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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath, and are financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, and Warren Kuehl. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in each *Newsletter*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

**DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AS A
POLITICAL WEAPON:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-AMERICANISM
IN SOUTH KOREA TODAY**

by

James I. Matray

(New Mexico State University)

On May 21, 1988, I returned from two weeks of speaking engagements in the Republic of Korea in conjunction with the U.S. Information Agency's "American Participant [AMPART] Program." As the airplane landed in Los Angeles, the steward announced over the intercom, "Welcome to the United States of America." While I was glad to be home, the steward's words reminded me of the most troubling aspect of my recent experiences. There prevails today among the general Korean populace a dual and contradictory image of the United States—"Mi-kuk" in Korean. For most older Koreans, the United States remains "the beautiful nation"—a translation of "Mi-kuk" using a Chinese character. But younger Koreans, especially students and academics, have devised a new meaning for "Mi-kuk." For them, the United States has become the "rat tail nation" or more precisely "buttocks nation," utilizing another translation for the Chinese character "mi." This play on words illustrates well the persistence and growth of anti-Americanism in contemporary South Korea. But what makes the existence of Korean hostility toward the United States so unusual is that it draws intellectual as well as emotional strength from the writings of specialists on Korean-American relations in the United States.

Currently in South Korea, radical politicians, students, and academics accept as an article of faith the factual and interpretational validity of Bruce Cumings' *The Origins of the*

Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Significantly, critics of the government often quote Cumings during debate on the floor of the National Assembly. Since Cumings paints a decidedly negative picture of American military rule in Korea after World War II, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul has been interested for some time in educating the Korean people to other interpretations. As a result, the U.S. Information Agency [USIA] contacted me in September 1987 and asked if I would be interested in writing an article summarizing the contents of my book *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* for publication in the *Sisa Nonpyong*, a magazine printed for college students in South Korea. The USIA representative explained in his letter that the U.S. Embassy in Seoul "hopes that a piece by you will help to balance the historical record."

After considerable thought, I decided to decline USIA's offer for two reasons. First, I had no desire to serve as a tool for the American government's propaganda machine, not least because of my dislike for the Reagan administration. Second, I did not want to become involved in South Korean internal political bickering. In my letter, I pointed out that my writings were readily available for citation in any article the agency chose to write. But the USIA was persistent. After I refused to write the article, the agency asked if I would consent to an interview. My comments would provide the substantive material for the desired article countering the Cumings interpretation. With some hesitation, I consented. Several weeks later, another USIA official conducted the interview and in February 1988 the resulting article appeared in the *Sisa Nonpyong*. I was both pleased and impressed with the final product. The USIA presented my views in a straightforward and factual manner without a trace of manipulation for propaganda value. My comments on U.S. policy toward Korea from 1941 to 1950 were far from laudatory, but the

USIA printed the good with the bad. Apparently, the U.S. Embassy was willing to settle for a less than perfect image of "Mi-kuk," since the prevailing perception of the United States was so poor.

During my last telephone conversation with the USIA regarding the interview, I mentioned half in jest that if the U.S. Embassy wanted to talk to me in person, I would be happy to visit Seoul all expenses paid. To my surprise, the USIA took me up on the offer, inviting me to be an AMPART. By then, I was persuaded that manipulation was not the agency's purpose. Rather, it was willing to provide me with a forum in Korea to present my views honestly and openly, because it served the U.S. Embassy's objective of trying to blunt anti-Americanism. More important, I had now concluded that the Korean people deserved more than just one viewpoint on Korean-American relations during the 1940s. While the Cumings book was available in Korean translation, mine was not. There was nothing wrong with me presenting my assessment of events. By contrast, it was neither intellectually honest nor fair to allow the Cumings interpretation to go unchallenged. That this also served the interests of current American foreign policy seemed to me of less importance.

This was my second trip to the Republic of Korea. During the summer of 1987, I had presented a paper at the First International Symposium on the Korean War. My visit coincided with the climax of domestic political turmoil and violence surrounding the demand for the popular election of the president. While in South Korea, I witnessed demonstrations, but met no dissidents, leaving Seoul only briefly for sightseeing at Suwon and Inchon. The two week AMPART program, however, took me not only to Seoul, but also to the three next largest cities: Kwangju, Taegu, and Pusan. I thus obtained a broader sampling of public opinion

throughout the country, though limited to students, academics, community leaders, and media representatives. I also met with both USIA representatives and U.S. Embassy officials, to include Ambassador James R. Lilley. After these discussions, it was clear to me that American diplomatic personnel in Korea were well-informed on internal affairs and sincerely interested in trying to deal constructively with anti-Americanism. To provide one minor example, in Korea the USIA is known as the USIS, with "Service" replacing "Agency" because of concern about being identified with the CIA. This sensitivity to appearances is not universal, however. The USIS office chief in Pusan pointed to one U.S. government policy that provides inviting targets for any South Korean radical wanting to demonstrate his anti-Americanism. Roads in the Republic of Korea are clogged with Hyundai, Daewoo, and Kiamaster automobiles, but only U.S. personnel drive Chevrolets.

My meetings with Korean citizens were of five types. First, I usually (eight times) would deliver prior to lunch or dinner a thirty-minute talk (consecutively translated) focused on a specific issue in Korean-American relations from 1941 to 1950. Following the meal, there would be a question and answer session lasting about ninety minutes. Second, I delivered two formal lectures. At Yeungnam University in Taegu and at the USIS building in Seoul, I spoke for over an hour to audiences comprised of around eighty people. A question and answer session followed each lecture. Third, on two occasions, I presented a summary of my book for about thirty minutes and entertained questions for an additional ninety minutes. Fourth, I was interviewed by three newspapers, two in Seoul and one in Kwangju. Finally, one radio station interviewed me for later broadcast. It is important to mention at this point that the question and answer sessions differed markedly from the American experience. Rather than asking questions after my presentation, Koreans in the

audience typically would make statements of their views, at times lasting as long as fifteen minutes.

After two weeks of discussions, I had become educated about those issues most central to the Korean people's current perception of the United States. The audiences consistently showed interest in the reasons for the formulation of a trusteeship proposal for Korea during and after World War II, the origins of the decision to divide Korea at the 38th parallel, the policies and impact of American Military Government during U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1948, and the events culminating in the outbreak of the Korean War, plus a few selected issues during the war itself. But these Koreans were more interested in discussing the reasons for U.S. government support for the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes, the Kwangju Incident of 1980, the continuing presence of American combat forces in Korea, recent friction regarding Korean-American trade, and the Reagan administration's pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. These matters sharply raised the intensity and emotional flavor of every conversation. With respect to these issues, I had done no research and possessed only general knowledge. The Korean audiences were very disappointed and frustrated when I refused to comment on these questions. Despite my hesitancy to offer opinions on current Korean-American relations, they invariably remained persistent, with one Korean even calling me "cowardly."

Without doubt, the most frequently asked specific question was why the United States supported those Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese before 1945 during the period of American military occupation. Also, there was uniform hostility voiced toward U.S. plans for a postwar trusteeship in Korea, based on the view—vigorously expressed—that the United States underestimated the ability of the Korean people who were thoroughly prepared for self-government. Several

Koreans argued that there was unity among all factions at the time of liberation and the United States defied the will of the people in establishing a military government. Interestingly enough, the audiences were about evenly divided in asserting that the United States should have recognized the rightist Korean Provisional Government or the leftist Korean People's Republic, the two principal claimants to authority, with diametrically opposed programs, as the war came to an end in 1945.

Most Koreans advanced the opinion that the United States from 1941 to 1953 placed its own national interests above those of Korea and its people. In addition, the United States made mistakes that greatly injured Korea, such as making no effort to learn about Korean history and culture before dividing and then occupying their nation. Other grave errors included putting a higher priority on Europe than on Korea, failing to accurately assess Japanese military power toward the end of World War II (some saying overestimation, others claiming the reverse), miscalculating the intentions of the Soviet Union, and withdrawing American military forces in 1949 and thereby inviting the North Korean attack in 1950. Having done so much to injure Korea and its people, one Korean stated emphatically, the least the United States could have done was intervene in the Korean War. But then President Harry Truman again ignored Korea's best interests when he fired General Douglas MacArthur and refused to fight for reunification.

Worse than mistakes, many Koreans insisted that the United States sought to dominate Korea as early as the late nineteenth century, following the advice of such racists as Horace Allen and Theodore Roosevelt. Following World War II, the United States wanted to establish a military outpost in Korea for use in its fight against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The partition of Korea was, therefore, no accident.

In contrast to the Soviets, who offered a program for progressive reform, Americans committed atrocities and then imposed a dictatorial regime on South Korea under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. Since 1945, the United States has promoted policies aimed at oppressing the Korean people, the best example being the Cheju-do Incident of 1948. All these indiscretions, the Koreans insisted, had delayed South Korean progress toward achieving political democracy.

Underlying most of these views was the central assumption that the United States is an imperialist nation driven by a capitalist system bent on global economic domination and military aggression. This explained not only continued American support for the allegedly dictatorial regime in the Republic of Korea, but also unsubstantiated claims of American efforts to block reunification. All of these opinions led to some interesting and at times startling contradictions. For example, the presence of American military forces in Korea today is an example of imperialist aggression, but the United States should not have withdrawn its occupation forces in 1949. Washington supported a trusteeship for Korea during World War II because it was determined to dominate postwar Korea, but then abandoned the plan in 1945 for the same reason. South Korea should have had equal representation at the Panmunjom negotiations, even though the Truman administration had great difficulty persuading the Republic of Korea to participate in the first place. Most fantastic was the allegation that the United States was planning to start a war in Korea, should it begin to lose some future hypothetical war in the Mideast.

