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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in March or April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath, and are financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in each *Newsletter*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

THE BRADLEY UNIVERSITY BERLIN SEMINAR: 1986-1990

by
Donald G. Stevens
(Kings College)

Since 1981 the Bradley University Berlin Seminar, under the guidance of SHAFR member Professor Lester Brune, has been an effective way to study the differences and similarities between the two Germanies which are now in the process of becoming one. The purpose of this report is to highlight the remarkable degree of change that has occurred in Germany by comparing the seminars of 1986 and 1990. On average, about 35 American professors and several Canadians are selected to attend. Several SHAFR members have been included each time. Except for travel to Germany most expenses are subsidized by foundations and agencies of the two governments. It is a unique opportunity to gain insights into the Cold War, German-American and German-German relations and other aspects of international affairs in Europe. The program emphasizes formal meetings, briefings, and discussions with other people. The seminar exists in several parts. The East German program is divided between six days in various areas of East Germany and six days of formal meetings and discussion sessions in East Berlin. An unrelated six day conference at the European Academy in West Berlin follows, and the program ends with three days in Bonn for briefings at the Foreign Office and meetings with representatives of the major political parties.

The impressions gained in 1986 and 1990 were startlingly different as one would expect. Actually the West German portions of the experience changed the least. As usual the West Berlin segment was held at the European Academy, a comfortable conference center in one of the city's most exclusive neighborhoods. The formal sessions were varied and interesting both times. In 1986 we discussed intra-German and West German-American relations with prominent professors from the Free University of Berlin, the

permanent representative of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a member of the American Mission in Berlin, and a professor from Hungary among others. In 1990 a security advisor from Chancellor Kohl's office, a representative of the French military government in Berlin, a West Berlin journalist, and a Soviet professor from Leningrad were part of the program. On both occasions we had lively sessions with West Berlin political party officials, including the Alternate List or "Greens." This year for the first time a representative of one of the minor political factions from East Berlin was part of the panel.

The complex and often spirited discussions are difficult to characterize. In 1986 many of the issues were familiar and theoretical (arms control and so on). The division of Germany was taken for granted. This year, of course, the collapse of the East German regime, the imminent economic union, and the forthcoming reunification monopolized the seminars. The smug self-assurance, bordering on arrogance, of our West German colleagues was our most vivid impression. Chancellor Kohl had acted, they argued, to stem the flood of refugees from the East. "If we don't bring the Deutsch Mark to them, they will come to the Deutsch Mark," was a frequent refrain. Apprehension about the effects of reunification on East Germany, such as up to 30 percent unemployment, was denied. Any difficulties which might emerge as the process goes forward will be taken care of we were assured. It became an inside joke among us that almost every discussion could be summarized by "no problem."

The major difference in the Bonn portion of the seminar this year was the absence of the Foreign Office briefings which really make that part of the experience worthwhile. The press of fast-breaking events in late June 1990 was given as the reason why we could not be received there, though our collective ego resisted accepting that. The discussions at the foundations (*Stiftungen*) of the three parties and at the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Affairs in Cologne were predictable but informative both times. The free time for relaxation at Bonn and environs was a welcome conclusion to an intense three weeks, but the Bonn days are

the weakest part of the program, salvaged only by the hours at the Foreign Office. Hopefully next year will see a more normal schedule.

Contrasts between the two seminar experiences in East Germany were apparent even at the border crossings. In 1986 we met our East German hosts after passing through Checkpoint Charlie. Allegedly we were the first group of American professors ever to be an "official delegation." Preferential treatment relieved us of the customary form-filing and currency exchanges, but the crossing still took considerable time. Two weeks later our exit was held up for an hour because one of our number had departed the day before and there was an inconsistency on our group visas. In 1990 our East German moderators collected us by bus at our West Berlin hotel. At Checkpoint Charlie our passports were cheerfully collected, quickly stamped, and returned while we remained on the bus. Two weeks later, as we were being taken directly to the Academy in West Berlin, the border official saluted pleasantly and didn't even check our passports. In 1986 we were treated to a special presentation by the Commandant of the East German Border Guard at his Brandenburg Gate office including a slide show on the "anti-Fascist protection barrier" so crude in its propaganda content that even our hosts were embarrassed. This year many of us strolled back and forth unchallenged between the two Berlins at the Brandenburg Gate even though foreigners were still officially forbidden to cross there.

Space forbids detailed exposition of the many contrasts between the two visits, but three issues of interest to historians stand out. First, we were struck by the totality of change at every level of society since 1986 and the degree to which sovereign identity and self-confidence had been replaced by anxiety about the future, mixed with resignation that absorption by the West could not be halted. The GDR has gone from a Socialist Unity Party (SED) dominated society with a militantly separate identity to one where SED, most of its officials at all levels of government, and all of its subsidized employment has been eliminated or replaced. Second, we found the East Germans caught up in a self-induced Orwellian revision or eradication of their own forty-

five year history. This pattern was repeated at all the historical places, museums and memorials we visited. Most of those doing it are historians. Presentations have been changed and museum displays are being modified or even completely discarded. The third and related issue that impressed us is the ease with which so many intellectuals, especially the historians, are making this transition. Sovereignty, the SED, Lenin, indeed much of the memory of the past forty-five years is being discarded with little embarrassment or apology.

The first issue, the magnitude of the change that has occurred, can be illustrated by several examples from the Berlin Seminar. In 1986 our simultaneous translator proudly described her probationary SED membership period and her fears that she could not fulfill the Party's expectations of her. She was with us again this year. The SED was no longer a part of her life, her Party-funded translation office had become an independent cooperative and she was about to spend several months in the United States with her scientist husband. She didn't like the new situation very much, and translating criticisms of the previous regime was often visibly painful, but like most of her colleagues she seemed to be adjusting fairly well. "My whole country is for sale," she complained, as she joyfully bought up soon to be scarce Mongolian vodka, Albanian brandy and every other bargain in sight. Of course, unlike the employment prospects of many of her countrymen, her multilingual skills will remain in demand.

In 1986 an SED-affiliated historian traveled with us and we had many interesting conversations about the Marxist view of past and current affairs. When we met again this year at a social reception in East Berlin, his fortunes had changed dramatically. His was a chilling tale of academic retrenchment which left him as one of 18 survivors at an institute which had employed 400 social scientists. Instead of Marxism we discussed his agency's lack of funding and uncertain future. Our East Berlin accommodations in 1986 were in a College of Economics dormitory which left much to be desired even for academics. This June we were comfortably housed at a hotel formerly owned and operated

by the SED for middle ranking Party officials. West German businessmen and professors had replaced the *nomenklatura*.

The state and local officials we met in 1986 were competent, professional and, of course, ideologically committed. This year it was difficult to find any government officials with real expertise for us to meet. In Weimar, we spent an evening with newly elected local representatives who were well intentioned but hopelessly naive amateurs with little practical understanding of democracy or the mechanics of government.

We found average people like firemen in Dresden, laundrywomen in Wittenburg, policemen in Berlin worried about food, housing, social policy, and employment. Pride in being the most advanced socialist state had given way for most to the realization that they were hopelessly inferior to the West economically. Their ingrained Marxist intellectual framework helps them cope with the changes because they believe "objective factors" can only be analyzed and understood but not altered. In many ways this is a handicap in dealing with Westerners who are conditioned to "make things happen," but this mindset may actually facilitate the difficult adjustments expected in the short term.

Four years ago we visited a huge East Berlin brewery which was supposed to be a showplace socialist industry. The plant was less than modern but we were assured that the obsolete knobs and handles controlling the brewing process were only months away from computerization. We moved on to tour the workers' day care center and medical/dental facility, followed by a pleasant discussion of the socialist work ethic with the plant manager, brewmaster, and selected employees over pastries and free flowing beer. We went back again in 1990. The old knobs and handles were still there, the clinic wasn't mentioned, and most of our time was spent with employee representatives who were desperately trying to cope with changing conditions. Their 3,000 person workforce had just been reduced by 350, soon to be followed by another 750, according to efficiency guidelines provided by West German brewery organizations. Productivity was only 50% that of West German breweries, they conceded, and they talked candidly about worker apathy and inadequate

unemployment safeguards and retraining programs. They had no idea how to involve themselves in decisions about the future of the plant and expected it to be shut down completely by the end of the year. Confidence had been superseded by this repeatedly observed blend of anxiety and resignation. Only the beer was still the same, average in quality but plentiful.

The second striking change was revealed in our visits to the museums and historical sites. Everywhere it seemed history is being revised in preparation for the merger of the two Germanies. In 1986 our guides, interpreters or experts were state or Party employees who presented official versions of events. They proclaimed the identity of a distinct German nation which had successfully implemented an alternative sociopolitical system. Now the Communist state which had employed them is gone and they believe it necessary to make their sites and presentations acceptable to potential patrons. A visit to the Cecilienhof Palace, site of the Potsdam Conference, was a Seminar highlight in 1986. Our guide presented an ideologically charged and grossly distorted version of conference events. The maps in the American room displayed incorrect German boundaries and highlighted the Morgenthau Plan which had been discarded by the Allies long before the conference. In our discussion afterward with members of the Institute for International Relations about Potsdam and the Cold War all criticism of the presentation was rejected. This year the orientation talk was basic, factual, and superficial in detail, though the maps had not been replaced yet. There was no discussion of events afterwards.

This pattern was repeated elsewhere. Those who had formerly embraced an ideologically slanted portrayal of events were no longer being paid by the Communist state. They worried about who would assume financial responsibility for their historic sites, were openly critical of their past presentations, and very candid about the changes they felt free to make. Four years ago at the memorial devoted to the origins of the Social Democratic Party in Eisenach the entire display pointed toward the founding of the German Communist Party and its evolution as the SED after 1945. This year Marx and Lenin were noticeably absent,

and the director cheerfully detailed the display modifications made over several months. Not coincidentally he hoped that the site could become a museum instead of an SED propaganda center, possibly under the aegis of the West German Social Democratic Party, though some additional reinterpretation of party origins would likely be required.

