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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath, and are financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, and Warren Kuehl. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in each *Newsletter*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

SEARCHING FOR LBJ AT THE JOHNSON LIBRARY

by

David C. Humphrey

(Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

"Unlike some of his predecessors, notably Dwight Eisenhower, LBJ did not like to commit himself to writing," Robert A. Divine noted in a 1985 article on the LBJ Library. "Johnson preferred to deal with issues orally, either in face-to-face discussion or by telephone." One result, wrote Divine, is that the LBJ Library's extensive holdings, while amply documenting "the flow of information and suggestions into the Oval Office," reveal little about how Johnson responded to the influences brought to bear on him. How and why, one is left wondering, did the president reach "his final policy positions?"¹

Historians of American foreign relations who have pored through country files at the LBJ Library, barely gaining a glimpse of the president, will sympathize with Divine's concern. If Johnson is an elusive figure in most White House files, however, he is not beyond reach, especially given the kind of documentation that should become available in the years ahead. What follows is an overview of several types of documents and some specific files that may prove useful to scholars seeking to delineate Johnson's role in the foreign policy process.

Notes of LBJ's Meetings

Since Johnson was a talker rather than a writer, records of what he said in behind-the-scene discussions are potentially of great value. The LBJ Library holds notes of more than 450 meetings in which the president discussed

foreign policy issues with his advisers, the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and Congressional and foreign leaders.

The value of a particular set of notes depends on several factors, especially the significance of the meeting itself and the quality of the note-taking. Any number of meetings, such as Cabinet meetings, were convened for informational rather than deliberative purposes, or to ratify decisions already reached, as was sometimes the case with NSC meetings, or simply to give the appearance of genuine debate, as has been contended about the discussions concerning escalation of the Vietnam War during late July 1965. While such meetings may illuminate LBJ's playing various roles as president, they shed little light on his decision-making. Fortunately the library holds notes of Johnson's Tuesday lunches and similar advisory meetings that go to the heart of the foreign policy process.

The quality of the note-taking itself is also crucial, although difficult to judge. Meeting notes, even when fifteen to twenty-five pages long, are far from transcripts—and most of the notes are just a few pages long. Many notes summarize what each participant said as the discussion unfolded ("The President said he would like to see Indonesia become a 'showcase.'"). Just as common are notes in the form of a dialogue ("President: I don't want you and Rostow and Francis [Bator] to get the wrong impression about the Congress. I have dealt with those babies for 30 years; the breakfast went the way it did not because that's the way the Congress really feels, but because it's the way I managed it...").² Such notes are often quoted by scholars as if they reproduced exactly what was said in a meeting, but this is hardly the case.

Note-takers sought to capture the main lines of the discussion but necessarily omitted much of it. Lengthy statements might be condensed to a sentence or two,

digressions and idiomatic expressions ignored, and rapid-fire exchanges simplified by combining an individual's several statements into one. Sometimes note-takers erred in reporting the gist of what was said or missed it entirely. And distortions could occur when informal handwritten notes were later typed, often with the wording fleshed out or formalized.

Comparing two sets of notes for the same meeting can illuminate some of the problems. The following selections are from notes taken by the deputy White House press secretary (#1) and the executive secretary of the National Security Council (#2) at the NSC meeting on 7 February 1968, a week after the beginning of the Tet offensive in Vietnam.³ The speakers are President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

#1

Rusk: What about the possibility of MIG's attacking a carrier?

Wheeler: No, I do not think this likely. The carriers do have air caps and are distant from the MIG bases.

Johnson: Go in and get those MIGs at Phuc Yen.

#2

Do you anticipate an attack on U.S. carriers off South Vietnam by IL-28s?

No. The IL-28s carry only light weapons and the U.S. carriers have a strong air cap. In addition, the weather is bad at the North Vietnamese airbase in Phuc Yen.

Why do we not go in and get their planes?

Wheeler: We will as soon [no statement noted]
as the weather permits.

In this case one sees two strikingly different statements by the president: giving an order to General Wheeler in one set of notes, asking him a question in the other. And what did General Wheeler think of the gravity of the situation at Khe Sanh, the U.S. base under siege by North Vietnamese troops?

#1

Wheeler: Mr. President, this is not a situation to take lightly. This is of great concern to us. I do think that Khesanh is an important position which can and should be defended. It is important to us tactically and it is very important to us psychologically. But the fighting will be very heavy, and the losses may be high.

#2

Wheeler: Mr. President, We should not take the situation around Khe Sanh Seriously.

President: We are trying not to.

Wheeler: Khe Sanh can be held. It may mean heavy fighting because General Giap may be prepared to take heavy casualties.

The notes diverge in other eye-catching ways, with dialogues of several lines appearing in one set that are not reflected at all in the other, or with several individuals speaking in one set but totally silent in the other.

The clear implication is that meeting notes must be used with care. They may be extremely useful in revealing patterns in the president's interaction with his advisers, for instance, but one should not pin too much on the exact wording of a particular statement, or claim unequivocally,

based on the notes, that an issue was not raised or that an individual did not speak.

Listed below are the major files containing notes of the president's foreign policy meetings. Some of the collections, like the Meeting Notes Files, also contain notes of meetings on domestic issues or meetings that Johnson did not attend, but the figures cited refer only to meetings attended by the president at which foreign policy issues were considered.

Meeting Notes File: Typed notes for 100 of the president's foreign policy meetings from 1963 to 1968, mostly with advisers and Congressional leaders. Three-quarters of the meetings deal mainly with the Vietnam War. In addition, there are notes for 37 meetings at which LBJ discussed foreign affairs with correspondents and a fifty-two-page transcript of his meeting with Congressional leaders on 31 January 1968. Most of the notes are open for research in whole or in part.

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings: Notes (mostly typed) taken by W. Thomas Johnson, deputy White House press secretary, at 161 of the president's meetings on foreign affairs, all but two of which took place between July 1967 and December 1968. Fifty-two sets of notes, virtually all open for research in whole or in part, record the president's meetings with House and Senate leaders, the National Security Council, the Cabinet, correspondents, and other groups. The remaining 109 sets of notes record LBJ's meetings with his senior civilian and military foreign policy advisers, including 45 Tuesday lunch meetings. As of December 1988 these notes had not been released to the public, except for minor portions that were made available in 1984 in response to a subpoena from CBS, Inc., specifying that discussions of enemy strength in Vietnam be released.

National Security Council Meetings File, National Security File: Typed notes for 73 of the 75 official NSC meetings during the Johnson presidency (#520 through #594). Most of the notes have been opened for research in whole or in part.

Files of McGeorge Bundy, National Security File: Typed notes for 20 of Johnson's foreign policy meetings from December 1963 to January 1965, 17 of them advisory meetings. Prominent topics include Southeast Asia, Africa, Panama, Cuba, Cyprus, China, and NATO. Half the notes have been opened for research in whole or in part.

Valenti, Jack—Notes Taken at Various Meetings During 1965 and 1966, Office of the President File: Handwritten notes taken by Jack Valenti, special assistant to the president, at 45 of the president's foreign policy meetings between April 1965 and April 1966. Included are 23 advisory meetings on Vietnam (typed versions of these notes can be found in the Meeting Notes File), 12 advisory meetings during April and May 1965 on the Dominican intervention, 5 meetings on Western Europe, and 3 meetings on South Asia. Many of the Vietnam notes are open for research, but only fragments of the other notes have been declassified.

Papers of McGeorge Bundy: National security adviser McGeorge Bundy's very informal, handwritten notes of more than 50 of Johnson's advisory meetings on foreign policy from 1964 to February 1966. While sometimes sketchy and fragmentary, the notes capture more fully than formal notes the flavor of the President's comments, questions, and concerns. Notes for more than 20 meetings on Vietnam, most of them dated from November 1964 to July 1965, have been opened for research.

Country File, National Security File: Typed notes for many of the president's meetings with foreign heads-of-state and other foreign officials and some notes of his meetings with U.S. ambassadors. Only a small percentage is open for research. Due to Johnson's concern with leaks, notes of his meetings with senior foreign policy advisers were normally placed in closely-held special files, like the first two noted above, and so are rarely found in the Country File.

Cabinet Papers: Typed notes (and one transcript) for 27 Cabinet meetings at which foreign policy issues were discussed, mainly the Vietnam War and the Middle East. All but 2 of the meetings took place during 1967 and 1968. Most of the notes are open for research.

President's Appointment File: Notes for more than a dozen foreign policy meetings held by the president with advisers, Congressional leaders, and foreign leaders, including several discussions of the Vietnam War (mostly open for research), in addition to more than 50 sets of meeting notes that duplicate notes found in the Meeting Notes Files and Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Among the unusual items available for research in this file are LBJ's own handwritten notes made during his meetings with Chairman Alexsei Kosygin of the Soviet Union at Glassboro, New Jersey, on 23 and 25 June 1967.

