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WILL THE REAL AUTHOR OF CONTAINMENT PLEASE STAND UP: THE STRANGE CASE OF GEORGE KENNAN AND FRANK ROBERTS

by

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“My reputation was made. My voice now carried.”¹ Such was George Kennan’s own response to the since-famous reception of the Long Telegram in Washington in February 1946. On one hand, Kennan noted with glee, the effect “was nothing less than sensational,”² while on the other, he mused, he could not understand the magnitude of its impact after the failure of earlier work to “evoke even the faintest tremble from the bell at which they were aimed.”³ He attributes the unexpected reaction to the fact that Washington’s state of receptivity was strongly aroused, but oddly, has had little to add in explaining his own inspiration of his influential warning

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¹George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), p. 297.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.* Also see David S. McLellan, “Who Fathered Containment? A Discussion,” *International Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (1973), pp. 205-26; Robert L. Messer, “Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternatives of Containment, 1945-1946,” *Diplomatic History*, 1, no. 4 (1977), pp. 297-319; and Richard J. Powers, “Who Fathered Containment?” *International Studies Quarterly*, 15, no. 4 (1971), pp. 526-43.

from Moscow. His silence in the matter, uncharacteristic of the man, is intriguing. The reason may in part be found in the following detailed comparison of the work of Kennan with that of his British counterpart in Moscow, Frank Roberts.

Both Roberts and Kennan shared a strong belief that an inherent fear for national security was at the basis of Soviet policy decisions. The Long Telegram stated that "at the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on a vast exposed plain in a neighbourhood of fierce nomadic peoples."⁴ In a similar view Roberts in Despatch 189 writes: "There is one fundamental factor affecting Soviet Policy dating back to the small beginnings of the Muscovite State: This is the constant striving for security of a state with no natural frontiers and surrounded by enemies National security is in fact at the bottom of Soviet, as of Imperial Russian, policy, and explains much of the high handed behaviour of the Kremlin and many of the suspicions genuinely held there concerning the outside world."⁵ Both diplomats moreover indicated that a lack of Soviet development, compared to the West, added to the insecurity. Robert points out that "even today the Soviet Union, despite its prestige in the world, is more backward than not only Britain or the United States, but than most other European countries."⁶ Kennan, for his part, observed that "as Russia came into contact with the economically advanced West, fear

⁴Kennan's Long Telegram is reprinted in Joseph M. Siracusa, *The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1976), p. 190.

⁵Frank Roberts, Despatch 189, March 17, 1946, FO 371/56763 (Public Record Office, London), p. 1.

⁶*Ibid.*

increased of the more competent, more powerful and more highly organised countries in the area.”⁷

Despatch 189 by Roberts deviates from Kennan’s Long Telegram, in the initial paragraphs, by virtue of the fact that it deals extensively with Britain’s own special relations with Russia. This started on a friendly footing in the mid-sixteenth century and passed through strained relations in the nineteenth century with the Tsarist System, which Britain regarded with the same ideological aversion as the present tyranny. This history was recently culminated by their joint action, based on their mutual hostility to Hitler. By paragraph five however, one finds their views again converging. Both diplomats assess the Soviets’ attitude to the outside world from official Russian sources and acknowledge the strength and success of the party line in a country where such a small percentage of the population are actually members of the Communist Party. Roberts notes “that this attitude is shown in the ideological line laid down for the Soviet public by the Communist Party, since this not only conditions the thinking of the Soviet public but also guides the activities of the Communist parties throughout the world.”⁸ Kennan mentions that “the Party line only represents the thesis which the official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But the party line is binding for outlook and conduct of the people who made up the apparatus of power — and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.”⁹

Roberts then moves on to speak of “the tone of the party propaganda, which particularly on the thoughtful and more

⁷Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 190.

⁸Roberts, 189, p. 2.

⁹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 189.

authoritative publications such as 'Bolshevik,' 'World Economy and Peace,' and 'Party Organisations,' is not only critical of, but hostile to the outside world. The great bulk of information allowed to reach the Soviet public concerning Britain or the United States is mostly contemptuous in tone. These news items are weighted and selected in order to convey the desired impression of a civilization inferior to that of the Soviet Union and containing within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The United States is painted as a land torn with strikes, with an acute negro problem and with the working class exploited by selfish capitalists."¹⁰ Kennan takes a similar tack as shown in the following quotation from the Long Telegram: "All Soviet propaganda beyond the Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive."¹¹ Added to this is the next extract which echoes the sentiment of Roberts, though structured differently: "We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the United States there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure."¹²

In Paragraph Six of Robert's despatch, he speaks of "the Western democracies, weak and disunited though they may be, shown as the main dangers in a continued capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union,...and now that the German and Japanese menace has been removed, the former Allies of the Soviet Union are represented as potential, if not actual

¹⁰Roberts, 189, p. 2.

¹¹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 196.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 195.

enemies.”¹³ Kennan sees a similar fear as one of the basic features of the Soviet post war outlook being put forward by their propaganda machine, adding the “USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no peaceful co-existence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers: ‘In the course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world.’”¹⁴

Both diplomats were then able to continue their pattern of agreements when further delving into these Soviet held beliefs. Roberts relates the understanding “that the capitalist world is however shown as profoundly divided both between the states and within individual states. In fact, in the orthodox Marxist view, these capitalist states are bound to quarrel amongst themselves, more particularly over control of dwindling raw materials and over colonial territories still existing in the world.”¹⁵ Kennan matches this statement with the following: “The Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in the nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and the United States.”¹⁶

The notion that the Soviet fear that they may be exploited to distract attention from internal capitalist problems was agreed

¹³Roberts, 189, p. 2.

¹⁴Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 188.

¹⁵Roberts, 189, p. 2.

¹⁶Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 188.

upon by both men in the following extracts. On the one hand, Kennan states that "internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds; intra-capitalist wars between [the] two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against the socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline towards the later."¹⁷ On the other Roberts observes that "above all there is a danger that some leaders of capitalist society might unite their countries in an attack upon the Soviet Union, if only to distract attention from their own internal problems."¹⁸

As a result of such a possibility both find a unanimous approach in suggesting the practical steps to be taken by the Soviets as a result of the above apprehensions. Kennan described an "internal policy devoted to increasing in every way the strength and prestige of the Soviet state, intensive military industrialization, maximum development of the armed forces, great displays to press outsiders, continued secretiveness about internal matters continued to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in the dark."¹⁹ Roberts, less dramatically, but equally forcefully, covers the same ground. "The Soviet Union must therefore be constantly on her guard, surrounded as she is by enemies. She must build up her industrial potential to the greatest possible extent and maintain a strong military establishment, even in time of peace. She must improve such backward aims in her Air Force and Navy and, above all, catch up with Western Democracies, over the harnessing of atomic energy."²⁰

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 188.

¹⁸Roberts, 189, p. 3.

¹⁹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 191.

²⁰Roberts, 189, p. 3.

At this stage both assessments continue to elaborate on the official party line, which, as Roberts explains, preaches that in "the hostile capitalist world there are many good elements who may gain power and who, in any case, naturally sympathise with the Soviet Union and form of fifth column within individual states."²¹ Kennan repeats this assessment and agrees with Roberts' conclusion, adding "it must be borne in mind that the capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes certainly wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties or certain other elements (not described for factual reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be objectively favourable to interests of the USSR. These elements must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes."²²

Having examined the structure of the Soviet Party line, both Robert's Despatch and the Long Telegram make note that the premise on which it is based is not factual. Roberts points out that "Recent history has shown that the Western democracies, apart from writing against the Soviet Union, contribute all the aid in their power in the common struggle against fascism. Far from wishing to encircle the Soviet Union, Britain and America have made and are still making every effort to increase intercourse between their countries and peoples and those of the Soviet Union and to bring the Soviet Union fully into the world community. They have made concession after concession to encourage such co-operation, but so far with little response."²³ To be compared with these points are the following quotes from Kennan: "Capitalist countries, other

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

²²Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 188.

²³Roberts, 189, p. 3.

than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in a crusade against the USSR....If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion the capitalist world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia."²⁴

In paragraph nine, Roberts poses the question of the identity of the real power brokers in Russia, behind the above propaganda. He suggests that the ultimate decisions are made within the confines of the limited Politburo, "who have complete control of the military machine and of the ubiquitous and immensely powerful system of State security. The natural assumption is that Stalin is, in fact, a dictator as absolute as Hitler in Germany. There is little doubt that the last word rests with him: but we have so often found that views expressed by him in private conversation are belied by subsequent events, that it would seem either that he is exceptionally crafty in dealing with foreign statesmen or that he is himself dependent upon the collective decisions of his colleagues in the Politburo. The explanation may even be deeper in the information or lack of information which reaches him about the outside world."²⁵ The speculation is further increased by his discussion on the possible roles of men such as Malenkov and Beriya as well as the obvious Molotov. The following quote is also particularly relevant when compared directly to the proposals of Kennan. "Some well informed students of the Soviet Union have speculated that there may be a growing circle of ambitious Red army men and industrial executives who knowing nothing of the outside world, are ready to risk a trial strength with their former Allies, in pursuing an adventurous foreign policy."²⁶ In the ensuing paragraph

²⁴Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 189.

²⁵Roberts, 189, p. 3.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 4.

Roberts attempts to assess whether these men actually believe the view presented by the official party line. His comments again bear a striking resemblance to Kennan's words, soon to follow. "It would, I think be safer to assume that brought up in the pure Marxist doctrine from earliest manhood and for the most part ignorant of the outside world, and having no real contacts even with leaders of other nations, they do in fact believe their own dogma."²⁷

Kennan, again for his part, puts forward the idea that collaborators on the party line may be "too ignorant of the outside world...and have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find comforting and convenient to believe."²⁸ He also presents "the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in the Soviet Union actually receives accurate and unbiased information about the outside world."²⁹ He suggests that he is himself "reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of the outside world,"³⁰ and he views the government in terms of a conspiracy within a conspiracy. Unlike Roberts, who logically attempts to follow through the dilemma and place specific names on areas for disquiet, Kennan is quite content to generalise without specifics: "The very disrespect of Russians for the objective truth — indeed their disbelief in its existence — leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another."³¹ Even allowing for such differences in personal approach and analytical skill, the similarities of analysis are striking.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 191.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 191.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 191.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 191.

Roberts and Kennan both come to an agreement as to the problems associated with attempting to approach and the Soviets in the normally accepted diplomatic patterns and conventions. The following is an excerpt from Kennan: "The inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policymakers - the extent to which they are delivered up in their Russia to the good graces of obscure and unknown advisors, whom they never see and cannot influence - this to my mind is the most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand the nature of difficulties encountered here."³² Roberts contributes the following: "However well or ill informed the Kremlin may be on the situation in the outside world, it is certainly incapable of conducting international relations of the give and take, which is normal and indeed essential between other States."³³

The aggressive attitude of the Soviet leaders in international relations is a warning issued by both the British and American diplomats. Kennan notes that "the Russians will participate officially in international organisation where they see the opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting the power of others."³⁴ Roberts views the Soviets as approaching a relationship whereby she "endeavours to extract the maximum advantage for the Soviet Union, if possible without any return and, having obtained what she wants, moves on to her next predetermined move."³⁵

At this point in the comparison it is important to note that the further one moves through Roberts Despatch 189, the

³²*Ibid*, p. 191.

³³Roberts, 189, p. 4.

³⁴Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 192.

³⁵Roberts, 189, p. 4.

more the similarities with Kennan's Long Telegram appear to leap from the pages. However, with this observation one comes to sense of unease that the conclusion may not just be a comparison of contemporary works. One, in fact, may have been its intellectual predecessor. But which?

