows until 2009 when Nigel Farage entered the fray of political capitalisation on recent backlash regarding the Lisbon Treaty and the seeming influx of immigrants after EU enlargement of former Communist Eastern European bloc countries. Farage, a figure which now serves as a divisive reminder of Brexit woes and conjures up feelings of xenophobia and racism for many, worked diligently to distance himself from political elite and those “posh boys” he despised. In his book *The Purple Revolution: The Year that Changed Everything*, there is a tendency for Farage to “tell it like it is” and hold back little of his ill-mannered criticisms, no matter how against status quo they may seem. Most of the inside analysis of Farage will be gleaned from my interpretation of recently published *The Brexit Club* on the Leave campaign authored by Owen Bennett in 2016. Additionally, drawing upon literature on UKIP, right wing extremism in modern Britain, the Eurosceptic tendencies of the Conservative Party, and populism and anti-globalism will help further explain and substantiate the rise of UKIP and its effect on the overall outcome of the EU referendum vote.

In *The Brexit Club*, Bennett characterised Farage as a “political gambler” and an “anti-establishment” man who has great disdain for the “posh elite,” especially

within the Conservative Party. Bennett is not the only author to do so. Farage himself, especially in his own political works and speeches, sets himself apart as a figure of anti-establishment and as a “man of the ordinary people.” A quick glance at the dictionary defines “ordinary” as “with no special or distinctive features; normal.” However, Farage has the most distinctive features of all: a self-declared maverick and anti-establishment politician who served as a Member of European Parliament in the very institution he claimed to despise since 1999, winning re-elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. In 2016, Politico named Nigel Farage as the fifth most influential MEP out of a list of forty, naming him as one of the two most influential and effective speakers in the EP chamber (Politico EU 2016). Farage is far from ordinary.

The wave that Farage rode to victory in the Brexit referendum is also far from ordinary. The populist, anti-establishment, and anti-globalist wave across Europe has been fuelled incessantly by tensions with the very fundamental framework of the EU: freedom of movement of people. Anti-immigration has become, by far, one of the most influential policy points of right-wing extremist movements across Europe and in the United Kingdom. The “left behind” of globalisation also exhibit great backlash against those who have benefited from globalisation. The term “left behind” and the “have-nots” has been used in recent literature on Brexit and the rise of right-wing extremism and populist movements in Europe and the United States. In a working paper on *“Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,”* authors Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris proposed several interesting theories on the matter. The economic inequality perspective, which “emphasises the consequences for electoral behaviour arising from profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies” is very much so applicable to Brexit Britain. Supporters of Brexit and UKIP, as Inglehart and Norris

would perhaps categorise as the “less secure strata of society”⁹) have reportedly been more sceptical of immigration. However, the theory of “cultural backlash,” which Inglehart and Norris have surmised as building upon a silent revolution theory of value change, with cultural shifts experiencing a negative backlash, may prove more pertinent to explain the appeal of UKIP and its populist, anti-establishment rhetoric.

In “*Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind*,” authors Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin wrote that UKIP’s emergence was based on changes to Britain’s economic and social structure which pushed the “left behind” to the side. Relatedly, the generational changes in the values of Britain have left the older, more traditional and older voters behind in the sense that those “traditional views” are seen as “parochial” by the young, university-educated strata. As a result of these shifts in social change, alongside an increasingly multicultural and liberalised Britain, the “left behind” were drawn to a political party which promised to represent them and their views. In Ford and Goodwin’s book *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*, the three motives of UKIP support were seen as the following:

1. A ‘hard’ brand of Euroscepticism that opposes the principle of Britain’s EU membership;
2. Strong opposition to immigration and concern about its effects on the British economy and society;

⁹ “Less secure strata of society – low-waged unskilled workers, the long-term unemployed, households dependent on shrinking social benefits, residents of public housing, single-parent families, and poorer white populations living in inner city areas with concentrations of immigrants susceptible to the anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering of populist movements (2016, 2).”

3. Dissatisfaction with established politics in Westminster and how the established political parties have managed immigration and the [Eurozone] post-2008 financial crisis (2014, 278).

Drawing back on the first two questions posed in Chapter I, (1. To what extent has Euroscepticism transcended its philosophical roots and transformed into a vehicle of policy change vis-à-vis withdrawal from the European Union? and 2. Is Brexit better explained as a result of a different phenomenon, such as populism or anti-globalism, rather than Euroscepticism? Conversely, is populism or anti-globalism Euroscepticism in its ultimate application?), I pose that UKIP and the cultural backlash theory best explain the mobilisation of UKIP's politics, which served as a vehicle for hard Eurosceptic policy change vis-à-vis withdrawal from the European Union.

While these sentiments have existed in the UK before the existence of UKIP, UKIP brought the movement to the forefront and capitalised on the movement to create effectual policy change. Moreover, UKIP capitalised on the shift in political change with those “left behind” by mainstream parties, most notably the Conservative Party. According to Ford and Goodwin, Britons with no formal qualifications have been twice as likely to *strongly* say they feel as if they have no say in government than middle-class Britons and graduates (2014, 281). The politically “left behind” electorate were disenchanted from the political process, the mainstream political parties, and “traditional” society. Ford and Goodwin seem to agree that UKIP mobilised the left-behind, especially the blue-collar, white, and male voters who fell into the “less secure strata” as explained by Inglehart and Norris.

Another facet of the success of UKIP once again relies on the argument of the politics of identity. In *The UK Independence Party and the Politics of Englishness*,

Richard Hayton noted that one of the overlooked facets of UKIP includes the politics of national identity. While I contend that UKIP is indeed simultaneously a unionist and nationalist party, Hayton argued that Englishness is the pivot around which key elements of the party's appeal revolved; moreover, the "Anglo-Britishness" aspect of UKIP does not challenge the United Kingdom as a set of devolved nations, but rather celebrates English identity more so, and exacerbates the divide between Scottish and English identities (2016).

UKIP are undeniably nationalist. Moreover, UKIP seemingly favour "Englishness" as a defining factor of "Britishness." For example, interpretation of an excerpt from UKIP material declaring Britain facing an existential crisis with the rise of Scottish, Irish, and Welsh nationalism seems to indicate an uncompromising view of Britishness as rejecting the notions of the Scottish, Irish, and Welsh nationalism as anti-British and therefore anti-English. Farage noted that the Scottish referendum was not merely about independence, but rather a fight of anti-Englishness, fascist, and racist (Hayton 2016, 404). According to Hayton, Anglo-Britishness is strongly felt by some voters in Scotland, as indicated by UKIP's electoral success in gaining a Scottish seat in the European Parliament in 2014 (2016, 407).

In campaigning, UKIP was affiliated with two organisations: Leave.EU and Vote Leave. Farage endorsed Leave.EU and was a member of Vote Leave. Leave.EU was started by Arron Banks, a UKIP donor and business man out of Bristol, England. Vote Leave was established as the official campaign in favour of leaving the European Union by the Electoral Commission and was founded by political analysts Matthew Elliot and Dominic Cummings. Vote Leave was a multi-party coalition which held a committee with big names such as Michael Gove (Conservative MP for Surrey Heath), Douglas Carswell (UKIP MP for Clacton), Iain Duncan Smith (MP for

Chingford and Woodford Green, Boris Johnson (Former Mayor of London and MP for Uxbridge and South Ruislip), Daniel Hannan (MEP for South East England), and Andrea Leadsom (MP for South Northamptonshire). Vote Leave focused more on the economic and domestic rule aspects of leaving the European Union, whereas Leave.EU handled the social aspects of the EU, such as immigration.

In further analysis of the EU referendum vote, a discussion of immigration as a facet of the campaign will be explored in detail. Additionally, an exploration of further analysis regarding the cultural backlash and economic inequality theories in explaining the vote outcome will be given. Lastly, a discussion of voter theory will build upon the notions of populism and anti-globalism.

Chapter IV: The Arguments For and Against Brexit

The main areas of concern for the Brexit debate include Democracy/Sovereignty, Foreign Affairs, and Trade and Investment. Within each of those areas are subsidiary issues involving particular European policies. The following section will address these issues in regards to the pro-EU and anti-EU stances, and will provide relevant context for these issues in the current British political climate.

Section 4.1: Sovereignty, Democracy, and Security

As more nations joined the European Union, Britain's voice in the European Parliament has decreased from 18.2% of MEPs to 9.7% (Charter 2014, 3). The In-Britain voters counteract this point by indicating that each EU member state is appointed one European Commissioner and judge at the European Court of Justice. Additionally, the UK has seventy-three out of the 751 elected Members of European Parliament (MEPs). Yet, it is undeniable that as the EU has nearly tripled in size, Britain's influence has given way to the input of other nations. According to Bojan Pancevski's article in *Sunday Times*, Britain has 12.7% of the EU population, but the proportion of UK staff in the European Commission (the body that proposes law) was down to 4.5% in 2013 (2013, 43). In addition, the perceived 'democratic deficit' adds to Britain's uneasy history toward the supranational characteristics of the EU.¹⁰ Keeping in line with Britain's preference for intergovernmentalism, the EU's democratic deficit poses serious problems regarding the "representative," "accountability," and "engagement" qualities of the European Union (Terry nd., 10 –

¹⁰ According to EUR-LEX European Law, "Democratic deficit' is a term used by people who argue that the EU institutions and their decision-making procedures suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen due to their complexity."

13). Moreover, as proposed by Christophe Crombez in his article *“The Democratic Deficit in the EU: Much Ado about Nothing,”* the deficit begs the question of how effective, representative, and equal the policy making process is within the European channels (2003, 101 – 120). With this deficit considered, the anti-EU faction then further press the issue of how much EU legislation is imposed upon UK sovereign, domestic rule. According to a comprehensive analysis of legislation by the House of Commons library published in 2010, it is difficult to arrive at a consensus on how to effectively measure the laws and influences. Yet, according to the HoC report and Amy Sippit of FullFact.org, the analysis estimated the following results:

- Acts put in place by UK Parliament with EU influence: accounts for 10-14%;
- Regulations influenced by or related to the EU: accounts for 9-14%;
- EU regulations and regulations influenced by or related to the EU: accounts for 53% (House of Commons 2010; Sippit 2014)

The current British political climate is very wary of the EU’s imposition on the UK’s sovereignty and democracy. In the Conservative Party’s Manifesto in 2010, David Cameron promised the British electorate would vote on transfer of powers to the European Union. Furthermore, Cameron promised an amendment to the 1972 European Communities Act, “so that any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences, would be subject to a referendum – a ‘referendum lock’” (Conservative Manifesto 2010, 113 – 114).

In some regard, the EU’s regulations dominate domestic rule. In light of rising threats to national security from international terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State and the migrant crisis from Syria and surrounding territories, the call for

Britain to take complete control of its borders has been solidified into proposed legislation.¹¹ The EU has a guaranteed ‘freedom of movement’ for its citizens, and for many anti-EU proponents, this element of British society undermines border control and internal security. For example, the Brexit advocates took notice of the recent Brussels terror attacks on 22 March 2016. Notable political figures such as UKIP head Nigel Farage, Conservative MP Dominic Raab, and Conservative MP Graham Brady each noted that attacks like these were reason enough to need to secure Britain’s borders (Fidler 2016). However, the pro-EU side would point out that Britain is not part of the passport-free, borderless Schengen zone and retains the right to border controls.

Additionally, up until publication of this paper in November 2016, Britain has refused to take part in any EU-mandated refugee resettlement plan (Debating Europe, 2016). The Conservative Government released a leaflet in April 2016 that outlined their policies on remaining in the EU. Similarly, the Government posted online an outline of security reasons why the UK should remain a member. Other than border control and immigration, the Government named counterterrorism and criminal justice as per the European Arrest Warrant, as being a driving force for a secure Britain by claiming 1,000 suspects facing justice in UK courts and 7,000 extradited from the UK to face trial or serve a sentence (EU Referendum 2016).

¹¹ The United Kingdom Borders (Control and Sovereignty) Bill proposed by Tory MP Andrew Rosindell looks to “Make provision for the re-establishment of the control and sovereignty of policy, administration and all other matters relating to the United Kingdom’s borders with the European Union and to the entry and exit to the United Kingdom of foreign nationals; and for connected purposes.” (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2015-2016/0068/16068.pdf>)

Foreign Affairs

It is undeniable that the European Union is one of the most powerful and relevant international political entities in the modern political arena. Backers of British membership in the European Union argue that Britain uses EU influence to make their country more competitive because foreign policy goals are enhanced through the collective strength of the entire Union (Charter 2014, 18). For example, “soft power” types of actions, such as foreign aid and investment, sanctions, and response to crises and natural disasters are some of the influential decisions that Britain undertakes alongside other EU member states (Charter 2014, 18). The Brexit camp, however, would argue that Britain could instead strengthen global connections through historical links with Commonwealth countries and the United States. Additionally, in order to keep connection with the European nations, Brexit supporters suggest that Britain keep a close military connection with France and remain a key member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), G8, the G20, and take its own seat in the World Trade Organisation (Charter 2014, 18).

According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, which has 24 members from the United Kingdom, there will be eight major foreign affairs consequences if Brexit occurs. Firstly, the ECFR notes that Scotland will once again aim for independence from the UK, as “Scots are determined to stay in the EU” (Witney 2015). They further pose that there would be significant damages to the UK’s relationship with the EU, noting that there will be no “amicable divorce” or special trade deal between the two. The ECFR also contradicts pro-Brexit camp’s argument for the strength of the Commonwealth alliance. They argue that the Commonwealth countries have “moved on,” and the ‘Special Relationship’ between the UK and the United States will dissolve. Furthermore, ECFR writes off the Syrian “refugee crisis”

by stating that there will be no protection from the crisis as per the control of borders, and the issue of sovereignty is a non-issue unless Britain wants a world run by China or Russia (Witney 2015).