The FRG has assumed responsibility for the Holocaust in the name of all Germans, but the GDR has done the same for anti-Fascism. Several former Nazi concentration camps have been maintained by the GDR as monuments to anti-Fascist political prisoners who were housed there. In 1986 we visited Sachsenhausen camp north of Berlin and endured a presentation by several surviving members of the wartime anti-Fascist movement. The Jewish question was ignored and no one in the GDR would use the word "Nazi," only "Fascist." This year at Buchenwald, near Weimer, we saw the rewriting of history in process. We began with an overview of the structure and history of the camp in a room containing an elaborate model. The director's presentation was factual and straightforward. He even described some of the changes he had incorporated over the previous six months. However, the museum itself had not been modified. From that display it appeared that heroic Communist anti-Fascists spent all of their time conspiring against the Nazis and rescuing Jews and others who happened to end up there. The distortions were crude and amateurish, and unlikely to be there a year from now.

The small museum near Jena devoted to the 1806 battle of that name probably has an uncertain future. The display and battle diorama is one of the best of its kind I have seen, but the whole point was to commemorate Napoleon's defeat of feudalism and Prussian militarism in the name of bourgeois nationalism as part of the transition to Communism. This ideological monument may have made sense in the GDR, but one wonders whether any new state or national government will find value in perpetuating a celebration of one the most inglorious military defeats in German history.

The most troubling change of all is the one underway at the Museum of German History in East Berlin. Almost the

entire main floor is devoted to the post war evolution of the German Democratic Republic and the display is much more informative than propagandistic. The GDR is and will remain part of the history of Germany but we were informed that the entire section is to be dismantled.

Finally, we had to try to understand the behavior and intellectual transformation of historians and political scientists much like ourselves. Are they merely voicing what they had believed all along, or have they discarded true beliefs for the advantage of the moment? Many of us sensed more than a little disingenuousness. Only time will tell if there is any analogy between 1945 post-Nazi and 1990 post-Communist Germany.

We did meet some unreconstructed Marxists. Most were trying to understand the events which began in November 1989 and adjust to the freer environment. One history professor at Jena University complained to us that his students were asking questions, requiring him to revise his lectures for the first time in years. Another observed ruefully, "We tried to remain a big Albania in the middle of Europe." Their explanations cited leadership failures, Stalinist tendencies, poorly timed or planned decisions, defective socialist consciousness in youth seduced by western consumerism, and so on. That the whole system had failed, and it was Lenin who was being discarded seemed beyond their grasp. They will probably find positions in West German universities where their obsolete ideology may continue to retain its fashionable popularity.

Most intellectuals we met in 1990, however, appeared anxious to discard their previous positions, and seemed untroubled by guilt or embarrassment. At our last session in East Berlin a prominent economics professor, now a consultant to several West German banks, delivered a detailed analysis of the economic defects which had contributed to the East German collapse. I felt sorry for one of our East German guides sitting stoically in the back of the room. His four years of doctoral work on energy policy in a planned economy, under this man, had become worthless, but his former professor had successfully moved on to a whole new form of economics.

The opportunity to have been in Germany with the Bradley seminar in 1986 and 1990 under such disparate conditions was a valuable experience. I expect that the seminar next year will be equally exciting under conditions which are different still and I hope Lester Brune will be able to keep the program going. The West Berlin and Bonn segments should not be affected much by reunification, but the former East German portion will probably

be modified. In 1986 the organization which took care of our East German arrangements was safe in its SED subsidy as the GDR-USA Friendship Committee of the GDR League for Friendship Among Peoples. In 1990 it had been reconstructed as the German-North American Society in the GDR, in search of sponsors and funding. Whether it can survive after reunification remains to be seen. In any event, the Bradley Berlin Seminar is a rewarding intellectual experience, it should be supported by SHAFR members, and anyone interested in international affairs who has the opportunity to participate next year will be glad he did.

EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

by
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PREFACE

With the popularity of "Born on the Fourth of July," "Platoon," the "Rambo" sequels, and other pseudo-historical cinematic dramatizations has come a diminished understanding of the policy underpinnings of United States involvement in Vietnam. Hollywood's celluloid "trees" speak so loudly that even scholars—if they be youthful—can be excused if they find locating the "forest" rather difficult. One is tempted to describe evolution of U.S. policy in Vietnam as "continuous" in the statistical sense—that is, for the most part change took place in imperceptibly small increments. It is a worthwhile undertaking, however, to attempt a description which is "discrete" in the statistical sense. Such is the effort of the present work. By identifying distinct, though often subtle, shifts in policy, the hope exists that lessons are more readily extrapolated from this national experience which gnaws, even today, at the spirit of the unabashed patriot and disaffected citizen alike.

INTRODUCTION

From the Far East I send you one single thought, one sole idea, written in red on every beachhead from Australia to Tokyo—'There is no substitute for victory!'

Douglas MacArthur

In 1982, Clark Clifford related on nationwide television that when he took over as Secretary of Defense he asked what our nation's plan was to win the war in Vietnam. Clifford stated that he discovered that we had no plan to win the war, and, consequently, he recommended to the President

that the United States get out of Vietnam.¹ It was not an original thought—many before him had offered similar counsel—but it represented a disillusionment of significant proportions for one of the nation's top officials. Either we had no policy or we had no plan to implement our policy.

This paper traces, in summary fashion, the evolution of American policy and strategy with respect to Vietnam, beginning with the conclusion of World War II and continuing through the ceasefire of January 27, 1973. Emphasis is placed on discerning the clearest statement possible of that policy. The United States rarely acknowledged even a slight shift in policy, even though the means of pursuing policy caused pundits to speculate if, in fact, we had not charted a new course. There were many who concluded that the United States was sending mixed signals. American policy in Southeast Asia underwent significant change over the quarter century from 1947 to 1972. Public announcement of that policy was most frequently stated in the form of principles with which few could argue. The most ambitious iteration of U.S. policy—supporting free people everywhere and containing communism in Southeast Asia—gradually evolved to one of negotiating a face-saving peace and, finally, only a face-saving withdrawal.

Academics and others have long attempted to sort out the difference between such terms as "goals," "objectives," and "policy," not to mention "strategy" and "tactics." In this present effort, every attempt has been made to employ the terms which U.S. leaders and policy-makers themselves chose in assessing the situation at the time. Of necessity, much of this work reads like history, but the investigative thrust remains one of highlighting often subtle shifts in U.S. policy and strategy pertaining to Vietnam.

THE EARLY YEARS, 1946-1954

The Trend Toward Decolonization

By the end of World War II, decolonization was in vogue. The United States, as well as the overwhelming majority of western powers, supported decolonization efforts in countries throughout the world—Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, India and

the Philippines, to name a few. In Southeast Asia, however, we were confronted by an ally who was struggling to bring unity at home while consolidating its former position abroad. France was unique among western powers in not following the anti-colonial trend. France had signed agreements with Ho Chi Minh in March of 1946, that provided for the creation of a Republic of Vietnam as a "free state" within the French Union, with Ho Chi Minh as chief of state, and with its capital in Hanoi. The French would station troops in the north, withdraw them by 1951, and permit a referendum as to whether all of Vietnam would become a unified, independent state within the French Union.² Promptly abandoning this understanding, France established a puppet government in South Vietnam in June 1946. Elections were never held, and the resistance movement led by Ho Chi Minh crystallized. Former President Eisenhower, in his book *Mandate for Change: The White House Years*, estimated that had elections been held in 1950, as much as 80% of the population would have voted for Ho Chi Minh rather than the puppet head of state in the south, the former emperor Bao Dai. This is not to conclude that Ho was benevolent; indeed, he was later to prove himself not unlike his mentor, Josef Stalin, in dealing with those whom he deemed a threat, for whatever reason, to the establishment of the communist society. What Eisenhower's quotation did reflect was the intense disregard in which the French and Bao Dai were held.

Containing Communism in Southeast Asia

One of our earliest statements of policy regarding Southeast Asia was contained in President Truman's message to Congress on March 12, 1947. In that statement Truman concluded that it "must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."³ Truman's inclination to respond to French calls for assistance was abetted by the international climate at the time. If militant communism had remained quiescent during World War II, it was now out of the closet. The fall of nationalist China to Mao Tse Tung's forces—and later the invasion of South Korea—were seen as

evidence of the need to stop communism in its tracks. By 1950, the policy of the United States was clear: contain communism in Southeast Asia. Truman argued that aid to Indochina, routed through the French, was an extension of the Truman Doctrine—to aid countries to resist communist subversion—and cited aid to Greece and Turkey as precedent. The United States committed both dollars and people to the conflict in Southeast Asia; in August 1950, the first 35 American military advisors arrived in Vietnam.⁴

Defeat of the French

By 1954, France's war against Ho's forces, known as the Viet Minh, was going badly. President Eisenhower had taken the position that assistance in the Vietnam conflict should be channelled through the government of South Vietnam directly, a position vigorously opposed by France.⁵ Facing a crisis of immense proportions at Dien Bien Phu, France requested aid from the United States. In formulating American policy during this period Eisenhower had encouraged a full debate among key advisors. Within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, Admiral Radford, was pitted against Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway. The "nays" carried the day, and the United States elected not to intervene on behalf of the French in Vietnam. In reflecting on this policy decision, General Ridgway was to recount in his memoirs:

When the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions, the thing I would be most proud of was the fact that I fought against, and perhaps contributed to preventing, the carrying out of some harebrained tactical schemes which would have cost the lives of some thousands of men. To that list of tragic accidents that fortunately never happened I would add the Indochina intervention.⁶

Our policy in Southeast Asia at this moment was further clarified: no U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

Following the collapse of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva accords of 1954 set the stage for the next phase of our involvement. These accords partitioned Vietnam

at the 17th parallel, with the north to be under Ho's control. Ho slaughtered thousands of innocents and a stream of refugees poured over the 17th parallel. Now Eisenhower was again faced with the precise form that American assistance would take. In tendering aid to President Diem in October 1954, Eisenhower underscored its purpose: "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion of aggression."⁷

The previous month the United States had joined other signatories to the SEATO agreement which guaranteed protection for the states of Indochina against aggression from outside and subversion from within.