In paragraphs 14 and 15, Roberts refutes the suggestion that there is much in common between the regime and peoples of Nazi Germany, compared with the current Russian situation. He first concedes that the Russian leadership does believe that "the end justifies the means" and that they are head of "a system chosen to spread throughout the world."³⁶ However he suggests that the apprehension which arises from the above should be mellowed in the light of the following facts. "The peoples of the Soviet Union are not naturally hostile to the outside world, nor eager to dominate other peoples."³⁷ He makes a comparison with "the master race of Germany destined to dominate the world and who fully sympathise with the ruthless and ambitious policies of their leaders."³⁸ By contrast he portrays the Russians as undisciplined and frankly lazy and needing continual motivation to hold their eminence on the world stage.

Kennan, in his telegram, had also been expressing similar apprehensions concerning the Soviets. He too concedes that "the Soviet people are by and large friendly to the outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it the talents they are conscious of possessing, eager, above all, to live in the peace and fruits of their own labour."³⁹ He then proceeds, later in the telegram, with the following

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 189.

thought, which is both relevant to this point of comparison as well as a piece of vital evidence as to whether Kennan was the sole originator of his opinions on the Soviet Union. It is quoted in full for analysis and comparison with Roberts despatch. "Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can easily withdraw - and usually does - when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled, there need be no prestige engaging showdowns."⁴⁰ Surely this was the beginning of the seeds of his containment policy. But the question remains, was Kennan alone in moving along this path?

Further investigation of Roberts suggests otherwise. In paragraph 17 of Despatch 189 he lists five reasons why comparisons of Nazi and Soviet regimes are incompatible. The second point is the most startling: "The rulers of Russia are infinitely more flexible than those of Germany. However much they may be wedded to Marxist doctrine, this allows them considerable latitude in regard to tactics and timing. Whereas the Germans set themselves a definite goal to be achieved within a given time regardless of opposition and changes in the international situation, the Russians are capable

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 195. For Kennan's further refinement of this concept see "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, 25, no. 4 (1947), pp. 566-82. Also see John L. Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," *Foreign Affairs*, 55, no. 4 (1977), pp. 873-87; Eduard M. Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," *Foreign Affairs*, 56, no. 2 (1978), pp. 430-41; and C. Ben Wright, "Mr 'X' and Containment," *Slavic Review*, 35, no. 1 (1976), pp. 1-36.

of re-adjusting their projects if faced with opposition or unexpected difficulties. They do not charge into brick walls even when they have the necessary strength to break them down, but prefer to wait and find some means of either getting round or climbing over the wall."⁴¹ One suspects that Kennan's ticket to immortality, with the suggestion of containment as a policy possibility, should have been jointly shared.

Having assessed the potential of the current Soviet international menace, both men then proceed to examine more directly the internal position and stabilization of the regime in Russia. Roberts notes that "there is no doubt that the present Soviet regime is fully accepted by the overwhelming majority of Soviet peoples. Large sections of the population now have a stake in the regime and all those under 40 know of nothing else."⁴² While sounding a note of caution, Kennan is basically in agreement with the following: "In Russia, the party has now become a great and - for the moment - highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration."⁴³

The depth of Roberts assessment can be seen in the diplomats' individual attempts to estimate the comparative strengths of the Soviet and Western spheres. Kennan bluntly writes: "Gauged against the Western world as a whole, the Soviets are still be far the weaker force."⁴⁴ Roberts, however, includes the following: "the internal position inside the Soviet Union, and in particular, the economic structure, is at present much weaker than might be imagined if one listened only to

⁴¹Roberts, 189, p. 6.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴³Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 196.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 196.

Soviet propaganda....The advent of the atomic bomb has shown that the Soviet military machine is by no means invincible and the rulers of Russia know very well the inadequacy of the Red navy and air forces. They also know that there are strong forces throughout the world - American capitalism, British social democracy and the Catholic Church among them - which would form strong centers of opposition to any attempt by the Soviet Union in the immediate future to dominate the world."⁴⁵

Current Russian national policy is also given a similar overview by both diplomats. Roberts suggests the attitude that "Basically, the Kremlin is now pursuing a Russian policy which does not differ, except in degree from that pursued in the past by Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great or Catherine the Great. But, what would, in other lands, be naked imperialism or power politics, is covered by the more attractive garb of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which in its turn, moulds the approach to world problems of statesmen, whose belief in their own ideology is as profound as that of the Jesuits in their own faith during the Counter Reformation."⁴⁶ Kennan confirms how the Marxist dogma, after the establishment of the Bolsheviks, "became a perfect vehicle for the sense of insecurity with which the bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers were afflicted."⁴⁷ He sees it as "only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement, in which conceptions of offence and defence are inextricably confused. But in the new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than

⁴⁵Roberts, 189, p. 6.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁷Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 190.

ever before."⁴⁸ While the implications of these two extracts are similar, it is a good point on which to comment of their different personalities, approach and writing styles. As can be seen in these and previous quotes, Roberts is succinct and to the point. Kennan is constantly padding the issues with colourful descriptions and theatrical adjectives to stir the plot. Roberts allows his case to rest on the logic of his words and construction of his argument. Kennan wants to make the maximum impact by raising in the reader a wide range of emotions leading to apprehension.

The nature of the Soviets' long term policy goal is also covered in the Despatch and Long Telegram. While they do not follow the same sequence, a selection of points and comparative quotes will illustrate their unity of thought. Roberts, in paragraph 18, describes a Soviet Union making every effort to be the "most powerful state in the world."⁴⁹ This is to be achieved in several ways. Firstly, by maintaining and even modernising its armed forces at a time when other nations were demobilising. Secondly, by basing its search for security as "a constant expanding process" to advance Soviet power into, for example "the domination of Persian Azerbaijan to protect the oil in Baku, which leads on naturally to the domination of Persia as a whole, to the encouragement of a puppet Kurdish republic, to the isolation of Turkey and eventually to infiltration into the whole Arab world."⁵⁰

Kennan, in the first two paragraphs of a section devoted to the Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy, takes a similar stance. He speaks of maximising the armed forces and intensive military industrialization. This is combined with the

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁴⁹Roberts, 189, p. 6.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 6.

following: "efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighbouring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm."⁵¹ As with Roberts, Kennan also goes on to note that Soviet power is advancing in European countries, through the power of increasing Communist Party pressure.

In the same paragraph, Roberts enlarges on "the connected objective to weaken capitalist or social democratic countries in every way."⁵² He mentions from the British point of view, the establishment and encouragement of national liberation fronts throughout the colonial world especially India and also the Middle East. To this he adds Russian attempts to undermine Britain's established position in Western Europe, Greece, Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula. He also notes the following Russian objective. "Everything possible will be done to keep the Americans and ourselves apart."⁵³

Kennan gives a similar dimension to Russian activities on the international stage. It is naturally more general in tone and from the American point of view. The following quotes capture the essence of it. "On the unofficial plan particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken the power and influence of the Western Powers on colonial, backward or dependent peoples. On this level, no holes will be barred. Everything possible will be done to set the major Western Powers against each other."⁵⁴ He mentions specifically that a rift will be encouraged between the British and American camps

⁵¹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 191.

⁵²Roberts, 189, p. 6.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁴Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 191.

as well as with the Continentals. "Where suspicions exist they will be fanned, where not, ignited."⁵⁵

In Roberts, under the same headings, we have the following quote: "Although the Communist International no longer exists, the Communist parties everywhere will be supported and used to further Soviet interests and ultimately to take over the Government."⁵⁶ Kennan also finds "a concealed Comintern (i.e. The Third International) tightly coordinated and directed from Moscow."⁵⁷ Both men concede that the Soviets will also make use of non government international organisations including such groups as Youth Leagues, Women's Organisations, Trade Unions, etc.

In concluding Despatch 189, Roberts offers several assumptions on which to base Britain's decisions with regard to future relations with the Soviets. He presents the Soviet regime as "dynamic and still expanding."⁵⁸ He notes that her long term ambitions are dangerous to vital British interests as presently seen necessary. However, he emphasises "that security is the first consideration with the Soviet Union and that she will not endanger the realisation of her long term projects by pressing immediate issues to the point of serious conflict, except as a result of miscalculation of forces."⁵⁹ He concludes that it is therefore possible, though difficult, to reconcile British and Soviet interests in any problem which they are likely to face, granted the right mixture of strength and patience and avoidance of sabre rattling or the raising of prestige issues.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁵⁶Roberts, 189, p. 7.

⁵⁷Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 193.

⁵⁸Roberts, 189, p. 8.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 8.

Similarly Kennan reviews the Soviet regime as vigorous in character and expansionist by nature. He notes that while with the United States, there can be no permanent "modus vivendi," he believes that the problem is within our power to solve - and that without recourse to any general military conflict.⁶⁰ If situations are properly handled, there need be no prestige engaging showdowns.⁶¹ Kennan also presses for the Western World's need for "cohesion, firmness and vigor."⁶²

A comparison of Roberts Despatch 189 and George Kennan's Long Telegram leaves little doubt on the uncompromisingly similar views shared by both of the British and American diplomats on the assessment of the nature of and direction to be taken by an apparently elusive post war Soviet dictatorship. However this is not the end of the comparison. Frank Roberts wrote a second despatch, No. 190, on the 18th March 1947, to cover what he considered to be the most important question of all - the direction of British Foreign Policy to, allowing for the assessment of the facts presented in Despatch No. 189.

In paragraph 2, Roberts discusses the many approaches which Britain had tried with the Soviet Union since the Revolution. He speaks of "a brief attempt at the beginning of the revolution to work with the new regime in order to keep Russia in the war."⁶³ This he acknowledged failed lamentably. Following this effort was a "period of isolation during which there were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet

⁶⁰Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 195.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁶³Frank Roberts, *Despatch 190*, 18th March 1946, Public Records Office, London, FO 371/56763 0739, p. 1.

Union and the greater part of the outside world.”⁶⁴ He then speaks of it becoming clear “that the Soviet regime had come to stay and diplomatic relations were opened, but it was not until the thirties, when the common German danger brought the Soviet Union into the League of Nations in the pursuit of collective security that anything approaching normality existed between London and Moscow.”⁶⁵ “Then came the German attack upon the Soviet Union, the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 the growth of The Big Three cooperation and...the creation of the United Nations Organisation.”⁶⁶ Roberts speaks of a painfully but slowly improving period of Soviet British relations which was very convenient for the Soviets who achieved the majority of concessions. He adds that “they probably hoped and expected that this would continue after the war, and the present crisis in our relations is largely due to a realisation on both sides that the time for one-sided appeasement and concessions is past.”⁶⁷

By paragraph 3 on the basis of the assessment Roberts prescribes the following: “I would, however, suggest that the first essential is to treat the problem of Anglo-Soviet relations in the same way as major military problems were treated during the war. It calls for the closest coordination of political strategy for a very thorough staff study embracing every aspect of Soviet policy - not forgetting the ubiquitous activities of the Communist parties directed, if not controlled in detail from Moscow.”⁶⁸ It is impossible at this point to resist placing quotes from Kennan’s Long Telegram alongside

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

Roberts' Despatch: "The problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy has every faced and probably the greatest it will every have to face. It should be the point of departure from which our political general staff, working at the present juncture, should proceed. It should be approached with the same thoroughness and care as the solution of a major strategic problem in war and if necessary with no smaller outlay in planning effort."⁶⁹

In paragraph 5 Roberts notes that "Parallel with this should go a campaign to educate the British public with whom all decisions of policy ultimately rest. In the case of other important countries, the British public, or at least influential sections of it, have real knowledge on which to base their judgements. In the case of the Soviet Union alone they are dependent upon either Soviet propaganda or anti-Soviet prejudices which are all equally dangerous counsellors." "In so far as normal contacts do not exist between the Soviet and British publics and are unlikely to be permitted by the Soviet Government, and as even press correspondents in Moscow can only send out news censored by Soviet authorities and already coloured by their own fears, lest frankness might forfeit them a subsequent visa for the Soviet Union, the responsibility for educating the British public must rest with His Majesty's Government and the editors in London to an extent which could be abnormal in dealing with other countries."⁷⁰

Kennan's advice to the Washington administration is again along a similar vein. "We must see that our public is educated to the realities of the Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize the importance of this. The press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on the

⁶⁹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 195.

