

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
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MEMBERSHIP: Annual dues are \$16.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Student fees are \$6.00, for retired members \$8.00. Life memberships are \$250.00. In the case of membership by husband and wife, dues for one of them shall be one-half of the regular price. For those wishing only the SHAFR Newsletter the cost is \$10.00. Institutions wishing Diplomatic History should contact Scholarly Resources.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath, and are financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner and the late W. Stull Holt. The details of each of these awards are given in under the appropriate headings in each Newsletter.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly Newsletter; Diplomatic History, a journal; and the occasional Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects.

A.A. ADEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION

by

Ronald E. Swerczek (National Archives)

For nearly half a century, the legendary and, in John A. DeNovo's term, enigmatic Alvey Augustus Adee was at the center of administrative matters in the department of state.¹ After serving as Secretary of Legation in Spain beginning in 1870, Adee began his departmental career as a clerk in 1877. The following year he became Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau. In 1882 he was appointed Third Assistant Secretary of State. Then, in 1886, he became Second Assistant Secretary of State, a post he held until the year of his death, 1924. He was authorized to act as Secretary of State for a day on numerous occasions, and, for a brief period, September 17-29, 1898, he served as Secretary of State ad interim.

In 1911, at the time of the reorganization of the department, Adee drew upon his years of experience in the following memorandum to Director of the Consular Service Wilbur J. Carr. The memorandum is among the records of the Office of Coordination and Review, General Records of the Department of State (Record Group 59), National Archives.

MEMORANDUM

My dear Mr. Carr:

When we had our last conference concerning Departmental efficiency and economy, I had one or two subjects on my mind as the basis of a few brief remarks to the assembly, but the interruption of that meeting and the subsequent adjournment did not give me the opportunity to say anything. As I shall be absent at the time of the adjourned meeting I venture to put my observations in writing.

I think I may say without presumption that my long association with this Department now lasting for nearly thirty-four years, has enabled me to follow two phases of the Department's operations: first, the steady increase of its business from year to year, and

secondly, the changes which the diversified increase of business has rendered necessary from time to time. When I first came to the Department the work was, while important, comparatively limited in volume. The Diplomatic and Consular Bureau each did its share without much pressure while the direction of the work, in both Bureaus, was easily within the compass of one Assistant Secretary's capacity. That was before the days of typewriters and I remark in passing that the first typewriter used in the Department was bought by myself and employed under more or less vehement protest from the Secretary who believed that it was disreputable to use anything but pen and ink. The pen playing such an important part in the work, a large proportion of the more important correspondence was in point of fact written in original draft ready for signature. I suppose the notes and dispatches so prepared by myself in their day run up into the thousands. Mr. Evarts and Mr. Blaine used to send for me, give me some hint as to what was to be done and in half an hour the dispatch, ready for signature, was before him. The nature of the work at that time rendered conference and coordination much less necessary than it has since become, and in treating a matter involving both the Diplomatic and Consular Bureaus I would frequently write the instruction to the Legation, the instruction to the consulate and the corresponding note to the Foreign Minister in this city, all in original letter, and have them signed, leaving the several Bureaus to attend to the press-copying and mailing. The index bureau then worked generally from the press copies, although a brief entry of the signed mail was made each day.

This concentration of work made it possible for one man indeed to not only direct the whole correspondence of the Department but to do a good deal of the mechanical drudgery involved in its preparation. Where consultation was necessary about the only authorities I had to call into council were the Solicitor and the Chief of the Bureau of Accounts. But as to much of the Solicitor's work it was done by him indeed in the form of a draft which the respective Bureau only had to copy.

It is not necessary to follow the successive stages by which the increased volume of work has required subdivision of energy for its treatment. You all know what the work is now, and you can all realize how

completely it has passed beyond the competency of one Assistant Secretary or even of all three to perform the manual task of directing and preparing the necessary correspondence.

The crying need of some effective reorganization by which all the initial consideration and to a large extent the drudgery of putting the correspondence in shape for the Secretary's consideration, has been evident for years and many plans have been considered for dealing with the problem. The first proposition - which really dates back to Mr. Fish's time - was of geographical sub-division and distribution: but that was very primitively done, consisting principally in leaving the manual labor of actual preparation to one of three or four clerks of the Diplomatic or Consular Bureau, he in turn taking his orders from the Chief of Bureau who was the sole person responsible for the accurate preparation of correspondence. As is easily seen from the first this method of subdivision had two disadvantages, - it left very little initiative to the clerks who actually prepared the papers, and it made no provision for consultation between the two or more Bureaus concerned in the business under treatment. While I was Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau, I made it a rule to consult personally with the chief of the Consular Bureau whenever any matter came up involving correspondence with both Legations and Consulates. When I became Third Assistant Secretary I made a still further attempt in the direction of collaboration and coordination in the work by sending the principal direction to be followed or the draft to be copied to, let us say, the Diplomatic Bureau and sending a memorandum to the Bureau saying what was done and directing conference between the two Bureaus with a view to sending harmonious instructions to the Consulates: my object being to avoid independent treatment of the same subject in two different Bureaus with the results which sometimes were painfully contradictory. The system did not work very well and the coordination of the work of the two or more Bureaus, while pretty in theory, proved not to be practical in fact. However, it was a step in the right direction.

Another phase of the necessary collaborative effort used to be the exchange of views between different Bureaus and the Solicitor by means of tags pinned to the dispatch or endorsements written upon it. These

tags would often form a complete history of the transaction but unfortunately for the most part they did not become historical. When the periodical times came for arranging the correspondence for binding, the Index Bureau generally unpinned and destroyed all these illuminative memoranda and thereafter the only trace of what had been done in a given case was to appeal to the memory of the Assistant Secretaries. In this way a notable percentage of my time was occupied in cudgelling my memory to supply the missing links of the Department's business. The same thing occurred with the elaborate reports which were frequently made upon some given subject, reviewing the past correspondence, discussing the points involved and suggesting present and future treatment. Unless the Bureau Chief or the Assistant Secretary preserved duplicates of such report they ultimately found their way to the waste basket. They were not indexed or made part of the history of the case.

In this and other ways each year's increase of the volume of the work begot additional confusion and developed fresh lacunae in the historical report of important transactions. By the time Mr. Root assumed the Secretaryship the inconveniences and confusion of the old method became painfully evident. He attacked the difficulty at what he believed to be the system of indexing and endeavored to make it what it should be, thoroughly historical, so that upon calling the consecutive report of every case could be produced.

That was a most effective reform so far as it went but it left untouched the two principal defects of the old system, namely, want of coordination and collaboration of the different expert authorities entrusted with the preparation of the Department's correspondence and the strain of memory and drudgery upon the Assistant Secretaries who were supposed to be able to supply all missing details from memory and to compose all conflicting details of treatment offhand and upon simple inspection. In other words the Assistant Secretaries were expected to unite expert responsibility with authoritative direction and effective supervision.

When Mr. Knox took hold this state of things was wellnigh unbearable. Work had to be done under high pressure or at the cost of considerable delay. The most obvious remedy for this appeared to lie in the

direction of some reorganization which should provide the proper machinery for responsible initiative and direction of the work. The first essential was that the person called upon to do the work should not only have a general knowledge of the question but should be competent to act as an expert adviser in regard to it. This point of initial importance controlled the whole scheme of reorganization. The work of other Bureaus was assimilated to what had been found necessary in the case of the Bureau of Accounts, for example. Nobody ever supposed that the Secretary or his Assistants should originally direct the work of that Bureau. The proper discharge of its business naturally pertained to an expert accountant. Therefore, in organizing the new divisions of the Department the theory of expert treatment was predominant. The geographical divisions were necessarily to be severally placed under the direction and control of men familiar with the language and acquainted with the matters arising in the countries which their division embraced. The old system of expecting one man to be an expert on all matters he was called upon to handle was not practical. To take the Latin American Division in its present organization, as an example, we find a Minister of sound training and experience in Latin-American countries at its head² assisted by men familiar with Latin-American affairs and with the Spanish language and called from posts where they have acquired technical knowledge of the necessities of the service on the spot. None of these men is expected to act alone or independently. Mutual aid through conference and comparison of views is expected and enjoined as to all matter of importance, while routine matters are relegated to the old Diplomatic or Consular Bureau as the case may be. Incoming dispatches and telegrams in relation to the Latin-American affairs are promptly sent to the division and promptly treated by experts. The same thing as to the other divisions. Eastern Affairs³ are handled by men who have won their spurs in Eastern service; who know the Eastern Languages and people and who are competent to deal with any questions arising and submit to the secretaries their conclusions in carefully digested form for approval and action. Much time is gained in this way. Papers which formerly might lie for weeks waiting for an overburdened man to get a chance to look at them and see what they were about are now disposed of with timeliness and precision while the Secretary and his

Assistants are rarely called upon to give an original direction. I am the more and more struck every day by the efficiency of this system. It is rarely that the ripe judgement of the experts who initiate the treatment of correspondence requires amendment or direction from the higher officers. If in their judgement it appears to require examination[,] that can be promptly given to it by direct conference with the directors of the appropriate division. What matters may originate in point of time with the Secretary or one of the Assistants through personal interview with Senators or Representatives or interested parties is immediately made the subject of conference with the chief of the appropriate division and his course outlined briefly and in a way that leaves no room for doubt or cause for delay on carrying out his orders.

The only particular in which I see room for further development of the present very practical system is in the direction of fuller and freer collaboration of different divisions or Bureaus in a matter which concern two or more of them. The principle of conference, which works so well in the several divisions and in the transaction of business between the division and an Assistant Secretary, should I think be in some way extended to provide for and require conference between different divisions upon a matter of common concern. Moreover such conference should not be by reference and memoranda but be direct so that when agreement is reached as to the mode of treatment the actual reduction of the agreement to form can proceed simultaneously and promptly in all the divisions concerned. Successive references by memorandum of endorsement to different divisions makes delay and if the treatment be not identical in the successive stages divergence of views may ensue which can easily be avoided by initial conference. I throw this out as a suggestion in the hope that some practical rule of coordination and collaboration may be devised, so that the different divisions will work consistently and harmoniously and simultaneously towards the common end. And so that even when three or four divisions are concerned their respective coordinated labors may be completed promptly in one day instead of in several or perhaps a week.

I think I may throw out another suggestion of secondary importance. It is often necessary for the

Secretary or his Assistants to keep in immediate touch with outgoing correspondence. So far as telegrams is concerned that is now accomplished by the distribution of manifolds of telegrams sent and received. Such a system could not of course be applied to outgoing correspondence. I believe it possible to devise some expedient whereby, without interfering with the necessarily careful and deliberate process of indexing and recording, the fact of a signature and dispatch of an instruction or note and its general purport can be at once ascertained. However this is a matter of detail which can be licked into shape at any time.

