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Page

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1 | Diplomacy and Political Change by David D. Newsom |
| 13 | President Johnson, Self-determination, and the War in Vietnam |
| 21 | Announcements |
| 25 | Abstracts |
| 28 | Personals |
| 30 | Publications |
| 32 | Calendar |
| 33 | Awards and Prizes |
| 40 | A.E.A.R. Newsletter |

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(The Honorable David D. Newsom, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador to Libya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, served as chairman of a session at the Georgetown University SHAFR summer meeting. Mr. Newsom prepared a paper but time and format prevented its presentation. That paper is presented below. --editor)

DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE

by

The Honorable David D. Newsom

The eerie stillness in the early morning is suddenly broken by the sound of steel shutters being lowered. The few shops that have opened close again. The rumble of tanks can be heard and, perhaps, some shots. People stay in their homes and turn on radios. Martial music and cryptic messages announce a coup.

For the U.S. diplomat, the questions begin immediately - from the local press, from Washington. What has happened? Did the United States know it was going to happen? Why not? Who are the new leaders?

Abrupt political change has taken place.

In the past ten years, sudden changes of government have taken place in more than 25 countries.

Political change is clearly not a rarity.

But modern communications have made us more conscious than ever of such change. The drama, the violence, the tragedy, and the new personalities come vividly into our living rooms.

Modern communications have also stimulated change.

The impact of the French Revolution was eventually felt throughout Europe - but the immediate effect was confined to Paris.

Today, as in the case of Iran, one man, living in a village south of Paris, could, by telephone and tape recorder, arouse a whole nation to revolt nearly three thousand miles away.

In my career, I have been close to five such unpredicted overthrows; in each one appreciable U.S. interests were involved. In each one, U.S. diplomacy was faulted for being unable to detect or prevent such occurrences.

In 1958, I was the desk officer for Iraq when a military coup overthrew the government of King Faisal. The event marked the end of Iraq's participation in U.S. backed regional defense arrangements and of the close cooperation with Western countries in many fields.

In 1969, a small group of Libyan army officers headed by Muammer Qadhafi overthrew the government of King Idris. I had served until three months before the coup as ambassador to Libya and was, at the time of the coup, the responsible assistant secretary in Washington. This coup, also, ended close cooperation with Libya, including the use of Wheelus Air Force Base outside of Tripoli.

In 1975, a leftist military group toppled the regime of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. I had been one of the officials who, in earlier years, had sensed the uncertain future of the Emperor's regime and had sought to persuade him to look to the future. The United States lost a friendly regime and important military communications facilities at Asmara.

In 1979, when I was under secretary of state I witnessed the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the efforts to find a non-leftist alternative to the rule of Somoza in Nicaragua.

The American press, public and government depend on the diplomat to detect and prevent such changes and look for diplomatic failures when the nation is taken by surprise.

The United States does not live easily with abrupt change; the coup d'etat is not part of our tradition. Yet we are, as a nation, often an instrument of change. With the establishment by the Congress, in

1985, of the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States is officially committed, as never before, to changing the nature of governments in other countries.

Many who have led coups against oppressive regimes have claimed inspiration from the history and philosophy of the United States. Many bitter opponents of authoritarian regimes friendly to us have been students returning from education in the United States who have seen the contrast between the freedoms they were witnessing and the reality of their own country.

The American film and, now, American television are widely viewed abroad and present images in sharp contrast to the poverty and oppression that exist in many countries. Such images create pressures for change; at the same time, among conservatives in traditional societies, they breed resentment of the United States as the source of radical political and social influences. That the United States was seen as the villain in Iran's Islamic revolution was in part due to the deep resentment in conservative Muslim societies against the cultural influences stemming from the West - and, in particular, from the United States.

Our development assistance programs can be an instrument of change. The introduction of new approaches to agriculture or education can reveal the inadequacy of traditional methods and generate demands for new social and political policies.

American communities abroad, by their life style, have also had an impact, both favorable and unfavorable. At the same time that individual Americans may build strong personal relationships in a country, the overall influence of the wealthier foreigners may breed envy and resentment.

The global position we assumed as a nation made it inevitable that the American diplomat would be involved in the internal affairs of other countries. In our confrontation with the Soviets around the world, the stability of friendly regimes became vital to our global support on political issues, our retention of military facilities, and the maintenance of regional defense alliances.

In our empathetic view of the world, we acquired a sense of responsibility for what happened in other societies - almost a sense of guilt when changes took place. In our political culture, it is we who have "lost" a country - even when the peoples of that country cannot save it. We see revolts in other countries as an indication of our lack of vigilance or influence, rather than as signs of serious weakness in the country affected.

As it became apparent that our global policies would require that we work closely with regimes that were undemocratic, if not brutally oppressive, many in the United States became more and more uncomfortable. The diplomat serving in such a country was in the center of an American national debate between those who wanted to preserve a friendly status quo and those who wanted to risk change to a better or reformed regime.

We personalize our view of governments, leaders, and problems. We see friendship in terms of our relationship with individual leaders, creating in the minds of others a close identification with regimes and rulers. Because we are uncomfortable with the concept of interests, we stress friendship and identity of views with foreign leaders. Actions and rhetoric based on friendship cannot help but create an image of support and identification. President Carter praised the Shah of Iran for his "island of stability" just a few months before the Shah was overthrown. Vice President Bush spoke positively about democracy in the Philippines, despite the problems of President Marcos' autocratic rule. Many of my diplomatic colleagues and I have had the experience of drafting statements for U.S. leaders to be given during a meeting with a foreign head of state. Where we have felt a certain correct cordiality rather than effusiveness was required, the political leaders have disagreed. "Your statement is not friendly enough." The result often can be a statement suggesting to the local population American support for an unpopular leader in deep trouble. U.S. interests can and do suffer.

Political changes in countries where the U.S. has had major facilities or other interests have meant the end of the U.S. relationship largely because of the close identification of the United States with the

overthrown ruler. New regimes have frequently considered the United States a principal adversary, either because of the slowness of the United States in recognizing the new regime, because of suggestions that the U.S. may seek to reestablish a former regime, or because the U.S. is associated with the oppressive acts of the predecessor. When the regime falls, the United States has fallen with it.

We seek to explain political change in terms of inimical external influences, subversion, the deliberate effort by our adversaries to outflank our geopolitical position. We have difficulty accepting the fact that revolutions basically come from built-up internal grievances. External elements may be there, but they would not succeed in their efforts if the internal weaknesses in the society were not present.

The task of the diplomat in such situations is to seek to detect the seeds of change, to report them, and to look for ways to seek to protect U.S. interests against a violent change. Where possible, the United States seeks to encourage peaceful change, while, at the same time, preserving an effective working relationship with the government in power.

Detecting the seeds of change requires the mobilization of an embassy to establish relationships with as many elements of a population as possible. Pressures for change originate from many quarters and many factors: population growth, urban migration, disillusionment with leaders, discriminatory educational policies, corruption, excessive living costs, and the absence of institutionalized procedures for democratic change. The diplomat must evaluate the degree to which such pressures are building as well as assess the quarters from which change might come.

Radical change is often unexpected and undetected. Leaders may be unknown even to the rulers of a regime and the police apparatus. Muammer Qadhaffi of Libya was known to very few; his role in the coup became known only some weeks after the coup itself.

To detect the seeds, diplomats must delve beneath layers of a society often traditionally closed to foreigners. The revolution in Iran could first be detected in the sermons in the Shia mosques. Not only did the Shah's regime discourage contact between

foreign diplomats and religious leaders, but the mosques were closed to all non-Muslims. The presence of a foreign diplomat, particularly from a non-Muslim country, would probably have been quickly detected.

