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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

THE BOXER INDEMNITY REMISSION: A DAMAGE CONTROL DEVICE?

by
Delber L. McKee
WESTMINSTER, EMERITUS

You and I will have to do the best we can...to partially offset the effects of the inaction of Congress. — T. Roosevelt

Why did President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 ask Congress to set aside approximately \$11,000,000 of the \$25,000,000 indemnity, owed by China to the United States, for the purpose of educating Chinese students in America?¹ Was this a generous act? — or one serving a selfish purpose? The question continues to intrigue historians. At the time (1907-1908) the proposal was regarded by the press as unselfish and enlightened. According to the *New York Times* on 20 June 1907, the recommendation, later approved by

¹After the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was crushed by an international expedition, the powers involved chose in 1901 to impose a large indemnity on China in the Boxer Protocol to compensate for loss of life, property damage, and military expenditures. Secretary of State John Hay arbitrarily set \$25,000,000 as the American share of the total. The American negotiators informed him that the amount was excessive, but he apparently hoped to do some bargaining before agreeing to a reduced amount. The term "remission" came into common use subsequently when a final realistic figure was set and the surplus of approximately \$11,000,000 was to be turned back to China. Because a second remission was granted in 1924 the remission discussed here, completed by 28 December 1908, is called the "First Remission." For details see Carroll B. Malone, "The First Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," *American Historical Review* 32 (Oct. 1926): 64-68; or Terence E. Brockhausen, "The Boxer Indemnity: Five Decades of Sino-American Dissension" (Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 1981), 136-164.

Congress, was “not merely magnanimous,” but exhibited “our friendship for China.”² The same view, stated with more restraint, was expressed by historian Carroll B. Malone in an article in the *American Historical Review* in 1926.³

Sharply contrasting assessments followed later, however. By the 1970s historians asserted that altruism was not the correct explanation; rather, national self interest was the real reason for Roosevelt’s action. In the forefront of critics of the earlier view was Michael Hunt, who attacked the “old fable of magnanimity and gratitude in an article in 1972.”⁴ Hunt, making extensive use of Chinese sources, concluded that Chinese leaders much preferred to have the unrestricted restoration of the money and had their own ambitious plans for its use. Shrugging aside Chinese wishes, however, American policy makers chose to make the remission serve America’s own purposes. It would be useful, they thought, as a “cultural investment,” a “valuable hostage to guarantee Chinese good behavior,” and a boost to the nation’s commercial interests.⁵ That is, if the money was used to encourage young Chinese to come to the United States to study rather than go to another foreign country, presumably the recipients would then spread American political and moral ideas upon their return to China; above all, they would favor trade with the United States. The final terms of the remission were set in such a way that China was tied to the \$11,000,000 refund for many years; China would therefore have an interest

²*New York Times*, 20 June 1907, p. 6.

³Malone, “The First Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” 64-68.

⁴Michael H. Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31 (May 1972): 559.

⁵*Ibid.*, 558.

in remaining on good terms with the United States for an extended period.

Hunt's excellent article on the remission is so well documented and convincing that it might seem there is nothing more to be said on the subject, but an obscure note in the Elihu Root papers, written by Roosevelt to Root, who was then his Secretary of State, sheds additional light on the matter. It supports Hunt's thesis regarding self interest, but it opens up a new area of investigation and indicates that short term considerations were important as well as the long range factors stressed by Hunt. According to this overlooked document, the President saw the money's use for education as an improvised answer to an immediate problem. Its wording deserves careful scrutiny.

This note, sent to Root by the President, accompanied a letter received by Roosevelt from Dr. Arthur H. Smith, prominent missionary to China and educator, in which Smith urged the use of part of the Boxer indemnity money of 1901 for educating Chinese youths in America. Smith was arguing that the younger generation was the key to future influence in China. Roosevelt's comments on this letter, dated 3 April 1906, reads:

Dr. Smith is of all living men the best and sanest observer of affairs in China. His letter is worth your careful consideration. I should be inclined to go ahead on the line he indicates as regards the indemnity matter. I do not think Congress will act and therefore you and I will have to do the best we can, together with what outside help we can secure, to partially offset the effects of the inaction of Congress.⁶

⁶Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, 3 April 1906, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress.

The note's wording raises some interesting questions about Roosevelt's thinking. Was he sympathetic to Smith's proposal because he was influenced by the missionary's arguments and reputation as an authority on China? — or did he, as a politician, wish to remain on good terms with this prominent churchman? Did he have any real enthusiasm about returning the money to China? Was he, in fact, greatly interested in educating young Chinese?

In reaching conclusions regarding Roosevelt's thinking on the remission, too much should not, of course, be made of this brief and elliptical note in isolation. Actually, Roosevelt gave several explanations on various occasions for his final decision to use the money for education. To Dr. Smith he wrote in reply that he agreed with the missionary's reasoning and had for some time been in favor of not keeping the money but had "hesitated" because he feared "the Chinese would... interpret it as an act of weakness."⁷ When urging Congress to approve the remission and its use for educational purposes, he gave as his rationale helping Chinese modernization. As he stated in his Annual Message of 3 December 1907, the United States "should help in every practicable way in the education of the Chinese people, so that...China may gradually adapt itself to modern conditions. One way of doing this is by promoting the coming of Chinese students to this country."⁸

These reasons given by Roosevelt cannot be taken lightly by historians, but there is still room for skepticism. Why did he wait so long to act if he had a strong desire to modernize China — or to be fair to China — or encourage students to

⁷Roosevelt to Arthur H. Smith, 3 April 1906, in *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Elting E. Morison et al., (Cambridge, 1951), 5:206.

⁸U. S. Congress, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (New York, 1902-1908), 15:7009.

come to the United States for their education? Five years or more was a long time for reflection without action. His justification to Smith that he had waited because he did not want Peking to think he was acting from a position of weakness had a hollow ring. Presumably he meant that he did not want to appear to be yielding because of pressure from the Chinese boycott (to be discussed later) of American goods of May 1905, but he had not done anything in the interval between 1901 and that time. Not until he was subjected to a great deal of prodding by diplomatic problems in and after 1905, and then came to see the remission as a diplomatic tool, did he move.