THE DEVELOPING YEARS, 1955-1964

The Goal: A Unified, Non-Communist Vietnam

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

John F. Kennedy
Inaugural Address
January 20, 1961

In 1955, it was plain that the Viet Minh had their eyes set on goals that extended beyond the 17th parallel. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated September 9, 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that the use of nuclear weapons would be required if the United States was to avoid being caught up in a long drawn-out war in Southeast Asia.⁸ One year later, on September 5, 1956, the United States policy in mainland Southeast Asia was stated in National Security Council 5612/1, and included "work toward country reunification under non-communist leadership, while providing assistance to 'free Vietnam' in other ways."⁹ At this point, our policy envisioned not only a non-communist south, but also a non-communist North Vietnam.

Disenchantment With the Diem Regime

Ngo Dinh Diem was chief of state in South Vietnam, and his two closest counselors were his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his brother's wife. Nhu was the head of a secret political party in the south, the Can Lao party, and his excesses in putting down opposition among Buddhists and in outlying villages were well documented.¹⁰ These actions served to bring about widespread disenchantment with the Diem regime, even among anti-communist elements in South Vietnam. They also presented the United States with exceedingly difficult choices regarding aid to that country.

In 1961, President Kennedy ordered Maxwell Taylor to determine if, in his view, Vietnamese nationalism could serve as the basis for the "fight against communism."¹¹ Lyndon Johnson was dispatched to Saigon in May 1961, and out of that visit and a subsequent one by Professor Eugene Staley came the United States strategy to "save Vietnam from communism," as Johnson put it at the time.¹² This strategy involved the creation of strategic hamlets throughout the country, to be controlled by forces loyal to the Government of South Vietnam. The U.S. role in the scheme of things now took a decided shift toward military involvement.

U.S. Military Intervention

In October, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended commitment of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia (Laos) to stop infiltration and to protect the Lao-Thai border. In a memorandum to the President in November 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara framed the issue in Southeast Asia as the United States "committing itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism."¹³ McNamara believed this called for the insertion of U.S. troops, and said that more than 200,000 would ultimately be needed. Kennedy demurred, and offered increased aid to Vietnam in exchange for reforms. By 1963, major differences of opinion existed among U.S. officials over our policy toward Southeast Asia. We had gradually increased our

"advisory" presence in Vietnam, and in April 1963, the United States began supporting right-wing forces in Laos via a clandestine Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated airline—Air America. Interesting, and grimly prophetic, were the words of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, neutralist chief of state in Cambodia at that time. Sihanouk praised "American friends...as remarkable organizers, brilliant technicians, and excellent soldiers," but went on to say that we were unrealistic about politics in Southeast Asia. He stated that both South Vietnam and Cambodia were doomed to communist subversion.¹⁴ By this time, U.S. policy had shifted from seeking a non-communist north and south, with no U.S. military intervention, to one which envisioned saving only the south from communism by means of a significant U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia.

Assassination of Diem

By late 1963, opposition to the Diem regime in both Vietnam and the United States reached its zenith. Rumors of a coup persisted. In a cable to General Paul Harkins, head of United States forces in Vietnam, the United States authorized Harkins to make contact with coup planners.¹⁵ Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge recommended backing even an assassination plan, though he counseled that we should not review that portion of the plan. On November 1, 1963, Diem and his brother were assassinated in a successful coup attempt. By this time, confusion permeated several aspects of our policy. In an October 30, 1963, cable from Harkins to Maxwell Taylor, Harkins had said he interpreted our policy as being one in which no initiative was to be taken with regard to overthrow of the Diem regime, while Lodge, he said, believed our policy was one of wanting him overthrown. On November 26, 1963, Lyndon Johnson, then President, ordered plans for increased covert operations against North Vietnam. In December, Secretary McNamara

reported to the President that the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incidents

In a March 1964 address, Secretary McNamara stated that our objectives included denying strategically significant Southeast Asia to communists and providing "in the Vietnam test case that the free world can cope with communist 'wars of liberation.'"¹⁶ Our prestige was now formally on the line. McNamara saw our options as four: withdrawal, neutralization, initiation of action against North Vietnam, and helping South Vietnam win the battle in their own country. The first two options were rejected, the third was placed under study, and the fourth was to represent our primary thrust.¹⁷ In June 1964, Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs William Bundy argued for limited air strikes against North Vietnam, following an "appropriate provocation". That provocation came on July 30, 1964, when North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on the *USS Maddox* in the Gulf of Tonkin. While the record reflects that the North Vietnamese thought they were attacking part of a South Vietnamese clandestine force conducting operations in the north, the United States took the position that this represented a quantum jump in the level of North Vietnamese aggression.¹⁸ On August 7, 1964, the Congress obligingly assented to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave the president authority to take "all necessary steps" to assist South Vietnam or any other member or protocol state of SEATO. The vote was approved unanimously in the House and by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate. In February 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a cable to Maxwell Taylor, gave the go-ahead for "sustained reprisals" against the north. On April 6, 1965, a National Security Action Memorandum changed the mission of United States forces in Southeast Asia to one of active combat, as opposed to an advisory and

perimeter security role. Development of additional U.S. military forces was ordered.

THE MATURE YEARS, 1965-1968

The Strategy of Gradualism

"Tu'n me loose, fo' I kick de natchul stuffin' out'n you," sez
Brer Rabbit, sezee, but de TarBaby, she ain't sayin nothin'.

Joel Chandler Harris
Tales of Uncle Remus

In March 1964, Secretary McNamara had sent a memo to the President advocating a capability to initiate graduated pressure on the North Vietnamese on 30 days notice.⁹ This recommendation was implemented in February 1965, and the United States embarked on a strategy of "gradualism," a move vigorously opposed by the top military advisors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed this strategy and were joined by several distinguished civilian analysts.²⁰ Hanson Baldwin wrote in the *Reporter* that our policy prior to 1965 had been one of trying to win a war without fighting it ourselves. In criticizing "gradualism" he said it would be a case of "too little too late" and would be doomed to failure.²¹ The prevailing counsel in the Administration, however, held that "denying victory" to the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) forces would lead to a solution. At this point, McNamara was of the opinion that a favorable outcome was more likely without, rather than with, a negotiated settlement.²²

U.S. troop strength in Vietnam was increased dramatically in 1965 and 1966, and President Johnson showed increasing irritation with critics who claimed that the United States had no coherent policy in Vietnam. In a March 20, 1965, address, he noted that he had "made the policy statement 47 times." Without being more specific, he noted that the goal was "peaceful progress of people" in that area, and that that goal might require changes in tactics, strategy, equipment and personnel from time to time.²³ A little over a

year later, Ambassador to the United Nations Goldberg outlined specifically our "non-goals" in Southeast Asia. These included a "holy war against communism," creation of an American sphere of influence in Asia, and overthrow of the government of North Vietnam.²⁴

The policy of gradualism was designed to extract an incrementally higher price for each North Vietnamese aggressive act. The enemy was being told to quit in gradually shriller tones. Criticism of this policy came from quarters other than military and civilian analysts. Many sociologists argued that the "behavior" demanded of the North Vietnamese was too broad and unspecified, and that the longer such demands were made the more difficult it would become to achieve our goals, ill-defined though they were.²⁵ Professor Hans Morgenthau noted our "limited bombing" policy and framed the dilemma in these terms: a) we know that bombing North Vietnam risks confrontation with the Chinese and Soviets; b) we do not want confrontation with China and the Soviets; c) we choose to bomb North Vietnam anyway. At this point Professor Morgenthau recalled Winston Churchill's epigram on the occasion of the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War:

First the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; second, he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to comply with three conditions.²⁶

Morgenthau concluded that the only really decisive argument for remaining in Vietnam was that our prestige was on the line.

Micromanagement from the White House

By 1966, direction from Washington of the U.S. effort in Vietnam was not limited to policy and strategy. Individual bombing targets were personally approved by the President of the United States.²⁷ Major General G.L. Myers, Deputy Commander for Air Force Operations in Vietnam, later testified before Congress that we were fighting with "one hand tied behind our back," that lives were lost needlessly,

and that while political restraints were recognized, bombing one, two, or three specifically approved targets at a time instead of a target "system" was folly. General Harold K. Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, testified that the Joint Chiefs recommended against the policy of "gradualism."²⁶ Republicans argued that our strategy in Vietnam meant that the time, place, and means of doing battle were left to the enemy's discretion, since our stated policy was one in which each enemy initiative would be met only by a carefully measured response. Despite intense criticism, however, our strategy remained essentially unchanged through 1967. President Johnson stated that our bombing policy had three objectives: to bring back our fighting men by offering no sanctuary, to impose on North Vietnam a cost for violating its international agreements, and to raise the cost of infiltration.²⁹

Frustration and Despair

By 1968, frustration among U.S. officials had reached an all-time high. Each cessation of the bombing—undertaken as a conciliatory gesture designed to evoke a favorable response from Hanoi—had resulted in stepped-up infiltration levels. Reports from battlefield news correspondents indicated that the feeling of working for a goal was gone. General Westmoreland, for four and one half years the commander of United States forces in Vietnam, stated at a news conference that the war could not be won "in a classic sense—because of our national policy of not expanding the war."³⁰ By August 1968, there had been eight bombing halts. In an August 19, 1968, speech, President Johnson stated that "our objective in Southeast Asia is peace." Peace meant "one man, one vote"; i.e., free elections. In this speech, President Johnson said that the matter of unity could be left to the North and South Vietnamese. He also expressed his view that military victory was beyond the grasp of the enemy.³¹ Three months earlier he had said that the United States had "tried to fight a limited war—not to destroy an enemy, not to win a military victory, but to try...to protect our friends."³² Besieged at home and abroad, President Johnson had signalled a shift in course. By

November 1968, negotiations with the North Vietnamese were underway in Paris. Our policy was clearly to negotiate a face-saving peace.

NEGOTIATION AND WITHDRAWAL, 1969-1973

The Nixon Peace Plan

Now it is not good for the Christian's health
to hustle the Aryan brown.

For the Christian riles, and the Aryan smiles
and he weareth the Christian down.