Despite the usually harsh anti-American tone, my discussions with the Koreans were always stimulating and frequently insightful. Perhaps most beneficial to me was that I began to reassess a number of my views regarding Korean-American relations in the 1940s. For example, one Korean

reminded me of Japan's essential responsibility for the division of Korea. Without Japanese colonial rule, there would have been no need for Soviet-American occupation of Korea in 1945. Also, I came to realize that North Korea has been the primary instigator of current Korean-American friction. Had it not been for the Korean War, there would be no U.S. troops in Korea and arguably greater evidence of popular democracy. One especially sharp student asked me to define "democracy." After my reply, this perceptive young Korean noted that without economic and social reform, there can be little hope for genuine democratic government. Because the United States did not understand this relationship, he observed, its postwar policy in Korea had been a failure.

In general, the Korean scholars and professors I spoke with were quite knowledgeable regarding Korean-American relations during the 1940s. At the other extreme, the undergraduates seemed to possess little historical information, which I suppose does not differ from the status of affairs in the United States. One female student confessed freely that she was not well-informed on the immediate postwar period because it was too long ago to be important to her. Most disturbing was the misinformation invariably presented by the graduate students. This ranged from the claim that the United States arranged to divide Korea at the Portsmouth Conference in 1905 to the assertion that Dean Acheson established the "defensive perimeter" line in the Truman Doctrine speech to the allegation that Senator Joseph McCarthy ordered Truman to send combat troops into the Korean War.

I am not confident that my presentations influenced the thinking of many Koreans. Twice during my visit a Korean student charged that I was an official spokesperson for the United States government. Of greater difficulty, a pattern emerged almost immediately during my appearances and prevailed at each city I visited. Audiences would listen

attentively to my presentation and then several participants, during questions and answers, would offer opinions categorically opposed to those I had just expressed. Rarely did these Koreans offer hard evidence to substantiate their views. On numerous occasions, I responded that the historical record existing in American archival materials did not sustain these contrary opinions. One graduate student replied that the United States government had removed and destroyed those documents proving the truth of his arguments.

Despite extreme differences in opinion, these discussions transpired in a pleasant and cordial atmosphere, with one notable exception. On my second day in Korea, I visited the Institute for Korean History in Seoul. Prior to arrival, a USIS official had explained to me that several young professors had organized the institute after their own departments had begun to stifle open discussion of controversial issues in Korean history. A group of fifty people, mostly graduate students and young professors, crowded into a rather small room to hear me talk about the decision to divide Korea at the 38th parallel. With nearly everyone smoking except me, conditions were far from ideal. While speaking, I noticed on the table in front of me a paperback copy of my book, available only in hardback in the United States. I was startled to learn later that "pirating" books is a common practice in South Korea.

From the moment the question and answer session began, it was obvious that this was a very hostile audience. The first Korean to speak asked four "questions," exceeding in length my entire presentation. He covered several issues but the unifying theme was the charge that the United States had implemented a premeditated plan to dominate and exploit Korea. Given American actions in Vietnam and Central America, he concluded, it would have been more appropriate for me to have entitled my book the "Willing Crusade" rather than the "Reluctant Crusade." After I struggled to remember

and then to respond to his questions, a writer of historical fiction stated with considerable vehemence and emotion that I was being subjective. It was time for me to be objective, he insisted, which would require admitting that the United States was an imperialist nation bent on global economic domination. Later, I was shocked to learn that Korean students considered this novelist to be a leading authoritative source on recent Korean-American relations. More disturbing was a young professor's contention that the American Military Government from 1945 to 1948 treated the Korean people as badly as did the Japanese under colonial rule. After leaving the institute, my translator mentioned that as we walked out, one student angrily declared that the Americans were worse than the Japanese.

Of all the people I met in Korea, perhaps the most interesting and impressive was Lee Kang, General Secretary of the People's Movement for Democracy in Southern Cholla Province. He attended my evening seminar at the home of the USIS office chief in Kwangju. After dessert and some small talk, all the guests left except Lee Kang, who stayed behind to brief us about plans for the upcoming "Anti-Americanism Day." This event would commemorate the anniversary of the May 1980 Kwangju Incident, when a South Korean special forces unit brutally suppressed an anti-government student demonstration in the southwestern city. Korean dissidents claim that the United States "masterminded" the Kwangju Incident, pointing for proof to the military command structure in the Republic of Korea. Based upon an agreement dating from the Korean War, South Korean troops are ostensibly under the ultimate authority of the commanding general of U.S. forces in Korea. Lee Kang even alleged that Ronald Reagan had ordered the Korean military forces to Kwangju, dismissing my reminder that Jimmy Carter was president at that time. I finally asked him how he could justify attending a

USIS gathering, to include having dinner and drinks, given his hostility toward the United States. He replied that he came to gather information in order to plan future political strategy.

We discussed several issues, but most interesting was his insistence that the United States had brought Syngman Rhee to Korea, installed him in power, and insured his survival against the will of the Korean people. I responded that American leaders had tried on numerous occasions to prevent a political triumph for Rhee. Of all the rivals for governmental power, only the Communists were lower on the American list of preferred choices. When Lee Kang seemed unconvinced, I told him that the United States almost acted on a plan to forcibly oust Rhee from authority during the Korean War. Trying to be clever, I then asked whether the United States should have implemented this planned coup, since this would fulfill the popular wish for Rhee's removal. Lee Kang replied that no nation ever has the right to interfere in the internal political affairs of another.

Before leaving, Lee Kang related with considerable emotion a story about a Korean dissident whom the South Korean government had forced to flee the country. With the recent advent of greater political freedom, he now wanted to come home, but the government would not permit his return. Lee Kang then asked if I would hold a press conference when I arrived in the United States to publicize the plight of this dissident, thereby bringing pressure to bear on the Korean government. I replied that if I organized such an event, only my wife and children would attend. However, I knew that I would be seeing Ambassador Lilley prior to departure. I promised to raise the issue with him at that time, suggesting that Lee Kang provide me with background information.

On the day before my departure from Korea, I met Ambassador Lilley for the second time. Fulfilling my pledge to Lee Kang, I mentioned the Korean dissident exiled in Los

Angeles. Somewhat presumptuously, I offered the opinion to the ambassador that if the United States could assist Lee Kang on this matter, it might provide substantive evidence that anti-Americanism was unwarranted. Lilley listened sympathetically, then explained that the embassy had acted on other cases in the past. If the Korean government succumbed to pressure, he lamented, the United States would not receive any credit for advancing the cause of political freedom.

Prior to leaving his office, I summarized for the ambassador my impressions after two weeks in South Korea. In particular, I tried to offer an explanation for Korean anti-Americanism. The primary cause, I said, was the belief among many South Koreans that their government is not only a military dictatorship, but also illegitimate. Korean dissidents believe that the United States created the Republic of Korea in defiance of the people's will, which has an element of truth. For these unhappy Koreans, an explanation is necessary for the South Korean government's continued existence in the face of popular opposition. The simple answer is to fault the United States, which has been responsible for delaying progress toward true democracy in Korea. Significantly, the hostility I witnessed during my visit was not directed at me personally. As one professor declared at the Institute for Korean History, the real villain has been the United States government and, more specifically, the CIA.

There is scant reason to believe that I changed many minds while in Korea. My comments in fact reached few hardcore radicals, since the most anti-American student dissidents refused to accept the USIS's invitations to my presentations. Obviously, the United States faces a difficult and dangerous situation in South Korea today. This was made clear to me again just hours before my second meeting with Ambassador Lilley when seven students—the "Patriotic Commando Team"—attacked the U.S. Embassy using home made noise

bombs. Five jumped the wall and entered the compound carrying a placard declaring "Drive Out U.S. Imperialists Who Masterminded the Kwangju Massacre." The day before this incident, an angry mob had assaulted the USIS Cultural Office in Seoul, ripping down the name board and hurling petrol bombs at the building, shattering windowpanes. A young Korean undergraduate in Kwangju apparently was right when he told me that anti-Americanism would continue to grow and nothing could stop it.

To its credit, the U.S. Embassy and the USIS are striving to improve the Korean-American relationship, pursuing a cautious and careful strategy of promoting mutual understanding. The AMPART program is an important part of this effort, which focuses on disseminating information and then letting the Korean people decide for themselves what they want to believe. Not once during my program did any U.S. official attempt to alter or influence the content of my presentations. American diplomatic personnel manifested sincerity, competence, and dedication, not to mention a genuine concern for my safety and well-being. One cannot minimize the difficulty of the USIS task in Korea, especially for those Korean nationals working for the agency. The Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer in Seoul, Huh Yong-sang, told me that Korean students regularly ridicule him as a "running dog of the American imperialists."

Two weeks in the Republic of Korea provided me with a much deeper appreciation for the reasons behind anti-Americanism in South Korea. One Korean told me that there was no place in current intellectual and academic circles for any viewpoint on Korean-American relations in the 1940s other than the Cumings interpretation. The Korean educational system, he continued, had repressed creative and imaginative thinking for so long that the students were embracing those ideas most at odds with traditional teaching as an act of

defiance and to dramatize their determination to exercise freedom of opinion. Naturally, this would lead to attacks on the South Korean government, which has maintained dictatorial control over universities and their curricula since the inception of the republic. Given the current state of higher education in South Korea, it would be unreasonable to expect that student radicals and dissident politicals will cease using history as a weapon in the near future.