Various foreign heads of state have weighed in on the Brexit debates. President Barack Obama, in his late April 2016 trip to the UK, urged voters to not back an exit from the European Union. Furthermore, the United States Trade Representative Ambassador Michael Froman indicated that the United States is “not keen” on establishing a free trade agreement with Britain if they leave the European Union (Hughes & Blenkinsop 2015). In 2015, China’s Xi Jinping urged Britain to stay in the EU to prevent the US from dominating the trading markets (RT 2015).

German Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted on Brexit in February 2016 preceding a special negotiations meeting with David Cameron as saying, “[Germany] [is] convinced that from the German perspective, Great Britain remaining in the European Union is desirable.... [we pledge] to do everything with David Cameron to find a compromise” (Wagstyl 2016).

A recent poll in April 2016 showed that 59% of French respondents wanted Britain to remain in the EU; however, it can be argued that France is the most indifferent country on the Brexit debate (Ball 2016). Former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard wrote in *Le Monde* for the UK to leave the EU “before [the UK] destroys everything,” echoing the French sentiment that the EU has become “too English” (Ball 2016). According to some accounts, perhaps one of the most willing supporters of Brexit, other than Britain, is Russia. The Russian government has made no official statements on Brexit, but in the eyes of Moscow, the UK and the EU lose out in security and geopolitical terms from the alliance drifting apart (Gromyko 2016).

It is apparent that Brexit has caused a rift in the international community. For Britain, it becomes imperative to understand the consequences and implications of possible exit from the EU on alliance relationships and foreign policy. This relates substantially to dealings with Trade and Investment, which is discussed in the following section.

Trade and Investment

Currently, the UK is the EU's top recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The annual investment figures from UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) for the 2014 - 15 financial year showed the UK attracted 1,988 FDI projects, which was 12% more than 2013/14 (UKTI 2015). Additionally, there were almost 85,000 new jobs and 23,000 safeguarded jobs added across the UK (UKTI 2015). Even in years previous, the UK proved to be attracting trade and investment. In 2012, the UK won one in five FDI projects and received the highest amount of FDI from the United States and Japan (Charter 2014, 46). Moreover, in 2012, Britain attracted \$62 billion in foreign investment, which was the highest in Europe and sixth in the world (Charter 2014, 46). In 2014 – 15, the UKTI confirmed the UK's FDI stock reached £1 trillion (UKTI 2015).

These figures are impressive. Trade and investment drive economies and political influence within the European Union and the grander scope of international relations. However, one of the important aspects of Brexit regarding Trade and Investment is that of the economics of the European Union. As evident through Britain's history regarding the refusal to join the Euro single currency (and thereby the Eurozone), Britain seemingly dodged suffering first-hand the effects of the "Euro crisis." In his article "*An Island Apart?*" Thomas Raines wrote on the effects of British Euroscepticism on the Euro stating, "While the euro crisis seems likely to push

the countries using the [Euro].... into a fiscal union, it appears to be exerting a centrifugal force on Britain.” Moreover, the actual expenditure and government net contribution to the EU, in conjunction with the negative effects of the Euro crisis, has played a significant role in the pro-Brexit argument. Currently, the UK pays more into the EU than it gets back. According to the UK Government Report *European Union Finances 2015*, the UK paid £13 billion to the EU budget, and EU spending on the UK was £4.5 billion. Therefore, the net contribution is at approximately £8.5 billion. This figure is also in light of the rebate of almost £5 billion.

Pro-Brexit backers indicate that the expenditure on the EU adds insult to injury. Moreover, the opportunities for Britain’s FDI investments post-Brexit would come from its “flexible and well-educated labour force, quality of life and language advantages, good technology and transport infrastructure, stable and proven domestic legal and political framework, and comparatively low company taxes” (Charter 2014, 46). The anti-Brexit, pro-EU group counter and instead point to the apparent market success of Britain’s investment history, as well as indicating that Britain acts as a “gateway for investors to the Single Market of 504 million people” (Charter 2014, 46). Furthermore, Brexit would undermine the economic stability that investors value. If the UK leaves the EU, they will renegotiate the status of their membership in the single market, and a large proportion of these investments could be lost. Additionally, this brings rise to the issue of multinational corporations, EU migrant workers, tax law, and financial protections for the City of London.

Many of these aspects of Brexit are impossible to accurately foresee, and they exist only in hypothetical realm of a ‘if-when’ scenario. Considering the implicit nature of the debate, there follows an interesting analysis of what happens after a (possible) successful vote for the British exit from the European Union.

Navigating the World Post-Brexit (Pros and Cons)

If the Eurosceptics win and Brexit occurs, Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty will be enacted. Under Article 50, the UK will exit the EU two years after the declaration to the European Council of the nation state's intention to leave the EU. The leave is not simply cut-and-dry. The EU is required to negotiate and agree by qualified majority and consent of the European Parliament with the member state for the arrangements of the exit and future proposed relationship. The following projections are based from my analysis of hypotheticals and estimations of possible outcomes of Brexit.

Trade

The most important negotiation between the UK and the EU encompasses the future of trade. If no agreement happens, the UK would be subject to the trade barriers of non-EU nations. Therefore, it is imperative that the UK secures an agreement on access to the European markets through a trade pact similar or equal to a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Moreover, the UK needs to ensure that bilateral trade between itself and the EU is not subjected to tariffs, which could be accomplished by joining the EFTA or European Union Customs Union. However, if the UK achieves this, it needs to detach itself from the Single Market full membership. This is due to the fact that Single Market membership entails all of the controversial EU requirements from which Britain seeks to disentangle, such as freedom of movement of people. The UK could instead seek to gain a special status within the EU that emulates that of Turkey, but with more involvement in the EFTA. Turkey's current status does not include freedom of movement of goods, services, people, or capital, and Turkey does not contribute to the EU budget. However, some portions of EU law are applied to Turkey, and Turkey cannot negotiate their own external trade

agreements without the say of the EU. Therefore, the UK should implement some of the aspects of Switzerland's status, which is a member of the EFTA but comes without some of the regulations of EU law and the European Economic Area.

In addition to securing a negotiated trade relationship with the European Union, the United Kingdom should seek to further their trade agendas with the rest of the world, especially the United States. Post-Brexit, the UK will still be a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and therefore, it is assumed that the pre-existing Free Trade Agreements set up within the WTO parameters will still stand. Importantly, the United States should seek a FTA with the United Kingdom. The US should abandon its hardened look toward Brexit and allow for the UK to seek trade agreements outside the EU. If the US could set up a FTA with the UK, the strengthened political connection will signal stability and potential in the UK (which is the six largest global economy), and could lead to additional FTA with the UK from various nations. While it is possible that the UK could join up with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the US should instead look into a joint FTA between itself and the UK before pursuing this option. Other than the United States, the top countries with which the UK should promote trade agreements are China, Russia, Australia, Brazil, India, and South Korea. Outside of the EU, the UK will have the ability to negotiate their own trade agreements and will enjoy the advantages of being unconstrained by the EU's regulations.

Foreign Relations

Leaving the European Union will not *completely* damper Britain's political influence as critically as some suggest. While Britain is a leading member of the European Union, it is also a part of the G8, G20, NATO, the OECD, the WTO, the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council, the Commonwealth, and has

strong alliances with countries outside of the European Union. If the UK leaves the EU, it will still be a part of all of these political entities. The UK will still be consulted in the United Nations and it will contribute to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. All of the aspects of Britain's political repertoire are not contingent upon membership of the European Union. Therefore, if Britain does leave the EU, they will not leave their perceived importance at Brussels's doorstep when they go.

Yet, the United Kingdom needs to stress that they are not retreating into political isolationism. It is possible that alliances between the UK and EU nations will be put under some strain following a successful Brexit; to put it simply, Brexit could make alliances "politically awkward" initially. However, if this is the case, the UK should spend time cultivating alliances outside of the EU, which is something that the Foreign Office should consider especially in South East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Additionally, the 'Special Relationship' with the United States could use some fine-tuning, alongside the relationships with Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada. That is not to say that the UK should turn its back on European allies. Instead, it can be proposed that the UK looks to strong allies such as France and Germany within their mutual political groups, such as the United Nations, and work to continue cultivating those relationships outside of the EU membership context.


Migration: Britons Abroad, EU Nationals, and Special Circumstances

If Brexit occurred, the internal changes within the United Kingdom would not be immediate, as the full exit from the European Union will not be immediately implemented. However, there are some aspects of the British political and economic culture that will be eroded, some of which will be difficult to remove from the mindset of the 'British European.' For example, if Brexit occurs, the freedom of movement of peoples will be ended. British citizens would no longer be granted the

same visa-free, universal passport access to EU nation states. This affects foreign relations with the rest of the European Union nation states, as migrants have moved into the UK. According to the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, inflows of EU nationals migrating to the UK in 2014 was at 268,000, and EU citizens accounted for an estimated 48% of total non-British inflows in 2014. Moreover, at the first quarter of 2015, approximately 1.9 million EU citizens were employed in the United Kingdom. Two in three EU nationals were migrating to the UK for work; the second most common reason for migrating was for formal study.

According to the United Nations, there are approximately 4.5 million Britons living

Chart 6: EU Migration by Nationality



abroad and 1.3 million are in Europe. In Chart 6, provided by information from *The Telegraph*, indicates that there are nearly 319,000 British expats in Spain alone (Bennet 2016). What will happen to these citizens if Britain leaves the EU and thereby voids their participation in the ‘freedom of movement’ aspect of the EU? Within the UK’s negotiations with the EU, the protection of British expats needs to be a clear and indicated priority. These Britons will not be deported back to the UK from the European Union. Instead, these citizens could gain ‘acquired rights’ under international law after the termination of a treaty. This is evident through the *Vienna Convention of 1969*, which says the termination of a treaty "does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination." So, those who left Britain before Brexit should be protected under this Convention and retain the right to live within the EU. However, to an extent, the EU would have the right to negotiate the parameters of those rights. For example, expats would need access to health care, need to pay taxes, need to retain their property, and solve the plethora of issues that will surround passports and visas. The EU nationals within Britain would more than likely be given an indefinite leave to remain, but it depends on the negotiations post-Brexit.


One last special circumstance to consider in the current political climate is the Syrian refugee crisis. As a result of the Syrian civil war, 4.6 million Syrians are refugees, 6.6 million are displaced within Syria, and the numbers are growing as the displaced are coming to Europe (10% have come to Europe to date). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for the global community to provide safe and legal routes for the Syrian refugees. The UK’s initial policy was to give “generous... humanitarian aid to Syria’s neighbours, rather than to accept recognised Syrian refugees for resettlement in the UK” (Parliament, 2016). However, the UK


Government started a scheme to take in 20,000 refugees at the estimated cost of over 'half a billion pounds' (BBC, 2016). This current crisis has mobilised the anti-EU crowd, indicating the disdain toward the EU regulations for taking in refugees. The elements behind this issue are numerous, yet are irrelevant to the topic of Brexit. The more important factor is the understanding of the UK's current involvement in the EU mandates and future cooperation.

Chapter V: The EU Referendum Results

Before the analysis of the results, the following will include charts depicting results regionally and overall. In the proceeding discussion, the results will be analysed regionally in sections and lastly overall. The charts were made manually with data available from the UK Electoral Commission after the vote was official and finalised. The spreadsheets from which the charts originated are available in the *Appendix*, and consist of data compiled from Electoral Commission and UK Home Office statistics. In some cases, the regions were split into two charts for clarity; in this instance, the chart's title indicates (1/2) or (2/2). Each chart indicates the overall percentage of leave and remain on the x axis, alongside the constituency name on the y axis.

EAST MIDLANDS EU REFERENDUM RESULTS (1/2)






Leave ■ **Remain** ■


Overall East Midlands: 2,508,515 votes, 58.8% Leave and 41.2% Remain

East EU Referendum Vote Results Chart (1/2)



Leave ■ **Remain** ■


East EU Referendum Results Chart (2/2)



Leave ■ **Remain** ■

Overall East: 3,328,983 votes. Leave: 56.5% and Remain: 43.5%


London EU Referendum Results



Leave ■

Remain ■


Overall London: 3,776,751 Leave: 40.1% Remain: 59.9%



Leave ■


Remain ■

Overall Northeast: 1,340,698 Leave: 58% Remain: 42%



Overall Northern Ireland: 790,149 Leave: 44.22% Remain: 55.78%


Northwest EU Referendum Results Chart (1/2)



Leave ■

Remain ■

Northwest EU Referendum Results Chart (2/2)




Leave ■

Remain ■

Overall Northwest: 3,665,983 Leave: 53.7% Remain: 46.3%


Scotland EU Vote Results



Leave ■

Remain ■

Overall Scotland: 2,679,513 Leave: 38% Remain: 62%




Leave ■

Remain ■


Overall Southeast: 4,959,683 Leave: 51.8% Remain: 48.2%

Southwest EU Referendum Results Chart (1/2)



Leave ■ **Remain** ■

Southwest and Gibraltar EU Referendum Chart (2/2)




Leave ■

Remain ■

Overall Southwest: 3,172,730 Leave: 52.6% Remain: 47.4%

Wales EU Referendum Results




Leave ■

Remain ■


Overall Wales: 1,629,919 Leave: 52.5% Remain: 47.5%

West Midlands EU Referendum Vote Results



Leave ■ **Remain** ■

Overall West Midlands: 2,962,862 Leave: 59.3% Remain: 40.7%




Leave ■ **Remain** ■

Overall Yorkshire and the Humber: 2,739,235 Leave: 57.7% Remain: 42.3%

The overall result

Leave polled the most strongly in 270 counting areas, with Remain coming first in 129.