Rudyard Kipling
Chapter Headings

Refusing to run for office a second time, Johnson turned over the reins of government to Richard Nixon in January, 1969. Nixon's peace plan was announced in a May 14, 1969, speech and involved an eight point proposal calling for mutual withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam, to be verified by an international supervisory body.³³ In July, 1969, Nixon changed General Abrams' (Commander U.S. Forces, Vietnam) orders "to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume full responsibility for security of South Vietnam." This represented a dramatic shift, at least in theory, from the active and aggressive combat role which had characterized our immediate past involvement. A U.S. troop withdrawal timetable was drawn up, with 60,000 of our 540,000 men to be withdrawn by December, 1969. In December, 1969, the House of Representatives voted 333 to 55 to endorse Nixon's peace plan, but members disagreed as to what they were endorsing. Speaker John McCormack thought his vote meant no more than an endorsement of "free elections in Vietnam," while Congressman Jim Wright of Texas saw it as a "statement of unity." The resolution was vague, but, in general, congressmen apparently feared to go on record against a plan for a "just peace in Vietnam."³⁴ President Nixon, in announcing his plan, had said that anything is negotiable except the "right of South Vietnam to determine

their own future." Nixon went on to say that the rate of withdrawal would be contingent upon Hanoi's reaction and Saigon's readiness to take on its own defense. If increased enemy action jeopardized American forces, the United States would take strong measures to deal with it—as a "matter of policy, not threat."

By this time, the United States had received reports that Hanoi had given up on military victory, but was counting on collapse of our will. Accordingly, Nixon's strategy, as analyzed by the *US News and World Report*, consisted of four points: 1) make war less repugnant at home, 2) reduce American casualties, 3) abandon large scale operations, and 4) proceed with Vietnamization (turning over the fight to the South Vietnamese) at full speed. This strategy, according to that view, was designed to convince Hanoi of our staying power so that they would negotiate seriously.³⁵ Our policy was now one which was prepared to endorse neutrality and not insist on a non-communist government, if that was what the people of South Vietnam desired. Nixon had made this point clear in his May 14, 1969 speech, although our "preferred goal," he had stated elsewhere, was to maintain an "independent, non-communist South Vietnam."³⁶

Preferred Versus Alternative Goal

By 1970, we had a "preferred goal" and an alternative goal. The latter appeared to be best defined by our strategy: extricate U.S. forces under honorable terms. Our peace policy had undergone yet another subtle shift: from negotiating an honorable peace to negotiating an honorable withdrawal. Nixon was quoted in 1970 as saying that the United States would "get out of Vietnam come hell or high water."³⁷ In a January 5, 1970, progress report, Nixon announced that enemy infiltration had increased significantly. In the next paragraph of that report he announced an additional withdrawal of 50,000 U.S. troops, repeating the warning that if U.S. troops in South Vietnam were jeopardized he would "not hesitate to take strong and effective measures."³⁸ In April, 1970, the President announced a further withdrawal of 150,000 U.S. troops, while noting increased enemy action in

South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He reiterated his oft-repeated remark about actions to be taken if remaining U.S. troops were jeopardized.³⁹

Mounting Pressure at Home

In 1971, the enemy forces confined most of their actions to "sapper" attacks, of terrorism and small unit engagements. Over a year had passed since North Vietnam or the Viet Cong had initiated a large scale attack. In a nationwide television/radio address, President Nixon announced a plan to leave Vietnam "in a way that gives the South Vietnamese people a reasonable chance to survive as a free people."⁴⁰ There was mounting pressure at home to withdraw U.S. forces subject only to return of the prisoners of war. In signing the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1971, Nixon made a special point of disowning section 601 of that Act which urged him to withdraw U.S. forces subject only to a release of the prisoners of war. On that occasion, he stated that our goal was a negotiated settlement providing for total withdrawal of all foreign forces and a ceasefire throughout Indochina.⁴¹

The 1972 Spring Invasion

In April, 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam. The United States' role in resisting this effort was limited to air and naval strikes. In a May 8, 1972 nationwide television and radio address, President Nixon announced that he had ordered mining of Haiphong harbor and stepped up air and naval strikes against the north. Nixon declared that these strikes would cease if Hanoi agreed to return the prisoners of war and to accept an internationally supervised ceasefire. The United States, he said, would then proceed with complete withdrawal of American forces within four months.⁴²

Events moved swiftly after that. On May 10, four democratic congressmen filed a resolution to impeach the President for "high crimes and misdemeanors" in waging illegal war.⁴³ Also on that date, South Vietnam's President

Thieu declared martial law. All democratic contenders for the Presidential nomination called for a total pullout of U.S. forces in Vietnam. Presidential hopeful Edmund Muskie rejected President Nixon's peace plan before Hanoi had a chance to respond. A Harris poll indicated, meanwhile, that 57% of the American people supported the President's decision to mine the North Vietnamese harbors. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark visited Hanoi and declared that American prisoners of war were getting good food and care and that living conditions "could not be better," a statement which would later be vigorously and passionately disputed by those same returned prisoners. On August 2, 1972, the Senate passed an amendment requiring a pullout of all U.S. forces from Southeast Asia in four months, subject only to the concurrent release of prisoners of war. The resolution was defeated in the House by a vote of 228 to 178.

A Bold Strike

In October, 1972, President Nixon ordered a unilateral halt in the bombing of North Vietnam.⁴⁴ The North Vietnamese did not respond to that gesture of conciliation. It was apparent to the administration that the North Vietnamese were stalling, hoping to force the United States out of South Vietnam without a satisfactory agreement. It was at this point that the United States adopted its boldest strategy of the war. It was a strategy that President Nixon felt would force the North Vietnamese to negotiate seriously, in order that the United States might extricate itself on honorable terms. On December 18, 1972, President Nixon ordered the execution of Operation Linebacker II—massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. For the first time, waves of B-52s, flying round-trip from Guam, conducted air strikes against Hanoi. When Linebacker II terminated twelve days later, the North Vietnamese had completely exhausted their supply of surface-to-air missiles. In the judgment of knowledgeable

military officials, they were effectively rendered defenseless.⁴⁵

Criticism of Nixon's action was shrill on the home front. Ironically, those in closest touch with the North Vietnamese during this time—the American prisoners of war—report that the North Vietnamese considered the war lost at this point.⁴⁶ Sir Robert Thompson, a recognized expert in counter-insurgency warfare and head of the British advisory mission to Vietnam from 1961-1965, notes that after Linebacker II, North Vietnam was at the mercy of the United States and would have accepted any terms. The North Vietnamese indicated their willingness to conclude the conflict and the bombing ceased on December 31, 1972. On January 23, 1973, President Nixon referred to the goals he had set in his May 8, 1972, speech for "peace with honor," and said that all conditions had been met: a) U.S. forces were to leave with honor, b) prisoners of war were to be returned, c) an internationally supervised ceasefire would go into effect, and d) South Vietnam would have the opportunity to determine its own political future.⁴⁷ A ceasefire took effect on January 27, 1973. The United States had lost 8500 planes and helicopters since 1961. The final death toll of U.S. forces was 45,941 killed in combat, 150,303 wounded requiring hospitalization, 1811 missing/captured/interned.⁴⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Know ye not that they which run in a race run all, but one receiveth the prize? So run, that ye may obtain.

I Corinthians 9:24

The Holy Bible

King James Version

In drawing conclusions, there is value in cataloguing a synthesis of the policy, goals and related strategy of the United States in the Vietnam conflict. This appears on the following page:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy/Goal/Strategy</i>
1947	Policy: Support free peoples everywhere resisting subjugation
1950	Policy: Contain communism in Southeast Asia
1954	Strategy: No U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia
1956	Goal: Reunification of North and South Vietnam under non-communist leadership
1961	Policy: Prevent the fall of South Vietnam to communism
1961	Strategy: Direct U.S. military intervention in a defensive role; strategic hamlets
1964	Policy: Treat Vietnam as a test case for resisting communist wars of liberation
1965	Goal: Peaceful progress of Vietnamese people, specifically excluding overthrow of North Vietnamese government
1965	Strategy: U.S. forces assume active combat role; "graduated response" in order to "deny victory" to the enemy
1968	Policy: Negotiate an honorable peace
1969	"Preferred goal:" maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam "Alternative goal:" endorse neutrality
1969	Strategy: Vietnamization
1970	Policy: Negotiate an honorable withdrawal
1971	Goal: Negotiate a ceasefire in Indochina
1972	Strategy: Deliver a strong military blow to the enemy in order to force negotiations

The lack of specificity in our Vietnam goal-setting impeded effective strategy formulation to achieve those goals. In responding to an investigative questionnaire circulated after the conclusion of the war, 91% of the United States Army generals who served in Vietnam identified "defining objectives" as the most needed change in our approach to that conflict.⁴⁹

The strategies required to implement our policy in Southeast Asia were essentially military in nature after 1964.

Yet the advice of the President's military advisors was ignored in deciding on "gradualism"—the key strategy which was to guide our efforts until the December 1972 bombing raids. As one critic noted at the time, "skillfully applied gradualism can hardly fail to nourish a skirmish into a major war."⁵⁰

If the principles which represented our policy in South Vietnam sounded noble, they provided for the participating American soldier and much of the population at home only the vaguest of reasons for our involvement. In armed conflict, objectives are most easily framed in territorial terms; above all, "there is no substitute for victory." The United States' policy and strategy committed us to eschewing these traditional measures of merit in favor of less tangible ends. Ultimately, our only successful strategy—Linebacker II—was applied after our goal had been scaled back to its least ambitious iteration: negotiate a face-saving withdrawal.

Arguably, the outstanding lesson of the Vietnam War is that goals should be realistic and attainable, and that strategies should be specific and designed to achieve unambiguously those goals. The United States' approach to policy and strategy in Vietnam provides an interesting contrast to that of the North Vietnamese. In early 1975, General Duong Van Minh, chief of state of South Vietnam, offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the war in Southeast Asia. Hanoi's response, in the form of a directive to their Southern military command, was a succinct and unambiguous statement which amounted to more than a tactical directive. It was, in fact, a statement of policy governing resolution of the conflict—as seen by Hanoi. Its clarity and lack of ambiguity stand in marked contrast to the position taken by the

United States over the preceding 28 years:

Continue the attack on Saigon according to plan, advancing in the most powerful spirit, liberate and take over the whole city, disarm enemy troops, dissolve the enemy administration at all levels, and thoroughly smash all enemy resistance.⁵¹

EPILOGUE

"...not with a bang but a whimper."