Records of What LBJ Read and How he Reacted

The White House files of the Johnson presidency virtually overflow with many thousands of memos and other messages prepared by White House staff and agency officials. But which did the president read? A file called "Night Reading," not yet available for research, will help answer this question. Night Reading includes lists of the

memos, reports, and other materials assembled for Johnson's evening reading sessions—often forty to sixty or more items per evening. Judging by the lists which date from late February 1964 through the close of the administration, LBJ customarily worked on night reading more than twenty evenings (and the following mornings) each month. A secretary usually annotated each evening's list, indicating which items LBJ read and, in some cases, his reactions to them, though the latter notations are brief.

The Night Reading file includes only lists, not the items listed, which were eventually placed in regular files. At the top of each item a secretary placed a number or letter corresponding to the number or letter assigned to the item on the Night Reading list. Those items seen by the president usually were marked with an "L" or, starting in November 1967, with a "ps" or "PS" ("President Saw"), unless Johnson himself wrote on the item.⁴ An "L" or a "ps" was also placed on many other items that crossed the president's desk, and Johnson himself made notations on a good many. Thus one can readily identify memos seen by LBJ, although such markings provide no guarantee that he read them carefully; and the absence of such markings does not mean they escaped his notice, since not everything he saw was marked, and since one may be looking at a copy rather than the original that went to the president.

Items listed in Night Reading were grouped according to the White House aide who provided them, making it easy to identify those furnished by LBJ's national security advisers, McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow. Their Memos to the President file in the National Security File offers a more comprehensive view of their written advice to Johnson. McGeorge Bundy's file is far from complete but still very enlightening. While not all-inclusive, Walt Rostow's file was maintained much more systematically. Copies of his memos

to LBJ and their attachments (by far the biggest part of the file) comprise more than twenty-five thousand pages, and these are memos that routinely reached the president's desk.⁵ The Memos to the President file has been processed through 1966, and significant portions have been declassified.

Night Reading and Memos to the President both offer an advantage over the Country File for those interested in viewing a foreign policy issue from the president's perspective. Whereas the Country File can encourage tunnel vision as one examines a set of bilateral relations extracted from other issues, Night Reading and Memos to the President introduce the context within which Johnson considered a particular memo or report. For example, a memo to LBJ from Walt Rostow may stand out sharply in the Country File, set against the background of second-level staff memos and State Department cables, but the same memo may dim in its advisory significance when seen in Memos to the President together with fifteen other memos with attachments forwarded by Rostow the same day—or when seen in a Night Reading list that includes sixty other items covered by LBJ in an hour session in the Oval Office during which he also spoke by phone with the secretaries of State and Defense.⁶

A third way to get a handle on what the president read and, in this case, to gauge his reactions, is by examining those memos and other materials on which Johnson penned notes. While LBJ rarely wrote memos himself, he sometimes made notations on other peoples' often routine jottings such as "Yes," "OK," "Put on my desk," "Call me," "See me," "File," or a check mark by one of several options provided by an aide at the bottom of his memo (i.e., "Yes No See me"). Longer or more unusual notes can be found in foreign policy files, but not with any frequency—about three hundred memos out of the four hundred thousand pages in the

Country File have them.⁷ "Too long—not sharp—Very dull—& uninteresting," commented LBJ on summary answers to seven questions that might be raised about progress in the Vietnam War, forwarded by Walt Rostow in late 1967. In 1964 McGeorge Bundy urged LBJ to approve a draft message aimed at "straightening out Ayub Khan" of Pakistan, but Johnson opposed the move, noting that "If I know Ayub it will only incense him."⁸

More than fifteen thousand pages of memos, notes, doodles, and other documents with LBJ's handwriting—but excluding material normally filed in the National Security File—were placed in a special Handwriting File during the Johnson presidency. Copies were frequently substituted in the regular files, though not in the case of the scratch pad notes collected by secretaries from the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room. Foreign relations material composes a minor portion of the Handwriting File, but once processed it should provide interesting glimpses of LBJ's leadership in foreign affairs. For example, at 4:10 p.m. on 27 July 1965, Bill Moyers, who was briefing reporters on the week-long deliberations over whether to commit major ground forces to Vietnam, sent urgent word to LBJ that the networks wanted him to answer questions before their cameras. Should he do it? "Yes by all means," responded Johnson; "answer fully [and] frankly—then stress the *following words*[:] thorough, cautious, deliberative, long range thinking[,] search for program that will bring Peace."⁹

LBJ's "Daily Diary"

This richly detailed, thirteen-thousand-page daily log of the president's meetings, phone calls, and other activities occasionally sparkles with unusual information about LBJ—his offhand comments, his conversations, his moods, his late night calls to the Situation Room. For instance, the Daily

Diary records Walt Rostow's comments on Johnson's meetings with several heads of state during his visit to Germany for Konrad Adenauer's funeral. Two brief excerpts: "The President thought [Chancellor Kurt] Kiesinger was sort of a dandy before he met him, but Kiesinger himself changed that impression." "The President, trying to throw [Prime Minister Harold] Wilson off guard, and fully expecting Wilson to complain again about our bombing of Vietnam—asked Wilson when he was going to send his two brigades of troops to Vietnam." Another of LBJ's discussions with foreign leaders—during his luncheon with Chairman Kosygin and top Russian and U.S. officials at Glassboro in 1967—was recorded in the Daily Diary by a White House secretary who took notes while eavesdropping from just outside the door and, after the door was closed, from a back stairway.¹⁰

The Daily Diary permits scholars to reconstruct crucial days in LBJ's presidency, such as the first day of the Six Day War, which is detailed in eighteen pages starting with Walt Rostow's 4:30 a.m. phone call from the Situation Room and ending with Johnson's phone conversation with Abe Fortas prior to retiring at 11:15 p.m. Or one can analyze Johnson's contacts over a period of time.¹¹ Did he, for instance, become more isolated as his administration progressed? Access to the Daily Diary is facilitated by the Diary Cards, an alphabetical name index providing the dates and times that each individual met with Johnson or talked with him by phone. The Daily Diary is open for research at the LBJ Library and may also be purchased on microfilm.¹²

Recollections About LBJ

Since 1968 the University of Texas Oral History Project and its successor, the LBJ Library Oral History Project, have recorded and transcribed interviews with more than eight

hundred friends and associates of LBJ and members of his administration. Interviewers usually question subjects not only about their own activities but also about their perceptions of Johnson. The result is a variety of perspectives on the chief executive—those of White House special assistants like Harry McPherson and John Roche, national security staff members like Michael Forrestal and James Thomson, top State, Defense, and CIA officials like Dean Rusk and Richard Helms, and special advisers like Maxwell Taylor and John McCloy.

While interviews with several key figures—McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, Walt Rostow, Robert Komer—are not yet open for research, students of U.S. foreign policy will find those interviews already available to be a revealing source of information on Johnson's style of leadership. "He placed a great emphasis upon performance rather than words," recalled Secretary of State Dean Rusk in his 232-page interview. "I remember during the first week of his presidency he called me on the phone one day and asked me what was being done under the Alliance for Progress. I gave him a rather general summary in State Department language, and he said very impatiently, 'I don't mean all that. I mean what are we *doing*—what are we actually doing? Send me a list of the actual actions the Latin Americans themselves are taking.'" A turning point in Undersecretary of State George Ball's relationship with LBJ was Ball's decision, without consulting Johnson, to recognize the new Brazilian government following the 1964 coup. "The President was furious with me...", Ball related in his 97-page interview. "Why hadn't I let him know...? I said, 'It was three o'clock in the morning, Mr. President.' He said, 'Don't ever do that again. I don't care what hour in the morning it is, I want to know. I'm not saying that what you did wasn't right, but

after this I want to know.' Thereafter I never hesitated," concluded Ball.¹³

Most of the library's oral histories are open for research. Transcripts may be borrowed by mail.¹⁴

LBJ on Film and Videotape

While LBJ is often difficult to find in the library's textual holdings, he is hard to miss in the audiovisual records. Most of the five hundred thousand still photographs taken by White House photographers feature the president, as do all the films of the president's activities produced each month from June 1966 through January 1969 by the White House Naval Photographic Unit. Historians of U.S. foreign relations may find of particular interest the many still photographs of meetings—NSC meetings in the Cabinet Room, Tuesday lunches in the family dining room, conferences with ambassadors in the Oval Office, emergency meetings on the Six Day War in the Situation Room. One only need compare the sprawling group at LBJ's first NSC meeting, pictured following page 84 in Johnson's *The Vantage Point*, with the Tuesday lunch pictured following page 540 to appreciate why the president found the latter forum much more conducive to frank discussion.¹⁵ The library's videotape collection includes Johnson's televised speeches and press conferences, network morning and evening news broadcasts from April 1968 through January 1969, and a fascinating, half-hour, off-the-record tape of Johnson rehearsing his 31 March 1968 speech.