Without dismissing Roosevelt's other explanations entirely it would seem reasonable, in accounting for his final course of action to give the greatest credence to his comments in confidence to Secretary of State Root. One point that stands out in the note is that the remission was not his first choice; he much preferred to have Congress take action. Disappointed, however, by the "inaction" of Congress Roosevelt was finally ready to recommend a remission for educational purposes as a less satisfactory alternative.

What had Roosevelt wanted from Congress, and why did its failure to give him what he sought matter so greatly to him? The abbreviated note itself offers no clue, but it is easy to tell what he meant by a review of what was happening at that time in relations with China. In 1905 the President had been shaken by a backlash in the form of a boycott of American goods against the exclusion policy, which had come to be administered in a harsh and increasingly restrictive manner. Before the boycott the Chinese government in 1904 had sought a less stringent immigration treaty after terminating the ten-year Gresham-Yang Treaty of 1894 on immigration. When negotiations bogged down, and when the exclusion policy remained in effect in 1905 without change, Chinese merchants in Shanghai and elsewhere took matters in their own hands

and agreed among themselves not to buy American goods. Their decision came at meetings in Shanghai on 10 and 16 May 1905, and the boycott was originally scheduled to begin officially on 20 July but later rescheduled for 1 August.⁹

While the boycott itself is an important story it has been told by others and need not be retold in detail here.¹⁰ What is relevant here is the way Roosevelt was involved and how the boycott influenced American policy on remission. Americans with interests in China saw the approaching boycott as a disaster and pleaded with the President to do something to avert it. The outcry from businessmen, spearheaded by the American Asiatic Association, led Roosevelt to pledge them on 12 June 1905 that he would seek less restrictive

⁹Delber L. McKee, *Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906: Clashes over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era* (Detroit, 1977), 106.

¹⁰For an excellent review of the boycott and for a synthesis of scholarship on that subject see Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York, 1983), 227-49. For the boycott as a nationalistic expression see Shih-shan H. Ts'ai, "Reaction to Exclusion: The Boycott of 1905 and Chinese National Awakening," *Historian*, 39 (Nov. 1976): 95. For an older study emphasizing economic aspects see Charles F. Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts* (Baltimore, 1933), ch. 4. For its connection with the emergence of a public opinion in China see Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Case of Late Ch'ing China," in *Approaches to Modern Chinese History*, eds. Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphey, and Mary C. Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), 232. For a book length study of the boycott with emphasis on China's new nationalism see Chang Ts'un-wu, *Chung Mei Kung-yueh Feng-ch'ao [Agitation Concerning the Sino-American Labor Treaty, 1905]* (Taipei, Taiwan, 1966). See also McKee, *Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906*; and Margaret Field, "The Boycott of 1905," *Papers on China*, 11 (Harvard University, 1957): 63-98. The preceding list is representative, rather than exhaustive.

immigration legislation from Congress.¹¹ This promise, intended at the time to head off the boycott, failed to accomplish its purpose, but the boycott proved to be short lived and less damaging than was feared at first. Although some agitation lingered on into 1906, most of the steam was out of the Chinese merchant enterprise by December 1905 when Roosevelt delivered his Annual Message to Congress. Nevertheless, the President kept his promise and urged Congress to change the exclusion laws so as to allow all Chinese except laborers to enter the United States.¹²

If Congress had acted favorably on Roosevelt's request, the new policy would have represented a major shift from the existing exclusion policy which, by the early 1900s barred all Chinese from admission to the United States except temporary residents such as students, officials, travelers, merchants, and teachers. Favorable action by Congress would have removed a major Chinese grievance against the United States. A bill (HR 12973), introduced by David J. Foster, Republican congressman from Vermont, on 24 January 1906 reflected the wishes of the President and quickly became the rallying point for groups having an interest in China.¹³ In the vanguard of

¹¹*New York Times*, 13 June 1905, p. 8; "The Administration of the Chinese Exclusion Laws," *Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 5 (July 1905): 168.

¹²Congress, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 15:7009.

¹³The imposing delegation at the hearings that had been assembled by the American Asiatic Association included spokesmen for the National Association of Manufacturers, the New England Cotton Manufacturers Association, the Southern Manufacturers Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the City of New York, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, the Boston Merchants Association, the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers Club of Cincinnati, the American Cotton Manufacturers Association, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, the Protestant Episcopal

supporters of the bill was the American Asiatic Association, which had assembled an imposing delegation of businessmen and religious leaders to speak on its behalf at the House of Representatives hearings that began on 15 February 1906. At that point prospects for passage of the bill seemed bright. The hearings dragged on, however, until April 1906 by which time an opposition movement composed of Californians, organized labor, and others had mounted a major counterattack and succeeded in blocking congressional action.¹⁴ So it became clear to Roosevelt, as he indicated in his comment to Root on 3 April 1906, that he would fail to get a change in policy on exclusion from Congress.

With the boycott over by that time the President might have given up the fight. He had made a good faith effort; it was not his fault the restrictive policy remained frozen in place. Nevertheless, his note to Root insisted that the two of them would still have to do "the best we can." Why did he feel under pressure to find some alternative? The answer underlines common assumptions in America in the early 1900s. One assumption, a widely held myth, was that the

Board of Missions, the Missionary Board of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the American Board of Foreign Missions. "The delegation," announced Asiatic Association Secretary, John Foord, "is possessed of only one voice, and that voice we propose to deliver in favor of the House bill 12973." House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on Chinese Exclusion*, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 1905-1906, 20. For further details on the Asiatic Association's opposition to the exclusion policy see James J. Lorence, "Business and Reform: The American Asiatic Association and the Exclusion Laws," *Pacific Historical Review* 39 (Nov. 1970): 421-38.