The important thing in my mind is that we should each and all appreciate the practical nature of the reforms which have followed the reorganization of the Departmental service and should each and all contribute in every way to make the new system a thorough and abiding success.

April 17, 1911.

Second Assistant Secretary.

NOTES

¹John A. DeNovo, "The Enigmatic Alvey A. Adee and American Foreign Relations, 1870-1924," Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives, Vol. 7, 2 (Summer 1975), pp. 69-80.

²William T.S. Doyle.

³Ransford S. Miller was Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs at the time.

(Following a tradition established several years ago the Newsletter once again publishes a review essay of a new text. In this case it is Howard Jones, The Course of American Diplomacy: From the revolution to the Present. Dorsey Press has very recently secured publication rights to Jones' text.)

A HEFTY DOSE OF REALISM

by

Joseph A. Fry (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Each year for the past thirteen as I have faced the "out-of-print," "out-of-date," "too difficult," or "too-expensive" considerations of textbook selection, I have been impressed with the difficulty of writing one of these monsters. Fortunately, because of sloth, good sense, or lack of a publisher, my impressions remain vicarious; however, thanks to Bill Brinker, the editor of the SHAFR Newsletter, I have experienced the challenge of formally reviewing an American diplomatic text! The experience has convinced me further of the vast effort required for Howard Jones to write The Course of American Diplomacy: From the Revolution to the Present.

Professor Jones' objectives are generally unexceptional. Aiming at a "straightforward, balanced, and comprehensive account of the major events in the nation's foreign policy," he proposes to feature the "interplay of idealism and realism" and writes from the "premise that the most effective foreign policy results when the two themes run parallel in methods and goals." Jones has also emphasized "the intimate relationship between foreign and domestic policy," and "most importantly" has relied "primarily on the natural chronology of events to organize and narrate the story as the nation's leaders saw it."

The product of these objectives is a big book--612 large pages of text, including 25 nicely-done, full-page maps and 27 pages of well-chosen pictures ranging from George Washington to the Sandinista guerrillas and contemporary Beirut. The prose is straightforward, clear, and readable, and Jones enlivens a richly-detailed narrative with interesting quotes and anecdotes. Undergraduates and instructors alike will chuckle at the Marcy-Elgin Treaty floating through Congress "on champaigne" since that was the only way "to deal with hogs," at Patrick Hurley dubbing Mao Tse-tung "Mouse Dung," or Fidel Castro dismissing

Eisenhower as a "senile White House golfer." Less amusing perhaps, but still quite effective were the contemporary assertions that Charles Sumner made up "by vigour of tongue for his want of capacity in other organs," that Vietnamization was simply "changing the color of the corpses," and that Zbigniew Brezinski was "the first Pole in 300 years in a position to really stick it to the Russians."

Within his consistently chronological organization, Jones demonstrates effectively the interplay and mutual influence of simultaneously occurring events. This facet of the narrative is apparent not only in the expansion of the 1840s and the coming of war in the 1930s but also in the relation of Cuba and the Middle East to Vietnam in the 1960s. But he misses another prime opportunity to exploit this approach by not relating Far Eastern developments to the coming of war with Spain in 1898, and this organizational scheme results occasionally in abrupt, not over-informative changes of scene. See for example the paragraph on Panama (pp. 513-514) which disrupts the discussion of "Americanizing the War in Vietnam" while providing too little information to be of real value.

Many of Jones' conclusions flow predictably from an application of the realist-idealistic categories. Generally, he finds eighteenth and nineteenth century diplomacy more solvent than that of the twentieth. He lauds the diplomacy of the American Revolution, contends that "idealism had become one with reality" under Washington, criticizes Jefferson and Madison for failing to match goals with available power, deems the "genius" of the Monroe Doctrine to have been "its balance between idealism and self-interest," praises TR "for his realistic...policy grounded in the national interest," castigates Wilson for "idealistic objectives" that precluded compromise, locates the essence of World War II diplomacy in the clash between Stalin's realism and the idealism of the Atlantic charter, and judges that Nixon and Kissinger were more attuned to the limits of American power than Carter. Other judgments are more surprising. Jones endorses the Model Treaty of 1776 as the "finest form of foreign policy--idealism balanced with realism" and opines that ideals and reality merged in the U.S. decisions for war in both 1812 and 1898. While such variations on the realist theme are hardly grounds for criticism, the author's failure to apply this

interpretative framework more consistently might be deemed a liability. Since none of the other recent writers (Paterson, et al, Schulzinger, and Combs) of diplomatic texts have adopted this approach, a clearer, more conspicuous application of realist analysis to the 1840s, the Civil War, the 1920s and 1930s, and the postwar period would further establish this volume's distinctiveness. Of course, the respective preferences of instructors and publishers for distinctiveness in textbooks probably diverge markedly.

This pattern of intermittent application of realist analysis mirrors Professor Jones' tendency to intersperse chapters marked by clear thematic argument with others in which the central thesis is far less discernable. His treatment of the "Strange Alliance" of World War II, of the inevitability of the Cold War, of the relation of subsequent Kennedy policies to the Bay of Pigs, and of the profound contradictions within Carter's foreign policy are trenchant and provocative. By contrast, he provides no such viable and unifying theme for understanding American Imperialism from 1897-1900 (where the catalyst was more involved than the "desire to act before European powers incorporated everything of value") or the 1930-1939 period (where the reader needs a firmer handle than the concept that FDR "usually took the lead in making policy," but "the realities of politics kept him from venturing too far ahead of his constituents.") This is not to contend that Jones avoids judgments or that his judgments are uncritical or uniformly laudatory, but rather to suggest that his best chapters tie these conclusions to a clearly recognizable theme.

Just as many of Jones' conclusions follow from a realistic analysis, also do the bulk of his explanations of the motives behind U.S. policy. He most often credits American leaders with pursuing strategic or security goals, with attempting to propagate political ideals, or with reacting to domestic politics. Although not completely ignored, economic considerations are much less prominent. For example, Jones does not incorporate the depression of 1893 into his treatment of late nineteenth century imperialism; his focus for the 1900-1913 period is upon TR and power politics rather than the relation of Progressivism to imperialism or the nature of the new American empire; and he chooses not to employ aspects

of the corporatist approach to the 1920s. Nor does race play a crucial role in the narrative. Reginald Horsman's Race and Manifest Destiny is not included in the "Selected Readings"; American atrocities during the Philippine-American war are mentioned and tied to anti-imperialism but are not related to imperial motivations; and My Lai commands only one sentence.

Horsman's absence brings us to the "Selected Readings." To be sure, an author has the right to "select" these readings; but at the risk of appearing quarrelsome, I must mention several other rather conspicuous omissions. Frederick Marks' Independence on Trial and J.C.A. Stagg's Mr. Madison's War are the most recent monographic treatments of the Confederation period and the War of 1812, respectively. Neither Richard Hofstadter's classic article on the "psychic crisis" of the 1890s nor Robert Dallek's book-length statement of this approach are included. Also missing are George Kennan's American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 and Wayne Cole's latest commentary on the pre-World War II isolationists, Franklin Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945. Influential younger scholars such as Drew McCoy, Michael J. Hogan, and Nancy B. Tucker would have added depth and perspective to the potential readings on the 1790s, 1920s, and 1940s. And the decision to include virtually no periodical literature deprives students of ready bibliographic direction to some of the most interesting (and briefest) materials.

By way of summary, just how successfully has Professor Jones realized his stated objectives? On balance, quite well. The writing is clear and readable; the organization is solid and especially useful for understanding simultaneous events; and the conclusions are judicious and informed. Although more persistent and discernable attention to the realistic framework and more clearly stated theses in several chapters would have aided students and further distinguished this volume from other texts, Jones' hefty dose of realism still provides a distinct and attractive alternative in textbook selection.

**REPORT: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HISTORICAL DIPLOMATIC
DOCUMENTATION MEETING OF NOVEMBER 8, 1985**
(February 24, 1986)

Introduction

The Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation met in Washington on November 8, 1985. In attendance were Robert Dallek, Carol S. Gruber, and Warren F. Kuehl, representing the American Historical Association; Ole R. Holsti and Deborah W. Larson, representing the American Political Science Association; John L. Hargrove of the American Society of International Law; and Bradford Perkins representing the Organization of American Historians. (The committee re-elected Kuehl to the chair).

The committee received helpful assistance from William Z. Slany, the Historian, and his staff, both during the meeting and through written reports circulated in advance. It also welcomed the support of George B. High, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Public Affairs, who attended the meeting, and Bernard Kalb, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs for the Department, who met twice with the committee.

The past year has been one of meritorious accomplishments in the Historical Office. Answers to some long-standing questions have been developed, and work on the FRUS series has progressed well. Five volumes appeared in 1985 and eleven are in press. The staff has compiled all twenty-seven volumes of the 1955-1957 series.

Positive accomplishments in the Historical Office are, however, accompanied by discouraging evidence that the declassification process continues to delay publication. Committee members, reflecting the position of the societies they represent, continue to insist on a 25-year line, while State Department officers consider a 30-year line the objective. While the Committee commends the Historical Office, the Secretary of State, and the Department of State for the positive efforts to attain and adhere to a 30-year line, it must be noted that continuing and major effort must be applied. It is evident that the 30-year line has been seriously breached. In 1985 the

last volume in the 1951 series appeared. At least three volumes for the 1952-1954 set remain to be declassified, with projected publication ranging from 1986 to 1987, well beyond 30 years. Little progress has been made on clearance for the 1955-1957 series. Thus the outlook is bleak: the FRUS series seems destined to fall farther and farther behind unless direct action is taken to facilitate the declassification process. Thus while commending the substantial progress, members of the Advisory Committee find it necessary, to concentrate on problems identified during their deliberations.

Clearance, the FRUS series, and a 30-year line

The committee is charged with responsible advisory oversight of the nation's historical record in the realm of foreign affairs. Our society is a democratic system that prides itself on its openness, yet we are aware that there are sensitive issues in the realm of foreign policy. Censorship must be resisted; but security concerns cannot be neglected. To maintain a balance is difficult, but the committee's task is complicated by obscurities in declassification procedures which makes it difficult to fulfill our advisory charge.

