

The Root Causes of Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa:  
Contradictions and Trends

by

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## Abstract

This thesis examines the relationships and contradictions of the root causes of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa between 2002 and 2016. A mixed-methods approach was utilized to collect and evaluate the relationships between several cases. These cases were placed into two categories depending on the amount of terrorism present. A historical synopsis of each country and an analysis of numerous variables was performed. There was an evaluation of trends to determine root causes. Many common misconceptions and contradictions of the causes of terrorism were outlined to determine accuracy. An overall evaluation of variables, some of which are often attributed to terrorism rates, occurred to determine the true underlying root causes of terrorism. In the conclusion, overall findings suggest that type of instability and hybrid regimes are correlated with amount of terrorism.

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In the last one hundred years, the world has immensely changed in both positive and negative ways. One of the major negative ways it has changed is through terrorism. This phenomenon has occurred for thousands of years; it is not a modern activity. Yet, it is relatively recently that terrorism has become a major force in the world. When one tends to think of places with a major terrorism problem, the Middle East is usually one of the first places to come to mind. The region has the most terrorist incidents in the entire world according to the Global Terrorism Database. In 2016, there were 4,732 attacks with 13,512 deaths in just the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The next highest place was South Asia with 3,137 attacks and 5,949 deaths (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017, p. 19). Most of the terrorism in MENA, contrary to popular belief, occurs in only a select few countries. This thesis will examine the root causes of why some countries in the Middle East and North Africa experience more terrorism than other countries in the same area.

This research is important to examine for numerous reasons. The causes of terrorism are crucial to the policies of many countries. Specifically, for the United States, the region is essential due to numerous allies and resources. Allied countries in the MENA region with high rates of terrorism can use some of the strategies that may be developed to lower their terrorism rates. Globally, the Middle East is not the only region with instances of terrorism. Tactics can perhaps be adopted by all countries that have problems with terrorism. This research can also be used to show what may lead to more terrorism in a country. Additionally, most of the work that has been done on this subject previously has involved large quantitative studies. In this thesis, a detailed qualitative case study approach will be used to sort out and understand these contradictory

quantitative studies. The variables that will be examined are: educational attainment, educational content, wealth, poverty, amount of instability, instability type, and government structures.

### **Definitions**


Before an examination into the thesis can be achieved, there are several definitions that must be established. There are important definitions to establish, including that of terrorism, MENA, and root causes. First, the definition of terrorism, is quite complex and is a political issue. Not every attack is terrorism. The use of terrorism as a label may lead to more exaggerated opinions on a group of people.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a catalogue outlining most of the terrorist incidents in the world. It is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The GTD is the largest publicly available resource for data on terrorism. Since this will be the main source of information on terrorism in this thesis, its definition of terrorism will be used: “The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017, p. 9). This thesis will also make use of three optional criteria the GTD offers to filter results: “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims; The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (as in against citizens or non-combatants)” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism



and Responses to Terrorism, 2017, p. 10). The biggest difference between GTD definition of terrorism and many others is that it excludes attacks on military, police, and terrorism by the state. The GTD, with the three optional conditions applied to it, examine attacks on civilian targets only.

The next definition is that of the Middle East and North Africa or MENA. The World Bank provides a comprehensive definition of the region, which is illustrated in Figure 1.



### **Literature Review**

The study of terrorism as its on subject did not occur until the second half of the twentieth century. In 1976, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, a committee created by the United States government to set national criminal justice standards, published a volume regarding terrorism. One of the chapters addresses the causes of terrorism, stating that most causes of terrorism are due to psychological and social factors. The text does not go into external or more abstract

issues. It keeps itself more focused on group and individual reasons (National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976, pp. 19-23).

The 1980s and 1990s saw further research in the causes of terrorism. Authors such as Ted Gurr, Alex Schmid, Bruce Hoffman, and Martha Crenshaw pioneered terrorism research in all aspects. Their research comprises the basis for most modern terrorism studies. Crenshaw is specifically important to research on the causes of terrorism. She states that there are three different factors to determine the causes of terrorism: situational, short or long-term causes, and individual factors (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 390).

After the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City, research on terrorism greatly expanded. As such, the findings on the reasons of terrorism also increased. This increase in terrorism research also saw the arrival of many contradictory studies especially on the causes of terrorism. There is research now on the topic but the most common reported causes of terrorism that will be examined are: education, economics, instability, and government structures (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011, pp. 210-212).

### **Education**

The first cause to examine is the effects of education on terrorism. It would be rational to believe that a higher level of education among the general populace would decrease terrorism. It could be easily believed that well-educated persons may be less likely to commit acts of terror but that may not be true. The effects of education on terrorism remain unclear. One of the most cited articles on the subject is by Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maclečková; their study uses evidence from public opinion polls in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip. Krueger and Maclečková find illiteracy rate and school enrollment to have a negligible effect on participation in terrorism (Krueger & Maclečková, 2003, p. 140). They conclude that there is little reason to believe that an increase in education will lead to a decrease in terrorism. They do say that terrorist organizations may covet well-educated individuals due to their skills and ability to carry out acts of terrorism. That is not to say that better educated people are more prone to terrorist activities. The authors state that it is all about the content of a person's education. In the Middle East specifically, there are many schools and madrasas offering a fundamentalist Islamic education (Krueger & Maclečková, 2003, pg. 142).

Many other authors follow the same line of thinking such as Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks. The authors argue that the effects of education on terrorism is heavily conditional upon other factors like the political or the economic environment in a country. They believe that education is not a root cause by itself. Yet, they also discuss that the content of education is extremely important as it can indoctrinate in ways that may promote terrorism (Brockhoff, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2012, pp. 20-21).

Abdelaziz Testas finds that there is a positive relationship between education and terrorism (2004, pp. 262-263). More education will lead to more terrorism. Testas borrows from Krueger and Maclečková that well-educated people are sought out by terrorist groups due to their ability to carry out acts of terrorism better than poorly-educated persons. He further elaborates by stating that educated people are more likely to be involved in the political system or at least hold some interest in it. Less educated people are more likely to hold less interest in politics (Testas, 2004, pg. 264).

Claude Berrebi agrees with Testas that education is positively associated with terrorism. Berrebi found that, in a study of over twenty years, that well-educated and wealthy Palestinians were more likely to become involved in terrorist activities than those who were uneducated and poor (Berrebi, 2007, p. 30).

Abdullah Yousef Sahar Mohammad further examines Testas' points. He finds that, especially for the Middle East, "While their countries are full of economic potential and resources, many Middle Eastern youths and well-educated citizens are left without either jobs or any of the other prerequisites of a satisfactory life" (Mohammad, 2005, pg. 105). Thus, many well-educated Middle Easterners are unsatisfied with their current living situation. They have potential, but no way to use it. They tend to get frustrated and castigate the political system (Mohammad, 2005, pg. 106). He also cites that the content of education is important—an idea shared with Testas, Krueger, and Maclečková.

Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen state that the average education levels of a country's citizens have a negative effect on the amount of terrorism in a country. They state further that countries looking to aid other countries experiencing high amounts of terrorism should focus on education. They state that any education is better than no education in this manner (Azam & Thelen, 2008, pp. 393-394).

Ana Bela Santos Bravo and Carlos Manuel Mendes Dias observe that the states with the most terrorism tend to be those with lower literacy levels and poor education (2006, pg.337). States with low literacy rates have less opportunities for their citizens.

The major contradictions when it comes to education are on the amount of education of population and content of education. These are often cited as the root causes

of terrorism in the media and by individuals. Does educational attainment and educational content share a relationship with amount of terrorism in a country?

### **Economics**

The role of the economy in terrorism is just as confusing as the role of education in terrorism. As in education, it would be rational to believe that a state with high levels of wealth and a functioning economy will lead to less terrorism. That is, however, not exactly the consensus. It may be that, like with education, wealthier individuals may be more inclined to terrorist activities. Karin Von Hippel finds that the poor are often not too involved with terrorism planning (Hippel, 2002, pp. 26-27).

Other authors like Claude Berrebi agree with Hippel. Berrebi states that the common terrorist is not poor and ignorant. They may, however, take advantage of a poor economic situation in a state (Berrebi, 2009, pg.169). There is little consensus about states with widespread economic discrimination, poverty, and poor economic growth will be more prone to terrorism.