Recordings and Transcripts of LBJ's Meetings

On some thirty occasions during the Johnson presidency sizable groups of Senators and Congressmen gathered at the White House for off-the-record briefings by the president and his senior advisers which were recorded on audio tape. The

library has opened 430 pages of transcripts of those portions of the briefings that dealt with the Vietnam War. While Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara handled the lion's share of the briefings on Vietnam, Johnson participated in virtually every session. His comments take up more than 130 pages of the transcripts and provide a good sense of his off-the-record style with groups of Senators and Congressmen.

The LBJ Library also holds audio tapes and transcripts of a number of meetings on national security issues—mainly the Vietnam War—held during 1968 in the Cabinet Room, where Johnson frequently met with advisers and other officials. Meetings were secretly recorded on a selective basis, at the president's discretion. According to Bill Gulley of the White House Military Office, the White House Communications Agency installed a recording system in the Cabinet Room in January 1968 and removed it in December 1968.¹⁶ At Johnson's instructions, the audio tapes and transcripts were turned over to the LBJ Library upon his death in 1973 and closed for fifty years.

Records of LBJ's Telephone Conversations

The president "had those damned telephones of his going all the time," recalled White House Special Assistant John Roche. During Johnson's first twenty-five months in office, through the end of 1965, he talked on the telephone some fifteen thousand times, almost eighteen hundred of them with McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, or Robert McNamara.¹⁷ Days with thirty, forty, even fifty telephone conversations were not uncommon. And when the president talked on the phone, he frequently did the major share of the talking. Records of Johnson's telephone conversations document him in action—questioning, probing, testing ideas, informing, instructing.

The Papers of George Ball, not yet available for research, include typed notes for forty-four of Ball's telephone conversations with the president from January 1965 through June 1966. Far more extensive are the dictabelt recordings and transcripts of the president's telephone conversations that, at Johnson's instructions, were turned over to the library upon his death in 1973 and closed for fifty years.

Only a small portion of Johnson's phone conversations was recorded; but a small portion of many thousands of phone calls represents a rich historical resource. While on many a day few or no calls were recorded, on some days the number might reach ten or more. On 1 May 1965, for instance, during the Dominican intervention, ten of LBJ's fifty-nine phone conversations were taped: five with McGeorge Bundy, four with Robert McNamara, and one with the Situation Room. On 4 August 1964, the day of retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin attacks and a day probably exceeded by few others in the number of LBJ's phone conversations, thirty-six of the president's one hundred calls were taped.¹⁸

Summary

Historians searching for LBJ in the holdings of the Johnson Library should eventually find a rich record of his leadership in foreign affairs. Even now a variety of sources can be brought to bear on the issue, and additional important material will become available in the next several years. Those seeking a fuller picture of the library's holdings may wish to consult *Historical Materials in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library*, a 121-page guide to the library's holdings published in 1988. A copy may be obtained free of charge by writing to the Supervisory Archivist, LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas 78705.

NOTES

¹Robert A. Divine, "Presidential Library," *Discovery: Research and Scholarship at the University of Texas at Austin* 10 (Number 1, 1985): 32-33.

²Francis Bator, Memorandum for the Record, 2 March 1967, #54a, Book 2, Box 50, NSC History of the Trilateral Negotiations and NATO, 1966-1967, National Security File (cited hereafter as NSF).

³For #1, see Notes of the President's Meeting with the NSC, 7 February 1968, #48a, Box 2, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. For #2, see Summary Notes for 581st NSC Meeting, #2, Tab 63, Volume 5, Box 2, NSC Meetings File, NSF.

⁴Until September 1966 the normal procedure was to prepare one list for each evening's reading. Each item on the list was assigned a number. From September 1966 to March 1968 a second list was prepared specifically for materials assembled by appointments secretary Marvin Watson. Each item on Watson's list was assigned a letter (A, B, C) or a double letter (AA, BB, CC). Jim Jones succeeded Marvin Watson as appointments secretary in 1968 and continued to assemble a second set of materials that was listed separately and assigned letters rather than numbers. The Night Reading file contains both the numbered lists and Watson's and Jones's lists. Annotated carbon copies of Jones's lists, dated from June 1968 through January 1969, are open for research in "Jones Night Reading Lists," Box 1, Office Files of Jim Jones.

⁵Lois Nivens to D.C.H., 16 September 1988, interview. Nivens was Walt Rostow's secretary while he served as national security adviser.

⁶See, for example, the Daily Diary, 18 May 1967, 7:20 p.m. to 8:25 p.m.

⁷For security reasons, items with Johnson's handwriting have been removed from the Country File, replaced with photocopies, and put in a special file, making it fairly easy to come up with the figure of "about three hundred memos."

⁸Walt Rostow to the President, 11 November 1967, #25, "7E (2) Public Relations Activities," Box 99, Country File, Vietnam, NSF; McGeorge Bundy to the President, 8 March 1964, #75, Volume 1, Box 150, Country File, Pakistan, NSF.

⁹Bill Moyers to the President, 27 July 1965, "July 20-31, 1965," Box 10, Handwriting File.

¹⁰Daily Diary, 23 April 1967, 23 June 1967. For an excellent introduction to the Daily Diary and accompanying files, see Claudia

Anderson, "The Daily Diaries of Lyndon B. Johnson, Diary Cards, and Appointment File [Diary Backup]" (typescript, LBJ Library, 1980). While the Daily Diary provides an extensively detailed record, it should not be treated as complete or infallible. The secretaries who compiled it were not in a position to detect every phone call the president made or every individual with whom he met. This is especially true when Johnson was away from the Oval Office, but even while in the Oval Office it was possible for the president to make calls on his direct lines that the secretaries missed or to meet with advisers who slipped unnoticed into the Oval Office through the side door rather than through the front entrance.

¹¹Daily Diary, 5 June 1967. For examples of using the Daily Diary to analyze Johnson's contacts, see Lee Sigelman and Dixie Mercer McNeil, "White House Decision-Making under Stress: A Case Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (Nov. 1980): 652-73; and James J. Best, "Who Talked to the President When? A Study of Lyndon B. Johnson," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Fall, 1988): 531-45.

¹²The Daily Diary may be purchased from the library at \$15 per roll. Rolls 3-14 cover the entire Johnson presidency. The Daily Diary may also be purchased from University Publications of America.

¹³Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview #I, 28 July 1969, p. 2; Transcript, George Ball Oral History Interview #II, 9 July 1971, p. 39.

¹⁴As many as four transcripts at a time may be borrowed for a two-week period by writing directly to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas 78705.

¹⁵Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York, 1971).

¹⁶Bill Gulley, *Breaking Cover* (New York, 1980), pp. 78-84.

¹⁷Transcript, John P. Roche Oral History Interview #I, 16 July 1970, p. 63; Best, "Who Talked to the President When?" p. 540.

¹⁸Daily Diary, 1 May 1965, 4 August 1964.

GHOSTS OF ADMINISTRATIONS PAST: CONTINUITIES IN U.S.—LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

by

*John Rossi (University of South Carolina)
and Jonathan Nashel (Rutgers University)*

There are several nagging questions facing the new administration. Chief among them is the fact that the Reagan/Bush efforts to reorder the political landscape in Central America, overtly and covertly, have failed. In particular, their efforts to support *Contra* "freedom fighters" have simply left the incoming administration with haunting ghosts, one in the form of Lt. Colonel Oliver North's trial. Reagan and Bush's attempt to order Central America to their tastes seems to confirm one of the great denominators in recent American foreign policy: the United States invariably perceives any type of change in the world as a threatening one. Why is this?

Leaving aside whether either the outgoing or incoming President had any idea of the antics involving a Marine Lt. Colonel and his entourage of arms dealers and fast talkers, the central problem, as perceived by American leaders, of how to produce stability in Central America remains. A clue to this question might be found in the following memo written over seventy years ago.

In the fall of 1915, the new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, wrote President Wilson expressing his fears of revolution and European intervention in the independent republics of the Caribbean basin. His concern that matters were rapidly unravelling, and that the U.S. was facing genuine security problems, is remarkable because of its similarity to how present U.S. leaders perceive the problems in the region today:

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL:

Washington November 24, 1915

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a memorandum covering the subject of the Monroe Doctrine, its application, and the possible extension of the principle in a way to constitute a policy which may be termed a "Carribean [sic] Policy," since it is limited in application to the territory in and about the Carribean Sea....

Recently the financing of revolutions and corruption of governments of the smaller republics by European capitalists have frequently thrown the control of these governments into the hands of a European power.