This nation once prided itself on making its historical record almost immediately available. For decades political figures and scholars boasted that our foreign policy records were open while other nations kept theirs closed. When in the post-1945 era it became necessary to extend the time between events and disclosure through publication in the FRUS series, a compromise was reached in the form of a 20-year rule. Yet a review of those years reveals that the extension in time was due as much or more to limitations of staff than to security questions. Within the past decade, the gap has widened to 30+ years. Early in 1985, Secretary Shultz set a clear 30-year line, but this already has been breached, and the Advisory Committee fears that even this time-line cannot be regained unless major changes are made.

The Advisory Committee understands the necessity for the initial classification of certain documents. It cannot understand why the process of declassification is so slow. If 30 years ago during and after a war in

Korea, documents could be cleared in less than a 20-year span, why not today? If the 25 to 30 year goal could be achieved during military involvement in Vietnam, why not now?

Because the declassification process itself is unclear, the committee is frustrated in seeking explanations for the publication delay. Efforts to ascertain what the clearance procedures are have not succeeded. There are guidelines for the systematic declassification of department records, but these cannot be seen by the Committee because they are apparently protected. This Committee, charged under statutory mandate to make recommendations related to the historical documentation of the United States, thus cannot respond properly because of limitations imposed by the bureaucratic structure.

A number of agencies are involved in the review procedure, in addition to the Classification Declassification Center (A/CDC). Even after a document is cleared by one or more agencies, another agency can frustrate publication by its refusal to approve. While efforts are made largely through the A/CDC to negotiate a settlement, the Historical Office feels compelled to withhold volumes from publication when documents vital to an understanding of events have not been cleared. This position, designed to protect the integrity of the FRUS series, has been endorsed repeatedly by past Advisory Committees. In some instances the number of items to be declassified is not great; in others it may constitute as much as 20% of the documentation.

The following illustrate the delays that have resulted:

1. In October, 1985, the last volume of the 1951 series appeared, 34-35 years after the events occurred.
2. The 1952-1954 set still has six unpublished volumes. Three of these are yet involved in clearance processing, with possible publication set for 1986 and 1987.
3. As noted earlier, all 27 volumes for 1955-1957 have been compiled by the Office of Historian. Four are in the printing process. All the others are still under review. Only six of these are targeted for publication in 1987, and the Committee sees even that

as an optimistic figure. Thus, less than half the volumes will appear within the time-line set by Secretary Shultz unless drastic measures are taken to alter the situation.

Since the Committee met, President Reagan has issued a new directive calling on all agencies to move to and adhere to a 30-year line. This is a positive and welcome step. It reaffirms in the strongest fashion the value of the FRUS series and asks the Secretary of State to "take necessary measures to ensure the publication by 1990 of the foreign affairs volumes through 1960." It further directs "agencies and staffs to cooperate with the Department of State in the collection, declassification review, and publication of these volumes" pointing toward a 30-year timeframe. The Department of State is charged with setting the process in motion and making annual status reports. The Committee discussed the directive, which had been drafted before it met. In the light of past experience and the fact that the 30-year line has already been severely breached, it is cautious in its expectations. It makes the following recommendations to enhance the prospects of achieving the directive's intent.

1. The Committee suggests that as representatives meet to implement the directive they pay special attention to the following issues, which were identified during the discussions:

a) There is ambiguity whether the 30-year line applies to the first date in combined series or the last (in triennial volumes 1955-1957 whether to 1955 or 1957). Ideally, publication by 30 years from the first date should be the goal.

b) Whereas it has been common to blame the Government Printing Office for delays, the problem now appears to lie in the failure to begin the clearance process sufficiently in advance to achieve a 30-year publication date. The president's directive clearly intends to remedy this problem where it notes the need to accord the declassification review "the necessary priority to achieve this 30-year publication timeframe."

c) It should be clearly established that any timeframe does not foreclose publication prior to any set terminal date, i.e. the 30-year line should not be viewed as a reason to postpone or delay clearance that might be accomplished sooner.

d) It should be clearly established that the word disclosure, which appears in Secretary Shultz's letter in response to the 1984 Advisory Committee report and in the president's directory, refers not only to publication of the partial record in the Foreign Relations series but also to the transfer of records to the Archives where they would become fully accessible. The Committee hopes that meaning will be established as a rule.

2. The Advisory Committee requests a detailed description of the processes of declassification, including the principles established and instructions issued to prepare the Declassification Guidelines for 1950-1954 and 1955-1959. The Committee expects that such information will enable it to make specific suggestions to accelerate declassification.

3. The Committee recommends that additional resources be provided to enlarge the staff involved in the declassification process. Such action should increase the number of items reviewed and narrow the time gap. The need appears to be especially acute for materials held by the NSC, but the Historical Office also could use additional personnel.

4. The systematic review staff of A/CDC should focus its time on releasing the FRUS volumes. It should be careful about being drawn away from its primary task by becoming involved in extensive projects from other government agencies seeking declassification for historical studies.

5. The Committee hopes that President Reagan's directive will prompt a review of the subject of "foreign government information," a phrase embodied in his previous Executive Order 12356. Reports continue to circulate that it has been used as a license to deny or delay declassification of documents containing information from foreign governments irrespective of the contents.

6. The Committee recommends the creation of a special position within the Office of the Historian, to be held by a senior historian, nominated by the Advisory Committee, familiar with foreign relations records and the historical context. The person would be assigned to A/CDC and other agencies to act as spokesperson for the general public and the scholarly

community when agencies become stalemated over differing views related to declassification. Acting as an ombudsman, such a person could be a significant facilitator. The Committee believes that leading scholars retiring from academic posts might be interested in such a challenging assignment. We suggest implementing this proposal by June of 1986 on an experimental basis.

Fiche

The Advisory Committee devoted considerable discussion to the fiche supplements being developed by the Historical Office. Considerable concern has been expressed by persons within the scholarly community that the inauguration of any fiche project might imperil the printed volumes. Committee members believe that such dangers do not exist at this time. First, the Historical Office is committed to the printed volumes, as its recent record testifies. The number of volumes and pages produced matches the projected figure of a few years ago. Second, it is evident that with the massive documentation available no printed series could contain all the useful materials. Third, because clearance is tied to the FRUS series, the appearance of additional documents increases the availability of materials. Fourth, fiche provide a convenient way of circulating documents that may have been missed or were cleared after the print volumes had been issued. Finally, the Historical Office has responded to suggestions of several years ago that it find ways to tie the fiche directly to the printed volumes. It has developed a library shelf system which should do this adequately wherever libraries are willing to accept the suggested arrangement. Thus the Committee, after reviewing this matter for a number of years, supports the fiche operation. The Committee suggests careful consultation and coordination with the National Archives and Records Service to be certain there is no duplication in reproducing documents.

The Committee urges the Historical Office to consider the widespread circulation of separately printed tables of contents and indexes for the fiche supplements and if possible to include such items from the print volumes as well. Such a reference tool

would reveal in handy form the utility of the FRUS series and increase the number of users.

Editorial Board

At its 1984 meeting, the Advisory Committee requested a report from the Historian on how an editorial board might be used to facilitate the preparation of the FRUS volumes. The submitted report has raised additional questions which need to be explored. Furthermore, it is evident that the responsibilities of the Advisory Committee need to be reviewed, particularly in the light of its enlargement from 7 to 9 persons. A subcommittee consisting of Carol Gruber, Warren Kuehl, and Deborah Larson has agreed to review these matters and prepare recommendations.

Distribution

At its 1984 meeting, the Advisory Committee expressed considerable concern that the FRUS volumes were not being promoted sufficiently and urged greater effort to increase their circulation and availability. The Committee was pleased at the printed and verbal reports of steps taken in response to its stated concerns.

Printing

The Committee reviewed with pleasure information that the Government Printing Office and the Historical Office have been working to eliminate many of the obstacles that previously delayed publication.

Preservation

In 1984, the Committee also had requested a report on the maintenance and preservation of current records. The extensive and impressive documentation it received, relating largely to electronic files since 1974, convinces the Committee that serious problems exist in this area. It is also concerned about paper documents and rules regarding their disposal. While the Committee feels it cannot become involved in making detailed suggestions, it strongly urges that

the Historical Office be assigned leadership in reviewing all questions related to foreign relations document preservation and disposal. The Committee would also like an annual statement on this subject which describes what is being done, what dangers may exist to the records, and what responses have been given to concerns expressed by members of the Advisory Committee.

Office of the Historian and Department of State

This report cannot end without expressing satisfaction with the work of the Historical Office. It is efficiently administered and the staff is dedicated and able. The Advisory Committee especially wishes to commend the two-part 1952-1954 National Security volume as illustrative of the excellence of the series as a whole. It is also gratifying to see the Current Documents annual publication moving so close to currency. The Committee is pleased, too, with the commitment of Department of State officers to the series and the strong support they have given. The Advisory Committee wishes to be as helpful as possible as everyone moves to implement the new presidential directive.

THE 1985 SHAFR ANNUAL MEETING

The Society began its second decade of annual conferences by meeting from June 25-28, 1985 at Stanford University. The meeting was unique in site, format, and diversity. This was SHAFR's first conference held on the West Coast. For the first time, the Society, together with Conference on Peace Research in History, and the American Military Institute, met jointly with the Pacific Coast Branch, American Historical Association. Among the more than one hundred contributors to twenty sessions were fifteen participants from seven Asia/Pacific nations. More than three hundred persons, of whom nearly half were SHAFR members, attended the combined conference.

The conference began on Tuesday evening, June 25, with a session devoted to women in American foreign policy.

The three papers by Edward Crapol and Judith Ewell, both of William and Mary College, and Lynn Dunn, University of Utah, focused on women who attempted to influence American diplomacy in widely differing periods: Lydia Maria Child in the decades before and immediately following the Civil War; Eleanor Lansing Dulles in the early Cold War years; and Jeane Kirkpatrick during the first Reagan Administration.

Commentators Joan Hoff-Wilson of Indiana University and Barton Bernstein of Stanford University drew attention to themes common to the careers of all three women. All manifested the feminine behavior patterns described by Carroll Smith-Rosenburg and Carol Gilligan; yet Dulles and Kirkpatrick denied that gender influenced their careers. None of the papers elaborated on how female networks or "male mentors" may have provided ideas or private support for these women's public struggles to change American diplomacy. Hoff-Wilson suggested that all three authors, by admitting the marginality of their subjects, pointed to the general conclusion that American women were scarcely more influential in foreign policy formulation in the 1980's than they had been in the 1850's. That hypothesis prompted vigorous discussion that continued throughout the reception that followed.