James A. Piazza finds that economic discrimination of a minority population, primary poverty and inequality, leads to more terrorism, but the overall economic performance of a state has a much smaller impact on the amount of terrorism in a country (Piazza, 2011, pg.350). Alberto Abadie agrees with Piazza's findings, saying that economic variables do not have a significant impact upon amount of terrorism in a country (Abadie, 2006, p. 55).

Many authors disagree with Piazza and Abadie's findings. Freytag and several other authors state that growth and economic performance of a state can decrease the amount of terrorism in a state. This is due to increasing the opportunity cost of terrorism.

The wealthier people are, the less reasons they would have to be discontent and participate in terrorist activities (Freytag et al., 2009, pg.21). A similar idea is promoted by Quan Li and Drew Schaub. They state that globalization, to the point in which it promotes economic development, negatively affects terrorism. The more developed a country is, the less terrorism there will be (Li & Schaub, 2004, pp. 253-254).

Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu offer a different theory on the effects of the economy on terrorism. They state that economic development is a deterrent against terrorism (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002, pp.189-190).

The main contradictions in terms of economics with relation to terrorism are wealth and poverty. Does wealth or poverty share a relationship with amount of terrorism in a country?

### **Instability**

There are three broad types of instability: crisis of authority where a state cannot enforce its rules on society often due to lack of control or weakness; often associated with civil wars, crisis of resilience which is where a state cannot meet its basic responsibilities to society and is unable to change; often associated with state failure, and crisis of legitimacy which refers to society's view that the current regime has lost the right to rule because it was wrong or corrupt; often associated with insurgencies (Margolis, 2012, pp. 17-18).

The most common belief is that all types of instability are found to be positively associated with terrorism. Piazza states that countries which are only somewhat failed do not experience more terrorism. He mentions that states experiencing high levels of failure are susceptible to major levels of terrorism (Piazza, 2008, pg. 483). This means that low

levels of instability do not contribute much to terrorism. It takes high levels of instability to contribute to terrorism.

Tiffany Howard states: “findings point to the absence of the public good of security, a corrupt and illegitimate state authority, lack of provision of essential public goods, and the inability to protect private property as the major components of state failure that increase the probability of political violence” (Howard, 2010, pg. 982). A lack of a state creates a system where there are no public protections. In such a system there is no opportunity cost on the part of the terrorist—there is nothing to lose.

Bridget L. Coggins also finds that state failure is a major factor in terrorism but it depends on the type of failure. States that fail with high levels of violence and anarchy are much more likely to experience terrorism than other types. Other types of instability such as state capacity and political collapse do not seem to contribute to terrorism (Coggins, 2015, pg.477). It is apparent that amount of instability creates an environment where terrorism can prosper but it may depend on the type of instability.

There are some authors that hold that failed states do not have the highest chance of terrorism. Edward Newman finds that terrorist groups are adaptive, and it is more likely for there to be terrorist groups in a state that has not failed. He does go on to say that the most destructive terrorists are found in failed states. Terrorists work with weak governments to get what they want. They would have no reason to use acts of terror if a state is so weak that it concedes easily. If a state has failed, there is nothing to stop terrorists from getting what they want without such acts. A strong state would see more instances of terrorism because it is actively fighting such organizations. There is more of a reason to use terrorism (Newman, 2007, pp. 483-484).

When it comes to instability, the main contradictions by authors are apparent: is it amount of instability or type of instability that shares a relationship with amount of terrorism?

### **Government Structure**

Another major theory proposed by many is that the type of government a state has can determine its risk for terrorism. The two most common government types in the world are authoritarian and democratic. On its face, it would make sense to believe that democracy will lead to less terrorism; people will be able to voice their opinions and thus there will be few grievances held by the population. While in an authoritarian system, one could easily believe that there could be more instances of terrorism due to a lack of free expression available in the general population in that country. The population would have more unsolved grievances and must find some way to express their political opinions (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011, pp. 199-200).

Matthew C. Wilson and James A. Piazza argue that authoritarian governments have more options than democracies when dealing with terrorism and political upheaval. An authoritarian government can imitate democratic institutions while still retaining its oppressive activities. Authoritarian governments also can readily use military might while democracies are often handicapped in this aspect. Authoritarian governments can use both the carrot and the stick (Piazza & Wilson, 2013, pp.951-953).

On the opposite side of the spectrum, Quan Li states that democracy will lead to a massive decrease in terrorism for several reasons, including greater political participation, increased right to free press, and a government consensus. Li finds that authoritarian governments constrain their citizens to the point where they must respond with acts of



terrorism. Li observes that using tactics that can potentially lead to an increased state presence may just lead to a heightened sense of disgust on the citizen's part. Li, however, does recognize there are certain institutions in democratic governments not present in authoritarian governments that may lead to more terrorist incidents. These institutions depend greatly on location and political environment (Li, 2005, pg.294)

Bekir Çinar finds that no specific political system is more at risk of terrorism than any other. The amount of terrorism in a country is based on the decisions made by its policy makers. If a policy maker ostracizes significant parties in the political system, terrorist attacks will be more likely to occur (Çinar, 2009, pp. 114-115).

Alberto Abadie states the opposite of Çinar. Countries that are either fully democratic or authoritarian do not experience more terrorism than the other, but those that are in-between, or hybrid regimes, are more likely to experience terrorism (Abadie, 2006, pp. 55-56).

The major contradiction in terms of government mostly deal with democracy. The literature offers contradictory views on the relationship between terrorism and government structures—if a country is more democratic or authoritarian.

### **Methodology**

This thesis will be organized as a comparative case study by comparing MENA countries that have experienced high levels of terrorism with those that have low levels of terrorism. It will also be conductive using qualitative methods rather than quantitative. The reasons for this are that qualitative studies allow for a greater amount of detail.

The cases that will be used for countries with high rates of terrorism are Iraq and Algeria. Iraq is by far the country with the highest amount of terrorist activity in the

world. Algeria used to have very high amounts of terrorism but it the numbers have fallen over the years. The cases with low rates of terrorism are Iran and Morocco. For its size, Iran has a very low amount of terrorism. It is also next to Iraq and Afghanistan—two countries that contain much of the world’s terrorism. Morocco also has little to no terrorism. The amount of terrorism in each country and the whole region from 2002 to 2016 are listed below in Table 1.

	Iraq	Algeria	Iran	Morocco	MENA
2002	6	122	0	0	303
2003	71	60	2	5	240
2004	300	50	0	0	424
2005	562	77	5	0	755
2006	820	121	13	0	1,077
2007	962	100	8	6	1,284
2008	1,075	81	7	0	1,435
2009	1,122	68	14	0	1,299
2010	1,162	56	14	0	1,379
2011	1,225	13	11	1	1,481
2012	1,266	30	3	0	1,860
2013	2,504	15	8	0	3,762
2014	3,375	7	7	0	5,578
2015	2,415	12	7	1	4,604
2016	2,967	6	6	0	4,584
Total Amount	19,832	818	105	13	30,065

(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2018)

These are not the countries with the highest or lowest amount of terrorism attacks when looking at pure numbers. The only country with extremely high amounts of terrorism consistently is Iraq which is number for that sort of activity in the world and the case with one of the lowest numbers is Morocco. Egypt and Syria have more terrorist attacks than Algeria but this is rather a recent phenomenon. Before 2010, the amount of terrorism in those countries were much lower than my cases. The same holds for the

lowest cases. Some countries can experience major swings in terrorist activity but the selected cases have been consistent.

The main factors to be examined in this study are the following: educational attainment, educational content, wealth, poverty, instability, type of instability, and government structure. They have been chosen due to the contradictions presented in the literature review. Their effects should be evident when comparing the high to low terrorism cases.

## **Results**

This section will provide the results of this study. The layout of this section will be by case with background information and tables with data on relevant results.

### **Regional Averages**

This section provides data on the MENA region to offer comparisons to the cases that will be studied in this thesis.

**Education.** Table 2 provides information on education in the MENA region. Education in the region does not appear to be that low in comparison to the rest of the world. Primary enrollment in 2014 for the world was 104.1% while the completion rate for the same grade was 91%. Secondary enrollment for the world in 2014 was 76.4% while lower secondary completion was at 76.3%. The tertiary enrollment rate for the world in 2014 was at 35% (The World Bank, 2018). This comparison paints a rosy picture of the region, but it is important to remember, just like with the rest of the world, the MENA region has extremes. Education in Saudi Arabia is much different than education in Morocco.