Key: ■ Majority leave ■ Majority remain ■ Tie ■ Undeclared



Source: BBC News Analysis of EU Referendum

How Leave won the referendum

Depth of bars is proportional to votes cast, largest areas shown first



Source: BBC News Analysis of EU Referendum

Overall Facts

On June 23, 2016, the majority of England and Wales voted to leave the European Union; Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Gibraltar voted to remain. Outside the capital city boroughs of London, almost every region had a majority voting to leave the European Union, some by merely one percentage point. Overall, 17,410,742 votes (52%) were cast to leave the European Union, and 16,141,241 votes (48%) were cast to remain in the European Union (UK Electoral Commission 2016).

Impressively, the Remain campaign took a majority of London (59.9%) and Scotland (62%). The turn-out was 72% with over 30 million votes overall. Turn-out was lower, however, in areas with a younger population.

Turnout was low in areas with more young people




Table 6 : Turnout by Age

Areas with higher percentages of residents with higher education and formal qualifications saw a positive relationship between level of education and qualifications and voting remain, as depicted on the charts on page 109.

% residents with no formal qualifications




Chart 7: Percentage of residents with no formal qualifications alongside distribution of remain and leave vote percentage

% residents with higher education




Chart 8: Percentage of residents with higher education alongside distribution of remain and leave vote percentage

Section 4.2: Analysis

Voting to Leave: The 70% Club

In this referendum, the slim majority of the voting population voted to leave the European Union. In areas such as Boston, South Holland, Castle Point, Thurrock, and Great Yarmouth, Fenland, Mansfield, Bolsover, and East Lindsey, the vote percentage for leave was over or equal to 70%, topping out at 75% in Boston. Such high percentage of votes cast for leaving the European raises the question: why did these areas predominately vote to leave the EU?



Boston and Skegness/South Holland

Population: 64,600 (2012 data)

County: Lincolnshire

Member of Parliament: Matt Warman
(Conservative)

Electorate: 39, 363

Turn-Out: 77%

Leave Percent: 75.56%

South Holland is neighbouring (73.9% to Leave)

According to 2011 – 2012 census data, of Boston’s population of roughly 65,000, 10.6% are migrants from the newest European Union member states such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania (Gallagher 2016; Pidd 2012). In 2012, the local councillor responsible for housing, population, and communities Mike Gilbert said that the biggest challenge brought about by the high levels of immigration was the perceived disadvantages of immigration (Pidd 2012). Between 2001 – 2011, Boston saw a six-fold increase in foreign-born residents (Freitas-Tamusa 2016). As a result of the growing migrant and migrant-born population, tensions between native British and EU citizens became a “microcosm for the Brexit vote’s immigration debate” (Moore 2016). Seemingly, a major factor in

the high percentage of votes for leave has to do with disapproval of immigration. As non-British citizens (EU and non-EU citizens) were not allowed to vote even if they lived in Britain, the reflection of the vote is only that of native British and those with British citizenship. Moreover, the Policy Exchange think tank named Boston as the least integrated area in Britain, adding a quantifiable measure to the idea that racial tensions exist in Boston (Boyle 2016). The high amount of immigrants has been linked to the substantial opportunity for agricultural and low-skilled work in Boston (BBC EU Referendum Lincolnshire).



Castle Point

Population: 86, 608 (2001)

County: Essex

MP: Rebecca Harris (Conservative)

Turn-Out: 75.38%

Leave Percent: 72.7%

Castle Point has 21 Conservative local councillors, 14 Canvey Island Independent Party councillors, 5 United Kingdom Independence Party councillors, and 1 independent councillor. In 2011, the average median age of Castle Point citizens was 45 years old. In a report by the Essex County Council in 2015, between 25.86 – 28.78% of Castle Point citizens were aged 65 or older.

According to the same report. 9% of households are older singles with private pensions, aged 66 or older; 7.4% of households are elderly couples with “traditional views” aged 66 or older; and 7.3% of households are couples without children or with adult children living with them aged 55-65 (Essex County Council, 2015, 5).

Percentage of older people (65+ years) by district (2024)




Chart 9: Percentage of older people by district projection 2024



Thurrock

Population: 163, 270

County: Essex

MPs: Jackie Doyle-Price and Stephen Metcalfe (C)

Leave Percentage: 72.3%

Thurrock, neighbouring Castle Point, has similar concerns. Demographically, the pensioners (older population) are outnumbered 2:1 by under 25s. In port town Tilbury, many of those who voted to leave the EU were swayed by the economic arguments. Massive layoffs in the 80s left the era behind. Those who voted to leave were reportedly in industries such as the car manufacturing industry, those industries that could be effected substantially by EU trade and the allure of new trade deals (Noack 2016). Immigration does not seem to be that much a factor, but it still is reported as important with local council and supporters from UKIP in the area.

Theories


According to the top in the 70% plus range, the commonalities seem to correlate with previous discussion on Euroscepticism and the “left behind” strata. As a result, I hypothesise that the main driving factors for the top Eurosceptic and thereby top “leave” constituencies are economic and social. Within the economic factor was the appeal of new markets outside of the EU, which Vote Leave indicated as a possibility only by leaving the EU, and the backlash against foreign migrant workers. There are several social factors that I would deem important for understanding the higher vote leave percentage. Firstly, the areas have portions of the population which would most likely be Eurosceptic, such as the pensioner age, with the exception of Thurrock. As previously discussed, in *Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind*, authors Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin wrote that UKIP’s emergence was based on changes to Britain’s economic and social structure which pushed the “left behind” to the side. Relatedly, the generational changes in the values of Britain have left the older, more traditional and older voters behind in the sense that those “traditional views” are seen as “parochial” by the young, university-educated strata. As a result of these shifts in social change, alongside an increasingly multicultural and liberalised Britain, the “left behind” were drawn to a political party which promised to represent them and their views. In this case, UKIP and Vote Leave/Leave.EU mobilised the left behind in these areas to fulfil the hard Eurosceptic decision to leave the EU in order to “right the wrongs” caused by the EU and the political establishment in Westminster.

The point is then raised as to how one can explain the remaining portions of England and Wales that voted to leave the European Union, especially those which do not exhibit obvious correlations with the theories posed. There are several answers

that could be hypothesised, but I pose the simple answer of analysing the turn-out.

Overall, the turn-out for those who are more likely to vote to stay in the EU (young, college educated, middle class) was lower than that of over-65s.

Chart 10: Turnout vs. Percentage of Over 65s in voting region



Source: ONS

Turn-out for those more likely to be Eurosceptic (aged 60+) was higher than 60% in most cases. For those aged 18-24 and eligible, 64% voted compared to the 90% of over-65s. The results found that 64% of those young people who were registered did vote, rising to 65% among 25-to-39-year-olds and 66% among those aged between 40 and 54. It increased to 74% among the 55-to-64 age group and 90% for those aged 65 and over. It is thought that more than 70% of young voters chose to remain in the EU (Helm 2016).

In analysing motivations for vote choice, I subscribe to the social group theory for explaining many of the questions regarding Brexit's turnout. Barring any consideration of the somewhat untruthful campaigns and any misconceptions or

misunderstandings of the vote choice, social group theory can explain the way individuals choice to vote as per the social characteristics and properties of the group in which they belong or identify. Essentially, the argument is that a person votes politically as they are socially. Additionally, I pose that economic and cultural backlash theories follow in the same regard with overlapping imposition of social variables confounding the results. Without oversimplifying the explanation, it seems as if the data points to a correlation between how the region is categorically “left behind” in the globalised world and how willing they would be to reject the notions of the European Union and accept the fervour of an anti-establishment populism movement as one which encapsulates the needs of the “ordinary” and “British” people who have been “left behind.”

Moreover, the issue of immigration, while a driving factor in the votes of many, was reportedly second to issues over national sovereignty and the principle that decisions about the UK should be made in and by the UK Parliament alone. In Lord Ashcroft’s poll of 12,369 voters after the referendum, one third of Leave voters indicated that the most important factor driving their vote was national sovereignty, followed secondly by immigration and border control, and thirdly by concerns over EU’s expansion of powers. According to YouGov data on EU membership and immigration in 2016, a higher percentage of respondents indicated that they believed there would be less immigration if Britain left the EU, as depicted in the chart on the following page.

YouGov: Do you think there would be more or less immigration into Britain if it left the EU?




Chart 11: Percentage overtime March – June 2016 of Immigration Attitudes

I would pose that the relationship between the “national sovereignty” and “immigration and border control” variables is interlinked. Essentially, while the UK is not part of the borderless Europe and the Schengen Agreement, the fact remains that most of the immigration requirements to which the UK is obligated to adhere come from the European Union with no leeway for reversal. Therefore, I would hypothesize that the relationship between being concerned with national sovereignty and being able to legislate the control of borders is interlinked in many cases.

Section 4.2: Aftermath

The aftermath of the EU referendum was an indication of how confused the world seemed to be about post-Brexit Britain's future. The British Pound Sterling fell during the referendum result, plummeting 15% on July 6. The FTSE 100 index bounced back to pre-referendum levels within a couple days, but the stability of both economic factors remains uncertain (Kottasova 2016). Prime Minister David Cameron resigned from his position as Prime Minister the following morning after the Referendum results were officialised, eventually he would resign from his position as a Member of Parliament a few months later. Following tense leadership contents in both the Labour and Conservative Parties, Jeremy Corbyn retained his leadership position and Theresa May, former Home Secretary, became Prime Minister.

Within the same few weeks, Nigel Farage stepped down as leader of UKIP. Michael Grove and Boris Johnson went AWOL until Johnson returned with a position in May's cabinet as Foreign Secretary. Politicians such as Caroline Lucas of the Green Party called for a second referendum, indicating that the referendum results were too close and the campaigns were not fair. Millions marched throughout the UK in protest of the vote. The EU leaders, shocked but vigilant, immediately went into action to ensure that similar referendums did not happen in their countries by showing strength in the statements against Brexit's terms of triggering Article 50. Recently, British High Courts ruled that Members of Parliament must vote in order to trigger Article 50, to much condemnation of the Leave side. Prime Minister Theresa May has been secretive about her negotiations and plans for the UK, but the looming fact remains: Article 50 has yet to be triggered, so the UK is still technically in the EU.

Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union¹²

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

In order to leave the European Union, a member state has to trigger Article 50 with the steps enumerated above. The formal process is initiated by the member state

¹² Source: EUROPA Online

in the European Council, which provides the guidelines for negotiations. The member state and the EC have two years to agree on arrangements for leaving and the relationship once the member state leaves. The withdrawal of the member state does not require ratification by the EP or EC.

In November 2016, the British High Courts ruled that Members of Parliament must vote on whether or not to trigger Article 50, and as a result, start the official negotiations for leaving the European Union. According to data compiled by MPs reported intentions to vote, I conclude that if the vote was held at time of publication, the outcome would be as followed:

Row Labels	Count of Intended Vote
Leave	152
Conservative	132
DUP	8
Labour	10
UKIP	1
UUP	1
Remain	477
Conservative	184
Green	1
Independent	2
Labour	218
Lib Dems	8
Plaid Cymru	3
SDLP	3
Sinn Fein	4
SNP	53
UUP	1
Grand Total	629

In the *Appendix*, a detailed list of MPs with respective political party and intended vote is available; the data was manually compiled from data reported by BBC News on the votes of MPs and the Cabinets. It does not necessarily reflect the

vote of each constituency region, however, which leaves room for further research into the correlation between the Voting MP and the outcome of his or her constituency. Additionally, there are some missing MPs who did not declare their decision in the matter at the time (629/650). Of the voting intentions articulated, it seems as if Remain would have a majority over Leave based solely on MP intentions to vote, notwithstanding constituency or party pressure.

It is theorised, however, that the referendum result is a signal to MPs to vote accordingly. The overturning of the referendum result in a Parliament vote is unlikely, while possible, but would signal the disregard of the referendum result. Interestingly, the outcome of the Scottish and Northern Irish referendum vote will bring into question the constitutional question of how the UK can overall leave the EU, thereby disregarding the overall votes within two devolved countries and their Parliaments, which would more than likely vote again to Remain.

Triggering Article 50 has brought into question the ideas of “hard” and “soft” Brexit. Currently, there is a majority in Parliament supporting the idea of a “soft” Brexit, whereas some hard-line Eurosceptics would prefer the “hard” version instead. Theoretically, the future of the UK outside of the EU can take several routes. In the following analysis, I will assume the triggering of Article 50 by the UK Parliament, regardless of political party in control. Some possibilities will incorporate a “hard” or “clean” Brexit which severs the tie of Britain and the EU legally; some will represent a “soft” Brexit and a continued relationship in various models.

According to *Brexit: Directions for Britain Outside the EU*, there are likely topics of importance for the UK exit agreements once Article 50 is triggered. The following tables represent the opinions of the authors. For routes similar to countries with modified agreements with the EU, Britain could look into the

following model options:

Table 7 : Likely Topics for Negotiation in UK Exit Negotiations Post-Brexit¹³			
<i>Issue</i>	<i>Importance</i>	<i>Difficulty of Achieving</i>	<i>Overall Priority</i>
Regaining full national sovereignty	High	Medium	High
Membership of EFTA	High	Medium	High
Leaving EEA	High	Medium/High	High
Opting out of EU requirements	High	Medium/High	High
Free movement of capital	Medium/High	Low	Medium/High
End freedom of movement	Medium/High	Medium	Medium/high
Significant Access for services	High	Medium/High	Medium/High
No contribution to EU Budget	Medium	Medium/High	Medium
Access to EU Research Framework program	Low/Medium	Low	Medium
Duty-Free access for agricultural goods	Medium	High	Low/Medium

¹³ Source: Buckle, Hewish, Hulsam, Mansfield, Oulds, 2015. "Brexit: Directions for Britain Outside of the EU," Page 19.