On Wednesday morning, June 26, the conference resumed with a session devoted to recent Soviet-American relations. Professor Alexander Dallin of Stanford University analyzed the two superpowers' management of the KAL 007 crisis. He argued that their different behaviors reflected divergent priorities: Washington wanted to tag Moscow with "mass murder" and to rally political support for Administration policies. The Soviet Union, by contrast, sought confirmation of the regime's credibility at home. Both powers allowed latent assumptions about the adversary to surface, and events reinforced each side's predisposition to impute the worst possible motives to the other. Such probable contributors to the incident as confusion, accident, error, and incompetence were ruled out in a manner which Dallin and the audience found dangerous.

Keith Nelson of the University of California, Irvine, probed the sources of detente during the Nixon and Brezhnev years. He found striking similarities in the behavior of leaders who confronted surprisingly analogous problems. Both men found that the easiest

way to pacify domestic interests was to bargain with the foreign foe. Behaving like politicians who had overcommitted themselves to constituencies they dared not disappoint, they struggled to reduce demands upon their governments by resorting to trade, threat limitation, and new arrangements with opponent's allies. Nelson cautioned against overpraising the two statesmen's creativity by noting that their "solutions" to policy problems were essentially conservative reactions to pressures brought upon them. An exceedingly lively exchange of comments from the audience ensued.

A second morning session examined the role of image-makers in American-East Asian relations. Kitaoka Shin'ichi of Rikkyo University, in a prize-winning essay subsequently published in the prestigious Chuo Koron, described diplomatic historian Kiyosawa Kiyoshi's attempts to persuade his countrymen that Wilsonian idealism, rather than racism and economic self-interest, was the basis of American foreign policy. A failure in the 1930's, he nevertheless laid intellectual foundations for Japanese-American cooperation after 1945. Sandra Hawley of the University of Houston offered a critical assessment of Pearl Buck's works, suggesting that they helped perpetuate the myth of a special Sino-American relationship by overemphasizing missionary influences, romanticizing the Chinese peasant, and shifting from an early focus on him to concentrate on upper class persons displaced by the 1949 revolution. Patricia Neils, of United States International University, presented a decidedly revisionist interpretation of the career of a third important imagemaker, publisher Henry R. Luce. She argued that his views of China in the 1940's came closer to reality than his critics believed; yet his opinions as expressed in Time and Life had only a modest impact on public opinion and still less influence on American policy.

The three papers prompted extensive comments by Frank Ninkovich of St. John's University and David Axeen of Occidental College. Ninkovich welcomed the focus on myths, pointing out their diplomatic utility despite historians' efforts to disprove them. He criticized Neils for reviving Cold War myths and neglecting the very real constraints on American China policy in the 1940's. Axeen suggested that all three papers revealed the pervasive influence of American culture

on attitudes and policies. Americans could not comprehend Asians without imposing supposedly universal, but actually particular, value-laden and distorted frames of reference upon them.

The Japanese peace settlement of 1951 was the focal point of the third morning session. The two presentations by Watanabe Akio of the University of Tokyo and Miyazato Seigen of the International University of Japan analyzed Japanese and American approaches to peacemaking. Watanabe focused on Tokyo's efforts to shape the security aspects of the treaty. He argued that the Foreign Ministry correctly anticipated Washington's approach to peace and suggested that diplomat's served Japan's interests by favoring delay in concluding a treaty. Miyazato explored the impact of bureaucratic clashes between the State and Defense Departments on the peace settlement.

Commentators Peter Duus of Stanford University and Howard Schonberger of the University of Maine responded quite differently to the essays. Duus suggested that the peace-negotiating process revealed typically Japanese patterns of behavior - digging around to get to the root issues at stake and using historical precedent to delay a settlement. He noted that the treaty marked a fundamental shift in Tokyo's pursuit of security - away from independent defense toward acceptance of dependence on an external protector. Schonberger suggested that Japan paid too high a price for the latter, avoiding rearmament at the cost of semi-permanent occupation. He felt that Watanabe had not paid sufficient attention to the "real" security negotiations surrounding the 1952 US-Japan Administrative Agreement.

The session on prisoners of war and internees in the two world wars dealt with three diverse episodes: Japanese detention of Germans during World War I; German treatment of American diplomatic internees at the outset of World War II; and France's postwar utilization of German POW's as forced laborers. Commentators Stanley Falk and Frederick Kiley of National Defense University were struck by the contrast between the relatively benign and humane treatment accorded all of those held and the much harsher experiences of more recent prisoners of war.

The traditional work-in-progress session highlighted the research of doctoral candidates from Midwestern universities. Richard D. Byrne of the University of Iowa traced the origins of the Mutual Security Program of 1951 back to the European Recovery Program of 1948. He argued that it was designed as much to overcome bureaucratic rivalries in the management of containment programs as to deal with new external challenges. Taking the Buraimi oil conflict as an example, Tore T. Petersen of the University of Minnesota described the gradual resolution of Anglo-American differences over Saudi Arabia. The two papers provoked a lively exchange on the importance and difficulties of decision-making analyses.

The morning's final session focused on the last fifty years of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Ricardo Jose of the University of the Philippines demonstrated how Douglas MacArthur's unrealistic idealism and Filipino politics wrought havoc with attempts to build a Philippine army before 1941. Richard E. Welch of Lafayette College suggested that tensions between Philippine economic and diplomatic nationalism and American interventionism perpetuated a patron-client relationship long after Manila obtained independence from Washington. Pamela Sodhy of the National University of Malaysia, in a review of the last twenty years of Malaysian-American relations, argued that Washington dealt with Kuala Lumpur within a framework based on regionalism and containment. Strong economic ties and growing socio-cultural links strengthened a relationship of friendship short of alliance.

In his commentary, Gary Hess of Bowling Green University noted that all three papers dealt with important redefinitions of American interests and means for their defense. While Washington hesitated to use force to challenge change in mainland Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 1940's, by the end of the decade economic and diplomatic containment had become the hallmarks of American policy. Post-1966 shifts in US-Malaysian relations illustrated the movement away from military to social, economic, and cultural instruments and techniques for the preservation of stable and friendly Southeast Asian governments.

On Wednesday afternoon, two very different sessions were presented. The first was a broadly comparative treatment of the nature and implications of imperialism for 19th Century American diplomacy. Frank Merli of Queens University used the vignette of the prospective sale of the Chinese fleet to the Confederacy to probe tensions in British policies toward Asian and American rebellions. Thomas Schoonover of the University of Southwestern Louisiana offered a multi-archival analysis of great power rivalry in Central America, suggesting that it intensified both socio-economic problems and American interest in the region. Commentator Jerald Combs of San Francisco State University doubted that Schoonover's emphasis on transportation bottlenecks had added anything new to the story of United States' Central American policy. Joseph Fry of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, commended both authors for demonstrating the value of analyzing Civil War and Central American diplomacy in a broadly comparative international framework.

The afternoon concluded with a plenary session, held jointly with the Pacific Coast Branch, AHA, at which Jeremy Kinsman, Minister of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, offered his reflections on changing patterns of interaction between the United States, Canada, and the world. He made particularly valuable comments on foreign diplomats' deepening involvement in Washington's bureaucratic and legislative politics. His remarks prompted lively exchanges of views during the wine and cheese reception immediately following his presentation.

The four morning sessions on Thursday June 27 dealt with two broad themes - presidential responsibility in foreign policy decision-making and American attitudes toward the use of force. The two presidential sessions focused on Dwight D. Eisenhower and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Chairman Norman Graebner of the University of Virginia placed the first session papers in context by reviewing the history of Eisenhower revisionism. Edward C. Keefer, a historian in the Department of State, argued that the president had no clear policy for ending the Korean War. Desiring but unable to achieve easy battlefield victory, the administration resorted to nuclear threat less as bluff than as a fall-back policy - one taken only after it was clear that Beijing was prepared to make

necessary concessions. Isaac Alteras of Queens University revealed how Israel, despite its need for American support and desire for continuation of Truman policies, resisted Eisenhower pressure to come to terms with Arab nations. Harriet D. Schwar, also of the Department of State, traced the origins of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China. Her study probed Eisenhower Administration efforts to resolve the dilemma created by its unwillingness to desert the Chinese Nationalists or to commit itself to the defense of the offshore islands. While Secretary of State Dulles hoped to obtain either a UN-imposed ceasefire or a trade of the offshore islands for Beijing's abandonment of all claims to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-Shek took alarm at both proposals and had to be reassured through a mutual defense treaty.

Commentators Ian Bickerton of the University of New South Wales and James Matray of New Mexico State University were more critical of Eisenhower policies than of the papers. They suggested that the president was not a strong leader who followed well-conceived courses of action but rather a man who groped for but proved ultimately unable to define new and more appropriate policies.

The second presidential session offered equally stimulating - and controversial - analyses of Franklin Roosevelt as foreign policy-maker. J. Garry Clifford of the University of Connecticut criticized FDR for moving slowly and hesitantly in the summer of 1940 on both the destroyer deal and selective service. Waldo Heinrichs of Temple University, in a perceptive combination of diplomatic and operational naval analysis of the battle of the Atlantic in 1941, contended that when opportunity and capability permitted, FDR acted quickly and decisively. In his analysis of Japanese-American relations before Pearl Harbor, Jonathan G. Utley of the University of Tennessee found Roosevelt's leadership wanting. Failing to control subordinate administrators and bureaucrats whose widely divergent views were more conducive to anarchy than sound policy, FDR acted as captain but not commander of the ship of state.

Both commentators took issue with the presentations. Asada Sadao of Doshisha University challenged Utley's definition of leadership, insisting that FDR's

behavior should be judged by the standards he brought to the presidency rather than by those scholars developed later. Frederick Marks, while commending the authors for the thoroughness of their research, suggested that none had fully fathomed FDR's intentions. On the one hand, he suggested that administrative disarray camouflaged presidential determination to give primacy to domestic politics in 1940. On the other, he criticized Utley for paying insufficient attention to Roosevelt's anti-Japanese attitudes and behavior before 1940. A vigorous exchange between panelists and audience ensued, demonstrating historians' enduring interest in Franklin D. Roosevelt and his impact on American foreign policy.

The morning's other two sessions focused on the use of American naval and air power. Richard Turk of Alleghany College led off the first, sponsored by the American Military Institute, by arguing that Alfred Thayer Mahan's advocacy of Anglo-American alliance in the Pacific/East Asia region contradicted President Theodore Roosevelt's understanding of how best to advance American interests. Dr. Richard Bowling, in his study of Mahan's influence on convoying, suggested that the admiral, through his emphasis on capital ships and decisive battles, ill-prepared naval leaders for convoying and undersea operations vital in both world wars. Commentator Jack Shulimson of the Marine Corps Historical Center disagreed with Bowling, arguing that German failure to contest British control of the Atlantic after the Battle of Jutland validated Mahan's arguments for the generation of senior officers that fought World War II.