Many coups originate in the military. The younger military officers who have coups in their minds are the very ones who, being nationalistic and often xenophobic, shut themselves off from the outsider. In countries with which the United States has a close military relationship they may be the ones who most resent the dependence created by that relationship. Again, in Iran, the first open revolt against the American military presence was by non-commissioned technicians especially trained by the United States.

Cannot the C.I.A. meet this need to "penetrate" these reclusive layers of society? Within some limits, the answer is "yes." The priority task of officers of the CIA in friendly countries is generally directed at Soviet, East European, and other adversary elements. Either because of limited resources or, in some cases, agreement with local security services, they do not "target" the local society. When they do, my experience suggests that they are no more successful in anticipating trouble through their clandestine approach than are the political officers of the embassy with a more open and direct approach.

A clandestine service can penetrate another society by finding those disenchanting persons or persons with serious personal problems who are open to inducements of money or future exile. In a tight, idealistic society the pressures against such a defection are intense. They are equally so in many military establishments; the risk of being charged with treason is a strong deterrent to cooperation with outsiders.

The seeds of change are planted deep and they mature slowly. While some coups may be sudden "spur-of-the-moment" affairs, many represent a long period of planning by a small, tight group. Our diplomats come and go; their ability to establish the kind of relationships over time that would penetrate such a group is limited. Even those who live in the country and whose job it is to penetrate such groups are frequently unable to do so until it is too late.

Although the source and timing of political change may be difficult for a diplomat to detect, the growing weakness of a regime is not. The signs of disaffection, of polarization, that precede violent change are often clear.

In much of the Third World, individuals are more important than institutions or constitutions. A smooth succession depends upon the willingness of a ruler to look beyond death. Aging rulers, unwilling to face and prepare for their death, present an open invitation to radical change. Invariably they are reluctant to choose a successor or to give scope to those chosen. The moment such a choice is made, the ruler loses part of his or her aura and power; those around the throne immediately begin to curry favor with the future, not the past. It is the royal, authoritarian version of the "lame duck."

King Idris of Libya grew less and less interested in ruling, more and more distant from his people. His contempt for his nephew, the crown prince, was widely known. The king was out of the country on a long vacation when the Qadhaffi coup occurred.

Haile Selassie, in a similar fashion, was suspicious of the crown prince, his son. Like other Byzantine rulers, he had played one figure off against another for so long, he was unwilling to lay the mantle on any possible successor in his lifetime.

In many instances, diplomats have been asked to discuss the future with aging rulers. It is not a popular subject. I raised the succession issue with King Idris and, as a visiting Washington official, with Haile Selassie. With King Idris, a masque came over his face that said, quite unmistakably, this subject is out of bounds. Haile Selassie responded by assuring me that all was well; the crown prince would succeed. Yet we knew from other information that he was doing little to support the crown prince, that he was suspicious of him, and that, on one occasion, the emperor had said to close associates that he was not concerned with what would come after his own death.

Internal rivalries in anticipation of the death of a ruler are another sign. The maneuvering of those seeking power becomes clear to any alert diplomat -

even though those openly maneuvering may not, in the end, be the ones who seize power.

Official corruption may reach a point where it is beyond even the normal tolerance of a people. The pressures on an Asian or African ruler for favors by those surrounding him, supported by long tradition, can be irresistible. King Idris of Libya permitted one family, the Shalhi family, to profit substantially from the negotiation of oil contracts. The widespread knowledge of this was undoubtedly a factor in the lack of support for the king at the time of the coup.

Few challenge the conclusion that the misuse of relief funds following the Managua earthquake in Nicaragua was a factor in the final assault on Somoza's regime.

An Arab merchant sitting next to me on an airplane a few years ago said to me with great assurance, "I can always tell when a coup is about to take place in a country. It is when the side payments to officials on a contract reach over 25 percent."

There are other signs to watch for.

A ruler may become so isolated that he is solely dependent upon those around him for a view of events. Those close to him are unlikely to give him the truth about local opposition or resentment of his rule.

The domination of one ethnic or religious group by another or age-old tensions between groups can become exacerbated in periods of unrest. A taunting intolerance and desperate reaches for power characterize ancient rivalries. The tragic divisions in Lebanon stem from bitter hatred built up among internal religious groups; outside forces, whether Palestinian or Israeli removed what fabric of accord existed.

A vicious circle of brutal repression can be another cause. To stay in power, a regime may clamp down hard on its citizens. That very act not only weakens the regime's ability to govern, but also adds a measure of vengeance to political change when it comes.

The diplomat, in such cases, must sift through the traditional barbs and slurs that one group uses about another to detect that degree of genuine bitterness

that can presage an explosion. U.S. diplomats in Lebanon were long aware of the deep ethnic and religious differences in that country. It was clear that these could some day explode into dangerous and reciprocating violence. It took only a spark to ignite; it was not possible to predict exactly when that spark would flash.

Authoritarian regimes live by oppression. As their popularity may decline, the oppression will grow. They depend more and more on the security services that provide the information and carry out the acts of violence against the population. Approaches to a ruler to discourage such acts are met by clear indications that a reform of their methods is unlikely. The ruler is beholden to these services for his survival - or has, at least, been led to believe so.

Economic factors must be watched. In most developing countries, poverty, in itself, may not breed revolt. The exodus of the poor from their villages to urban areas in search of better opportunities for livelihood, however, can create a mass ready to support change if their own economic situation worsens. This was one of the elements leading to the revolution in Iran.

The diplomat assessing the possibilities of political change must gauge the depth of dissatisfaction. Coups against established leaders succeed either when there are few who will raise their hands to defend the ruler or where the depth of dissatisfaction is such that the newcomers ride the crest of a popular wave. When Qaddafi staged his coup in Libya, no one raised a hand to defend King Idris, although the king was not a despised ruler. Some did raise their hands to defend the Shah of Iran, but the weight of a mass revolution swept away this defense.

Resentment can be heightened by a feeling of dislocation or by a sense of a great disparity in a society. Ostentatious wealth can become a target of resentment and ultimate revolt.

Finally, modernization, itself, can create changes in a society - urbanization, new social classes, heightened expectations, and profound changes in value systems and traditional beliefs. Inevitably these changes can create stresses on political leaders and

fragile institutions. When neither the ruler nor the institutions can be adapted to accommodate these changes, political unrest and violent upheaval can result.

Reporting possible unrest or change in a country in which the United States has important interests is not always welcome in Washington. Much depends on the credibility of the ambassador or the reporting officer. The assessment of the diplomatic reporter must compete with other information flowing to the decision makers from intelligence sources, from the military, from business, from other capitals, and from friends of the beleaguered ruler. Policymakers gain a vested interest in the continuance of a comfortable relationship with a ruler or a regime, a relationship solidified occasionally by the rhetoric of toasts or arrival statements during visits. Perhaps there have been letters from the U.S. president to the ruler indicating an official interest and support. When an ambassador may report that the ruler is in trouble and may not survive, policymakers naturally will seek opinions that may be more optimistic.

If Washington does accept the fact that a regime is in trouble, the question then arises: what can be done about it?

How we react as a government and as a nation inevitably affects the attitudes of other nations in the area and of our principal allies. If we seem to fail to support a friend, this can cast doubt on our assurances to others. Excessive statements of support can be counter-productive, adding the burden of a foreign identification to a beleaguered ruler. Our friends in the region look at our reactions and our attitudes as indicators of our will and resolve. Our adversaries, too, take advantage of each phrase, each turn to exploit anti-American attitudes existing as the result of our identification with a regime in trouble.