Table 8: Alternative Brexit Models						
	EU Membership	Norway	Switzerland	Canada	Turkey	WTO
Single market status	Full	Full	Partial	No	No	No
Free Movement	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
In the customs union	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Makes EU budget contributions	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Tariffs	None	None	None	Reduced tariffs	None on industrial goods	Yes

Hard Brexit would include not compromising on key aspects of EU membership, such as the rejection of freedom of movement of people and immigration. However, membership of the EU's Common Market necessitates such agreements be set in place. Interestingly, withdrawing from the EU would diminish the UK's ability to make political decisions within the body, thereby limiting the ability to influence future or current policy on further political and economic integration. Having "membership of" and "access to" the single market are also different implications. In regard to trade, some MPs believe that the EU will want to continue trade with the UK, one such official being International Trade Secretary Liam Fox who predicted a free trade agreement between the EU and UK as probable (BBC News 2016). The probable scenario is that the EU and the UK will reach an agreement on access to the EFTA. According to *Brexit: Directions for the Britain Outside of the EU's* chapter "A Blueprint for Britain: Openness Not Isolation," it is "abundantly clear that the UK can have a positive economic future either inside or outside the EU" (Buckle, et. al 2015, 42). The stressing of economic openness as

opposed to protectionism and isolationism is reflecting in those optimistic suggestions that the UK could thrive outside the EU. Moreover, the arrangement is likely to produce a trade-off between how much access the UK can have to the Common Market and how willing the UK is to participate in and accept the fundamental four freedoms required of member states.

Chapter VI: Conclusions

On June 23, 2016, the British electorate voted on the future of Britain in the European Union. The European Union membership referendum is the culmination of British Euroscepticism. Undoubtedly, Britain has always been a lukewarm partner to the European Union, but now, the UK Parliament must decide if they will commit or finally dismiss themselves from the European project altogether. The projected votes are always split, with Stay edging over Leave by only a few points (average ~46-47% for Stay, 40-43% for Leave), and the end result of the referendum encapsulated the split over the issue. Even still, the Conservative Government led by Former Prime Minister David Cameron and now Prime Minister Theresa May has split over the issue of Brexit. The Labour Party has also showed signs of disarray as a result of leadership contests and in-party fighting. This hot international issue has also involved foreign heads of state from various EU states, the United States, and China, all of whom urge for Britain to remain in the EU. However, the possibility of Britain leaving the EU is very real.

The consequences, while all projected and sometimes exaggerated, align heavily with economics and trade, foreign affairs, and domestic implications. These areas are also the main areas of concern for the pro-Brexit camps, which argue that Britain is versatile enough to thrive outside of the restrictive, anti-democratic European Union. Needless to say, Britain's versatility will be put to the test if Brexit occurs and Article 50 is triggered by Parliament. The potential of Britain will be thrust into the limelight, as they will need to produce their own opportunities rather than seeking them within the European context. Notably, the access to Free Trade Agreements, European and other markets, and economic benefits of multinational businesses and migrant workers will become a heightened priority.

Appendix

Data Set 1: Region's Data from EU Referendum

Region	Area	Turnout	Remain	Leave	% Remain	% Leave
East	Babergh	78.26	25309	29933	45.81	54.19
East	Basildon	73.86	30748	67251	31.38	68.62
East	Bedford	72.06	41497	44569	48.22	51.78
East	Braintree	76.67	33523	52713	38.87	61.13
East	Breckland	74.34	26313	47235	35.78	64.22
East	Brentwood	79.5	19077	27627	40.85	59.15
East	Broadland	78.37	35469	42268	45.63	54.37
East	Broxbourne	73.78	17166	33706	33.74	66.26
East	Cambridge	72.22	42682	15117	73.85	26.15
East	Castle Point	75.38	14154	37691	27.3	72.7
East	Central Bedfordshire	77.89	69670	89134	43.87	56.13
East	Chelmsford	77.6	47545	53249	47.17	52.83
East	Colchester	75.11	44414	51305	46.4	53.6
East	Dacorum	79.21	42542	43702	49.33	50.67
East	East Cambridgeshire	77.08	23599	24487	49.08	50.92
East	East Hertfordshire	80.4	42372	42994	49.64	50.36
East	Epping Forest	76.89	28676	48176	37.31	62.69
East	Fenland	73.69	15055	37571	28.61	71.39
East	Forest Heath	72.62	9791	18160	35.03	64.97
East	Great Yarmouth	69.06	14284	35844	28.5	71.5
East	Harlow	73.56	13867	29602	31.9	68.1
East	Hertsmere	76.62	27593	28532	49.16	50.84
East	Huntingdonshire	77.82	45729	54198	45.76	54.24
East	Ipswich	72.51	27698	38655	41.74	58.26
East	King's Lynn and West Norfolk	74.75	28587	56493	33.6	66.4
East	Luton	66.31	36708	47773	43.45	56.55
East	Maldon	79.17	14529	24302	37.42	62.58
East	Mid Suffolk	78.16	27391	33794	44.77	55.23
East	North Hertfordshire	78.27	42234	35438	54.37	45.63
East	North Norfolk	76.84	26214	37576	41.09	58.91
East	Norwich	69.12	37326	29040	56.24	43.76
East	Peterborough	72.35	34176	53216	39.11	60.89
East	Rochford	78.81	17510	34937	33.39	66.61
East	South Cambridgeshire	81.21	56128	37061	60.23	39.77
East	South Norfolk	78.54	38817	41541	48.31	51.69
East	Southend-on-Sea	72.9	39348	54522	41.92	58.08
East	St Albans	82.51	54208	32237	62.71	37.29
East	St Edmundsbury	76.72	26986	35224	43.38	56.62
East	Stevenage	73.7	18659	27126	40.75	59.25

East	Suffolk Coastal	80.68	37218	41966	47	53
East	Tendring	74.4	25210	57447	30.5	69.5
East	Three Rivers	78.5	25751	27097	48.73	51.27
East	Thurrock	72.75	22151	57765	27.72	72.28
East	Uttlesford	80.28	25619	26324	49.32	50.68
East	Watford	71.68	23167	23419	49.73	50.27
East	Waveney	72.67	24356	41290	37.1	62.9
East	Welwyn Hatfield	75.04	27550	31060	47.01	52.99
East Midlands	Amber Valley	76.34	29319	44501	39.72	60.28
East Midlands	Ashfield	72.83	20179	46720	30.16	69.84
East Midlands	Bassetlaw	74.82	20575	43392	32.17	67.83
East Midlands	Blaby	76.54	22888	33583	40.53	59.47
East Midlands	Bolsover	72.33	12242	29730	29.17	70.83
East Midlands	Boston	77.27	7430	22974	24.44	75.56
East Midlands	Broxtowe	78.32	29672	35754	45.35	54.65
East Midlands	Charnwood	70.46	43500	50672	46.19	53.81
East Midlands	Chesterfield	71.92	22946	34478	39.96	60.04
East Midlands	Corby	74.1	11470	20611	35.75	64.25
East Midlands	Daventry	81.01	20443	28938	41.4	58.6
East Midlands	Derby	70.53	51612	69043	42.78	57.22
East Midlands	Derbyshire Dales	81.92	22633	24095	48.44	51.56
East Midlands	East Lindsey	74.93	23515	56613	29.35	70.65
East Midlands	East Northamptonshire	76.99	21680	30894	41.24	58.76
East Midlands	Erewash	75.99	25791	40739	38.77	61.23
East Midlands	Gedling	76.6	30035	37542	44.45	55.55
East Midlands	Harborough	81.44	27028	27850	49.25	50.75
East Midlands	High Peak	75.69	27116	27717	49.45	50.55
East Midlands	Hinckley and Bosworth	76.8	25969	39501	39.67	60.33
East Midlands	Kettering	76.43	21030	32877	39.01	60.99
East Midlands	Leicester	65.15	70980	67992	51.08	48.92
East Midlands	Lincoln	69.34	18902	24992	43.06	56.94
East Midlands	Mansfield	72.62	16417	39927	29.14	70.86
East Midlands	Melton	81.36	12695	17610	41.89	58.11
East Midlands	Newark and Sherwood	76.86	26571	40516	39.61	60.39
East Midlands	North East Derbyshire	75.25	22075	37235	37.22	62.78
East Midlands	North Kesteven	78.4	25570	42183	37.74	62.26
East Midlands	North West Leicestershire	77.95	22642	34969	39.3	60.7
East Midlands	Northampton	72.68	43805	61454	41.62	58.38
East Midlands	Nottingham	61.82	59318	61343	49.16	50.84
East Midlands	Oadby and Wigston	73.77	14292	17173	45.42	54.58
East Midlands	Rushcliffe	81.56	40522	29888	57.55	42.45
East Midlands	Rutland	78.2	11353	11613	49.43	50.57
East Midlands	South Derbyshire	76.8	22479	34216	39.65	60.35
East Midlands	South Holland	75.37	13074	36423	26.41	73.59
East Midlands	South Kesteven	78.25	33047	49424	40.07	59.93

East Midlands	South Northamptonshire	79.46	25853	30771	45.66	54.34
East Midlands	Wellingborough	75.46	15462	25679	37.58	62.42
East Midlands	West Lindsey	74.53	20906	33847	38.18	61.82
London	Barking and Dagenham	63.85	27750	46130	37.56	62.44
London	Barnet	72.14	100210	60823	62.23	37.77
London	Bexley	75.28	47603	80886	37.05	62.95
London	Brent	65.14	72523	48881	59.74	40.26
London	Bromley	78.87	92398	90034	50.65	49.35
London	Camden	65.52	71295	23838	74.94	25.06
London	City of London	73.58	3312	1087	75.29	24.71
London	Croydon	69.81	92913	78221	54.29	45.71
London	Ealing	70.08	90024	59017	60.4	39.6
London	Enfield	69.09	76425	60481	55.82	44.18
London	Greenwich	69.52	65248	52117	55.59	44.41
London	Hackney	65.18	83398	22868	78.48	21.52
London	Hammersmith and Fulham	69.95	56188	24054	70.02	29.98
London	Haringey	70.64	79991	25855	75.57	24.43
London	Harrow	72.26	64042	53183	54.63	45.37
London	Havering	76.02	42201	96885	30.34	69.66
London	Hillingdon	68.99	58040	74982	43.63	56.37
London	Hounslow	69.8	58755	56321	51.06	48.94
London	Islington	70.39	76420	25180	75.22	24.78
London	Kensington and Chelsea	65.99	37601	17138	68.69	31.31
London	Kingston upon Thames	78.4	52533	32737	61.61	38.39
London	Lambeth	67.44	111584	30340	78.62	21.38
London	Lewisham	63.1	86955	37518	69.86	30.14
London	Merton	73.49	63003	37097	62.94	37.06
London	Newham	59.25	55328	49371	52.84	47.16
London	Redbridge	67.63	69213	59020	53.97	46.03
London	Richmond upon Thames	82.09	75396	33410	69.29	30.71
London	Southwark	66.2	94293	35209	72.81	27.19
London	Sutton	76.01	49319	57241	46.28	53.72
London	Tower Hamlets	64.6	73011	35224	67.46	32.54
London	Waltham Forest	66.69	64156	44395	59.1	40.9
London	Wandsworth	71.98	118463	39421	75.03	24.97
London	Westminster	64.99	53928	24268	68.97	31.03
North East	County Durham	68.69	113521	153877	42.45	57.55
North East	Darlington	71.07	24172	30994	43.82	56.18
North East	Gateshead	70.62	44429	58529	43.15	56.85
North East	Hartlepool	65.59	14029	32071	30.43	69.57
North East	Middlesbrough	64.89	21181	40177	34.52	65.48
North East	Newcastle upon Tyne	67.67	65405	63598	50.7	49.3
North East	North Tyneside	72.3	52873	60589	46.6	53.4
North East	Northumberland	74.35	82022	96699	45.89	54.11
North East	Redcar and Cleveland	70.26	24586	48128	33.81	66.19