The second session dealt with the projection of American airpower to Japan and Western Europe. Ronald Schaffer, of California State University Northridge, analyzed the way scientists, military officers, civilian analysts, and policy-makers dealt with humanitarian issues in planning the 1945 incendiary bombing of Japanese cities. He concluded that while Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was sensitive to these issues, his concern had relatively little impact on operations; the organizational configuration in Washington simply did not allow for adequate consideration of moral issues in strategic planning. Captain Gary Tocchet of the U.S. Military Academy argued that presidential decisions rather than

Pentagon bureaucratic politics were the driving force behind intermediate range ballistic missile deployments to Europe during the Eisenhower Administration. At home, the president used the deployments to answer critics and stimulate research; abroad, they blunted the psychological and diplomatic impact of Sputnik. But Eisenhower's tolerance of bureaucratic competition in deployments and refusal to acknowledge their strategic redundancy left a dangerous and confusing legacy to his successor.

Commentator Conrad Crane, also of the U.S. Military Academy, argued that the exigencies of war and the lure of a 'deathblow' to the enemy drastically narrowed the range of alternatives to fire-bombing Japan in 1945. In his view, both essays pointed to one of the great unresolved dilemmas of modern times: Will man simply keep on doing what his weapons make possible? In reflecting on Schaffer's arguments, David Holloway of Stanford University suggested that ethical issues could be resolved only before wars began; otherwise, operational pressures pushed humanitarian considerations aside. While agreeing with Tocchet's emphasis on the symbolic and political importance of American missile deployments, he cautioned against overlooking the fact that they triggered Soviet political and military responses.

Peace, security, and the ethical dilemmas of diplomacy figured in a variety of ways in Thursday afternoon's sessions. The first of them explored different attempts to guarantee security in the Pacific. Jonathan M. Nielson of the University of Alaska traced the growth of that state's importance in American strategic planning over the last half century. Malcolm Murfett of the University of Singapore dealt with that port's enduring strategic significance. Despite the costliness of maintaining a naval base there, the Attlee Government decided to maintain a Royal Naval presence in East Asia in hopes of reaping trade and political benefits. David W. Mabon of the Department of State used negotiations for an abortive Pacific Pact at mid-century to reveal contradictions between the attitudes and diplomacy of American allies in the war against Japan and the intentions of John Foster Dulles.

In his commentary, Ramon Myers of the Hoover Institution observed that while all three essays

emphasized the roles of key individuals in defining Pacific strategies and policies, none considered why these leaders experienced so much difficulty in mobilizing public support for measures designed to assure American security interests in the Pacific/Asian region. D. Clayton James of Mississippi State University commended the authors for relating their particular subjects to broader developments but urged Nielson and Mabon to look to individual service and Joint Chiefs of Staff planning documents for further insights.

European peace movements were the central concern of the afternoon's second session, sponsored by the Conference on Peace Research in History. Professor Udo Heyn of California State University Los Angeles offered an historiographical review of mediaeval peace movements. He showed how the transformation of civil law along territorial lines contributed to the doctrine of a just war and formed the basis for the eventual emergence of international law. Professor Harold Bauman of the University of Utah noted the paucity of American studies of European pacifism between the two world wars and identified topics demanding future research. Commentator John Conway of the University of British Columbia suggested that historians might profitably consider how European pacifists contributed to the unpopularity of their cause. Professor Carroll Gillmore, of the University of Utah praised the breadth of Heyn's analysis but contended that the process by which western and central European law became universally accepted deserved fuller treatment.

The session on Anglo-American relations at mid-century probed sources of harmony and tension between Washington and London. Holly C. Shulman of the Golden Jubilee Commission on Telecommunications demonstrated Britain's influence on the development of American propaganda policy and Voice of America programs during World War II. J.Y. Ra of Kyunghee University analyzed shifting British perspectives on American policy in Korea from 1945 to 1950 and revealed how London downplayed serious reservations about it in hopes of preserving Anglo-American cooperation in Europe. In Iran, according to James F. Goode of the University of Georgia, British determination to preserve oil investments conflicted with American conviction that containment of the

Soviet Union was the primary policy goal. While Iranian leaders struggling to nationalize the oil industry were tempted to exploit these differences, they failed - both because Americans would not break with an ally whose support appeared essential in the Korean War and because Britain abjured the use of force in Iran without prior consultation with Washington.

Comments by Peter Buzanski of San Jose State University and Roger Adelson of Arizona State University touched off a vigorous and wide-ranging debate between panel members and the audience over analytical approaches to and conclusions about Anglo-American relations at mid-century.

The afternoon's final session juxtaposed two very different examples of use of food in diplomacy. Arline Golkin of Whittier College argued that conflicts between Chinese and American officials, together with debates within United States relief agencies as to whether famine was naturally or politically induced, put an end to private food aid for China by 1931. Marc Cohen of the Washington Center demonstrated how nearly seventy-five percent of the Food for Peace program budget in the early 1970's went to support the American war effort in Indochina, despite food emergencies elsewhere.

Jane Porter of the Department of Agriculture, responded by pointing out the inevitability of domestic special interest group influences on food diplomacy. Franz Schurman, of the University of California, Berkeley, suggested that the two papers provided ample evidence of Washington's inability to recognize and respond to the fact that hunger is a major threat to world peace. A vigorous dialogue with the audience over the relevance of historical cases to contemporary ethical and policy dilemmas ensued.

Thursday's activities were crowned by a banquet and reception in honor of former SHAFR, and current Pacific Coast Branch, President Alexander DeConde, of the University of California, Santa Barbara. In his eloquent address, DeConde called upon all historians to beware of nationalistic biases that might distort their interpretations of the past.

The conference came to a conclusion on Friday morning, June 28, with four sessions that covered the entire spectrum of American foreign relations. The session devoted to foreign perspectives on American diplomacy highlighted the way in which differing national interests color perceptions of the American diplomatic past. Geoffrey Smith of Queens University emphasized Canada's concern for national identity and overawe of its powerful neighbor. Chen Chi, of National Chung-Hsing University, focused on economic cooperation and the "two China" dilemma as dominant elements in Taiwan's view of American diplomacy. Balance of power, moralism, and projection of domestic concerns abroad were seen by Aruga Tadashi of Hitotsubashi University as the determining forces of Washington's diplomatic behavior. Commentator Sandra Taylor, of the University of Utah, introduced the ensuing audience discussion by offering a definition of what might be considered the essential elements of an American diplomatic style.

The session devoted to intelligence and covert operations in Latin America brought to light their long-standing relationship with more traditional aspects of American diplomacy in the region. W. Dirk Raat of the State University of New York at Fredonia traced the evolution of American intelligence activities in Mexico from the simple, direct tactics of the first decade of the century to the highly technical, complex, and massive operations of the last quarter century. Stephen G. Rabe, of the University of Texas at Dallas, explored the Eisenhower Administration's consideration of violent measures to remove Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic. Rabe concluded that while the precise intent behind President Eisenhower's May 1960 expression of a desire to see Trujillo "sawed off," remains unclear, it did trigger efforts to arm opponents of the dictator which led to his assassination a year later. Commentators Friederich Katz of the University of Chicago and Thomas M. Leonard of the University of North Florida praised both papers and emphasized the difficulty of determining the precise impact of intelligence and covert operations on the overall conduct of U.S. diplomacy in Latin America.

The next session, devoted to the impact of American occupations in Asia and the Pacific, ranged broadly over a half century of the United States' activities

in the region. Kenton J. Clymer of the University of Texas at El Paso contrasted real and perceived missionary impact on mountain peoples in the Philippines prior to 1941. He concluded that despite missionaries' conviction that they had effected lasting and significant changes in values, whether or not they contributed to deeper societal changes remained problematic. Charles J. Weeks of Southern Technological Institute drew a somewhat similar conclusion about the effect of the United States' 1942-1945 occupation of Tonga. American forces left improved transport systems, memories of a period of great prosperity, as well as social ills such as venereal disease and alcoholism. But after 1945, Tonga reverted to relative isolation from the outside world and to the practices of its traditional society. The session's final paper, by Takarashi Igarashi of the University of Tokyo, focused on the efforts of Takagi Yasaka, a pioneer of American studies of Japan, to promote Japanese understanding of the United States during the postwar occupation and to assure the continuation of a productive intellectual exchange program thereafter.

Commentator George Knoles of Stanford University, who participated in that program during the early 1950's, commended Igarashi for his sensitive treatment of an important aspect of Japanese-American relations. James Boutilier, of Royal Roads Military College, praised the Clymer and Weeks' papers for their description of the occupiers' efforts but suggested that both needed to pay closer attention to Americans' intentions and the characteristics of the societies into which they intruded before advancing conclusions as to their impact.

The conference's final session, devoted the American war in Vietnam, attracted a large and spirited audience. William B. Pickett, of the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, traced former president Eisenhower's unsuccessful attempts to sensitize Lyndon Johnson to the political nature of American objectives in Vietnam and to limits on Washington's ability to influence events there. Vincent Demma, of the U.S. Army Center for Military History, offered a detailed analysis of General Harold K. Johnson's role in the 1964-1965 decisions that led to the commitment of ground combat troops to Vietnam. Christian Appy of Harvard University explored the ways individual

soldiers responded to the realization that theirs was "a war for nothing." He argued that they sought exhilaration in danger and violence, concentrated on doing their "job," or shunned combat through disobedience, drugs, and alcohol.

Commentator Stephen Vlastos of the University of Iowa praised the rigor of Appy's analysis but suggested the need for greater attention to the responses of Latino and Asian-American soldiers. Less certain than Demma of General Johnson's impact on the troop commitment decisions, he also suggested that Pickett had exaggerated the potential impact of Eisenhower's views on the subsequent conduct of the war. The vigor and variety of audience responses to the three presentations demonstrated that the Vietnam War continues to provoke the imagination and challenge the abilities of historians.

The foregoing summary provides only a brief overview of the events and discussions of three and a half very full days. Those who were unable to attend the conference but who wish fuller details may obtain a copy of abstracts of the papers by writing to me at the Department of History, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-0034.

The achievements of the conference flowed from the efforts of a great many people, not all of whom can be mentioned here. Special thanks, however, are due to Dean Allard, Charles Burdick, Richard Immerman, Ian Mugridge, Ronald Spector, and Sandra Taylor for assistance in developing the program. Barton Bernstein provided invaluable help with local arrangements. Finally, I am grateful to Wayne Cole, Stanley Falk, Norman Graebner, Joan Hoff-Wilson, Richard Immerman, D. Clayton James, Warren Kuehl, Raymond G. O'Connor, Roger Paxton, David Rosenberg, Paul B. Ryan, and Betty M. Unterberger for their assistance in the preparation of this report.