¹⁴McKee, *Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906*, 176-84.

China market had enormous potential.¹⁵ With the recently proclaimed open door policy of 1899-1900 American businessmen hoped to penetrate this vast market and prosper mightily. Another belief of that time, held by a number of Protestant churches in America, was that the Chinese could be converted to Christianity in large numbers if missionary activity were energetically promoted in that country.¹⁶ These aspirations of businessmen and churchmen had been threatened by the anti-American boycott, and it was not sufficient, for their purposes, to have the boycott end officially; these Americans wanted the Chinese to have a positive and favorable attitude toward America and Americans. Obviously, Chinese businessmen could not be forced to buy American goods, and they might well decide to switch their purchases to Japanese, British, or other non-American traders if a residue of ill will toward the United States remained in the months and years ahead. American missionaries, wanting Chinese to be receptive to the Christian faith, had a similar need to maintain a favorable Chinese attitude toward Americans.

Unfortunately for these American interests, much evidence existed in 1905-1906 to show that the boycott agitation had aroused considerable anti-American sentiment in China. Pamphlets and flyers in Canton and elsewhere disseminated stories of mistreatment of Chinese at American ports of

¹⁵Paul Varg explores this subject in *The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897-1912* (East Lansing, 1968). See also his article, "The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914," *American Historical Review* 73 (Feb. 1968): 642-58.

¹⁶Paul Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952* (Princeton, 1958), 52-67, 86-104.

entry.¹⁷ Chinese students told tales of insulting treatment by American immigration officials and of being rejected at San Francisco over minor irregularities in their passport documents and forced to return to China. Various expressions of hostility surfaced among the Chinese people. In south China, for example, a young man took a hatchet and broke up his prized American-made record player.¹⁸ His family made a pile of American-made items in their home and burned them. In Shanghai a man committed suicide near the American consulate in protest over the exclusion policy.¹⁹ On 28 October 1905 a mob in the remote village of Lienchow in south China murdered six American missionary personnel.²⁰ Consul Julius Lay in Canton wrote Minister William W. Rockhill: "My chair coolies are hooted at in the street, and I would not be surprised if my servants left me."²¹ A petition signed by over a thousand merchants from many parts of China, dated 1 October 1905, warned the American legation that, even though the boycott was ending officially,

¹⁷McKee, *Chinese Exclusion versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906*, 160.

¹⁸Arthur H. Smith, *China and America To-Day: A Study of Conditions and Relations* (New York, 1907), 172.

¹⁹Chang, *Chung Mei Kung-yueh Feng-ch'ao*, 220-21; Field, "The Chinese Boycott of 1905," 63; Ts'ai, "Reaction to Exclusion," 298.

²⁰For the first report see Julius Lay to Elihu Root, 3 November 1905, Canton Dispatches, Record Group [RG] 59, National Archives [NA]. For the final report see Enc. in Lay to State Department, 26 December 1905, *ibid.*. For a study that maintains the boycott had nothing to do with the massacre see Edward J. M. Rhoads, "Nationalism and Xenophobia in Kwangtung (1905-1906): The Canton Anti-American Boycott and the Lienchow Anti-Missionary Uprising," *Papers on China* (Harvard University, 1962): 177.

²¹Lay to State Department, 30 October 1905, Canton Dispatches, RG 59, NA.

they would still informally pledge among themselves not to buy American products unless Congress changed the exclusion policy to avoid the exclusion or mistreatment of visiting Chinese merchants.²²

It was clear that the boycott had done much damage to long term American interests, and Roosevelt felt obliged to do more than take satisfaction that the disruption was officially over. Somehow he had to regain Chinese good will toward America. The time to use the stick was over; the time to offer carrots had arrived.

But why did Roosevelt, now that he was thinking in terms of damage control, single out students for special attention? Instead of using the remission to help them he might easily have chosen another alternative, and influential people both in and outside of his administration were pressing him to support their pet projects.²³ The answer to this question is many faceted. One important point is the general conviction at that time that the best way for Americans to gain influence in China was by attracting Chinese students to the United States. One American business spokesman who frequently expressed that view was John Foord, Secretary of the American Asiatic Association; he summed up the business outlook succinctly in a 1902 statement at a congressional hearing: "The student question we regard as of considerable importance....That is to

²²"Letters from Hang Shen-hsiu and more than thousand Others, Representing Chinese Merchants of every Province" to William W. Rockhill, 1 October 1905, Peking Legation Archives, RG 59, NA. See also Department of Commerce and Labor, RG 85, 52320/27. In all, the signatures numbered 1,241.

²³For a discussion of one such proposal see Richard H. Werking, "The Boxer Indemnity Remission and the Hunt Thesis," *Diplomatic History* 2 (Winter, 1978): 105. Werking calls attention to the proposal by Secretary Root to allocate a million dollars of the remission to upgrade consular facilities in China, Korea, and Japan.

say, we would like to take the youths and educate them to American ideas and lead them up to trade."²⁴ Spokesmen for the missionary community expressed a similar keen interest. Dr. Smith, for example, put the case in broad terms: "The nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial influence."²⁵ Educators in China were of the same opinion. In a letter to Roosevelt on 15 May 1905, at the time the Chinese merchants were making their decision to boycott, American members of the Education Association of China in Shanghai stressed that America... had a vital stake in having "the young men of China...pursue their studies in our schools and colleges under the influence of American ideals and American institutions."²⁶ Diplomats also insisted that the national interest would be well served by attracting Chinese students.

²⁴Senate Committee on Immigration, *Hearings on Chinese Exclusion*, S2960, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, 12.

²⁵Smith, *China and America To-Day*, 214.