North East	South Tyneside	68.27	30014	49065	37.95	62.05
North East	Stockton-on-Tees	71	38433	61982	38.27	61.73
North East	Sunderland	64.86	51930	82394	38.66	61.34
North West	Allerdale	72.92	22429	31809	41.35	58.65
North West	Barrow-in-Furness	67.87	14207	21867	39.38	60.62
North West	Blackburn with Darwen	65.33	28522	36799	43.66	56.34
North West	Blackpool	65.42	21781	45146	32.54	67.46
North West	Bolton	70.1	57589	80491	41.71	58.29
North West	Burnley	67.25	14462	28854	33.39	66.61
North West	Bury	71.43	46354	54674	45.88	54.12
North West	Carlisle	74.54	23788	35895	39.86	60.14
North West	Cheshire East	77.36	107962	113163	48.82	51.18
North West	Cheshire West and Chester	74.51	95455	98082	49.32	50.68
North West	Chorley	75.52	27417	36098	43.17	56.83
North West	Copeland	70.06	14419	23528	38	62
North West	Eden	75.82	14807	16911	46.68	53.32
North West	Fylde	75.57	19889	26317	43.04	56.96
North West	Halton	68.26	27678	37327	42.58	57.42
North West	Hyndburn	64.74	13569	26568	33.81	66.19
North West	Knowsley	63.54	34345	36558	48.44	51.56
North West	Lancaster	72.69	35732	37309	48.92	51.08
North West	Liverpool	64.08	118453	85101	58.19	41.81
North West	Manchester	59.77	121823	79991	60.36	39.64
North West	Oldham	68	42034	65369	39.14	60.86
North West	Pendle	70.33	16704	28631	36.85	63.15
North West	Preston	68.72	30227	34518	46.69	53.31
North West	Ribble Valley	79.02	15892	20550	43.61	56.39
North West	Rochdale	65.97	41217	62014	39.93	60.07
North West	Rossendale	72.43	15012	23169	39.32	60.68
North West	Salford	63.3	47430	62385	43.19	56.81
North West	Sefton	71.73	76702	71176	51.87	48.13
North West	South Lakeland	79.78	34531	30800	52.86	47.14
North West	South Ribble	75.38	26406	37318	41.44	58.56
North West	St. Helens	68.86	39322	54357	41.98	58.02
North West	Stockport	73.97	85559	77930	52.33	47.67
North West	Tameside	66.06	43118	67829	38.86	61.14
North West	Trafford	75.86	72293	53018	57.69	42.31
North West	Warrington	73.36	52657	62487	45.73	54.27
North West	West Lancashire	74.47	28546	35323	44.69	55.31
North West	Wigan	69.23	58942	104331	36.1	63.9
North West	Wirral	70.96	88931	83069	51.7	48.3
North West	Wyre	74.61	22816	40163	36.23	63.77
Northern Ireland	Northern Ireland	62.69	440707	349442	55.78	44.22
Scotland	Aberdeen City	67.94	63985	40729	61.1	38.9
Scotland	Aberdeenshire	70.63	76445	62516	55.01	44.99

Scotland	Angus	68.03	32747	26511	55.26	44.74
Scotland	Argyll and Bute	73.13	29494	19202	60.57	39.43
Scotland	City of Edinburgh	72.96	187796	64498	74.44	25.56
Scotland	Clackmannanshire	67.23	14691	10736	57.78	42.22
Scotland	Dumfries and Galloway	71.41	43864	38803	53.06	46.94
Scotland	Dundee City	62.92	39688	26697	59.78	40.22
Scotland	East Ayrshire	62.91	33891	23942	58.6	41.4
Scotland	East Dunbartonshire	75.17	44534	17840	71.4	28.6
Scotland	East Lothian	71.73	36026	19738	64.6	35.4
Scotland	East Renfrewshire	76.13	39345	13596	74.32	25.68
Scotland	Eilean Siar	70.18	8232	6671	55.24	44.76
Scotland	Falkirk	67.55	44987	34271	56.76	43.24
Scotland	Fife	66.78	106754	75466	58.59	41.41
Scotland	Glasgow City	56.25	168335	84474	66.59	33.41
Scotland	Highland	71.61	70308	55349	55.95	44.05
Scotland	Inverclyde	66.05	24688	14010	63.8	36.2
Scotland	Midlothian	68.15	28217	17251	62.06	37.94
Scotland	Moray	67.45	24114	23992	50.13	49.87
Scotland	North Ayrshire	64.59	38394	29110	56.88	43.12
Scotland	North Lanarkshire	60.91	95549	59400	61.66	38.34
Scotland	Orkney Islands	68.45	7189	4193	63.16	36.84
Scotland	Perth and Kinross	73.75	49641	31614	61.09	38.91
Scotland	Renfrewshire	69.29	57119	31010	64.81	35.19
Scotland	Scottish Borders	73.44	37952	26962	58.47	41.53
Scotland	Shetland Islands	70.39	6907	5315	56.51	43.49
Scotland	South Ayrshire	69.84	36265	25241	58.96	41.04
Scotland	South Lanarkshire	65.35	102568	60024	63.08	36.92
Scotland	Stirling	74.03	33112	15787	67.72	32.28
Scotland	West Dunbartonshire	63.98	26794	16426	61.99	38.01
Scotland	West Lothian	67.64	51560	36948	58.25	41.75
South East	Adur	76.4	16914	20315	45.43	54.57
South East	Arun	77.86	34193	56936	37.52	62.48
South East	Ashford	77.14	28314	41472	40.57	59.43
South East	Aylesbury Vale	78.46	52877	53956	49.5	50.5
South East	Basingstoke and Deane	78.02	48257	52071	48.1	51.9
South East	Bracknell Forest	76.11	29888	35002	46.06	53.94
South East	Brighton and Hove	74.05	100648	46027	68.62	31.38
South East	Canterbury	75.05	40169	41879	48.96	51.04
South East	Cherwell	75.6	40668	41168	49.69	50.31
South East	Chichester	77.91	35011	36326	49.08	50.92
South East	Chiltern	83.57	32241	26363	55.02	44.98
South East	Crawley	73.24	22388	31447	41.59	58.41
South East	Dartford	75.57	19985	35870	35.78	64.22
South East	Dover	76.53	24606	40410	37.85	62.15
South East	East Hampshire	81.65	37346	36576	50.52	49.48

South East	Eastbourne	74.73	22845	30700	42.67	57.33
South East	Eastleigh	78.28	36172	39902	47.55	52.45
South East	Elmbridge	78.14	45841	31162	59.53	40.47
South East	Epsom and Ewell	80.42	23596	21707	52.08	47.92
South East	Fareham	79.59	32210	39525	44.9	55.1
South East	Gosport	73.51	16671	29456	36.14	63.86
South East	Gravesham	74.93	18876	35643	34.62	65.38
South East	Guildford	76.96	44155	34458	56.17	43.83
South East	Hart	82.67	30282	27513	52.4	47.6
South East	Hastings	71.64	20011	24339	45.12	54.88
South East	Havant	74.1	26582	44047	37.64	62.36
South East	Horsham	81.65	43785	41303	51.46	48.54
South East	Isle of Wight	72.31	30207	49173	38.05	61.95
South East	Lewes	77.89	30974	28508	52.07	47.93
South East	Maidstone	76.02	36762	52365	41.25	58.75
South East	Medway	72.18	49889	88997	35.92	64.08
South East	Mid Sussex	80.79	46471	41057	53.09	46.91
South East	Milton Keynes	73.66	63393	67063	48.59	51.41
South East	Mole Valley	82.17	29088	25708	53.08	46.92
South East	New Forest	79.25	47199	64541	42.24	57.76
South East	Oxford	72.34	49424	20913	70.27	29.73
South East	Portsmouth	70.3	41384	57336	41.92	58.08
South East	Reading	72.53	43385	31382	58.03	41.97
South East	Reigate and Banstead	78.28	40181	40980	49.51	50.49
South East	Rother	79.33	23916	33753	41.47	58.53
South East	Runnymede	76.07	20259	24035	45.74	54.26
South East	Rushmoor	74.18	20384	28396	41.79	58.21
South East	Sevenoaks	80.68	32091	38258	45.62	54.38
South East	Shepway	75	22884	37729	37.75	62.25
South East	Slough	62.13	24911	29631	45.67	54.33
South East	South Bucks	78.08	20077	20647	49.3	50.7
South East	South Oxfordshire	80.75	46245	37865	54.98	45.02
South East	Southampton	68.14	49738	57927	46.2	53.8
South East	Spelthorne	77.93	22474	34135	39.7	60.3
South East	Surrey Heath	79.81	25638	26667	49.02	50.98
South East	Swale	74.27	28481	47388	37.54	62.46
South East	Tandridge	80.36	24251	27169	47.16	52.84
South East	Test Valley	79.65	36170	39091	48.06	51.94
South East	Thanet	72.8	26065	46037	36.15	63.85
South East	Tonbridge and Malling	79.62	32792	41229	44.3	55.7
South East	Tunbridge Wells	79.14	35676	29320	54.89	45.11
South East	Vale of White Horse	81.18	43462	33192	56.7	43.3
South East	Waverley	82.35	44341	31601	58.39	41.61
South East	Wealden	80.03	44084	52808	45.5	54.5
South East	West Berkshire	79.95	48300	44977	51.78	48.22

South East	West Oxfordshire	79.72	35236	30435	53.66	46.34
South East	Winchester	81.26	42878	29886	58.93	41.07
South East	Windsor and Maidenhead	79.73	44086	37706	53.9	46.1
South East	Woking	77.49	31007	24214	56.15	43.85
South East	Wokingham	80.03	55272	42229	56.69	43.31
South East	Worthing	75.46	28851	32515	47.01	52.99
South East	Wycombe	75.74	49261	45529	51.97	48.03
South West	Bath and North East Somerset	77.13	60878	44352	57.85	42.15
South West	Bournemouth	69.3	41473	50453	45.12	54.88
South West	Bristol, City of	73.17	141027	87418	61.73	38.27
South West	Cheltenham	75.88	37081	28932	56.17	43.83
South West	Christchurch	79.3	12782	18268	41.17	58.83
South West	Cornwall	77.05	140540	182665	43.48	56.52
South West	Cotswold	79.8	28015	26806	51.1	48.9
South West	East Devon	78.94	40743	48040	45.89	54.11
South West	East Dorset	81.33	24786	33702	42.38	57.62
South West	Exeter	73.91	35270	28533	55.28	44.72
South West	Forest of Dean	77.47	21392	30251	41.42	58.58
South West	Gibraltar	83.64	19322	823	95.91	4.09
South West	Gloucester	72.06	26801	37776	41.5	58.5
South West	Isles of Scilly	79.16	803	621	56.39	43.61
South West	Mendip	77.01	33427	32028	51.07	48.93
South West	Mid Devon	79.38	22400	25606	46.66	53.34
South West	North Devon	76.85	24931	33100	42.96	57.04
South West	North Dorset	79.71	18399	23802	43.6	56.4
South West	North Somerset	77.47	59572	64976	47.83	52.17
South West	Plymouth	71.41	53458	79997	40.06	59.94
South West	Poole	75.38	35741	49707	41.83	58.17
South West	Purbeck	78.91	11754	16966	40.93	59.07
South West	Sedgemoor	76.3	26545	41869	38.8	61.2
South West	South Gloucestershire	76.24	74928	83405	47.32	52.68
South West	South Hams	80.27	29308	26142	52.85	47.15
South West	South Somerset	78.69	42527	56940	42.75	57.25
South West	Stroud	80.03	40446	33618	54.61	45.39
South West	Swindon	75.9	51220	61745	45.34	54.66
South West	Taunton Deane	78.16	30944	34789	47.08	52.92
South West	Teignbridge	79.4	37949	44363	46.1	53.9
South West	Tewkesbury	79.15	25084	28568	46.75	53.25
South West	Torbay	73.69	27935	47889	36.84	63.16
South West	Torrige	78.41	16229	25200	39.17	60.83
South West	West Devon	81.26	16658	18937	46.8	53.2
South West	West Dorset	79.49	31924	33267	48.97	51.03
South West	West Somerset	79.17	8566	13168	39.41	60.59
South West	Weymouth and Portland	75.87	14903	23352	38.96	61.04
South West	Wiltshire	78.87	137258	151637	47.51	52.49

Wales	Blaenau Gwent	68.08	13215	21587	37.97	62.03
Wales	Bridgend	71.18	33723	40622	45.36	54.64
Wales	Caerphilly	70.74	39178	53295	42.37	57.63
Wales	Cardiff	69.66	101788	67816	60.02	39.98
Wales	Carmarthenshire	74.07	47654	55381	46.25	53.75
Wales	Ceredigion	74.48	21711	18031	54.63	45.37
Wales	Conwy	71.75	30147	35357	46.02	53.98
Wales	Denbighshire	69.14	23955	28117	46	54
Wales	Flintshire	74.9	37867	48930	43.63	56.37
Wales	Gwynedd	72.42	35517	25665	58.05	41.95
Wales	Isle of Anglesey	73.82	18618	19333	49.06	50.94
Wales	Merthyr Tydfil	67.39	12574	16291	43.56	56.44
Wales	Monmouthshire	77.74	28061	27569	50.44	49.56
Wales	Neath Port Talbot	71.57	32651	43001	43.16	56.84
Wales	Newport	70.21	32413	41236	44.01	55.99
Wales	Pembrokeshire	74.39	29367	39155	42.86	57.14
Wales	Powys	77	36762	42707	46.26	53.74
Wales	Rhondda Cynon Taf	67.47	53973	62590	46.3	53.7
Wales	Swansea	69.6	58307	61936	48.49	51.51
Wales	Torfaen	69.86	19363	28781	40.22	59.78
Wales	Vale of Glamorgan	76.15	36681	35628	50.73	49.27
Wales	Wrexham	71.56	28822	41544	40.96	59.04
West Midlands	Birmingham	63.81	223451	227251	49.58	50.42
West Midlands	Bromsgrove	79.35	26252	32563	44.63	55.37
West Midlands	Cannock Chase	71.47	16684	36894	31.14	68.86
West Midlands	Coventry	69.21	67967	85097	44.4	55.6
West Midlands	Dudley	71.71	56780	118446	32.4	67.6
West Midlands	East Staffordshire	74.39	22850	39266	36.79	63.21
West Midlands	Herefordshire, County of	78.36	44148	64122	40.78	59.22
West Midlands	Lichfield	78.78	26064	37214	41.19	58.81
West Midlands	Malvern Hills	80.61	23203	25294	47.84	52.16
West Midlands	Newcastle-under-Lyme	74.3	25477	43457	36.96	63.04
West Midlands	North Warwickshire	76.27	12569	25385	33.12	66.88
West Midlands	Nuneaton and Bedworth	74.35	23736	46095	33.99	66.01
West Midlands	Redditch	75.22	17303	28579	37.71	62.29
West Midlands	Rugby	79.03	25350	33199	43.3	56.7
West Midlands	Sandwell	66.58	49004	98250	33.28	66.72
West Midlands	Shropshire	77.42	78987	104166	43.13	56.87
West Midlands	Solihull	76.06	53466	68484	43.84	56.16
West Midlands	South Staffordshire	77.81	23444	43248	35.15	64.85
West Midlands	Stafford	77.83	34098	43386	44.01	55.99
West Midlands	Staffordshire Moorlands	75.36	21076	38684	35.27	64.73
West Midlands	Stoke-on-Trent	65.74	36027	81563	30.64	69.36
West Midlands	Stratford-on-Avon	80.82	38341	40817	48.44	51.56
West Midlands	Tamworth	74.18	13705	28424	32.53	67.47