**THE VIETNAM WAR OF
HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR.**

by

James Fetzer

(State University of New York)

Colonel Harry G. Summers' *On Strategy* has been singled out for a good deal of praise since its publication in 1981. The U.S. Army has seen fit to make the book a text at both the Army War College and the Army Command and General Staff College. Summers' analysis of the Vietnam War contains much that is praiseworthy. He has carried out a good faith effort to discover the shortcomings in American policy. Summers does not shy away from casting blame on the Army when he sees it proper to do so. He clearly rejects a simple-minded stab-in-the-back theory which might exonerate the American military from responsibility for Vietnam errors. Summers' attempt to apply the insights of Clausewitz to the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia is also an interesting and useful exercise. His arguments about the lack of clarity in American goals and strategic ideas are solid throughout.

Summers' analysis, however, becomes curious and troublesome when he describes the central features of the war and the course of action which might have produced a more favorable outcome for the United States. What Colonel Summers has done is to create a description of the Vietnam War which in its omissions and points of emphasis is at odds with some fundamental and well-established facts about the Vietnam struggle. His recommendations about what the U.S. might have done better rest upon his description of the war. These recommendations, therefore, are supported by a

foundation of serious omissions and repeated misplaced emphasis.

In Colonel Summers' view, the Vietnam struggle did not constitute a new military challenge for the United States. The fundamentals of the war were the same as those which confronted the United States in Korea. In Vietnam as in Korea, the American military faced the task of repelling external aggression. The American effort in Vietnam, Summers argues, failed to focus on this basic fact and, instead, mistakenly emphasized the development of a counterinsurgency capability. According to Summers, the political/military insurgency in the south was nothing more than a "smoke screen" behind which Hanoi sought to carry out a regular force conquest of South Vietnam. Summers repeatedly cites Hanoi's Easter offensive of 1972 and the regular force makeup of the final 1975 offensive as proof positive that the Vietnam War was a conventional military struggle. The United States, he contends, made the mistake of relegating the repulsion of this regular force aggression to a secondary consideration. "The Vietnam War," Summers asserts, "was in the final analysis a conventional war best understood in terms of conventional military strategy."¹

This narrow view of the war neglects the existence of what clearly was a multi-faceted military struggle. The presence of North Vietnamese regulars in the south and their prominence in the later northern offenses are not valid grounds for asserting that the war was essentially a conventional one. General Bruce Palmer is surely much closer to the mark when he notes that North Vietnam waged a "clever mixture of conventional warfare fought somewhat unconventionally and guerrilla warfare fought in the classical manner."² The military forces which confronted the United States and the South Vietnamese government were quite varied. They included small teams of Viet Cong (VC) self-defense forces,

local VC units up to battalion size, main force VC units, and regular North Vietnamese Army units. All of these elements played a significant role in the war. They were employed as Hanoi saw fit in various ways at various times.³ Summers is mistaken when he argues that the war should be understood largely as one of regular force aggression.⁴

In addition, Summers also fails to emphasize the extent to which the war contained a powerful political component represented most dramatically by the efforts of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the southern contingent of the Lao Dong Party. The political offensive carried out by these groups featured actions which ranged from assassinations to land reform. This political effort reflected a determined conviction that success in the Vietnamese countryside involved much more than successful military campaigns. The war in the countryside was also about gaining the allegiance of the Vietnamese peasantry. Communist activities in this regard were not just cover for Hanoi's regular force movements.

The revolutionary movement in the south was capable of achieving a great deal on its own. This does not mean that the movement was divorced from northern control. The NLF leadership was heavily influenced by and subordinate to Hanoi. The Viet Cong should not be romanticized as Robin Hoods seeking only to take from the rich and give to the poor. The National Liberation Front and the People's Liberation Armed Forces were, however, effective organizations. Summers really concedes as much when he notes that the South Vietnamese government (GVN) was "on the verge of collapse in the spring of 1965."⁵ At this time, there were probably fewer than 7,000 North Vietnamese regulars in the south.⁶ No one seriously suggests that these regular forces were responsible for the dire state of the GVN. Instead, the fact that the Communists were on the verge of victory in 1965 was the result of the effectiveness of the southern

revolutionary movement and the ineptness of the GVN which was characterized by an absurd game of political musical chairs going on in Saigon. The massive American rescue operation, which began in 1965, would weaken the movement in the South, but the American effort would never eliminate the movement's capacity to carry on successful operations. The revolutionary movement in the south was no mere "smoke screen."

Summers' contention that U.S. military operations after 1965 mistakenly emphasized counterinsurgent and nation building tasks is also a dubious proposition. It is not always clear what Summers means in this regard. More often than not he seems to refer to an alleged American tendency to spend too much time helping the GVN combat the political/military offensive in the countryside. This was done, he argues, at the expense of regular force engagements, particularly those which would have achieved the "isolation of the battlefield" by "sealing off South Vietnam from North Vietnam."⁷ Judging the technical feasibility of sealing off hundreds of miles of border is beyond the competence of this commentary. Summers is simply wrong, however, when he suggests that the U.S. spent too little time and effort seeking out big unit, regular force engagements.

The major emphasis in the U.S. military program from 1965 to 1969 was to discover and engage opposition regular forces. American search-and-destroy operations were based on General William Westmoreland's assessment that a steady engagement and pounding of enemy regular units would produce decisive gains through attrition.⁸ As General Palmer notes, the most suitable role for U.S. forces "seemed to be one of taking on the regular, so-called main force units of the enemy."⁹ Summers insists that the U.S. concentrated instead on pacification programs as a way of demonstrating an ability to counter guerrilla campaigns. Robert Komer, who led the

American pacification effort in the late 1960s, directly contradicts Summers on this point. Komer has recalled:

Harry Summers really thinks that the U.S. Army went off and fought the insurgency. Well as a guy who was constantly complaining that the U.S. Army was not paying any attention to the insurgency, I will say, Clausewitz or no, Colonel Summers has it backwards.¹⁰

The big unit war which the United States actually fought was flawed because it did not pay enough attention to the issues of pacification and counterinsurgency. One major problem with the search-and-destroy campaigns was that successful military actions by the U.S. frequently did not address basic political issues. Guenter Lewy hits at this point effectively when he notes that "successful initial engagement was one thing, and eliminating the enemy and breaking up his strong political apparatus was quite another." Search-and-destroy missions frequently left the political apparatus intact. Lewy further adds that "with U.S. forces preoccupied with hunting the large units, the VC infrastructure much of the time had a free run in the villages and hamlets of Vietnam."¹¹ The strategy of attrition was also often insensitive to and destructive of the general population in the countryside. This was a problem even after 1968 when some pacification gains were achieved as the process of Vietnamization took over. The American tendency was to lay on the firepower and let the non-combatants head for cover. The justification for this approach was most vividly voiced by Major General Julian Ewell who was head of the 9th Infantry Division during the 1969 Operation Speedy Express in the upper Mekong Delta. "I guess," Ewell opined, "I basically feel that the 'hearts and minds' approach can be overdone. In the Delta the only way to overcome VC control and terror is by brute force applied against the VC." There is good reason to believe that Operation Speedy Express carried out under Ewell's rationale

killed many non-combatants and created more enemies for the United States.¹² The American search-and-destroy campaigns, as General Palmer points out, also diverted American attention from the "primary task" of developing effective South Vietnamese forces. In sum, it is difficult to disagree with Palmer's overall assessment that "the consequences of our conscious decision to give first priority to the defeat of enemy regular forces in the field, using American forces almost exclusively, were wide-ranging with many adverse ramifications."¹³

All of this makes Summers' misplaced emphasis especially mischievous. Summers not only describes American priorities which did not exist, but he also recommends retrospectively an emphasis on regular force engagements, which were tried in fact and found seriously wanting. This is not the kind of lesson drawing which should be done in connection with the Vietnam conflict.

An additional element of Summers' analysis is his contention that the U.S. was poorly equipped to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. Colonel Summers frequently asserts that counterinsurgency and nation building should have been left to the South Vietnamese.¹⁴ Summers certainly has a point in noting that Americans brought major handicaps to the tasks of pacification. Americans simply did not know the territory in sufficient detail to lead the pacification campaign. For every effective John Paul Vann there were scores of well-meaning Americans who were not up to the task. It is also possible that the American attempt to play a significant role in pacification was not well-received in the Vietnamese countryside. A GVN soldier told the following to an interviewer:

Do you know what it means to lose face in Vietnam? That is so important between our people. Whenever the American advisors went into the Government office, or whenever the

Americans were seen in public with our village chief, then the village chief lost face in front of the people. Being with the Americans proved they were not independent.¹⁵

Even if American pacification assistance did not have this tainting effect, it is clear that Vietnamese peasants were not inclined to feel that Americans knew what was best for them. Summers contends, therefore, that the South Vietnamese government should have carried out pacification. From Summers' perspective, this would have allowed for a war in which the U.S. would have handled the regular force fighting and the GVN would have tended to counterinsurgency and nation building. Summers is right in arguing that the South Vietnamese government should have handled pacification. The problem is that the correctness of his contention does not address the dilemma of the situation which existed in South Vietnam. The simple assertion that the GVN should have taken care of pacification ignores a difficulty similar to that posed by the proverbial recipe for elephant stew. The recipe begins with the instruction to "place one elephant in a pot." Easier said than done.