²⁶Committee Representing American members of the Educational Association of China to Roosevelt, 19 May 1905, Segregated Chinese Records, File Box 85, Packet #12,264, RG 58, NA. See copies also in China Dispatches and the Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. The substantial American missionary stake in education and Chinese students is better appreciated when one realizes that, in 1905, 2,585 schools in China were under the control of Protestant missions. Included in this number were twelve American controlled colleges. In addition, American missionary-educators headed some recently (post-1895) established important state universities, namely: the Imperial University of Peking — W. A. P. Martin; Peiyang College, Tientsin — Charles D. Tenny; and Nanyang College, Shanghai — John C. Ferguson. Hosea B. Morse and Harley F. McNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (Boston, 1931), 546-47.

“A Chinese who acquires his education in this country,” stated Charles Denby, Jr., representing the State Department at hearings on the boycott in 1906, “goes back predisposed toward America and American goods.”²⁷

Another point to note is that Americans were surprised and alarmed to learn that young people in China had responded enthusiastically to the launching of the boycott and that they were leaders in anti-American public demonstrations in the cities. At Christian college campuses in China students organized protest meetings and sent petitions to Roosevelt objecting to the exclusion policy and calling for its revision. Two such petitions, respectful but insistent, came from Anglo-Chinese College in Foochow and Canton Christian College.²⁸ In Shanghai students energetically publicized the boycott and pressured merchants to observe it. When merchants lost enthusiasm and prepared to abandon the operation, the students, reported Consul General James Rodgers of Shanghai, were passionately resisting their doing so.²⁹ James N. Jameson, prominent in educational circles in Shanghai, wrote to Rodgers that the students had “educational associations in nearly every important city,” and continued “to meet together and pass resolutions condemnatory of our Government and

²⁷Senate Committee on Immigration, *Hearings before the Committee on Immigration of the United States Senate on the Boycott of American Manufactured Goods by the People of China*, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 1905-1906, 8.

²⁸Edward S. Ling, Chairman of the Committee for Students and Teachers of the Anglo-Chinese College, Foochow, China, to Theodore Roosevelt, 2 June 1905, Segregated Chinese Records, File Box 85, RG 85, NA. Oscar F. Wisner to William W. Rockhill, 15 July 1905, in Rockhill to State Department, 26 July 1905, China Dispatches, Enc. 3, RG 59, NA.

²⁹James L. Rodgers to State Department, 10 January 1906, Shanghai Dispatches, RG 59, NA.

[were] making excitable speeches in denunciation of nearly everything the Americans have done."³⁰

A key individual in the State Department, William W. Rockhill, was a strong advocate of using part of the remission for education; and, as the specialist on Asia in the Department, had considerable influence in Asian matters on the Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909, Elihu Root.³¹ He was the one who first discussed the subject officially with the Chinese diplomat, Minister Liang Ch'eng, in Washington in May 1905 before he left Washington to take up his diplomatic post in China.³²

Some American educators came out in favor of channeling the funds toward education. At the University of Washington, for example, faculty members worked on a bill that they hoped their senator would sponsor in the interest of promoting the education of Chinese students.³³ Press endorsement of this concept came from the *San Francisco Chronicle* on January 1906.³⁴ Thus Roosevelt heard the same kind of message from various influential sources.

If Japan had not dramatically gained prominence in international affairs in 1905, the anti-American sentiment among young Chinese might have bothered American China-watchers less, but Japan, after a few decades of internal transformation, had scored an unexpected and spectacular victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 10 February

³⁰James N. Jameson to Consul General James L. Rodgers, 7 November 1905, in "Correspondence," *Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 5 (Jan. 1906): 357.

³¹Hunt, "The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," 549.

³²*Ibid.*, 547.

³³*San Francisco Chronicle*, 15 Jan. 1906.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 17 Jan. 1906.

1905 to 5 September 1906. In witnessing this Asian triumph over a Western imperial power, young Chinese, who were frustrated and angered by foreign encroachments on China and searching for means of dealing with this problem, were certain to be impressed by the Japanese model. Indeed, large numbers of them were flocking to Japan, maintained a writer in *Japan Mail* on 25 June 1905. According to the clipping forwarded to Roosevelt by the Peking Legation, the writer supported his assertion by quoting a Japanese newspaper, the *Jiji Shimpo*, that "scarcely a steamer brings less than a hundred, and...three or four hundred are always waiting in Shanghai for an opportunity to come."³⁵ It was cold comfort for Roosevelt to be informed by Jeremiah M. Jenks, Cornell economist and member of the International Commission for the Gold Standard, that 3000 Chinese students were currently in Japan while 300 to 500 per country were in Germany, Belgium, and France; only 50, he thought, were in the United States.³⁶ Although the figure Jenks gave for the United States was too low, and the correct number in 1905 was 130, that number was still distressingly small.³⁷ The disproportion was even more striking in 1906 when only 217 Chinese were studying in this country while 15,000 were studying in Japan.³⁸

Would Japan become the predominant tutoring power for China and dash any hopes that Americans had of playing that role? That prospect seemed to be a real one to Francis M. Huntington Wilson, the American chargé d'affaires in Japan

³⁵Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, [Incoming] 6 June 1905—3 July 1905, Library of Congress.

³⁶Jeremiah M. Jenks to Roosevelt, 10 August 1905, *ibid.*.

³⁷Wang, Yi Chu, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949* (Chapel Hill, 1966), Appendix B.

³⁸*Ibid.*

in 1906, who cautioned the State Department that the large numbers of Chinese students in Japan could have a pronounced "effect upon the relations of these two peoples."³⁹ In Shanghai in 1906 twenty-two missionaries sent a statement to their boards and societies lamenting the Chinese student enthusiasm for Japan and the trend among Chinese youths to go to that country to study where they would be removed from missionary contacts and exposed to "anti-Christian and anti-foreign [*sic*] ideas."⁴⁰

A serious problem confronting the President, if he wanted to meet the challenge from Japan, was to find some way to reduce this outflow of students from China to Japan and redirect it in part to the United States. He could well envision, if he did nothing to reverse the current trend, the China market, as well as the interests of missionaries and educators, to be in danger. Yes, to a great extent, his hands were tied. Congress, he had found, would not act. Powerful exclusionist forces were too strong to allow any significant weakening of the existing barriers to Chinese immigration. Root and he, nevertheless, had to "do the best we can."

