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THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL AND THE "SECRET DU ROI"

by

Jonathan R. Dull

Motivated by patriotism and fear of Russia they set up a shadow government to bypass the foreign policy bureaucracy. Eventually, however, secrecy became an end in itself; even with the government's chief investigator trying to limit publicity, too many people were involved. The chief executive's whole agenda became dominated by the need to prevent the whole affair's becoming public knowledge. One of the top agents began acting strangely; not only did he blackmail the government but he started wearing women's clothing. This transvestite was not Oliver North but rather the notorious chevalier (or chevaliere) d'Eon.¹ The shadow government he served was what historians now call the "Secret du Roi" (King's Secret), which has shocked and titillated generations of French readers.² Although the events occurred two centuries ago they may be of interest to students of recent events in the United States, particularly because the story of the "Secret du Roi" was played to its conclusion. Some of the principal agents of that shadow government eventually had their revenge. They were named to the chief posts in the French foreign ministry and had the opportunity of implementing their policies--with disastrous results for the French monarchy (although, ironically, very fortunate results for the United States).

Let us, however, start at the beginning. The "Secret du Roi" began in 1745-6 as an informal group, comprising King Louis XV of France, his cousin the Prince de Conti, and the French diplomatic representative in Warsaw. The Polish

throne was elective rather than hereditary and the French group's purpose was to plan the election of Conti should it become vacant. (Conti's grandfather had been a candidate for the throne in the late 17th century.) The group's activities had to be kept secret from the current Polish king, who wished his own son as a successor. His good will was needed because he was also a ruler of the strategic German principality of Saxony and because France was currently involved in a war in Germany. Soon thereafter King Louis XV's son and heir married the 15-year-old daughter of the Saxon-Polish ruler, making secrecy all the more necessary. Nevertheless Conti's election was considered worth pursuing, even though the powers of the Polish monarchy were quite limited. Elections to the Polish throne were a test of French influence in eastern Europe and Louis XV took a great interest in Polish affairs, in part because his father-in-law was an exiled Polish king. Over the next few years Louis and Conti recruited for their purposes French diplomats at several other European courts. These agents generally were employed to gather intelligence about Poland in addition to their regular duties. In some cases they were the ambassadors themselves, who were asked to report to the king or Conti outside regular channels; in other cases they were subordinates at the diplomatic post, such as an embassy secretary or a charge d'affaires. As the secret diplomacy grew in size it gradually expanded its objectives. France's rival for influence in Poland was Russia and hence the secret diplomacy sought the diplomatic isolation of Empress Elizabeth of that country. This policy differed only in nuance from that of official French diplomacy, which under foreign ministers like the marquis de Puyzieulx (served 1747-1751) saw Russia as the chief long-term threat to French security. Puyzieulx believed Russia threatened to dominate or even conquer Sweden, Poland and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), which France treated as the outer ring of her defenses. (Her

inner ring of defenses was formed by the small states of northwest Italy, the cantons of Switzerland and the minor principalities of Germany.) Since official and unofficial diplomacy sought basically the same ends little harm was done by the "Secret du Roi" except to the internal discipline and cohesion of the French diplomatic service.

For several years the anti-Russian policy flourished. France signed or renewed alliances with Sweden, Denmark and Prussia. Should Conti ascend the throne, Poland could be added to the coalition. In the mid-1750s, however, France's entire diplomatic system was turned upside down. Hostilities between Britain and France opened in 1755. The attempts of King Frederick of Prussia to avoid being drawn into the war on the side of his French ally precipitated a diplomatic revolution which led to France's being allied with her former enemy Austria (while Prussia saw herself allied to Britain). Disastrously for the secret diplomacy, France also soon found herself allied to Russia. At the same time French court politics led Conti to quarrel with King Louis XV and he was expelled from the "Secret du Roi." Not wishing to abandon the pro-French in Poland the king decided to keep the secret diplomacy alive and appointed a new director, Jean-Pierre Tercier, an undersecretary of state (*premier commis* of one of the foreign ministry's two political bureaus). In January 1759 Tercier was fired by the French foreign minister (who had become suspicious of him) and he was replaced as head of "Secret du Roi" by Comte de Broglie, former French ambassador in Poland. By now its policies were in direct contradiction to those of the French foreign ministry. To save Canada France needed to drive Prussia from the war and thereby deprive Britain of its only ally. To accomplish this the Russian army was vital and to reach eastern Prussia it needed to cross Polish territory. The secret diplomacy, however, was concerned above all with reducing Russian influence in

Poland and believed with some justification that Russia was more interested in expanding its influence in Poland than in fighting the Prussians. It therefore worked against the policies of the French foreign ministry. As might be expected, both policies failed. Canada was lost to Britain, Prussia survived the war intact and France was totally discredited in Poland. Shortly after the war's end in 1763 the king of Poland died and the Poles elected as his successor Stanislas Poniatowski, a former lover of Catherine II, the new Empress of Russia and the rival of France.

With Poland now subservient to Russia the secret diplomacy had seemingly lost its reason for being. King Louis XV's love of intrigue was boundless, however, and he found another job for it: the reconnoitering of landing sites along the English coast. France had already begun rebuilding her navy for a war of revenge against Britain and the foreign ministry sent an agent to America to report on the possibility of anti-British uprising. The agent sent to Britain by the king, however, was ordered to report not to the French ambassador, but to the embassy secretary, a veteran agent of the "Secret du Roi" (and Tercier's cousin), the chevalier d'Eon. Soon d'Eon's discretion, sanity and sexual identity proved problematical and he eventually had to be bought off with a pension. As part of the agreement d'Eon promised to henceforth dress only in women's clothes; he later supplemented his income by giving fencing exhibitions in drag. This was not the only scandal which the king had to avert. He began going behind the back of Broglie and selecting agents for other missions; in 1773 several of them were arrested for treason and the king had to call for help on Gabriel de Sartine, head of the Paris policy department (and also agent of the "Secret du Roi") to suppress information and prevent the destruction of the secret diplomacy by the French foreign minister. The final blow came in April 1774 when the king learned that for years the

secret diplomacy's correspondence had been intercepted by the Austrian government. This crisis was one which Louis XV did not have to resolve himself; within weeks he contracted smallpox and died.

On the surface the "Secret du Roi" died along with him. He was succeeded by his nineteen-year-old grandson, King Louis XVI. The new king cleared Bogle's name but gave him no further employment. He preserved the information about landing sites (which Napoleon dug out of the archives years later), but abolished the "Secret du Roi." In fact, however, the secret diplomacy underwent not interment but metamorphosis. It emerged in control of the French foreign ministry and its policies.

This resurrection is not so surprising. The methods of the secret diplomacy had been discredited, but its goals did not differ greatly from those of the regular diplomatic service and the problems it tried to counter had not been resolved. The situation in eastern Europe was actually worse than it had been in 1763. Five years after the election of their pro-Russian king the Poles had risen in a futile revolt, during which they received half-hearted assistance from the French government. France's chief assistance had been to encourage the Turks to declare war on Russia, but they too were badly beaten. The Russian victories threatened the balance of power in eastern Europe. At the suggestion of King Frederick II of Prussia war was averted by Prussia, Austria and Russia each taking a sizable portion of Poland. This partition deprived Poland of roughly a third of its population and territory. Turkey was let off fairly easily, making minor territorial concessions to Austria and Russia. France also lost; her prestige and influence declined again.

The new king of France seemed hardly the ruler to restore them. Naive, idealistic and impressionable, King Louis XVI's priority was domestic and fiscal reform. His choice as chief

minister was the elderly comte de Maurepas, who proved self-serving and unenergetic. For foreign minister Louis chose the comte de Vergennes, a career diplomat with a reputation for extreme caution. Maurepas left Vergennes great latitude in foreign policy (in exchange for his political support), thereby giving the "Secret du Roi" its opportunity.³ Vergennes had been one of the top agents of the "Secret" and was a firm believer in its tenets: that France's security was tied to eastern Europe, that Russia was the chief threat to her interests there, that the alliance with Austria should be maintained for the sake of peace in Germany and that Britain as Russia's closest friend was a part of France's security problem. Vergennes had been ambassador in Constantinople and had helped foment the Russo-Turkish war. He had also been ambassador in Stockholm where he witnessed both the British-Russian cooperation in influencing Swedish politics and the humiliation Britain had inflicted on France when the French attempted to protect Sweden from the fate of Poland. (When war between Sweden and Russia threatened in 1773 France turned to Britain for help; the British replied by forcing France to demobilize the fleet she was preparing as a demonstration against Russia.)⁴ Furthermore Vergennes was not the only expert at the foreign ministry on the Russian threat. Vergennes chose to retain his predecessor's two undersecretaries of state. These men were brothers and each had direct experience with Poland. The elder brother, Conrad-Alexandre Gerard, had spent 1761-6 as first secretary of the French embassy in Vienna. In 1765 his ambassador had sent him to Poland to confer with General Branicki, head of the party opposed to the new Polish king. Joseph-Mathias Gerard, the younger brother, had more extensive experience with Poland. He spent several years as French resident in Danzig and was blamed by King Frederick II for instigating the resistance which spared that city from the Polish partition.