The government of South Vietnam and its armed forces never exhibited the capability to construct and implement an effective pacification program. A very substantial literature now exists on the political/military struggle in the Vietnamese countryside. The authors of these studies express a wide range of opinion about the desirability of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Almost all agree, however, that the GVN never enlisted the confidence and enduring support of the Vietnamese population. Corruption, ineffective organization, political ineptness, and military incompetence characterized the GVN's endeavors. The organization, staying power, and political programs of the Communists in the south proved to be superior. The South Vietnamese government was never

able to produce decisive political victories and long lasting military success.¹⁶

Summers fails to take these shortcomings into account. He is content merely to assert that the South Vietnamese should have taken care of pacification. How the GVN was supposed to develop this capability is a matter which Summers refuses to consider. This refusal is not so surprising. Consideration of this complex question threatens Summers' notion of a war in which the Americans kill the regulars and the South Vietnamese pacify the peasants. Rather than wrestle with this important matter, Summers asks the reader to accept the judgment that if the U.S. had concentrated more on stopping the infiltration into the south, then the defeat of the insurgency by the South Vietnamese would have been "easy."¹⁷

This kind of judgment is characteristic of the wishful thinking which pervades Summers' book. Summers has created his own peculiar vision of the Vietnam War. He has done this by misreading the historical record and assigning characteristics which were not present. He repeatedly neglects crucial considerations and distorts what American forces were actually doing in Vietnam. Summers' contention, however, does allow him to contend that the United States needed only to deal with "external aggression" while a competent GVN dealt with a "smoke screen" insurgency. Harry Summers' war is one which the U.S. might have won. Summers' war makes it unnecessary to consider the possibility that the U.S. lacked the means to emerge victorious. His war also contains the promise that the next time the United States can do better. The problem, of course, is that Harry Summers' war did not actually exist. Colonel Summers' wish that it were so does not make it so.

ENDNOTES

- ¹Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA, 1982), pp. 75, 77, 84, 96, 102, 119, 121, 171.
- ²Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, KY, 1984), p. 176. For a comparison of Palmer and Summers see Gary R. Hess' excellent "The Military Perspective on Strategy in Vietnam: Harry G. Summers' *On Strategy* and Bruce Palmer's *The 25-Year War*," *Diplomatic History* 10, (Winter, 1986), pp. 91-106.
- ³William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO, 1981), pp. 201-318; Douglas Pike, "Conduct of the War: Strategic Factors" in John Schlight (ed.), *The Second Indochina War* (Washington, 1986), pp. 199-220; Douglas Pike, "The Other Side" in Peter Braestrup (ed.), *Vietnam as History* (Washington, 1984), pp. 71-77.
- ⁴For further development of this point see Russell F. Weigley, "Reflections on 'Lessons' from Vietnam" in Braestrup, *Vietnam as History*, pp. 115-124.
- ⁵Summers, *On Strategy*, pp. 167-168.
- ⁶Gunter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York, 1978), pp. 39-40.
- ⁷Summers, *On Strategy*, pp. 116, 121, 77-79, 171.
- ⁸Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 42-76.
- ⁹Palmer, *The 25-Year War*, p. 57.
- ¹⁰Robert Komer, "Comment" in Schlight, *The Second Indochina War*, p. 161.
- ¹¹Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 58-63.
- ¹²*Ibid.*, p. 143.
- ¹³Palmer, *The 25-Year War*, p. 179.
- ¹⁴Summers, *On Strategy*, pp. 86, 77-79, 116, 119, 173-174.
- ¹⁵Quoted in James W. Trullinger, *Village at War* (Longman, NY, 1980), p. 163. For an overview of pacification programs see Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era* (New York, 1977).

¹⁶See for example Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An* (Berkeley, 1972); William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO, 1973), Douglas Pike, *War, Peace, and the Viet Cong* (Cambridge, 1969); Trullinger, *Village at War*; Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power*; Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War* (Boulder, CO, 1986).

¹⁷Summers, *On Strategy*, p. 170.

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

SPECIAL NOTICE

SHAFR has arrangements with ABC-CLIO Inc. to make the *Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700* available to its membership for \$30. Orders must be made through the SHAFR office which will forward them to ABC-CLIO. Make checks for \$30 payable to SHAFR and send them to:

SHAFR Department of History
Box 13735
University of North Texas
Denton, Texas 76203

If you know persons who are not members of SHAFR who would like a copy of the *Guide* for \$30, encourage them to join the Society

**EXCERPTS FROM A REPORT FROM THE
NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR
THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY**

by

Page Putnam Miller, Director

**NCC Publishes a Report from the User Community to the
National Archives**

The National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History has published a report titled "Developing a Premier National Institution: A Report from the User Community to the National Archives." This report identifies some specific goals for strengthening the National Archives and conveys the concerns of the NCC about future directions for this important institution. It is the hope of the NCC that this report may provide a perspective that can be useful to those who plan archival policy, to those who appropriate funds for the National Archives, and to our joint efforts to strengthen the National Archives.

For a more detailed summary of the report, see the SHAFR Council Minutes printed below.

The report may be obtained by writing: Page Miller, NCC, 400 A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003.

**House of Representatives Establishes Office of the
Historian**

On January 3 the House of Representatives voted to establish a permanent Office of the Historian. The permanent office will ensure that the history and development of the House is given proper attention, and that House historical information is readily available. The Office of the Historian has just published *A Guide to Research Collections of Former*

Members of the House. This extremely useful research guide is available in the Federal Depository Libraries. If you wish to obtain a copy, contact: Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives, Cannon House Office Building, Room 138, Washington, DC 20515.

Federal Suit to Prevent Destruction of Key White House Computer Tapes

Journalist and author Scott Armstrong and former U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson, with other plaintiffs, filed suit on January 19 to prevent the destruction of secret National Security Council internal computer messages, commonly known as PROFS (Professional Office System, originated by IBM). The National Archives' position has been that most of the items on the electronic tapes were brief messages, equivalent to telephone slips, and that substantive statements or memos of permanent value were printed out and preserved in paper form. However, Armstrong said the Iran-Contra affair demonstrated that many important messages existed only on tape. The restraining order to prevent the destruction of the electronic records was originally to expire on January 30. However the judge has extended the time and a hearing may not occur until mid-February. Members of both the Senate and the House have expressed concern about this matter for it raises larger issues about the authority of the Archivist and federal policies for dealing with electronic records.

SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

27 December 1988

Bluegrass A Room, Hyatt Regency Hotel

Cincinnati, Ohio

Lloyd Gardner presiding

Council members present were: Lloyd Gardner, George Herring, Waldo Heinrichs, Gary Hess, Betty Unterberger, and William Kamman; others

present were David Anderson, William Brinker, Edward Crapol, James Gormly, Daniel Helmstadter, Michael Hogan, Robert McMahon, Michael Schaller, William O. Walker III, Marvin Zahniser, and Thomas Zoumaras.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, spoke to the Council about declassification of documents. She distributed an NCC briefing sheet of December 8, 1988, on declassification. Miller noted that under President Reagan's Executive Order 12356 there is no timetable for the process. Miller suggested that it would be best to work for a thirty-year rule at this time because it would be easier to achieve than a twenty or twenty-five year period. She believed it was important to get a date, something automatic, and then when the system is working try to decrease the period of time. There followed a discussion of declassification and of persons in congress who might pick up the issue and lead the fight. Senator John Glenn was suggested; Ohio members of SHAFR may try to enlist his support.

In response to Miller's emphasis on a more streamlined system of declassification, Council passed a resolution supporting creation of an automatic declassification procedure for thirty-year-old documents.

Miller then opened discussion of the *Foreign Relations* series. She noted that William Z. Slany, the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs in the Department of State, has addressed the problems of the expansion of the foreign affairs record, the more complex and comprehensive Federal information security measures, and the increasing funding constraints in a memorandum, "New Directions for the *Foreign Relations* Series: A Report with Proposals." Given these problems, Slany has suggested consideration of three options for the future of the *Foreign Relations* series. They are: (1) return to the long-established compiling strategy and expand the series to accommodate the broadening of American

commitments and activities abroad as well as the expansion of records; (2) continue the general principles of the current compiling strategy, including the present scope of topics covered, but exclude selected subjects on a case-by-case basis in order to meet resource limitations; (3) broaden the series' scope as necessary to comprehend all aspects of American foreign policy but focus on publishing a bibliographical guide of foreign affairs sources combined with a selection of documents and narrative summaries. Miller said that the options were predicated on the assumption that the *Foreign Relations* budget would remain the same. Miller also said that the State Department Advisory Committee would meet in the spring to discuss these options. She asked if Council wanted input on this issue. It was noted that SHAFR is represented by two members on the Advisory Committee.

Miller noted that the NCC had worked for a long time on the independence of the National Archives. Now the NCC was urging the development of the Archives as a premier national institution. To explain what the NCC had in mind Miller distributed a draft report dated December 8, 1988, and entitled "Developing a Premier National Institution: A Report from the User Community to the National Archives." Recommendations included:

(I) 1. The National Archives should develop a comprehensive plan for becoming a premier institution for research and adopt both short and long term strategies for meeting needs identified in the four categories of quality of holdings, accessibility of holdings, stimulation of intellectual exchange, and capable personnel support.

2. The National Archives should consider establishing a visiting peer review committee, a virtual tradition among libraries, museums, scientific laboratories, and universities. This would afford a fresh, in-depth look at some old problems, give employees an opportunity to voice

substantive concerns to an objective but interested group, and draw on the expertise of a range of individuals who are knowledgeable in issues associated with large institutions for research.

(II)1. The National Archives needs to undertake a comprehensive survey of the diverse categories of users and their needs.

2. The National Archives needs to involve users in the evaluation of reference services, to study the characteristics of quality reference tools and reference interviews and letters, and to develop strategies for incorporating these findings into management policies.