Roger Dingman, Chairman

SHAFR 1985 Program Committee

ABSTRACTS

Joseph Preston Baratta (Association of World Federalists), "Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal of World Government?" International History Review, 7 (November 1985), pp. 592-621. Recent historical scholarship on the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy is cited for a new departure in interpretation. The Baruch Plan was the nearest approach to a world government proposal by the United States; such a proposal could have been more "fair" to the Russians, who in the circumstances of 1946 probably still would have rejected it, but at least they would not have been alarmed by the deceptiveness of the plan actually offered; and the story of the failure to make the plan a complete world government proposal casts a sidelight on the origins of the Cold War and offers some guidance for a way out of the present nuclear arms race. The Acheson-Lilienthal proposal for control by an early warning system was rejected by Bernard Baruch's policy, was approved by President Truman, and was for the "abolition of war" through elimination of the U.N. veto and creation of a strong Atomic Development Authority. But the State Department hedged the plan, the President permitted the provocative Bikini tests, the Russians delayed, and Baruch did not develop the plan, as Grenville Clark suggested, into thorough-going U.N. reform. Hence, the enforcement power conceived was war, and not court action on individuals. An adequate, private proposal by Clark in the U.N. was defeated, in an atmosphere of reversion to great power diplomacy and abandonment of internationalism, just before the decisive vote on the last day of 1946. Nevertheless, the Clark proposals remain instructive for the realistic international control of atomic energy.

, Grenville Clark, World Federalist (Amsterdam: Institute for Global Policy Studies, Occasional Paper No. 3, 1985). 46 pp. The great world political factor in the future, Grenville Clark thought, would not be nuclear war but the dead end of deterrence policy. The fundamental alternative is a policy of strengthening the United Nations by transforming it into a limited, federal world government, with powers to enact and enforce law. Clark maintained four

principles for U.N. reform: (1) universal membership, (2) weighted representation in the world legislature, (3) powers limited to peace and security, and (4) transition through negotiated agreement. His distinguished career is sketched in order to demonstrate his realism, timeliness, and practical wisdom. He was a "statesman incognito" for the United States, and an "elder statesman" for the world federalist movement. He was critical of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, contributed to some liberalization of the amendment provisions in the Charter (Art. 109, para. 3), sponsored the Dublin conference which called for federal world government in response to atomic energy, and tried to develop the Baruch plan into an adequate plan for the international control of atomic energy. With the coming of the Cold War, Clark found his opportunities closing down, but he (and Louis B. Sohn) used the discouraging time to think through the plan published as World Peace through World Law.

Frederick W. Marks III (Forest Hills, N.Y.), "Six Between Roosevelt and Hitler: America's Role in the Appeasement of Nazi Germany," The Historical Journal (of England), 28 (December 1985), pp. 969-82. Franklin Roosevelt was far more involved in the appeasement of Nazi Germany than anyone has yet supposed. Through a series of secret missions targeted at the Wilhelmstrasse, FDR explored a remarkably broad range of possibilities, all aimed at satisfying the demands of Hitler: everything from a gift of Gibraltar to Italy, courtesy of Great Britain, to retrocession of the Polish Corridor and the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, to a blessing bestowed upon Anschluss. Germany was also asked to consider a gift of American gold, along with reduction of the U.S. tariff. At one point, FDR went so far as to advocate a Monroe Doctrine for Europe which would have given Hitler effective control over the central and eastern portions. Czechoslovakia was advised by American envoys to pull out of her defensive pact with the Soviet Union -- in other words, to commit suicide. Roosevelt did all he could to bring about the Munich Conference, and later to take credit for it. Finally, the United States showed itself willing to lend moral support to a clandestine pact between Rome, London, and Paris in which Mussolini was to be satisfied on the score of unspecified Italian claims. The six envoys who headed the respective missions and who appear in the title are: Samuel Fuller, William

Bullitt, Hugh Wilson, William Davis, James Mooney, and Sumner Welles.

David Reynolds (Cambridge University, England), "The Churchill Government and the Black American Troops in Britain during World War II," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 35 (1985), 113-33. From the time that U.S. troops arrived in Britain in 1942 the British Government cooperated discreetly with U.S. Army efforts to segregate black GIs from whites and from the British. Although the Cabinet rejected an overt colour bar, the British Army tried to "educate" its troops about white American attitudes, and it came down particularly hard on women soldiers found in the company of black GIs. No official "guidance" was given to civilians, but there is evidence that an informal "whispering campaign" was fostered. The article explores British policy, both on paper and in practice, and suggests underlying reasons for it.

"A 'special relationship'?: America, Britain and the International Order since 1945," International Affairs, 62:1 (Winter 1985/6), 1-20. This article starts from the substantial evidence of Anglo-American rivalry, but notes that no diplomatic relationship is ever perfectly harmonious and asks whether this one was unusually close compared with other bilateral ties. It argues that the ties were "special" in the 1940s and 1950s, both in the "quality" of contacts and in their "importance" for each country and for the international order. Nuclear, intelligence and diplomatic collaboration are identified as being particularly significant. But since the 1960s the relationship, though still in many ways qualitatively "special", is no longer of special importance. This is explained by reference not merely to British decline, but also to changes in Western Europe, the U.S.A. and the international order as a whole.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh), "The CIA and the Demise of Anti-Anti-Americanism: Some Evidence and Reflections." A paper read at the annual meeting of the Netherlands American Studies Association, Amsterdam, May 23, 1985, and to be published in R. Kroes, ed., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam: Free University Press). From the 1950s on, the CIA became a stimulus to, instead of weapon against, anti-Americanism. There were two main

reasons for this: foreigners' resentment of the Agency's covert action programs, and poor conceptualization of the sources of anti-Americanism on the part of the Agency's leaders. It is noted that Soviet defamation was one potent source of CIA's ill repute. Another was, however, political opportunism by non-Communist leaders who thrived on nationalistic, anti-CIA rhetoric.

, "The Socio-Educational Composition of the CIA Elite: A Statistical Note," Journal of American Studies, XIX (December 1985), 421-424. Analysis of a computer-derived list of CIA entries in Who's Who in America and of a control group suggests that there is no statistical ground for doubting that CIA's leadership has been drawn from an Ivy League socio-educational elite. This made for cohesion on the one hand, but caused resentment on the other.

, "The Teaching of United States History in British Institutions of Higher Learning," in Lewis Hanke, ed., Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S., 1945-1980, 5 vols. (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus for AHA, 1985), II, 305-362. This study endorses the view that federal action replaced voluntarism in the projection of America's image abroad after 1945. British willingness to receive American academic aid, the product of domestic political trends and of a tendency toward greater social mobility in the historical profession, was a further factor assisting U.S. cultural diplomacy.

MINUTES OF THE SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING April 10, 1986

The SHAFR Council met at 8:00 p.m. on April 10, 1986, in the Hartford Room of the New York Penta Hotel. President Betty Unterberger presided. Council members present were Vice President Thomas Paterson, Richard Dean Burns, Michael Hunt, Warren Kuehl, Roger Trask, Ted Wilson, and William Kamman. Others present included William Brinker, Milton Gustafson, Daniel Helmstadter, Page Putnam Miller, and Nancy B. Tucker.

1. Page Putnam Miller of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History reported on various issues of interest to historians. She noted publication of regulations on release of the Nixon

papers. She expressed concern about a Justice Department memorandum of understanding accompanying the regulations which removes the Archivist and professional archival judgments from the decision-making on the release of the papers and states that the Archivist "serves at the pleasure of the President and is therefore subject to the President's supervision and control." Miller stated that the nomination of John Agresto as Archivist of the United States was circulating among Republicans. She noted opposition to the appointment from the OAH and the AHA. There was discussion concerning the stand of SHAFR and whether the Society should take a position on specific appointments. It was decided that SHAFR would affirm the principles and standards as outlined for the position requiring a seasoned administrator and a trained archivist. Miller discussed possible introduction of a bill on the Freedom of Information Act which would provide for expedited service if there were a compelling need. Miller questioned whether journalists with deadlines would be given priority over historians. Miller opened discussion of President Reagan's comparison of the Nicaraguan contras with the Founding Fathers. President Unterberger read a resolution of the OAH on the issue and asked if Council should send a similar resolution to the SHAFR membership for approval or disapproval. It was decided to present the issue to the SHAFR luncheon group on Saturday, April 12.

2. Daniel Helmstadter of Scholarly Resources discussed indexing Diplomatic History. It was noted that indexing should be left to SHAFR rather than Scholarly Resources because the SHAFR Council would have a better grasp of the task. Council should decide the nature of the index, who should do it, and how. It was noted that the index could be a fifth issue of Diplomatic History or a supplement. There followed several questions and comments on who should do it, the cost, and the depth of the index. Warren Kuehl moved and Michael Hunt seconded a resolution that Council endorse the necessity of indexing Diplomatic History and that a committee on method and cost be appointed. The resolution passed and President Unterberger appointed a committee of Daniel Helmstadter, Warren Kuehl, and Richard Burns. Burns is the chairman.

3. President Unterberger reported on the upcoming summer conference at Georgetown University. She noted that there would be a tour of the State Department on Friday, June 27 at 1:15 p.m. and a tour of the Old Executive Office Building on Saturday, June 28, at 11:30 a.m. The latter will require a three-weeks advance reservation. Unterberger noted her letter requesting Secretary of State George P. Shultz to be the speaker at the plenary session of SHAFR's summer conference. Although he declined, Unterberger believed the reply indicated positive support for the Foreign Relations series. Registration for the summer conference will be \$15 and \$5 for students.

4. The final cost of the Roster and Research List has not been determined. David Anderson, the newly appointed editor, is considering new approaches to future lists. There will probably be a roster supplement with the Newsletter in March, 1987.

5. Warren Kuehl and Dick Burns reported on updating and republication of the Guide. Requests for financing from the National Endowment of the Humanities have so far been unsuccessful. There will be further overtures to NEH. There was discussion on reprinting the Guide and making it available to members of SHAFR for around \$30. There will be a survey of the membership to determine how many members would purchase the Guide at the noted price. The question will be on the agenda of Council's summer meeting at Georgetown.

6. Council approved holding the summer conference in 1987 at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis in late June. George Herring of the University of Kentucky is co-chairman in charge of the program and Robert Love of the Naval Academy is co-chairman in charge of local arrangements.