The younger Gerard was also an expert on England and had translated into French an English satire on the Polish partition.⁵

In 1778 Conrad-Alexandre Gerard was sent to Philadelphia as France's first minister plenipotentiary to the United States. Vergennes replaced him as undersecretary with one of the top agents of the "Secret du Roi." This was Pierre-Michel Hennin, who had been personally recruited by Broglic and who had been in charge of the secret diplomacy in Warsaw at the time of the Polish royal election. Hennin (like the younger Gerard) remained as undersecretary until the French Revolution; Thomas Jefferson was a great admirer of him.⁶ The chief impact of Vergennes and his colleagues was not, however, on relations with Russia, but rather on French relations with Britain. As noted above, the French foreign ministry in the early 1760s had taken an interest in a possible American revolution and had begun to rebuild the French navy. After 1766, though, official French diplomacy turned its attention to eastern Europe and after a brief 1770 war scare (over a British incursion in the Falkland Islands!) had even sought a *rapprochement* with Britain. Vergennes saw the effort rebuffed and with America restive and Russia exhausted from her long war with Turkey chances seemed promising for a preemptive war against Britain. When the Americans did revolt and then turn to France for arms aid they found a ready audience in Vergennes and the brothers Gerard. The transition to full French participation in the war took more than two years, partly because of King Louis XVI's reluctance for war.⁷ This was largely the work of another former agent of the "Secret du Roi", Naval Minister Gabriel de Sartine, whom we last encountered as head of the Paris police. In a very real sense the French involvement in the American Revolution was one of the results of the triumph of the "Secret du Roi."

From an American standpoint French participation in the war was a great blessing; from a French standpoint it was disastrous. American independence neither weakened Britain nor helped France, since the United States continued to trade chiefly with her former mother country. The enormous cost of the war drove the French monarchy to the edge of bankruptcy and its attempts to escape that bankruptcy loosened a revolution which destroyed it. Even in terms of European diplomacy the victory over Britain was hollow by 1782 Russia was again threatening Turkey, reducing Vergennes to such desperation that he called for help from the prime minister of Britain (with whom France was still at war!).⁸ By the late 1780s even Vergennes had come to realize how sterile was France's policy of opposition to Britain and Russia. In his final years as foreign minister he sought to disarm British and Russian hostility through trade agreements, a distant forerunner of the Russian policy of Richard Nixon.

What is the significance to American historians of the "Secret du Roi?" It, of course, played an important part (although an indirect one) in the diplomacy of the American Revolution. In helping to explain how the United States found assistance from France it has an inherent interest for scholars of American history. Beyond that, moreover, it illustrates a number of patterns in the conduct of diplomacy, particularly diplomacy by secret and extragovernmental organisations. As such it provides perspective on the tragicomical events of recent times. I have entitled this article "The Iran-Contra Scandal and the 'Secret du Roi'" because both sets of events can be read as cautionary tales about secret diplomacy. The story of the Iran-Contra Scandal is well enough known that I need not repeat its details. Instead I wish to draw some conclusions from the common pattern of the two sets of occurrences. My readers may find more parallels from which to draw edification and amusement; I will restrict myself to

discussing five principles or rules derived from the "Secret du Roi" and the scandals of the Reagan administration.

Rule One: Secret organisations tend to disregard historical experience. This contrasts with regular diplomatic establishments which tend to misapply it. (Witness, for example, the last forty years misplaced use of the Munich analogy.) In defense of foreign policy establishments, however, it must be conceded that they generally do attempt to make use of history. Organisations like the "Secret du Roi" and the Poindexter-North gang have a tendency to assume they are above it. In the 1960s the French unsuccessfully attempted to place a Conti on the Polish throne and to invade England. The fact that the "Secret du Roi" was attempting the same quixotic projects half a century later indicates a mind set prone to wish fulfillment. Similarly the attempts by North *et al.* to find moderates among the Iranian revolutionaries disregarded everything expert opinion had to say about Islamic fundamentalism. Equally misguided were the attempts to base a popular movement in Nicaragua on an army which specialized in attacking schools, public health clinics and farm cooperatives. Even had they employed different tactics, the contras were so badly discredited by their connections with the Somozan National Guard and the United States that they had little chance of winning sufficient popular support to overthrow the regime. If the regular American foreign policy establishment was prone to wish fulfillment (e.g., Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams), the North-Poindexter organisation was awash in it.

Rule Two: Secret organisations tend to focus too narrowly on the task at hand. Because they are committed to solving specific problems like the election of a pro-French king of Poland or rescuing hostages, they tend to ignore the costs of their policies or the connection between that policy and wider diplomatic goals. Diplomacy, like much else in life, is not a

program but a process. Secret diplomacy is inclined to be programmatic and hence lacking in perspective, subtlety and flexibility. Louis XV circumscribed his diplomatic options by focusing on an exaggerated Russian threat; then, as now, Russian diplomacy generally was cautious and opportunistic rather than adventurous and reckless, more like a patient vulture than a rampaging bear. Recent American official diplomacy has taken a creative approach to our own Russian problem. The secret American diplomacy was rigid on central America and flexible only on Iran, the reverse in both cases of a sensible policy.

Rule Three: Loose organisations produce loose cannon. Regular diplomatic services may not always encourage creative intellects, but they at least tend to weed out such odd characters as the chevalier d'Eon and Oliver North. They also are less prone to the inefficiency, insubordination and corruption fostered by the general lack of accountability found in secret organisations. The "Secret du Roi" in general was a far more responsible body than its recent American counterpart. Figures like d'Eon were a minority. Its eventual leader, the comte de Broglie, was seriously considered in 1771 for the position of French foreign minister. (He was so impetuous that it is perhaps as well that he was not selected.) Vergennes, who was later named foreign minister, and his colleagues were men of great idealism and ability, as indeed were a number of other members of the organisation, such as the baron de Breteuil, Vergennes' ambassador at Vienna and later a minister of state. Most members of the American secret diplomacy were sane at least some were idealistic, but it is difficult to consider any of them statesmen. Even President Reagan suffers in comparison to King Louis XV, who in spite of his faults at least knew what was going on.

Rule Four: Secret organisations survive because it is always possible for the constituted authorities to preserve their

ignorance. One of the most interesting unresolved questions about the "Secret du Roi" is how it escaped the knowledge of the astute foreign minister the duc de Choiseul, who directed French diplomacy from 1758 to 1770. Historians surmise that it was in Choiseul's interest to remain ignorant of Louis XV's indulgence in secret diplomacy—or at least to pretend such ignorance. I am told similar questions have arisen about the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Vice President, Mr. Bush.

Rule Five: It doesn't always suffice to root up the organisation if policies don't change as well. The death of Louis XV and the disbandment of the "Secret du Roi" did not end the careers of Vergennes and his colleagues. As we have seen, they took over the establishment and used it to implement the policies they had heretofore pursued in secret. We cannot be certain the same thing will not eventually occur in the United States. It seems unlikely that John Poindexter or Oliver North will ever become secretary of state. Unless we reorient our thinking about covert operations, about Central America and about the limits of American power, we may, however, see the reappearance of a foreign policy based on folly, corruption and secrecy. Unlike the story of the "Secret du Roi," the tale of the Iran-Contra scandal may not yet be finished.

ENDNOTES

¹Most of the many studies on d'Eon lack scholarly merit; one which is usable is Ernest A. Viztelly, *The True Story of the Chevalier d'Eon* (London, 1895).

²For the "Secret du Roi" consult Edgard Boutaric, *Etude sur le caractere et la politique de Louis XV d'apres sa correspondance secrete inedite* (Paris, 1866); Edgard Boutaric, ed., *Correspondance secrete inedite de Louis XV sur la politique etrangere avec le Comte de Broglie, Tercier, etc.* (2 vols., Paris, 1866); Charles-Jacques-Victor-Albert, duc de Broglie, *le Secret du Roi: Correspondance secrete de Louis*

XV avec ses agents diplomatiques, 1752-1774 (2 vols., Paris, 1878); Didier Ozanam and Michel Antoine, eds., *Correspondance secrete du comte de Broglie avec Louis XV (1756-1774)* (2 vols., Paris, 1956-61); L. Jay Oliva, *Misalliance: A Study of French Policy in Russia during the Seven Years' War* (New York, 1964).

³That Vergennes' administration represented the triumph of the "Secret du Roi" is hardly original; it is discussed in an article by the greatest of all French diplomatic historians first published in 1883: Albert Sorel, "La Diplomatie secrete de Louis XV" in *Essais d'histoire et de critique* (4th ed., Paris, 1913), p. 178.

⁴For Vergennes' diplomatic career see Louis Bonneville de Marsagny, *Le Chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade a Constantinople* (2 vols., Paris, 1894) and *Le Comte de Vergennes: son ambassade en Suede, 1771-4* (Paris, 1898); Michael Roberts, *British Diplomacy and Swedish Politics, 1758-1773* (Minneapolis, 1980); Orville T. Murphy, *Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787* (Albany, 1982); Jonathan R. Dull, *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution* (New Haven and London, 1985). For the Swedish crisis of 1773 (which ended without war when Russia was forced to turn her attention to Turkey) see Michael Roberts, "Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution, 1772-73," *Historical Journal* 7 (1964): 1-46.

⁵For the Gerard brothers and their connection with Poland see Frederic Masson, *Le Departement des affaires etrangeres pendant la Revolution, 1787-1804* (Paris, 1877); *Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen* (46 vols., Berlin, 1879-1939), 23:147, 159, 163, 174, 188; 24:37, 392; 25:375; 26:368, 374, 494; 27:59, 243; Louis Farges, ed., *Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traites de Westphalie jusqu'a la revolution francaise*, vol. 5, *Poland, tome second (1729-1794)* (Paris, 1888), pp. 249-54; John J. Meng, ed., *Despatches and Instruction of Conrad Alexandre Gerard 1778-1780* (Baltimore, 1939), pp. 33-122; Jean-Pierre Samoyault, *Les Bureaux du Secretariat d'Etat des affaires etrangeres sous Louis XV, administration, personnel* (Paris, 1971). The satire was Theophilus Lindsey's pseudonymous *The Polish Partition, Illustrated; In Seven Dramatic Dialogues...* (London, 1773).