⁷⁰Roberts, 190, p. 2.

practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by the ugliness of the picture. I am concerned that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if the realities of the situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown....Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we know; and I am concerned we have a better chance of realizing these hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with the Russians are placed entirely on a realistic and matter of fact basis."⁷¹

Again back to Roberts: "The most essential factor in our long term strategy is, however, to ensure that our own country, the Commonwealth, the Colonial Empire and those countries particularly in Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, whose fortunes are so closely bound up with ours, should be healthy political and economic organisers pursuing progressive policies, raising the standard of being of their peoples and removing the causes of social strife. At the same time we can offer civil and personal liberties which are unknown in the Soviet Union and would be the enemy of its inhabitants. In fact we should act as the champion of a dynamic and progressive faith and a way of life with an appeal to the world at least as great as that of the Communist system of the Kremlin."⁷²

In the Long Telegram, Kennan also presses the need for an internal strength in American society to meet the Soviet challenge: "Much depends on the health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like a malignant parasite which only feeds on diseased tissue. This is the point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve the internal problems of our own

⁷¹Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 196.

⁷²Roberts, 190, p. 2.

society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow, worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiques." "We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign people, in Europe at least are tired and frightened by experiences of the past and are less interested in abstract than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than the Russians to give them this. And unless we do, the Russians certainly will."⁷³

In the closing paragraphs of his Despatch, Roberts turns his attention to tactics rather than strategy. The opinions that he expresses are notable, not just for their decisive and logical approach but also for the fact that they permeate Kennan's Long Telegram. Roberts notes that "the day has also long gone when we might hope by unilateral gestures or concessions on our side gradually to influence Soviet policy and so to inspire similar gestures and concessions from the Soviet side. In dealing with the Soviet Union as indeed with the Old Russian Empire we should base ourselves firmly on the principle of reciprocity and give nothing unless we receive a counter-advantage in return. This in turn implies great firmness in dealing with big matters and small alike, coupled, however, with a friendly approach with perfect politeness and with formal correctness, which we may no longer consider necessary in our dealings with other countries in this democratic age." "In all our dealings with the Soviet Union we should certainly bear in mind the absolute need for earning and maintaining respect. This means that we must be strong

⁷³Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 197.

and look strong. But this strength should never be paraded unnecessarily and it should always take account of Soviet susceptibilities and prestige. Above all we should never rattle the sabre and make it difficult for the Russians to climb down without loss of face."⁷⁴

The following quotes come from Kennan's report. While the wording naturally varies considerably the sentiment and emphasis are clearly recognisable. "Our final step must be to apprehend and recognise for what it is the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with the same courage, detachment, objectivity and the same determination, not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which the doctor studies the unruly and unreasonable individual."⁷⁵ "We must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society"⁷⁶ and "if situations are properly handled there need be no prestige engaging showdowns."⁷⁷ Just as with Roberts, Kennan sees relations with the Soviet Union best conducted within formal guidelines. He notes that "Soviet official relations will take what might be called a 'correct' course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on the prestige of the Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol, as distinct from good manners."⁷⁸

Having noted the undeniable similarity between the analyses of both Kennan and Roberts, I wrote to each of them for an explanation of their professional relationship. The reply from

⁷⁴Roberts, 190, p. 2.

⁷⁵Kennan, Long Telegram, p. 196.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 197.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 193.

Frank Roberts is dated the 4th June 1980, and was written from his retirement home at Kensington Court Palace. Roberts acknowledges that "We were for long periods in charge of our respective Embassies during the last months of the war and the difficult year or so afterwards."⁷⁹ Roberts also notes graciously that he had already seen Kennan's reply to my query and gently attempts to defer any innuendo with the following: "My background in diplomacy had been more concerned with Germany, and Europe generally, from Poland to Spain, and I therefore benefitted greatly from George Kennan's profound knowledge of Russia and the Soviet System."⁸⁰ Robert's correspondence is relaxed and in parts non-committal - in the best diplomatic sense. He writes "that I learned to respect very highly George Kennan's courage and character, as I have always done since, even though we may not always have seen eye to eye on every development of the German question."⁸¹ Significantly, Roberts points specifically to areas of incompatibility of ideas as being outside the Russian sphere, giving the answer wrapped in the guise of understatement.

Clearly, Roberts' letter provides a clue to the important question of overlap in attitudes within their respective areas of diplomatic expertise. "We were working very closely together as were our governments at the time - we took a very similar view of the problem affecting Soviet relations with the West and we gave similar advise to our respective governments."⁸² This section bears a startling similarity to the correspondence from Kennan. In fact Roberts places the last

⁷⁹Frank Roberts, Letter to J. Siracusa, 4th June, 1980.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 2.

section in inverted commas and makes the point that his “reply can only echo the nice letter he [Kennan] sent to you.”⁸³ The style and content of this letter are measured and relaxed in striking contrast to Kennan’s letter, where the sharpness of the tone merely accentuates his defensive and at times aggressive response to the mere suggestion of a collaboration theory.

The correspondence from Kennan is dated earlier on the 17th March 1980 and was written at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. It must be noted that Kennan’s tone was in part most probably indirectly attributed to the fact that he had clearly been sent the initial letter and was at the distinct disadvantage of wondering what Frank Roberts’ reply would encompass. Unlike Roberts, who describes it as a “rewarding relationship in my diplomatic career,”⁸⁴ Kennan says, “I can say only that we were opposite numbers in the British and American Embassies at Moscow in the 1945-46 period, as I remember it, and had many occasions to consult about the problems of the respective relationships of our two governments with the Soviet Union.”⁸⁵ While Kennan does go on to comment on a good friendship, it seems unusual that he would not have confidently remembered Roberts’ official position in Moscow. This was a vital period in Kennan’s life - a turning point - yet he strangely infers that Roberts’ position, at times in charge of the British Embassy, was inconsequential. The mystery surrounding this response is strengthened with the next sentence in Kennan’s correspondence, “We were, and are, good friends, and I have always

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸⁵George Kennan, *Letter to J. Siracusa 17th March, 1980*, p. 1.

had high respect for him.”⁸⁶ This tactic appears representative of Kennan’s “Memoirs” in which a certain ambiguity dominates. In any case, Kennan’s letter confirms this assessment of Kennan’s ambitious nature and his obvious determination not to let hard won fame slip away. He states, “In our discussions of Soviet policy and behaviour, I fear, to my shame, that I did most of the talking and he most of the listening....I do not recall seeing any of his despatches from that period.”⁸⁷ This latter point may well be totally accurate but also irrelevant. This paper argues that there was a planned and directed sounding board action between colleagues, not an espionage network between the two Embassies.

Kennan, however, in one sentence, confirms the basic similarities between the Long Telegram and Roberts’ Despatches to London. “I had the impression that we took a familiar view of things in most respects; I can, in fact, recall no differences of opinion with him.”⁸⁸ He further comments that they faced, “after all, almost identically the same problems and reacted similarly to them.”⁸⁹ This could but be viewed as a truly wonderful coincidence and certainly extremely convenient for the beleaguered British. After such a concession Kennan then reacts abruptly and attempts to modify the implications of his statements with the following. “But I would not like to attribute to him all the views I then held. I am sure there were some about which he had his reservations.”⁹⁰ What an important admission. Kennan himself

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1.

confirms that *all* his views were not to be attributed to Roberts. This undoubtedly was true - in fact it was just the majority of them!

These letters indicate that beyond question there was considerable contact and obvious discussion between the two men. Kennan is unable to deny this and has taken the tack that he was the dominant colleague and also originator of the views passed on to Washington. The Long Telegram and Roberts' Despatch do not reflect this superiority nor the fact that the similarities were merely a result of being thrashed out and moulded in the same diplomatic circumstances. Chance did not play an overly large part in Kennan's progress through life - and the Long Telegram was not one of those exceptional occasions.

Finally, the last question to be addressed is why the British would waste their time with Kennan if his frustrations on not getting through to Washington were justified? The British were, in fact, well aware that Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to Moscow, was in accord with Kennan's concerns. David Mayers has argued correctly that "although not fully appreciated by Kennan at the time, Harriman, whose issues carried weight in Washington, effectively presented his view there."⁹¹ The influence of Roberts, as the British were well aware, was having its impact even before the Long Telegram.

⁹¹David Mayers, *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of United States Foreign Policy* (New York, 1988), p. 98. Harriman thought so, too. Interview with W. Averell Harriman, Georgetown, Washington, DC, April 25, 1977.

THE AUGUST, 1990, INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC
CONFERENCE ON THE OPIUM WAR:
AN EVALUATION

by

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Between August 27 and 29, 1990, I participated in the International Academic Discussion Conference on the Opium War, held in Beijing, People's Republic of China (hereafter "PRC"). My evaluation of the conference falls into three parts. Part One concerns the political context in which this and other well-publicized events have been held in China in the wake of the June 4, 1989, Tien An Men Square massacre of Chinese students. Since June 4 China has made frenetic efforts to salvage, maintain, and strengthen international ties. Part Two will be a summation of the conference itself and its

*Copyright 1990, Jonathan Goldstein. Used here with the author's permission. This paper was prepared for December 29, 1990, delivery to the Keechong Society, a Boston-based association of historians and businessmen interested in nineteenth-century Sino-Western trade.

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For additional viewpoints on the academic climate in China, for American scholars and for the Chinese themselves, see Kandice Hauf, "Research in China After Tiananmen," China Update no. 3 (December 1990), pp. 21-22; "The Academic Climate in China: Views of Recent Visits," China Exchange News 18, no. 2 (June 1990), pp. 3-6; and Paul A. Cohen and Merle Goldman, "Modern History," in Anne F. Thurston and Jason H. Parker, eds., Humanistic and Social Science Research in China: Recent History and Future Prospects (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1980).

adherence to traditional Marxist-Leninist analysis of the Opium War. I will only briefly trace that analysis here since as long ago as 1964 John King Fairbank, Hsin-pao Chang and others provided Westerners with lengthy and readily available explications of it.¹ Part Three covers some new things I learned about Chinese historiography of the Opium War, the conditions under which PRC historians labor, and possible assistance scholars in the West can furnish to Chinese historians.