3. As the National Archives moves forward on strategies for making electronic records more accessible to users and for developing computerized finding aids, there is a need to involve users in the planning process.

(III)1. Develop career initiatives.

2. Expand the mentoring function.

3. Provide flexibility for staff to move easily between the development of reference tools and reference assistance.

4. Assign staff to domains or clusters of record groups that allow them to build an expert knowledge base.

5. Involve staff with extensive experience and knowledge in the records in the development of archival policies.

(IV)1. Urge congressional hearings to consider the inadequacy of current funding levels for meeting the National Archives' legislated mandates.

2. Develop a documented proposal, with appropriate projections of costs, for securing the resources necessary for making the National Archives a premier institution.

2. George Herring reported on a Committee on Access to Documents. He noted that it was not yet organized, but the group would meet on December 28.

3. Robert McMahon, co-chairman of the 1989 summer conference committee, reported that his committee would meet later during the AHA conference to make decisions on the program. McMahon said that the committee had received many good proposals including several from foreign members. He noted the committee's intention to have a session for high school teachers.

Edward P. Crapol, co-chairman of the 1989 summer conference committee, reported on local arrangements for the June 14-17, 1989, meeting. Residence hall rooms for single and double occupancy will be available for 175-200 people. The rooms are air conditioned; linens will be provided. Meal plans will also be available. An opening reception is planned for Wednesday evening, June 14. Tours of historic Williamsburg will be available for members and families. Crapol noted that Williamsburg can be reached by Amtrak, by Greyhound Bus Lines, and by air from Richmond and Newport News.

Timing of summer conferences was discussed. It was noted that persons who read advanced placement examinations would have a conflict with the 1989 summer conference. It was suggested that future conferences be scheduled to avoid such conflict.

4. No plans have been made for the 1990 summer conference, but George Herring is contacting people for possible sites.

5. William Kamman read the report from Harriet D. Schwar, chairperson of the Bernath Dissertation Award Committee. Thomas W. Zeiler, a doctoral candidate at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Russel Van Wyk, a doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, received awards for 1988.

6. In November Kamman distributed to members of the *ad hoc* committee for indexing *Diplomatic History* a letter from

Professor Allen Dennis of Delta State University in which he outlined his experience in indexing and his willingness to index *Diplomatic History* for \$1.25 per page. There was discussion of need, cost, and the ability of SHAFR to fund the project. It was suggested that SHAFR charge for the index; a fee of \$10 was mentioned. Council instructed the executive secretary to poll the membership to determine desire for an index and the willingness to pay for it.

7. Upon recommendation of Michael Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History*, Council approved the appointment of Mark T. Gilderhus, Fraser J. Harbutt, and Douglas J. Little to the editorial board.

8. Michael Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History*, distributed his annual report to the Council. His report will be published in the Spring 1989 issue of *Diplomatic History*. There followed discussion of increasing *DH's* circulation, particularly abroad. Various methods were suggested: an overseas agent; an advertising campaign at home and abroad; exchange of journal advertising; enlargement of the editorial board to include three non-U.S. scholars. There were no decisions, but the suggestions will be explored by Michael Hogan and Daniel Helmstadter.

SHAFR Council passed a resolution of appreciation for the strong support given to the editorial office of *Diplomatic History* by Ohio State University.

Betty Unterberger, who recently returned from a lectureship in China, noted the interest in SHAFR and *Diplomatic History* there. She reminded Council of her efforts in 1985 to recruit East European members for SHAFR at the Third World Congress on Soviet and East European History in Washington, DC (SHAFR Council minutes of December 27, 1985). She noted that an arrangement had been made with Dr. and Mrs. Bernath to subsidize these persons who have difficulty with currency exchange. Little was accomplished at

that time, but she thought the same arrangement could be made for two Chinese memberships. Council supported her suggestion.

9. David Anderson reported on his efforts to collect information for a new roster and research list. He noted that about one-third of the forms distributed to the membership had been returned. All members are urged to return the form as soon as possible. Anderson intends to assemble the list after March 1, 1989.

10. Council discussed SHAFR's representation on the State Department Advisory Committee. Currently, SHAFR's representatives are Warren Cohen, whose term goes through 1989, and Michael Hunt, whose term ends in 1988. Council recommended the reappointment of Michael Hunt for a three-year term.

11. Gary Hess, chairman of the Finance Committee, reported on arrangements for handling SHAFR's endowment funds. He said that the endowment accounts were in the same form as they were six months ago; the proposed consolidation of accounts had not yet taken place. He noted the committee's desire to work with Dr. and Mrs. Gerald Bernath on these arrangements and to make sure that agreements with the Bernaths establishing the Bernath Prizes were observed. Hess expressed concern that the consolidation take place as soon as possible because various holdings were maturing and decisions on reinvestment were necessary. He asked Council for guidance in the matter. After discussion, Council authorized the payment of Hess's expenses and perhaps those of one other person to visit the Bernaths to explain the consolidation proposal.

12. Council approved the amount of \$1,000 for the Warren Kuehl Prize for 1989.

13. Kamman announced the results of the SHAFR elections. George Herring of the University of Kentucky will

succeed to the presidency; Michael Hunt of the University of North Carolina was elected to the vice-presidency; Rosemary Foot of the University of Sussex and J. Samuel Walker of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were elected to three-year terms on Council (serving through 1991); and Lloyd Ambrosius of the University of Nebraska was elected to the nominating committee.

14. Kamman distributed copies of the 1988 SHAFR financial reports for the trust, prize, and endowment portfolio and the operating account. He also distributed a proposed SHAFR budget for 1989. Council approved these reports and proposed budget.

15. Lloyd Gardner reported that the search committee for a new executive secretary-treasurer had selected Allan B. Spetter of Wright State University. He will assume his duties around June 1, 1989.

Council adjourned at 10:00 p.m.

FINANCIAL REPORT FOR SHAFR 1988

December 16, 1987 to
December 20, 1988

Carryover from 1987

Checking Account	\$1,593.25
First State Bank Money Market	\$22,691.33
TOTAL	\$24,284.58

RECEIPTS

Dues	\$22,408.70
Bernath Living Trust	\$1,900.00
Reimbursement Bernath Dissertation	\$500.00
Reimbursement Holt	\$1,500.00
Sale of SHAFR Mailing List	\$630.00
Endowment	\$519.00
Graebner Contributions	\$496.42
Holt Award Contributions	\$250.00
Summer Conference	\$3,122.46

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

1988 AHA Luncheon	\$1,491.00
Net Interest and Dividends	\$1,285.40
Guide	\$180.00
Misc. (money for air mail postage)	\$15.00
Reimbursement Bernath Prizes	\$3,122.68
Transfer from Checking Account	\$1,500.00
TOTAL	\$38,920.66
GRAND TOTAL	\$63,205.24

DISBURSEMENTS

Scholarly Resources	\$11,200.50
Bernath Prizes and Expenses	\$3,580.68
Operating Expenses	\$2,502.59
1988 AHA Conf—Luncheon & Reception	\$525.00
1988 Summer Conference	\$1,823.87
1987 OAH Conference (expenses)	\$270.56
Contribution to NCC	\$850.00
1987 AHA Conf—Luncheon & Reception	\$1,697.32
Holt Award	\$1,600.00
Graebner Award	\$2,286.92
Transfer to Checking	\$1,500.00
Work Preparing DH records for trans	\$160.00
Bernath Trust	\$1,900.00
Guide Expenses	\$34.48
CPA	\$250.00
Diplomatic History Copy Editor	\$2,500.00
Susan Shah (pay & expenses)	\$800.77
Misc. Fees (safety deposit box and service charge)	\$24.40
TOTAL	\$33,507.09
CASH ON HAND	
First State Bank—Denton Operating	\$542.59
First State Bank Money Market	\$29,155.56
GRAND TOTAL	\$63,205.24

Proposed SHAFR Budget for 1989

SHAFR's anticipated revenue sources for 1989 are as follows:

Membership dues for 850 regular members	\$17,000.00
Membership dues for 180 student members	\$2,430.00
Membership dues for 65 retired and unemployed members	\$585.00
Interest on checking account and money market funds	\$1,200.00
Sale of membership list	<u>\$600.00</u>
	\$21,815.00

SHAFR's anticipated expenditures for 1989 are as follows:

<i>Diplomatic History</i> (Scholarly Resources)	\$12,000.00
Copy editor for <i>Diplomatic History</i>	\$2,500.00
General operating (postage, stationery, supplies, xeroxing, secretary-treasurer expenses)	\$2,500.00
Convention expenses (cash bar, display table—AHA)	\$700.00
Contribution to National Coordinating Committee	\$2,000.00
Tax consultant	\$250.00
Roster and Research List	\$1,000.00
Susan Shah (pay for keeping books, endowment accounts, and reimbursement for expenses)	<u>\$850.00</u>
	\$21,800.00

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1770s-1990s James K. Libbey

Libbey has succeeded in summarizing the basic economic activities in the long commercial relationship between the United States and Russia.

"It strikes me that we don't have anything like it."

Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University.

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Raymond L Garthoff, Brookings Institution.

(Spring 1989) \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-35-0], \$12.95 paper [ISBN 0-941690-36-9], \$8.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

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240 pages (1987) text \$8.75 **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 1987: An Annual Bibliography Richard Dean Burns, Editor-in-Chief. *Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University, Los Angeles and the Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C.* Each annual bibliography will identify and classify some 1,500 to 2,500 reference works, books and monographs, documents, articles, and dissertations on arms control, disarmament, and international security.