⁶Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (22 vols. to date, Princeton, 1950--) 11:96. For his career use Masson, *Departement des affaires etrangeres*; Samoyault, *Bureaux du Secretariat d'Etat*; Henri Doniol, *Politiques d'autrefois: Le Cte. de Vergennes et P. M. Hennin* (Paris, 1898).

⁷ Consult Jonathan R. Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787* (Princeton, 1985).

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 298, 310-12. For the eventual resolution of the crisis which cost Turkey the Crimea, but did not lead to war, see M. S. Anderson, "The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-4," *Slavonic and East European Review* 37 (1958-9), 17-41.

**HISTORY WITHOUT SOME OF THE FACTS
INTERPRETATIONS OF AUSTRALIA—UNITED
STATES RELATIONS SINCE 1949**

by

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History, if it is to be true as history, cannot be written or interpreted to fit a rigid ideological mould or to serve partisan political purposes. True history, like intellectualism itself, is necessarily subversive of political organisations and institutions of all kinds. History, of course, cannot be written without some derivation from the moral and political pressures of those who write it. Even if such history could be written it would be barren and sterile. But the value-laden premises that are brought to historical analysis need to be seen for what they are and to be themselves the subject of investigation and criticism.

Few other aspects of the history of Australian foreign policy have been the victim of as much lack of detachment and disinterestedness as Australia's relations with the United States in the period since the Second World War. A popular orthodoxy which has been carefully cultivated is that, with the exception of the periods of "nationalist governments" in Canberra (1972-75 and since 1983), management of Australia's relations with the United States by successive Australian conservative governments has been characterised by servile ineptitude and an institutionalised dependence.

This orthodoxy has as its starting point the revisionist view that the US-Australian associations during the Second World War have been exaggerated and that no special or enduring bilateral relationship developed as a result.¹ Linked

to this view is the general notion that even the idea of a "special relationship" destroys intellectual honesty and rigour in the conduct of foreign affairs.² The specific claim is that Australian conservative governments have accepted American leadership uncritically and unthinkingly, that they have been excessively compliant with American strategic views and that their "light on the hill" was always the conviction that Australia needed to "cling to the hem of a great power."³

Australian conservative governments, the orthodoxy goes, made Australia a client not an ally of the United States.⁴ In doing so they unnecessarily diminished Australia's diplomatic flexibility, demeaned Australian sovereignty, involved Australia in wars not of its own making and allowed it to become an unwitting party to superpower rivalry and nuclear competition. The conclusion is that only "nationalist," non-conservative governments can assert any real sense of Australian identity or independence of thought and action in managing Australia's relations with the United States and that such governments saved Australia from a headlong rush to the "new colonialism" which conservative governments seemed only too willing to accelerate.⁵

This interpretation of the historical record obviously serves a political purpose. It has been popularised by politicians masquerading as objective historians and by historians whose strong partisan political views have diminished their objectivity. The orthodoxy has been repeated often enough that it has now assumed in the minds of many the status of an unquestionable historical fact. But somehow the real facts get in the way of this pseudo-historical neatness. What has become historical orthodoxy for many is sorely in need of some corrective revision.

Proponents of this orthodoxy point to the Labor governments of the period (the Whitlam government 1972-75

and the Hawke government since 1983) as times when there was an important reassertion of an independent nationalist approach to the management of US-Australian alliance relations. They cite the willingness of both governments to disagree vigorously and publicly with US policy on important issues and, on occasions, to use their influence in international organisations to gain wider support for their views. They contrast these characteristics with the sterile compliance which, they argue, characterised the approach of conservative Australian governments to Australia-US relations in the post-war period.

This popularly accepted view of Australia-US relations has been made to serve important political purposes for the current Australian government particularly in the context of the very real differences which it has had with the US Administration on the issue of subsidies for US agricultural exports. Some Australian Ministers have sought to convey the impression that they are confronting a development that has no precedent in Australia-US relations and that they, unlike their conservative predecessors, are standing up to American policy-makers and asserting Australian interests.

Some of this, of course, has an element of justification. The negative impact of the US Export Enhancement Program has been severe on efficient agricultural producers, such as Australia, which do not subsidise their agricultural exports. Markets have been eroded and commodity prices reduced in ways that are inconsistent with efficient international agricultural production policies, enormously and unnecessarily expensive for US taxpayers and quite counter-productive to long-term US economic, and possibly strategic, purposes.

But the kind of protest that the Australian government has been leading has its limits. The severity of the impact of US trade policies on Australian economic performance over

recent years is only one, and certainly not the predominant, factor in explaining the economic problems which Australia faces. Yet many in the government have sought to make it the scapegoat for all the country's economic difficulties. Conveniently neglected are the relative impact of Australia's disproportionately high foreign debt, its high inflation rate compared with its international competitors, the levels of foreign investment, and the rigidities of its wage-fixing system, its labour regulations and its extensive government regulation of economic activity. The notion that American self-interest is the root cause of Australia's economic problems is both deceptive and self-serving. It is deceptive in that it conceals the fundamental structural inadequacies of the Australian economy which lie at the heart of Australia's current and future difficulties. It is self-serving in that it has been used by the Australian government to substantiate the view that, unlike their non-Labor counterparts, they are capable of "standing up" to the Americans and bringing a truly nationalist perspective to the bilateral relationship. This is the extent to which historical myth has taken over from historical reality.

History is not quite so neat nor as politically convenient as the orthodox view of post-war Australia-US relations would lead one to believe. This generalisation holds in the two vital areas of the bilateral relationship—trade and diplomacy.

The long period of non-Labor rule in Australian Federal politics after 1949 was not characterised by a monolithic and unchanging approach to the management of Australia's relations with the United States. During the 1950s and much of the 1960s Australian foreign policy derived from the following premises: that in the region, as beyond, the focus of international relations was the conflict between the communist powers, led by the Soviet Union and China, and

the Western alliance system led by the United States; that the extension of communist influence in the Asia-Pacific region was inseparable from the encroachment of the Soviet Union, China or both and was a direct threat to Australia's security; that to meet such a threat Australia looked to her "great and powerful friends," Britain and the United States, but particularly to the latter; that the most important objective of Australian diplomacy was to ensure that the United States remained militarily present in Australia's region and willing to assist Australia should the need arise; and that "forward defence," meaning the deployment of Australian forces in South East Asia in support of British or US positions and with the objective of keeping encroaching communist influence as far away as possible from Australia as well as of demonstrating "loyalty to the protector," was the most appropriate military strategy for Australia.⁶

These priorities were the parameters within which the alliance relationship with the United States was managed in the 1950s and early 1960s. They reflected an Australian assessment of the prevailing international situation and how Australian security interests were best served. The fact that the US alliance and forward deployment were considered fundamental to the protection of those interests does not negate the fact that the assessment itself started and ended with a focus on Australian interests. The premises that underlay the Australian foreign policy of that period were in many ways a product of an international situation fundamentally different to that existing today and of an Australian foreign policy outlook that was conditioned by the views of a generation that had only recently experienced the dangers and horrors of a world war. Those premises were consistent with those which guided almost all Western governments at that time. They enjoyed the general support of the Australian electorate for all of the period in question.

It was obvious by the late 1960s, however, that these premises were no longer satisfactory foundations for Australian foreign policy. They took inadequate account of the Sino-Soviet split, the changing nature of the nuclear balance of terror, the 1969 "Nixon Doctrine" whereby the United States hoped to avoid another land war in Asia and which created many uncertainties about the whole concept of "forward defence," the British withdrawal east of Suez, and the absence of any clear, identifiable or direct threat to Australian territory. Under the Prime Ministerships of John Gorton (1969-71) and William McMahon (1971-72), conservative governments sensed the inadequacy of the strategic assumptions inherited from an earlier period and began to move away from them.

The initiative for developing a "more independent" Australian foreign policy is often ascribed to the Whitlam government (1972-1975). That initiative, however, can be traced more directly and accurately to strategic reviews and reassessments undertaken by the Gorton and McMahon governments between 1969 and 1972. The Whitlam government may have accelerated these changes and dramatised rather than disguised their extent (an unsurprising development given that its time in office was during the full bloom of superpower detente) but it did not initiate them.

It was the Gorton government, for example, that sought to develop a new framework for relations with the United States. It moved away from the close identification of Australian foreign policy with that of the United States established during the period of the Holt government (1966-1968) and aimed to fashion a more distinctively Australian outlook. It began the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam which was largely completed by the time that Labor assumed office in 1972. It initially refused to become a party to the US-sponsored Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It

introduced for the first time policies designed to limit foreign ownership and control of Australian interests. It developed a doctrine of defence self-reliance within an alliance framework and first espoused the doctrine of the absence of any major security threat to Australia for at least a decade. It insisted on strict limits for Australia's participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements limits which were interpreted in the region as a prelude to Australia's military withdrawal rather than the beginning of an enduring commitment.⁷

The Whitlam government built on this new approach. It dramatised it and took what credit there was for it. It made a show of public criticism of US policies. It emphasised in novel ways a notion that was quite unoriginal by 1972—that there was much more to Australian foreign policy than the US alliance and that there was much more to the US alliance than ANZUS. It gave substance to exaggerated notions of "alliance independence." But it was not, as is often claimed, the new intellectual and political force that swept away the strategic assumptions that had underlain post-war Australian foreign policy.

In addition to assumptions of a monolithic mind set that allegedly characterised non-Labor foreign policy in the 1949-72 period, the popular historical orthodoxy of the management of Australia-US relations by conservative Australian governments in the 1949-72 and 1975-83 periods also takes inadequate account of the regularity with which those governments asserted national security interests that ran counter to actual or proposed American policies and the significance of the issues that were involved. Some selective issues from the 1950s through to the 1980s are illustrative of this fact.