We can deal with crises of political change neither in silence nor at leisure. The speed of communications, the debate over different approaches, and the pressure of events make reaction inevitable. Reaction, in turn, can directly affect the events creating the concern. A statement that we "no longer support" a ruler can speed the ruler's fall; a statement of

support when all hope has gone can make relations with the successor regime more difficult.

The diplomats on the spot can bring their assessment of the situation to the attention of the rulers and officials of the foreign government. They can, beyond that, make suggestions of steps that might be taken to relieve the pressure or put the government in a more favorable light. Such an approach may be met by unrealistic demands for U.S. support. In few cases, is the approach fully welcomed.

Seldom, if ever, will a ruler admit to a foreign diplomat that he is in serious trouble. The reaction is more likely to be that he is being assailed by unfriendly forces - probably communists - and needs more support. His salvation lies not with himself, but with the United States.

Suggestions of specific steps that might be taken - reforms, reassuring statements, changes in personnel - are, except in rare instances, likely to be taken as unwarranted interference in the ruler's internal affairs. The ruler, quite logically, may feel he knows more about his political environment than does an ambassador.

Even an unpopular ruler can turn outside pressures to his benefit by exploiting latent nationalist feelings against external intervention. An ambassador or diplomat seeking to make suggestions regarding the internal workings of another state, may also encounter the suspicions of those who live in an atmosphere of conspiracy and intrigue. Who is behind this ambassador's effort? Who do the Americans want to put in my place?

Opposition elements in some countries will oppose the efforts of foreign diplomats to press reforms upon unpopular regimes. In their view, to do so is merely to seek to perpetuate a basically unacceptable regime through giving the ruler the option of reform.

An ambassador's discussions can be supplemented by signals. A diplomat can increase the meetings with known opposition leaders, can decline invitations to events of special importance to the ruler. A diplomat can make equivocal public statements, less warm toward the regime than previous statements. In countries

where the American ambassador's actions are closely observed, such acts can begin to plant doubts in a ruler's mind about the degree of U.S. support. In some cases, they can perhaps make him more receptive to the assessments and suggestions that come from the U.S. embassy.

To carry out such a policy a diplomat must have the certainty of support in Washington. When the ruler hears from his embassy in Washington that U.S. administration officials are saying different things, are reiterating their strong expressions of support, the word of the diplomat on the spot has little force.

Signals are important, not only to suggest to the ruler a diminished enthusiasm for his rule, but, also, to suggest to the population that the United States is not inextricably tied to the ruler in power. Until the recent events in the Philippines, the United States had never successfully accomplished this where a close relationship had existed. U.S. actions, even in the case of the Philippines, were clouded by the debate in the United States between those who wished to stay with the ruler to the bitter end and those who would support change, with all its risks.

When change does take place, policymakers in Washington must adopt an attitude toward the new regime. Is it to be welcomed or accepted as an inevitable fact? Or are hopes entertained that the process can be reversed? Are statements of support more likely to harm or to help a new regime?

The United States government is not, by its nature, capable of the subtle application of pressure. Neither, therefore, are U.S. diplomats. Diverse opinions within the government, varied channels to a ruler, and the ever present possibility of leaks disclosing a strategy make exceedingly difficult any broad orchestration of a pattern of change. In the Philippines, the United States was aided by the traditions of that country and a strong opposition movement. Such conditions are not likely to be duplicated in other areas.

Not all political change has been adverse to U.S. interests. The changes in Indonesia in 1965, in Egypt

in 1973, in Portugal in 1974, and in Spain in 1975 are examples.

When change is viewed as favorable to U.S. interests, the U.S. government must avoid overreacting in a way that will either raise expectations of support or identify the new regime too closely with Washington. Seldom can new regimes reject totally the basic national policies of the predecessor. The Indonesian regime that replaced Sukarno in 1965 did not wish, for example, to depart from the traditional Indonesian stance of "non-alignment". The political maneuvering within any country remains within boundaries established by history and tradition.

In areas where the regime is unfriendly, U.S. diplomats will frequently be approached by dissident politicians and others with plans to overthrow the government. As tempting as the thought may be, the wise diplomat will reject such approaches. They could be a trap by the regime in power; they could have little prospect of success. It is almost certain that approaches such as this - and the American response - will become known.

The prospect of political change presents U.S. diplomats with special tasks and difficulties. Our political system, our tendency to look at the world in terms of friendship makes it difficult for us to turn our backs on friends, no matter how unattractive or undemocratic they may be. Although we can predict possible change, we are much less certain about how we can prevent it if we wish to do so or live with it if it happens.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

by

Delber L. McKee (Westminster College, PA)

"We're in South Vietnam today because we want to allow a little nation self-determination "

Lyndon Johnson
June 27, 1967

Self-determination, a precept in foreign relations not easily defined but commonly thought of as the right of a people to establish their own government and elect their own leaders,¹ has been fondly embraced by American political leaders of the twentieth century. Among presidents, those closely identified with self-determination were Woodrow Wilson, who adopted it in his Fourteen Points and applied it in the remaking of European political boundaries at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and Franklin Roosevelt, who avoided the terminology but expressed the spirit of it in the Atlantic Charter of 1941.² At Roosevelt's behest, the Yalta Conference of 1945 called for its application to the countries of Eastern Europe, soon to be liberated by the armies of the Soviet Union.³ President Lyndon Johnson was in good company when in the 1960s he publicly adopted this principle as the goal that justified American military intervention in Vietnam.

To Americans in general the principle has had great appeal as an altruistic and high minded, if paternalistic, approach for their nation to take in its relations with other countries. It is eminently satisfying to the idealistically inclined citizen. Since most Americans like to believe their country's foreign policy is on a higher plane than that of other nations anyway, their predilections are enhanced by their nation's firm identification with a doctrine so enlightened and unselfish.

Nevertheless, while the idealism is rightly to be recognized, it is no secret to scholars that a darker, more self-serving, feature has sometimes appeared: that the principle has been used on occasion by American presidents as a device to manipulate and control a foreign nation; that it has even been employed to thwart self-determination; and that, in fact, it has sometimes been treated as a weapon in the arsenal of realpolitik.

A revealing study in the use of self-determination to serve American national interests is the examination of Johnson's dealing with Vietnam in the 1960s. After suddenly becoming president on November 22, 1963, he soon found the shaky condition of the South Vietnamese government to be one of his most challenging foreign policy problems. Picking up where Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy left off, Johnson

gradually moved beyond supplying economic aid and military advisers to South Vietnam by sanctioning military intervention in 1965 against North Vietnam. It was inevitable that, with this growing military involvement, the president would also become embroiled in the political affairs of dangerously unstable South Vietnam. How did Johnson face this political challenge? How far did he go in using the rhetoric of self-determination in the problem of Vietnam? How much did he mean in what he said? Was self-determination a feasible policy for Vietnam?

Johnson's frequent use of the term self-determination in connection with Vietnam is easily illustrated. In his State of the Union Message of January 12, 1966, he declared that the United States was fighting "for the principle of self-determination" in that country.⁴ In a speech to the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Baltimore on June 27, 1967, he repeatedly invoked the term. "We're in South Vietnam today," he asserted, "because we want to allow a little nation self-determination."⁵ In the same speech, he proclaimed, "We Americans are deeply concerned about the recognition of the right of self-determination--self-determination is really the right to live." Again, reverting to the same theme later in this address but now giving it an economic twist, he stated: "We believe that the real self-determination" can only come "when hunger and disease and ignorance and poverty are overcome."⁶

Not only Johnson but other members of his administration extolled the right to self-determination. Dean Rusk, his secretary of state, for example, paid homage to the principle in his speech to the Detroit Economic Club on September 4, 1964. Indeed, he saw self-determination as "a scarlet thread of American policy." Starting with the year 1776, he declared, this thread could be traced through American history from Jefferson's stress on the need for governments to be based upon the "consent of the governed," on up to the present time, when the need was still felt for peoples to recover "what Woodrow Wilson called the right of self-determination."⁷

Further illustrations are hardly necessary to establish the point that Johnson, Rusk, and others in his administration often used the rhetoric of self-determination with Vietnam in mind. But was Johnson

sincere? How strong were his convictions about the right of self-determination in Southeast Asia?