For Roosevelt, it is clear, the use of the remission for education was to serve as a "damage control" device to regain some favor with Chinese students and counteract continuing hostile attitudes in China. Moreover, the action would please the missionary community as represented by Smith, and it would be welcomed by educators as well as by Foord and his American Asiatic Society. For a politician a political plus was

³⁹Francis M. Huntington Wilson to State Department, 3 January 1906, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906* (Washington, 1907), 1072.

⁴⁰"General Missionary Intelligence," *Missionary Review of the World*, 39, o.s., 19, n.s. (July 1906): 855.

always welcome. Still, it was a defensive move, adopted only when the President could get nothing better.

Representative William H. Stafford of Vermont affirmed and emphasized the damage control aspect in a House debate in May 1908 when he advocated the return of these funds to China. "What we desire more than anything else at the present time," he declared, "is to establish a kindly feeling toward us in the Chinese Empire." But that did not exist at the time, he stressed. "You are all acquainted with the feeling that has existed heretofore." Some steps had to be taken, he insisted, to preserve and increase trade with China. That trade was "of the utmost value to this nation."⁴¹

In the final terms that China accepted in 1908 regarding the return of part of the indemnity, the money would be used by China to send 100 students to the United States each year for four years and 50 after that for the rest of the remission period.⁴² The actual number of students to qualify was at first below the stipulated figure; in 1909, the first year of implementation, only 47 were approved by the Chinese to study in America in 1910. The amount to be paid according to the terms worked out by the two governments, was to come from China to the United States and then back into the fund in monthly installments and to total up to \$13,655,592.60 (with a possible \$2,000,000 in claims to Americans still to be taken from this sum) at 4% interest, with the final payment to be in 1940.⁴³

⁴¹*Congressional Record*, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 23 May 1908, 42: 6843.

⁴²Hunt, "The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," 554-55. Some of the money ended up establishing a preparatory school in Peking. *Ibid.*, 539n. For the official record see U.S. Congress, House Document 1275, 60th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 147, no. 5557.

⁴³Brockhausen, "The Boxer Indemnity," 156.

While the course pursued in this affair by Roosevelt fitted the long range American aspirations of opening up China to this nation's trade and cultural influence, it is apparent that the remission enabled Roosevelt to solve a short range public relations problem also. To counteract the embittered Chinese atmosphere lingering after the boycott, he had to try remedies outside of conventional government to government diplomacy. Despite the fact that this vexing diplomatic problem persisted throughout most of Roosevelt's second term from 1905 to 1909, he remained boxed in by pro and anti exclusion forces and had little room to maneuver. By using the remission to encourage Chinese students to come to America he finally did, as he wrote Root, the best he could.

Although the short term public relations aspect has not been given its due heretofore and should be recognized, the remission story is also valuable in illustrating the crippling effect of racial discrimination in American foreign policy.⁴⁴ When one connects the open door policy with the exclusion policy and then considers the boycott followed by the remission, one quickly realizes how paralyzing this major contradiction in American aims toward China could be. While Americans wanted a favored place — or at least an even playing field — for trade, the discriminatory and offensive character of the exclusion policy frustrated that desire. The negative effects of the exclusion policy were not so disruptive as to bar altogether the door to the trade and cultural penetration Americans dreamed about, but they obviously made passage through that door more difficult. Roosevelt found he could not easily reconcile the open door with

⁴⁴The exclusion policy began as a class-based policy — the exclusion of Chinese laborers — but it evolved into a race-based policy. For a perceptive discussion of American racism and its implications for American foreign policy see the chapter entitled "The Hierarchy of Race" in *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Michael H. Hunt, (New Haven, 1987), 46-91.

exclusion, but he felt he had to make an effort. "You and I," he told his Secretary of State, "will have to do the best we can...to partially offset the effects of the inaction of Congress."

THE KGB BEGAN TO OPEN ITS ARCHIVES TO WESTERN RESEARCHERS: NEW DOCUMENTS ON FREDERICK WERNER GRAF VON SCHULENBERG

by
Regina Gramer¹
RUTGERS

The end of the Cold War did not just bring down the Berlin Wall, but also triggered the opening of the green and wrought-iron gate of the KGB archives in Moscow. Germany, once at the forefront of the Cold War divide in Europe, has turned into a new frontier for Soviet demonstrations of archival *glasnost*. After officially announcing the opening of the pre-1960 Soviet Foreign Ministry archives in August of 1990 — accompanied by the dramatic distribution of the Soviet equivalent of George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram," the Novikov Telegram of 27 September 1947² — the Soviet Union has taken a maybe even more spectacular step in announcing the opening of the KGB archives. In an unprecedented but equally well-crafted move, the KGB has declassified its first substantial set of archival documents and

¹For comments and advice, I thank Warren Kimball and David Foglesong.

²For an English translation of "The Novikov Telegram" and commentaries, see "The Soviet Side of the Cold War: A Symposium," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Fall 1991): 523-63.

deposited copies at the Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives) in Koblenz, Germany, in July of 1991. General Lieutenant Sergei A. Kondrashov, an advisor to then KGB Chief Vladimir A. Kryuchkov,³ brought a dossier of about 100 secret documents on Friedrich Werner Graf von Schulenburg, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1934 to 1941, to Germany to make them available to Western researchers.