T. S. Eliot

The Hollow Men

The South Vietnamese proved unequal to the task of providing for their own defense. Many reasons can be cited for this, including the action by the United States Congress to appropriate only \$700 million of the \$1 billion authorized for the Defense Assistance Vietnam program. Clearly, this affected the morale of the South Vietnamese. In the end, however, the massive defection in early 1975 of thousands of South Vietnamese troops who placed the perceived safety of their families above their military duties was unquestionably the straw that broke the camel's back.⁵² On the morning of April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese tanks entered downtown Saigon. A North Vietnamese soldier mounted the roof of the palace, lowered the national flag of South Vietnam and raised the standard of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The war was over.

NOTES

- ¹The 26-week television series, "Vietnam", provided insights of various officials on the Vietnam war. For a discussion of the series from a reportorial standpoint, see Grace, Bob, "'Vietnam' 26-week Series Painful but Provides Insight," *Houston Chronicle*, June 11, 1982, p. 11.
- ²For one discussion of United States' policy in Southeast Asia during the late 1940s and 1950s, see *The War in Vietnam* (Wash., D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1967), prepared by the Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee.
- ³See, for example, Nirveen, J., "Vietnam: The Neglected Debate; Reconstruction of our Foreign Policy," *Christian Century*, March 29, 1967, p. 400.
- ⁴See the reference cited in Note 2.
- ⁵McNamara, R.S., "United States Policy in Vietnam," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 13, 1964, pp. 562-570.
- ⁶See Note 2.

⁷See Note 2.

⁸Porter, Gareth, *Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Volume 2*, Stanfordville, New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, Inc., 1979, p. 10.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹For a discussion of President John F. Kennedy's role in Vietnam policy see, for example, Kahin, George McTurnan, and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam*, New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1969.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹³The details of United States policy discussed in this paragraph, including the CIA's "Air America" airline, are not in dispute, and are outlined comprehensively in Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 124ff.

¹⁴"U.S. Reexamines Viet Policy," *Senior Scholastic*, October 18, 1963, p. 18.

¹⁵Details outlined in this paragraph follow Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 187ff.

¹⁶R. S. McNamara, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 569.

¹⁸For these details, see Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 311ff.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 258.

²⁰"Generals vs. Vietnam Strategy," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 6, 1967, p. 114.

²¹Baldwin, H. W., "Vietnam: New Policy in the Making," *Reporter*, August 12, 1965, pp. 16-20.

²²Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

²³Many of the officially cited positions of the administration discussed in this paper are iterated in *Department of State Bulletin* of various dates, hereafter referred to as *DSB*. For this reference, see *DSB*, December 6, 1971, p. 658.

²⁴*DSB*, July 4, 1966, p. 2.

²⁵See, for example, R. Shaplin, "Vietnam: Crisis of Indecision," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967, pp. 95-110.

²⁶Morgenthau, H. J., "Johnson's Dilemma: Alternatives Now in Vietnam," *New Republic*, May 28, 1966, pp. 12-16.

²⁷One discussion of this appears in "Military Experts Tell Why Gradualism Failed in Vietnam," *U.S. News and World Report*, April 29, 1968, pp. 56-58.

²⁸See Note 20.

- ²⁹DSB, March 27, 1967, pp. 514-516.
- ³⁰General Westmoreland's remarks concerning the war are now well known, but were carried at the time of the news conference in "War Without a Goal: Mood of Americans in Vietnam," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 24, 1968, pp. 31-33.
- ³¹This speech of President Johnson appears in its entirety in *Vital Speeches*, September 15, 1968, pp. 712-716.
- ³²DSB, September 20, 1968, pp. 324-328.
- ³³For President Nixon's actions and proposals mentioned in this paragraph, see "Nixon on War: A Plan and a Warning," *Current History*, January 1970, pp. 42-46.
- ³⁴See "No Deliberate Speed: House Resolution Passed to Support the President's Vietnam Policy," *Newsweek*, December 15, 1969, p. 26.
- ³⁵"As U.S. Seeks a New Strategy for Vietnam," *U.S. News and World Report*, September 22, 1969, pp. 37-38.
- ³⁶See Osborner, J., "Doubts About Vietnamization: R. M. Nixon's Messages of December 8 and 15, 1969," *New Republic*, January 3, 1970, pp. 11-12.
- ³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ³⁸DSB, June 5, 1970, pp. 1-2.
- ³⁹DSB, May 11, 1970, pp. 601-604.
- ⁴⁰DSB, April 26, 1971, pp. 537-540.
- ⁴¹DSB, December 6, 1971, p. 658.
- ⁴²DSB, May 29, 1972, pp. 747-750.
- ⁴³For a recap of events discussed in this paragraph, see Knappman, Edward W., *South Vietnam, U.S.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia*, New York: Facts on File, Inc.
- ⁴⁴President Nixon's strategy here is outlined in DSB, June 4, 1973, pp. 715-834.
- ⁴⁵For a discussion of the views of military and civilian officials on this issue, see U.S. Grant Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat*, San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978, pp. 254ff.
- ⁴⁶This information is gleaned from the author's personal conversations with returned Prisoners of War. This view is also documented, along with the observations of Sir Robert Thompson, in U.S. Grant Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-258.
- ⁴⁷Knappman, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
- ⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁴⁹See Kinnard, Douglas, *The War Managers*, Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1977.

⁵⁰See Note 27.

⁵¹Quoted in Duiker, William J., *Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1980.

⁵²For a retrospective discussion of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) collapse after U.S. troop withdrawal, see Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 662-669.

The following remarks were delivered to representatives of SHAFR August 2, 1990, at the University of Maryland.

—Editor

THE DECLASSIFICATION OF RECORDS REMARKS BY THE ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES

*by
Don W. Wilson*

There is an old adage known to all of us: "If it ain't broke don't fix it." But you are painfully aware, as historians of American foreign relations, as I am painfully aware, as Archivist of the United States, that the system is broken and should be fixed.

There are four significant reasons why the system is not functioning properly. First, there is absolute overload; far too many classified documents are being created for the present system to work effectively. Second, agencies of origin declassify too few records before transferring them to the National Archives. Third, agency guidance sometimes fails to provide the Archives with much needed declassification authority. Fourth, the Archives does not have sufficient staff for prompt handling of its reference service, and this includes the declassification workload.

Let me address each issue in detail. Presently, the National Archives accessions 40,000 cubic feet of records annually; of that amount about 40 percent are security classified files. If those accessioned classified records are at least thirty years old they may be declassified, providing the agency of origin has given us declassification guidance.

Suppose we have declassification guidance, then what? Candidly put, we face two formidable hurdles. One, we do not have the manpower, or anywhere near it, to undertake systematic review of all thirty-year-old records coming into our custody. As a consequence, we have piecemeal declassification, meaning we review on demand, Mandatory Review and FOIA.

The second hurdle pertains to the so-called "declassification guidance" issued to us by certain agencies. In point of fact, those certain agencies are not furnishing declassification guidance; it is more accurate to say they are providing "guidance for identification." This means the responsibility of National Archives staff is limited to identifying and removing records, then forwarding those records to the creating agency for declassification review. Our role honestly may be described as clerical, complex sometimes, but clerical.

For records less than thirty years old there is no declassification guidance. This means declassification can occur only in two ways, through Mandatory Review or FOIA. While the number of Mandatory Review cases has remained at comparable levels the past two years (595 in 1988, 565 in 1989) the number of FOIA requests for access has risen sharply (400 requests in 1987, almost 1200 in 1989). Because fully 60 percent of the FOIA requests are for classified documents the National Archives was obliged to create a special unit in order to process these requests within an acceptable time frame.

Maintaining declassification staff has been and remains a problem of enduring dimension. Before an employee can be assigned to declassification duties, he/she must hold a Top Secret clearance, a process that takes from 12 to 15 months. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that some candidates seek out and secure other work during the long waiting period. When this happens, the process must begin anew with another candidate. The story is even more melancholy at the moment, as current budget constraints do not allow us to fill existing declassification vacancies.

The lack of adequate declassification manpower has stifled our expectations. We had expected to review all World War II era and earlier documents before the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor. This will not happen. We had expected to have a database of recently declassified documents. That expectation is only partly realized. We had hoped to undertake significant systematic review before occupying Archives II (it is much cheaper to move declassified material)

but short of a change in law or adoption of a new executive order that will not occur either.

What needs to be done? There are alternative means of declassifying records and we ought to pursue them. Clearly, it will hasten the work if the Archives' authority to declassify is expanded. "Bulk declassification" is a proven and expeditious method; it should be utilized also. (Bulk declassification is the automatic declassification of material of a specific type and age, for example, commercial foreign trade information over thirty years old.) Lastly, the Archives must be permitted to hire more archivists and archive technicians for reference, FOIA processing, and declassification, both in Central Office and in the presidential libraries.

The road ahead is bumpy but I believe we can find the means to get the job done. The present procedures are in disarray; they must be replaced.

SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

*3 August 1990
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland
MICHAEL HUNT presiding*

The meeting opened at 8 a.m. Council members present were Michael Hunt, Gary Hess, John Gimbel, George Herring, Robert Schulzinger, Allan Spetter and J. Samuel Walker. Others present were Lloyd Ambrosius, David Anderson, Kinley Brauer, William Brinker, Wayne Cole, Mark Gilderhus, Milton Gustafson, Daniel Helmstadter, Joan Hoff-Wilson, Richard Hopper, Richard Immerman, Page Miller, Anna Nelson, William Slany, Kenneth Steur, Betty Unterberger and William Walker.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, brought Council up to date on pending legislation dealing with the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Responding to controversy over the U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, inserted in June, 1990, a section in S. 2749 which would give considerable review authority to the Advisory Committee of outside scholars, would put the series on a thirty year timetable, and introduces for the first time in legislation the principle of automatic declassification. Committee staff are continuing to work to refine the legislative language in this portion of the bill. A broad range of Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee, including Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY), have supported these measures.