1. The Political Context in Which This Conference Was Held

Since the events of June 4, China has been isolated. The United States and France almost immediately embargoed military shipments to China. France refused to reappoint her ambassador to China and briefly sponsored an offshore dissident radio station. The European Community imposed economic sanctions. While some of these measures were relaxed by December, 1990, in the period from June 4, 1989 through December, 1990, China vigorously attempted to combat her isolation by extending an outstretched hand to almost anyone, including sworn enemies. China accelerated ties with once-vilified compatriots from Taiwan. In August, 1990, Republic of China tourists appeared to constitute the major foreign clientele in Beijing hotels, the Forbidden City, the Ming Tombs, the Great Wall at Badaling, and the newly-opened cable-car-accessible section of the Wall at Mutianyu. The second largest group of visitors I saw were Chinese from Singapore and Indonesia, with which countries China has just established diplomatic relations. Years of official animosity toward those two Southeast Asian nations evaporated in the

¹See, for example, John K. Fairbank's preface to Hsin-pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*. (New York: Norton, 1970 [1964]).

wake of China's post-June 4 isolation. Even Israel, whose existence has never been recognized by China, was in June 1990 permitted to open a Beijing liaison office. There is a Chinese counterpart in Tel Aviv. As of September, 1990, fifteen PRC students are learning Hebrew in Jerusalem and five Israelis study Chinese in Chengdu, all under official host-government sponsorship.²

In addition to accelerating state-to-state relations, the PRC sponsored a whirlwind of special international gatherings. In September, 1990, Beijing hosted the Pan-Asian Games with significant Taiwan and overseas Chinese representation. During August and September Chinese- and English-language banners crisscrossed Beijing streets proclaiming "Asian Games Honor the Motherland and Overseas Chinese," the latter group presumably sharing the financial burden. In October China hosted an international conference commemorating the ninetieth anniversary of the Boxer Rebellion. In December the PRC sponsored an international symposium honoring the ninety-fifth birthday of philosopher Fung Yulan. The Chinese leadership overlooked hardly any major anniversary that could be turned into an international media event. While each of these events also had an intrinsic significance, one should bear in mind *New York Times* Beijing correspondent Sheryl WuDunn's conclusion that elaborate preparations especially for the Pan-Asian Games "were intended to dispel the shadow of the June 4 crackdown."³

²"Israel-China Ties," *The Jewish Advocate* (Boston) December 27, 1990, p. 15; *The Jerusalem Post*, September 19, October 2 and November 16, 1989; March 28, May 17, June 14 and 17, December 19 and 20, 1990; *Washington Post*, December 15, 1989; interviews with Yoseph Shalhevet, Director, and Yoel Guilatt, Deputy Director, Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities Liaison Office, Beijing, August 23-29, 1990.

³*The New York Times*, December 23, 1990.

2. The Conference Itself

Between August 27 and 29 I attended one of these well-orchestrated and well-publicized gatherings.⁴ The "Conference Commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Opium War" was jointly hosted by luminaries of China's historical establishment: Dai Yi, President of the Chinese Historical Society and Honorary Director of the Qing Dynasty History Institute of People's University; Zhou Guchang and Zhang Kaifeng, respectively President and Vice-President of the Chinese Society for Studying Pacific Region History; Wu Jianyong, Deputy Director of the Institute of History of the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences; and by the directors of China's Number One Historical Archives, which stores much primary source material on the Opium War.⁵ About one hundred professional academicians attended from all over China. Mamtimin Yusup, Vice-Chairman of the Society for Philosophy and Social Science of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, came from Urumqi. There was significant representation from Canton, Shanghai, and Fujian. The meeting included such well-known Beijing-based "foreign friends of the Revolution" as Israel Epstein, author of one book on the Opium War, and Sol Adler, an American victim of McCarthyism with no obvious tie to the conference other

⁴The August 27-29 event should not be confused with a June 3, 1990, PRC symposium commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Opium War and addressed by Hu Sheng, President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. *Beijing Review*, 33, no. 24 (June 11-17, 1990), p. 9.

⁵Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "China's New Historical Archives," *Fresh Perspectives on Qing Dynasty Maritime Relations*. A special issue of *The American Neptune* (Salem, Mass.: The Peabody Museum of Salem, Fall 1988), pp. 283-285.

than to give it international gloss.⁶ Adler was brought in on the arm of a nurse at the beginning of the conference and was promptly removed as soon as the photo session was over.

The conference also showcased three lineal descendants of Opium War Commissioner Lin Zexu (Lin Tse-hsü): Ling Qing, fifth generation grandson of Lin and former Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Lin Jitao, great great grandson of Lin Zexu and professor of foreign languages at Fujian Teachers' University; and Shen Zukan of the Chinese Society for Studying Pacific Region History. Shen's closing speech at the conference concerned his great grandfather Shen Bao-zhen, Commissioner Lin's son-in-law and founder of the Ma-wei shipyard and maritime academy, who has been considered the father of the modern Chinese navy.⁷

To the best of my knowledge I was the only foreign scholar in attendance. I have no idea how many others may have been invited. I gave the conference organizers the full text of my formal presentation before a Chinese visa was issued to me.

The conference convened in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, arguably the PRC's most spectacular and media-accessible auditorium. It began with an hour-long photo session in which everyone remotely associated with the conference, down to the chauffeurs of the delegates' cars, were scanned again and again by a gigantic panoramic camera. Then television cameras took over, recording the opening speeches in Chinese and English for broadcast on the TV evening news. The conference was also the lead story for

⁶Israel Epstein, *From Opium War to Liberation*. (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1980 [1956]).

⁷Letter, Shen Zukan to the author, December 9, 1990; "Impact of Opium War Discussed," *China Daily* (Beijing), August 29, 1990.

two nights running on the French-language news program, possibly because of major difficulties China was having with France. It was front-page copy in Beijing's *China Daily*.⁸

What new information did the conference convey about the Opium War? Not much, apart from a few slight twists of traditional Marxist interpretation. Zhou Gucheng, in his opening speech, put events in China since the Opium War in dialectical perspective. From 1840 to 1911 China endured a depressed economy, politics, and culture. Since 1911 China has witnessed an upward trend owing to the concerted efforts of the people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Party is an historical choice of the nation and in its absence the new China would never have been created.⁹ Historian Chen Hansheng characterized the Opium War as "the beginning of the nation's unyielding resistance against foreign aggression and a glorious chapter of patriotism," a theme reiterated in a pamphlet passed out to conference delegates at a concurrent Opium War archival exhibition.¹⁰ That brochure denounced the "unbridled imperialist aggression" which evoked a raging tide of Chinese resistance to foreign invaders and the reactionary Qing government and finally overthrew the rule of the Qing dynasty. The true history of the Opium War shows big power aggression against China and Chinese revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism.¹¹

There is, of course, nothing new in such an interpretation of the Opium War. In 1964 John K. Fairbank in his preface to

⁸*China Daily*, August 29, 1990.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹"Forward" to pamphlet "Archives and Picture Exhibition Commemorating the 150th Anniversary of the Opium War." Beijing, 1990.

Hsin-pao Chang's *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War* summarized traditional Marxist analysis of the event. To Marxists that war constituted "specific proof" of the Marxist-Leninist theorem that free-enterprise capitalism leads to aggressive "imperialism," which allies with reactionary "feudalism" to the detriment of common people everywhere.¹² How then can we account for the existence of Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu, a mandarin who oversaw the destruction of hoards of Cantonese opium from which Western imperialists and Chinese compradors profited at the expense of the Chinese masses? Lin and other empathetic members of China's "feudal" ruling class could be rationalized as *kaiming*, or "enlightened," landlords. One of the five stars of the PRC flag honors these progressive upper-class individuals, akin to overseas counterparts such as Lafayette or George Washington.

3. New Information on the Opium War and the Study of History in China

I noticed some slight deviation from the traditional Marxist viewpoint when some historians spoke about being "confined" by the class struggle theory. Instead they sought to study events from the viewpoint of overall social modernization and place them in a larger social context. Such a rubric can explain Lin's progressivism as more than an individual existential act. As explained to me by Wu Jianyong of the Institute of History, Lin was a *product* of social forces. He was a reformer, motivated and thrust to the forefront of social change by the progressive attitudes and behavior of the Chinese peasant masses.

Even when one takes into account this slight new twist of ideology, what I learned from Chinese scholars at this

¹²John K. Fairbank, "Forward," in Chang, *Commissioner*, p. vii.

conference hardly represented any major intellectual breakthrough. The Chinese scholarly establishment's adherence to ideological dogma was poignantly brought home when conference delegates were loaded on a bus and transported down Fu Xing Street to the Beijing Military Museum. The nominal purpose of the trip was to view a special exhibit on the Opium War. That exhibit consisted of about thirty photographs of artifacts plus reprints of documents displayed in a second floor gallery. What greeted us on the first floor of the museum, occupying over half of the floor space, was a pictorial and sculptural hagiography of Lei Feng, a recently-resuscitated Maoist military hero of the 1960s. Even more prominently depicted than Lei Feng were twelve recent busts of People's Liberation Army soldiers, each bedecked with the ribbon of the order of Lei Feng. When I asked my Beijing Academy of Social Sciences host about the twelve effigies, I was told that they were "soldiers who died recently, and now we must go." I later learned that "recently" referred to the June 4 massacre, and the effigies were of soldiers who died in the course of the fighting.

Despite this sobering encounter with hard-core ideology, I did enjoy my less-formal interactions with Chinese scholars. My official contribution to the conference was a paper contrasting pre- and post-Opium War American visual images of China. I will not reiterate that paper here, because the full text of it will be published in the conference proceedings and in a forthcoming book, *America Views China: American Images of China Then and Now* (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: Lehigh University Press, 1990). My most personally-rewarding interaction consisted not so much in that formal contribution but in informal discussions with colleagues. No sooner had I arrived at the conference than I was immediately invited to give several unscheduled presentations to small working groups of scholars. I was specifically asked to survey the current state of current Taiwanese, Indian, and

Western scholarship on nineteenth century Sino-Western maritime trade and relations. I happily accepted these informal assignments, summarizing especially the work of Taiwan's Kuo-tung Chen and India's Tan Chung and Assiya Siddiqi.¹³ I described the activities of The China Trade Society recently formed in the United Kingdom "to encourage the study of China's traditional trade to the West" and of Boston's Keechong Society, led by legal and business historian Frederic Delano Grant, Jr.¹⁴ Chinese scholars took a particular interest in Mr. Grant's studies of lawsuits by nineteenth-century Chinese hong merchants in United States courts.¹⁵ They also were curious about the work of the late

¹³Kuo-tung Anthony Ch'en, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843* (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990); Tan Chung, "Interpretations of the Opium War (1840-1842): A Critical Appraisal," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* (December 1977), 3 (Supp. 1), pp. 32-46. Tan Chung, "The Britain-China-India Trade Triangle (1771-1840)," *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 9, no. 4 (December 1974), pp. 411-31; Tan Chung, "Trade Between India and China: A Historical Assessment," *China Report* 12, no. 2 (March-April 1976), pp. 50-58; Assiya Siddiqi, "The Business World of Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 19, nos. 3 & 4 (1982).

¹⁴For information on the China Trade Society contact Dr. P.J.N. Tuck, History Department, University of Liverpool, 8 Abercromby Square, P.O. Box 147, Liverpool L69 3BX United Kingdom. For the Keechong Society, contact Mr. Frederic D. Grant, Jr. 83 Chestnut Street, No. 1, Boston, Massachusetts, 02108, TEL: (617) 742-7141.