There was strong Australian opposition during the negotiation of the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty (which was signed in Manila in 1954) to possible use

by the United States of the new security organisation (the South East Asian Treaty Organisation) as a "united front" to overthrow the new communist regime in China or to underwrite Franco-US policy in Indochina. Australia strongly and successfully resisted US notions of a military involvement in Indochina in 1954 and, under pressure from Britain, Australia and France, the United States gradually reversed its policy of "dissociation" from the final settlement of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Furthermore, the Pacific Pact which accompanied the SEATO Treaty and which emphasised the need for economic and technical assistance to contain communism, marked a frank recognition of the fact that military measures alone were inadequate for that task. The inclusion of that provision in the Treaty and the reluctant acceptance of its explicitness by the United States was due in no small measure to Australian, British and Philippine pressure.

In fact, the Geneva Conference of 1954 represented a high water mark of Australian diplomatic influence. The then Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, appears to have played a decisive role in reconciling British and US attitudes on Indochina.⁸ A respected commentator at the time noted that during this period

...the influence of Canberra upon Washington appears to have been exercised without friction and without loss of self-respect on either side. It would seem to have been more widely appreciated outside than inside Australia.⁹

There were differences which were clearly expressed between Australian and US policies during the 1955-58 period on the appropriate response to the armed action taken by China against the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The Australian government unambiguously made known its determination to avoid involvement through association with the "brinkmanship" policies of US Secretary of State, John

Foster Dulles. Similarly, during the Laotian crises of 1959-60 and 1961-62, the Australian government made clear to the United States its unequivocal opposition to any intervention or show of force by SEATO powers on the side of the right wing elements in Laos. This Australian position was reflected in the outcome of the 1961-62 Geneva Conference which resulted in the ostensible neutralisation of Laos and its de facto partitioning.¹⁰

An area of open and sometimes bitter disagreement between Australian and US policies during the 1950s was the Middle East. There was no particular issue that epitomised those differences more starkly than the 1956 Suez Canal crisis and Australia's decision to support British rather than American policies.

Australia's military involvement in the Vietnam war between 1962 and 1972 is often cited as the most telling example of Australian subservience to US strategic requirements. It is important to recognise, however, that the issue in question here is not whether the military involvement of non-regional countries in that war was "right" or "wrong." That will continue to be argued by historians, strategists, moralists and politicians and both sides of the argument have coherent cases to make. Rather, the issue is whether the decision of the Australian government to involve Australia militarily on the ground in Vietnam was made on the basis of what it perceived to be Australia's national interests or whether it was taken primarily to support US regional and global security objectives.

The Australian decision to commit Australian forces to Vietnam was entirely consistent with the strategic doctrine which successive Australian governments had supported as the one that most effectively served Australia's national security interests. That doctrine was "forward defence." Given the existing limitations of Australia's military

capabilities, the successful implementation of the doctrine depended on the cohesiveness and effectiveness of ANZUS and SEATO arrangements and, above all, on a US regional military presence. Australia's objective was that the United States not waver in its commitment to South East Asia and it was that basic goal that led to Australia's support for a US presence diplomatically, politically and, if necessary, militarily.¹¹

"Forward defence" was a concept that rationalised Australian, not American, interests. Its appropriateness to strategic realities that existed in South East Asia during the 1960s will continue to be a source of debate and differences of view. But it was a concept that enjoyed broad and popular support in Australia, even throughout most of the Vietnam war notwithstanding the widespread public opposition to some aspects of the war such as the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, the conscription issue and the pace of the peace negotiations. It is a mistake to equate a coherent Australian strategic concept, in which the US alliance relationship plays a central role, with a strategy based purely and simply on a blind faith in American policy and meek compliance with all that such a faith implies. It is the distinction between the two that explains such facts as the decision of the Australian government in July 1967 (which was taken to the considerable annoyance of the US administration) to refuse American requests for further increases in the level of Australian forces.

Regional security issues in the period after the Vietnam war also produced substantive difference on important issues between Australian conservative governments and US administrations. Prime Minister Fraser differed unambiguously with President Carter over the latter's talk of neutralisation of the Indian Ocean, his apparent disinterest in South East Asian affairs and his proposal for the withdrawal

of US combat forces in the Republic of Korea. Fraser had made it clear that "the interests of the United States and the interests of Australia are not identical." He emphasised that in its relations with the United States as with other countries Australia's "firm responsibility is independence to assess our own interests."¹²

As on diplomacy so too on bilateral trade issues, there is a long history which testifies to the preparedness of conservative Australian governments to criticise US policies and to assert vigorously Australian interests. That history goes back to the 1930s when bilateral relations were almost exclusively economic and almost entirely unsatisfactory, when a non-Labor Australian government decided to wage a "trade war" against the United States in support of what it considered to be Australia's national economic interests and when the deep antagonisms generated by those differences only faded as a result of developments elsewhere—Japan's march to empire in the Far East, the settlement of Anglo-US trade disagreements and the course of Hitler's war in Europe.¹³

Throughout the 1950s there were sharp differences between Australian and US policy on international commodity prices for foodstuffs and raw materials. Australian governments made clearly known their strong opposition to the US tariff on raw wool and to other US commodity import restraints as well as to the export of US wheat surpluses as food aid to developing countries on the grounds that it affected the levels of and returns on sales of Australian wheat. Australian governments rejected US criticisms of continuing Australia-Britain trade preference arrangements. The Minister for Trade in many non-Labor governments during the 1950s and 1960s, John McEwen, bitterly protested against US restrictions on lead and zinc imports in 1958 and he later concluded in 1960 that

...no great world trading nation has obstructed Australia's battle for overseas trade in the past eight years more than the United States.¹⁴

These bilateral trade tensions continued into the 1960s and beyond. There was open disagreement between both countries on US duties on Australian wool and meat and over the Australian preferential tariff system. Australian non-Labor governments also bitterly disagreed with US policy on trade with Communist China. Australia endorsed and supported the American policy on recognition of the regime in Peking but it did not see this as a barrier to trade in the same way as did the United States. By 1963 Communist China had become the largest single buyer of Australian wheat, taking twice as much as the next largest customer, Britain. Successive Australian non-Labor governments during the 1950s and 1960s were quite prepared to tread this potentially discomfoting path between their American ally and their Chinese customer.

Nor was there any significant diminution of tensions and resentments arising from bilateral trade issues during the tenure of one of Australia's most pro-American Prime Ministers, Malcolm Fraser, from 1975 to 1983. There were a number of specific and bitterly contested disputes over access to the Australian and US markets. The Fraser government's concerns were focused, in particular, on US quota arrangements for Australian beef, wool and other primary products. American resentment over these specific bilateral trade disputes were exacerbated by Mr. Fraser's high profile international promotion of multilateral trade reforms based on a renewed and more constructive concern with the "North-South dialogue."¹⁵ Many US policymakers and senior officials considered this initiative, at best, to be quite disproportionate to Australia's real international influence and, at worst, to be one that was quite inappropriate, even

hypocritical, for a country with Australia's highly protectionist trade infrastructure to be promoting.

One of the ironies of the current Australia-US tensions over US subsidisation of its agricultural exports has been that it has prompted such unabashed declarations of fealty to the American alliance by an Australian non-Labor government. For years the current Australian government has enjoyed the best of two roles—that of proclaiming itself to be a loyal and supportive ally of the United States and that of an independent and self-reliant actor protecting exclusively Australian interests. It has rarely been pressed on the underlying tensions between these two roles. Both at times have served important international and domestic political purposes. It is the trade issue that has brought some of these tensions to the surface. A central theme of the Australian government's opposition to US trade policies is that Australia is what it traditionally has been—a reliable and supportive ally to the United States. As such, Australia should not be discriminated against because the decline in national income being caused by US trade policies is reducing Australia's capacity to continue to contribute to the important defence and strategic objectives which Australia and the United States share. The tone of that argument is quite different from the often strident emphasis on independent self-reliance which has underlain many of the Australian government's differences with the current US Administration. These differences are over issues as wide-ranging as the strategic modernisation program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the pace and extent of the arms control negotiations, Southern Africa and Central America. For all the questioning of the Australia-US alliance which US trade policies has occasioned in Australia, the most interesting aspect of the Australian Government's approach has been not its leadership and promotion of that questioning but rather its emphasis on the

need to maintain its capacity to fulfill Australia's traditional role as a supportive alliance partner of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusions

The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are neither dramatic nor novel but they do provide an important balance to the exaggerated claims that are often made, particularly for self-serving political purposes, concerning the "lessons" to be learned from the history of Australia-US relations since 1945. The first is that rather than adopting any fundamentally different approach to the relevance of the American alliance for Australian interests, all Australian governments since 1949 (with the possible exception of the Whitlam government, especially in its early phases and towards the end of its period in office) differed more on style than on substance in its management of the Australia-US alliance relationship. Non-Labor governments usually preferred quiet diplomacy and emphasis on broad areas of common agreement to the public displays of concern for "independence" and "self-reliance" which have tended to dominate the approach of Labor governments. But the record shows that despite these differences of style both Labor and non-Labor governments in Australia have had significant policy differences with the United States on defence, economic and trade issues. No historical purpose is served by claiming for Labor or non-Labor governments a monopoly of effectiveness, independence or fearlessness in seeking to resolve those differences.