Johnson's private utterances, one finds, did not follow the same course as his public pronouncements. Statements he made in a confidential report to President Kennedy after his return from a trip to Southeast Asia, and while still vice president, disclose that he was not really a champion of self-determination. This document, entitled "Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan," May 23, 1961, never intended for publication but contained in the Pentagon Papers and made public in 1971, is most revealing. His conclusion in this report was that the "battle against Communism" would have to be "joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination."⁸ The United States he asserted, would have to provide leadership. It "should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia." Vietnam and Thailand were "the immediate--and most important--trouble spots, critical to the U.S." Indeed, he insisted, the "basic decision" in Southeast Asia was there. "We must decide whether to help those countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in that area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a 'Fortress America' concept." As to Vietnam, continued Johnson, the United States "must decide whether to support Diem--or let Vietnam fall." But, the "fundamental decision required of the United States" was "whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel."⁹

While this statement by Johnson includes a great deal of ideological verbiage--"forces of freedom," "threat of Communism" and similar phrasing--it is nevertheless evident that he was primarily alarmed over a perceived threat to the strategic position of the United States in Asia. "Asian Communism," he declared, "is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent." But, lacking "this inhibitory influence, the island outposts--Philippines, Japan, Taiwan--have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea."¹⁰ Clearly Johnson meant that the United States, for military reasons, would have to support governments in Southeast Asia that would serve the national interest of the United States.

In this 1961 report the vice president expressed no interest in self-determination. What he wanted in Southeast Asia were pro-American governments, and he favored using any means--military alliances, economic aid, military power--to preserve or achieve them. There is no reason to believe that Johnson ever changed his mind or his policy from 1961 through his presidential years to 1969 when he left office. Realpolitik was motivating this complex person far more than the ideal of self-determination. "I am not going to lose Vietnam,"¹¹ Johnson swore to Henry Cabot Lodge, his ambassador to South Vietnam at the time. That was his fixed aim--his obsession.

But even if the president had believed heart and soul in self-determination, was it a viable goal for Vietnam? Most assuredly not. The Vietnamese people, with their colonial heritage, had no acquaintance with the electoral process implied in the doctrine.¹² In fact, French rule, which had continued for nearly a century, had been marked by a lack of sympathy for self-determination in the form of elections or any other form of popular representation. Before the French governed, Vietnam had experienced a traditional authoritarian Asian government. The problem of boundaries compounded the possible use of self-determination. Since North and South Vietnam were parts of an ethnic unit artificially and temporarily divided at the 17th parallel at the Geneva Conference in 1954, the principle of self-determination would be violated, in a sense, if elections were only held in South Vietnam. The prospects of getting any cooperation from North Vietnam on this subject were nil.

In addition to the problems of inexperience and geographical divisions, another that cannot be ignored is the fact that elections have often failed to accomplish their stated purpose. The most glaring example, in recent decades, of a perversion of the election process is probably the case of Eastern European countries after World War II, where elections held under the supervision of the Soviet Union resulted in the installation of pro-Soviet Communist governments. Many cases of rigged elections, however, have occurred in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere in recent years. In fact, lip service to the principle of self-determination and its betrayal in practice had become a sophisticated art form by the

1960s. If the government, or supervising political power, controls the press and other media, prohibits public rallies by opposition parties, and jails or kills leading opposition candidates, the election outcome is never in doubt.¹³

Dean Acheson, many years after his tenure as Secretary of State under President Harry Truman, described self-determination as "often invoked" but "delusive."¹⁴ He illustrated how confusing and nearly meaningless the term could be by discussing the island of Cyprus, which, at the time of the speech on December 10, 1964, had been invaded and was still occupied by Turkish troops. Meanwhile, Greece denounced this Turkish incursion. Acheson pointed to the various appeals to self-determination by the parties involved:

In the continuing dispute over Cyprus it has been invoked by nearly all parties to the struggle to support whatever they were temporarily seeking to achieve--by all Cypriotes to justify revolt against British rule, by Archbishop Markarios to support an independent government for the whole island, by Greek Cypriotes as a foundation for enosis (union) with Greece, and by Turkish Cypriotes for partition of the island and double enosis, union of one part with Greece and the other with Turkey.¹⁵

In this comment, Acheson well substantiates his case; self-determination is slippery in meaning and application.

It is apparent that Johnson talked a great deal about setting the goal of self-determination when he turned to the use of American military power in Vietnam, but his real purpose was to serve the national interest of the United States, as he interpreted it, by installing a non-Communist, pro-American government in South Vietnam. Perhaps there is nothing new or surprising in this conclusion; and, one should hasten to add, "idealism and self interest," as Robert O. Osgood points out, "Need not be mutually exclusive in international relations."¹⁶ Nevertheless, in Johnson's case, realpolitik had the stronger claim. But even if Johnson had been supporting self-determination as an idealistic goal in its own right in Vietnam--as he publicly proclaimed--it is obvious that he faced circumstances that made that goal, in the conventional form of free elections in South Vietnam, virtually impossible.

This study may serve as a reminder that scholars in the fields of diplomatic history and international politics have to be on their guard against misleading idealistic vocabulary used by American presidents to disguise what are basically the ends of the Realist. Manifestly they need to be especially watchful when public officials dealing with foreign policy use the term self-determination.

NOTES

¹According to Alfred Cobban, self-determination is "in general terms, the belief that each nation has a right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government." Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (New York, 1970), p. 39. To Thomas A. Bailey it is the "asserted right of a people (usually homogeneous) in a territorial unit to determine their political status." Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 1980), p. 985.

²Bailey, Diplomatic History, pp. 598-99, 728-29. In the "Atlantic Charter," note especially: "they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Thomas P. Brockway, Basic Documents in United States Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (New York, 1967), p. 103.

³Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 764.

⁴New York Times, Jan. 13, 1966, p. 14.

⁵Ibid., June 28, 1967, p. 24.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., Sept. 15, 1964, p. 14.

⁸Doc. #21 in Neil Sheehan et al., eds., The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times (New York, 1971), p. 133.

⁹Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 133.

¹¹Quoted in David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1969), p. 298.

¹²Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, taking into account the absence of a democratic tradition in the Western sense, saw bringing democracy to Vietnam "clearly an impossible task." Quoted in George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), p. 159.

¹³With a great deal of American prodding, the South Vietnamese government attempted to hold elections in 1967. Johnson's subsequent judgment was that the "campaign was hard-fought but clean." Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York, 1971), p. 264. Historian George Herring, more critical, notes that there was a "wholesale disqualification of opposition candidates" and that the "regime conducted" elections "under conditions which made defeat unlikely." Also, "there was evidence of considerable last-minute fraud." Herring, America's Longest War, p. 160. A harsher assessment of elections in South Vietnam is given by Hugh Higgins, who wrote: "The evidence suggests that every election in South Vietnam has been rigged." He referred to "bribery, terror, and disqualification of unfriendly voters." Hugh Higgins, Vietnam, second ed. (London, 1982), p. 88.