	Primary Enrollment Rate	Primary Completion Rate	Secondary Enrollment Rate	Lower Secondary Completion Rate	Tertiary Enrollment Rate
2002	98.9%	84.3%	70.3%	66.2%	21.4%
2003	100.2%	85.9%	71.3%	68.2%	21.6%
2004	101%	89.7%	72.5%	69%	22.8%
2005	101.5%	91%	72.5%	70.3%	23.9%
2006	102.7%	87.9%	73%	69.5%	24.7%
2007	103.8%	89.1%	72%	69.6%	26.3%
2008	104.3%	91.5%	73.2%	69.7%	28.3%
2009	105.2%	90.6%	74.7%	71.8%	28.9%
2010	105.9%	92.6%	75.7%	72.1%	30.8%
2011	105.7%	92.7%	79.2%	74.6%	31.6%
2012	107.1%	94.7%	80.3%	79.3%	34.1%
2013	107.4%	92.3%	78.4%	75.8%	35.8%
2014	105.3%	93.7%	79.4%	75.3%	37.9%

(The World Bank, 2018)

**Economy.** Table 3 provides information economics in the MENA region.

Globally, GDP per capita in 2016 was \$16,214 (The World Bank, 2018). The MENA region is somewhat wealthier than the global average. Unemployment for the world in 2016 was 5.7% (The World Bank, 2018). This is much lower than the MENA region. Economically, the MENA region is somewhat consistent with the rest of the world.

	GDP per Capita (PPP Constant 2011 \$)	Unemployment, (Percent of Total Labor Force ILO Estimate)
2002	13,480	13%
2003	13,909	13.3%
2004	14,739	12.1%
2005	15,169	11.8%
2006	15,714	10.9%
2007	16,183	10.4%
2008	16,551	10%
2009	16,341	10.2%
2010	16,807	10.4%
2011	16,965	11.2%
2012	17,022	11.4%
2013	17,158	11%
2014	17,372	11.1%
2015	17,463	11.1%
2016	18,055	11.1%

(The World Bank, 2018)

## **Iraq**


The modern state of Iraq started back in the First World War. The fall of the Ottoman Empire saw the Middle East divided among several European powers. The British obtained Iraq, which used to be three separate provinces, and started to govern it. The British maintained control over the area by pitting the Shi'a majority and Sunni minority against each other. In 1921, the British appointed Feisal I as the King of Iraq. The nation becomes independent in 1932 (Marr, 2011, pp. 21-35). The King was ousted during World War II, but the British restored him by the end of the war. The monarchy, however, fell in a 1958 coup. There were many coups until 1968 when the Ba'ath party, under President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, came into power. Saddam Hussein took over from al-Bakr in 1979 (Marr, 2011, pp. 50-80). He ruled until 2003. During Hussein's rule, he led the country into a failed war against Iran from 1980 to 1988, and he invaded Kuwait in 1990 which was halted by a large international coalition (Marr, 2011, pp. 175-220).

Saddam Hussein fell in 2003 due to a United States-led coalition and Hussein's government collapsed. The United States attempted to install a new government, but it mostly failed due to the many evolving insurgencies and growing terrorist presence in the country. Most notable of these insurgencies was al-Qaeda. The country was held at a stalemate for the next few years. By 2004, a new government was installed, which eventually led to elections in 2005. With a new government, it seemed the situation would improve but the opposite happened. Political violence and terrorism started to increase in the mid-2000s. Still, the situation improved as the country gained some stability by the end of the decade (Marr, 2011, pp. 305-325). The United States planned

to withdraw its forces from the country by 2012. By 2012, the situation quickly degraded. The government did not work together and by that year, the Arab Spring had fully engulfed the country, bringing with it large-scale protests that often turned violent. Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki appeased the protesters by announcing he would not run for another term. The situation turned even worse with new insurgencies emerging. The most important of these was the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL. ISIL captured much of the country by 2015. The group took advantage of the vulnerable state the country was in due to political unrest and governmental deadlock. It took around a year for ISIL to start losing large swaths of territory (Robertson, 2015, pp. 323-326).

Iraq has had a tumultuous time in recent years. Since the early 2000s, it has had the highest amount of terrorism in the world. Iraq's rise in terrorist attacks correlates with the loss of stability in the government around 2003 when Hussein's government fell. Since then, there has been foreign militaries and insurgent groups present in Iraq, which may help bolster the numbers of attacks. The government only stabilized itself around 2007, and right when it seemed it was going to establish itself, the Arab Spring and eventually ISIL ruined any such chance. These factors have perpetuated terrorism in the country.

Figure 2 is a line graph of terrorist incidents in Iraq going back to 2002. According to the graph, attacks have increased over time. Attacks started to rapidly increase after 2003 when the Hussain government fell. The number of attacks greatly increased between 2012 and 2014, which correlate with the fight against ISIL.



**Education.** Iraq has a strong history of education. Education is free and compulsory through primary school which lasts six years. Students can then go onto intermediate school which lasts three years and students may then go to upper secondary schools. Most of these schools last around three years and prepare students differently depending on the pathway they choose. If students pass, they can move on to tertiary levels of education where the country offers both public and private schools of differing quality (Wenger, 2016). Additionally, there is a dual system in Iraq where the North, mainly the Kurdish regions, has its own educational system separate from the rest of the country. Compulsory education lasts for six years in Iraq (The World Bank, 2018).

Iraq, however, has had its education system deteriorate due to the many conflicts it has experienced. Much of its infrastructure, especially school buildings, have crumbled. The country has been isolated due to conflict and that has resulted in outdated curricula and teaching methods. The system is also highly centralized which does not allow it to meet students' needs most of the time. One of the biggest problems the country faces is

that there are huge disparities between rural and urban areas. The more urban areas, such as Baghdad, tend to have rather modern educational systems while rural areas are left behind (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2014, pp. 9-11).

Educational content in Iraq is also troubling. During its multiple conflicts, education became an afterthought. People learned somewhere and so many went into fundamentalist religious schools. This is shown through ISIL's educational curriculum which was modeled around violent practices and extremism. Iraq has only recently started to shut down on religious fundamentalism in schools (Gyorog, 2017).

The primary enrollment rate in Iraq was 108.1% in 2007, which is around the normal rate for the region which was 103.8% that same year. The number of students who complete primary school was on 66.65% in that same year which is well below the average in the region which was 89.1%. The rest of Iraq's statistics were also rather low as a result with secondary enrollment and lower secondary completion being at 53.3% and 48% respectively. The tertiary enrollment rate was at 16.1% in 2005 and the literacy rate for ages fifteen and up was at 43.7% in 2013 (The World Bank, 2018).

Iraq has a severe educational deficiency in its population. Before the start of major conflict Iraq already seemed to be below the regional standard and over the years, the continued terrorist attacks did not help its situation. As education decreases, terrorism increases. Thus, at least in Iraq, education shares a negative relationship with terrorism. There also seems to be some relationship between educational content and amount of terrorism.



**Economy.** Iraq is a resource-rich country in a great position for international trade. The country is the world's fourth largest oil exporter. Hydrocarbons accounts for more than half of its GDP. The country's many problems go far beyond just its conflicts. Bad governance has plagued its history even before Hussein took power. However, he certainly did not help the country, and the constant conflict in it has not either. Even with these problems, the country is in the upper middle-income range. Before Iraq can utilize its growing population and vast natural resources, it needs to improve its infrastructure and governance (World Bank Group, 2017, pp. 1-6).

Table 2 provides information on the economy of Iraq. This table provides evidence for what was stated in the previous paragraph. The country is below the average GDP of the region, \$18,055 in 2016. In terms of poverty, it is around the average of the region with its percent of population in absolute poverty (\$1.90 a day international 2011 PPP) at 2.5% in 2012 compared to 2.6% for the whole area (The World Bank, 2018). Unemployment is very high, especially when compared to the region at 11.1% in 2016. Its GINI score, which provides information about how much inequality there is in a country, is at 28.6 which is rather low (The World Bank, 2018).