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Individuals only, please



THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

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EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion Norman A. Graebner. This classic work explores the reasons for the rapid American expansion to the Pacific coast in the 1840s. Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages. (1983) \$16.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], text \$8.75 **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

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Buckingham. <i>America Sees Red</i>	discount \$7.00	—
Burns <i>Arms Control...</i>	discount \$12.00	—
Esthus. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	discount \$6.00	—
Graebner. <i>Empire</i>	discount \$7.00	—

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR FUNCTIONS AT THE OAH

SHAFR Council Meeting— Thursday, April 6, 1989, 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Adam's Mark-St. Louis, Boardroom 23.

SHAFR Reception, Cash Bar—Friday, April 7, 1989, 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., Adam's Mark-St. Louis, Room 43.

SHAFR Luncheon—Saturday, April 8, 1989, 12:15 p.m. to 2:00 p.m., Adam's Mark-St. Louis, St. Louis Ballroom H. Luncheon tickets will cost \$16.00 each, including tax and gratuity. Tickets can be purchased through the OAH and members are advised to purchase them early because the hotel requires a 48-hour guarantee.

SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

A complete Roster and Research List will be published in 1989. Members who have not provided research information recently should send the research data form included in their membership renewals to:

David L. Anderson
Department of History
University of Indianapolis
1400 East Hanna Avenue
Indianapolis, IN 46227

Only information received by April 17 can be included in the 1989 Roster.

CALL FOR PARTICIPATION AT INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF HISTORICAL SCIENCES (CISH)

Madrid, Spain, August 1990

There will be two four-hour roundtable discussion sessions about *Methodological and Technical Information Transfer in the Historical Sciences*. Each session will consist of three one-hour segments plus a break period, focusing on three topics that are delineated by pre-circulated papers that are succinctly summarized by their authors followed by prepared commentaries by two or three reactors and an open forum discussion between panelists and the audience. Topics of interest with an international scope include: Session 1: Bibliographical Control of Historical Studies, Archival Control of Primary Historical Services, Publishing and the Dissemination of History Secondary Literature and Primary Historical Sources; Session 2: Qualitative vs. Quantitative History, the Pedagogy of Historical Computing, Scholarship and New Technology. Those wishing to participate should provide a brief biographical sketch of qualifications and a short abstract or outline of key issues to be discussed. Contact:

Session 1: Dean Lawrence J. McCrank
FSU Library & Instructional Services
Big Rapids, Michigan 49307
(616) 592-3727

Session 2: Professor Deian Hopkin
Department of History
The University College of Wales
Aberystwyth, Dyfed SY23 3DY

CALL FOR PAPERS

The French Revolution of Archives and Libraries

A Preconference to the AHA Annual Conference in San Francisco, CA, December 1989, devoted to the French Revolution with attention to library history, archives history,

historical bibliography, documentation, intellectual access, document retrieval, research methods in historical investigation, and manuscript and rare book collecting. Proposals are requested for papers (20-30 minute duration) on topics related to the theme of this preconference. Present short abstracts and titles of proposed papers (one page maximum) to the ABH program committee c/o Dean Lawrence J. McCrank, FSU Library and Instructional Services, Ferris State University, Big Rapids, MI 49307, by February 1, 1989.

The Second International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI)

The Second International Conference of the ISSEI will take place in late August 1990 in Europe. The theme to be discussed is Comparative History of European Nationalism (on the Eve of 1992). There will be twenty-five workshops dealing with the following subjects: philosophy, history, sociology, economics, literature, war studies, linguistics, religion, science, politics, and women's studies. For information, contact:

Ezra Talmor, Editor
History of European Ideas
Department of Philosophy
Haifa University
Mount Carmel, Haifa 31999
Israel

NCC and the National Archives to Jointly Sponsor Discussion Session at the OAH Annual Meeting

During the April OAH Annual Meeting in St. Louis, Dr. Trudy Peterson, Assistant Archivist, Office of the National Archives, and John Fawcett, Assistant Archivist, Office of Presidential Libraries, will be available to discuss a wide range of National

Archives policies with OAH members. It is our hope that in this informal conversational setting users of the National Archives will have an opportunity to clarify issues and raise questions concerning research services, access to records, relocations of records with the move to Archives II, and plans for the new archival facility. The meeting is scheduled for the afternoon of April 7 in the Adam's Mark Hotel. For details concerning the meeting time and place, see the OAH Annual Meeting Pocket Program.

Upcoming Meetings

The deadline for proposals for all the following conferences has passed.

"The Vietnam War as History," March 16-17, Royal Military College of Canada military history symposium. Contact: Dept. of History, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7K 5L0.

Great Lakes History Conference, April 20-21, held in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Contact: Dennis S. Delvin, Department of History, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI 49401.

Society for Historians of the Early American Republic annual conference at the University of Virginia, July 20-22. Contact: John L. Larson, Dept. of History, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907.

"New Perspectives on the 1890s," October 12-13, a conference sponsored by the Lehigh Valley Association of Independent Colleges. Contact: Daniel W. Ross, Dept. of English, Allentown College, Center Valley, PA 18034.

Naval History Symposium, October 18-20, sponsored by the history department of the U.S. Naval Academy. Contact: William R. Roberts, History Dept., U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402-5044.

Social Science History Association annual meeting in Washington, DC, November 16-19. Contact: Carole

Shammas, Dept. of History, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201.

Recent Contributors to the SHAFR Endowment

Nathan Anthony	Jules Karlin
Semyen Appatov	Alexander
Tadashi Aruga	Kendrick
Guenter Bischof	Delbert McKee
Wayne Cole	Robert Olson
George Constantinides	Albert Padley
Martin Cramer	L. Fletcher Prouty
Calvin Davis	Anabel Schaupner
Khalid De Khayel	William Z. Slany
Howard Duff	Jed Snyder
Tor Forland	Charles Stefan
H. S. Foster	Sara Stratton
Nolan Fowler	William Stueck
Rebecca Goodman	J. A. Thompson
Lloyd Graybar	Lowell Wenger
Fred Harvey Harrington	Antony Wood
Edward Jamison	

ABSTRACTS

Joseph Preston Baratta (Cambridge, MA), *Greenville Clark, World Federalist* (Amsterdam: Institute for Global Policy Studies, Leliegracht 21, 1016 GR Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Occasional Paper No. 3, 1985), 47 pp.

The great world political factor in the future, Greenville Clark thought, would not be nuclear war but the dead end of deterrence policy. The fundamental alternative is a policy of strengthening the United Nations by transforming it into a limited, federal world government, with powers to enact and

enforce law. Clark maintained four principles for U.N. reform: (1) universal membership, (2) weighted representation in the world legislature, (3) powers limited to peace and security, and (4) transition through negotiated agreement. His distinguished career is sketched in order to demonstrate his realism, timelessness, and practical wisdom. He was a "statesman incognito" for the United States, and an "elder statesman" for the world federalist movement. He was critical of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, contributed to some liberalization of the amendment provisions in the Charter (Art. 109, para. 3), sponsored the Dublin conference which called for federal world government in response to atomic energy, and tried to develop the Baruch plan into an adequate plan for the international control of atomic energy. With the coming of the Cold War, Clark found his opportunities closing down, but he (and Louis B. Sohn) used the discouraging time to think through the plan published as *World Peace through World Law*.

Cecilia Stiles Cornell (Vanderbilt University) and Melvyn P. Leffler (University of Virginia), "James V. Forrestal: The Tragic End of a Successful Entrepreneur," in *Leadership and Innovation: A Biographical Perspective on Entrepreneurs in Government*, edited by Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987).

The authors argue that Forrestal's effective leadership of the Navy Department played a major role in mobilizing that service for World War II and in preserving the Navy's role and mission during the immediate postwar years. Forrestal, however, failed to achieve his major goals as Secretary of Defense. Flaws within the new national security apparatus that he had helped to create and his own inability to adapt his

consensual style of leadership to his new environment made it exceedingly difficult for him to build a constituency either within the National Military Establishment or outside of it.

Nathan Godfried (Hiram College), "Economic Development and Regionalism: United States Foreign Relations in the Middle East, 1942-5," in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 22, no. 3, (July 1987), 481-500.

While planning America's post-war role in the world, government officials realized that the economic development of the Middle East would lessen the chances for regional conflicts involving local countries and external powers. This, in turn, would protect vital American interests, including communication routes, oil resources, trade opportunities and outlets for capital investment. During the war, State Department planners discussed and outlined technical and financial aid, trade and regional policies for the Middle East. The regional approach to Middle East economic development focused on two issues: the efficacy of an indigenous regional economic organization and the most suitable bureaucratic organization for the conduct of American policy in the area. This article examines the wartime debate surrounding the application of a regional approach to Middle East economic development. The essay concludes that government officials rejected a regional Middle East economic organization because it threatened to obstruct the quest for the "Holy Grail" of free international trade. Those same officials rejected structuring U.S. economic policy along regional lines because it threatened the prerogatives of the State Department and Foreign Service.

Robert J. McMahon (University of Florida), "Food as a Diplomatic Weapon: The India Wheat Loan of

1951," in *Pacific Historical Review* 56 (August 1987), 349-77.

This article examines the American response to the Indian food crisis of 1951. It argues that Truman's efforts to gain Congressional approval for an emergency shipment of grain to India, although couched in humanitarian language, was intended primarily to serve diplomatic ends. The United States hoped that a prompt and generous response to the Indian food crisis might pay valuable diplomatic dividends by helping India to recognize that its true interests lay with the West. Ironically, the administration's initiative proved largely counterproductive. Congress eventually approved the request, but only after a long and acrimonious debate, one that provided a public forum for critics of Indian foreign policy and generated ill will between the United States and India. The article seeks to illuminate some of the dilemmas inherent in using humanitarian aid to further diplomatic objectives. It tries as well to underscore the independent—and disruptive—role that Congress could play on an important foreign policy issue during the early Cold War years.