Diplomatic historians comment frequently on the specific shortcomings of the Cold War historiography that is exclusively based on Western documents. The prospect for a growing opportunity to gain access to Soviet documents, and for a multi-sided reassessment of the Cold War, has been a source of both excitement and frustration for historians. As John Lewis Gaddis has noted most recently, the Soviets promised large-scale archival openings, but there has been little apparent progress toward the release of documents.⁴ Despite the danger of selective access to Soviet archives and documents — which may result in overrating the significance of those few documents made available for largely contemporary political reasons — diplomatic historians need

³Kryuchkov was elevated to KGB chief by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988 and is now imprisoned. He is charged with treason and faces a possible death sentence for leading the failed coup in August of 1991. For more information on Kryuchkov and the post-coup status of the KGB see David Wise, "Closing Down the K.G.B.," *The New York Times Magazine* (24 November 1991).

⁴See John Lewis Gaddis' introduction to the symposium "The Soviet Side of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Fall 1991): 525. Also note the most recent announcement of the British publishing company Chadwyck-Healey that it had reached an agreement with the Russian Government to microfilm the entire Communist Party's archives in Moscow, which some have estimated include more than 70 million documents [*The New York Times* (22 January 1992)].

to know about the changes in Soviet and Russian archives so they can play a more active role in their opening. In July of 1991, the KGB invited German historians to respond to Soviet initiatives and to cooperate toward the release of further documents from the KGB archives. American diplomatic historians seeking access to Soviet documents and searching for ways to make their research requests more effective might gain from quoting General Lieutenant Kondrashov's invitation translated at the end of this article.

What follows is a summary of a German newspaper article about the Graf von Schulenburg documents, written by Karl-Heinz Janßen and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, entitled "Der KGB lädt ein: Die sowjetischen Archive öffnen sich, [The KGB invites: The Soviet archives open up]" in *Die Zeit* of 19 July 1991.

As German ambassador in Moscow in 1941, Graf von Schulenburg tried to prevent war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, going so far as to warn the Soviet government of the German attack on the Soviet Union on 22 July 1941, which he had opposed for a long time. Three and one-half years later, in November of 1944, the Nazis executed him as a senior conspirator in the 20th of July assassination plot against Adolf Hitler. The documents from the secret KGB dossier on Schulenburg mainly consist of deciphered telegrams of the German Embassy to offices in Berlin, and agency reports from circles around Schulenburg. At first sight, these espionage reports seem to mix banalities with explosive news; observations of Schulenburg in Moscow combined with information on his trips to the Caucasus and to his superiors in Berlin, as well as the attempts by the National Socialists to keep him on the party line. The Soviet secret service, then the NKVD, also seems to have known about the failed plans of the Gestapo to kill Schulenburg.

The Schulenburg dossier has not yet been examined systematically, but the initial impression of the Schulenburg

biographer and German historian, Ingeborg Fleischhauer, has been very positive. Fleischhauer — author of *“Diplomatischer Widerstand” gegen ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’* [*“Diplomatic Resistance” against ‘Operation Barbarossa’*], (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1991) — called these “sensational” documents a “very good supplement to diplomatic sources,” enabling one to understand, for instance, conversations between Hitler and Schulenburg about which only rumors had circulated so far. Even more important, Fleischhauer has tested the new openness of the Soviet secret service by asking for a research permit for the KGB archives and unexpectedly received one. This was a stark contrast to the response she received asking the British secret service for a similar research permit. British officials told her to inquire again in 2016.

So far, however, only a few selected personnel files have been released by the KGB. Ninety percent of the holdings of the KGB archives are still classified. To substantiate this recent liberalization effort, the deputy director of the KGB archives, V. Vinogradov, has announced the compilation of a catalogue that would list all its holdings. That the KGB has chosen the Schulenburg dossier for its demonstrative presentation of declassified documents in Germany, is certainly no coincidence. The Germans honor him as a Resistance fighter, and the Russians consider him a friend. Schulenburg, who assumed his diplomatic post in 1934 at a low point of German-Soviet relations, soon became adopted by the Russians as “*unser Graf*” (our Count). The Soviet secret service had found out how Alfred Rosenberg, the main ideologue of the National Socialist Party, had put pressure on Schulenburg to never forget that he represented the National Socialist state. Yet, Schulenburg preserved his inner independence. He considered himself a non-ideological diplomat in the tradition of Bismarck’s *Realpolitik*. From early on he worked against those National Socialists who sought *Lebensraum* in the East. Fleischhauer has described

Schulenburg's dilemma between two totalitarian systems — being abhorred by Hitler, Schulenburg and his friends tended to pass milder judgments on Stalin than do current historians. Having experienced the German destruction of Tsarist Russia and the rise of the Bolsheviks to power, Schulenburg's cohort developed, according to Fleischhauer, a feeling of "national guilt" toward the defeated and traditional Russia. When war broke out, despite the Nazi-Soviet Pact that Schulenburg had helped to negotiate, the German ambassador in Moscow was driven to despair. During the war, Schulenburg was especially eager to ease the fate of the Poles. He asked the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to free Polish prisoners in the Soviet Union, and he helped Polish Jews who had escaped from the Nazis. In a typical gesture of anxious helplessness, he raised both hands as he had to hand over Hitler's declaration of war to Foreign Minister Molotov — the same gesture he made standing in front of the German "People's Court" in November of 1944.

If Fleischhauer's research permit does not remain an exception, diplomatic historians will begin to find answers to a whole range of "blank spots" in Soviet history and Soviet foreign relations. Some of the following questions in the field of German-Soviet relations between 1937 and 1952 could be reconsidered: did the two secret services cooperate in the run-up to the 1937-38 purge in the Red Army? Did Stalin think about a preventive attack in the final phase of a long war between Germany and the Western allies? Did Stalin actually seek an agreement with Hitler through Schulenburg in the first few days after the German attack on the Soviet Union? What motives and reasons were hidden behind Stalin's note of March 1952 offering German unification for German neutrality?

Gaining access to Soviet documents is difficult because state and party offices still control their own archival holdings.