Secondly, the differences in style between Australian Labor and non-Labor governments in managing the Australia-US alliance have been, and are, significant to the extent that they reveal particular aspects of very different approaches to alliance management. At times, non-Labor

governments were guilty of getting ahead of the Americans in order to show that they were behind them.¹⁶ Hardline Australian support in the late 1960s for the US bombing of North Vietnam was an example of this characteristic. Non-Labor governments were also generally more secretive on aspects of the Australia-US alliance than were their Labor counterparts, and often unnecessarily so. The presence of joint Australia-US defence facilities in Australia is one such example. These facilities, which were established during the 1960s and early 1970s, were shrouded by non-Labor governments in a good deal of self-defeating secrecy. The current Labor government has shown that it is possible to explain the rationale for Australia's hosting of the facilities in ways that do not compromise Australian or US security interests and that enjoy broad bipartisan support.

Labor's style of alliance management has not been characterised by a tendency towards self-defeating secrecy but by a good deal of "chip on the shoulder" nationalism and heavy rhetoric on issues which are either peripheral to Australia's real national interests or on which Australia has minimal international influence.¹⁷ Labor's commitment to an "independent" foreign policy has often inclined it to the view that any Australian support for American policies should always be conditional, rarely if ever complete and never permanent. The fear is that acknowledgement of an inherent commonality of outlook is the first step to "subservience." This kind of approach is part of the ideological baggage that many in the Australian Labor Party carry with them from their experiences in opposing the Vietnam War. For others, it is the inevitable consequence of a true commitment to nationalism. Whatever its genesis, its effect on the style of Labor's management of Australia-US relations is unmistakable.

Thirdly, the Australia-US alliance relationship has always been a paradoxical one: so natural given the ties of language, history, culture, geography and shared concerns about Pacific developments, and yet so unnatural given the asymmetrical nature of the relationship in terms of the size, economic and military significance of each party, and their respective international influence.¹⁸ Tensions and strains are inevitably created as a result of that paradox. The United States, as the larger party, has often felt that the smaller partner, Australia, has failed to appreciate adequately the global implications of particular issues and the fact that regional developments are often part of a bigger picture. Australian governments, on the other hand, have often felt that their priorities, their views and their regional expertise are not taken seriously enough by the United States, whose economic and strategic imperatives are basically driven by either great power rivalry or strict commercialism.

These tensions and strains have always underlain the generally successful and mutually beneficial management of the Australia-US alliance relationship. They have not existed only when "nationalist" governments of a particular political persuasion have been in power in either country. Non-Labor as well as Labor governments in Australia have had to contend with those tensions and strains and to manage them constructively. The differences that are evident between their efforts to do so centre on non-Labor's narrower, and more realistic, definition of the limits of Australia's international influence and its capacity for true self-reliance.

Fourthly, it is indisputable that Australian foreign policy has at times deferred to direct pressure from the United States (Australia's policy of non-recognition of Communist China in the 1950s and 1960s is one such example) and that, as a result of the length of their tenure in government in the post-war period, non-Labor parties are more accountable for such

deferrals than is the Labor Party. But this fact is not exceptional nor is it evidence of non-Labor's "subservience" to US interests. It is in the nature of an alliance relationship that parties frequently need to take account of the differing views of others. There is no evidence in the Australia-US alliance this has been a one-way process. Furthermore, while it is true that American pressure is reflected in some Australian foreign policy decisions, there is also evidence in others of pressure from Britain, Japan, New Zealand, the Commonwealth, particular Third World countries, ASEAN, South Pacific island nations, and others. Similarly, none of these exertions of influence are one-way processes.

One of the outstanding characteristics of Australian foreign policy since 1945 has been the consistently high popular support for the maintenance of a strong alliance relationship with the United States. Past and present critics have argued that the Australian people have been deluded by their governments, that they have been denied all the necessary information, that they are paralysed by habit and inertia, that they are obsessed with a siege mentality, that they have underrated Australia's capacity for self-reliance, and that they have never been offered a credible, non-extremist and truly alternative approach. Most of these claims have some limited if varying basis in truth but they are inadequate as explanations of the level and consistency of public support which the American alliance has enjoyed in Australia. They fail because they refuse to countenance that, as in other areas of government policy, a majority of ordinary Australians might be more in touch with reality than foreign policy "experts" and self-appointed political guardians of Australian nationalism who found so frustrating the consistent electoral endorsement of the management of the American alliance and foreign policy generally during the long periods of non-Labor government. The reality was that for the great

majority of Australians enhancement of the American alliance was the nearest approximation to safety in a dangerous world. At the present time that reality continues to exist to a greater extent than many Australian policymakers are prepared or willing to admit.

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1914 AND *DEJA VU*: AN ANTERIOR FUTURE

by

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Early in this century The Great War, World War I, erupted. It was not, as thought at the time, The-War-To-End-All-Wars.

The origins of World War I have been extensively studied. Indeed, recently there has been renewed interest, partly because of the striking parallels between current world affairs and the international situation in 1914.¹

As the reader will recall, the assassination of Austria's Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists in Sarajvo (in what is now Yugoslavia) was the immediate *causus belli*. Austria-Hungary was a moribund major power, beset by economic decline and ethnic division, and its leaders tried to resuscitate the empire through aggression against its Slavic neighbors, the Serbs. The Germans, who perceived themselves as surrounded by hostile powers (Britain and France to the west, Russia to the east), felt compelled to support their sole ally Austria, and they gave Vienna a "blank check." On the other side, Russia supported Serbia, partly because it presented a chance to avenge earlier diplomatic defeats and because it seemed a chance to bedevil the Austrians.²

The prospect of an Austro-Russian war created a terrible dilemma for Germany. France and Russia both feared Germany and had joined together in the *Entente Cordiale*. Great Britain, alarmed by German naval expansion, had subsequently joined the informal, but potent, understanding,

making it the Triple *Entente*. If war came, Germany expected that it would have to fight on two fronts.

The Germans had a plan, the von Schlieffen plan, to deal with the two front contingency. This plan assumed that a simultaneous two front war would be disastrous. Instead, well-armed, technologically advanced France would have to be defeated first and quickly. The most direct path to Paris was through neutral, unhappily located Belgium. But that would bring German troops to the English Channel and British troops into the war. The implications were foreboding, yet the von Schlieffen plan became set doctrine: Germany had to attack and defeat the western powers first so that it could then move its forces to the eastern front to face the Russian steamroller: slow to mobilize, poorly armed, yet with massive manpower.

Few could believe that Europe would slip into general war. The balance of power system had preserved peace among the central powers for a century. Modern war technology made conflict seem too terrible. Deterrence worked, they said. Yet war came. Germany could not persuade France and England to pledge neutrality. Each country felt forced to mobilize lest it be left unprepared and vulnerable. The defensive mobilization of one seemed an aggressive preparation to attack by another. The "first strike" von Schlieffen plan took over with a terrible, automatic logic. Last minute attempts by the politicians to stop the slide into war were futile, too late, and rejected by their military subordinates.

What follows is the result of a nagging sense of *deja vu*. The Soviet Union, today, is a power beset by economic and nationalistic problems, just as Austria was yesterday. Like the 1917 Germans, the 1987 Soviets see themselves surrounded and isolated. To their east is China,

technologically backward yet possessing a frightening mass of humanity, not unlike Russia four score years ago. To the Soviet west are the technologically advanced Americans and Western Europeans, held together by fear of Moscow. No treaty exists between the western powers and China, yet they are increasingly cast together by their common opposition to the Soviet Union. From Moscow's perspective, it would be foolish not to presume a two front war.³

The intellectual origins of this essay also rest on a creative article published by Richard Klein and William Warner.⁴ In their literary critique of works about the truism that "Total nuclear does not refer to anything that is or ever has been, so far; its real referent is in some still hypothetical future." Further, after a nuclear war there may well be no history, "no discourse left, no memory and no work of mourning capable of registering the then real referent." What is needed then, Klein and Warner write, is to become "historians of a time without model, anticipating in the tense of the future anterior a decisive historical possibility which, if it occurs, our culture might never view historically."

The "story" that follows is an attempt to create an anterior future. Its setting is drawn from what Klein and Warner call the "textuality" of World War I. Most of the quotes are drawn directly from that time. Many of the actors roughly coincide. Today's USSR is an amalgam of then's Germany and Austria-Hungary. Contemporary China is an echo of historical Russia. The United States has elements of Great Britain and France in 1914. Similarly, West Germany is a bit like France was, but also like Belgium between the superpowers. Even many of the individuals' names are pseudo-translations from one language to another. Thus, then, the reflections of the past, present, and future all merge into one image, distorted, yet reflecting reality.

It is true that this history of the anterior future is only suggestive, that the parallels are not exact. But it is also true that they are disturbing. And if we are to avoid repeating a recorded history of the past in an unrecorded history of the future, it is well to ponder Klein and Warner's "hypothetical phantasm, in which all our plans and all our strategies...are conditioned by a non-real referent...about which we can only talk, and opine and hope."

The explosion that scattered the Yugoslav crowd also rocked the already teetering balance between peace and war in an unstable world. More specifically, the bomb which detonated in a manhole destroyed the limousine and ended the life of American Vice President Francisco Fernando.

Fernando had gone to troubled Yugoslavia over the strenuous objections of the U.S. State Department. Yugoslavia's unity had been tenuous since the death of Marshal Tito nearly two decades earlier, but in recent months the strains between the dominant Serbs and the Croatian minority had erupted into sporadic violence. To make matters worse, the again simmering Croatian independence movement had a strong element of anti-slavic-Russian big brother nationalism, and by extension, anti-communism.