¹⁵Frederic D. Grant, Jr., "The Failure of the Li-ch'uan Hong: Litigation as a Hazard of Nineteenth Century Foreign Trade," *Fresh Perspectives on Qing Dynasty Maritime Relations*. A special issue of *The American Neptune*. (Salem, Mass.: The Peabody Museum of Salem, Fall 1988), pp. 243-260; Geoffrey C. Ward with Frederick D. Grant, Jr., "A Fair, Honorable and Legitimate Trade," *American Heritage* 37, no. 5 (August/September, 1986), pp. 4, 49-64; Frederick D. Grant, Jr., "Merchants, Lawyers, and the China Trade of Boston," *Boston Bar*

Richard Capurso, of West Somerville, Massachusetts, who produced a yet-to-be-published architectural survey of many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Canton hong buildings.¹⁶

Since the conference I have sent offprints of some of these American scholars' work to the Chinese who requested it. Each Chinese researcher has sent me a lengthy shopping list of additional materials he seeks and which I am trying to procure. Wu Jianyong of the Institute of History, for example, is in urgent need of Carl Crossman's The China Trade.¹⁷ There is apparently only one copy in all China, in the Beijing Library. Lin Jitao of Fujian Teacher's University seeks a copy of Amasa Delano's A Narrative of Voyages (1817) to complete current research.¹⁸ He has never seen this text nor, presumably, is there a single copy of it in China.

In conclusion, despite the Marxist-Leninist constraints under which Chinese scholars must work, there are rays of hope. We in the West, with easier access to academic resources and the protective umbrellas of United States passports, should continue to assist our Chinese colleagues much in the same way that we assisted our Soviet counterparts in the days before Gorbachev. We should heed the requests of our Chinese colleagues, while never endangering their fragile existence by sending anything they have not specifically requested. In

Journal 23, no. 8, (September 1979), pp. 5-16; and Frederic D. Grant, Jr., "Hong Merchant Litigation in the American Courts," *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, 99 (1987), pp. 44-62.

¹⁶Mr. Capurso's book may be published posthumously. Contact Frederic D. Grant, Jr., address above, for further information.

¹⁷Carl L. Crossman, *The China Trade. Export Paintings, Furniture, Silver and other objects* (Princeton, N.J.: The Pyne Press, 1972). A new edition of Crossman's book is in press in 1991.

¹⁸Amasa Delano, *A Narrative of Voyages...in the Pacific Ocean and Oriental Islands* (Boston: E.G. House, 1817).

1964 Hsin-pao Chang urged us to utilize such Western sources as the Jardine Matheson Archives and the Forbes, Heard, and Latimer Papers along with Chinese sources in our study of the Opium War.¹⁹ Today we have an additional obligation to provide Western sources as best we can to Chinese colleagues as they labor under less-than-ideal circumstances.

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[prepared for presentation to the 1991 meeting of the
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The series *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) began one hundred thirty years ago, when Abraham Lincoln was president. For most of the 19th century, the volumes printed papers that were only a year old - documenting the diplomacy of the preceding year. But by the time World War I ended, secrecy had become more pervasive, whatever Mr. Wilson's commitment to "covenants openly arrived at." In the late 1920s, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg woke up from his afternoon nap (his most predictable occupation), and approved an admirable set of criteria for the FRUS volumes, an injunction that is repeated in each preface. The volumes

¹⁹Chang, *Commissioner*, p. ix.

were to provide “a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions” with nothing “omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy.”

But the time gap between events and publication of that year's FRUS volumes grew, slowly but steadily. By the time World War II arrived, diplomats no longer had to worry that their actions would be exposed to the public of their own generation. There were, of course, exceptions when it served the government's purpose. Such “white papers” were not forgeries, but they did distort the record by their selectivity and incompleteness. The two volume special collection subtitled *Japan, 1931-1941*, sought to demonstrate that the United States had done all it could to avoid war and that Japan was the aggressor. It appeared in 1943, only two years after the attack on Pearl Harbor. [It is worth noting that Kellogg's rules were not repeated in the preface to those two volumes.] The Cold War generated the early appearance of another collection of documents - *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1919-1941* - printed in 1948, only seven years after the events. This time, however the State Department had the decency to print the papers as a special publication, not part of FRUS.

But historians and the public then had to wait until 1956 for the first volume of FRUS for 1939 to appear - a seventeen year gap. And those were the good years! Publication of the FRUS volumes also opened up the State Department's archival materials - so the public could gain access to the full record. But the Cold War and this nation's commitment to globalism soon made even a seventeen year waiting period too close for comfort - at least for the comfort of presidents, national security councils, and the State Department.

In the meantime, historians were both impressed and spoiled by the massive collection of World War II documents published in the annual and special conference volumes of FRUS. As ever, politics played a role, with the Yalta

Conference volume published in 1955 under prodding from Congressional Republicans who hoped to embarrass the party of Franklin Roosevelt. But that volume, and the others for the Second World War period, benefitted from the general celebratory mood of the "Good War." The number of pages and volumes published for that era was staggering, and not to be repeated.

The Cold War brought dramatic changes in the *Foreign Relations* series. The usual explanations - covert activities, destabilization of governments, assassination attempts, and a world-wide agenda for American foreign policy - are not sufficient, for similar activities took place during World War II and were proudly revealed to the public. Another excuse has been costs, which seem to have risen dramatically (though I have my doubts), but that was no problem when it came to the Second World War volumes. Why then do we have a gap today of about THIRTY-FIVE YEARS from the event to publication of the documents? I suspect the answer is psychological and moral, and that dashed expectations and the ambivalent nature of the Cold War are at the root of the delay. After all, it is difficult to place Castro, Nehru, and the Italian socialists in the same category as Adolf Hitler. Yet that is what the Cold War geo-political agenda demanded of the American public. As Sen. Arthur Vandenberg so succinctly put it to Harry Truman about the Marshall Plan, the only way to get this through was to scare the hell out of the American public. Never was advice taken more fully.

And that is where your Historical Advisory Committee found itself about a year ago. [I say "your" committee, because the members all believe their responsibility is not just to the professional organizations that nominated them, but to the American public at large.] At that time, publication of a grossly incomplete volume of papers dealing with US-Iranian relations in the early 1950s provided the then chair, Warren Cohen, enough leverage to arrange for the Advisory Commit-

tee to have access to documents that were not declassified for publication. The role of the CIA and the U.S. government in destabilizing the Iranian government of Mossadeq was so much a part of the public record that the integrity of the FRUS series was brought into question. Access for the Advisory Committee was designed to allow that group to give the Secretary of State useful, honest advice about the comprehensiveness and forthrightness of FRUS.

But we live in a "National Security State" atmosphere where knowledge is deemed dangerous; where government finds it necessary to act in the democracy's best interest without asking the public to approved or disapprove those actions. Both Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton would have been appalled. Fortunately, the resignation of my predecessor attracted enough public-media attention to prevent the matter from being swept under the rug. The result was legislation supported by the unlikely coalition of Claiborne Pell (Liberal Democrat), Joseph Boren (chair of the Senate Committee on Intelligence), and Jesse Helms (conservative Republican) - all of whom believed that the American public had a right and a need to know the historical record of our foreign policy. They have agreed that publication of documents THIRTY YEARS OLD does not threaten our national security, especially since other legal exemptions exist for things like intelligence, weapons technology, and matters that would affect on-going diplomacy.

Thanks to the efforts of people like Page Miller (National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History), we now have legislation, bill S(enate) 1433, that will insure four very important things:

1. that the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* will be published in accordance with the principles of objectivity and completeness that were outlined by Secretary Kellogg some sixty years ago;

2. that the Historical Advisory Committee will be in a position to insure the INTEGRITY of the process followed by the State Department's Historical Office in compiling the volumes;
3. that the public will have access to the archival record of our foreign policy, within specific and enumerated national security considerations, within thirty years after the events;
4. that the classification of documents relating to our foreign policy will not be used to hide matters that are simply politically or personally embarrassing.

The legislation currently before the Senate appears to me to be the best way to insure the permanence of recent State Department reforms that were instituted with the strong and effective support of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Margaret Tutwiler. There are, after all, those in the Department who do not support these new policies and who can be counted on to try to reduce public access when the opportunity presents itself. It will take six months or a year for the Historical Advisory Committee to develop its own internal procedures and policies so that it can act effectively to protect the public interest, but if the Committee's access and independence are not guaranteed, then the democracy remains at the mercy of bureaucrats whose personal interests and/or politics will determine whether or not the public know our nation's history.

I personally urge you to write your Senators and Representatives expressing your support for S. 1433 and the principle of an informed public that underlines the bill.

A PASSAGE TO INDIA

by

Dennis Merrill

MISSOURI - KANSAS CITY

It has been years since India has been featured regularly in the headlines of American newspapers, or been a point of sustained discussion in American politics. There are the periodic accounts of Muslim-Hindu rioting or political assassinations; or human-interest stories about arranged marriages, the caste system, and other exotic phenomenon; or exposes on the shanty towns of Calcutta and Bombay. Yet for most Americans, knowledge of India runs only skin deep. And in terms of contemporary international relations, India pales in significance when compared to Europe where Cold War walls are crumbling, or the Persian Gulf where war has unleashed unpredictable forces of change, or the Pacific Rim where dynamic new economies are fast emerging.

So why did SHAFRITES Gary Hess, Robert McMahan, and Dennis Merrill undertake a passage to India in January 1991? In fact, there have been moments in recent history when India fired imaginations and ranked as a major foreign policy concern. In the late 1940s, India captured world attention when it successfully wrested independence from the British and emerged as the "world's largest democracy." In the early 1950s, India held out promise as a strategic ally, but was cast aside in favor of the more cooperative Pakistanis following New Delhi's refusal to modify its nonaligned posture in the Cold War. In the late 1950s and 1960s, American foreign policy-makers extended large amounts of economic aid and worked to establish India as a model for Third World development. Given India's stature as the world's second most populous nation, its strategic location mid-way between

the Near and Far East, its nuclear capacity, and its status as the predominant power in the Indian Ocean region, there will certainly come a time when India will again win our attention. To discuss this history, and to speculate about the future, the three of us joined with some of India's leading historians and political scientists in a series of bi-national conferences.

Our trip was made possible through the generosity and hard work of the United States Educational Foundation in India (USEFI). USEFI's energetic and engaging director, Mrs. Sharada Nayak, especially deserves credit for making this trip possible. Her tireless efforts assured that we never suffered a dull moment! Two USEFI-sponsored conferences allowed the three Americans to meet as a team with their Indian counterparts - the first conference in New Delhi focused on the history of Indo-American relations, and a second in the southern, coastal city of Madras looked at emerging trends in United States-Indian and United States-Asian relations. Between New Delhi and Madras, we met with Indian scholars at the American Studies and Research Centre in Hyderabad, an outstanding facility where Indian humanists and social scientists come to conduct research on American history and culture. USEFI also arranged for the three of us to spread out across the country on our own to give separate lectures. Each of these events was extremely well attended, and most of them were covered in the local newspapers. For the New Delhi Conference, Mrs. Nayak arranged for keynote speeches by the American Ambassador William Clark Jr., and the well-known sociologist and long-time India watcher Professor Nathan Glazier. Together these events commemorated forty years of Fulbright programming in India. In the spirit of Fulbright, the trip generated dialogue, debate, and perhaps a degree of mutual understanding.

Beyond the conference rooms and lecture halls, we also experienced the sights, sounds, and smells of Indian streets and alleyways. The rush of city crowds for overfilled buses,

the persistence of the young shoe shine boys, the shirtless men digging ditches at the roadside, and the graceful movement of multi-colored saris. There were also side trips to sites of historical and cultural significance: the seventh century Hindu sculptures at Mahabalipuram, the mosques and minarets of Charminar in old Hyderabad city, and the journey by rail to Agra to see the magnificent Taj Mahal. Beauty and squalor, wealth and poverty, laughter and despair, endless energy, sensory overload - India was all of this, and more.