¹⁴New York Times, December 10, 1964, p. 16.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Robert O. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1953, pp. 441-42.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR ACTIVITIES AT CHICAGO

- Council Meeting 8 p.m. Saturday (Dec. 27)
 Board of Options Room, 33rd floor-West Tower
- Reception 5-7 p.m. Sunday (Dec. 28)
 Water Tower Room
- SHAFR Luncheon 12-2 p.m. Monday (Dec. 29)
 Grand Ballroom C-South

The luncheon speaker will be President Betty Unterberger. Her topic, "Woodrow Wilson and the Bolsheviks: The 'Acid Test' of Soviet-American Relations."

SUMMER MEETING PROPOSALS

The annual SHAFR meeting will be held at the U.S. Naval Academy, June 24-27, 1987. All persons interested in presenting papers, organizing sessions, or serving as chairs or commentators, should submit their names and, where appropriate, titles and abstracts of papers. Full panels are preferred but not required. Deadline for submitting proposals is January 1, 1987. Submit proposals to:

George C. Herring
Department of History
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

As an American Historical Association member on the Joint Committee on Historians and Archivists and as the incoming president of SHAFR, Tom Paterson welcomes information from SHAFR members who have recently conducted research at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. He is particularly interested in learning about how the new security and copying rules are working in the main research room. Please be

specific about both positive and negative aspects, and feel free to suggest recommendations for improving research. Write to:

Professor Thomas G. Paterson
Department of History, U-103
241 Glenbrook Road
Storrs, CT 06268

CARTER LIBRARY

Dedication of the Carter Presidential Library was held on October 1, 1986. Some 27 million pages of documents and other memorabilia were moved into the new facility over the summer. The address is: 1 Copen Hill Avenue, Atlanta, GA.

8TH NAVAL HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

The United States Naval Academy will host the eighth Naval History Symposium on 24-25 September 1987. The Symposium is seeking papers on all topics relating to naval and maritime history. Proposals should be sent to Assistant Professor William B. Cogar, History Department, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402. The deadline for proposals is 1 March 1987.

POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, has announced that for the academic year 1987-88 it plans to grant two postdoctoral fellowships of up to \$2,500 each to individuals undertaking research and writing in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants should be United States citizens and hold a Ph.D degree from an accredited university. The deadline for submitting completed applications will be April 1, 1987. For information contact the Director of Naval History, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374.

The Naval Historical Center also announces a \$7,500 fellowship for predoctoral candidates. The same restrictions as above apply. For information contact the Director of Naval History (address above).

BIBLIOGRAPHERS' REGISTRY

The Association for the Bibliography of History wishes to remind historical bibliographers of the National Registry for the Bibliography of History, an on-going listing of bibliographical projects in progress in all fields of history. The Registry is published annually in American History: A Bibliographic Review (see vol. II, 1986), in which the completion and publication of a bibliography is also noted. Compilers of bibliographies are urged to register their work in progress. For information and registration forms write to the Director, Thomas T. Helde, Department of History, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057.

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Popular Culture Association is calling for papers for their March 25-29, 1987 meeting in Montreal, Canada. Proposals for papers on any facet of the topic, "Literature and Lore of the Sea" should be sent to:

Patricia Ann Carlson
Humanities
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
Terre Haute, IN 47803

CALL FOR PAPERS

On June 11-12, 1987 Siena College will sponsor its 2nd annual multidisciplinary conference on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1987 will be 1937. However papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Send inquiries to:

Thomas O. Kelly, II
Head, Department of History
Siena College
Loudonville, NY 12211

PEACE GRANTS

The U.S. Institute of Peace has recently established procedures for awarding \$4 million in grants for

research, curriculum development, education and training, and public information activities. For additional information contact:

U.S. Institute of Peace
730 Jackson Place NW
Washington, DC 20502

NEW CATALOG

The National Archives has just produced an extremely useful new catalog titled Diplomatic Records: A Select Catalog of National Archives Microfilm Publications. This 245-page work describes all the State Department records that have been microfilmed and lists them by record group, decimal file, country/area, and publication number. It also provides the contents of each roll of microfilm. Scholarly Resources is pleased to make this catalog available to SHAFR members at no charge. To request a copy, please write to SR, 104 Greenhill Avenue, Wilmington, DE 19805-1897, or call toll-free 1-800-772-8937.

BONERS

Question: Discuss the Causes and Consequences of the War of 1812.

(Part) of the response:

...English colonists were trying to become civilized but at first it was not working out to well because in their colony's they were getting attacked by indians as well as animals. And the english were trying for trade across to other countries such as Britain which failed because of the british attacking ships and taking hostages on board and using them for slaves.

I think that the War of 1812 was primarily the Indians fought because everything we tryed to have the Indians usually had taken away from us and the british had taken away also.

--from the files of Linda Killen (Radford University)

ABSTRACTS

Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), "The Origins of the Cold War," Magazine of History, II (Summer, 1986), 5-9, 18. In this magazine published by the Organization of American Historians for junior and senior high school teachers, Paterson explains the shifts in interpretation over the last couple of decades. He explains changes in the United States that helped spawn the revisionist challenge to traditional views, the central propositions of a critical perspective, and the key question of the nature of the Soviet threat and American exaggerations of it. The article closes with an overview of current thinking about the beginnings of the Cold War.

Thomas Paterson and William J. Brophy (Stephen F. Austin State University), "October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962," Journal of American History, LXXIII (June, 1986), 87-119. This essay questions the oft-heard assumption that John F. Kennedy played politics with the missile crisis. Based upon considerable archival research and the analysis of political data, the article argues that Kennedy and the Democrats did not engage the USSR and Cuba in the missile crisis to silence noisy critics like Senator Kenneth Keating or to attract votes in the November elections. The Democrats, in fact, had no political need to manufacture a war scare. From October 16 to October 22 Kennedy's choice of the quarantine was not dictated by politics, although the tactic of the surprise television address may have been. From the alarmist speech to the fading of the crisis on October 28, Kennedy ruminated about the political effects of the imbroglio, but, again, his decisions did not reflect a partisan stance. From October 28 to the November 6 elections, both Republicans and Democrats exploited Cuba for political advantage. But neither party particularly profited from the missile crisis on election day. Not one election in 1962, seems to have been decided by voter reaction to the missile crisis--other factors such as reapportionment, local politics, and personalities counted more. As for what did shape Kennedy's decisions in the Cuban missile crisis, scholars will find the answers in the study of his personality traits, calculations of national security

and hemispheric hegemony, and perceptions of international power, prestige, and credibility.

Kenton J. Clymer (University of Texas at El Paso), "Checking the Sources: John Hay and Spanish Possessions in the Philippines," The Historian, (November, 1985), 82-87. This brief article takes issue with an assertion by Stuart Creighton Miller in his book, "Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903," that John Hay advocated the annexation of Spain's Pacific possessions even before the Spanish American War commenced. The article argues that Miller misinterpreted a letter that Hay wrote to President William McKinley in February, 1898. The article further contends that Miller was misled, in part, by David Healy who had cited, and misinterpreted, the same letter in his book, U.S. Expansion: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s. It is the article's contention that the letter that both Miller and Healy cite refers to domestic matters, not foreign policy.

Robert J. McMahon (University of Florida). "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly, 101, No. 3 (1986), 453-473. This essay examines recent scholarly literature concerning the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration. It argues that the current wave of "Eisenhower revisionism" has tended to slight Eisenhower's persistent failures in the Third World and thus presents a distorted view of his administration's overall diplomatic record.