To avoid this danger of European political control by this means which may be as great a menace to the national safety of this country as occupation or cession, the only method seems to be to establish a stable and honest government and to prevent the revenues of the republic from becoming the prize of revolution and of foreigners who finance it.

Stability and honesty of government depend on sufficient force to resist revolutions and on sufficient control over the revenues and over the development of the resources to prevent official graft and dishonest grants of privileges.

...It is vital to the interests of this country that European political domination should in no way be extended over these regions. As it happens within this area lie the small republics of America which have been and to an extent still are the prey of revolutionists, of corrupt government, and of predatory foreigners.

Because of this state of affairs our national safety, in my opinion, requires that the United States should intervene and aid in the establishment and maintenance of a stable and honest government, if no other way seems possible to attain that end....¹

The "timelessness" of Lansing's argument should be readily apparent. The Secretary's premise was that stability in the Caribbean would have to be imposed militarily by the United States on the region's "volatile" nations. Indeed, only with U.S. guidance, backed by the force of arms could some

measure of equilibrium favorable to American security be achieved.

While the memo depicts an American Secretary of State trying to ensure free societies in Latin America, U.S. concerns of stability in the region were always of paramount concern to him. And stability for the United States has tragically resulted in tinpot dictators and death squads for Latin Americans. Witness the continual intervention of U.S. forces in the region in this century.

Most recently, the Iran/Contra scandal has shown the extent to which U.S. Governments will go to actively support counterrevolutionary groups within Latin America. What the Congressional Hearings on Iran/Contra-gate avoided and what the trial of Lt. Colonel North & Co. will doubtless skirt is the very question of U.S. policy in Latin America: that is, why were Reagan and Bush supporting the *Contras* in the first place? It is our contention that this vitally important issue never had to be raised, because Lansing had already answered it for them. Lansing's call for the U.S. to actively challenge any form of change in the region is still the prevailing consensus within the foreign policy making establishment today.

The continuity in U.S.-Latin American relations is also equally evident in the memo. Although the Soviet Union did not even exist at the time, Lansing saw the necessity for the U.S. to counter political corruption and revolutions in Latin America. And of course, Lansing presumed that these problems were always incited by outside European powers. While his concern was over the intentions of Germany and England, the memo shows that these other powers were perceived in much the same light as the Soviets are portrayed today. It reveals a strategic mind-set where demands for change within another country are always seen as threatening to U.S. interests—and always external in origin.

The triumph of stability over genuine freedoms for other countries has many roots. Some of them are quite mundane—U.S. access to raw materials or markets for instance. Others though seem to get to the heart of the problem. A disorderly world, and by this phrase we mean one where countries reject the U.S. lead politically and economically, challenges the very notion of how American leaders have conceived of America's duties to the rest of the world. A Liberal Empire might be the best way to describe American actions abroad. In the case of Latin America, its countries have felt the full brunt of America's notions of a stable world. As the Mexican proverb bemoans so tellingly, "so close to America and so far from God."

Thus, the ghost of Secretary Lansing's memo will continue to haunt the Bush Administration. Equally haunting and more pressing are the problems posed by the Nicaraguan Revolution. Will U.S. Presidents always feel the need for the services of a Lt. Colonel North and always happily meet for photo opportunities with *Contra*-like "freedom fighters" in the White House? Probably so, for the Bush Administration appears to have fully embraced Lansing's legacy.

The Reagan/Bush effort to impose a U.S. defined order through military proxies in Central America has failed from Guatemala to El Salvador, from Haiti to Nicaragua. The time is long overdue for the U.S. to cease its maddening quest to rule and manage the rest of the world, to quit foisting upon other people our notions of what the world should look like so that America as an Idea can continue. And we must stop viewing any political change in the world as a virus that must be eradicated before it destroys us.

¹Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to President Woodrow Wilson, November 24, 1915, in Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 35, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 246.

THE "DIRTY LITTLE SECRET" IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

by

Thomas J. Noer
(Carthage College)

Those who write American diplomatic history seem hopelessly addicted to self-flagellation. Periodically we seem to require a public jeremiad denouncing our sins of omission and commission. While social historians tout their triumphs, cliometricians applaud their achievements, and intellectual historians hail their insights, diplomatic historians brood about their failures and revel in accounts of their perceived shortcomings.

The latest public scouring was administered by Christopher Thorne in his review in *Diplomatic History* of Gary Hess' *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950*.¹ In the best tradition of the non-review review, Thorne quickly abandons Hess and addresses his comments to the entire band of historians of American foreign relations. Thorne asserts that Hess' "very conception of the book" shows fundamental flaws "widely shared among his colleagues in the United States." His errors are symptomatic of ingrained defects in the writing of American diplomatic history. Narrow, provincial, unaware of the "human dimension" in international affairs, the conceptual limits of historians of American foreign relations are symbolized in their acceptance of the label "diplomatic history." The term "reveals a parochialism, simplicity of thought, and narrowness of vision endemic to specialists in the field." To rectify such a lack of sophistication, Thorne urges Americans to alter their methodology and assumptions and to change the name of their society and its journal to move away from "national, cultural, and disciplinary parochialism."

Reading Thorne's critique one is struck with a sense of *deja vu*—have we not heard all of this before? For over three decades American diplomatic historians have been told that they are narrow, elitist, ethnocentric, unaware of the insights of the social sciences, out of touch with the expansive nature of the new social history, and locked into an outmoded methodology. What is most significant about such criticism is that it has come from some of the most distinguished specialists in the field. As early as 1957 William Langer chided historians of international relations for ignoring the value of Freudian psychology.² In 1970 Thomas McCormick contended that diplomatic historians had steadfastly resisted "the stimulation, insights, and methodology of the other social sciences" and the discipline was "trapped in increasingly sterile models" limited to accounts of "elite decision-makers...interacting with other nations' elite decision-makers."³ At the same time Peter Paret chastised diplomatic historians for "an unwillingness to devote serious attention to the ideas that...stand behind diplomatic practice" and a "refusal to explore the emotional sources and psychological impact of policy." He concluded that most in the field clung to a "superficial, unsystematic, or politically undesirable" method of studying the interaction between foreign and domestic affairs.⁴ One critic even went so far as to attack the one area of shared pride among the battered scholars of diplomatic history: research. Laurence Evans charged that "the history of American foreign policy is the only specialty within our discipline that permits its practitioners to ignore almost systematically most of the significant sources."⁵

In the mid-1970s three of the most prominent practitioners in the field weighed in with equally harsh critiques. Alexander DeConde repeated the plea for the use of social science techniques and urged a clearer connection between foreign policy, public opinion, and domestic events. Over a decade

before Thorne, DeConde called for abandoning the label "diplomatic history" for the more inclusive "international history."⁶ Richard W. Leopold echoed DeConde's demand for more attention to domestic forces and urged comparative studies rather than the traditional focus on American actions. Leopold also suggested jettisoning the term "diplomatic history" in favor of "foreign relations."⁷ David Patterson also chided historians of American foreign policy for methodological simplicity. He expressed concern with "the conventional research methods...practiced by diplomatic historians and their failure to utilize...new research strategies." Patterson noted a continued emphasis on "narrative-analysis of specific episodes or themes, a preoccupation with the facts and the existential uniqueness of events...."⁸

Despite these and other harsh critiques, it was Charles S. Maier's landmark essay "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations" in 1980 that forced even the most chauvinistic of diplomatic historians to take notice of fatal flaws.⁹ Maier contended that the sterility and rigidity of American diplomatic history had caused younger scholars to be "tempted by the methodological excitement attending social history." Those remaining in the field had "little sense of collective enterprise, of being at the cutting edge of scholarship." Maier blamed the malaise on many of the same problems cited by DeConde, McCormick, Leopold, and others: the refusal to integrate the new techniques of social science and social history; an outdated commitment to the nation state rather than to study of the "international system"; too narrow a focus on the decision-making process rather than the results of those decisions; and the general anti-elitist trend in American scholarship in the 1970s.

What was most telling about Maier's essay was the lack of any real rejoinder. It provoked no ringing defense of diplomatic history or its proponents. If Thorne is correct, it

also did little to alter the way diplomatic historians worked. Despite the collective hand-wringing and *mea culpas*, most books and articles continued to be written from the same perspective as before. Although recent acceptance of corporatism as a means of analysis may indicate an attempt to utilize new techniques, the results of this approach do not seem to offer the dramatic breakthrough in methodology that the critics have demanded.¹⁰

There appears then to exist a dilemma among American diplomatic historians. Our approach and methods have been denounced as sterile, narrow, parochial, and outdated. Our research is inadequate, our subject matter too limited, and our conclusions impressionistic. We labor in an academic backwater, intellectual troglodytes frozen to the tables at the National Archives, while our colleagues in other fields rest on the cutting edge of history. Yet despite such repeated and harsh critiques, we cling to our outmoded methods and sophomoric assumptions, unwilling or unable to meet the demands for a "new" approach to international relations. If, as the critics argue, diplomatic history is sick, why have we so stubbornly resisted the assigned cures?