Understandably, Moscow was greatly alarmed. The Soviet Union was a declining superpower. In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev had attempted a series of sweeping changes to resuscitate the faltering Soviet economy and reform the increasingly sullen Soviet polity. He had failed, just as Nikita Khrushchev had failed twenty years before him. And after a humiliating retreat from Afghanistan and the loss of client states Nicaragua to American invasion, Angola to the "Reagan Doctrine," and Vietnam to Chinese pressure, Gorbachev had been toppled from power by a combination of hawks and entrenched *apparatchiki*. Indeed, and in another

parallel with Khrushchev, Gorbachev's sole legacy was unrest in East Europe. Just as had been true in the 1950s, moderation in the Soviet regime had seemed an opportunity to nationalist reform elements from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Polish restiveness had flared anew in Gdansk and elsewhere. West Germany's *Eine Deutschland* Party had gained widespread support on both sides of a border imposed on Germany by defeat. Thus, to the Russians, a separatist Croatian movement threatened Soviet domination of its East European empire. More locally, Croatian nationalism had spawned a counter movement, the Slavic Red Hand, a "secret" organization intent on preserving Yugoslavian unity, that is Slavic domination.

A number of factors prompted Vice President Fernando to plunge into this cauldron. To the American hawks who dominated the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency it seemed a perfect opportunity to discomfit the already beleaguered Soviets by tacitly encouraging the Croats. To that end, Fernando had scheduled his first stop in Zagreb, the traditional Croatian capital. Domestic politics also played a role. Fernando's aged commander-in-chief was a second term, lame duck, and the Vice President aimed to move up. As the first Hispanic-American elected to his office, Fernando had been a darling of an American public proud that it had demonstrated, at least to itself, that rumors of prejudice were untrue. But six years in the loyalist second spot had taken their toll, and the columnists had dubbed the Vice President "El Clone" and the cartoonists had caricaturized him as a Sancho Panza. Thus, in 1994, Fernando was seeking to assert his strength and propel himself into the Oval Office in '96.

Fernando's assassination outraged the United States. Beyond the emotion, the hawks also saw the incident as an opening to further weaken Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

Pressure on the Yugoslav government, especially a demand for the prosecution of the assassins and suppression of the Red Hand, would be, the hawks reasoned, impossible for the Slav-dominated government to meet. Destabilization would result, and that, especially in concert with U.S. encouragement of the Croats, would encourage the region's anti-Russian nationalism.

The U.S. demands and the reinforcement of the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet to lend substance to the *demarche* were met with spasmodic fear and anger in the communist capitals. The Yugoslav government, which had grown closer to Moscow to offset its Croatian problems, demanded protection. The communist regimes in Warsaw, East Berlin, and other capitals also pressured the Kremlin with dire predictions that unchecked Croatian nationalism might spread to their own populations. The party and government bureaucracies in Moscow which simultaneously worried about the U.S.S.R.'s stumbling economy and protected the centralized system that caused it, saw possible U.S. intervention and a resulting dissolution of Yugoslavia as a threat to their personal sinecures, their country, and their country's empire. Failing at home economically and socially, unable to keep up with the West technologically, having lost Nicaragua, Angola, and Vietnam, and now threatened in their Eastern European buffer zone, the crisis was perceived by the Soviets an epochal struggle. The Soviet Union had become known as the "sick superpower," and it was better, they reasoned, to risk war than to die a degenerative death. In an attempt to reassert their strength, shore up their nervous Warsaw Pact allies, and win a propaganda victory by facing the Americans down, Soviet foreign minister Yagakov flew into Belgrade to sign a hastily arranged mutual defense pact. "You have," he told Yugoslav officials, "an open account on Soviet fraternal arms to resist the American imperialists."

The pressures of history and geography also urged the Soviets to action. Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler had all overrun the motherland from the West. World War II, in particular, had created an almost religious resolve never to wait to be attacked and to preserve a buffer so that the next war would start far to the west of the Soviet border.

Earlier in its history, Russia had also been ravaged many times from the east, and the fear of the West paled in comparison with the horrific specter of the "yellow hordes" of Asia. In the last century, Russia had seized great tracts of land from a weakened China, but the turn into the 20th Century had ushered in a slow decline in Soviet fortunes in Asia. Japan had humiliated Russia in the war of 1904-05. Soon thereafter, China had cast off its decadent imperial past and had begun the long road to rejuvenation. Mao's victory in 1949 did little to dispel the historic and geo-strategic realities that separated the two countries, and relations had deteriorated to the point of armed conflict by 1969. China was no match technologically for the Soviets, but its one billion people could supply a massive ground force, a seeming human tidal wave to engulf Soviet Siberia. Moreover, China had been militarily modernizing. It had become a nuclear power in 1964 and possessed a still relatively small, but increasingly lethal, strategic arsenal. China's conventional forces had also improved as a result of its reforms in the '80s along with limited U.S. technological assistance. Indeed, relations between Washington and Beijing had improved to a point where an unofficial *entente orientale* existed.

Although no treaty or other agreement to cooperate militarily existed, the Sino-American axis was a reality in the minds of paranoid Soviet planners. They reasoned that war with the West would occasion a preplanned or opportunistic Chinese attack into Siberia to recover the 1.5 million square

miles that China still claimed had been imperialistically taken a century earlier. In sum, Moscow saw itself as isolated and surrounded.

In reaction to this real or imagined threat, Soviet military planners led by General Shafarevich had drawn up a contingency plan to deal with the danger of a two front war. The partial mobilization against Poland in the early 1980s had proven a bungled disaster, and the general staff was determined to leave nothing to chance. As is often the bureaucratic truth, the contingency plan had rapidly assumed the status of set doctrine and standard operating procedure.

The Shafarevich plan was based on several factors. The distance between the two fronts in Europe and Asia was some 6,000 miles, and the Soviet transportation system would be hard pressed to man and equip both. In particular, the constricted Siberian rail lines would strangle efforts to resupply and reinforce the eastern front. The Shafarevich plan estimated that it would require 12,020 railcars grouped in 280 trains to move one division and its supplies. And Soviet ground forces were grouped into over 200 divisions!

The Shafarevich plan also operated on the assumptions that first, the two fronts could not be fought simultaneously and, second, that China would be slower to mobilize than the West and lay further from the Soviet heartland than the West. The strategy, therefore, was initially to concentrate the vast bulk of Soviet forces in the West and defeat the U.S. and its NATO allies quickly. Then Soviet forces could be redeployed to the East to defeat China. It all required great planning and quartz movement timing.

Finally, the Soviets felt compelled to use battlefield and theater nuclear weapons. They were not as sure of their conventional preponderance over NATO as many in the West were. And, in any case, the Soviets were convinced that they needed victory quickly to allow them to transfer their

divisions east to face the lumbering Chinese giant. To that end, and to ensure that the immediate correlation of forces was in their favor, Soviet plans called for a preemptive attack, *en masse* and in depth once war was inevitable.⁵

The Soviet-backed Yugoslav rejection of the American demands left Washington in an anxious quandary. Everyone wanted victory, no one wanted war, but the gauntlet had been publicly cast. Retreat would be humiliating and, it was said, destroy U.S. credibility with both its allies and nonaligned countries. The Soviet ambassador was called to the White House and told that the United States pledged not to "permanently" occupy Yugoslavia, but, warned President Grey, "the United States insists that the complicity of the Yugoslav government in the murder of Vice President Fernando must be recognized and paid for." Meanwhile, to underline its determination, U.S. forces worldwide went to Defcon 3, and carrier elements of the Atlantic 2nd and 6th Fleets moved into the Baltic and Adriatic seas.

The reaction in the Soviet capital was distressingly close to hysterical. After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets had sworn that they would never again be humbled by American arms. Now a worse humiliation threatened, this time in their own sphere of influence. Some in the Politburo argued for moderation rather than face the onslaught of America's superior technology in the West and China's hordes in the East. "Nyet," Defense Minister Molochkov thundered slamming the table, "if we are to be crushed, let us be crushed gloriously." Glory carried the day.

Appearing on national television the next day in a broadcast aimed around the world, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Beysembaev told a nervous globe that "The sword has been forced into our hand." The Soviet Union would mobilize and maneuver its forces, he warned, unless the "imperialist-capitalist clique" in Washington

withdrew its forces from the Adriatic and Baltic and submitted the Yugoslav incident to a U.N. factfinding board. "Be assured though," he tried to calm Europe and China, "that we will only mobilize against the American threat to our brothers in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. If they wish peace, we bear no hostility toward any of our neighbors."

Amid what can only be described as "frightful nervous tension," Soviet diplomats probed the reaction of China and the NATO allies. What would they do if hostilities erupted? "We would ask," China's foreign minister Sha Xinfu countered, "if you are willing to ensure socialist solidarity and agree in principle to return China's territory seized by imperialist Tsars that you, yourself, discredited and overthrew?" Ambassador Portugalov's uncertain response met with studied silence, then a terse but elliptical reply by Premier Ni Cholu: "China will act in its own interests."

The replies from West Germany, France, and Great Britain were no less unsettling. Each country wanted to avoid war, yet each feared the results of a collapse of resolve and unity during the crisis. The fate of Finland could be the future of Western Europe. The West German camp, in particular, was divided. Germany might be the battleground, yet weakness might be fatal. Also, a Soviet diplomatic defeat in the crisis might mean a collapse of control in Eastern Europe and open the way for *eine Deutschland*.

Hoping to force what could not be gotten through persuasion, Moscow issued an ultimatum to Bonn. West Germany was to move its troops back 100 kilometers from the eastern frontier, pledge neutrality, and promise to block any U.S. attempt to launch an attack from its territory. "Otherwise," Beysembaev's note to German President Albrecht warned, "the Soviet Union cannot be responsible for the potential tragic course of history." West Germany's

resounding *Nein!* rang out as a bell of courage in the West and as an ominous tolling in Moscow. A reunited, vengeful Germany would once again threaten mother Russia's heartland.