2. William Z. Slany, Director, Office of the Historian, Department of State, then spoke to Council on difficulties his office has encountered in meeting a 30-year timetable for the FRUS series. Slany assured Council that bound volumes of the FRUS series will be made available to libraries in the Federal Repository System. Slany acknowledged the resolution passed unanimously by the SHAFR Council in December which called for such action. Slany informed

Council that George Herring has been appointed to fill one of two vacancies on the Advisory Committee.

3. George Herring informed Council that the following issues would be brought up in negotiations with Scholarly Resources about a new contract to print *Diplomatic History*: copyright, advertising and promotion, quality control and cost. Council unanimously authorized Herring and President Michael Hunt to discuss the contract with representatives of Scholarly Resources and to pursue other arrangements if a satisfactory agreement is not reached.

4. Betty Unterberger, chair of an ad hoc committee on which Alexander DeConde and Joan Hoff-Wilson serve, reported to Council the terms of two new awards to honor the memory of the late Mrs. Myrna L. Bernath. Council unanimously approved the terms of the awards as follows:

The Myrna L. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense of strategic studies.

The Myrna L. Bernath Research Fellowship

A \$2,500.00 research fellowship awarded every two years for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student.

The above awards are not to be limited to SHAFR members. The awards are to be widely publicized and promoted throughout the historical profession and related fields, and especially among women scholars. Funds for this purpose may be drawn from the endowment.

5. Anna Nelson, chair of the Committee on Documentation, reported to Council about her discussions

with Don Wilson, head of the National Archives, on declassification of government documents. She said there were some indications that the National Archives might support the 30-year timetable on declassification and might constitute an advisory committee on setting priorities for document declassification.

6. Richard Immerman and William Walker recommended to Council that the terms of the Bernath Article Award be amended to include essays appearing in edited books. Council unanimously approved the following new wording for the Bernath Article Award:

Prize competition is open to any article, or essay appearing in an edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1990. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication.

7. William Brinker informed Council that Tennessee Tech is at the maximum level of financial support it can provide for the *Newsletter*. The costs have proven high for mailing copies to members outside the United States. Brinker suggested three possible solutions for Council to consider: reduce the size of the *Newsletter*; require members outside the United States to pay an additional amount for postage; use operating funds to cover some of the *Newsletter* budget.

8. Based on a written recommendation from Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, President Hunt asked Council to approve creation of the Armin Rappaport Journal Fund. Contributions to the fund would be used for operating costs of *Diplomatic History*. Council unanimously approved the request.

8. President Hunt informed Council that he had made the following appointments to committees: Bernath Article (Klaus Schwabe), Bernath Book (Bruce Kuniholm), Bernath Dissertation (Walter Hixson), Bernath Lecture (Kinley Brauer), Kuehl Award (Lester Herring). Hunt also announced that he had nominated Norman Graebner for membership in the Bureau of the International Commission for the History of International Relations. Finally, Hunt informed Council that the following individuals will serve with Sandra Taylor,

chair, as the program committee for the 1991 summer conference: Frederick Marks, Howard Schonberger, Geoffrey Smith and Robert Freeman Smith.

10. Council passed a resolution of thanks for the efforts of Wayne Cole and Mark Gilderhus, co-chairs of the 1990 summer conference.

The meeting adjourned at 9:50 a.m.

NOTE

Richard W. Leopold, William Smith Mason Professor of American History Emeritus at Northwestern University, recipient of the Graebner Award for 1990, has contributed the \$1,000 prize to SHAFR. Prof. Leopold suggested that the money be divided between the Graebner Fund, in honor of Norman and Laura Graebner, and the General Endowment Fund, in honor of the late Warren Kuehl, who played a key role in developing the Endowment to provide financial stability for the Society in its early years.

STUART LOREN BERNATH, PH.D.

by
Dr. Gerald J. Bernath
and
Mrs. Myrna F. Bernath (deceased)

(Stuart L. Bernath, a gifted young scholar in the field of U.S. diplomatic history with a doctorate from the University of California at Santa Barbara, died in 1970 at the age of thirty-one.)

His parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, of Luguna Hills, California, have memorialized their late son's name and record through their support of SHAFR and SHAFR awards.

To some members of SHAFR the name "Stuart L. Bernath" may not have any special significance. It is fitting, therefore, that the membership be made conversant with the career of the young historian whose untimely death precipitated the establishment of the annual awards in his name. The following resume of the younger Bernath's life was written by his parents.)

Stuart Loren Bernath was born on April 10, 1939, at Detroit, Michigan. In 1961 he graduated from the University of California at Santa Barbara. His M.A. was received from Humboldt State College, California, in 1964. Although brief, his career was distinguished. As a candidate for the master's degree, he won the Civil War Round Table Fellowship Award for 1967. While still a Ph.D. candidate, he continued to write extensively and had several articles published. His hallmark was original research in depth in either previously unexplored or superficially studied facets of history. He was never satisfied until he could discover the truth about the background of historical events. Casual statements in books or other publications without adequate proof were unacceptable to him.

He recognized that nations often hid the facts of their own history in order to benefit those in power. When expunging information was in their own selfish best interests, book-burning or alteration of records was employed. Stuart believed that it was, therefore, necessary also to read the publications of other nations, be they neutral, sympathetic, or

adversary. To be an accurate historian, he felt, required "hard detective work." He was convinced, as I. B. Namier said, that "the crowning attainment of historical study" required "an intuitive sense of how things do not happen." Precursory happenings of great events had to be evaluated. In his M.A. and Ph.D. candidacies, his personal notes revealed that Stuart already had the capacity for this type of research. Thus, during his graduate program he was often asked to review books of other historians. In 1968 he received his Ph.D. with distinction from the University of California at Santa Barbara. His professors there, and particularly Dr. Alexander DeConde, were extremely inspirational in their guidance. Earlier, in Stuart's master's program at Humboldt State University, Professor Ralph Roske, then Chairman of the Department of History, took a close, personal interest in directing him along his initial steps in the field of history because, as Dr. Roske said, "I immediately recognized Stuart as the brightest student I had ever taught." Dr. DeConde has expressed similar thoughts.

In February, 1970, the University of California Press published his major work, *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy*. Reviewers unanimously hailed it as a remarkable first book, a masterful account and analysis of an intricate subject. The chief editor of the U. C. Press stated that the book was one of very few that had not received a single adverse review. Because reviews did not start to appear until months after publication, Stuart's critical illness did not allow him to live long enough to see them. Because the book did discuss aspects of maritime law, the Library of Congress has classified the book under International Law. While this may be technically correct, it is also unfortunate because it deprives the general public and even most historians of an opportunity to read a very fascinating book full of action, intrigue, and suspense, as well as a discussion of the treatment of captured neutral subjects. "It is exciting reading," as some newspaper reviewers have noted. As parents, we feel that students of American history would more readily find access to the book and enjoy reading it were it classified under "American History" or "Civil War History." At any rate, *Squall Across*

the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy is considered the authoritative book on the subject of Civil War prize cases. It has, therefore, been quoted extensively by other historians in their own books.

At the request of editors of the *Encyclopedia Americana* he wrote short articles on "Christian Herter" and the "Hay-Pauncefote Treaties." These appeared in the 1970 edition of the work.

In August, 1969, after several months of intensive research on William Randolph Hearst, the Hearst Press, and American foreign relations, 1887-1951, which he calculated could be an extensive five-year project, he was stricken by bone cancer. He had already interviewed several associates of Hearst, and had planned on doing the same with all prominent Hearst contacts while they were still alive. This, in itself, would have been a major work with an approach entirely different from previous books on Hearst. Inquiries from four publishing houses, evidencing great interest in reading the manuscript when completed, were received by him. His topic, encompassing the influence of the Hearst press on U.S. foreign policy, intrigued the publishers.

Notes discovered by his parents suggest that he also had in mind writing several other books. It was also discovered that during the preparing of *Squall Across the Atlantic* for publication Stuart rejected several suggestions of his editor because, as he said, "they altered the precise meaning of my words." His editor acknowledged that Stuart was correct and, consequently, yielded to him. Later we were to learn that his editor had sent a memorandum to the editor-in-chief that Stuart Bernath was "a man deserving special attention because he undoubtedly will be writing many fine books in the next forty years." What a tragedy that his premature death nullified this assessment!

In those years in which he was not engaged in graduate studies, Stuart insisted on earning his own financial way towards his Ph.D. by teaching at the high school in Eureka, California. He had also acted as a teaching assistant in the University of California at Santa Barbara. Subsequently, he taught at Humboldt State University, Arcata, and California State University at Long Beach where he was a serious and

devoted teacher and a promising scholar who seemed destined to become an outstanding historian of American foreign relations.

His life on earth was ended by bone cancer on July 3, 1970, in his parents' home in Beverly Hills, California, at the young age of thirty-one plus three months.

Stuart was a true humanitarian in feeling and actions. He served as an inspiration to his friends and students. He was, for example, instrumental in prevailing upon several of these not to "drop out" of their studies with the result that some subsequently became teachers or entered other professions in a successful way. There was no hesitation on his part to loaning or giving money to students in temporary distress. War, with its death, destruction, and wastefulness, was abhorrent to him. Unaffected, with no trace of conceit, he sought the advice of specialized historians when he thought he had an idea or project he should pursue. If he read an article or a book stating something which Stuart knew was incorrect, he would write a very polite letter to the author pointing out the error. He was invariably thanked in return for pointing out the discrepancy.

"At heart," he said, "I am an artist." In fact, this was true. Though not a professional photographer, his pictures of people, birds, events, and nature have a rare artistic beauty. The only photographic contest he ever entered won him a prize several years ago. He was fond of birds and since childhood had several devoted pets. He was also a lover of fine classical music, and played the Spanish flamenco guitar with remarkable agility. This was a self-learned talent.

Stuart had a desire to become a top-rated historian, as shown by this true event: He was visiting a friend, a former assistant professor in college who had quit teaching to take up the study of law. Stuart asked his friend why he had forsaken the teaching profession. The answer was, "I want to become rich." Stuart responded, "I'm sure you will become a rich lawyer. My intention is to become a famous historian." Thus, his urge and purpose in life were brought to the surface.