The Human Development Index for Iraq is medium. This index attempts to provide an overview of the wellbeing of a country's citizens. The Human Development Index places Iraq as a country with medium development. This shows that the average citizen in Iraq does as well as most other citizens in different countries. For Iraq, it almost seems that wealth and poverty have a positive relationship with amount of terrorism.

	GDP per Capita (PPP Constant 2011 \$)	Unemployment (Percent of Total Labor Force ILO Estimate)	Human Development Index
2002	10,959	16.6%	.616
2003	7,134	28.1%	.603
2004	10,710	26.8%	.628
2005	10,896	18%	.631
2006	11,703	17.5%	.636
2007	11,573	16.9%	.638
2008	12,217	15.3%	.643
2009	12,299	15.2%	.646
2010	12,717	15.2%	.649
2011	13,261	15.2%	.656
2012	14,626	15.3%	.659
2013	15,072	15.1%	.658
2014	14,696	15%	.649
2015	14,928	15%	.649
2016	16,086	15.1%	
(The World Bank, 2018)			(United Nations Development Programme, 2016)

**Instability.** Iraq's history displays a pattern of instability that reached a peak in 2003. The country managed to stabilize a bit around 2007, but the Arab Spring and ISIL halted any major progress towards stability.

Below, Table 3 provides data to back up its history of instability. The Fragile States Index consistently gives Iraq a score above 100 which is extremely high. It scores this way even before terrorism was widespread in the country. The Political Stability and Absence of Violence index scores Iraq poorly—the lower the rank, the more unstable and violent a country is. It is in the bottom of the ranks which shows how unstable the country is perceived. Its Rule of Law Percentile Rank, which shows how well the country's citizens and government officers obey laws and government officers as well as quality of various government services, is very low.

Table 5: Instability in Iraq			
	Fragile States Index	Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank	Rule of Law Percentile Rank
2002	109	7.9	4.4
2003	111.4	.5	2.9
2004	110.6	0	0.47
2005	108.6	.5	1.4
2006	107.3	1.9	1.4
2007	104.8	.5	0.47
2008	104.3	1.9	1.4
2009	103.9	2.4	1.4
2010	102.2	2.4	2.3
2011	104.4	4.3	3.2
2012	104.7	4.7	3.2
2013	109	4.3	3.7
2014	111.4	2.4	6.7
2015	110.6	2.9	5.7
2016	108.6	3.3	2.4
(The Fund for Peace, 2017)		(The World Bank, 2016)	

These scores reflect its history. Around 2007, its scores are slowly improving but by 2013, its scores start to go back up again. Terrorism consistently increased during these time periods with some spikes in certain years.

It may seem that these scores are just increasing with the trends in terrorism, but before there were any increases in terrorism, the country was already unstable. The instability of the country provided a perfect environment in which terrorists could operate. This suggests that instability and amount of terrorism in a country share a positive relationship.

Additionally, it seems that type of instability matters. The country is in both a crisis of resilience, legitimacy, and authority. Before the conflicts in the country started, it could be argued that many did not respect the authority of Hussein, but he managed to assert himself as the central figure in government. Once the government toppled with

force, any attempts by the USA to install a new government was doomed to fail. This suggests that type of instability may matter regarding amount of terrorism.

**Government structure.** The government in Iraq claims to be a federal parliamentary republic (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). This type of government is a democracy in theory. Democracy in Iraq is rather recent. Hussein led a one-man rule in Iraq until his downfall in 2003. Iraq has still had trouble adopting to democratic ideals.

The Economist's Democracy Index characterizes Iraq as a hybrid regime, which is a government that blends authoritarianism and democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). Iraq tends to score higher than the rest of the regime which is, on average, considered to be authoritarian. There are many contradictions in terms of how a government's type relates to the amount of terrorism in a country. In this situation, a hybrid regime, at least reportedly, has a large amount of terrorism.

Table 4 provides more information on Iraq's government structure. The country's government is inefficient. It ranks below the 15-percentile rank. Iraq fares better when it comes to giving its people more voice and accountability, but it still does not manage to ever reach above the 25-percentile rank. The government is also perceived as very corrupt as it has a lower score and it is not very free throughout the study according to the Freedom in the World Index, which provides data on how free a country's citizens are in comparison to other countries. As such, the Economist seems to be correct in its assertion that Iraq is a hybrid regime.

	Government Efficiency (Percentile Rank)	Voice and Accountability in Government (Percentile Rank)	Corruption Perceptions Index	Freedom in the World Index
2002	0.5	0.49		7
2003	1.5	7.9	2.2	7
2004	1.9	4.8	2.1	6
2005	0.98	9.6	2.2	6
2006	0.97	10	1.9	5.5
2007	2.9	15.8	1.5	6
2008	9.2	16.3	1.3	6
2009	9.569378	18.00948	1.5	6
2010	10.04785	19.43128	1.5	5.5
2011	12.32228	18.30986	1.8	5.5
2012	13.27014	16.43192	18	5.5
2013	13.74408	16.43192	16	6
2014	13.94231	15.76355	16	5.5
2015	9.615385	17.73399	16	6
2016	9.134615	22.16749	17	5.5
	(The World Bank, 2016)		(Transparency International, 2018)	(Freedom House, 2018)

This data also gives credence to many authors who hold that a government in a country is indicative of the amount of terrorism it may have. It seems that a hybrid regime may be more at risk for terrorism than other types of governments. Iraq has less of an ability to deal with its enemies than other countries. This can even be seen in how the Arab Spring affected the country. Instead of just shutting down the protesters, the government tried to appease them. This might have shown many that the government was vulnerable which might have spurred on ISIL to start taking over parts of the country. In addition, the country's is perceived as incredibly corrupt as it ranked 166 out of 176 countries in its perceived corruption in 2016.

**Summary of Iraq.** The results show that Iraq has been involved in serious conflicts since the early 2000s. The amount of terrorism in the country is higher than

anywhere else in the world. Iraq suggests that terrorism shares a positive relationship with wealth, poverty, and instability. There is a negative relationship with educational attainment. These results also suggest that type of educational content, type of instability, and government structures do seem to matter. The government is a hybrid regime which offers data that hybrid regimes may be more likely to have larger amounts of terrorism.

## **Algeria**

Algeria's more modern history begins in 1830 when the French started to take over the country. The whole country was not subjected until the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Even with France's attempts to make Algeria an integral part of its nation, a large-scale revolt started in 1954 by the National Liberation Front. Eventually, Algeria became independent in 1962. The war was extremely bloody and resulted in many leaving the country for France. There were elections in 1963 which were overturned by a large-scale revolt in the same year and a coup in 1964 by the military. In 1976, the government moved towards socialism and one-party rule (Naylor, 2009, pp. 215-223).


The country became rather stable politically in the 1980s. In the 1990s, things changed quite a bit. In 1989, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a fundamentalist Islamic group, was founded and gained massive political power in 1990. FIS dominated elections in 1991. The military and government officials were alarmed at an Islamic party controlling the government and acted by trying to overthrow them. Their actions lead to the Algerian Civil War. The easiest way to describe this conflict is as a civil war, but, it was much more complicated than that. Islamic groups often fought amongst themselves. The Civil War continued until 2002 with the government victorious. During the Civil War, Abdelaziz Bouteflika assumed office as the president of the country which he still

holds as of today. He has continued to win elections even though, in his most recent election win, he has not even appeared in public. The government won the war by supporting reconciliation politics and by providing amnesty to the militants. The country was completely exhausted after the war (Naylor, 2009, pp. 223-226).

There were a few Islamic militant groups that did not stop fighting. These groups eventually formed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007. During this time, the country experienced terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and other Islamic groups. Also, in 2011, the Arab Spring reached Algeria. There were many revolts about food prices, unemployment, and political repression. The government attempted to end these protests by lifting the state of emergency that had been in place since 1992 (Naylor, 2009, pp. 223-227). Attacks against citizens has slowly decreased over the years, but attacks against military and police have been rather constant. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb tends to attack such targets (Library of Congress, 2008).

Since the end of the war, President Bouteflika consolidated his power under the guise of national reconciliation. He has reduced the political power of the army and has created a constitutional amendment allowing himself to run for a third term. This continued with another constitutional amendment allowing for him to run for a fourth turn. Those who support the President are worried about his health as it has continually declined. President Boutiflika rarely makes appearances due to his sickly image (Naylor, 2009, pp. 223-227).