7. Michael Hogan, the new editor of Diplomatic History is leaving Miami University and joining the history faculty of The Ohio State University. The editorial office of Diplomatic History will also go to The Ohio State University. It is time for contract renewal with Scholarly Resources for publication of Diplomatic History. Daniel Helmstadter presented a copy of the proposed new contract. It will be considered at the Georgetown meeting.

8. Milton Gustafson reported for the Government Relations Committee. He noted his report in the recent issue of the Newsletter. His committee will try to have a major government figure as speaker at the SHAFR summer conference at Annapolis in 1987.

9. The following winners of Bernath prizes were announced.

A. Thomas J. Noer of Carthage College won the Bernath Book Award for his Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

B. Duane Tananbaum of The Ohio State University won the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize for his article "The Bricker Amendment Controversy: Its Origins and Eisenhower's Role", Diplomatic History, IX (Winter, 1985) 73-93.

C. Nancy B. Tucker of Colgate University will be the Stuart L. Bernath Lecturer for 1987.

10. President Unterberger announced the following committee members. Those marked with an asterisk indicate the new member appointed in 1986.

Bernath Book Prize	Government Relations
Stephen Pelz, Chair, '87	1 new member every four years
Calvin D. Davis, '88	Milton Gustafson,
*Sandra Taylor, '89	Chair, '90
Bernath Article Prize	Anna Nelson, '89
James Fetzer, Chair, '87	Marlene Mayo, '88
Sally Marks, '88	Harold Langley, '87
*Gaddis Smith, '89	
Bernath Lecture	Finance
Ronald Nurse, Chair, '87	Marvin Zahniser
Dorothy V. Jones, '88	Lawrence S. Kaplan
*Clayton Koppes, '89	Joseph O'Grady
Bernath Dissertation Award	
Dennis Bozyk, Chair, '87	
Keith Nelson, '88	
*Harriet Schwar, '89	

Graebner Prize	Program (1987)
Richard D. Burns, Chair, '86	*George Herring, Co-chair
Charles DeBenedetti, '88	*Robert Love, Co-chair
Edward Bennett, '90	*Blance Wiseen Cook
*Lloyd Ambrosius, '92	*Joyce Goldberg *Robert McMahon
Holt Prize	Nominations (Elected by membership)
Bernard Burke, Chair, '87	Albert H. Bowman, Chair, '86
Michael Hogan, '88	Garry Clifford, '87
*Terry H. Anderson, '89	Roger Dingman, '88
Membership	
Ralph Weber, Chair	

11. William Kamman reported on liability insurance for SHAFR. He noted that the companies contacted have delayed processing the applications because of major changes taking place in the insurance industry.

12. There will be discussion of the 1988 summer conference at the Council meeting in June at Georgetown University.

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 10:10 p.m.

William Kamman
Executive Secretary-Treasurer.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Any SHAFR member who was inadvertently omitted from the January printing of the Roster and Research List or who would like to correct any information in the Roster and Research List is asked to correspond with the newly appointed editor: Professor David L. Anderson, Department of History, Indiana Central University, Indianapolis, Indiana 46227.

ADVANCED RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS IN FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

These fellowships were established in 1986 by the Social Science Research Council. Funds for the program are provided by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The purpose of this program is to extend research on U.S. foreign policy-making processes beyond the conventional focus on the foreign policy and national security agencies of the U.S. federal executive. The program seeks to encourage empirical research that:

- 1) analyzes how institutions, groups, sectors, or broad societal forces bear on U.S. relations with other countries;
- 2) compares the making of contemporary U.S. foreign policy to policy-making processes across historical periods, issues, or countries;
- 3) makes use of theories and insights from diverse social science disciplines.

These fellowships support one to two years of research. Awards include a stipend as well as limited funds to cover research expenses. The size of the stipend will depend on the fellow's current salary or level of experience, but the total award is expected to range between \$25,000 and \$30,000 per year.

MANUSCRIPT GUIDE

The George C. Marshall Foundation announces publication of Manuscripts Collections of the George C. Marshall Library: A Guide. Funded in part by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the guide provides an abstract for each of the 121 collections held by the library. Holdings include the papers of George C. Marshall, figures associated with General Marshall, post-war recovery and other related areas. The publication is available at no charge.

Contact:

Anita M. Weber, Assistant Archivist
George C. Marshall Foundation
P.O. Box 1600
Lexington, VA 24450

CALL FOR MANUSCRIPTS

The University of Kansas and the Joyce and Elizabeth Hall Center for the Humanities announces the revival of the University of Kansas Humanistic Studies Series, a monograph series begun in 1912. Anyone is eligible to submit a manuscript for consideration.

For information contact:

David M. Bergeron, Editor
Hall Center for the Humanities
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045
(913) 864-4798 or (913) 864-3773

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES GUIDE

A Guide to Manuscripts in the Presidential Libraries edited by Dennis A. Burton, James B. Rhoads, and Raymond W. Smock, ISBN 0-934631-00-X has been published by Research Materials Corporation, Box 243, College Park, MD 20740. This publication provides indexed descriptions of the manuscript collections, microfilm, and oral histories in all seven presidential libraries. The price is \$90.00.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES RULES MODIFICATION

The Legislative Archives Division of the National Archives is pleased to announce a modification of the rules on access to the records of the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Recently Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman of the Committee, opened for public inspection all of the Committee's records at the National Archives from the following series: legislative files, treaty files, executive communications, and petitions and memorials.

The only materials from these series that will remain unavailable are those records restricted by EO 12356 (national security classified information) and records containing personal privacy information. There is, however, relatively little restricted information among these series.

Normal rules of access to Senate records require that they be closed to public inspection for 20 years after

their creation. The National Archives has records from the Committee on Foreign Relations from 1816 to the early 1980s. For further information, please contact: David R. Kepley, Chief, Reference Branch, Legislative Archives Division, National Archives, Washington, DC 20408.

PERSONALS

Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green State University) held a Fulbright lectureship in India for two months in early 1986. He spoke at ten universities on recent U.S. foreign policy, particularly on Indo-American relations and U.S.-Southeast Asian relations.

Beverly Zweiben (Bureau of International Organization) was a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. World Conference on Women to mark the end of the U.N. decade for women. The Conference was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in July 1985.

Manfred Jonas (Union College) has been named John Bigelow Professor of History at Union College. Congratulations!

Thomas H. Buckley (University of Tulsa) was awarded a Fulbright Fellowship to Australia for the fall of 1986.

Akira Iriye (University of Chicago) is a candidate for President-elect of the American Historical Association. Good Luck!

George Herring (University of Kentucky) has been awarded a University Research Professorship for 1986-1987 and will have the year off for research and writing.

Steven L. Rearden (Herndon, Virginia) has won the 1986 Richard W. Leopold Prize given by the OAH in alternate years for the best book written by a historian connected with federal, state, or municipal government. Mr. Rearden's book is the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950. Congratulations!

Michael Hogan (Miami University), the new editor of Diplomatic History, has accepted a position at The Ohio State University to commence in the fall. Dr. Hogan will "take" the society's journal with him.

Nancy B. Tucker (Colgate University) has been promoted to full professor and is spending this spring at the State Department.

Jack Fairchild (graduate student, San Francisco State University) has been awarded a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to study with John Lukacs at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia during the coming summer.

PUBLICATIONS

Michael Schaller (University of Arizona), The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. Oxford University Press. 1986. \$22.50, ISBN 0-19-503626-3.

Richard Lukas (Tennessee Technological University), The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation. University of Kentucky Press. 1986. \$24.00, ISBN 0-813-11566-3.

Joan Hoff Wilson, ed., (Indiana University), Rights of Passage: The Past and Future of the ERA. Indiana University Press. 1986. \$22.50 cloth, ISBN 0-25-335013-1; \$6.95 paper, ISBN 0-25-320368-6.

Sharon R. Lowenstein (University of Kansas), Token Refuge: The Story of the Jewish Refugee Shelter at Oswebo, 1944-1946. Indiana University Press. 1986. \$27.50, ISBN 0253360234.

Norman Graebner, ed., (University of Virginia), The National Security: Its Theory and Practice in the United States, 1945-1960. Oxford University Press. 1986. \$29.95 cloth, ISBN 0-19-503986-6; \$9.95 paper, ISBN 0-19-503987-4.

Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers), A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan. Oxford

University Press. 1986. \$8.95 paper, ISBN 0-19-503009-0.

Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis, MD) and K. Jack Bauer (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), eds., United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic. Greenwood. 1985. \$95.00, ISBN 0-313-23133-8.

Paolo E. Coletta (Annapolis, MD) and K. Jack Bauer (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), eds., United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas. Greenwood. 1985. \$75.00, ISBN 0-313-24504-5.

Kenneth J. Hagan (Naval Academy) and William R. Roberts, eds., Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present. Greenwood. 1986. \$45.00 cloth, ISBN 0-313-21197-3; \$18.50 paper, ISBN 0-313-25280-7.

John H. Schroeder (University of Wisconsin), Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-1861. Greenwood. 1985. \$35.00, ISBN 0-313-24883-4.

CALENDAR

- June 25-28 The 12th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Georgetown University. Program co-chairs are Thomas Helde (Georgetown) and Justus Doenecke (New College, University of South Florida).
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the Bernath Dissertation Support Awards.

December 27-30 The 101st annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago. The headquarters hotel is to be the Hyatt Regency.

January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.

February 1 Deadlines for the 1986 Bernath article award and the Bernath book award.

February 1 Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter.

March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.

April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship are due.

April 2 - 5 The 80th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Philadelphia with headquarters at the Wyndham Franklin Plaza Hotel. (The deadline for submissions has passed.)

May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter.

STUART LOREN BERNATH, Ph.D.

Dr. Gerald J. Bernath and Mrs. Myrna F. Bernath

(Stuart L. Bernath, a gifted young scholar in the field of U.S. diplomatic history, with a doctorate from the University of California at Santa Barbara, died in 1970 at the age of thirty-one.

His parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernth, of Laguna Hills, California, have memorialized their late son's name and record through their support of SHAFR and SHAFR awards.

By far the great majority of the members of SHAFR have joined since the death of Stuart Bernath. To these individuals the name "Stuart L. Bernath" may not have any special significance. It is fitting therefore, that the membership be made conversant with the career of the young historian whose untimely death precipitated the establishment of the annual awards in his name. The following resume of the younger Bernath's life was written by his parents.)