Gordon H. Chang (Oakland, CA), "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-55," in *International Security* (Spring 1988), Vol. 12, No. 4, 96-123.

Newly declassified material shows that the Eisenhower administration brought the United States closer to war with China than previously thought. Eisenhower made secret commitments to Chiang Kaishek to help defend Quemoy and Matsu in the event of a major Communist attack; was himself personally determined to defend the islands, with nuclear weapons if necessary; and, in April 1955, proposed to Chiang that if he withdrew from the offshore islands the United States would establish a 500-mile-long blockade of the China coast.

Moreover, Eisenhower's handling of the crisis was seriously flawed in several respects. He was less the restrained and supple president than other recent accounts have made him out to be.

John L. Offner (Shippensburg University), "United States Expansionism: The McKinley Administration," in Serge Ricard and James Bolner, eds., *La Republique Imperialiste: L'Expansionnisme et la Politique Exterieur des Etats-Unis, 1885-1909*, (Aix-en-Provence, 1987), 89-111.

This article was written for the use of French teachers and students of American culture studying U.S. imperialism at the turn of the century. The author argues that when the United States went to war with Spain over Cuba, a war based upon traditional American interests, it revealed long-term economic, political, and military shifts in United States power. The successful war inspired United States expansionism. Astonishing victories fired public enthusiasm for colonies and business and political leaders eagerly took part. McKinley provided leadership, defining the final settlement with Spain, as well as acquiring the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands, and supporting the Open Door policy. The long and costly war in the Philippines cooled the ardor of many American expansionists. McKinley's policies, successfully defended in the Senate and in national elections, continued with some adjustments until World War I redefined international relations.

David F. Long (University of New Hampshire), "'Mad Jack' Percival in Vietnam: First American Hostilities, May 1845," in *American Neptune*, vol. 47 (Summer, 1987), 169-173.

After a long naval career during which he had demonstrated both efficiency and eccentricity, Percival was dispatched in the USS *Constitution's* only around-the-world cruise, 1844-46. He was to "show the flag" throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans to open new American trade opportunities by establishing friendly relations with peoples along his route. He came into Danang, the port of Hue, the capital, in central Vietnam, for food and water. He soon learned that a French missionary was under death sentence, and reacted in a manner commendable morally but indefensible strategically. He seized hostages and fired on war junks, killing a few Vietnamese, while issuing unfulfilled ultimatums demanding the priest's release. The imperial court at Hue ignored him, and after sixteen wasted days he was compelled to depart. His explanation of his behavior was angrily spurned by the Secretary of the Navy: "The Department wholly disapproves of the conduct of Captain Percival as not warranted either by the demands of the Bishop or the Law of Nations." This ended "Mad Jack's" active naval service, for a later U.S. mission of apology was contemptuously rejected in Hue. The almost total differences between the two American armed interventions in Vietnam are obvious, but they ended the same—in total defeat for U.S. objectives.

Randall B. Woods (University of Arkansas), "The Politics of Diplomacy: Winston S. Churchill and the Second Quebec Conference," in *Canadian Journal of History* XXII (December 1987), 367-382.

Despite the success of the Normandy landings and the destruction of Japanese naval power in the Far East, Winston Churchill began the last half of 1944 with a deep sense of foreboding. In the international realm the United Kingdom faced the threat of financial and commercial domination by America and strategic eclipse by Russia. At home the

destruction inflicted by Nazi bombing, the collectivization spawned by the war effort, and memories of the depression had created an irresistible demand among Britons for measures designed to guarantee their economic and social security. At Quebec Churchill, who bore responsibility for devising successful strategies in both domestic and foreign policy, signed two agreements with the United States. Britain agreed in the first to lower its trade barriers and to abolish exchange controls, and in the second to acquiesce in the demilitarization and deindustrialization of Germany. In return the U.S. promised to provide the UK with \$6.5 million in military and non-military aid. The Quebec accords left Britain economically and strategically vulnerable, but promised the Churchill government the short-term aid it needed to quell domestic discontent and maintain itself in power.

Norman A. Graebner (University of Virginia), "Multipolarity in World Politics: The Challenge," in *Virginia Quarterly Review* 64 (Summer 1988), 377-97.

This essay is the most recent in a series, appearing in the *Virginia Quarterly Review*, that stress the declining influence of the United States in world affairs. The essay under review begins with an overview of the origins and continuance of the bipolar view of the world which sees the United States and the U.S.S.R. as predominant powers, dominating the international scene and determining, in their competition, the course of history. The remainder of the essay presents evidence that the world has indeed become multipolar, exerting its will on both the United States and the Soviet Union. After dwelling on the growing independence and assertiveness of both European and Third World countries, the essay analyzes briefly the decline of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States as world powers, largely because of domestic economic

disabilities. Despite the burgeoning internal and external constraints on American action abroad, the Reagan administration attempted to re-establish the position in world affairs that the United States held during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, both through larger military expenditures and through policies designed to counter Soviet activity in the Third World, especially Central America. In the end the added military expenditures and Third World involvements failed to bring many successes or to alter the basic structure of international life.

Goran Rystad (University of Lund, Sweden), "Republic or Empire? The Philippine-American War and American Expansionism at the Turn of the Century," in Serge Ricard and James Bolner, eds., *La Republique Imperialiste: L'Expansionnisme et la Politique Exterieur des Etats-Unis, 1885-1909* (Aix-en-Provence, 1987), 130-158.

The Philippine-American War, which Robert Beisner rightly has called "the forgotten war," deserves the renewed interest devoted to it since the late 1960s. However, the reason is not possible analogies to the Vietnam War, analogies which in many cases are strained and misleading. The main significance of the Philippine-American War for the United States was its profound effects on the development of American expansionism. Using evidence from the author's larger study of the interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign policy at the turn of the century, the article describes the various arguments and motives generated by the war and the acquisition of the Philippine Islands. The ongoing war was costly in lives and money. The reports of atrocities committed by Americans recurred and gained credibility. The hearing on the Philippine war conducted by a Senate committee at the beginning of 1902 demonstrated to the public

the discrepancy between reality and the stated goals of the American Philippine policy. The ferocity of the war compromised the imperial pretension in the Pacific. Even numerous expansionists became deeply disillusioned. The war became a major factor in stopping expansionism, bolstering anti-imperialist sentiments and discouraging even the most ardent supporters of empire-building.

Peter G. Boyle (University of Nottingham, England), "Britain, America and the Transition from Economic to Military Assistance, 1948-51," in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 22 (July 1987), 521-538.

Based largely upon British Foreign Office and Cabinet papers in the Public Record Office in Kew, Surrey, this article analyses the perspective of the British government on the transition from containment in its economic form, particularly the Marshall Plan, to containment in its military form, particularly NATO, the military assistance programme and western rearmament, with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 acting as a catalyst in this process of change. The evidence from British sources shows that the British government accepted the main trends and assumptions of the Truman-Acheson line of U.S. foreign policy in these years, rather than the views of critics concerned by the over-militarization of western policy, such as George F. Kennan. The article suggests that the evidence from British sources for 1945-48 has lent support to the post-revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, and shown sound judgment on the part of contemporary British diplomats, while the views of contemporary critics and later revisionist historians seem more questionable. For 1948-51, however, the article argues that while British sources would lend no more support to revisionist accounts than for earlier years, the judgment of

British diplomats on policy on these later years, such as precipitous British rearmament and support for crossing the 38th Parallel in Korea, seems much more open to question compared to the judgment of later critical historical accounts or of a contemporary critic such as George F. Kennan.

Joseph P. O'Grady (LaSalle University), "W. J. Fulbright and the Fulbright Program in Ireland," in *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, XLVII (Spring 1988), 47-69.

This article adds to our understanding of Senator William J. Fulbright's role in American history by showing how he never lost his view of the importance of education as a force to promote peace and understanding in the world. The author accomplished this by relating how in April to July 1954 in the midst of the policy debates on what the United States should do in Southeast Asia, Europe and the rest of the world, Fulbright insisted that the Irish establish an educational exchange program similar to the Fulbright Program he had sponsored in 1945. The issue arose because the Irish had joined the Marshall Plan in 1948 and their participation generated Counterpart Funds in Irish pounds. When they refused to continue to accept American aid in January 1952 under the Mutual Security Act, they had to get U.S. congressional approval of any plan to spend that money. The Irish successfully negotiated with the State Department a list of projects for such funding and the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved that agreement on April 9, 1954. When that package got to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fulbright wanted the money to be used for educational purposes, including an exchange program. That opened a three month debate between Fulbright and the Irish which ended in the latter's acceptance of the former's ideas. The Fulbright Program to Ireland was born.

Thomas G. Paterson, "John F. Kennedy and the World," in J. Richard Snyder, ed., *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1988), pp. 123-128.

A critical exploration of Kennedy's foreign policy and the historian's debate over his record. Emphasis is placed on Kennedy's ideology (especially counter-revolutionary thought), 1940s historical lessons, personality, and style. Included are case studies of the Vietnam War, the nuclear arms race, and the Cuban missile race.

Thomas G. Paterson, "Thought Control and the Writing of History," in Richard O. Curry, *Freedom at Risk: Secrecy, Censorship, and Repression in the 1980s*, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 60-68.