Figure 3 provides information on the trend of terrorism in Algeria from 2002 to 2016. The trend shows that terrorism has been slowly falling since 2006.



**Education.** The education system in Algeria has been in a constant state of improvement in the past decade. The public education system is divided into preschool, primary, secondary, and tertiary education (Singh, 2015). Compulsory education lasts for ten years (The World Bank, 2018). In 2003, after the Civil War, the educational system was reformed. This reform led to vast improvement in the overall quality of education available in the country and improvements made to the content of said education (Singh, 2015).

The education system is not perfect and is still in need of some improvement. In recent years, there have been a lack of educators as well as a large increase in students. Additionally, this large increase in attendance has also resulted in overcrowding which exacerbates any education deficiencies. Another complication is that the demand for teachers is resulting in a lowering of quality. Poor teachers are often selected to teach because there is no one else (Singh, 2015). The government disallows the distribution of



Muslim literature promoting violence. It also monitors the teaching in religious schools (Library of Congress, 2008). The government of Algeria is making efforts to stop the spread of radical Islamic literature.

Table 5 provides information on education in Algeria. Primary education completion rate and enrollment in Algeria is quite high, especially when compared with the regional averages of 93.7% and 105.3% in 2014. The same could be said with secondary school enrollment and completion. The only aspects of education that fell below the average are tertiary school enrollment and literacy rate, which was at 75.1% in 2008, are low (The World Bank, 2018).

	Primary Enrollment Rate	Primary Completion Rate	Secondary Enrollment Rate	Lower Secondary Completion Rate	Tertiary Enrollment Rate
2002	105.1%	87.9%	71.6%	60.3%	17.3%
2003	106%	89.6%	73.8%	61.1%	18.5%
2004	107%	91.4%	77.2%	62%	19%
2005	107.7%	93.3%	78.8%	72.3%	20.8%
2006	108.2%	83.8%	79.8%	66%	21.2%
2007	109.6%	94.6%	70.3%	60.4%	23.5%
2008	109.3%	113.2%	76.8%	55.3%	
2009	112.4%	92%	93.1%	62.3%	29.8%
2010	115.4%	95.7%	97.2%	58.4%	29.8%
2011	116.7%	97.8%	99.9%	70.6%	31.2%
2012	118.2%	101.7%		114.8%	32.2%
2013	119.7%	106.2%		85.3%	34%
2014	118.7%	108.6%		79.4%	34.6%
2015	116.1%	105.8%		76.3%	36.9%

(The World Bank, 2018)

The reforms that the government implemented in 2003 seems to have greatly improved educational statistics. It seems that even before the amount of terrorism drastically fell, education was at competent levels. This indicates that education may not be a root cause of terrorism though it shows a negative relationship in Algeria.

On the other hand, content of education, while it is still a problem, has been taken more into consideration while the amount of terrorism has fallen. There may be a negative relationship associated educational content and amount of terrorism attacks a country may experience. The public education system, at least according to the United Nations, is attempting to reform to international standards. Thus, content of education in Algeria does not seem to have a relationship to amount of terrorism.

**Economy.** Around 95 percent of Algeria's exports are related to hydrocarbon sales. The president has made several reforms, which include opening the economy and discarding state control of the economy (Naylor, 2009, pp. 227-228). Table 6 shows, in most aspects, that the economy is quickly improving. GDP increased by an average of 3.7% during the period of this case study. This is respectable but lower than the average for the region, which is 4.1%. Absolute poverty is at .5% of the overall population and moderate poverty is at 3.9% of the population—both in 2011 (The World Bank, 2018). Unemployment, while high at first, shows a large decrease over time.

The Human Development Index places Algeria as having high human development and thus better off than most other countries. The GINI Index lists Algeria as having little inequality with a score of 27.6 in 2011 (The World Bank, 2018).

This data shows that Algeria has managed to implement successful reform programs. The economy did not seem to be in shambles before the war, apart from unemployment, which improved drastically due to reforms

Table 8: Economy in Algeria			
	GDP per Capita (PPP Constant 2011 \$)	Unemployment (Percent of Total Labor Force ILO Estimate)	Human Development Index
2002	10,826	25.9%	.663
2003	11,459	23.7%	.673
2004	11,797	17.7%	.680
2005	12,322	15.3%	.686
2006	12,348	12.3%	.690
2007	12,570	13.8%	.697
2008	12,660	11.3%	.705
2009	12,647	10.2%	.714
2010	12,870	10%	.724
2011	12,990	10%	.732
2012	13,162	11%	.737
2013	13,253	9.8%	.741
2014	13,483	10.6%	.743
2015	13,724	11.2%	.745
2016	13,921	11.5%	
(The World Bank, 2018)			(United Nations Development Programme, 2016)

**Instability.** Algeria has become much more stable since the end of the Civil War due to reforms by the President and the decline of terrorist attacks. Table 7 provides data regarding instability in the country. The Fragile States Index ranks Algeria in the upper range of countries. The Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank places Algeria on the lower end of their respective scales. The Rule of Law Percentile Rank is more forgiving to Algeria, but it is still rather low. This instability data is probably influenced by the continuing attacks by al-Qaeda in the country. These attacks are not relevant for this study as they are targeting government forces and police. The state is somewhat fragile and unstable but in a different way than Iraq or other countries. Algeria is overall a functioning country. It has some insurgencies that are difficult to attack due to the geography of the country (Library of Congress, 2008). The data and historical conflicts provide evidence to suggest that instability can increase the amount of terrorism in a country. As Algeria became more stable and resolved its conflict, the amount of terrorist attacks started to fall. Additionally, it offers data showing that type of

instability can matter. The country experienced a crisis of authority, resilience, and legitimacy. It eventually managed to assert itself by conforming to the needs of its citizens through reform and reasserted its authority.

	Fragile States Index	Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank	Rule of Law Percentile Rank
2002		6.9	33.1
2003		5.5	31.6
2004		10.7	33.4
2005		20.4	28.2
2006	77.8	15.5	27.7
2007	75.9	14	24.8
2008	77.8	14.9	25.4
2009	80.6	13.3	23.2
2010	81.3	11.8	26.5
2011	78	10.4	24.4
2012	78.1	9.5	26.7
2013	78.7	12.8	30.9
2014	78.8	9.5	24
2015	79.6	11.9	18.7
2016	78.3	11.4	19.2
(The Fund for Peace, 2017)		(The World Bank, 2016)	

**Government structure.** The government of Algeria is a presidential republic (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). President Abdelaziz has been president since 1999. He continues to be reelected ever since. The country has multiple parties and its government employs a federal system. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index places Algeria as an authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). This is backed by the strong rule of the president and the fact that President Abdelaziz has been in power for almost two decades.

Table 8 suggests that Algeria has erred on the side of authoritarianism rather than democracy even though it states that it is one. The people in Algeria have little voice in

their government. The government is perceived as corrupt as it ranks 108 out of 178 countries in 2016. Also, over the course of this study, it had a Freedom in the World Index score of 5.5 which means it is not considered free (Freedom House, 2018). This information suggests that more authoritarian governments can handle terrorism better than non-authoritarian governments.

	Government Efficiency (Percentile Rank)	Voice and Accountability in Government (Percentile Rank)	Corruption Perceptions Index
2002	31.1	18.9	
2003	31.1	18.9	2.6
2004	34.4	23.5	2.7
2005	39.2	25.4	2.8
2006	38	22.5	3.1
2007	32.5	20.1	3
2008	31	20.6	3.2
2009	35.4	17.5	2.8
2010	38.7	18.4	2.9
2011	36	20.1	2.9
2012	35	22.5	34
2013	35	23.9	36
2014	35	25.1	36
2015	35.5	24.6	36
2016	35	23.6	34
(The World Bank, 2016)			(Transparency International, 2018)

**Summary of Algeria.** The results for Algeria suggests that educational attainment, wealth, and poverty have no relationship with amount of terrorism. Government structures, instability, and educational content matters for amount of terrorism in Algeria. The government of Algeria is an authoritarian regime. This displays information that authoritarian regimes may have less terrorism than other forms of government. Algeria has also tried to fight Fundamentalist Islamic educations and the success they have had in it may lead to lower amount of terrorism.