Stuart Loren Bernath was born on April 10, 1939, at Detroit, Michigan. In 1961 he graduated from the University of California at Santa Barbara. His M.A. was received from Humboldt State College, California, in 1964. Although brief, his career was distinguished. As a candidate for the master's degree, he won the Barnham Prize for the writing of local California history. While working on his doctorate, he won the Civil War Round Table Fellowship Award for 1967. While still a Ph.D. candidate, he continued to write extensively and had several articles published. His hallmark was original research in depth in either previously unexplored or superficially studied facets of history. He was never satisfied until he could discover the truth about the background of historical events. Casual statements in books or other publications without adequate proof were unacceptable to him.

He recognized that nations often hid the facts of their own history in order to benefit those in power. When expunging information was in their own selfish best interests, book-burning or alteration of records were employed. Stuart believed that it was, therefore, necessary also to read the publications of other nations, be they neutral, sympathetic, or adversary. To be an accurate historian, he felt, required "hard detective work". He was convinced, as I.B. Namier said, that "the crowning attainment of historical study" required "an intuitive sense of how things do not happen." Precursory happenings of great events had to be evaluated. In his M.A. and Ph.D. candidacies, his personal notes revealed that Stuart already had the capacity for this type of research. Thus, during his graduate program he was often asked to review books of other historians. In 1968 he received his Ph.D. with distinction from the University of California at Santa Barbara. His

professors there, and particularly Dr. Alexander DeConde, were extremely inspirational in their guidance. Earlier, in his master's program at Humboldt State University in California, Professor Ralph Roske, then Chairman of the Department of History, took a close, personal interest in directing Stuart along his initial steps in the field of history because, as Dr. Roske said, "I immediately recognized Stuart as the brightest student I had ever taught." Dr. DeConde has expressed similar thoughts.

In February, 1970, the University of California Press published his major work, Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy. Reviewers unanimously hailed it as a remarkable first book, a masterful account and analysis of an intricate subject. The chief editor of the U.C. Press stated that the book was one of very few that had not received a single adverse review. Because reviews did not start to appear until months after publication, Stuart's critical illness did not allow him to live long enough to see them. Because the book did discuss aspects of maritime law, the Library of Congress has classified the book under International Law. While this may be technically correct, it is also unfortunate because it deprives the general public and even most historians of an opportunity to read a very fascinating book full of action, intrigue, and suspense, as well as a discussion of the treatment of captured neutral subjects. "It is exciting reading", as some newspaper reviewers have noted. As parents, we feel that students of American history would more readily find access to the book and enjoy reading it were it classified under "American History; or "Civil War History". At any rate, Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy is considered the authoritative book on the subject of Civil War prize cases. It has, therefore, been quoted extensively by other historians in their own books.

At the request of editors of the Encyclopedia Americana he wrote short articles on "Christian Herter" and the "Hay-Pauncefote Treaties". These appeared in the 1970 edition of the work.

In August, 1969, after several months of intensive research on William Randolph Hearst, the Hearst Press, and American foreign relations, 1887-1951, which he

calculated could be an extensive five-year project, he was stricken by bone cancer. He had already interviewed several associates of Hearst, and had planned on doing the same with all prominent Hearst contacts while they were still alive. This, in itself, would have been a two or three year task. This would have been a major work with an approach entirely different from previous books on Hearst. Inquiries from four publishing houses, evidencing great interest in reading the manuscript when completed, were received by him. His topic, encompassing the influence of the Hearst press on U.S. foreign policy, intrigued the publishers.

Notes discovered by his parents suggest that he also had in mind writing several other books. It was also discovered that during the preparing of Squall Across the Atlantic for publication Stuart rejected several suggestions of his editor because, as he said, "they altered the precise meaning of my words." His editor acknowledged that Stuart was correct and, consequently, yielded to him. Later we were to learn that his editor had sent a memorandum to the editor-in-chief that Stuart Bernath was "a man deserving special attention because he undoubtedly will be writing many fine books in the next forty years". What a tragedy that his premature death nullified this assessment!

In those years in which he was not engaged in graduate studies, Stuart insisted on earning his own financial way towards his Ph.D. by teaching at the high school in Eureka, California. He had also acted as a teaching assistant in the University of California at Santa Barbara. Subsequently, he taught at Humboldt State University, Arcata, Calif., and California State University at Long Beach where he was a serious and devoted teacher and a promising scholar who seemed destined to become an outstanding historian of American foreign relations.

An interesting fact is that, as a sophomore in Beverly Hills High School, he was a member of its International Statesmen Club which discussed foreign relationships. Was this some sort of preview of the field he finally entered?

His life on earth was ended by bone cancer on July 3, 1970, in his parent's home, Beverly Hills, California, at the young age of thirty-one plus three months.

Stuart was a true humanitarian in feeling and actions. He served as an inspiration to his friends and students. He was, for example, instrumental in prevailing upon several of these not to "drop out" of their studies with the result that some subsequently became teachers or entered other professions in a successful way. There was no hesitation on his part in loaning or giving money to students in temporary distress. War, with its death, destruction and wastefulness, was abhorrent to him. Unaffected, with no trace of conceit, he sought the advice of specialized historians when he thought he had a idea or project he should pursue. If he read an article or a book stating something which Stuart knew was incorrect, he would write a very polite letter to the author pointing out the error. He was invariably thanked in return for pointing out the discrepancy.

"At heart", he said, "I am an artist." In fact, this was true. Though not a professional photographer, his pictures of people, birds, events, and nature have a rare artistic beauty. The only photographic contest he ever entered won him a prize several years ago. He was fond of birds and since childhood had several devoted pets. He was also a lover of fine classical music, and played the Spanish glamenco guitar with remarkable agility. This was a self-learned talent.

Stuart had a desire to become a top-rated historian, as shown by this true event: He was visiting a friend, a former assistant professor in college who had quit teaching to take up the study of law. Stuart asked his friend why he had forsaken the teaching profession. The answer was, "I want to become rich". Stuart responded, "I'm sure you will become a rich lawyer. My intention is to become a famous historian." Thus, his urge and purpose in life were brought to the surface.

In recognition of his outstanding scholarship, the History Department of the University of California at Santa Barbara had named its annual award for the best essay in history by an undergraduate student "The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize". This was ultimately dropped in deference to the more meaningful

prizes set up through the cooperation of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. An essay prize bearing Stuart's name is administered by the History Department of California State University at Long Beach. A major book collection in American Foreign Diplomacy bears Stuart's name at the U.C. Santa Barbara Library. It is constantly being augmented by contributions from historians, and other donors, as well as by internal funding. The Library welcomes donations of new and old books to the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Collection. A similar but less extensive collection exists at California State University at Long Beach. A fund for research in the field of Immunology of Cancer has been established at the City of Hope National Medical Center, Duarte, California, in the suburbs of Los Angeles. This fund in Stuart's name, is supported by his parents, relatives, friends, former colleagues and others interested in the ultimate conquest of cancer.

Lastly, there was Stuart's determination to fight his unrelenting, painful disease to the very last moment. He knowingly and willingly submitted himself to dangerous experimental procedures proposed by his oncologists in their hopeful effort to save him from certain death. In their words, "He was one of the bravest men we've ever met."

In view of the fact that Stuart was

A young man of character and high ideals;

A brilliant, multi-talented individual;

A humanitarian who helped others and despised injustices;

A devoted teacher who stimulated thinking in his discussions and assignments;

A man with a burning desire to excel and ultimately reach the pinnacle in his chosen field; and

A heroic fighter of his disease.

We, his parents, with great love and unabated sorrow, believe that Stuart, as an exceptional individual, deserves such recognition by memorialization. With

the kindly cooperation of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, it is our dearest wish to help younger historians in achieving their own aspirations by inspiring them to reach their utmost capabilities in the field of American Foreign Relations. Towards this goal, we are financing certain prizes and/or other scholarly aids. Stuart would have approved of this, as shown by his own acts during his brief lifetime. Could anything better befit his memory?

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize, were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

Description: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1986. It must be the author's first or second monograph.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The book should be sent directly to: Stephen E. Pelz, History Department, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003.

Books may be sent at any time during 1986, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1987.

The award of \$1500.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American

Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in April, 1987, in Philadelphia.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
	Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
	Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
	Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his/her own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vita, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1987. The chairman of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Ronald J. Nurse, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in Diplomatic History

Previous Winners

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985	Michael Schaller (Arizona)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1986. The author must be under 45 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: Nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1987. It will be helpful if the person making the nomination can supply at least one copy and if possible five (5) copies. The chairperson of the committee is: James Fetzer, State University of New York, Maritime College/Ft. Schuyler, Bronx, New York 10465.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1987, in Philadelphia.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Fund

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. An award will help defray:
 - (a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources
 - (b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript
 - (c) abstracting costs.
3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are not intended for general research or for time to write.
4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.
5. A report on how the funds were used must be filed by the successful applicant(s) not later than six (6) months following presentation of each award.
6. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the applicant's request and report of completion.
7. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Dennis Bozyk, 33952 Spring Valley, Westland, Michigan 48185. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1986.

Previous winners:

1985	John Nielson	(UC-Santa Barbara)
1986	Valdinia C. Winn	(University of Kansas)
	Walter L. Hixon	(University of Colorado)

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray travel and living expenses connected with the research and/or the writing of the dissertation.

To be qualified, applicants must be candidates in good standing at a doctoral granting graduate school who will have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree (including the general or comprehensive examinations) except for the dissertation before April, 1987.

There is no special application form. Applicants must submit a complete academic transcript of graduate work to date. A prospectus of the dissertation must accompany the application. This should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used.

Three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, should be submitted to the committee.

Deadline for filing applications and supporting letters for this year's award will be April 1, 1987.

Applications should be addressed to the Chairperson of this year's W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

BONERS

The China Lobby success was enhanced by growing an anti-Communist phobia in the United States because of the situation in Europe and later the discovery of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union.

Geoff Smith (Queen's University)

Dow was the leading manufacturer of napalm, a genocide used in Vietnam.

Melvin Small (Wayne State University)

President Johnson was president via the assignation of J.F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green State University)

The Nurembergs were a husband and wife convicted of espionage and sentenced to death. There is some doubt of whether they would have been treated so harshly if these trials had not taken place during the Red Scare.

The New Left was the Grand Old Party or the Republican Party.

The New Left "is what the Kennedy administration was dubbed." This was due to his personality and ideas.

Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana University)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University,
Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Donna Mealer and Payton Robbins.

ISSUES: The Newsletter is published on the 1st of
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DEADLINES: All material should be sent to the editor
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Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the Newsletter
may be obtained from the editorial office upon
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members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements,
abstracts of scholarly papers and articles
delivered--or published--upon diplomatic sub-
jects, bibliographical or historiographical
essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, infor-
mation about foreign depositories, biographies,
autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the
field, jokes, etc.

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