West Midlands	Telford and Wrekin	72.15	32954	56649	36.78	63.22
West Midlands	Walsall	69.68	43572	92007	32.14	67.86
West Midlands	Warwick	79.22	47976	33642	58.78	41.22
West Midlands	Wolverhampton	67.54	44138	73798	37.43	62.57
West Midlands	Worcester	73.85	25125	29114	46.32	53.68
West Midlands	Wychavon	80.88	32188	44201	42.14	57.86
West Midlands	Wyre Forest	74.05	21240	36392	36.85	63.15
Yorkshire	Barnsley	69.95	38951	83958	31.69	68.31
Yorkshire	Bradford	66.72	104575	123913	45.77	54.23
Yorkshire	Calderdale	71.05	46950	58975	44.32	55.68
Yorkshire	Craven	81.02	16930	18961	47.17	52.83
Yorkshire	Doncaster	69.56	46922	104260	31.04	68.96
Yorkshire	East Riding of Yorkshire	74.81	78779	120136	39.6	60.4
Yorkshire	Hambleton	78.45	25480	29502	46.34	53.66
Yorkshire	Harrogate	78.89	48211	46374	50.97	49.03
Yorkshire	Kingston upon Hull, City of	62.94	36709	76646	32.38	67.62
Yorkshire	Kirklees	70.8	98485	118755	45.33	54.67
Yorkshire	Leeds	71.39	194863	192474	50.31	49.69
Yorkshire	North East Lincolnshire	67.94	23797	55185	30.13	69.87
Yorkshire	North Lincolnshire	71.92	29947	58915	33.7	66.3
Yorkshire	Richmondshire	75.15	11945	15691	43.22	56.78
Yorkshire	Rotherham	69.56	44115	93272	32.11	67.89
Yorkshire	Ryedale	77.22	14340	17710	44.74	55.26
Yorkshire	Scarborough	73.03	22999	37512	38.01	61.99
Yorkshire	Selby	79.1	21071	30532	40.83	59.17
Yorkshire	Sheffield	67.34	130735	136018	49.01	50.99
Yorkshire	Wakefield	71.17	58877	116165	33.64	66.36
Yorkshire	York	70.69	63617	45983	58.04	41.96

Data Set 2: Members of Parliament and Intended Vote: Used to create the in-text chart for predicting how the MPs would vote on triggering Article 50 if Parliament was asked based off personal vote to Leave/Remain.

Member of Parliament	Party Affiliation	Vote
Prime Minister David Cameron	Conservative	Remain
Chancellor George Osborne	Conservative	Remain
Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond	Conservative	Remain
Home Secretary Theresa May	Conservative	Remain
Business Secretary Sajid Javid	Conservative	Remain
Welsh Secretary Alun Cairns	Conservative	Remain
International Development Secretary Justine Greening	Conservative	Remain
Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt	Conservative	Remain
Communities and Local Government Secretary Greg Clark	Conservative	Remain
Transport Secretary Patrick McLoughlin	Conservative	Remain
Environment Secretary Elizabeth Truss	Conservative	Remain
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Oliver Letwin	Conservative	Remain
Secretary of State for Education Nicky Morgan	Conservative	Remain
Secretary of State for Scotland David Mundell	Conservative	Remain
House of Lords Leader Baroness Stowell of Beeston (not in House of Commons)	Conservative	Remain
Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon	Conservative	Remain
Secretary of State for Energy Amber Rudd	Conservative	Remain
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Stephen Crabb	Conservative	Remain
Paymaster General Matt Hancock*	Conservative	Remain
Chief Secretary to the Treasury Greg Hands*	Conservative	Remain
Chief Whip Mark Harper*	Conservative	Remain
Minister for Small Business Anna Soubry*	Conservative	Remain
Minister without Portfolio Robert Halfon*	Conservative	Remain
Attorney General Jeremy Wright*	Conservative	Remain
Peter Aldous - Waveney	Conservative	Remain
Heidi Allen - Cambridgeshire South	Conservative	Remain
Edward Argar- Charnwood	Conservative	Remain
Victoria Atkins - Louth and Horncastle	Conservative	Remain
Harriett Baldwin - Worcestershire West	Conservative	Remain
Gavin Barwell - Croydon Central	Conservative	Remain
Guto Bebb - Aberconwy	Conservative	Remain
Richard Benyon - Newbury	Conservative	Remain

Paul Beresford - Mole Valley	Conservative	Remain
James Berry - Kingston and Surbiton	Conservative	Remain
Jake Berry - Rossendale and Darwen	Conservative	Remain
Nicola Blackwood - Oxford West and Abingdon	Conservative	Remain
Nicholas Boles - Grantham and Stamford	Conservative	Remain
Peter Bottomley - Worthing West	Conservative	Remain
Karen Bradley - Staffordshire Moorlands	Conservative	Remain
Steve Brine - Winchester	Conservative	Remain
James Brokenshire - Old Bexley and Sidcup	Conservative	Remain
Robert Buckland - Swindon South	Conservative	Remain
Simon Burns - Chelmsford	Conservative	Remain
Alistair Burt - Bedfordshire North East	Conservative	Remain
Neil Carmichael - Stroud	Conservative	Remain
James Cartlidge - Suffolk South	Conservative	Remain
Alex Chalk - Cheltenham	Conservative	Remain
Jo Churchill - Bury St Edmunds	Conservative	Remain
Kenneth Clarke - Rushcliffe	Conservative	Remain
Therese Coffey - Suffolk Coastal	Conservative	Remain
Damian Collins - Folkestone and Hythe	Conservative	Remain
Oliver Colvile - Plymouth Sutton and Devonport	Conservative	Remain
Alberto Costa - South Leicestershire	Conservative	Remain
Byron Davies - Gower	Conservative	Remain
Caroline Dinenage - Gosport	Conservative	Remain
Jonathan Djanogly - Huntingdon	Conservative	Remain
Michelle Donelan - Chippenham	Conservative	Remain
Oliver Dowden - Hertsmere	Conservative	Remain
Jackie Doyle-Price - Thurrock	Conservative	Remain
Flick Drummond - Portsmouth South	Conservative	Remain
Alan Duncan - Rutland and Melton	Conservative	Remain
Philip Dunne - Ludlow	Conservative	Remain
Michael Ellis - Northampton North	Conservative	Remain
Jane Ellison - Battersea	Conservative	Remain
Tobias Ellwood - Bournemouth East	Conservative	Remain
Charlie Elphicke - Dover	Conservative	Remain
Graham Evans - Weaver Vale	Conservative	Remain
David Evennett - Bexleyheath and Crayford	Conservative	Remain
Mark Field - Cities of London and Westminster	Conservative	Remain
Kevin Foster - Torbay	Conservative	Remain
Lucy Frazer - Cambridgeshire South East	Conservative	Remain
George Freeman - Norfolk Mid	Conservative	Remain
Mike Freer - Finchley and Golders Green	Conservative	Remain

Roger Gale - Thanet North	Conservative	Remain
Edward Garnier - Harborough	Conservative	Remain
Mark Garnier - Wyre Forest	Conservative	Remain
David Gauke - South West Hertfordshire	Conservative	Remain
Nick Gibb - Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	Conservative	Remain
John Glen - Salisbury	Conservative	Remain
Robert Goodwill - Scarborough and Whitby	Conservative	Remain
Richard Graham - Gloucester	Conservative	Remain
Helen Grant - Maidstone and The Weald	Conservative	Remain
Damian Green - Ashford	Conservative	Remain
Dominic Grieve - Beaconsfield	Conservative	Remain
Andrew Griffiths - Burton	Conservative	Remain
Ben Gummer - Ipswich	Conservative	Remain
Sam Gyimah - Surrey East	Conservative	Remain
Luke Hall - Thornbury and Yate	Conservative	Remain
Stephen Hammond - Wimbledon	Conservative	Remain
Richard Harrington - Watford	Conservative	Remain
Simon Hart - Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire	Conservative	Remain
Sir Alan Haselhurst - Saffron Walden	Conservative	Remain
Oliver Heald - Hertfordshire NE	Conservative	Remain
James Heapey - Wells	Conservative	Remain
Peter Heaton-Jones - Devon North	Conservative	Remain
Nick Herbert - Arundel and South Downs	Conservative	Remain
Damian Hinds - Hampshire East	Conservative	Remain
Simon Hoare - Dorset North	Conservative	Remain
George Hollingbery - Meon Valley	Conservative	Remain
Kevin Hollinrake - Thirsk and Malton	Conservative	Remain
Kris Hopkins - Keighley	Conservative	Remain
John Howell - Henley	Conservative	Remain
Ben Howlett - Bath	Conservative	Remain
Nigel Huddleston - Worcestershire Mid	Conservative	Remain
Nick Hurd - Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner	Conservative	Remain
Margot James - Stourbridge	Conservative	Remain
Robert Jenrick - Newark	Conservative	Remain
Joseph Johnson - Orpington	Conservative	Remain
Andrew Jones - Harrogate and Knaresborough	Conservative	Remain
Marcus Jones - Nuneaton	Conservative	Remain
Seema Kennedy - South Ribble	Conservative	Remain
Simon Kirby - Brighton Kemptown	Conservative	Remain
Julian Knight - Solihull	Conservative	Remain
Mark Lancaster - Milton Keynes North	Conservative	Remain
Phillip Lee - Bracknell	Conservative	Remain

Jeremy Lefroy - Stafford	Conservative	Remain
Brandon Lewis - Great Yarmouth	Conservative	Remain
David Lidington - Aylesbury	Conservative	Remain
David Mackintosh - Northampton South	Conservative	Remain
Alan Mak - Havant	Conservative	Remain
Tania Mathias - Twickenham	Conservative	Remain
Mark Menzies - Fylde	Conservative	Remain
Johnny Mercer - Plymouth Moor View	Conservative	Remain
Maria Miller- Basingstoke	Conservative	Remain
Amanda Milling - Cannock Chase	Conservative	Remain
Andrew Mitchell - Sutton Coldfield	Conservative	Remain
David Morris - Morecombe and Lunesdale	Conservative	Remain
James Morris - Halesowen and Rowley Regis	Conservative	Remain
Wendy Morton - Aldridge-Brownhills	Conservative	Remain
David Mowat - Warrington South	Conservative	Remain
Bob Neill - Bromley and Chislehurst	Conservative	Remain
Sarah Newton - Truro and Falmouth	Conservative	Remain
Caroline Nokes - Romsey and Southampton North	Conservative	Remain
Guy Opperman - Hexham	Conservative	Remain
Neil Parish - Tiverton and Honiton	Conservative	Remain
Mark Pawsey - Rugby	Conservative	Remain
John Penrose - Weston-super-Mare	Conservative	Remain
Claire Perry - Devizes	Conservative	Remain
Chris Philp - Croydon South	Conservative	Remain
Eric Pickles - Brentwood and Ongar	Conservative	Remain
Dan Poulter- Suffolk Central	Conservative	Remain
Rebecca Pow - Taunton Deane	Conservative	Remain
Victoria Prentis - Banbury	Conservative	Remain
Mark Prisk - Hertford and Stortford	Conservative	Remain
Mark Pritchard - The Wrekin	Conservative	Remain
Jeremy Quin - Horsham	Conservative	Remain
Mary Robinson - Cheadle	Conservative	Remain
David Rutley - Macclesfield	Conservative	Remain
Antoinette Sandbach - Eddisbury	Conservative	Remain
Andrew Selous - South West Bedfordshire	Conservative	Remain
Grant Shapps - Welwyn Hatfield	Conservative	Remain
Alok Sharma - Reading West	Conservative	Remain
Alec Shelbrooke - Elmet and Rothwell	Conservative	Remain
Keith Simpson - Broadland	Conservative	Remain
Chris Skidmore - Kingswood	Conservative	Remain
Chloe Smith - Norwich North	Conservative	Remain
Julian Smith - Skipton and Ripon	Conservative	Remain
Nicholas Soames - Mid-Sussex	Conservative	Remain