Richard H. Bradford (West Virginia Institute of Technology), "The Last Filibusters: Frederick Russell Burnham and the American Colony in Sonora, 1906-1917." A paper read at the Organization of American Historians annual meeting, New York, 1986. In 1906 Frederick Russell Burnham, who had built a reputation in the settlement of Rhodesia, became involved with one of the most extensive American business projects operating in Mexico, the Yaqui Land and Water Company, in the state of Sonora. Burnham felt keenly the passing of economic opportunities with the end of the American frontier. In Sonora he hoped to find a replacement for the American frontier.

Burnham saw American developers as beneficial to Mexico. He planned deep water ports, railroads, and, in particular, agricultural development that would make the Yaqui Valley a bread basket for North America.

The Mexican Revolution intervened to thwart Burnham and his associates. Where he believed the creation of a new agricultural and industrial base would provide prosperity, Mexicans saw only American imperialism. At one and the same time Burnham and company settlers faced revolutionists and an uprising of Yaqui Indians. Finally, the combined assault was too much for the company to withstand and the Yaqui Land and Water Company collapsed.

Hal Elliott Wert (Kansas City Art Institute), Hoover, Roosevelt, and American Aid to Poland during the Twilight War, 1939-1940." Three days before the commencement of WWII the Red Cross severely restricted the kinds and amount of aid that could be provided to foreign countries. Red Cross policy and FDR's cautious attitude made it unlikely that Poland would receive anything substantial. The Poles pressed Washington and also requested the help of Herbert Hoover who had done much for Poland in WWI. Hoover agreed to serve and created a private relief agency named the Commission for Polish Relief. Roosevelt and the Red Cross opposed Hoover's relief policies because they were too broad and they suspected that his motivation was partially political. Hoover was genuinely motivated by humanitarian concerns, but he was planning a campaign to capture the Republican presidential nomination. Regardless, in September FDR asked Hoover to head a proposed wartime relief agency. Hoover was convinced that FDR's offer was a disingenuous effort to silence a critic and simultaneously derail a political opponent. His continued challenge of Roosevelt/Red Cross relief policy touched off a sharp debate over aid to Poland. This paper examines the Hoover/Roosevelt controversy surrounding aid to Poland, the resulting competition between the Red Cross and Hoover's organization and the impact of this dispute upon aid actually rendered. The American Red Cross did give limited emergency aid to the Romanian, Hungarian, Lithuanian and German Red Crosses, but aid to Poland was essentially written off as impractical and politically risky.

Jonathan Goldstein (West Georgia College / Harvard University Fairbank Center), "Edward Sylvester Morse (1838-1925) as Expert and Western Observer in Meiji Japan." Paper delivered at International Congress for Asian Studies (Hamburg, FRG), August 29, 1986. Between 1868 and 1912, Japan's restored Imperial government determined to modernize and strengthen its rule by hiring approximately 3000 foreign technical experts. The American zoologist Edward Morse, unlike most of the other hired hands, continues in 1986 to be the subject of special adulation by the Japanese, in the form of monuments, medals, and effusive testimonials.

Why this adoration? Morse contrasted with other experts in that he was not a narrow specialist in his academic researches. He sensed that public lectures in his fields of academic interest were as important as his lectures to exclusively student audiences. He held little if any racial or religious prejudice toward the Japanese: his forceful advocacy of Darwinism set him apart from ultrafundamentalist Christians and endeared him to many Japanese. Lastly, he denounced the meretriciousness of mechanical civilization. He loved the simple beauty of nature as reflected in early Japanese artifacts, and admired Japanese who clung to this same value in their personal lives.

The roots of Morse's contemporary and historical popularity lie, then, in more than his teaching of useful skills. His technical information, coupled with his preservation of traditional Japanese culture, assisted Japan to grow materially and spiritually and thereby to resist Western political and cultural encroachment.

PERSONALS

Robert Freeman Smith (University of Toledo) has been named Distinguished University Professor by the Board of Regents. Smith is one of the first two such appointments made by the University. Professor Smith was also commissioned a Major in the Ohio Military Reserve. Congratulations!

Duane Tananbaum (winner of the Bernath Article Prize) has taken a position at Lehman College, The City University of New York.

Marvin Zahniser (The Ohio State University) has been on leave and working on a book-length manuscript. During the summer he participated in the Bradley University Berlin Seminar.

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers-Newark) has recently been awarded a Franklin D. Roosevelt Four Freedoms Foundation grant for work on "Roosevelt, Churchill and the Politics of Strategy."

D. Clayton James (Mississippi State University) has been awarded the Harry S. Truman Book Award by the Directors of the Truman Library Institute for the best work on the Truman period published during 1984-85. The award is for Professor James' book The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964. Congratulations!!!

Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut) has received a Gerald Ford Foundation grant for research at the Ford Library. Paterson will conduct research on "The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1950s to the Present."

Melvyn Leffler will spend the 1986-87 academic year at the University of Virginia.

Mordechai Rozanski is now Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

Kenton J. Clymer (University of Texas at El Paso) has been awarded an Indo-American Research Fellowship. He will be in India for six months in 1987 doing research on Indian-American relations.

J. Samuel Walker has been appointed historian of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

George Mazuzan has been appointed historian of the National Science Foundation.

Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers) is a nominee for a position on the Executive Board of the Organization of American Historians.

Michael Barnhart (SUNY-Stony Brook) has been awarded tenure.

SHAFR members receiving Fulbright awards include Bruce Kuniholm (Duke) to Turkey; Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana) to Japan; Joan Hoff-Wilson (Indiana) to Australia; Lester D. Langley (Georgia) to Costa Rica; W. Pat Strauss (Oakland) to China; and Dimitri Lazo (Alverno College) to Bangladesh. Awards to Linda Killen and Robert Swartout were noted in the September issue.

PUBLICATIONS

Kenton J. Clymer (University of Texas at El Paso), Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, 1898-1916: An Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality. University of Illinois Press. 1986. \$28.95, ISBN 0-252-01210-0.

Gaddis Smith (Yale University) Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter years. Hill & Wang. 1986. \$18.95, ISBN 0-809-07017-0.

J. Garry Clifford (University of Connecticut) and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft. University of Kansas Press. 1986. \$29.95. ISBN 0-7006-0305-0

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (City University of New York), The Cycles of American History. Houghton-Mifflin. 1986. \$22.95, ISBN 0-395-37887-7.

Lloyd C. Gardner ed. (Rutgers), Redefining the Past: Essays in Dipolomatic History In Honor of William Appleman Williams. Oregon State University Press. 1986. \$27.95 ISBN 0-87071-348-5.

-----, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923. Oxford. Now in paper \$9.95, ISBN 0-19-503429-5.

Arnold Offner (Boston University), The Origins of the Second World War: American Foreign Policy and World Politics, 1917-1941. Krieger. 1986 reprint edition. \$17.50, ISBN 0-89874-924-7.

Mark T. Gilderhus (Colorado State University) History and Historians: A Historiographical Introduction, 1987. Prentice Hall. 1986. ISBN 0-13-390097-5.

Ernest R. May, ed. (Harvard University), Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before The Two World Wars. Princeton University Press. 1986. Paperback \$14.50, ISBN 0-691-00601-6.

Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. (Temple University), American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition. Oxford. 1986. Paperback \$10.95, ISBN 0-19504159-3.

Fraser Harbutt (Emory University), America and the Iron Curtain: A Study in the Origins of the Cold War. Oxford. 1986. \$24.95, ISBN 0-19-503817-7.

Michael T. Ruddy (St. Louis University), The Cautious Diplomat: Charles E. Bohlen and the Soviet Union, 1929-1969. 1986. Kent State University Press. \$27.00, ISBN 0-87338-331-1.

The School of Foreign Service and the Department of History at **Georgetown University** invite applications for a **tenure-track position in American Diplomatic History** for September 1987. Applications will be received through the end of December. Apply to Dean Charles E. Pirtle, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057.