Our most substantial interactions with India, of course, came when we gathered with our Indian colleagues and friends to talk about history and politics. Indeed, Indians do not take their conferences lightly. They typically ran three days in duration, and usually met daily from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Each presenter tries to make the most of his or her fifteen to twenty minutes, and prepares carefully to respond to the barrage of commentary that always follows. It took me one whole panel session before I learned the fine art of jockeying for position during the follow-up question and answer period. This is done by submitting a piece of paper to the panel chair, and requesting the privilege to "intervene." Interventions may involve questions, comments, or lengthy political diatribes. I never did feel entirely comfortable with the thought that anyone of my comments might be termed an "American intervention."

Indian scholars proved eager to hear our views, dissect them, and engage in debate. Indian etiquette, however, allows for discussion only after the obligatory but heartfelt praise for originality and brilliance has been extended to the presented. Then it's time for critical analysis. Although the nature of the international setting has changed dramatically since the halcyon days of the nonaligned movement in the 1950s and 60s, suspicion toward the great powers still molds many Indian perceptions on foreign affairs. A blending of nationalism and various forms of leftism, something that one

Indian scholar referred to as the "Nehruvian elan," informed many of the Indian presentations, and certainly affected reactions to our presentations. A full account of our exchanges is impractical here, but an overview of the major issues that dominated the New Delhi conference is illustrative.

The most frequent point of contention in New Delhi arose over the United States military alliance with Pakistan. "Why does America support dictatorship in Pakistan, instead of democracy in India?" is an often heard refrain. It is an excellent question which goes to the heart of many fundamental issues in modern American foreign policy. Bob McMahon's discussion of American strategic planning in South Asia from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, therefore, proved to be controversial. Bob's use of quotes from State Department, NSC, and CIA documents were at times misread as representing his own views, and his critique of American policy received far less attention than his narrative of the policy-making process. In part, the problem arose from language barriers. In part, it may have sprung from the fact that most of the Indian scholars - especially the political scientists - were not accustomed to working with American primary sources. Very few of the Indian papers, for example, included references to the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes even though those publications are readily available in New Delhi and other major Indian cities. At bottom the reaction demonstrated the power that this issue holds over Indian politics. Still, many of the Indian analysts, such as Professors R.R. Subramanian of the Institute for Defence Studies in New Delhi and Tarun C. Bose of Kalyani University in West Bengal, spoke with authority on defense and security matters. For the most part, they employed geopolitical models and published United States sources to examine Pakistan and many other issues from a less emotionally-charged perspective.

Gary Hess' presentation drew attention to the importance of perceptions in American foreign policy making, and highlighted the distorted images that have plagued Indo-American relations from the 1940s to the present. Exaggerated hopes for India's democracy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, disillusionment in the 1970s, and impatience with India's neutral stance throughout the Cold War era produced a rocky relationship subject to spurts of fascination and neglect. Many of the Indians responded enthusiastically. Professor Ramesh Babu of Bombay University extended the analysis in his paper by probing the impact of domestic politics and ideology on both United States and Indian foreign policy. This, of course, led to a discussion of the special difficulties inherent to relations between two democracies. Others challenged the notion that perceptions rather than interests have been central to Indo-American relations, and once more critically assessed America's hegemonic aims on the subcontinent.

My paper examined the origins and early implementation during the 1950s and early 1960s of United States economic aid to India. My references to America's drive toward global hegemony and a critical assessment of Washington's attempt to export liberal development did not guarantee a warm reception. Many of the Indians took issue with my emphasis on foreign aid as a tool of national security policy, preferring instead to view aid more narrowly as a weapon of capitalist imperialism. Yet the Indians were hardly of one mind regarding the relative benefits and shortcomings of capitalism. Professor B.K. Shrivastava invoked what has become Indian orthodoxy when he stressed the government's responsibility to balance economic liberalization with planning and the pursuit of social justice. On the other hand, several young Indian scholars expressed impatience with their mentor's incantations. I detected both Ronald Reagan's and Rajiv Gandhi's influence - and perhaps that of the Harvard business school - in their

impassioned denunciations of public ownership and Indian bureaucratic redtape. All present seemed to recognize that the post Cold War setting would invariably give rise to new developmental strategies and increasing global interdependence.

Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon for the three of us to observe was the way in which historians and political scientists from outside the United States - particularly in a non-Western setting - study the history of foreign relations. As we listened and watched our Indian colleagues cope with American scholars being critical of their own government, we could not help but notice how uncritical and uninquisitive many Indian scholars were regarding their own country's foreign policies. This contrasted sharply with their contentious approach to domestic issues. In fact, one of the most common characteristics of the Indian scholarship was the overall lack of interest in searching our Indian sources, examining the intricacies of Indian bureaucracy, the role of the Indian Parliament, or the impact of interest groups and the media to reconstruct a richer and more meaningful history of Indian diplomacy. Rather, most of the Indians seemed reasonably content to draw conclusions about Indo-American relations mainly from published American documents, and to direct most of their analytical energies towards examining the motives and rationales of United States diplomats. Unfortunately, what all-too-often emerged was a picture of Indian policy that is static, and my implication relatively unimportant. Bob, Gary, and I commented on this time and again during question and answer sessions - and the Indian scholars seemed open-minded and receptive to our critique. I am certain that most foreign relations historians in the United States, increasingly sensitive to the ethnocentric nature of our craft, would welcome the special insights that our foreign counterparts could extend regarding the interactive nature of bilateral relations.

Although the formal presentations and discussions proved fruitful, Indian and American participants agreed that some of the richest dialogue occurred during our many informal gatherings. While Indians take their conferences seriously, doing without "chai," or tea, would be unthinkable. Morning and afternoon tea breaks were accordingly made a part of the daily regimen at every conference. These half-hour sessions often lasted forty or forty-five minutes, and provided ample opportunity for discussion, banter, photograph taking, and the inevitable exchange of business cards and addresses. We also shared lunch with our new friends, and every conference involved at least one evening reception. Gary, Bob, Barb, and I were simply overwhelmed by the warm hospitality and the outpouring of friendship that accompanied these occasions.

Speaking one on one, many of the Indian scholars modified some of the generalizations advanced during the day's formal sessions and addressed issues with more candor. Warming to the informal atmosphere, the Americans spoke with greater openness as well. Gary later related that during one reception two of the Indian scholars confided in him their suspicion that Bob McMahan was a Republican! And I was flattered when I was told by one friend that I bore a strong resemblance to the American actor Dustin Hoffman. I really haven't a clue what that says about my politics or my scholarship. We had a chance to discuss India's recent fervor over the preferential hiring of scheduled castes, and to draw comparisons to the affirmative action controversy in the United States. We inquired into the future of India's

increasingly fragmented political setting. We also exchanged notes on conditions at our respective universities and colleges, received sight-seeing tips, and speculated about the unfolding events in the Persian Gulf. I cannot even begin to calculate how many invitations Barb and I received to visit different parts of the country, and Gary and Bob encountered the same warmth and enthusiasm. What was most impressive,

was that USEFI always proved willing to step in and make the necessary travel arrangements so that we could oblige our willing hosts.

Our visit came to a dramatic close as war broke out in the Persian Gulf. At this point each of us had gone off to different parts of the country for separate speaking engagements. I still recall the eerie feeling of waking up on the morning of 18 January in Patna, a city located in Northeast India and reading in the papers that United States planes had bombed Bagdad. Indians, like Americans, were initially divided on this issue. A minority strongly supported President Bush's policies. Many others, while offering little support for Saddam Hussein, expressed sympathy for the Iraqi people and a preference for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. No one foresaw that the conflict would be so one-sided. For Gary, Bob, and I the outbreak of war brought endless questions from our Indian hosts, and a frustrating search at the newsstands for dependable information on Gulf events. We were also aware of the possibility that Anti-American sentiment might take an unfriendly, even violent turn. Fortunately, none of us encountered anything of the sort. Then came the final, tense moments in the crowded Palam airport in New Delhi where long lines of returning tourists formed, a multitude of security personnel carefully inspected and labeled each piece of luggage and we slowly made our way on board our departing flight.

More than anything else, our passage to India was a learning experience. The interaction with intellectuals, the extensive travel, and the absorption of history and culture deepened our understanding of India. At a time when historians of American foreign relations seek to break through Eurocentric barriers and internationalize their field, our trip enabled us to analyze important aspects of American foreign policy from a multi-national and multi-cultural perspective. In learning how others view us, we learned about ourselves.

In this regard, SHAFR president Gary Hess deserves, as they say in India, a special "vote of thanks." His many publications on American-Asian relations have been characterized by their attention to the Asian side of the story, and it should come as no surprise to diplomatic historians that it was Gary who first conceptualized the Indo-American program. We look forward to seeing the publication of the conference papers, and to soon inviting a group of our Indian friends to the United States for a second round of conferences. And we hope that other SHAFR members will have the opportunity to initiate similar overseas exchanges.

SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING
JUNE 20, 1991

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
GARY HESS PRESIDING

The meeting opened at 8 a.m. Council members present were Gary Hess, Michael Hunt, Linda Killen, Robert Schulzinger, Allan Spetter, and J. Samuel Walker. Others present were Robert Accinelli, Joyce Goldberg, Waldo Heinrichs, Daniel Helmstadter, Michael Logan, Page Putnam Miller, and Betty Unterberger.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, brought Council up to date on pending legislation dealing with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.

2. Robert Accinelli, Chair of the Warren Kuehl Book Award Committee, informed Council that the committee had chosen *The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse University Press) by Charles Chatfield and the late Charles DeBenedetti to receive the 1990-1991 Kuehl Award.

3. Allan Spetter reported for William Stueck, chair of the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship Award Committee. The committee selected Kyle Longley of the University of Kentucky to receive the 1991 award. Longley will use the award to finance a research trip to Costa Rica.

4. President Hess reported on the following committee appointments: Bernath Article (Diane Kunz, Yale); Bernath Book (Frank Ninkovich, St. John's); Bernath Lecture (Charles Brower, USMA). Hess also informed Council that David Anderson of the University of Indianapolis has agreed to serve as chair of the Program Committee for the 1992 SHAFR Conference. Anderson's committee will include Joseph Fry (UNLV), Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City), Harriet Schwar (State Department), Geoffrey Smith (Queen's), Donald Whitnah (Northern Iowa), and Kevin Simon (FDR Library), in charge of local arrangements).

5. President Hess presented to Council the following resolution of appreciation for Sandra Taylor, Chair, and the members of the 1991 SHAFR Conference Program Committee, unanimously endorsed by Council:

On behalf of membership of SHAFR, Council expresses appreciation to the Program Committee for the 1991 meeting. To Sandra Taylor as Chair and other members, we are indebted for a program that is unusually rich in the diversity of topics represented in the panels. The program is enhanced by the contributions of scholars from many countries and by

the inclusion of a number of younger participants. To William Becker and his colleagues at George Washington University, we express thanks for their hospitality and for helping to make the 17th annual SHAFR Conference a success.

6. Betty Unterberger reported to Council about the results of her meeting with Dr. Bernath in California. The most important result was agreement by Dr. Bernath to create the Dr. Gerald J. Bernath Scholarship Support fund by combining the existing Bernath Supplementary Account with one of two life insurance policies which had been bequeathed to SHAFR by the late Mrs. Myrna F. Bernath. The new fund will continue to subsidize student memberships in SHAFR, help pay for increases in various Bernath awards, and help underwrite such activities as *Diplomatic History*, the *Newsletter*, and a revised edition of *The Guide to American Foreign Relations*.

7. Joyce Goldberg reported to Council that colleagues, friends and former students of Robert Ferrell wished to present to SHAFR the necessary funds to establish a new Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize. Council unanimously endorsed the award as follows:

This is competition for a book which is a history of American foreign relations, broadly defined, and that includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five copies of each

book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to the committee (to be chosen).