Amanda Solloway - Derby North	Conservative	Remain
Caroline Spelman - Meriden	Conservative	Remain
Mark Spencer - Sherwood	Conservative	Remain
John Stevenson - Carlisle	Conservative	Remain
Rory Stewart - Penrith and The Border	Conservative	Remain
Gary Streeter - Devon South West	Conservative	Remain
Mel Stride - Devon Central	Conservative	Remain
Graham Stuart - Beverley and Holderness	Conservative	Remain
Hugo Swire - East Devon	Conservative	Remain
Maggie Throup - Erewash	Conservative	Remain
Edward Timpson - Crewe and Nantwich	Conservative	Remain
Kelly Tolhurst - Rochester and Strood	Conservative	Remain
David Tredinnick - Bosworth	Conservative	Remain
Tom Tugendhat - Tonbridge and Malling	Conservative	Remain
Andrew Tyrie - Chichester	Conservative	Remain
Ed Vaizey - Wantage	Conservative	Remain
Shailesh Vara - North West Cambridgeshire	Conservative	Remain
Robin Walker - Worcester	Conservative	Remain
Ben Wallace - Wyre and Preston North	Conservative	Remain
Matt Warman - Boston and Skegness	Conservative	Remain
Angela Watkinson - Hornchurch and Upminster	Conservative	Remain
Helen Whately - Faversham and Mid Kent	Conservative	Remain
Chris White - Warwick and Leamington	Conservative	Remain
Craig Whittaker - Calder Valley	Conservative	Remain
Craig Williams - Cardiff North	Conservative	Remain
Gavin Williamson - Staffordshire South	Conservative	Remain
Nigel Adams - Selby and Ainsty	Conservative	Leave
Adam Afriyie - Windsor	Conservative	Leave
Lucy Allan - Telford	Conservative	Leave
David Amess - Southend West	Conservative	Leave
Stuart Andrew - Pudsey	Conservative	Leave
Caroline Ansell - Eastbourne	Conservative	Leave
Richard Bacon - Norfolk South	Conservative	Leave
Steven Baker - Wycombe	Conservative	Leave
Stephen Barclay - North East Cambridgeshire	Conservative	Leave
John Baron - Basildon and Billericay	Conservative	Leave
Henry Bellingham - North West Norfolk	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Bingham - High Peak	Conservative	Leave
Bob Blackman - Harrow East	Conservative	Leave
Crispin Blunt - Reigate	Conservative	Leave
Peter Bone - Wellingborough	Conservative	Leave
Victoria Borwick - Kensington	Conservative	Leave

Total:

Graham Brady - Altrincham and Sale West	Conservative	Leave
Julian Brazier - Canterbury	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Bridgen - Leicestershire North West	Conservative	Leave
Fiona Bruce - Congleton	Conservative	Leave
Conor Burns - Bournemouth West	Conservative	Leave
David Burrowes - Enfield, Southgate	Conservative	Leave
Bill Cash - Stone	Conservative	Leave
Maria Caulfield - Lewes	Conservative	Leave
Rehman Chishti - Gillingham and Rainham	Conservative	Leave
Christopher Chope - Christchurch	Conservative	Leave
James Cleverly - Braintree	Conservative	Leave
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown - The Cotswolds	Conservative	Leave
Geoffrey Cox - Devon West and Torridge	Conservative	Leave
Christopher Davies - Brecon and Radnorshire	Conservative	Leave
David Davies - Monmouth	Conservative	Leave
Glyn Davies - Montgomeryshire	Conservative	Leave
James Davies - Vale of Clwyd	Conservative	Leave
Mims Davies - Eastleigh	Conservative	Leave
Philip Davies - Shipley	Conservative	Leave
David Davis - Haltemprice and Howden	Conservative	Leave
Nadine Dorries - Bedfordshire Mid	Conservative	Leave
Steve Double - St Austell and Newquay	Conservative	Leave
Richard Drax - Dorset South	Conservative	Leave
James Duddridge - Rochford and Southend East	Conservative	Leave
Iain Duncan Smith - Chingford and Wood Green	Conservative	Leave
George Eustice - Camborne and Redruth	Conservative	Leave
Nigel Evans - Ribble Valley	Conservative	Leave
Michael Fabricant - Lichfield	Conservative	Leave
Suella Fernandes - Fareham	Conservative	Leave
Dr Liam Fox - Somerset North	Conservative	Leave
Mark Francois - Rayleigh and Wickford	Conservative	Leave
Richard Fuller - Bedford and Kempston	Conservative	Leave
Marcus Fysh - Yeovil	Conservative	Leave
Nusrat Ghani - Wealden	Conservative	Leave
Cheryl Gillan - Chesham and Amersham	Conservative	Leave
Zac Goldsmith - Richmond Park and North Kingston	Conservative	Leave
James Gray - Wiltshire North	Conservative	Leave
Chris Green - Bolton West	Conservative	Leave
Rebecca Harris - Castle Point	Conservative	Leave

John Hayes - South Holland and The Deepings	Conservative	Leave
Chris Heaton-Harris - Daventry	Conservative	Leave
Gordon Henderson - Sittingbourne and Sheppey	Conservative	Leave
Philip Hollobone - Kettering	Conservative	Leave
Adam Holloway - Gravesham	Conservative	Leave
Gerald Howarth - Aldershot	Conservative	Leave
Stewart Jackson - Peterborough	Conservative	Leave
Ranil Jayawardena - Hampshire North East	Conservative	Leave
Bernard Jenkin - Harwich and Essex North	Conservative	Leave
Andrea Jenkyns - Morley and Outwood	Conservative	Leave
Gareth Johnson - Dartford	Conservative	Leave
David Jones - Clwyd West	Conservative	Leave
Daniel Kawczynski - Shrewsbury and Atcham	Conservative	Leave
Greg Knight - Yorkshire East	Conservative	Leave
Kwasi Kwarteng - Spelthorne	Conservative	Leave
Andrea Leadsom - Northamptonshire South	Conservative	Leave
Edward Leigh - Gainsborough	Conservative	Leave
Charlotte Leslie - Bristol NW	Conservative	Leave
Julian Lewis - New Forest East	Conservative	Leave
Peter Lilley - Hitchin and Harpenden	Conservative	Leave
Jack Lopresti- Filton, Bradley and Stoke	Conservative	Leave
Jonathan Lord (Con, Woking	Conservative	Leave
Tim Loughton - Worthing East and Shoreham	Conservative	Leave
Karen Lumley - Redditch	Conservative	Leave
Craig Mackinlay - Thanet South	Conservative	Leave
Anne Main - St Albans	Conservative	Leave
Kit Malthouse - North West Hampshire	Conservative	Leave
Scott Mann - Cornwall North	Conservative	Leave
Paul Maynard - Blackpool North and Cleveleys	Conservative	Leave
Karl McCartney - Lincoln	Conservative	Leave
Jason McCartney - Colne Valley	Conservative	Leave
Stephen McPartland - Stevenage	Conservative	Leave
Stephen Metcalfe - Basildon South and Thurrock East	Conservative	Leave
Nigel Mills - Amber Valley	Conservative	Leave
Penny Mordaunt - Portsmouth North	Conservative	Leave
Anne-Marie Morris - Newton Abbot	Conservative	Leave
Sheryll Murray - Cornwall South East	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Murrison - Wiltshire South West	Conservative	Leave
David Nuttall - Bury North	Conservative	Leave

Matthew Offord - Hendon	Conservative	Leave
Owen Paterson - Shropshire North	Conservative	Leave
Mike Penning - Hemel Hempstead	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Percy - Brigg and Goole	Conservative	Leave
Stephen Phillips - Sleaford and North Hykeham	Conservative	Leave
Christopher Pincher - Tamworth	Conservative	Leave
Tom Pursglove - Corby	Conservative	Leave
Will Quince - Colchester	Conservative	Leave
Dominic Raab - Esher and Walton	Conservative	Leave
John Redwood - Wokingham	Conservative	Leave
Jacob Rees-Mogg - Somerset North East	Conservative	Leave
Laurence Robertson - Tewkesbury	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Rosindell - Romford	Conservative	Leave
Paul Scully - Sutton and Cheam	Conservative	Leave
Henry Smith - Crawley	Conservative	Leave
Royston Smith - Southampton Itchen	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Stephenson - Pendle	Conservative	Leave
Bob Stewart - Beckenham	Conservative	Leave
Iain Stewart - Milton Keynes South	Conservative	Leave
Julian Sturdy - York Outer	Conservative	Leave
Rishi Sunak - Richmond, North Yorkshire	Conservative	Leave
Desmond Swayne - New Forest West	Conservative	Leave
Robert Syms - Poole	Conservative	Leave
Derek Thomas - St Ives	Conservative	Leave
Justin Tomlinson - North Swindon	Conservative	Leave
Michael Tomlinson - Mid Dorset and North Poole	Conservative	Leave
Craig Tracey - Warwickshire North	Conservative	Leave
Anne-Marie Trevelyan - Berwick-upon-Tweed	Conservative	Leave
Andrew Turner - Isle of Wight	Conservative	Leave
Martin Vickers - Cleethorpes	Conservative	Leave
Charles Walker - Broxbourne	Conservative	Leave
David Warburton - Somerton and Frome	Conservative	Leave
James Wharton - Stockton South	Conservative	Leave
Heather Wheeler - Derbyshire South	Conservative	Leave
Bill Wiggin - Herefordshire North	Conservative	Leave
Mike Wood - Dudley South	Conservative	Leave
Nadhim Zahawi - Stratford-upon-Avon	Conservative	Leave
William Wragg - Hazel Grove	Conservative	Leave
Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh - Ochil and South Perthshire	SNP	Remain
Richard Arkless - Dumfries and Galloway	SNP	Remain
Hannah Bardell - Livingston	SNP	Remain

Mhairi Black - Paisley and Renfrewshire South	SNP	Remain
Ian Blackford - Ross, Skye and Lochaber	SNP	Remain
Kirsty Blackman - Aberdeen North	SNP	Remain
Philip Boswell - Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill	SNP	Remain
Deidre Brock - Edinburgh North and Leith	SNP	Remain
Alan Brown - Kilmarnock and Loudoun	SNP	Remain
Lisa Cameron - East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow	SNP	Remain
Douglas Chapman - Dunfermline and West Fife	SNP	Remain
Joanna Cherry - Edinburgh South West	SNP	Remain
Ronnie Cowan - Inverclyde	SNP	Remain
Angela Crawley - Lanark and Hamilton East	SNP	Remain
Martyn Day - Linlithgow and East Falkirk	SNP	Remain
Martin Docherty-Hughes - West Dunbartonshire	SNP	Remain
Stuart Donaldson - West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine	SNP	Remain
Marion Fellows - Motherwell and Wishaw	SNP	Remain
Margaret Ferrier - Rutherglen and Hamilton West	SNP	Remain
Stephen Gethins - North East Fife	SNP	Remain
Patricia Gibson - North Ayrshire and Arran	SNP	Remain
Patrick Grady - Glasgow North	SNP	Remain
Peter Grant - Glenrothes	SNP	Remain
Neil Gray - Airdrie and Shotts	SNP	Remain
Brendan O'Hara - Argyll and Bute	SNP	Remain
Drew Hendry - Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey	SNP	Remain
Stewart Hosie - Dundee East	SNP	Remain
George Kerevan - East Lothian	SNP	Remain
Calum Kerr - Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	SNP	Remain
Chris Law - Dundee West	SNP	Remain
Callum McCaig - Aberdeen South	SNP	Remain
Stuart McDonald - Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East	SNP	Remain
Stewart McDonald - Glasgow South	SNP	Remain
John McNally - Falkirk	SNP	Remain
Angus MacNeil - Na h-Eileanan an Iar	SNP	Remain
Paul Monaghan - Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross	SNP	Remain
Carol Monaghan - Glasgow North West	SNP	Remain
Roger Mullin - Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	SNP	Remain

Gavin Newlands - Paisley and Renfrewshire North	SNP	Remain
John Nicolson - East Dunbartonshire	SNP	Remain
Kirsten Oswald - East Renfrewshire	SNP	Remain
Steven Paterson - Stirling	SNP	Remain
Angus Robertson - Moray	SNP	Remain
Alex Salmond - Gordon	SNP	Remain
Tommy Sheppard - Edinburgh East	SNP	Remain
Christopher Stephens - Glasgow South West	SNP	Remain
Alison Thewliss - Glasgow Central	SNP	Remain
Owen George Thompson - Midlothian	SNP	Remain
Mike Weir - Angus	SNP	Remain
Eilidh Whiteford - Banff and Buchan	SNP	Remain
Philippa Whitford - Central Ayrshire	SNP	Remain
Corri Wilson - Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock	SNP	Remain
Pete Wishart - Perth and North Perthshire	SNP	Remain
Mike Brady	Sinn Fein	Remain
Tom Brake	Lib Dems	Remain
Alistair Carmichael	Lib Dems	Remain
Nick Clegg	Lib Dems	Remain
Pat Doherty	Sinn Fein	Remain
Mark Durkan	SDLP	Remain
Johnathan Edwards	Plaid Cymru	Remain
Tim Farron	Lib Dems	Remain
Sylvia Hermon	Independent	Remain
Norman Lamb	Lib Dems	Remain
Danny Kinahan	UUP	Remain
Caroline Lucas	Green	Remain
Paul Maskey	Sinn Fein	Remain
Alasdair McDonnell	SDLP	Remain
Natalie McGarry	Independent	Remain
Francie Molloy	Sinn Fein	Remain
Greg Mulholland	Lib Dems	Remain
John Pugh	Lib Dems	Remain
Margaret Ritchie	SDLP	Remain
Liz Saville Roberts	Plaid Cymru	Remain
Hywel Williams	Plaid Cymru	Remain
Mark Williams	Lib Dems	Remain
Diane Abbott - Hackney North and Stoke Newington	Labour	Remain
Debbie Abrahams - Oldham East and Saddleworth	Labour	Remain
Heidi Alexander - Lewisham East	Labour	Remain
Rushanara Ali - Bethnal Green and Bow	Labour	Remain