Perhaps the reason is that the critics have diagnosed the wrong disease and prescribed the wrong medication. The decline of diplomatic history may not be the result of faulty techniques and outmoded methods, but symptomatic of a different ailment. None of the scathing critiques of the discipline have identified the real fatal flaw in the history of American diplomacy: it is incredibly poorly written. Style remains the "dirty little secret" of diplomatic history. It is rarely mentioned and never fully addressed. Perhaps it is not that our methods are inferior or our concepts simplistic. Perhaps it is that we just cannot communicate. Perhaps the problem is not in our systems, but in our sentences, not in our paradigms, but in our paragraphs, not in our *Weltanschauung*,

but in our words. To be blunt, diplomatic history as currently written is at best dull and at worst unreadable. To students, colleagues, and to the oft-hailed but seldom served "general reader," American diplomatic history is literary Novocaine.

It is quite easy for college professors and other historians to ignore style as we rarely actually read works in our field. To "stay current" usually means taking time only to "gut" monographs and articles, to find quickly the thesis, briefly appraise the research, and place the work into an existing historiographic category. Students and the public, however, do not function this way: They actually read, or try to read, all of the words. They expect those words to be clear, the prose to be interesting, and assume they may even be entertained as well as enlightened. They are usually disappointed. Rather than engaging and lively prose they find endless bloc quotes, incomprehensible jargon, numbing repetition, and languid language. Diplomatic historians have adopted new methods, examined new sources, and developed new topics, but have systematically lost their audience through the inability to communicate.

The decline in American historical writing is not confined to the history of foreign relations. In an incisive and disturbing look at the American historical profession, Bernard Weisberger judged the group to be hopelessly fragmented, overly-specialized, and totally removed from both students and the public.¹¹ He contended that while the demand for written history remains strong, it was only the non-academic historian who could communicate the subject with clarity and enjoyment. Those who do produce literate history for the non-specialist are dismissed as "popularizers" pandering to the uneducated. The result is that academic history has been drained of any drama and narrative and is either incomprehensible or of little interest to students or the public.

Weisberger's indictment is harsh but accurate and is most evident among those who write American diplomatic history. It is a sad irony that those who study some of the most engaging issues and most interesting individuals in American history do so in a manner almost guaranteed to bore and alienate their audience. There are any number of reasons for this shared illiteracy, but among the most obvious are: a) a lack of attention to writing and style in graduate training and in evaluation of published work by reviewers; b) an obsessional research emphasis that often intrudes on and detracts from the written text; c) acceptance and reliance on jargon devoid of clear meaning and unintelligible to most readers; d) abandonment of narrative and decreased attention to individual action partly in response to the assumptions of the new social and quantitative approaches to history; and e) a crisis in confidence among writers of diplomatic history in reaction to the wave of criticism of the discipline in the past two decades.

Graduate seminars and dissertation preparation in diplomatic history inculcate the need to examine and exhaust the sources but devote little attention to the honing of writing skills and the development of literary style. Students quickly learn that they will be severely criticized for failure to consult a manuscript collection or a published source, but will rarely be censored for poor writing. Meticulous research is expected but careful writing is not. When students receive their degrees and begin to publish the research emphasis continues to dominate and is encouraged by reviewers who devote paragraphs to research (archives examined/archives ignored), but often do not even mention style. The result is an ingrained fear of being criticized for inadequate research but little trepidation of being faulted for poor prose. To be told that your writing "needs polishing" or "could flow better" is a minor misdemeanor easily ignored. To be censored for overlooking a manuscript collection is a major felony

demanding immediate attention. Research is crucial to good history, but so too is skillful writing. As Barbara Tuchman, one of the "popularizers" academics denigrate but secretly envy, has noted, "research is endlessly seductive; writing is hard work."¹² Diplomatic historians, more than most, have failed to recognize that research is only the first step in historical writing, it is a beginning, not an end. As Peter Gay warned in *Style in History*: "The house of history...must be not only secure [based on sound research], but handsome as well. Otherwise, though it may stand, neither casual tourist nor cultivated connoisseur will take the trouble to visit."¹³

The dominant research emphasis has resulted in a style of writing diplomatic history that makes the evidence the central focus rather than the prose. Books and articles tend to read as precis of documents rather than literature. Having spent years among the sources, there is an assumption that the documents themselves can structure and carry the argument. As Marc Bloch warned, however, such a procedure is not history and the result ignores the essential duties of the historian to summarize, analyze, and interpret evidence in language that is graceful and understandable.¹⁴ Unfortunately, most diplomatic history consists of lengthy quotations from archival sources linked by brief transitions to the next quote. The process resembles that described by Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff in *The Modern Researcher*: the writer announces what the quote will say; presents the quote; and then summarizes what the quote said. Barzun and Graff note that "to the reader, this is death in triplicate."¹⁵ Quotes, even lengthy ones, are at times essential to convey language, nuance, and personality, but the current over-reliance on quotations is both destructive to style and represents an easy way to avoid the more difficult tasks of summary, paraphrase, selection, and clear writing. Monographs are not edited

documentary collections and sources are just that: a point of origin.

Equally destructive to writing style is the recent intrusion of social science jargon. While diplomatic historians continue to be faulted for ignoring the insights of other disciplines, we have become addicted to their phrases and buzz words. Too often the use of such terms does not lead to clarity and understanding but to confusion and incoherence. It is nearly impossible to read current diplomatic history that is not encumbered with paradigms, structures, political cultures, incremental decision-making models, conceptualizations, policy imperatives, value-maximizing bureaucratic incentives, and the like. As useful as these may be in explaining and understanding foreign relations, they are too often undefined and meaningless to the non-specialist. They confuse rather than enlighten and, like the over-reliance on quotes, represent a form of escape by the writer. They permit the avoidance of the painful process of clear usage and careful word selection by periodically inserting jargon. Those professionals who know the code may nod and read on, but those not fluent in social science merely nod off.

The most sophisticated theory or method may be used as long as it is explained and presented in a way that the reader can understand. Too often this is not the case. For example, McCormick's call for the use of social science theory advocates the adoption of Samuel Hays' "conceptualization of American social structure" by diplomatic historians. McCormick describes this theory as follows:

Its basic premise is that industrialization, urbanization, and bureaucratization created a highly expanded vertical social structure that became ever more differentiated and finely divided; that while there was constant mobility within this expanding vertical structure, mobility did not lead to homogeneity....Hays sees the resultant differentiation in terms of a local-cosmopolitan continuum....The usefulness of this

structural framework, both as an analytical and descriptive tool, is almost boundless for the diplomatic historian.¹⁶

Although it may well be useful, it is far from clear. Professional historians may well read (or re-read) this summary and understand what Hays means, but it is doubtful that students or the public will be as perceptive or as patient. It is even more doubtful that a book or an article that relies on such undefined terminology will capture and hold the attention of the reader. This does not mean that diplomatic historians should ignore the contributions of other disciplines, but it does mean an insistence on making their terms understandable. We can borrow their ideas and methods without becoming a slave to their nomenclature.

American diplomatic historians have taken more than jargon from colleagues in other areas. They have also reacted to the success of the new social history and quantification. Unfortunately, this response has further contributed to the demise of writing quality. Diplomatic history has been especially vulnerable to the attack on traditional history as elitist and preoccupied with assumed important "events." Diplomatic historians usually write about leaders, but the new social history argues that leaders are relatively unimportant. We are generally event-oriented but the new history contends that "the effacement of the event, the negation of its importance and its dissolution" is a central aim of the new approach to the past.¹⁷ Finally, those who write about foreign relations tend to focus on the nation state and its interaction with other nation states while the thrust of the new social history is to move away from nations and political boundaries. They have reversed Voltaire's axiom "happy is the nation that has no history" to assert "happy is the history that has no nation."

Diplomatic history has served as the perfect foil for advocates of the new methodologies. What could be more

obsolete than a discipline that studies the actions of leaders of nation states who shape and respond to events? Reacting to such criticism, and in a frantic attempt to appear up-to-date, diplomatic historians have downplayed the role of individuals, equivocated on the significance of previously assumed important events, and moved away from their focus on the nation state. While understandable and even well-intended, the result has been to drain the lifeblood from their histories. Narrative is out of fashion, the analysis of the individual dismissed as elitist, and the emphasis on the clash of nations deemed provincial. It may well be possible to write non-narrative diplomatic history devoid of individual action and with no reference to nation states, but it is doubtful that it will be of interest to anyone. Narratives of the interaction of leaders, the conflict among nations, and the significance of major events was at the heart of diplomatic history, but are now often abandoned in our fear of being dismissed as old-fashioned. As Weisberger reminds us in a recent review article, "'out there' is an audience that unabashedly yearns for conflicts, characters, villainy, heroism, suspense, beauty, meaning, and verdict—all the narrative elements of which much contemporary academic history is purged."¹⁸ The social historians and the cliometricians have expanded and redefined history and forced historians to examine ingrained assumptions about both subject matter and method. Diplomatic historians can learn a great deal from them, but they can also learn a great deal from us. Diplomatic historians can appreciate and even applaud their efforts without denigrating and discarding their own. Too often, however, we have abdicated rather than acknowledged. By abandoning the essential elements in the history of foreign relations we have produced writing that lacks both purpose and confidence, that is little more than trendy dullness.