BONERS

John Foster Dulles was secretary of state under President Eisenhower. He was an ambassador of good will concerning foreign affairs. Dulles warned America not to engage in a land war in Asia. During the beginning of the Vietnam crisis he worked patiently for peace between the U.S. and Vietnam. Eisenhower held him in high esteem because of his abilities to negotiate plans.

--Guy R. Swanson (University of Alabama)

CALENDAR

- January 1, 1987 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- February 1 Deadlines for the 1986 Bernath article award and the Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship are due.
- April 2 - 5 The 80th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Philadelphia with headquarters at the Wyndham Franklin Plaza Hotel. (The deadline for submissions has passed.)
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter.
- June 25-28 The 13th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Annapolis, Maryland Program co-chairs are George Herring, University of Kentucky and Robert Love, U.S. Naval Academy.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the Bernath Dissertation Support Awards.

December 27-30

The 102nd annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Washington. The deadline for proposals has passed.

The 1988 meeting of the OAH will be held in Reno, Nevada, March 30 - April 2, at the MGM Grand Hotel.

The Program Chair is:

Professor Paul Boyer
Department of History
Humanities Building, Room 4131
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, WI 53706.

The deadline for proposals is March 15, 1987.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize, were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

Description: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1986. It must be the author's first or second monograph.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5)

copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The book should be sent directly to: Stephen E. Pelz, History Department, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003.

Books may be sent at any time during 1986, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1987.

The award of \$1500.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in April, 1987, in Philadelphia.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986	Thomas J. Noer (Carthage)

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his/her own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vita, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1987. The chairman of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Ronald J. Nurse, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in Diplomatic History

Previous Winners

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1986	William Stueck (Georgia)
1987	Nancy B. Tucker (Colgate)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1986. The author must be under 45 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: Nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1987. It will be helpful if the person making the nomination can supply at least one copy and if possible five (5) copies. The chairperson of the committee is: James Fetzer, State University of New York, Maritime College/Ft. Schuyler, Bronx, New York 10465.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1987, in Philadelphia.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, N.J.)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Fund

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. An award will help defray:
 - (a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources
 - (b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript
 - (c) abstracting costs.
3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are not intended for general research or for time to write.
4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.
5. A report on how the funds were used must be filed by the successful applicant(s) not later than six (6) months following presentation of each award.
6. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the

- applicant's request and report of completion.
7. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Dennis Bozyk, 33952 Spring Valley, Westland, Michigan 48185. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1986.

Previous winners:

1985 John Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara)
1986 Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas)
Walter L. Hixon (Colorado)

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray travel and living expenses connected with the research and/or the writing of the dissertation.

To be qualified, applicants must be candidates in good standing at a doctoral granting graduate school who will have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree (including the general or comprehensive examinations) except for the dissertation before April, 1987.

There is no special application form. Applicants must submit a complete academic transcript of graduate work to date. A prospectus of the dissertation must accompany the application. This should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The

applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used.

Three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, should be submitted to the committee.

Deadline for filing applications and supporting letters for this year's award will be April 1, 1987.

Applications should be addressed to the Chairperson of this year's W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contri-

bution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;

(c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and

(d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Previous Winner:

1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Warren F. Kuehl Prize will be awarded to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. Such books may be biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations which examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations; "Webs of Common Interests Revisited: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Historians of American Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History (Spring 1986): 107-120.

The prize is to be offered every other year beginning in 1987.

A committee chaired by Charles L. DeBenedetti is presently at work devising regulations and deadlines for the award.

(After a short lapse the A.E.A.R. Newsletter is resuming publication. The most recent issue was included in the December 1984 issue of the SHAFR Newsletter.)



AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS NEWSLETTER

VOLUME V, NO. 1

DECEMBER 1986

Signs of Renewal

by

Ron Lilley

(Northern Virginia Community College, Woodridge)

The last few years have been troubling ones for historians of American foreign relations. Charles S. Maier has reminded us that ours "cannot...be counted among the pioneering fields of the discipline during the 1970's." We have faltered, says Maier. There's a sense that we are no longer "at the cutting edge of scholarship."¹ Without denying the reality of Maier's critique, we can add that there are signs of renewal in our field, and those signs are everywhere. Three come readily to mind. On April 26, 1986, Professor Takeshi Matsuda read a paper on "American-East Asian Relations: Japanese Perspectives" to the Washington and Southeast Regional Seminar, which met at the University of Maryland. Matsuda examined the several conceptual frameworks which Japanese scholars have used in the post-World War II era to analyze American-East Asian Relations. His essay also reiterates what a number of other historians and political scientists have recently been saying about some of the conceptual shortcomings of A.E.A.R. For example, he takes note of the current "bilateral myopia" of American-Japanese relations. We need to place them, he says, in a

¹Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in The Past Before Us ed. by Michael Kammen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 355.

broader international context. Another sign of renewal appeared at the Twelfth Annual SHAFR Conference, June 25-28, 1986, Georgetown University. Warren I. Cohen and Michael H. Hunt were instrumental in organizing a panel on the "Social History of American-East Asian Relations in the Early Twentieth Century." The panelists (Warren Cohen, Michael Hunt, Jane Hunter, James Huskey, Ron Lilley, and Sandra Taylor) explored ways in which the methodologies of the social and cultural historians could be applied to the study of American foreign relations, and, like Matsuda, they looked at ways to refine and re-define our understanding of "foreign relations." Their effort is aimed at giving A.E.A.R. what Maier says we lack: a "sense of collective enterprise." Finally, a number of recent dissertations suggest that this renewal rests on a rather substantial foundation. What follows is a selected bibliography compiled from a list of over one hundred doctoral theses (completed between July 1983 and May 1986) which, I think, illustrates the renewal and the rich possibilities of the expanded horizons of A.E.A.R. For the complete list, write Charles R. Lilley, Northern Virginia Community College, Woodbridge Campus, B&SS, 15200 Neabsco Mills Road, Woodbridge, Virginia, 22191.

General

1. Browne, Blaine Terry. "A Common Thread: American Images of the Chinese and Japanese, 1930-1960." University of Oklahoma, 1985. DA8514193.
2. Gaenslen, Frederick Richard. "Culture and Decision Making: Social Influence in China, Japan, Soviet Russia, and the United States." University of Michigan, 1984. DA8502816.
3. Golkin, Arline Tartus. "The Faces of Hunger: Famine Relief to China, 1900-1949." University of Southern California, 1984. Copies available exclusively from Micrographics Department, Doheny Library, USC, Los Angeles, CA 90089.
4. Johnson, Deborah Jean. "The Impact of East Asian Art Within the Early Impressionist Circle, 1856-1868." Brown University, 1984. DA8422439.

5. Liu, John Mei. "Cultivating Cane: Asian Labor and the Hawaiian Sugar Plantation System Within the Capitalist World Economy, 1835-1920." University of California, Los Angeles, 1985. DA8525858.

Asian-Americans Relations

1. Chao, Tonia. "Communicating Through Architecture: San Francisco Chinese Restaurants as Cultural Intersections, 1849-1984." University of California, Berkeley, 1985. DA8524904.

2. James, Henry Thomas. "Exile Within: The Schooling of Japanese Americans, 1942-1945." Stanford University, 1984. DA8429522.

3. Kuroiwa, Wallace Hisashi Ryan. "The Internment of the Japanese in America During World War II: An Interpretation According to the Ethics of Character." Emory University, 1983. DA8405571.

4. Matsubayashi, Yoshihide. "The Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii and California From 1892 to 1941." The University of San Francisco. DA8516320.