Graham Allen - Nottingham North	Labour	Remain
David Anderson - Blaydon	Labour	Remain
Jon Ashworth - Leicester South	Labour	Remain
Ian Austin - Dudley North	Labour	Remain
Adrian Bailey - West Bromwich West	Labour	Remain
Kevin Barron - Rother Valley	Labour	Remain
Margaret Beckett - Derby South	Labour	Remain
Hilary Benn - Leeds Central	Labour	Remain
Luciana Berger - Liverpool Wavertree	Labour	Remain
Clive Betts - Sheffield South East	Labour	Remain
Roberta Blackman-Woods - City of Durham	Labour	Remain
Tom Blenkinsop - Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland	Labour	Remain
Paul Blomfield - Sheffield Central	Labour	Remain
Ben Bradshaw - Exeter	Labour	Remain
Kevin Brennan - Cardiff West	Labour	Remain
Lyn Brown - West Ham	Labour	Remain
Nick Brown - Newcastle East	Labour	Remain
Chris Bryant - Rhondda	Labour	Remain
Karen Buck - Westminster North	Labour	Remain
Richard Burden - Birmingham, Northfield	Labour	Remain
Richard Burgon - Leeds East	Labour	Remain
Andy Burnham - Leigh	Labour	Remain
Dawn Butler - Brentford and Isleworth	Labour	Remain
Liam Byrne - Birmingham Hodge Hill	Labour	Remain
Ruth Cadbury - Brentford and Isleworth	Labour	Remain
Alan Campbell - Tynemouth	Labour	Remain
Sarah Champion - Rotherham	Labour	Remain
Jenny Chapman - Darlington	Labour	Remain
Ann Clwyd - Cynon Valley	Labour	Remain
Vernon Coaker - Gedling	Labour	Remain
Ann Coffey - Stockport	Labour	Remain
Julie Cooper - Burnley	Labour	Remain
Rosie Cooper - West Lancashire	Labour	Remain
Yvette Cooper - Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford	Labour	Remain
Jeremy Corbyn - Islington North	Labour	Remain
Neil Coyle - Southwark and Bermondsey	Labour	Remain
David Crausby - Bolton North East	Labour	Remain
Mary Creagh - Wakefield	Labour	Remain
Stella Creasy - Walthamstow	Labour	Remain
Jon Cruddas - Dagenham and Rainham	Labour	Remain
Judith Cummins - Bradford South	Labour	Remain
Alex Cunningham - Stockton North	Labour	Remain

Jim Cunningham - Coventry South	Labour	Remain
Nic Dakin - Scunthorpe	Labour	Remain
Simon Danczuk - Rochdale	Labour	Remain
Wayne David - Caerphilly	Labour	Remain
Geraint Davies - Swansea West	Labour	Remain
Gloria De Piero - Ashfield	Labour	Remain
Thangam Debbonaire - Bristol West	Labour	Remain
Stephen Doughty - Cardiff South and Penarth	Labour	Remain
Jim Dowd - Lewisham West and Penge	Labour	Remain
Peter Dowd - Bootle	Labour	Remain
Jack Dromey - Birmingham Erdington	Labour	Remain
Michael Dugher - Barnsley East	Labour	Remain
Angela Eagle - Wallasey	Labour	Remain
Maria Eagle - Garston and Halewood	Labour	Remain
Clive Efford - Eltham	Labour	Remain
Julie Elliott - Sunderland Central	Labour	Remain
Louise Ellman - Liverpool Riverside	Labour	Remain
Chris Elmore - Ogmore	Labour	Remain
Bill Esterson - Sefton Central	Labour	Remain
Chris Evans - Islwyn	Labour	Remain
Paul Farrelly - Newcastle under Lyme	Labour	Remain
Jim Fitzpatrick - Poplar and Limehouse	Labour	Remain
Robert Ffello - Stoke-on-Trent South	Labour	Remain
Colleen Fletcher - Coventry North East	Labour	Remain
Caroline Flint - Don Valley	Labour	Remain
Paul Flynn - Newport West	Labour	Remain
Yvonne Fovargue - Makerfield	Labour	Remain
Vicky Foxcroft - Lewisham, Deptford	Labour	Remain
Gill Furniss - Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough	Labour	Remain
Mike Gapes - Ilford South	Labour	Remain
Barry Gardiner - Brent North	Labour	Remain
Pat Glass - Durham	Labour	Remain
Mary Glendon - North Tyneside	Labour	Remain
Helen Goodman - Bishop Auckland	Labour	Remain
Kate Green - Stretford and Urmston	Labour	Remain
Lillian Greenwood - Nottingham South	Labour	Remain
Margaret Greenwood - Wirral West	Labour	Remain
Nia Griffith - Llanelli	Labour	Remain
Andrew Gwynne - Denton and Reddish	Labour	Remain
Louise Haigh - Sheffield, Heeley	Labour	Remain
Fabian Hamilton - Leeds North East	Labour	Remain
David Hanson - Delyn	Labour	Remain

Harriet Harman - Camberwell and Peckham	Labour	Remain
Carolyn Harris - Swansea East	Labour	Remain
Helen Hayes - Dulwich and West Norwood	Labour	Remain
Sue Hayman - Workington	Labour	Remain
John Healey - Wentworth and Dearne	Labour	Remain
Mark Hendrick - Preston	Labour	Remain
Stephen Hepburn - Jarrow	Labour	Remain
Meg Hillier - Hackney South and Shoreditch	Labour	Remain
Margaret Hodge - Barking	Labour	Remain
Sharon Hodgson - Washington and Sunderland West	Labour	Remain
Kate Hollern - Blackburn	Labour	Remain
George Howarth - Knowsley	Labour	Remain
Tristram Hunt - Stoke-on-Trent Central	Labour	Remain
Rupa Huq - Ealing Central and Acton	Labour	Remain
Imran Hussain - Bradford East	Labour	Remain
Dan Jarvis - Barnsley Central	Labour	Remain
Alan Johnson - Hull West and Hessle	Labour	Remain
Diana Johnson - Hull North	Labour	Remain
Gerald Jones - Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney	Labour	Remain
Graham Jones - Hyndburn	Labour	Remain
Helen Jones - Warrington North	Labour	Remain
Kevan Jones - North Durham	Labour	Remain
Susan Elan Jones - Clwyd South	Labour	Remain
Mike Kane - Wythenshawe and Sale East	Labour	Remain
Gerald Kaufman - Manchester Gorton	Labour	Remain
Barbara Keeley - Worsley and Eccles South	Labour	Remain
Liz Kendall - Leicester West	Labour	Remain
Sadiq Khan - Tooting	Labour	Remain
Stephen Kinnock - Aberavon	Labour	Remain
Peter Kyle - Hove	Labour	Remain
David Lammy - Tottenham	Labour	Remain
Ian Lavery - Wansbeck	Labour	Remain
Chris Leslie - Nottingham East	Labour	Remain
Emma Lewell-Buck - South Shields	Labour	Remain
Clive Lewis - Norwich South	Labour	Remain
Ivan Lewis - Bury South	Labour	Remain
Rebecca Long-Bailey - Salford and Eccles	Labour	Remain
Ian Lucas - Wrexham	Labour	Remain
Holly Lynch - Halifax	Labour	Remain
Steve McCabe - Birmingham Selly Oak	Labour	Remain
Kerry McCarthy - Bristol East	Labour	Remain
Siobhan McDonagh - Mitcham and Morden	Labour	Remain
Andy McDonald - Middlesbrough	Labour	Remain

John McDonnell - Hayes and Harlington	Labour	Remain
Pat McFadden - Wolverhampton South East	Labour	Remain
Conor McGinn - St Helens North	Labour	Remain
Alison McGovern - Wirral South	Labour	Remain
Liz McInnes - Heywood and Middleton	Labour	Remain
Catherine McKinnell - Newcastle upon Tyne North	Labour	Remain
Jim McMahon - Oldham West and Royton	Labour	Remain
Fiona Mactaggart - Slough	Labour	Remain
Justin Madders - Ellesmere Port and Neston	Labour	Remain
Khalid Mahmood - Birmingham Perry Barr	Labour	Remain
Shabana Mahmood - Birmingham, Ladywood	Labour	Remain
Seema Malhotra - Feltham and Heston	Labour	Remain
Rob Marris - Wolverhampton South West	Labour	Remain
Gordon Marsden - Blackpool South	Labour	Remain
Rachael Maskell - York Central	Labour	Remain
Christian Matheson - City of Chester	Labour	Remain
Alan Meale - Mansfield	Labour	Remain
Ian Mearns - Gateshead	Labour	Remain
Ed Miliband - Doncaster North	Labour	Remain
Madeleine Moon - Bridgend	Labour	Remain
Jessica Morden - Newport East	Labour	Remain
Grahame Morris - Easington	Labour	Remain
Ian Murray - Edinburgh South	Labour	Remain
Lisa Nandy - Wigan	Labour	Remain
Melanie Onn - Great Grimsby	Labour	Remain
Chi Onwurah - Newcastle upon Tyne Central	Labour	Remain
Kate Osamor - Edmonton	Labour	Remain
Albert Owen - Ynys Môn	Labour	Remain
Teresa Pearce - Erith and Thamesmead	Labour	Remain
Matthew Pennycook - Greenwich and Woolwich	Labour	Remain
Toby Perkins - Chesterfield	Labour	Remain
Jess Phillips - Birmingham, Yardley	Labour	Remain
Bridget Phillipson - Houghton and Sunderland South	Labour	Remain
Stephen Pound - Ealing North	Labour	Remain
Lucy Powell - Manchester Central	Labour	Remain
Yasmin Qureshi - Bolton South East	Labour	Remain
Angela Rayner - Ashton-under-Lyne	Labour	Remain
Jamie Reed - Copeland	Labour	Remain
Steve Reed - Croydon North	Labour	Remain
Christina Rees - Neath	Labour	Remain
Rachel Reeves - Leeds West	Labour	Remain
Emma Reynolds - Wolverhampton North East	Labour	Remain

Jonathan Reynolds - Stalybridge and Hyde	Labour	Remain
Marie Rimmer - St Helens South and Whiston	Labour	Remain
Geoffrey Robinson - Coventry North West	Labour	Remain
Steve Rotheram - Liverpool, Walton	Labour	Remain
Joan Ryan- Enfield North	Labour	Remain
Naz Shah - Bradford West	Labour	Remain
Virendra Sharma - Ealing, Southall	Labour	Remain
Barry Sheerman - Huddersfield	Labour	Remain
Paula Sherriff - Dewsbury	Labour	Remain
Gavin Shuker - Luton South	Labour	Remain
Tulip Siddiq - Hampsted and Kilburn	Labour	Remain
Andy Slaughter - Hammersmith	Labour	Remain
Ruth Smeeth - Stoke-on-Trent North	Labour	Remain
Andrew Smith - Oxford East	Labour	Remain
Angela Smith - Penistone and Stocksbridge	Labour	Remain
Cat Smith - Lancaster and Fleetwood	Labour	Remain
Jeff Smith - Manchester, Withington	Labour	Remain
Nick Smith - Blaenau Gwent	Labour	Remain
Owen Smith - Pontypridd	Labour	Remain
Karin Smyth - Bristol South	Labour	Remain
Keir Starmer - Holborn and St Pancras	Labour	Remain
Jo Stevens - Cardiff Central	Labour	Remain
Wes Streeting - Ilford North	Labour	Remain
Mark Tami - Alyn and Deeside	Labour	Remain
Gareth Thomas - Harrow West	Labour	Remain
Nick Thomas-Symonds - Torfaen	Labour	Remain
Emily Thornberry - Islington South	Labour	Remain
Stephen Timms - East Ham	Labour	Remain
John Trickett - Hemsworth	Labour	Remain
Anna Turley - Redcar	Labour	Remain
Karl Turner - Kingston upon Hull East	Labour	Remain
Derek Twigg - Halton	Labour	Remain
Stephen Twigg - Liverpool, West Derby	Labour	Remain
Chuka Umunna - Streatham	Labour	Remain
Keith Vaz - Leicester East	Labour	Remain
Valerie Vaz - Walsall South	Labour	Remain
Tom Watson - West Bromwich East	Labour	Remain
Catherine West - Hornsey and Wood Green	Labour	Remain
Alan Whitehead - Southampton Test	Labour	Remain
Phil Wilson - Sedgefield	Labour	Remain
David Winnick - Walsall North	Labour	Remain
Rosie Winterton - Doncaster Central	Labour	Remain
John Woodcock - Barrow and Furness	Labour	Remain
Iain Wright - Hartlepool	Labour	Remain
Daniel Zeichner - Cambridge	Labour	Remain

Ronnie Campbell - Blyth Valley	Labour	Leave
John Cryer - Leyton and Wanstead	Labour	Leave
Frank Field - Birkenhead	Labour	Leave
Roger Godsiff - Birmingham Hall Green	Labour	Leave
Kate Hoey - Vauxhall	Labour	Leave
Kelvin Hopkins - Luton North	Labour	Leave
John Mann - Bassetlaw	Labour	Leave
Dennis Skinner - Bolsover	Labour	Leave
Graham Stringer - Blackley and Broughton	Labour	Leave
Gisela Stuart - Birmingham Edgbaston	Labour	Leave
Gregory Campbell (Democratic Unionist Party - East Londonderry)	DUP	Leave
Douglas Carswell (UKIP - Clacton)	UKIP	Leave
Nigel Dodds (DUP - Belfast North)	DUP	Leave
Jeffrey M. Donaldson (DUP - Lagan Valley)	DUP	Leave
Tom Elliott (UUP - Fermanagh and South Tyrone)	UUP	Leave
Ian Paisley (DUP - North Antrim)	DUP	Leave
Gavin Robinson (DUP - Belfast East)	DUP	Leave
Jim Shannon (DUP - Strangford)	DUP	Leave
David Simpson (DUP - Upper Bann)	DUP	Leave
Sammy Wilson (DUP - East Antrim)	DUP	Leave

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