In recognition of his outstanding scholarship, the History Department of the University of California at Santa Barbara

had named its annual award for the best essay in history by an undergraduate student "The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize." This was ultimately dropped in deference to the more meaningful prizes set up through the cooperation of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. An essay prize bearing Stuart's name is administered by the History Department of California State University at Long Beach. A major book collection in American Foreign Diplomacy bears Stuart's name at the U.C. Santa Barbara Library. It is constantly being augmented by contributions from historians and other donors, as well as by internal funding. The Library welcomes donations of new and old books to the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Collection. A similar but less extensive collection exists at California State University at Long Beach. A fund for research in the field of Immunology of Cancer has been established at the City of Hope National Medical Center, Duarte, California, in the suburbs of Los Angeles. This fund in Stuart's name is supported by his parents, relatives, friends, former colleagues, and others interested in the ultimate conquest of cancer.

Lastly, there was Stuart's determination to fight his unrelenting, painful disease to the very last moment. He knowingly and willingly submitted himself to dangerous experimental procedures proposed by his oncologists in their hopeful effort to save him from certain death. In their words, "He was one of the bravest men we've ever met."

In view of the fact that Stuart was:

- A young man of character and high ideals;*
- A brilliant, multi-talented individual;*
- A humanitarian who helped others and despised injustices;*
- A devoted teacher who stimulated thinking in his discussions and assignments;*
- A man with a burning desire to excel and ultimately to reach the pinnacle in his chosen field;*
- and*
- A heroic fighter of his disease.*

We, his parents, with great love and unabated sorrow, believe that Stuart, as an exceptional individual, deserves such recognition by memorialization. With the kindly cooperation of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, it is our dearest wish to help younger historians in achieving their own aspirations by inspiring them to reach their utmost capabilities in the field of American Foreign Relations. Towards this goal, we are financing certain prizes and/or other scholarly aids. Stuart would have approved of this, as shown by his own acts during his brief lifetime. Could anything better befit his memory?

**EXCERPT FROM THE
NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR
THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY REPORT**

by
Page Putnam Miller

Legislation on Foreign Relations Series and Declassification Passes. On October 19, the Senate passed S. 3225, a bill establishing procedures to assure a reliable documentary report of major U.S. foreign policy activities through the *Foreign Relations of the United States* historical series. In February Warren Cohen, Chairman of the U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, resigned as chairman because he felt that the committee was not being given access to the information that it needed to make informed judgments about the integrity of the series. Responding to the problems raised by Cohen's resignation, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Chair of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, developed in S. 3225 legislation that would: give considerable review authority to the Advisory Committee of outside scholars; put the series on a thirty-year time table; and introduce, for the first time in legislation, the principle of automatic declassification. S. 3225 specifies that all State Department records over thirty years old will be declassified with the exception of very sensitive information. To assure that the exceptions do not become grounds for large scale withholdings, the legislation provides for the Advisory Committee to review the declassification guidelines and procedures and to review documents that remain classified. The Advisory Committee will report annually their findings to Congress. This bill was cosponsored by the ranking majority and minority members

of both the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees—Senators Pell (D-RI), Helms (R-NC), Boren (D-OK), and Cohen (R-ME). A parallel bill, H.R. 5954, was introduced in the House by Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY) on October 26. The NCC and several of its member organizations passed resolutions on this issue. Copies of organizations' letters and resolutions are printed in the October 19 *Congressional Record*, pages 16288 to 16301. Possibilities for passage early in the next Congress seem good.

PUBLICATIONS

- Jules R. Benjamin (Ithaca College), *A Student's Guide to History*, 5th ed. St. Martin's Press, 1990. ISBN 0-312-03168-8.
- Peter G. Boyle (Univ. of Nottingham), ed., *The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955*. U. of North Carolina Press, 1990. ISBN 0-8078-1910-7, \$24.95
- Peter H. Buckingham (Linfield College), ed., *Woodrow Wilson: A Bibliography of His Times and Presidency*. Scholarly Resources, 1989. ISBN 0-8420-2291-0, \$60.00
- Akira Iriye (Harvard Univ.), *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931*. Reprinted by Imprint Publications, 1990. Paper: ISBN 1-879176-00-9, \$15.95
- Akira Iriye (Harvard Univ.) and Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State Univ.), eds., *American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia, 1931-1949*. Scholarly Resources, 1990. ISBN 0-8420-2347-X, \$40.00
- Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Univ. of Edinburgh), *The CIA and American Democracy*. Yale U. Press, 1989. Now in paper: ISBN 0-300-05017-8, \$14.95
- Manfred Jonas (Union College), *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941*. Reprinted by Imprint Publications, 1990. Paper: ISBN 1-879176-01-7, \$15.95
- Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State Univ.), Denise Artaud, and Mark R. Rubin, eds., *Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-1955*. Scholarly Resources, 1989. ISBN 0-8420-2341-0, \$40.00
- Michael L. Krenn (Univ. of Miami), *U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917-1929*. Scholarly Resources, 1990. ISBN 0-8420-2346-1, \$35.00
- Geir Lundestad (Nobel Institute, Oslo), *The American Empire and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective*. Oxford U. Press, 1990. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-021093-6, \$29.95; paper: ISBN 0-19-021092-8, \$10.95

- Charles S. Maier (Harvard Univ.), *Across the Wall: Revolution and National Reconstruction in Germany*. Princeton U. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-6910-7879-3, \$14.95
- Frederick W. Marks III (Forest Hills, NY), *Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt*. U. of Georgia Press, 1988. Now in paper: ISBN 0-820-30929-X, \$18.00
- Glenn Anthony May (Univ. of Oregon), *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War*. Yale U. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-300-04850-5, \$30.00
- Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut) and Robert McMahon (Florida), eds., *The Origins of the Cold War*, 3rd ed. D.C. Heath, 1991. ISBN 0-669-24445-7, \$8.50
- William B. Pickett (Rose-Hulman Univ.), *Homer E. Capehart: A Senator's Life, 1897-1979*. Indiana U. Press, 1990. ISBN 0-871-95054-5, \$27.95
- Andrew Rotter (Colgate Univ.), *Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology*. St. Martin's Press, 1990. Paper: ISBN 0-312-04529-8.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Hofstra Cultural Center and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute announce a call for papers for a conference entitled **"The United States and Japan in World War II,"** to be held December 5-7, 1991 (the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor), at Hofstra University. The Conference Committee welcomes papers on all aspects of the American and Japanese experience during World War II. A prospectus is requested by February 1, 1991. For information contact:

Laura J. Labenberg,
Conference Coordinator
Hofstra Cultural Center (HCC)
Hofstra University,
Hempstead, NY 11550

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE PUBLISHES CLOSED HEARINGS FROM 1965 ON VIETNAM AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has published volume 17 of its "Historical Series" of executive session transcripts, documenting the beginnings of the break between President Lyndon Johnson and committee chairman J. William Fulbright. Their disagreement started not over Vietnam but over the landing of U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic, ostensibly to protect American lives. After the committee questioned administration witnesses and reviewed cables between Washington and the American embassy in Santo Domingo, it concluded that the administration had exaggerated and misstated its case. Senator Fulbright reported these findings to the Senate in a speech on September 15, 1965, which significantly cooled his relations with the President.

A limited number of the copies of volume 17 are available, at no fee, from:

The Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510.

—Donald A. Ritchie
Associate Historian, US Senate

***ARIZONA HONORS ACADEMY ANNOUNCES ANNUAL
SEMINAR AND 1991 ESSAY CONTEST***

A special \$2,000 first prize, along with free tuition to the Arizona Honors Academy, will be awarded in the 1991 Essay Contest to an undergraduate writing on the subject "Meeting the United States' Greatest National Security Challenges in the Coming Decades." The second and third prize winners will receive free tuition to the Academy. The three prize-winning essays will be judged by a distinguished panel of US government officials, foreign policy experts, and academics. The prize-winning essays will also be published by the Arizona Honors Academy. The deadline for receipt of all applications is February 15, 1991. For more information about the essay contest and an application to the 1991 Arizona Honors Academy, write to:

Arizona Honors Academy,
Box 15033,
NAU,
Flagstaff, Arizona 86011
or call (602) 523-1945.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS CONFERENCE

"Rethinking the Cold War: An Interdisciplinary Conference in Honor of William Appleman Williams" will be held on October 18-20, 1991, at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Papers are invited on all aspects of the Cold War, and are especially encouraged on such topics as the politics of Cold War historiography; the current status of Cold War revisionism; theories, explanations, and models of

the Cold War era; decentering the Cold War: beyond East and West; domestic costs of the cold war and

after; the nuclear threat in the Cold War and after; voices of dissent from the Cold War; Cold War cultural politics; the Cold War as a phase in the history of socialism. The deadline for submission of proposals for papers or entire sessions is March 15, 1991. For additional information or the submission of proposals, please contact one of the following:

Allen Hunter

Havens Center, Room 8117,

Social Science Building

Thomas McCormick

Department of History

Humanities Building

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Madison, WI 53706

MACARTHUR MEMORIAL

"The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots," the eighth and final symposium in a series sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial, the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, and Old Dominion University, will be held on November 7-8, 1991. The symposium is premised upon the assumption that the activities of Occupation personnel at the prefectural and local levels were important in shaping the impact of reform programs. Civilians and service personnel on Military Government Teams were, more likely than not, the face and voice of the Occupation which the Japanese people encountered. It is time that this significant aspect of postwar Japan be seriously and systematically studied. This symposium will initiate such an inquiry. The sponsors seek Japanese and non-Japanese presenters (preferably ones involved with the Occupation) who can address the activities and influence of the Occupation at the grass roots level. Presentation may take the form of formal papers or written recollections. As far as possible, panels will be created with both Japanese and Allied viewpoints represented. Proposals,

accompanied by a resume, should be received by January 31, 1991. Please direct inquiries to:

Director, MacArthur Memorial
MacArthur Square
Norfolk, VA 23510
Phone: (804)441-2965

ENDOWMENT CONTRIBUTORS

The following individuals have made contributions to the SHAFR endowment since a list of contributors was printed in the March 1990 *Newsletter*:

K. Gefell Centola
John Coats
Gary Hess
Lawrence Kaplan
Alexander Kendrick

LIFE MEMBERS

John Harper and Milton Meyer have become life members of SHAFR.