## Iran

During World War II, the Shah of Iran were disposed and replaced by his son who was more sympathetic to the Allies. In 1951, the government attempted to nationalize the oil industry which was mostly owned by the British. In 1953, the Shah returned and the government of Iran was overthrown for a more Western-friendly one. The new government attempted to modernize the country (Katouzian, 2013, pp. 107-133). Conservative Islamic forces and Shah's authoritarian rule lead to a government change in 1979 where the Islamic Republic of Iran were proclaimed. In the same year, Islamic militants held 52 Americans hostage that strained relations between Iran and the West. These protests signaled a massive change in both policy and relations for Iran. The country became much more conservative and religious as well as angering the USA due to the hostage crisis (Katouzian, 2013, pp. 159-170).

In 1980, the Iran-Iraq war began and lasted until 1988 in which the country saw severe destruction and death. The country remained neutral during the Gulf War in 1990 (Katouzian, 2013, pp. 184-188). The 1990s saw the United States placing heavier economic sanctions on the country which lead to the conservatives, who had been kicked out of power in the 1990s, regaining power in 2004. The rest of the decade saw continued diplomatic strain between Iran and the United States. Between 2009 and 2012, Iran experienced several major protests. The first one called the Green Movement arose after the 2009 presidential elections in which President Ahmadinejad won. Many were angered by the results and this led to massive protests. The next major series of protests occurred in 2011 and 2012. These protests are called the "The Day of Rage" and heavily influenced by the Arab Spring (Katouzian, 2013, pp. 200-223). By 2013, however, economic conditions in the country stabilized, but the government did not make any

concessions to the protesters, which is still a point of soreness for them (Gasiorowski, 2014). Figure 4 offers information on terrorism trends in Iran from 2002 to 2016.

Terrorism has been rather low in Iran but some years saw drastic spikes in number of attacks.



**Education.** Compulsory public education in Iran lasts for nine years. The education system is heavily based on Islamic theology. On just a regional level, the educational system of Iran is very competent. It does not adhere to international standards of course as a major part of the curriculum is Islamic theology—even in private schools. The content of education in Iran is monitored and approved by the state (WES Staff, 2017). In the mid-2000s, there was somewhat of a crisis due to public universities overfilling due to an influx of new students. This crisis has been assuaged as of recently due to investments into infrastructure (WES Staff, 2017). Table 9 provides data on education in Iran. Education in Iran is rather consistent and stable. Primary, secondary, and literacy rate are all consistent with small improvements. The only major change in this case is tertiary school enrollment. It appears that there was a large increase in

enrollment. Iran's education is rather consistent and suggests that having some high educational values may lead to less terrorism. This data also suggests that educational content does matter for amount of terrorism in a country.

	Primary Enrollment Rate	Primary Completion Rate	Secondary Enrollment Rate	Lower Secondary Completion Rate	Tertiary Enrollment Rate	Literacy Rate (Ages 15 and Up)
2002	99.9%			74%		77%
2003	99.4%			82.4%		
2004	100.3%					
2005	100%					82.4%
2006	103.6%	97.6%	77.4%	85.1%	25.2%	82.3%
2007	104.8%	94.4%			29.7%	
2008	106.1%		81%	88.5%	36%	83%
2009	107.1%	102.2%		91.4%	36.4%	
2010	105.7%		82%	88.3%	42.6%	
2011	105.4%			91.9%	48.5%	
2012	105.2%	104%	87.6%	96.2%	54.9%	83.6%
2013	118.3%	95.7%			57.8%	84.6%
2014	109.1%	98.2%	88.4%		66%	84.6%
2015	108.9%	101.8%		94.5%	71.9%	

(The World Bank, 2018)

**Economy.** The economy of Iran is dominated by the hydrocarbon industry, which is controlled by the state. More than 80 percent of export earnings came from the hydrocarbon industry. The government of Iran also controls many other industries. The rest of the market includes the private sector, which is involved in numerous activities. There were attempts in the past to diversify the economy, but they have mostly resulted in failure. The black market is a major influence in Iran but it is extremely difficult to measure the exact amount (Library of Congress, 2008).

Table 10 offers information on the economy in Iran. The country performs around the average economically. Its GDP is consistent with the regional average as well as its unemployment. The amount of people in both absolute and moderate poverty is low. Its



GINI score is in the average for at 48.8 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2018). It is almost in the middle. Its Human Development Index places Iran as having high human development. This means that Iran's citizens do better in their own country than they would do in most other countries in the world. This is rather unusual for the area that Iran inhabits as the country's neighbors are Afghanistan and Iraq which both have very low scores in this area.

	GDP per Capita (PPP Constant 2011 \$)	Unemployment (Percent of Total Labor Force ILO Estimate)	Human Development Index
2002	13,830	12.8%	.679
2003	14,843	12.2%	.686
2004	15,308	10.3%	.6687
2005	15,616	12.1%	.692
2006	16,211	11.3%	.704
2007	17,338	10.6%	.716
2008	17,187	10.5%	.728
2009	17,162	12%	.735
2010	17,942	13.5%	.745
2011	18,192	12.3%	.755
2012	16,625	12.2%	.769
2013	16,383	10.4%	.770
2014	16,924	10.6%	.774
2015	16,509	11.1%	.774
2016	18,497	11.4%	
(The World Bank, 2018)			(United Nations Development Programme, 2016)

This data shows that Iran does not have a troubled economy. Its people are rather wealthy, at least when compared to the rest of the region, and there is not that much poverty with only .3% of the population being in absolute poverty in 2014 (The World Bank, 2018). Thus, it could be possible that the lack of terrorism in the region is due to its economic performance displaying a negative relationship.

**Instability.** Table 11 provides data regarding instability in the country. The Fragile States Index characterizes Iran as rather unstable. The Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank places Iran near the lower end of the rankings. These low scores are due to the authoritarian leanings of the government. The country is not in a crisis of resilience. The government of Iran can enforce its legitimacy through its authority. It is thus not in trouble of state failure. The Rule of Law Percentile Rank gives Iran a low score. This means that its laws are not respected nor are its government services of a high quality.

	Fragile States Index	Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank	Rule of Law Percentile Rank
2002		23.3	26.7
2003		24.1	30.1
2004		22.3	31.5
2005		24.3	23.4
2006	84	17.4	19.1
2007	82.8	17.9	15.7
2008	85.7	16.3	20.6
2009	90	8.1	17.5
2010	92.2	6.2	15.6
2011	90.2	7.6	17.3
2012	89.6	10	19.7
2013	89.7	11.4	16.4
2014	87.2	17.1	12.5
2015	87.1	17.6	17.3
2016	86.9	20.5	25.9
(The Fund for Peace, 2017)		(The World Bank, 2016)	

Terrorism relies on the type of instability in a country. Iran is not a failed state nor does it have a physical conflict—armed warfare. There is a political conflict that has been occurring since the 1970s shown through its numerous protests but the country is able to assert its authority over its citizens repeatedly. Thus, Iran’s data suggests that type of instability is more important than amount of instability.

**Government structure.** The government of Iran is a theocratic republic (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). While it may have the word republic in its name, Iran is nowhere near a democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index rates it almost at the bottom of its index by calling it an authoritarian regime. In the MENA region, only Saudi Arabia and Syria are considered more authoritarian.

	Government Efficiency (Percentile Rank)	Voice and Accountability in Government (Percentile Rank)	Corruption Perceptions Index
2002	34.1	17.4	
2003	38.2	11.4	3
2004	40.3	12.9	2.9
2005	33.3	10.5	2.9
2006	35.1	8.1	2.7
2007	30	7.6	2.5
2008	30.3	7.2	2.3
2009	36.8	6.6	1.8
2010	39.2	6.6	2.2
2011	41.2	7	2.7
2012	35.5	5.6	2.8
2013	28.9	5.1	2.5
2014	37.9	5.9	2.7
2015	46.6	7.8	2.7
2016	45.6	11.3	2.9
(The World Bank, 2016)			(Transparency International, 2018)

The government does have aspects of federalism, but the most important figure in the country is its religious leader or Supreme Leader. As of today, Sayyid Ali Khamenei has that role. The Supreme Leader of Iran has great power over government that probably results in the data in Table 12, which is of government structures in the country. Iran scores poorly in perceived government corruption, voice and accountability, and freedom where it is rated as a 6 throughout the entire study which means it is not free (Freedom

House, 2018). It can be easily seen that in Iran, specifically, authoritarianism seems to keep the amount of terrorism low.