There are no general archival laws in the Soviet Union.⁵ In April of 1991 a group of Soviet and German historians issued a common appeal to Soviet offices to open up all archives and to issue standard international archival regulations (with a waiting period of no more than thirty years). While archival reformers and conservatives in the Soviet Union will continue to quarrel, the opening up of the archives in the Russian Federation seems imminent. Anatolij Prokopenko, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Russian Archives, announced that the parliament would soon be able to pass Russian archival legislation that would allow full access to documents more than thirty years old. The announcement of KGB advisor Kondrashov of the opening up of the archival holdings of the secret service even before the passing of a general archival legislation is probably part of a large-scale "charm-offensive" by the KGB to improve its political and public image. [End of summary.]

"The plain truth"

[The following is a direct translation of an interview with KGB General Sergei A. Kondrashov conducted by Marion Gräfin Dönhoff and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff from the German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*.]

ZEIT: Lieutenant General Kondrashov, you came to Germany with an entire briefcase full of documents from the KGB archives. Why?

SERGEI A. KONDRASHOV: We have to find out the truth about the outbreak of World War II and the German attack on the Soviet Union, and we have to make our knowledge accessible to the public. We will not find out the plain truth

⁵A number are, however, being considered by the Soviet government.

without the documents of the secret services, not just of our own, but of the secret services of all countries involved. The truth about the prewar history cannot simply rely on diplomatic documents alone. When we heard that a symposium on the politics of the Soviet Union before the war would take place in Bad Godesberg — and this politics, of course, was geared toward preventing the war — , and when we heard that the activities of the German ambassador Graf von der Schulenburg would be dealt with — he tried many times to improve the relationship between Germany and Soviet Union at that time — , we asked ourselves: What do we actually have on the activities of Graf Schulenburg here in Moscow in the archives of the NKVD and OGPU?

ZEIT: And then you went into the archives to check?

KONDRASHOV: Yes, as I was browsing through this dossier, I saw that there was interesting material on Graf von Schulenburg — material, that shows that the Graf was a convinced opponent of National Socialism in 1933-34 and afterwards. He did not conceal his feelings and his political opinions, often expressing his critical evaluations of Ribbentrop's foreign policy. In our view, this is very important to assess correctly the life and work of Schulenburg.

ZEIT: What have you found in the archives? What are these documents about?

KONDRASHOV: These are reports of various secret agents from the Soviet Union, also from Berlin. We know from the papers, that we have here and now at our disposal, that the NKVD had good sources in the leadership of the Nazi Party and the state leadership in Berlin. Around Graf von Schulenburg in Moscow there were good informants anyways. Based on their information, our administration concluded that the Nazi-leadership did not agree with Schulenburg's line of improving the relationship between both countries.

ZEIT: Is there also material on the discontent of the Berlin leadership with Schulenburg?

KONDRASHOV: Yes, there are documents that indicate that the National Socialist leadership played with the idea of transferring Schulenburg.

ZEIT: One document reveals that the Gestapo had cast an eye on Schulenburg?

KONDRASHOV: Yes. We have documents according to which the Gestapo had planned something against Schulenburg. An accident or something of that sort was supposed to happen.

ZEIT: Members of the 20th of July resistance group thought it possible that Stalin would have been prepared for an armistice with an administration led by Stauffenberg and Goerdeler.

KONDRASHOV: At this moment, I do not have any material at hand about this.

ZEIT: Are you prepared to put more documents, including also documents on other questions, from the KGB archives at the disposal of historians in the future?

KONDRASHOV: This will depend on how the cooperation will develop in the immediate future. For this is not our task, but one for German historians to take on. We are in favor of getting together in order to find the historical truth on the prewar history.

ZEIT: That means that German historians have to approach you?

KONDRASHOV: Yes. We are making the first step, and we expect, of course, that German historians are ready to cooperate with us, and not just with the KGB, but also with Soviet historians.

ZEIT: Cooperation with the KGB — that sounds very awkward for us in the West.

KONDRASHOV: We believe that time has come to work on all levels and in all areas with more mutual trust. Not just between governments, not just between peoples, this is, of course, the main point, also between secret services. This is

very important for a faster progress in improving the relationship between our two countries.

CLEARING UP THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

by

R. C. Raack

CALIFORNIA STATE — HAYWARD, EMERITUS

Part II

At least three international conferences (in Bonn; Berlin; and Bellagio, Italy) were held around the anniversary to recall the beginning of the German-Soviet war, a major historical turning point, and to review the historiography centering on it in the light of considerable new information from eastern, particularly Soviet, archives. In addition, a major photographic exhibition, "Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941-1945 [The War against the Soviet Union, 1941-1945]"⁹ is, as of this writing, still in place in Berlin. The conference in Bonn was most narrowly focused, dedicated to "Die Friedensbemühungen der Russland-Diplomatie 1938-1944 [The Peace Efforts in Diplomacy Bearing on Russia, 1938-1945]" — an awkward translation, but the original is not much better.¹⁰ The conference in Berlin was entitled "Der

⁹The catalogue's title is that of the exhibit. It is edited by Reinhard Rürup, Berlin, 1991.

¹⁰I take note from my own interest in the Western efforts to deal with the Soviets that this Conference program oddly and conspicuously lacked any reference to the subject of contemporary French *Bemühungen*, and, just as oddly, lacked any reference to Poland, which was going to have to be restored in some form if any peace was to come about. (Poland really was

Vernichtungskrieg gegen die Sowjetunion, 1941-45 [The War of Annihilation against the Soviet Union, 1941-45],” and that in Bellagio, “June 1941: Fifty Years Later.”¹¹ In each case, the reports went somewhat beyond the scope of the announced conference titles and, in the case of the latter two conferences, well into the realm of wartime diplomacy.

To each conference historians from both sides of the former Iron Curtain were invited, including, at least to Bonn and Bellagio, some of the better known hacks of “Neo-Stalinist historical” journalism. In fact they dominated in the Soviet delegation to Bonn (where the talk of *Friedensbemühungen* centered — a fact the conference organizers there might want to try to explain). Among this group were some of those who used to consistently flay the West propagandistically, always

the “hot potato” diplomatic issue all during the war, for how could a mutually satisfactory peace be established if either one of the two original aggressors was to end up with its half of the swag from the original wartime aggression?)