PERSONALS

Manuela Aguilar, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Kansas, has been awarded a grant by the Kennedy Library Foundation in support of her dissertation on US-German cultural diplomacy in the 1960s.

Joan Hoff-Wilson (Indiana Univ.) is serving as co-editor of the *Journal of Women's History*, published three times a year by Indiana University Press.

Douglas Ley has been awarded a one-year position at Colgate.

J. Samuel Walker has received an award, the IEEE Life Members Prize, from the Society for the History of Technology for the best article in the history of electricity in 1989. The article, entitled "Nuclear Power and the Environment: The Atomic Energy Commission and Thermal Pollution, 1965-1971," appeared in the October 1989 issue of *Technology and Culture*.

Mark White, a PhD candidate at Rutgers, has been awarded a grant by the Kennedy Library Foundation in support of his dissertation on the effect of Churchill's influence on JFK as seen in the development of Kennedy Administration policy toward Vietnam.

The Harry Truman Library Institute has recently awarded Dissertation Year Fellowships to **Mary Ann Heiss** (Ohio State Univ.) and **Robert D. Ubraico** (Univ. of Illinois-Urbana).

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

U.S. DIPLOMATS IN EUROPE, 1919-1941. Kenneth Paul Jones, ed.

Essays on Thomas Lamont, Alanson B. Houghton, Owen D. Young, Hugh Gibson, John B. Stetson, Jr. Prentiss Gilbert, George Meessersmith, Claude Bowers, Loy Henderson, Joseph Kennedy.

(1981) cloth \$16.95, paper \$12.95, text \$9.95 **SHAFR Price \$7.00.**

20TH CENTURY LOS ANGELES: Power, Promotion, and Social Conflict. Norman Klein & Martin J. Schiesl, eds.

Essays which concentrate on the hidden Los Angeles: minorities, minority politics, the police, and other institutions.

Cloth \$26.95, paper \$12.95, text \$9.95 **SHAFR Price \$7.00.**

HOOVER AND THE HISTORIANS. Ellis Hawley, et al.

Essays reviewing historian's changing assessment of Hoover and his policies. Alexander DeConde surveys Hoover's foreign policy. (1989)

(1990) Cloth \$17.95, paper \$10.95, text \$9.00. **SHAFR Price \$6.00**

EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion. Norman A. Graebner.

Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages. (1983) \$19.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], \$11.95 pbk, \$9.95 text **SHAFR Price \$7.00**

AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM/CHALLENGE TO LIBERTY. Herbert Hoover

(reprint, 1989). Cloth \$19.95, paper \$11.95, text \$9.95. **SHAFR Price \$7.00**

Offer expires MARCH 15, 1991

Individuals only, please

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

165 pages. (1971, 1982) \$9.25 text SHAFR Price \$6.00

THE MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962: A Review of Issues and References. Lester Brune.

"Brune skillfully...scrutinizes the origins of the major issues and analyses the reaction and response of Washington and Moscow, relating them to domestic politics and international affairs....Highly recommended as a brief, analytical review of the crisis situation." —*Choice* (April 1986)

165 pages (1985) \$ 7.95 text SHAFR Price \$6.00

Jones. <i>U. S. Diplomats</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Klein. <i>20th Century L.A.</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Hawley <i>Hoover</i>	price \$6.00	_____
Graebner <i>Empire on Pacific</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Hoover. <i>Individualism</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Esthus. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	price \$6.00	_____
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CALENDAR

1991

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1990 Bernath article award.
- January 15 Deadline for submissions for 1991 Summer SHAFR panels and proposals.
- January 20 Deadline for the 1990 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1 Applications for the H. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 11-14 The 84th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Louisville with headquarters at the Galt House.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 19-22 The 17th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the George Washington University. Sandra Taylor and William Becker are in charge of the program and

the arrangements, respectively. The deadline for proposals is January 15, 1991.

August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

The OAH will meet in Chicago in 1992. The program co-chairs are Alan Brinkley, CUNY Graduate School, 33 West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036, and Maeva Marcus, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, DC 20543.

The OAH will meet April 15-18, 1993 in Anaheim; April 14-17, 1994 in Atlanta; and March 30-April 2, 1995 in Washington.

The AHA schedule for the next several years is:

December 27-30, 1991—Chicago Hilton

December 27-30, 1992—Washington DC Sheraton and Omni Shoreham hotels.

THERE WILL BE NO DECEMBER 1993 AHA MEETING! The next AHA will be held in January 1994 in a yet-to-be-designated-city. Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.

ABSTRACTS

"A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations," *Journal of American History* 77 (June 1990): 93-180.

Organized and edited by Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut), whose "Introduction" on the transformation of the field begins this symposium, nine brief essays explain different approaches to understanding the history of American foreign relations. The contributors and their subjects are Akira Iriye on "Culture," Michael H. Hunt on "Ideology," Emily S. Rosenberg on "Gender," Thomas J. McCormick on "World Systems," Louis A. Perez, Jr. on

"Dependency," Melvyn P. Leffler on "National Security," Michael J. Hogan on "Corporatism," J. Garry Clifford on "Bureaucratic Politics," and Richard H. Immerman on "Psychology."

Lester H. Brune (Bradley University), "Guns and Butter: The Pre-Korean War Dispute Over Budget Allocations." Focusing on the disagreement between Edwin Nourse and Leon Keyserling, to members of the first Council of Economic Advisers, the Truman Administration's gradual shift from Nourse's belief that a choice had to be made between "guns or butter" and Keyserling's claim that an expanding economy permitted large defense expenditures without sacrificing an increased standard of living is explained. In 1949, when Keyserling gained support from such presidential friends as Dean Acheson and Clark Clifford and persuaded the President, Nourse resigned as CEA Chairman, warning about the dangers of budget deficits and increased funding of "wasteful" defense costs. Keyserling succeeded to the chairmanship. He influenced Truman's Fair Deal proposals and the economic sections of National Security Council resolution 68 which, in April, 1950, asserted that the larger armed forces America needed would not affect living standards or risk the "transformation of the free character of our economy."

Manfred Jonas (Union College), "Immigration and U.S. Policy: The Interwar Period," in Robert W. Tucker, Charles B. Keeley, and Linda Wrigley, eds., *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (1990).

Using the evidence provided by the fight over ratification of the Versailles Treaty, the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the resurgence of isolationism in the 30's, and the subsequent movement towards involvement in World War II, the article contends that the degree of influence exerted by "hyphenate-Americans" on U.S. foreign policy was less than historians have frequently contended.

Edward Schapsmeier (Illinois State University) and Fred Schapsmeier (University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), "Eisenhower and Agricultural Reform: Farm Policy in the Fifties."

The agricultural policy set forth by President Dwight D. Eisenhower is examined and how Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson implemented it through a series of farm programs. The basic goals of the Eisenhower administration were threefold. First, to replace high, rigid price supports with a flexible mechanism that responded to the realities of the domestic marketplace. Second, to eliminate the distortions in production and reduce the accumulation of price-depressing surplus food and fiber held by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Third, through the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (1954) to dispose of stored surpluses held by the government via overseas disposal and the promotion of farm commodity exports. Overall, the Eisenhower administration did reorient farm policy and opened new foreign markets for the export of American farm products.

AWARDS AND PRIZES

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

Description: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Mark Stoler, Dept. of History, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05401.

Books may be sent at any time during 1990, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1991.

The award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians in 1991 in Louisville.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986	Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987	Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory) James Edward Miller (Department of State)
1988	Michael Hogan (Ohio State)
1989	Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas)
1990	Walter Hixson (Akron)

THE STUART L. BERNATH LECTURE PRIZE

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach

the Committee no later than March 1, 1991. Nominations should be sent to: Keith Olson, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

Previous Winners

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
- 1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)
- 1990 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)

THE STUART L. BERNATH SCHOLARLY ARTICLE PRIZE

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1990. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1991 to the chairperson of the committee: Richard Immerman, Department of History, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in 1991 in Louisville.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
- 1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)
- 1989 Robert J. McMahan (Florida)
- 1990 Lester Foltos (Seattle)

THE STUART L. BERNATH DISSERTATION PRIZE

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
 - (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
 - (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,
 - (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,
 - (c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,

- (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$500.
 6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. The deadline is November 1, 1990.

Previous winners:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1985 | Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara) |
| 1986 | Valdina C. Winn (Kansas) & Walter L. Hixson (Colorado) |
| 1987 | Janet M. Manson (Washington State), Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington), W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) & Michael Wala (Hamburg) |
| 1988 | Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford) & Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario) |
| 1989 | Thomas Zeiler (Massachusetts-Amherst) & Russel Van Wyk (North Carolina-Chapel Hill) |
| 1990 | David McFadden (UC-Berkeley) |

THE MYRNA L. BERNATH BOOK PRIZE

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Details will be forthcoming.

THE MYRNA L. BERNATH RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP

A \$2,500.00 research fellowship awarded every two years for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen

from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student. Details will be forthcoming.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1991, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1991 to: Frank Costigliola, Department of History, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

Prior winners:

1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)

1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)

1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Lloyd Ambrosius, Dept. of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Previous winners:

1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

1988 Alexander DeConde (University of California at Santa Barbara)

1990 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern University)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1989 and 1990. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1991. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee.

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A
Canada

Harold Josephson
Department of History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 2822

Previous winners:

- 1987 Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)
1989 Melvin Small (Wayne State University)

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) proudly announces the establishment of the **Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing**. The inaugural prize will be awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered thereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules:

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly

research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher.

Prize \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where it is presented.

For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee.

W. F. Kimball, Chair
19 Larsen Road
Somerset, NJ 08873
Phone: 201-648-5410

M. Giunta, Acting Dir.
NHRPC
Washington, DC
20408

G. C. Herring
Dept. of History
Univ. of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings from their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Brent W. York

ISSUES: The *Newsletter* is published quarterly.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to:

Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad the charge is \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
 - 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
 - 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
 - 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
 - 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
 - 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
 - 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
 - 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
 - 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)
 - 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
 - 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
 - 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
 - 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
 - 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
 - 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
 - 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
 - 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
 - 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
 - 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
 - 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
 - 1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
 - 1989 George Herring (Kentucky)
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