The sustained attack on diplomatic history from both within and outside the discipline has led to a final cause of stultification in writing: a lack of confidence. It is natural that a group that has been dismissed as obsolete, denounced as elitist, and condemned as ethnocentric may develop some doubts about its subject matter. Such doubts are evident in its writing. Good prose exudes confidence, a certainty that the subject is important and the conclusions significant. American diplomatic history, however, has become defensive about both its content and its findings. It has become tentative, hedging its insights through qualification and understatement. Any thesis is tempered by overrestraint and any judgments watered down by hesitation. We are uncertain about the importance of what we are doing and it comes through in our writing. Diplomatic history used to nearly swagger with assurance but it now squirms with self-doubt. Can we expect our readers to become engaged, enraged, excited, or delighted when we no longer have confidence in our area or our expertise?

Something or somebody, somewhere, sometime attracted us to the subject of American diplomatic history. Most of us have devoted our lives to its study and many of us to its teaching. We once assumed that it was important and interesting. It still is important and it can again be interesting. What could be more fascinating than the study of decisions that determined war and peace, of leaders who shaped the destiny of the world, of the interplay of politics, opinion, and individuals? Should we apologize because we work in an area of history that people actually care about? Need we defer to the social scientists, social historians, and methodological junkies high on the latest technique? We need not be ashamed of our specialty. We need only to communicate our material in a manner that is equal to its fascination. We need to believe in what we are doing and to do what we believe in. If we believe that American diplomatic history is vital we must show that

belief in our writing. Once we regain the confidence in our material and in our methods we can begin to address the real problem of the discipline: the manner in which we communicate. To write clearly, to write forcefully, to write in a style that transmits the drama and excitement of diplomatic history to the reader is our first imperative. *We* know its importance. *We* know its excitement. We need only convey this to others.

NOTES

¹Christopher Thorne, "After the Europeans: American Designs for the Remaking of Southeast Asia," *Diplomatic History* 12 (Spring 1988): 201-08.

²William Langer, "The Next Assignment," *American Historical Review* 63 (February 1958): 283-304.

³Thomas McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," in *The State of American History*, ed. Herbert Bass (Chicago: 1970): 119-41.

⁴Peter Paret, "Assignments New and Old," *American Historical Review* 76 (February 1971): 119-26.

⁵Laurence Evans, "The Dangers of Diplomatic History" in Bass, 142-56.

⁶Alexander DeConde, *American Diplomatic History in Transformation* (Washington, DC 1976). See also his "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History," *SHAFR Newsletter* 1 (May 1970): 1-16.

⁷Richard W. Leopold, "The History of United States Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," in *The Future of History*, ed. Charles F. Delzell (Nashville: 1977): 231-46.

⁸David Patterson, "What's Wrong (and Right) with American Diplomatic History?" *SHAFR Newsletter* 9 (September 1978): 1-14.

⁹Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY: 1980): 355-87.

¹⁰For discussion of the corporatist approach see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View" and Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Approach," *Diplomatic History* 10 (Fall 1986):

357-72. See also the early discussion of corporatism in Joan Hoff-Wilson, "The Future of American Diplomatic History," *SHAFR Newsletter* 16 (June 1985): 10-21.

¹¹Bernard Weisberger, "American History is Falling Down," *American Heritage* 38 (February-March 1987): 26-32.

¹²Barbara Tuchman, *Practicing History: Selected Essays by Barbara W. Tuchman* (New York: 1981): 21.

¹³Peter Gay, *Style in History* (New York: 1974): 189-90.

¹⁴Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* (New York: 1959): 169.

¹⁵Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graff, *The Modern Researcher* (New York 1985): 340.

¹⁶McCormick, 139-40.

¹⁷Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The New History and the Old* (Cambridge: 1987): 8.

¹⁸Bernard Weisberger, "Past Imperfect: From Clío to Clío, Inc.," *Reviews in American History* 16 (March 1988): 1-7.

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS *SPECIAL NOTICE*

SHAFR has arrangements with ABC-CLIO Inc. to make the *Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700* available to its membership for \$30. Orders must be made through the SHAFR office which will forward them to ABC-CLIO. Make checks for \$30 payable to SHAFR and send them to:

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SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

6 APRIL 1989

ADAM'S MARK

ST. LOUIS

GEORGE HERRING *presiding*

Council members present were: George Herring, Thomas Paterson, Betty Unterberger, and William Kamman; others present were William Brinker, Richard Dean Burns, Edward Crapol, Daniel Helmstadter, Walter LaFeber, Page Putnam Miller, William Slany, William Walker III, and Ralph Weber.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for Promotion of History, distributed to Council a booklet on "Developing a Premier National Institution: A Report From the User Community to the National Archives" and spoke on how to achieve the goal of a premier national institution. She noted that the National Archives does not have enough money to do its archival mission. She asked for assistance from the SHAFR membership to achieve an appropriation of \$150 million for the National Archives (FY '90) and for the National Historical Publications and Records Commissions' grants program. Miller requested that letters be sent to members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government. Miller noted that she had contacted the OMB on the matter and was urging the Archives leadership to push for more money.

Miller also discussed the declassification issue and referred to the letters that SHAFR members from Ohio had written to Senator Glenn. There have been no answers yet but Miller was optimistic that Glenn's office will help in the move toward a systematic declassification policy. Perhaps groups such as SHAFR can help the senator's office in studying the issue. There was discussion of what Congress should do by legislation to push agencies on declassification; perhaps

rumblings from Congress might push agencies in the right direction since they would prefer to work under executive order. Miller noted that the executive order procedure seemed to be going nowhere. It was noted that SHAFR was prepared to help as best it could and that the mechanism would be SHAFR's Committee on Access to Documents chaired by Anna Nelson.

2. William Kamman distributed to Council members copies of a letter from Michael Hogan to Senator John Glenn concerning the delays and declassification problems that hamper publication of the State Department series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Hogan urged Glenn to sponsor hearings to explore weaknesses in present rules governing declassification and publication of documents and offer solutions.

3. Kamman reported on the poll taken of the SHAFR membership concerning the indexing of past issues of *Diplomatic History*. There were 183 responses; 101 supported indexing and would pay up to \$20; 31 would pay up to \$15; and 25 would pay up to \$10; 8 supported an index but would not buy it; 18 did not support indexing. Kamman noted that one respondent believed that all that was needed was an author and title index similar to the one in the final issue of each year's *American Historical Review*. There will be further examination of cost for a report at the summer conference.

4. By letter, Gary Hess, chairman of the finance committee, reported that no further progress had been made on the proposed investment policy. Bonds that had recently matured were reinvested in two-year T-notes through the First National Bank of Akron. Betty Unterberger had been in contact with the Bernaths and noted their concern that the original agreements be followed.

5. Edward Crapol, co-chairman of the program committee, reported on preparations for the summer conference at the College of William and Mary. There will be a reception the first evening and a dinner the second. Dormitory rooms will be air conditioned and priced at \$31 for a single and \$25 for a double. Crapol will send a letter with housing and transportation information in the near future.

6. George Herring announced that the 1990 summer conference would be in August at the University of Maryland. Wayne Cole and Mark Gilderhus will co-chair the program committee.

7. Walter LaFeber, chairman of the Bernath Book Prize Committee, announced that the winner of the 1988 award was Stephen Rabe for his *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988.

8. George Herring reported that Robert J. McMahon had won the Bernath Article Prize for his "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954." *The Journal of American History* 75 (December, 1988): 812-840.

9. Kamman reported that Richard Immerman would be the Bernath Lecturer in 1990.

10. Kamman reported that David Anderson, editor of the Roster and Research List was beginning preparation for a new edition and that it would be published during 1989.

11. Herring announced the following committee appointments:

Carol Petillo (Boston College)—Bernath Book Prize Committee

Duane Tananbaum (Lehman College)—Bernath Article Prize Committee

Linda Killen (Radford)—Bernath Lecture Prize Committee

H. William Brands (Texas A&M)—Bernath Dissertation Award Committee

Marc Gallichio (Villanova)—Holt Prize Committee
Ralph Levering (Davidson College)—Kuehl Prize Committee

12. Herring briefly discussed the recently appointed SHAFR Committee on Access to Documents chaired by Anna Nelson and its concern about the declassification process at the Kennedy Presidential Library. He noted that the committee may have a project for SHAFR to underwrite a document tracing problems of declassification.