**Summary of Iran.** The country of Iran's data suggests that education does seem to matter. It has a high educational attainment rate, which shows that more education can lower amounts of terrorism in a country. It also seems that educational content does matter as Iran keeps its curriculum very strict. Wealth and poverty seem to have no relationship as there were no changes in either, though there may be a weak negative relationship with terrorism. Instability type seems to correlate with amount of terrorism as Iran has instability but not the same type as Iraq. The government structure of Iran is also very important as it is very authoritarian and this further provides information that authoritarian governments may respond to instances of terrorism better than other types.

## **Morocco**

The modern history of Morocco begins in 1912 after France created a protectorate in the area. The inhabitants of Morocco attempted to fight back against the French in the Rif War in 1921, but lost in 1926. In 1956, Morocco gained independence under King Mohammed V (Naylor, 2009, pp. 160-164). In 1962 the country became a constitutional monarchy. There was an attempted coup in 1971 which made the King accept some reform. In 1975, Morocco attempted to obtain much of Western Sahara once Spain left it. Neighboring Algeria disliked this and supported guerillas of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Río de Oro or the Polisario. This in turn led to the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was the attempt at an independent government in the area. In 1979, Mauritania renounced its claims in the Southern half of the region which Morocco than claimed. By 1984, Morocco left the Organization of

African Unity over the matter. There were attempts at peace in 1988 and 1992, but they went nowhere. In 1997, unrest grew to the point where the king had to institute more reforms. By 2002, the government attempted to crack down on radical Islamic elements in the country (Naylor, 2009, pp. 228-230).

The Arab Spring in 2011 hit Morocco, and there were many protests calling for reform. As a result, the king promised to advance political reform. The king started this by proposing a new constitution, which did change some things in a more positive direction and was approved by voters (Gasiorowski, 2014). Around 2014, Morocco became troubled with migrants looking to cross into Europe. Morocco has dealt harshly with these migrants by destroying many refugee camps. The problems of Western Sahara still plague the country. Relations are tense with many of its neighbors due to their opinions on the matter such as Algeria which has a closed border with Morocco since 1994 (BBC, 2017).




Figure 5 displays trend information on terrorism in Morocco from 2002 to 2016. Morocco has had very little terrorism even before the start of this study. Some years show

small spikes in the number of attacks but compared to Iraq and Algeria they are still quite few in number.

**Education.** Compulsory education in Morocco lasts for 9 years (The World Bank, 2018). In the past decade, education in Morocco has been reformed. Primary and lower secondary education has been changed quite a bit while upper secondary education has not changed at all. Upper secondary education is not compulsory; a student may not enter it if they have not made the grades or decline. There are few public universities available in the country (NUFFIC, 2015).

Morocco has made some efforts to improve the content of its educational system. These efforts are criticized by most as not doing enough to stop the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism. The lack of educational infrastructure and oversight has made it easy for Fundamentalist schools to open. Many are afraid these schools will turn students into potential militants or terrorists (Hedgecoe, 2017).

Table 13 offers information on education in Morocco. The primary education enrollment rate is rather high, but the completion rate is much lower, though it steadily increases over the years of this study. Secondary enrollment and lower secondary completion is much lower which shows that access or ability to move on in education is difficult in Morocco. Tertiary enrollment is even lower. Morocco's literacy rate is also very low. Overall, it seems that education in Morocco is much worse than the region.

This data suggests educational attainment and content have a positive relationship to amount of terrorism or no relationship at all. The historical information provides more backing for their being no relationship at all. Education has significantly improved since

its dispute with the Polisario. As such, it seems that educational attainment may not affect terrorism at all, at least for Morocco.

	Primary Enrollment Rate	Primary Completion Rate	Secondary Enrollment Rate	Lower Secondary Completion Rate	Tertiary Enrollment Rate	Literacy Rate (Ages 15 and Up)
2002	101.6%	61.9%	42.5%	38.8%	10.4%	
2003	104.2%	66.2%	44.8%	39.7%	10.9%	
2004	104.6%	73.7%	48.1%	41.3%	11%	52.3%
2005	105%	78.3%	49.8%		11.7%	
2006	105%	81.9%	52.6%	46.5%	12.3%	
2007	106.9%	82.1%	55.6%	50.8%	11.9%	
2008	107.2%	80.7%	57.7%	53.7%	13%	55.1%
2009	108.1%	80.2%	60.4%	58.8%	13.5%	56.1%
2010	112.2%	84.2%	62.7%	59.3%	14.4%	
2011	115%	89.2%	65.7%	60.7%	16.2%	67.1%
2012	116.5%	100%	69.1%	62.2%	19.3%	69.4%
2013	116.7%	99.7%		64.8%	22.5%	
2014	116.1%	101.7%		68.3%	25.1%	
2015	114.7%	102.9%			28.1%	
(The World Bank, 2018)						

**Economy.** Morocco's economy is much less reliant on hydrocarbons than the other countries in this study. The country primarily exports grain. Like many other countries in the MENA region, Morocco must import most of its basic needs like food and water. Globalization has both hurt and benefited Morocco. It hurt the country by eliminating most of the demand for its products; it has helped the country by increasing the amount of inbound tourism. In 2015, Morocco had the highest amount of tourism in all of Africa and the fourth highest in the MENA region behind Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain (Index Mundi, 2016). Tourists contribute a significant amount of money to the country; in 2016, 8.1% of Morocco's total GDP is attributed to tourism (World Travel & Tourism Council, 2017).

Table 14 provides information on the economy of Morocco. Overall, Morocco has a poorer economy than the region average. 3.1% of the population was in absolute poverty in 2006 which is very slightly higher than the regional average. Unemployment is slightly lower than the regional average. The GINI score was 40.7 in 2006 which shows that the country has some inequality (The World Bank, 2018). Finally, the Human Development Index states that Morocco has medium development when compared to the rest of the world. This data provides an argument that a less-well off economy can lead to less terrorism.

Table 16: Economy in Morocco			
	GDP per Capita (PPP Constant 2011 \$)	Unemployment (Percent of Total Labor Force ILO Estimate)	Human Development Index
2002	4,844	11.6%	.551
2003	5,071	11.9%	.561
2004	5,252	10.8%	.596
2005	5,361	11%	.575
2006	5,700	9.7%	.581
2007	5,834	9.8%	.589
2008	6,106	9.6%	.596
2009	6,287	9.1%	.603
2010	6,443	9.1%	.612
2011	6,688	8.9%	.623
2012	6,791	9%	.634
2013	6,995	9.2%	.640
2014	7,078	9.9%	.645
2015	7,296	9.7%	.647
2016	7,285	10.8%	
(The World Bank, 2018)			(United Nations Development Programme, 2016)

**Instability.** Table 15 offers data on instability in Morocco. The Fragile States Index characterizes Morocco as having slightly high levels of fragility. Its Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank is also low. Morocco fares much better with its Rule of Law Percentile Rank by being close to the middle. This data shows Morocco being slightly unstable. The historical information creates an image of Morocco



having conflict and several instances of protests. The Western Sahara conflict, however, is not a significant source of conflict or instability in the country now. The conflict seems to be about Morocco asserting its authority over the region. Inside the country of Morocco, there have been some protests that have put the role of government into question, but none have successfully challenged it. The government has also reformed to please the protesters. As such, the data provides credence to the belief that it is the type of conflict that can reflect amount of terrorism rather than just having a conflict at all.

Table 17: Instability in Morocco			
	Fragile States Index	Political Stability and Absence of Violence Percentile Rank	Rule of Law Percentile Rank
2002		37	52.9
2003		32.2	50.4
2004		35.4	51.1
2005		29.1	45.9
2006	76.5	30.9	46.4
2007	76	27.5	46.4
2008	75.8	26	46.6
2009	77.1	31.3	48.3
2010	77	32.7	50.2
2011	76.3	33.6	48.8
2012	76.1	32.7	48.8
2013	74.3	28.9	46.9
2014	74.4	29.5	54.3
2015	74.6	33.8	54.8
2016	74.2	35.7	49
(The Fund for Peace, 2017)		(The World Bank, 2016)	

**Government structure.** The government of Morocco is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index characterizes Morocco as a mostly authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). The government of Morocco instituted federalism. The King of Morocco has expanded the powers of the parliament several times since independence but he still has ultimate authority in the country (Library of Congress,

2006). Table 16 provides data on the government structure of Morocco. The government of Morocco ranks in the middle of efficiency. It does poorly in voice and accountability as well as how corrupt the government is perceived to be. The people of Morocco also are partly free according to the Freedom in the World Index throughout the study which is better than almost all other countries in the region.