A study of the many obstacles the Reagan Administration has placed or has attempted to place in the way of writing well-documented history: a narrow definition of "national security" to keep classified many documents scholars have requested under the Freedom of Information Act and mandatory review procedures of the presidential libraries; high search fees and the denial of fee waivers; an uncooperative, self-protecting Classification-Declassification Office in the Department of State that has even stymied the Office of the Historian in the preparation of *Foreign Relations* volumes; reclassification of documents once opened to scholars; prepublication requirements for former government officials; and many other examples. These several obstructionist measures deny historians the opportunity to test key questions and permit government officers to control access to information and thus to control how historians work. The Reagan Administration has not burned books, but it has prevented them.

PUBLICATIONS

Peter J. Beck (Kingston Polytechnic, England), *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem*. Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988. ISBN 0-415-00909-X. \$57.50

Guenter Bischof (Harvard University) and Josef Leidenfrost, eds., *A Nation under Tutelage: Austria and the Allies, 1945-1949*. In *Innsbruck Studies of Contemporary History*, Rolf Steininger, ed., vol. 4. Innsbruck: Haymon, 1988.

Michael M. Boll (Air War College), *National Security Planning: Roosevelt Through Reagan*. Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988. ISBN 0-8131-1645-7. \$26.00

John Chay (Pembroke State University) and Thomas Ross, eds., *Buffer State in World Politics*. Westview Press, 1986. ISBN 0-8133-7264-X. \$26.00

Paolo E. Coletta (U.S. Naval Academy—Emeritus), *Selected and Annotated Bibliography of American Naval History*. Univ. Press of America, 1988. ISBN 0-8191-7111-5. \$41.25

Robert Divine (University of Texas), ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. Markus Wiener Publishing, 1988. Paper: ISBN 0-919129-86-X, \$11.95; Cloth: ISBN 0-919129-15-0, \$21.95

John Dobson (Iowa State University), *Reticent Expansionism: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley*. Duquesne Univ. Press, 1988. ISBN 0-8207-0202-1. \$26.50

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University), *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1987. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-504336-7, \$24.95; now in paper: ISBN 0-19-504335-9, \$9.95

Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (all of Stanford University), eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*. Oxford

Univ. Press, 1988. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-505397-4, \$42.00; paper: ISBN 0-19-505398-2, \$18.95

June M. Grasso (Boston University), *Truman's Two-China Policy, 1948-1950*. M E Sharpe, 1987. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-505398-2, \$27.50

David Healy (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee), *A Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917*. Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1988. ISBN 0-299-11720-0. \$27.50

Michael J. Hogan (Ohio State University), *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987. Now available in paperback, \$15.95.

Michael H. Hunt (University of North Carolina), *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Yale Univ. Press, 1987. Cloth: ISBN 0-3000-3717-1, \$25.00. Now in paper: ISBN 0-3000-4369-4, \$8.95

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh), *The CIA and American Democracy*. Yale Univ. Press, 1989. ISBN 0-300-04149-7, \$25.00

Detlef Junker (University of Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany), *Kampf um die Weltmacht: Die USA und das Dritte Reich, 1933-1945 [Struggle for World Power: The US and the Third Reich, 1933-1945]*. Schwann-Verlag, 1988.

Howard Jones (University of Alabama), *A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1989. ISBN 0-19-504581-5. \$34.50

Robert H. Keyserlingk (University of Ottawa), *Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma*. McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1988. ISBN 0-7735-0644-6. \$25.95

Walter LaFeber (Cornell University), *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*. Norton, 1989. ISBN 0-393-95611-3.

Timothy P. Maga (University of Maryland), *America, France, and the European Refugee Problem, 1933-1947*. Garland, 1988. ISBN 0-8240-5678-7. \$52.00

Charles S. Maier (Harvard University), *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*. Harvard Univ. Press, 1988. ISBN 0-674-92975-6. \$22.50

Henry E. Mattox (University of North Carolina), *The Twilight of Amateur Diplomacy: The American Foreign Service and Its Senior Officers in the 1890s*. Kent State Univ. Press, 1988. ISBN 0-87338-375-3. \$21.00

Jonathan M. Nielson (Univ. of Alaska), *Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier: The Military in Alaska's History, 1867-1987*. Greenwood Press, 1988. ISBN 0-313-26030-3. \$39.95

Thomas G. Paterson (Univ. of Connecticut), ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1989. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-504585-8, \$34.50; paper: ISBN 0-19-504584-X, \$13.95

Thomas G. Paterson (Univ. of Connecticut), ed., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. Vol. I: *To 1914*, ISBN 0-669-15856-9; Vol. II: *Since 1914*, ISBN 0-669-15857-7. Heath, 1989. \$15.50 per vol.

Benjamin D. Rhodes (University of Wisconsin-Whitewater), *The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia, 1918-1919: A Diplomatic and Military Tragicomedy*. Greenwood Press, 1988. ISBN 0-313-26132-6. \$35.00

Howard B. Schonberger (University of Maine), *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent State Univ. Press, 1988. Cloth: ISBN 0-87338-369-9, \$24.00; paper: ISBN 0-87338-382-6, \$14.00

Stephen A. Schuker (Brandeis University), *American "Reparations" to Germany, 1919-33: Implications for the Third-World Debt Crisis*. International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1988. ISBN 0-88165-233-4. \$6.50

Melvin Small (Wayne State University) and David Singer, *International War*, 2nd ed. Dorsey Press, 1989. ISBN 0-256-07115-2.

Donald S. Spencer (University of Montana), *The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy*. Praeger Press, 1988. ISBN 0-275-93041-6. \$38.95

Duane Tananbaum (Lehman College), *The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower's Political Leadership*. Cornell Univ. Press, 1988. ISBN 0-8014-2037-7. \$34.50

Ralph E. Weber (Marquette University), ed., *The Final Memoranda of Major General Ralph H. Van Deman: Father of U.S. Military Intelligence*. Scholarly Resources, 1988. ISBN 0-8420-2296-1. \$30.00

PERSONALS

Peter Boyle (University of Nottingham, England) was selected as Wayne Aspinall Lecturer at Mesa College, Colorado. Professor Boyle will deliver a fifteen-lecture series on the history of U.S.-Soviet relations at the college this spring.

Michael J. Hogan's book, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), has received the Ohio Academy of History's Publication Award, the Quincy Wright Book Prize of the International Studies Association, and the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association.

Charles S. Maier (Harvard University) is participating in the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1988-89 West European Program.

David Alan Rosenberg (Naval War College) has received a John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellowship for Gifted Individuals.

Truman R. Strobridge, formerly of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Historical Division where he worked for five years on a book about the JCS, national policy, and the Carter Administration, is now the Command Historian, U.S. European Command, in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany.

CALENDAR

1989

- April 1 Applications for the H. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 6-9 The 82nd meeting of the OAH will be held in St. Louis, MO, at Adam's Mark Hotel.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 9-12 The 15th SHAFR Summer Conference at the College of William and Mary. The program chair is Robert McMahon, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- December 27-30 The 104th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in San Francisco. The deadline for proposals has passed.

1990

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.

- January 15 Deadline for the 1989 Bernath article award.
- January 20 Deadline for the 1989 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- March 22-25 The OAH will meet in Washington, D.C., and the program chairman is August Meier, Department of History, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44242.
- December AHA will meet in San Francisco. The deadline for proposals has passed.

AWARDS AND PRIZES

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

Description: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign

Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Walter LaFeber, History Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853.

Books may be sent at any time during 1988, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1989.

The award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in April, 1989, in St. Louis.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
	Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
	Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
	Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986	Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987	Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory)
	James Edward Miller (Department of State)
1988	Michael Hogan (Ohio State)

THE STUART L. BERNATH LECTURE PRIZE

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach

the Committee no later than March 1, 1989. Nominations should be sent to: Clayton Koppes, Department of History, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH 44074.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

Previous Winners

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
- 1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)

THE STUART L. BERNATH SCHOLARLY ARTICLE PRIZE

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1988. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1989 to the chairperson of the committee, who for 1989 is: Gaddis Smith, P.O. Box 1504A, Yale Station, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR

luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1989, in St. Louis.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)

- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
- 1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)

THE STUART L. BERNATH DISSERTATION FUND

This prize has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
 - (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
 - (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,
 - (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,
 - (c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)

5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to Dr. Stephen G. Rabe, Humanities Division, Box 830688, University of Texas, Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75083-0688. The deadline is November 1, 1989.

Previous winners:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1985 | Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara) |
| 1986 | Valdina C. Winn (Kansas) & Walter L. Hixon (Colorado) |
| 1987 | Janet M. Manson (Washington State), Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington), W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) & Michael Wala (Hamburg) |
| 1988 | Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford) & Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario) |

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1989, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application

and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1989 to: Wayne S. Cole, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

Prior winners:

1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)

1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)

1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and

- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Lloyd Ambrosius, Dept. of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Prior winners:

1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

1988 Alexander DeConde (University of California at Santa Barbara)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1987 and 1988. Deadline for submissions was February 1, 1989. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee.

David Patterson
9011 Montgomery Ave.
Chevy Chase
MD 20815

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A
Canada

Harold Josephson
Department of History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 2822

1987 winner: Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Brent W. York, Jay Fain.

ISSUES: The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September and December.

DEADLINES: All material should be sent to the editor four weeks prior to publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Address changes should be sent to: the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: William Kamman, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
 - 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
 - 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
 - 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
 - 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
 - 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
 - 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
 - 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
 - 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)
 - 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
 - 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
 - 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
 - 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
 - 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
 - 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
 - 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
 - 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
 - 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
 - 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
 - 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
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