The 1991 award will be approximately \$1,000, and it will be announced at the Annual luncheon of SHAFR held in conjunction with the OAH in 1992.

8. President Hess then introduced to Council his proposal that any future awards to be presented by SHAFR be designated to support research and/or teaching. Council unanimously endorsed the following statement:

The SHAFR Council believes that future awards ought to enhance research and teaching. It would welcome the establishment of awards that (a) provided funds for scholars to engage in research for extended periods of time (travel and stipends for perhaps three to six months); (b) financed a program of visiting scholars principally to small colleges and community colleges (travel expenses for SHAFR-designated lecturers to visit such schools and meet with classes, give public talks, etc.); (c) funded the travel expenses of younger scholars to present papers at SHAFR or other professional conferences.

9. Council discussed at length possible changes in eligibility for the Bernath Article Award. Council agreed unanimously to retain the eligibility requirements and to ask the current Bernath Article Prize Committee to consider the following: whether the award might be presented in alternate years; whether the amount of the award should be increased.

10. Council then discussed at length proposed changes in the description of the Bernath Dissertation Prize as submitted by

David Schmitz, current chair of the Bernath Dissertation Prize Committee. Council agreed unanimously to a revision which would present the award for the purpose of financing travel to conduct dissertation research. Council also agreed unanimously to increase the award to \$1,000. President Hess informed Council that he has asked the current committee (David Schmitz, chair, H. William Brands and Walter Hixson) to continue for another year. Council unanimously passed a resolution acknowledging the efforts of the current committee.

11. Allan Spetter presented a report on SHAFR's operating budget. He emphasized that the financial picture could best be determined at the close of SHAFR's fiscal year on Dec. 15. With operating costs continually increasing and income remaining stable, however, Spetter informed Council that dues should be increased in Oct. 1992, which would be the first dues increase in five years.

12. Waldo Heinrichs spoke to Council about the continuing concern in regard to what is perceived to be a lack of sessions in diplomatic history at the AHA conventions. Heinrichs assured Council that the problem is in the small number of papers or sessions submitted. He informed Council that there would be a respectable number of sessions at the 1991 conference and encouraged Council and members of SHAFR to work to increase the number of sessions proposed. (See Heinrichs' letter in the **Announcements** section of this *Newsletter*).

13. Daniel Helmstadter, president of **Scholarly Resources**, informed Council that **SR** is working to increase advertising and institutional subscriptions for *Diplomatic History*.

14. President Hess informed Council that Warren Kimball, chair of the Link Award Committee, is confident that the first award can be made this year at the AHA convention. Hess also informed Council that Kimball has agreed to serve as chair of the State Department Advisory Committee. (See Kimball's presentation regarding the Committee elsewhere in this *Newsletter*).

The meeting adjourned at 10:30 a.m.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Diplomatic History Reprint Fee

Beginning in 1991, SHAFR gained copyright to all materials in *Diplomatic History*. To take account of this fact, the following reprint policy has gone into effect:

The Society's standard reprint fee is \$200.00, which is normally split between the author and the Society's Armin Rappaport Journal Fund. The author is, of course, free to request a larger fee if s/he wishes. S/he is also free to donate her/his share of the reprint fee to the Rappaport fund, and the Society strongly encourages all authors to do so.

Call for Papers: 1992 SHAFR Conference

The 18th Annual Conference of SHAFR will be held June 18-21, 1992, at Hyde Park and Poughkeepsie, New York, and will be hosted by the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and Vassar College. Sessions will be held at the FDR Library and Vassar. The program committee welcomes proposals for entire sessions, individual papers, and panel discussions on all aspects of U.S. foreign relations. In addition, the committee requests proposals focusing on Franklin Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, the Roosevelt era, World War II, or presidential leadership in foreign policy. Proposals for complete sessions and for individual papers should include a one-page abstract of all papers and one-page vitae for all participants. Proposals for panel discussions should include a narrative description of the session and one-page vitae for all participants. Proposals should be sent no later than November 15, 1991, to the

program chairperson: Professor David L. Anderson, Department of History & Political Science, University of Indianapolis, 1400 East Hanna Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46227-3697.

AHA Call for Papers

The program committee for the 1992 AHA announces a deadline for submission of completed proposals of February 15, 1992.

The committee encourages proposals addressed to the theme of unification within historiography and the historical professions: approaches to new syntheses incorporating ethnic and gendered history, comparative history, new methodologies and new concepts of periodization. Proposals which address professional issues concerning diversity in staffing and the pedagogical challenges which arise when a department addresses a plural history with a unified curriculum are also invited.

Proposals (6 copies) devoted to U.S., Canadian, Latin American and Oceanian history are to be sent to Fred Hoxie, D'Arcy McNickle Center for the History of the American Indian, The Newberry Library, 60 W. Walton St., Chicago, IL 60610. Proposals (6 copies) devoted to European, Asian, African or general World History should be sent to Jo Ann McNamara, Department of History, Hunter College, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021.

World War II - A 50 Year Perspective

Siena College is sponsoring its seventh annual multidisciplinary conference on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1992 will be 1942 - though papers

dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed.

For information contact: Professor Thomas O. Kelly, II, Department of History Siena College, Loudonville, NY 12211. The deadline for submissions is December 15, 1991.

Seminar on Intelligence

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence will sponsor a sixth faculty seminar on teaching intelligence in the summer of 1992. The seminar will be held from August 8-15, 1992 and will take place at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. Applications are invited from faculty of all ranks and who regularly offer a course on intelligence. The deadline for applications is February 1, 1992. For further information and application forms, contact: Dr. Roy Godson, Consortium for the Study of Intelligence; 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 500; Washington, DC 20036. Tel: (202) 429-0129.

MacArthur Symposium

"The occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots" will be the subject of a symposium to be held at the General Douglas MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk on November 7 and 8, 1991.

This is the eighth in a series of symposia on the Allied Occupation of Japan and will consist of presentations made by former members of the American Occupation staff as well as by academic researchers. Among the topics to be discussed are: repatriation of Japanese troops, military government at the prefectural and local level, fraternization, public health, and the impact of education reforms on Japanese school children during the Occupation era.

For information, contact Colonel Edward M. Condra, III, USMC (Retired), Director, MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, VA 23510; telephone (804) 441-2965.

New Journal Established
The Journal of American-East Asian Relations

The *Journal* will focus on the history of American-East Asian relations broadly defined: diplomatic, economic, security, cultural. It will not, however, exclude scholarly discussions of recent or even contemporary affairs.

The *Journal* will accept manuscripts for major articles, review essays, and book reviews; it will only accept manuscripts written in English that are original and not submitted for consideration for publication.

Michael A. Barnhart, Editor
The Journal of American-East Asian Relations
Imprint Publications, Inc
100 East Ohio Street, Suite 630
Chicago, IL 60611

Espionage Conference

The History Department of the University of Toronto will sponsor a conference on November 7-9, 1991 on "Espionage: Past, Present, or Future?" The topics to be addressed will include the KGB, Canadian intelligence, scientific espionage during World War Two, and the Gouzenko affair. There will be a panel discussion on the future of spy fiction, and historic films and videos will be shown. Noted guest speakers include Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky.

For information contact: the History Department, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada M5S 1A1; tel. 416-978-3365; fax 416-978-4810.

The U.S., Japan, and W.W.II Conference

The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and Hofstra Cultural Center will co-sponsor a conference on "The United States and Japan in World War II," at Hofstra University in New York on December 5-7, 1991.

The conference will address pre-war diplomacy leading to Pearl Harbor; Pacific Strategies, 1941-45; the homefront and industrial mobilization in the U.S. and Japan; the American and Japanese commanders; and the atomic bomb.

For information contact: Laura J. Labenberg, Conference Coordinator, Hofstra Cultural Center, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11550, or call (516) 463-5041.

Vatican Diplomacy in the Modern Age

A symposium on *The Holy See in the Modern Age: Vatican Diplomacy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* will be held at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, from October 10 to 13, 1991. Scholars from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Ireland, Nicaragua, Israel and the Holy See will be attending and presenting papers.

For information contact: Peter C. Kent, Department of History, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, E3B 5A3, Canada. Tel: (506) 453-4655.

Kennesaw State College Conference

Kennesaw State College will host a one-day conference, October 9, on Vietnam and its impact on our society. The focus of this program will be "Vietnam: Impact on Culture."

For information contact: Stephen C. KcKelvey, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 444, Marietta, GA 30061

SHAFR Representation at the AHA

A number of us have been concerned that lately the history of American foreign relations has not been well represented among the panels at the national meetings of the Organization for American Historians and the American Historical Association. We may be the victims of our own success: the SHAFR annual meeting may be absorbing much of our paper-giving interest. Nevertheless, the historical profession as a whole will not gain a full appreciation of what this field is doing unless we participate in these larger annual meetings.

To ensure that we were given fair representation at the American Historical Association meeting, former President Michael Hunt asked me to serve on the AHA program committee for the forthcoming convention. This I have done and I wish to report that the committee welcomed offerings from our field, that virtually all of those offered were accepted, and that relatively few were offered.

I have no knowledge of the way the OAH program committee operates and committees change from year to year, but on the basis of my experience with the AHA, I believe that the single most important reason why we are not better represented is that we are not submitting panel proposals. So let's go campers!

Waldo Heinrichs, San Diego State University

Bradley Berlin Seminar for 1992

Sessions are held in English language on German politics, history, and international relations. The program is designed principally for undergraduate college teachers. Sessions in Dresden, Weimar, Bonn, and Berlin are scheduled for June 8 to 24, 1992. Seminars are presented by German university faculty, political leaders, and foreign office experts.

Participant's most important cost is travel to and from Berlin. American faculty are assigned as session commentators. Invitations are sent in October or November so faculty may plan ahead. Contact: Lester Brune, History Department, Bradley University, Peoria, IL 61625

Pew Case Studies

Hans Binnendijk, newly announced director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown University, announced plans to create a new center to revise and distribute the Pew Case Studies in International Negotiation. Over the next three years, the Institute will reissue each case after it has been reviewed and any necessary changes made.

On September 1, the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs will transfer the clearinghouse functions it has carried out since September 1988 to ISD. During a transition period, as the case studies are undergoing review and revision, ISD will continue to distribute them in their existing form to avoid disrupting their availability for use in the classroom.

Notice to Journalism Historians

The International Journalism History Interest Group of the American Journalism Historians Association invites inquiries.

Contact: James D. Startt, Department of History,
Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN 46383.

Cold War Conference

The University of Wisconsin - Madison will sponsor
"Rethinking the Cold War: An Interdisciplinary Conference,
October 19-20, 1991.

Contact: Allen Hunter, Havens Ctr., Rm 8117 Social
Science Bldg, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.
Telephone: (608) 262-0854.

CALENDAR

1991

- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- December 27-30 The 106th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago, headquarters at the Chicago Hilton and Towers.

1992

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1991 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1991 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 2-5 The 85th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Chicago with headquarters at the Palmer House.

- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June 18-21 The 18th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and Vassar College. David Anderson of the University of Indianapolis is in charge of the program.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.

The OAH will meet in Anaheim, April 15-18, 1993. The program co-chairs: Barbara Melosh and Roy Rosenzweig, History, George Mason U., Fairfax, VA 22030. Deadline for proposals is March 1, 1992.

The OAH will meet April 14-17, 1994, in Atlanta, and March 30-April 2, 1995, in Washington.