5. Woo, Wesley Stephen. "Protestant Work Among the Chinese in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1850-1920." Graduate Theological Union, 1984. DA18058.

6. Yamashita, Kanshi Stanley. "Terminal Island: Ethnography of an Ethnic Community: Its Dissolution and Reorganization to a Non-Spatial Community." University of California, Irvine, 1985. DA8516560.

Asian Wars

1. Chang, Youn-son. "War and Morality: The Search for Meaning in American Novels of World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War." Emory University, 1985. DA8526290.

2. Fleming, Robert Edward. "The Flotsam of War and Peace: A Study of the Vietnam Veteran in American Society." Boston University, 1979. DA8413166.

3. Gaspar, Charles Jamieson. "Reconnecting: Time and History in Narratives of the Vietnam War." University of Connecticut, 1983. DA8401976.

4. Haun, Agatha Dillard. "Commentary on Ooka Shohei's Prisoner of War Memoirs (Furyoki). Stanford University, 1984. DA8408297.
5. Heiss, Andrea Brandenburg. "On Foreign Grounds: Portraits of Americans in Vietnam." University of Iowa, 1983. DA8407752.
6. Malone, Anne. "Once Having Marched: American Narratives of the Vietnam War." Indiana University, 1983. DA8317181.
7. Palm, Edward Frederick. "American Heart of Darkness: The Moral Vision of Five Novels of the Vietnam War." University of Pennsylvania, 1983. DA8316068.
8. Stringer, Kenneth Thompson, Jr. "A Substitute for Victory?: Fictional Portraits of the American Soldier and Combat in Vietnam." The American University, 1984. DA8425730.

Chinese-American Relations

1. Brewer, Karen Lynn. "From Philanthropy to Reform: The American Red Cross in China, 1906-1930." Case Western University, 1983. DA8328251.
2. Chang Yao-hsin. "Chinese Influence in Emerson, Thoreau, and Pound." Temple University, 1985. DA8509372.
3. Chen Chang-fang. "Barbarian Paradise: Chinese Views of the United States, 1784-1911." Indiana University, 1985. DA26989.
4. Dockser, Cecile Bahn. "John Dewey and the May Fourth Movement in China: Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy in Relation to His Encounter with China 1919-1921." Harvard University, 1983. DA8429709.
5. King, Marjorie. "Missionary Mother and Radical Daughter: Anna and Ida Pruitt in China, 1887-1939." Temple University, 1985. DA 8509341.
6. Lindbeck, John M.H. "American Missionaries and the Policies of the United States in China, 1898-1911." Yale University, 1984. DA8329035.

7. Luke, Handel Hing-tat. "A History of the Seventh-Day Adventist Higher Education in the China Mission, 1888-1980." Andrews University, 1983. DA8318618.
8. Meyer, Kathryn Brennan. "Splitting Apart: The Shanghai Treaty Port in Transition, 1914-1921." Temple University, 1985. DA09357.
9. Reist, Katherine Kennedy. "A Church for China: A Problem in Self Identification, 1919-1937." Ohio State University, 1983. DA8403563.
10. Tinsman, Marilyn Williams. "China and the Returned Overseas Chinese Students." Columbia University Teachers College, 1983. DA8403289.
11. Tucker, Sara Waitstill. "The Canton Hospital and Medicine in Nineteenth Century China, 1835-1900." Indiana University, 1983. DA8308883.
12. Wells, Tanya. "Ezra Pound's Cathay and the American Idea of China." Arizona State University, 1983. DA8405166.
13. Wickeri, Philip Lauri. "Seeking the Common Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self Movement and China's United Front." Princeton Theological Seminary, 1985. DA8517392.

Japanese-American Relations

1. Hosoya, Masahiro. "Selected Aspects of Daibatsu Dissolution in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952: The Thought and Behavior of Zaibatsu Leaders, Japanese Governmental Officials and SCAP Officials." Yale University, 1982. DA8310502.
2. Kim, Ben Sun. "Forced Political Reorientation in Japan: A Study of the Impact of Defeat on Japanese National Consciousness." University of Oklahoma, 1984. DA8504326.
3. Krishnaswami, Sridhar. "A Study of Alliance Politics: The Impact of the Vietnam War on American-Japanese Relations." Miami University, 1983. DA8321170.

4. Sakakibara, Yoshitaka. "A Study of Japanese Students at the University of Southern California, 1946-1980: Vocational Impact of American Academic Experience on Japanese Students After Returning to Japan." University of Southern California, 1984. Not available through DA.

5. Takagi, Takako Frances. "A History of the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur in Japan, 1924-1978." The Catholic University of America, 1985. DA8525608.

Korean-American Relations

1. Kim, Dong Koo. "American Influence on Korean Educational Thought During the Period of U.S. Military Government." University of Connecticut, 1984. DA8416098.

2. Lee, Jong Hyeong. "Samuel Austin Moffett: His Life and Work in the Development of the Presbyterian Church in Korea, 1890-1936." Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, 1983. DA8324445.

3. Shim, Jung Soon. "Self vs. Tradition: Images of Women in Modern American and Korean Drama." University of Hawaii, 1984. DA8508794.

Filipino-American Relations

1. Birch, Louis Dean. "The International School, Manila, Philippines: A Historical Study of Its Origins, Growth and Development, 1920-1963." Miami University, 1985. DA8526803.

2. Fullante, Luis Cruz. "The National Language Question in the Philippines, 1936 to the Present." University of California, Los Angeles, 1983. DA8312009.

3. Palileo, Maria Clarissa. "Natives Voices, Foreign Tongues: Colonialism and Form in Philippine Fiction." Boston University, 1985. DA8515576.

Inter-Asian Relations

1. Chung, Chin-sung. "Colonial Migration From Korea to Japan." University of Chicago, 1984. Not available through DA.
2. Jones, Randall Sidney. "The Economic Development of Colonial Korea." University of Michigan, 1984. DA8502852.

SEMINARS & CONFERENCES IN A.E.A.R., 1986-87

We hope to make "News about Seminars and Conferences in American-East Asian Relations" a regular feature of our newsletter. In this issue we have made a beginning. Our feeling is that there's a lot more activity in our field than we are reporting here. Our problem is that we don't have, as yet, an efficient reporting network, and we would like to solicit your help. If you have news or information about a seminar or conference in A.E.A.R., please send the information to Dr. Michael Barnhart, Department of History, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York, 11794-4348.

The American-East Asian Relations Committee is sponsoring a conference on "INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST ASIA DURING THE EISENHOWER ERA." It will be held at Bellagio Center, Lake Como, Italy between 28 September and 3 October 1987. British, Chinese, Japanese, Soviet, and American scholars will participate.

Other conferences and seminars scheduled for 1986-1987 include:

New England Conference 15 November 1986
Association of Asian Studies
Yale University
Contact: Council of East Asian Affairs
Box 13A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

Midwest Japan Seminar
Cleveland State University
Contact: Prof. Sally Hastings
Dept. of History
Northeastern Illinois University
Chicago, IL 60625

15 November 1986

Southeast Conference
Association of Asian Studies
Contact: Prof. Richard Rice
Dept. of History
U. of Tennessee-Chattanooga
Chattanooga, TN 37403

15-17 January 1987

Southwestern Historical Assoc.
Contact: Prof. Cary Wintz
Dept. of History
Texas Southern University
Houston, TX 77004

18-21 March 1987

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Timothy Cross & Jay Fain.

ISSUES: The Newsletter is published on the 1st of March, June, September and December.

DEADLINES: All material should be sent to the editor four weeks prior to publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: William Kamman, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the Newsletter may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.

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