Herring voiced concern about the few diplomatic history sections on the OAH program. It was noted that SHAFR's program committee should consider the problem of having diplomatic history sessions on the OAH and AHA programs as well as developing a summer program for the SHAFR conference.

Council adjourned at 9:30 p.m.

**"A RESOLUTION APPROVED BY ACCLAMATION BY
THOSE ATTENDING THE SHAFR LUNCHEON ON
APRIL 8"**

"Resolved, that SHAFR members here assembled in St. Louis this 8th day of April, 1989, speak for the entire organization in commending William Kamman for his service as executive secretary-treasurer. In masterful fashion, he has kept the increasingly complex affairs of our organization in order. His commitment to his task and his efficiency in executing it have set the highest standards. He passes on to his successor an organization that is flourishing in every respect. SHAFR has reaped enormous benefits from his service, and we, its members, thank him for his contributions and for the sacrifices of time and energy they have required."

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY

by

Page Putnam Miller, NCC Director

NCC Presents Testimony on FY'90 Budget

In testimony before Congressional subcommittees, the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History (NCC) has advocated \$150 million in FY'90 for the National Archives. This would include \$8 million for the National Historical Publications and Records Commissions' (NHPRC) grants program, and an additional \$20 million for the National Archives. The Administration's budget calls for only \$122.6 million for the National Archives with zero funding for NHPRC grants.

The NCC member organizations believe that the situation has reached crisis proportions and are thus urging Congress to take a hard look at both the National Archives' responsibilities and its resources. The Archives must:

- 1) determine which records (including electronic records) merit preservation and which should be destroyed—yet the Archives has nominal contact with other federal agencies and provides little support in identifying, scheduling, and transferring records;

- 2) deal with the enormous backlog of inadequately described records—approximately one-third of the records of the National Archives have either no finding aides or inadequate finding aides;

- 3) maintain staff with extensive knowledge of the records—without intimate knowledge of the records, many records can never be identified adequately and used effectively. The size of the National Archives' staff is approximately the

same today as it was in 1976; the Archives is not able to complete its earlier responsibilities and there have been no additional staff to accompany new responsibilities.

In a democratic society, citizens expect the government to preserve records of enduring value and to make them available to the public. The amount of money allocated to archives frequently reflects the level of appreciation of the valuable functions that archives perform. The current budget for the National Archives of 50 cents per capita is simply not adequate for the work that is needed.

The additional resources proposed for the National Archives are just a beginning for addressing many serious inadequacies and does not even deal with the costs of preserving and declassifying an enormous backlog of records. The National Archives is entrusted with the stewardship of federal records of enduring value, both for administrative efficiency and accountability and for the study of American history. This mission merits adequate funding.

GAO Issues Report on FOIA

Over a year ago Representative Glenn English (D-OK) requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) examine the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) operation at the State Department. Since the initiation of the GAO Study, the State Department has hired additional staff to assist with the FOIA operation. Representative Robert E. Wise, Jr. (D-WV), newly elected chair of the House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture, has requested Secretary of State James A. Baker III to advise the subcommittee in 60 days what steps the agency has undertaken to improve its compliance with the FOIA.

Report Released on Electronic Recordkeeping

In February the National Academy of Public Administration presented to the National Archives a report

entitled "The Effects of Electronic Recordkeeping on the Historical Record of the U.S. Government." The report concludes that though federal agencies currently retain policy documents in paper form, "a number of factors are at work that imperil the historical record." While many agencies are involved in information policy, the report makes clear that "the National Archives and Records Administration, as an independent agency, must take the lead and develop a systematic, long-term strategy for electronic records."

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1770s-1990s James K. Libbey

Libbey has succeeded in summarizing the basic economic activities in the long commercial relationship between the United States and Russia.

"It strikes me that we don't have anything like it."

Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University.

"I think it is very good—informative, balanced, thoughtful..."

Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution.

(Spring 1989) \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-35-0], \$12.95 paper [ISBN 0-941690-36-9], \$8.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

AMERICA SEES RED: Anti-Communism in America, 1890s to 1980s. A Guide to Issues & References Peter H. Buckingham.

"I was greatly impressed by the thoroughness of the author's survey of issues, especially in the post-World War II period."

—Professor Robert Griffith, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
240 pages (1987)\$8.75 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion Norman A. Graebner.

Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages. (1983) \$16.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], \$8.75 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

Offer expires September 15, 1989

Individuals only, please

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

165 pages. (1971, 1982) \$7.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$6.00**

THE MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962: A Review of Issues and References. Lester Brune.

"Brune skillfully...scrutinizes the origins of the major issues and analyses the reaction and response of Washington and Moscow, relating them to domestic politics and international affairs....Highly recommended as a brief, analytical review of the crisis situation." —*Choice* (April 1986)

165 pages (1985)\$ 7.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$6.00**

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR NEWSLETTER BACK ISSUES

We have recently received several requests at the *SHAFR Newsletter* for back issues that we are no longer able to supply. We no longer have extra copies of these issues: June 1988, March 1988, March 1987, September 1986, December 1985, June 1985, March 1985, and March 1975. All other issues back to December 1969 (Vol I, No 1) are available in very limited quantities.

CONFERENCE ON THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA:

CALL FOR PAPERS

On the weekend of May 3-6, 1990, the University of Toledo and the Council on Peace Research in History are sponsoring a conference on the Vietnam Antiwar Movement in America. The conference will commemorate the posthumous publication of Charles DeBenedetti's history of the movement as completed by Charles Chatfield, *Ordeal for a Nation: The Antiwar Movement and America, 1955-1975*. For further details, contact Professor William D. Hoover, The University of Toledo, Local Arrangements Chairman. Paper proposals should be sent by September 1, 1989 to:

Professor Mel Small
816 Mackenzie
Dept. of History
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan 48202

CALL FOR PAPERS

Hofstra University will sponsor a conference entitled "Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America," April 19-21, 1990. The conference will deal with the life, career, and presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, The Progressive Era, Roosevelt's family and contemporaries and other topics. A prospectus should be sent by September 15, 1989, completed papers in duplicate due November 1, 1989 with a one-page abstract. Send to:

Laura J. Tringone
Conference Coordinator
Hofstra Cultural Center
Hofstra University
Hempstead, LI, NY 11550
Phone (516)560-5041

NATIONAL REGISTRY FOR THE
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HISTORY

The National Registry for the Bibliography of History, sponsored by the Association for the Bibliography of History, solicits listings of bibliographical projects in progress, in any field of history, by historians/bibliographers in the United States and Canada. This project is designed to reduce possible duplication of projects, and to serve as a medium of information concerning work now in progress. The listing is published each year in *American History: A Bibliographical Review* (Meckler & Co.) and is also circulated to interested publishers from time to time. For information and registration forms, write:

Prof. Thomas T. Helde, Director
National Registry for
the Bibliography of History
Dept. of History
Georgetown University

Washington, DC 20057

THE 1989 GILBERT CHINARD PRIZE

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Society for French Historical Studies and the Institut Francais de Washington for distinguished scholarly books or manuscripts in the history of relations between France and North, Central and South America published by Canadian or American authors during 1989. Historical studies in any area or period are acceptable. The Gilbert Chinard Prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually for a book or manuscript in page-proof. The Institut Francais de Washington funds the Prize and a committee of the Society for French Historical Studies determines the winners. The winners will be announced at the annual conference of the Society for French Historical Studies in the spring of 1990. Deadline for the 1989 award is December 15, and four copies of each entry should be sent to:

Prof. John McV. Haight, Jr.
Chairman, Chinard Prize Committee
Dept. of History
Lehigh University
Maginnes Hall #9
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania 18015

CALENDAR

1989

- June 9-12 The 15th SHAFR Summer Conference at the College of William and Mary. The program chair is Robert McMahon, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- December 27-30 The 104th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in San Francisco. The deadline for proposals has passed.

1990

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1989 Bernath article award.
- January 20 Deadline for the 1989 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.

- March 22-25 The 83rd meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Washington, DC with headquarters at the Washington Hilton.
- April 1 Applications for the H. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- August The 16th SHAFR Summer Conference at the University of Maryland. The co-chairs are Wayne Cole and Mark Gilderhus.

In 1990 the AHA will meet in New York. The program chair is Ronald Walters, The Johns Hopkins University.

The 1991 OAH will meet in Louisville, April 11-14, and the program chairman is Armstead L. Robinson, Carter G. Woodson Institute for Afro-American and African Studies, 1312 Jefferson Park Avenue, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903.