To support his threats, Beysembaev at first allowed the generals to prepare for the worst. Calls for all men to report to their military reserve units were broadcast over Soviet television and radio channels. All nonmilitary air and rail travel was halted. The East-West border again became an iron curtain as crossing points were sealed. Soviet naval vessels dispersed from their ports, army divisions moved from their bases to field positions, and American satellites detected unusual activity at known Soviet tactical nuclear weapons dumps in Eastern Europe. The most alarming sign of all was an FBI report that Soviet embassy personnel in Washington were burning documents.

Words, then deeds, then more words convulsed the nerves of the crisis managers. Control of events rapidly began to escape the hands of both sides' civilian leaders and, perhaps, even the generals. In the murky realm of SOPs, SIOPs, sensors and computer analyses, escalatory momentum replaced decision making.

The fragmentation of control was even stronger in the U.S.S.R. than in the U.S. The Soviets had learned the lesson of Operation Barbarossa, the German attack in June, 1941. The Soviets had been caught by surprise and nearly been overrun, and they had spent most of the war fighting on their own territory. In particular, the military believed that the political cowardice and dereliction of the civilian leader, Josif Stalin, had forced it to absorb the first, nearly fatal blow by the Nazi *Wehrmacht*. A great deal of subsequent Soviet military and political strategy was dedicated to ensuring that would never happen again. The Soviets did not want war, but if it came again, they would not wait to be attacked and

forced to fight a defensive battle. If the civilian leadership again hesitated at the critical moment, then the generals were resolved to save the motherland.

Late in the crisis, Beysembaev grasped to regain control, to contain the crisis that increasingly threatened to destroy the dialectic. He ordered the military to confine mobilization to the South West Command. The directive sparked near revolt in the general staff. There was no partial mobilization plan, the generals implored. Full mobilization had to proceed; change would invite disorganization, disaster, defeat. World War II, the generals virtually screamed, could not happen again! World War I was about to. Beysembaev waivered, then reversed his order.

The NATO Council issued a call for restraint and asked Moscow to halt its mobilization in the north and central sectors. Beysembaev personally telephoned the heads of each of the major European governments to assure them of Soviet good will, but told them that for "technical reasons" he could not countermand orders at this late date. "I hope you will not become too nervous," he told his incredulous listeners. Western Europe mobilized, and American forces began to airlift nuclear weapons, including neutron bombs and Pershing IIIs across the Atlantic. American nuclear submarines closed the hatches over their D-5 Trident missiles, sailed from their home ports, and disappeared beneath the dark waters.

China's People's Liberation Army also mobilized. Ni Cholu hoped to avoid a move that might prompt a Soviet preemptive strike, but he was overcome by his generals. "The enemy has already begun to mobilize," he was told, "and their forces are more mobile. If we delay, we are lost." The orders were given. A gestation that would soon give birth to an army of 20 million began on the Soviet Union's southeastern frontier.

China's mobilization seared the nerve center of the Soviet Russia's historical paranoia. The ultimate nightmare, Western technology and Asian masses united in a terrible orslaught, was at hand.

The terrible logic of the Shafarevich plan took over. The Western threat had to be met and crushed before the slowly mobilizing avalanche of Chinese manpower careened into Siberia. The civilian and military leaderships were dispersed into their respective underground command posts. At the last minute, Beysembaev tried to order a delay to give the other side a chance to blink. He failed. Whether by technical failure or by military intent it will never be known, but the phone and teletype links to the military command center were down.

It was Tuesday, August 4, 1944. At six in the morning, the Soviet ambassador paid his last visit to the West German Chancellery. His note declared that despite his government's "well intentioned proposals," the Soviet Union had been forced to protect its own safety, "if necessary by the force of arms."

At two minutes past eight that morning Soviet troops moved across the West German frontier near Kassel. Six minutes later, nuclear blasts destroyed NATO headquarters in Brussels and atomized a host of other military, governmental, and transportation targets throughout Western Europe. At 1:36 p.m. a counterbarrage of neutron weapons began detonating among advancing Soviet troops, and nuclear warheads rained down on targets in Eastern Europe and European Russia. With a great deal of the Soviet C³I capability destroyed, launches from British and French missile submarines were mistaken for launches from American SSBNs. A presumed retaliatory strike against U.S. land-based ICBMs was ordered at 2:17 p.m. It was still Tuesday. It would be Tuesday forever.

ENDNOTES

- ¹For some recent works see Miles Kahler, "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy," *Foreign Affairs* 58 (Winter 1979/80): 374-96; and its Discussion, *Orbis* 24 (Winter 1981): 719-50. Also David Keithly, "War Planning and the Outbreak of War in 1914," *Armed Forces and Society* 12 (Summer 1986): 553-79; Scott Sagan, "1914, Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986): 151-76; and Bruce Russett, "Security and the Resources Scramble: Will 1984 Be Like 1914," *International Affairs* (London) 58 (Winter 81/82) pp. 42-58.
- ²The author makes no pretense of discussing the origins of World War I in a scholarly way. The subject is complex and controversial. The discussion here is, rather, suggestive. Two excellent works, which this author relied on, are Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1963) and Laurence Lafore, *The Long Fuse* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1971).
- ³Some may think that the scenario of a Sino-West axis aimed against the Soviets is unlikely. The Soviets are not so sure. For a recent discussion see Paul Kennedy, "What Gorbachev is Up Against," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1987, pp. 29-43. For a different extended scenario, see Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War, 1985* (New York: Macmillan, 1978).
- ⁴Richard Klein and William B. Warner, "Nuclear Coincidence and the Korean Airline Disaster," *diacritics* 16(Spring 1986): 2-21.
- ⁵Some will argue that the Soviets would not initially use nuclear weapons. This author is not so sure and bases his assumptions on the lessons the Soviets drew from World War II, their preference for massive force and their distrust of deterrence.

TO THE EDITOR

In the February 1988 issue of the *AHR* there is a review of Warren Kimball's *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*. However, the single most important message which transpired between Roosevelt and Churchill, the message which not only changed the course of WWII and as a result affected the post-war history of the world, but which also more than any other resulted in bitter feelings, the effects of which are still remembered today—this message is not included in the "complete" correspondence.

It is the message which Roosevelt had Lord Mountbatten carry back to Churchill after a five hour conference which took place on the evening of June 9, 1942. The message was intended to extricate Roosevelt from his commitment to the Soviet Union to create "a second front in Europe in 1942," an agreement he had entered into with Molotov just nine days earlier.

Roosevelt invited Stalin to send Molotov and a high ranking general to Washington to discuss a "military proposal in order to relieve your front." Roosevelt's purpose was to offer the Soviet Union a second front and thereby finesse the pressure being placed on Churchill by the Soviets to recognize Russian pre-war borders. In retrospect this was not asking too much since Churchill had offered *de facto* recognition in return for a benevolent neutrality in 1940. Certainly it would seem that as a fighting ally the Russians could expect no less. However the State Department vehemently opposed recognition. One really has to wonder about the motivation of the State Department. Did the State Department think that the Soviet Union would have as a war aim the dismemberment of its own country? Has any other country ever done so? Why would the Soviet Union be different?

Molotov, on his way to Washington, stopped in London. Roosevelt, on May 27, 1942, requested of Churchill a resume of his discussions with Molotov. Churchill in his reply the next day refers to "Gymnast," the code name for the North African invasion. (By the way, this was never

discussed with Molotov.) Realizing the tenacity of Molotov in his desire for a second front, Churchill decided to send Lord Mountbatten to Washington. The purpose of Lord Mountbatten's visit was to dissuade Roosevelt from any commitment to a second front. Learning from Lord Mountbatten the depth of Churchill's opposition to a second front placed Roosevelt in an awkward situation. With an eye to history he would be very reluctant to commit in writing the change in his commitment to Russia on a matter he himself had initiated. Furthermore he had to placate his advisors, who it seems almost to a man favored a second front. There was also the matter of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. It was at this point that Roosevelt decided to use Lord Mountbatten to carry the message back to Churchill regarding the change in his commitment.

On June 12, 1942, Lord Mountbatten returned to London. On that same day he had a meeting with Churchill. On June 13, the next day, Churchill informed Roosevelt that he was coming to Washington.

What did Lord Mountbatten tell Churchill that energized him? On June 15, 1942, Lord Mountbatten sent to Roosevelt an almost stenographic transcript of his meeting with Churchill which was a report of the June 9 Mountbatten-Roosevelt discussion. Now why would Roosevelt require of Lord Mountbatten a resume of the discussion just held? Didn't Roosevelt know what had been discussed? Did he require of the thousands of other White House visitors that they send back to him a resume of what was discussed? Obviously not. He did require this of Lord Mountbatten in order to make certain that he delivered the correct message to Churchill. The message was how "struck" Roosevelt was with Churchill's phrase in his message of May 28, 1942, "we must never let Gymnast pass from our minds." As we saw, the message was successfully delivered because Churchill rose to the bait the next day when he informed Roosevelt he was coming to Washington.

On June 19, 1942, Churchill arrived in Hyde Park, New York, where he was met by Roosevelt who was driving alone, whereupon they immediately went for a ride. Because of his disability Roosevelt had to control the car with hand contrivances, which caused Churchill to

comment on the muscular strength required. Roosevelt, in reply, asked Churchill to feel his biceps, stating that a heavyweight boxer had admired his biceps. Churchill said, in commenting on the occasion, that it was a long trip. Further, they could not be interrupted or overheard by eavesdroppers and in fact had even eluded the Secret Service Agents. What else was discussed besides Roosevelt's biceps? On this matter, the usually voluble Churchill is curiously reticent. It is reasonable to assume that the purpose of the visit, military operations for 1942, was also discussed. In fact it was on this occasion, I believe, that agreement was reached to substitute *Gymnast* (later to be termed *Torch*) for the second front, with Churchill bearing the onus for the change. The next day, June 20, Churchill handed Roosevelt a memorandum categorically rejecting a second front in 1942.