The AHA schedule for next year is:

December 27-30, 1992 -- Washington DC Sheraton and Omni Shoreham hotels.

There will be no December 1993 meeting! The following AHA meeting will be held in January 1994 in a yet-to-be-designated-city. Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.

PERSONALS

Susan Aaronson (Johns Hopkins) was recently awarded a Truman Library Institute dissertation year fellowship.

Vincent de Santis (Notre Dame) was omitted from the list of 1990-91 Fulbright recipients. Professor de Santis was awarded a lectureship to India for 1990-91.

Carol Gluck (Columbia) was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Waldo Heinrichs has accepted the Dwight E. Stanford chair at San Diego State. (This is a correction of the June 1991 announcement.)

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers) is currently the chair of the State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation (See his comments regarding this task elsewhere in this issue - ed.)

Arnold Offner has accepted the Cornelia F. Hugel chair at Lafayette College.

Chester Pach has joined the faculty at Ohio University.

Klaus Schwabe (Technische Hochschule - Aachen) participated in the spring 1991 Lecture Series at the German Historical Institute in Washington.

Michael Wala (Erlangen-Nürnberg) has been awarded an American Studies Fellowship by the American Council of Learned Societies. He will spend 1991-92 at the Hoover

**Institution to conduct research on "Weimar and America:
German-American Relations between the World Wars."**

The Truman Library has awarded research grants to the following SHAFR members: Laura Belmonte (Virginia), Mark Bradley (Harvard), Douglas Brinkley (Hofstra), Jussi Hanhimake (Boston), Mark J. White (Rutgers), and Thomas Zeiler (Colorado).

PUBLICATIONS

- Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (both of Marshall Research Library) eds., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 3, "The Right Man for the Job," December 3, 1941-May 31, 1943*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8018-2967-4, \$45
- H.W. Brands (Texas A&M), *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-19-506707-x, \$29.95
- Keith Eubank (CUNY-Queens College) ed., *World War II: Roots and Causes*. Heath, 1992. Paper, ISBN 0-669-24969-6, \$10
- Diane B. Kunz (Yale), *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8078-1967-0, \$39.95
- B.J.C. McKercher (Royal Military College of Canada) ed., *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy*. Macmillans and the University of Alberta Press, 1991. ISBN 0-88864-224-5, CAN\$37.50
- Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut) and Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas) eds., *Imperial Surge: The United States Abroad, 1890s-Early 1900s*, Heath, 1992. Paper, ISBN 0-669-26915-8, \$10
- Priscilla Roberts (Hong Kong) ed., *Sino-American Relations Since 1900*. University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1991. ISBN 0378-2689, HK\$180.00
- Kenneth W. Thompson (Virginia) and Steven L. Rearden (Herndon, VA), eds., *Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Control*. University Press of America, 1990. Hardcover: ISBN 0-8191-7893-4, \$48.00; paper: ISBN 0-8191-7894-2, \$27.00

William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan), *Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954*. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8078-1970-0, \$39.95

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A few days ago, I put in a telephone call to Princeton University Press for the purpose of ordering the recently published volume by Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, II, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*. The person who took my call asked if I really wanted to order the book. I replied that I really did. Whereupon the person advised me that the price of the book is \$99.50. I thereupon told her that, on second thought, I really did not want to order the book.

What do you suppose is going on here? Why would a publisher charge such a price, even for a book of several hundred pages? One strongly suspects that Princeton expects to sell the book at a rip-off price to a couple of thousand libraries and government agencies, most of which will order it almost automatically. It will maintain its rip-off price until it has exhausted orders from those two sources. Then, in a year or two, it will bring out a paperback edition at, say, \$27, a rather dramatic reduction from the hardcover price of nearly a hundred dollars - for sale, hopefully, to historians and Korean War enthusiasts, including assorted members of SHAFR, who cannot afford to pay rip-off prices to book publishers. (For what it may be worth, Macmillan charged \$3.50 for a copy of Charles A. and Mary Beard's hefty *America in Midpassage* in 1939, one-twenty-eighth the price that Princeton has slapped on the Cumings book. A first-class postage stamp, conversely, cost three cents in 1939, more than one-tenth the price of a first-class stamp in 1991).

Why a reputable university press would toy with would-be purchasers of its books in such a manner passes imagination. The cost of composition has not suddenly broken through the proverbial roof. The composition of a single page, set in type by modern methods, I am told, may run about \$10. If done with a laser printer, perhaps with printed running heads, it could be as low as \$3. My arithmetic may be off, but it seems to me that even 976 pages with 21 halftones, 2 line illustrations, 9 maps, and 2 tables need not sell for \$99.50. If the cost of book composition in New Jersey has become substantially greater than elsewhere in the republic, perhaps Princeton University Press could explain to us would-be purchasers of its books why that is the case.

John Edward Wilz
Professor Emeritus
Indiana University

[**Ed. note:** Professor Wilz's letter was forwarded to Princeton University Press for comment. The following is a reply from the director of sales.]

We are sorry that Professor Wilz finds the price we charge for Mr. Cumings's book a "rip-off price" at \$99.50. I can't go into all the economics of book publishing or all the constraints on a university press in what I hope will be a short letter. Suffice it to say that beyond typesetting (which runs at about \$10 per page these days), there are our editorial overheads (copyediting a manuscript of nearly 2000 pages requires a great deal of time and attention), the costs of paper, printing, and binding, the other overheads of a publishing company like design, production, and marketing staff and expenditures. One way of looking at pricing is as price per page. The most recent survey of all university presses shows average price per page for Humanities titles at 10.8 cents per

page and for Social Science titles at 10.9 cents per page - this survey was taken for books published in the fall of 1989.

Looking at the question of price from another point of view, it is clear that most book buyers would consider \$99.50 an expensive book. While a 1000 page book *can* be priced at less than #20 if it is a Stephen King novel (the economies of scale of printing nearly 2 million copies on cheap paper and using inexpensive binding materials will allow this), the reality of our situation is that there simply are not enough potential buyers for Mr. Cumings's book for us to achieve those economies. Unfortunately we have been in a scholarly book market in decline for at least ten years. Where a university press used to confidently expect to sell 1000 copies of virtually anything they published, that number is now below 400. For all we know such a market may feed on itself: as sales decline, prices go up forcing sales to decline further. But even a book as worthy and potentially as popular as Mr. Cumings's is confronted with the new reality of declining markets, and, believe it or not, we brought the book out in what we thought was a very good price. If Mr. Wilz is also a reader of TLS he will have noted that scholarly books in England are now being priced at 10 *pence* per page and above. In England Mr. Cumings's book would be priced at about \$180.

We are also concerned about our prices and worry that some books may be priced out of the reach of potential customers. If this has indeed happened with Mr. Cumings's book, we are sorry that we have failed in our mission of disseminating the fruits of scholarship to the widest possible audience. I hope that Mr. Wilz will be able to borrow a copy from the library at Indiana. As Mr. Wilz correctly predicted, we do plan to issue a paperback of volume 2 in Spring '92 to match the paperback of volume 1 that has been available for several years. Perhaps Mr. Wilz will also be pleased to hear that Mr. Cumings is currently working on an abridgement of his

monumental two volume work into a single volume of more manageable length which we hope to have on the market in 1993.

I hope this letter will be helpful in explaining some of the considerations that go into pricing a scholarly book.

Eric Rohman
Director of Sales
Princeton University Press

To the Editor

It has been almost eighteen years since I left Vietnam, where for two tours of duty as an officer in the Foreign Service of the United States, I served as Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's executive assistant. Charles H. Davis IV's sketch, "The Evolution of Policy and Strategy in the Vietnam Conflict" (*SHAFR Newsletter*, vol. 21, no. 4, December 1990, pp 10-31), correctly indicates (p. 25) that only a few months earlier, the North Vietnamese considered the war lost and would have accepted any peace terms. This was so not simply because of the "Christmas bombing" of Hanoi and Haiphong in late 1972, which was only a proximate cause. Between "Tet '68" and 1973 a fundamental transformation of South Vietnam had taken place: the military strategy of General Creighton Abrams - centered on building a network of "firebases" - thoroughly defeated the Viet Cong insurgency; and the economic and political program of Ambassador Bunker, carried out to a surprising degree by the President of the Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, constructed a society of considerable confidence and enterprise. It was easily possible to drive unarmed and alone, as I did in the dry season of 1971, from one end of the country to the other with little thought of danger.

The inescapable reality of defeat for the Communist guerrilla insurgency and victory for the United States and our Vietnamese allies is what drove the Hanoi regime to launch a massive, conventional military invasion of the South in April 1972. I was there. As Mr. Davis states, the U.S. role in resisting this effort was limited to air and naval strikes. In open defiance of the hand-wringing pleas and threatening advice of the Americans, the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) carried out a brilliant defensive strategy worthy of Marshal Kutuzov's campaign against Napoleon at Moscow in 1812, and the North Vietnamese tanks were turned back in eventual defeat.

At this point, the war - and the social and political competition - had been won by the ARVN and the U.S. What happened next, in Paris, on Capitol Hill, and at the networks and editorial rooms of the American media, is a matter of record if of differing interpretation. I recall all too well how we gathered in the Embassy conference room to listen to the report of the Paris peace agreement piped in over AFRVN and how shocked we were to hear terms described that would almost certainly give the Communist forces a new lease on life.

I write this not to argue how or why or who is to blame for the Communist takeover of South Vietnam, but to point out that scholars simply have not addressed the 1968-1973 period. Novelists, historians, and docudramatists all treat the war as having peaked with the Tet '68's "defeat" of the U.S. and concluded almost immediately thereafter with the evacuation by helicopter off the roofs of the U.S. Embassy and the Duc Hotel (CIA Headquarters) in Saigon in April 1975. Certainly, the journalists, all mesmerized by the fame of David Halberstam and his colleagues in the mid-1960s, failed to report the evidence of progress in South Vietnam during this period; for them it was *always* "Tet '68."

I hope that scholarly attention eventually will turn to these

"lost years" - the Bunker years of Vietnam. A collection of materials now exists which provides the foundation for such an effort: *The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President from Vietnam, 1967-1973*, 3 volumes, edited by Douglas Pike, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, and the Asia Foundation, 1990.

Charles Hill
Career Minister, Foreign Service of the
United States (ret.)
Senior Research Fellow, Hoover
Institution, Stanford University

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

Starting with this *Newsletter* the several pages describing Awards, Prizes, and Funds will appear only in the June and December issues. The exception to this arrangement will be if changes or additions have occurred recently. For this September issue there is new information regarding the Bernath Dissertation Prize and the Robert Ferrell Prize. Other than changes a list of awards, prizes, and funds will appear in the September and March issues.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition
The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize
The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize
The Myrna L. Bernath Book Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Prize

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR to finance travel to conduct dissertation research.

The amount of the award has been increased to \$1,000.

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE

FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book which is a history of American Foreign relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.

Procedures:

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to the committee chair (to be announced).

Books may be sent at any time during 1991, but must arrive no later than February 1, 1992, for the 1992 prize.

The 1991 award will be approximately \$1,000, and it will be announced at the annual luncheon of SHAFR held in conjunction with the OAH convention in 1992.

(Donations to the Ferrell Prize fund may be sent to the SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer Allan Spetter.)

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Brent W. York.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Send changes of address to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$1.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$2.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication should be typed, double-spaced; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)	1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara)	1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)	1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)	1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)	1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)	1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)	1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
1975 Armin H. Rappaport (CA-San Diego)	1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)	1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)	1989 George Herring (Kentucky)
1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)	1990 Michael Hunt (North Carolina)
1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)	