(The AHA will meet in Chicago in 1991. The OAH will meet in Chicago in 1992 and in Anaheim in 1993.)

AWARDS AND PRIZES

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

Description: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of

essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Douglas Little, Dept. of History, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610.

Books may be sent at any time during 1989, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1990.

The award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the March 1990 luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians in Washington.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986	Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987	Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory) James Edward Miller (Department of State)
1988	Michael Hogan (Ohio State)
1989	Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas)

THE STUART L. BERNATH LECTURE PRIZE

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the

American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1990. Nominations should be sent to: Emily Rosenberg, Department of History, MacAlester College, St. Paul, MN 55105.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

Previous Winners

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
- 1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)
- 1990 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)

THE STUART L. BERNATH SCHOLARLY ARTICLE PRIZE

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1989. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1990 to the chairperson of the committee, who for 1990 is: William O. Walker III, Department of History, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH 43015.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in March, 1990, in Washington.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
- 1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)

THE STUART L. BERNATH DISSERTATION FUND

This prize has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
 - (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
 - (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,

- (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,
 - (c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to Dr. Stephen G. Rabe, Humanities Division, Box 830688, University of Texas, Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75083-0688. The deadline is November 1, 1989.

Previous winners:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1985 | Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara) |
| 1986 | Valdina C. Winn (Kansas) & Walter L. Hixon (Colorado) |
| 1987 | Janet M. Manson (Washington State), Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington), W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) & Michael Wala (Hamburg) |
| 1988 | Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford) & Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario) |
| 1989 | Thomas Zeiler (Massachusetts-Amherst) & Russel Van Wyk (North Carolina-Chapel Hill) |

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1989, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1990 to: Frank Costigliola, Dept. of History, Univ. of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

Prior winners:

1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)

1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)

1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Lloyd Ambrosius, Dept. of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Prior winners:

1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

1988 Alexander DeConde (University of California at Santa Barbara)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject

may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1987 and 1988. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1989. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee.

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A
Canada

Harold Josephson
Department of History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 2822

1987 winner: Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)



AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS
NEWSLETTER

NEWS FROM THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATION ONE HUNDRED THIRD ANNUAL
MEETING

*DECEMBER 27-30, 1988
CINCINNATI, OHIO*

I. Panels

"History as Inquiry and Practice" was the theme of the One Hundred Third Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association. The Program Committee sought "to show the status of the profession as an intellectual and practical enterprise." They did indeed. Of particular interest to me and I assume other American-East Asianists were the several panels specifically on A.E.A.R. and those related to American foreign relations and international history. The former category included "Imperial Visions of the Pacific," "Postwar Japan as History," "Asia, the Sorge Spy Ring & World War II," "The Air War Against North Vietnam," "World War II in the Far East: Chennault, China & Air Power," and "Race & International Relations: (which included a presentation by John Dower on 'Japan and the United States')." I thought the panels in the second category offered an even richer banquet of ideas. They reflect the ferment that has become so characteristic of the field of foreign relations and international history in recent years. Three panels in particular stand out in my mind. They are "American Identity & International History: Perceptions of Self and Other in the Twentieth Century" (presenters Mary Sheila McMahon, Beth

Bailey, and David Farber with comment by Robert Brent Toplin), "New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of U.S. Foreign Relations" (presenters John L. Gaddis and Michael H. Hunt with comment by Paul Kennedy and Thomas McCormick) and "Border Crossings: New Perspectives in International History in Honor of Akira Iriye" (presenters Bruce Cumings, Charles S. Maier, and Lloyd Gardner, who read Walter LaFeber's paper). Perhaps they stand out because they were three of the ones I attended! But I wasn't alone. They were all well attended. And for good reason. All of the panelists had important, fresh, and stimulating things to say about our discipline. It is my hope that the papers of the Gaddis-Hunt and Cumings-Maier-LaFeber panels as well as the commentaries will soon find their way into print.

Readers of this newsletter know that one of its editors (I scarcely need to identify him!) has a particular bias in favor of the non-state actors in the history of A.E.A.R. He has argued that in the study of missionaries, students, businessmen, and journalists that we have much to learn from our sister disciplines in the social sciences, particularly from social and cultural anthropology. So I was pleased to attend a panel on "American Identity & International History: Perceptions of Self and Other in the Twentieth Century," in which the panelists Beth Bailey, Mary Sheila McMahan, and David Farber (who are, incidentally, three of Professor Akira Iriye's students) successfully wed anthropological methodology to the history of foreign relations. The yield of their endeavors adds a new richness and thickness to our field of study. We need more studies like those of Farber, Bailey, and McMahan.

(And while we're on the subject of "culture," isn't it time to establish "The Akira Iriye Institute of Advanced Studies of Culture and Foreign Affairs"? And wouldn't the University of Chicago make an ideal location for such an institute?)

Two other panels come to mind that suggest the renewal of our field "as an intellectual and practical enterprise." They are "After Orientalism: The Third World Writes Its Own History" and "History and Policy." Along with the other panels they bear witness, I think, to the renewed intellectual vitality of diplomatic history, its growing self-awareness, and increased methodological sophistication. We have grown much over the past decade or so; much remains to be done.

In a forthcoming issue of the A.E.A.R. *Newsletter*, Dr. Mary Sheila McMahon has promised to write a short bibliographical essay on "Getting Started on Social-Cultural History: A Short Reading List for a Historian of Foreign Relations."

II. A.E.A.R. Committee Meeting

Warren Cohen, chairman of the Program Committee, introduced two new members of the editorial board of the *Newsletter*. They are Dr. Marc Gallicchio of Northwest Missouri State University and Dr. Robert (Bob) McMahon of the University of Florida. In addition, the committee discussed plans for a workshop on American-East Asian relations, the purpose of which is to introduce and attract graduate students to the field.

Others who attended the meeting were Ernest May, Michael Hunt, Nancy B. Tucker, Michael Barnhardt, Waldo Heinrichs, Ron Lilley, and Akira Iriye.

III. *Chung-kuo Liu-Mei li-shih hsueh-hui*

That's the new Chinese students' organization, recently established and incorporated in Massachusetts (August 1987). Its English name is Chinese Historians in the United States (CHUS). As the Chinese title implies it's an academic society (*hsueh-hui*) made up of students and scholars from the People's Republic of China, most of whom are studying in the

social sciences, history, or the humanities. Following in the footsteps of a pre-World War II generation of Chinese students studying in America (*Chung-kuo Liu-Mei hsueh-sheng*), who published such journals as *The Chinese Students' Monthly* and the *Liu-Mei hsueh-sheng chi-pao* [Chinese Students' Quarterly], the present one is publishing the *Chinese Historian*. It is through this publication that they hope to realize their larger goals—fostering the exchange of ideas, promoting cooperation between U.S. and PRC historians and academic institutions, and helping "to create an academic ethos characterized by intellectual creativity and constructiveness among the new generation of Chinese historians and social scientists," many of whom are expected to "play an important role in the course of China's modernization."

CHUS has already held two annual meetings. Its inaugural meeting was held September 5 & 6, 1987 at Columbia University; its second annual meeting was held at Columbia and Lake George between September 2-5, 1988. The meetings featured panel discussions on a wide range of topics and issues, Sino-American relations, pre-1949 Chinese local communities, East-West cultural exchanges and conflicts, and much more. Such meetings, I might add, echo the concerns of an earlier generation of *Liu-Mei*.

The current officers of CHUS are Xi Wang, President (Columbia University); Xin Zhang, Vice-President (University of Chicago), Hong Cheng, Academic Coordinator (UCLA), Chengyang Li, Treasurer (University of Connecticut), and Qiang Zhai, Organizational Coordinator (Ohio University). If you would like to know more about CHUS or make a contribution to its financial health, I suggest you write Mr. Qiang Zhai, Department of History, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701 or call (614)-592-6023.

A parting word: in order to introduce American audiences to the type of research interests and work in which young Chinese historians are engaged, forthcoming issues of the *A.E.A.R. Newsletter* will reprint bibliographical essays from *Chinese Historians*.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

- SPONSOR:** Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.
- EDITOR:** William J. Brinker, Department of History. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Brent W. York, Jay Fain.
- ISSUES:** The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September and December.
- DEADLINES:** All material should be sent to the editor four weeks prior to publication date.
- ADDRESS CHANGES:** Address changes should be sent to:
the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Executive Secretary-Treasurer:
Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.
- BACK ISSUES:** Copies of back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad, \$2.00.
- MATERIALS DESIRED:** Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.
- FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR**
- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
 - 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
 - 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
 - 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
 - 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
 - 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
 - 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
 - 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
 - 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)
 - 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
 - 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
 - 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
 - 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
 - 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
 - 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
 - 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
 - 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
 - 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
 - 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
 - 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
 - 1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
-
-