Kimball in his preface stated that he included every scrap of message that transpired between Churchill and Roosevelt. Lord Mountbatten's message of June 15, 1942, was not a scrap; in fact it was a page and a half long. Furthermore, its importance cannot be overstated.

Ephraim Schulman
(Valdosta, GA)

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR CONVENTION SCHEDULE

Tuesday, Dec. 27, 8-11 PM Hyatt Regency, Bluegrass A, Council Meeting

Wednesday, Dec. 28, 5-7 PM Hyatt Regency, Buckeye B, Cash Bar Reception

Thursday, Dec. 29, 12:15 PM Hyatt Regency, Regency F, Luncheon

NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER

Fellowship and Grant Opportunities, 1989-1990

The Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, has established the Secretary of the Navy's Research Chair in Naval History. This is a competitive **senior fellowship**, with a duration of one year, that allows research and writing on a major monograph concerning the history of the US Navy. The subject of that monograph will be proposed by the applicant. Applications are welcomed from specialists in national security affairs, foreign relations, or the history of science and technology, who have an interest in naval history, as well as from diplomatic, military, and naval historians.

The award amounts to approximately \$50,000 per year plus allowances, as regulated by the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. This law provides for the exchange of personnel between federal and state or local governments and institutions of higher education. Permanent employees of the federal government are not eligible for this position. The application deadline is March 31, 1989.

The Center will make two **postgraduate** grants of up to \$2,500 each to individuals undertaking research and writing in the field of US naval history. Applicants should have either the Ph.D. or equivalent credentials, and they must be US citizens. The deadline for submitting applications is March 31, 1989.

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All appointments and grants are subject to the availability of funds. Applicants for the research chair, the post-graduate grants, and the pre-doctoral fellowship should direct their inquiries to:

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Dr. John L. Larson
Department of History
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

QUINCENTENNIAL CONFERENCE

AT THE JOHN CARTER BROWN LIBRARY

In September 1991, the John Carter Brown Library intends to hold a four-day international conference on the general theme of "America in European Consciousness: The Impact of the New World on the Old, 1492-1750." The conference theme emphasizes the intellectual responses of Europeans to the encounter with the Americas over a period of 250

years and the ways in which these responses influenced the course of developments within Europe itself.

The JCB Quincentennial Conference will focus on what learned elites thought and imagined about "America" as well as on the way in which these thoughts and images may have influenced attitudes and policies within Europe itself. Our direct concern, it should be noted, is not with changes in European material life as a result of the Discovery.

In calling for papers, the conference organizers are looking for contributions that will be provocative and that will also point the way to new directions for research on the great theme of the meaning of the Discovery to European thought and sensibility. Inquiries should be sent to:

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On May 4 the John F. Kennedy Library announced the establishment of the Marjorie Kovler Research Fellowship, the Library's first named fellowship. The fellowship will provide financial assistance to scholars undertaking research at the library. For further information about the fellowship, write:

The Director
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A conference entitled "Gerald R. Ford: Restoring the Presidency" is scheduled for April 6-8, 1989, at Hofstra University. The conference committee welcomes papers dealing with the life, career, and Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. A prospectus or letter of intent is requested by October 15, 1988. The deadline for submission of completed papers in duplicate and a one-page abstract is December 1, 1988.

Hofstra University will also host a conference entitled "The French Revolution of 1789 and its Impact," to be held October 5-7, 1989. The conference committee welcomes proposals for papers from the humanities and social sciences which explore the legacy of the French Revolution. Completed papers will be due by February 1, 1989.

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For information pertaining to either of these conferences, contact Natalie Datlof at (516)560-5669 or write:

Natalie Datlof
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DUTCH ARCHIVES

Dr. Cees Wiebes, a Dutch member of SHAFR at the University of Amsterdam, is working to bring foreign archival materials (on microfilm and/or microfiche) concerning the Netherlands to his country. He would like to contact any American scholar who is trying to locate foreign materials about the United States for use in this country. His address is:

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Lawrence Spinelli (American University), *Dry Diplomacy: The United States, Great Britain, and Prohibition*. Scholarly Resources, 1988. ISBN 0-8420-2298-8. \$35.00

PERSONALS

Akira Iriye (Univ. of Chicago), AHA president, was named to the Library of Congress's National Advisory Committee by Librarian of Congress James H. Billington.

Ernest R. May (Harvard Univ.) and Richard E. Neustadt received the Grawemeyer Award of \$150,000 for their book *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, Free Press, MacMillan, 1986. The book received the award for its advocacy of more and better use of the lessons of history by those who influence public policy.

SHAFR members Sally J. Marks (Rhode Island College) and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Georgetown University) have been awarded Schmitt awards from the AHA for research projects in "The Western Entente and Germany, 1920-1926" and "Nationalist Chinese Policy and Views of American Policy, 1949-1980s" respectively.

Anna K. Nelson is serving as a Research Division committee member of the AHA for 1988 and is now adjunct professor at Tulane University.

Dr. Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers Univ.) has been named the 1988-89 Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions at The University of Cambridge, England.

Joan Hoff-Wilson (Indiana Univ.), executive secretary of the OAH, served as the first Landmarks Scholar of History at The American University for the spring 1988 semester.

Stephen G. Rabe (University of Texas at Dallas) has been promoted to Professor of History.

James Edward Miller (Washington, DC) has been named as recipient of the Richard W. Leopold Prize for his *The United States and Italy 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*.

Forrest C. Pogue (Arlington, VA) has been recently honored by the Society of American Historians for possessing "literary distinction in the writing of history and biography."

Gary Hess (Bowling Green State Univ.) has received BGSU's Paul and Ruth Olscamp Award, presented annually by the President to the faculty member whose "record of scholarship and creative work over the previous three-year period is judged to be the most outstanding."

The following SHAFR members have agreed to serve as lecturers for the 1988-89 OAH Lectureship Program: Stephen E. Ambrose (Univ. of New Orleans), Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford Univ.), Alexander DeConde (Univ. of California at Santa Barbara), Robert A. Divine (Univ. of Texas at Austin), Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers), Joan Hoff-Wilson (Indiana Univ.), Walter LaFeber (Cornell Univ.), Arthur S. Link (Princeton Univ.).

William Pickett (Rose-Hulman Univ.) was recently named a Fulbright Scholar by the Council for International Scholars in Washington, D.C., and will teach at Nangan University for 10 months beginning next spring.

CALENDAR

- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- December 27-30 The 103rd annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Cincinnati. The deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 1, 1989 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1988 Bernath article award.
- January 20 Deadline for the 1988 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1 Applications for the H. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 6-9 The 82nd meeting of the OAH will be held in St. Louis, MO, at Adam's Mark Hotel.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 14-17 The 15th SHAFR Summer Conference at the College of William and Mary. The program chair is Robert McMahon, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

In 1989 the AHA will meet in San Francisco; the program chairman is Timothy N. Tackett, Dept. of History, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. 20064.

The 1990 OAH will meet in Washington, D.C., March 22-25 and the program chairman is August Meier, Department of History, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44242.

AWARDS AND PRIZES

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

Description: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Walter LaFeber, History Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853.

Books may be sent at any time during 1988, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1989.

The award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in April, 1989, in St. Louis.

Previous Winners:

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
- Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
- Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
- 1980 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
- Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)

- 1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge)
- 1983 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
- 1984 Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1985 David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1986 Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
- 1987 Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory)
- James Edward Miller (Department of State)
- 1988 Michael Hogan (Ohio State)

THE STUART L. BERNATH LECTURE PRIZE

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1989. Nominations should be sent to: Clayton Koppes, Department of History, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH 44074.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

Previous Winners

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1987 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1988 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)

THE STUART L. BERNATH SCHOLARLY ARTICLE PRIZE

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1988. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1989 to the chairperson of the committee, who for 1989 is: Gaddis Smith, P.O. Box 1504A, Yale Station, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1989, in St. Louis.

Previous winners:

1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)

1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)

1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)

1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)

David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)

1981 Douglas Little (Clark)

1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)

1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)

1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)

1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)

1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)

1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)

THE STUART L. BERNATH DISSERTATION FUND

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.

2. An award will help defray:

(a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources

(b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript

(c) abstracting costs.

3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are *not* intended for general research or for time to write.

4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.

5. Deadline for receipt of applications is November 1.

6. The application should include an itemized listing of how the money is to be used; an abstract and a description of the significance of the study; and a projected date of completion.

7. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the applicant's request and report of completion.

8. When the dissertation is finished the recipient must send to the chairman of the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

9. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Harriet Schwar, Office of the Historian, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.

Previous winners:

1985 Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara)

1986 Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas) & Walter L. Hixon (Colorado)

1987 Janet M. Manson (Washington State), Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington), W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) & Michael Wala (Hamburg)

1988 Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford) & Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario)

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1989, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The

prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1989 to: Wayne S. Cole, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

Prior winners:

1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)

1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)

1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

(a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;

(b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;

(c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and

(d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Lloyd Ambrosius, Dept. of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Prior winner: Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1987 and 1988. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1989. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee.

David Patterson
9011 Montgomery Ave.
Chevy Chase, MD 20815

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A
Canada

Harold Josephson
UNCC St.-History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 2822

1987 winner: Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Brent York, Cindy Judd, Jay Fain.

ISSUES: The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September and December.

DEADLINES: All material should be sent to the editor four weeks prior to publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: William Kamman, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
- 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
- 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
- 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
- 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
- 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
- 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
- 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
- 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)
- 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
- 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
- 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
- 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
- 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
- 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
- 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
- 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
- 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
- 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
- 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)