	Government Efficiency (Percentile Rank)	Voice and Accountability in Government (Percentile Rank)	Corruption Perceptions Index	Freedom in the World Index
2002	51	34.8	3.7	5
2003	53	26.8	3.3	5
2004	53.2	33.6	3.2	5
2005	46.5	26.4	3.2	4.5
2006	51.2	28.8	3.2	4.5
2007	50.9	27.8	3.5	4.5
2008	48.5	25.9	3.5	4.5
2009	50.7	27.9	3.3	4.5
2010	50.2	28.9	3.4	4.5
2011	48.8	27.6	3.4	4.5
2012	52.6	29.1	37	4.5
2013	54	27.2	37	4.5
2014	50.4	27.5	39	4.5
2015	50.9	28.5	36	4.5
2016	50.9	29	37	4.5
(The World Bank, 2016)			(Transparency International, 2018)	(Freedom House, 2018)

This data shows that Morocco has some aspects of a democracy but it is mostly an authoritarian regime by most standards apart from in the MENA region. The King has had to make reforms due to pressure several times in the country's history, most recent was during the Arab Spring, but when it comes to physical threats, the government responds quickly and brutally. This provides backing for the argument that an authoritarian regime is better equipped to handle certain types of conflict. On the other

hand, the country has some aspects of a democracy and the King cannot do whatever he wants. This means that there are some restrictions and the government is not completely authoritarian. There does not seem to be a relationship between terrorism and democratic values in Morocco.

**Summary on Morocco.** The country of Morocco's results suggests many of the findings from previous countries may not be as solid as previously believed. Morocco has a very low educational attainment, which shows that the variable may not matter. Educational content still does seem to have a relationship with terrorism. The country is somewhat impoverished, which goes against the belief that a country needs a well-functioning economy to keep terrorism at bay. The country does have some instability but it is not the same as Iraq's or Algeria's, which further provides evidence that the type of instability is important than there just being some in a country regarding terrorism. Additionally, the country provides information to show that authoritarian governments can handle terrorism better than other types.

### **Discussion**

The results of this thesis are quite unexpected. It seems that the most common attributed causes of terrorism in the MENA region are not contributors, at least overall, to amount of terrorism. Overall, education levels in a country seem to not have a strong relationship with amount of terrorism. The main evidence for this is provided by Morocco. The country has much lower educational attainment than the other cases in this study, but it has the lowest amount of terrorism. Both Algeria and Iran have a higher educational rate but more terrorism. Iraq has the most terrorism in the world and is more educated overall. These results are reminiscent of Alan B. Krueger and Jitka

Maclečková's study on education on terrorism. They found educational levels to not play an important role in terrorism (2003, pg.140).

Content of education is more important to this study. For example, while Iran had an Islamic-based curriculum, the government made sure that it was created in a way to keep terrorism low. Algeria has been shutting down radical Islamic schools. Iraq has had much trouble fighting Islamic Fundamentalism education. Finally, Morocco has been attempting to shut down sources of Islamic Fundamentalism. These results harken back to Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks study. They found that content of education is more of an indicator for amount of terrorism in a country than just overall attainment. (Brockhoff, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2012, pp. 20-21).

Yet, content of education does not offer enough of a relationship with amount of terrorism in a country to provide any satisfactory conclusions. This is due to a lack of data on the type quality of education being taught in both public and private schools in the cases selected for this study. If any significant conclusions are to be found for content of education, there needs to be more data collected.

The economic contradictions, poverty and wealth, both provide no significant relationships with amount of terrorism to be considered root causes. Morocco provides information to back this up as its economic performance is below all the other cases and yet it still has the lowest amount of terrorism. Thus, the relationship between wealth and amount of terrorism depends on the country and cannot be a root cause. The same is true for poverty; all the cases experienced different results. This means poverty does not have a significant relationship with amount of terrorism as to signal it being a root cause.

These results are like Piazza's and Abadie's studies, which found no significant relationship between the economy and terrorism.

Unlike the contradictions so far, instability does have a relationship with terrorism but the type of stability a country is experiencing has much more of a significance towards terrorism. All the cases have had some sort of conflict during the years of this study, each varying in relevance. Yet, each of the conflicts are different. Iraq has an armed conflict against many different parties which has led to its authority begin questioned. Algeria has had a civil war and a small conflict against fundamentalists. Since the end of these wars, Algeria has managed to assert its authority over the country and maintain some stability Both Iran and Morocco have had more of a crisis of legitimacy. Crisis of authority are more likely to lead to terrorism. If a country's military and boundaries are being questioned, it seems that this can be exploited by terrorists. This is present in Iraq due to invasion in 2003 and the fight against ISIL. In Algeria, this was present during the Civil War.

Crises of resilience do not seem to present more terrorism as they lead to state failure which can cause more terrorism but is not always guaranteed to do so. Both Morocco and Iran have had crisis of legitimacy, but they have not seen a large increase in the amount of terrorism. Thus, instability itself is not exactly a root cause unless it is clarified by type of conflict present.

The results of instability are like what Edward Newman concluded. He regarded that state failure and weak states, on their own, do not increase the amount of terrorism in a country rather contested states are more likely to have it (Newman, 2006, pp. 483-484). This is a crisis of authority when a state cannot assert its control over its own territory.

Finally, the government structure contradictions provided interesting results. All the cases rated as rather authoritarian governments. Yet, Morocco was the least authoritarian out of all the cases and it has little terrorism. Morocco is one of the most democratic countries in the MENA region. In the same category, states with low amounts of terrorism, Iran is the most authoritative out of these cases. The country with the most terrorism, Iraq, is in the middle of transitioning between the two. Algeria is a rather authoritative state. It can be concluded that neither democracies nor authoritative governments are more at risk for terrorism but hybrid regimes, like Iraq, are more at risk. These results are like Çinar's and Abadie's conclusions. Çinar found that no government type is more at risk for terrorism (Çinar, 2009, pp. 114-115). Abadie concluded that hybrid regimes are more at risk (Abadie, 2006, pp. 55-56).

Comparing the cases also provides interesting results. The two cases with many incidents of terrorism share several trends. Iraq and Algeria's economies, content of education, and type of instability are similar. Both countries have developing economies and they have been having trouble with Islamic Fundamentalist education. These countries also have had a crisis of authority where they have not been able to assert their power over their own territories.

On the other hand, Morocco and Iran do not have much in common apart from low amounts of terrorism and type of instability. They have not had a crisis of authority but other types of crisis less associated with terrorism. Thus, it can be concluded that type of instability and government structures—hybrid regimes—matter.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, the root causes of why some countries in the Middle East and North Africa have more terrorism than others are due to instability type and hybrid regimes. These results are important as they suggest that the common beliefs—education, wealth, poverty, government structures, general stability—applied to the root causes of terrorism are false. This also casts doubt on the whole idea of root causes. The MENA region is not homogenous. This goes even further; no two countries, anywhere, are the same.

Root causes of terrorism are not some sort of magical solution for terrorism. There may not be an actual solution for terrorism, at least on a global scale. Governments looking to provide solutions for terrorism must look at each case specifically rather than generally. Occasionally, applying what worked in one place may work in another. However, terrorism is a severe enough threat that governments must use caution doing such things.

There needs to be less focus on the overall root causes of terrorism but instead how a specific country's environment and conditions correlate with terrorism. These results are useful as they can be applied in various situations and predict future trends. Countries experiencing these significant relationships can be monitored for terrorist activity due to the correlation between hybrid regimes and instability with terrorism. If governments know two of the major indicators of terrorism, they can take precautions to thwart instances of it.

Additionally, this research can be used to find out the starting points or more immediate causes of terrorism in a country. This can be useful as it allows for different

countries or researchers to move ahead with their studies and figure out what direction a country may be heading.



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