Those Soviet invited guests in Bonn were V. A. Sipols, Lev A. Bezymenskii, and F. N. Kovalev, all stalwarts of the “neo-Stalinist” historical order, and even recently staunch defenders of Stalin’s Pact with Hitler. (For their views, see *Prawda*, 11 August 1989, 5.) But no Polish scholars, reformed or unreformed “neo-Stalinist” — and there were, and are, plenty of the latter around — were invited. This may explain why the discussions in Berlin, as I suggest in the text, were apparently so much more interesting. Perhaps the Bonn organizers had a “peace” agenda, but on the Polish-Soviet historical agenda (news reports these days tell us that they have begun to dig up the corpses of the rest of the Polish officer corps and other groups of the pre-war Polish elite not found at Katyn, and murdered on Kremlin orders by the NKVD, from graves elsewhere in the Soviet Union) there remains too much to be resolved before peace is at hand.

¹¹Organized by Stanford Professors Alexander Dallin and Norman Naimark.

shrilly and more often than not downright dishonestly, from points of safety in the old eastern order.¹²

One perennial historical problem was readily manifested in all the discussions. Historians know (or ought to) from experience and training that radically different points of view on the same events are sometimes taken on the basis of substantially, sometimes almost totally, different sources. In the case of records long open and long available to all researchers, there is simply no excusing historians' failures to consult all the sources, or at least, in the case of marginally important aspects of their subjects, to consult reliable reports of the contents of neglected sources, and of ancillary historical issues published monographically or in serials. To be sure, when offering findings not based on all possibly relevant sources, historians should know that they must at least measure out the strength of their conclusions in keeping with the strengths and limitations of their evidence. Where, however, many of the available records have been, or remain closed, or open only to one side, as was, and remains the case with so vast a quantity of the materials relevant to the subjects in discussion at the three conferences, the issue is manifestly different. It really can be a case of a number of partially sighted investigators investigating the same elephant. And, as in the case of some of the reports at these conferences, the disputed results reflect the evidential limitations.

Here some of the Soviet scholars had access to much of the newly available evidence on the coming of the war and its

¹²Perhaps these invitations were meant as generous gestures to suggest that by-gones ought to be by-gones. Yet it must be remarked that, had that old eastern order these chaps so stridently served, achieved the grand triumph many of its champions imagined (instead of ending up confessed by its leaders as bankrupt), those who gave them their invitations would have ended up in the historical ashcan or worse. And what kind of food for historical thought is to be found there?

course, but probably wanted, because they have been locked away for so many years, the grounding in the mass of long available Western materials which the non-Soviet scholars had seen. In the future, it appears, some Western (and Eastern) scholars may be selectively admitted to some Soviet, and, possibly, to other East Bloc collections as well. Here a caveat is necessary: The nature of the process of selection will certainly pose a problem both for those selected and for those left outside.¹³

According to the newspaper and other accounts I read or heard, the most delectable tidbits for historians of the period were dished out at the conference in Berlin. The liveliest issues and greatest controversies there were two, and they are central to our understanding of the whole wartime era, as well as to the history of the coming of the Cold War. One such subject was that raised in recent years, by Soviet defector "Viktor Suvorov" (a pseudonym) in his articles (published in a Russian emigré journal, and, about the same time, in the British military journal *RUSI*; and shortly thereafter in a full-length book, *Der Eisbrecher. Hitler in Stalins Kalkül* [*The Icebreaker. Hitler in Stalin's Calculations*]), published in Germany (in 1989). Suvorov maintains that Stalin was about to launch a war against Hitler in 1941. Hitler preempted the Soviet attack west by his own strike against the Soviets in June 1941. Hitler is said to have argued that such was his purpose, but, being the notorious liar he was,

¹³See fn 1. The author notes that he has been permitted to work in the Polish Archives of Modern Records [*Archiwum akt nowych*] in Warsaw and in the former Socialist Unity Party archive in [East] Berlin. Those interested in the then internal effects of the current historical dialogue in the Soviet Union should look at Nina Tumarkin's article, "The Great Patriotic War as Myth and Memory," in *The Atlantic*, June 1991.

historians, over the years, have generally chosen not to believe him.¹⁴

This is an old discussion which has long raised hackles in Germany — some arguing that champions (who had not previously produced much evidence to support their point of view) of the notion that Hitler conducted a *necessary* preventative war in the east were trying to make German guilt for the war and its ubiquitous murders relative. They were seeking, by involving the Soviets in the war guilt issue, to exonerate Hitler and his countrymen from responsibility for some of their wartime crimes.

Historians familiar with the local scene then will recall how violently two German historical points of view on Hitler's and German wartime behavior recently met head on in print, even in the national headlines. The issues of this recent *Historikerstreit* (issues too complex to be discussed at length and not themselves directly relevant to the subject matter here — but the interested reader should consult Charles S. Maier's recent book, *The Unmastered Past*¹⁵), really a kind of intense national debate on history, were those of German guilt for causing the war and for the wartime events done under the German flag.

Suvorov's book, in any event, was skeptically reviewed in several German journalistic pieces I have seen, and has been systematically attacked (I think it would not be unfair to add, "venomously") by the Tel Aviv University historian, Gabriel

¹⁴In English: *RUSI* (Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies), volumes 130 (1985) and 131 (1986). The book was published in Stuttgart in 1989. Hitler on the prospect of a Soviet attack on Germany: Walter Görlitz, ed., *Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Verbrecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen. Briefe. Dokumenten des Chefs OKW* (Göttingen, 1961), 242-6, 253, 267.

¹⁵Cambridge, Mass., 1988.

Gorodetsky (who, at one point, termed Suvorov's conclusion "absurd"). He did this in follow-up articles in the *RUSI* journal as well as in an article in the *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* and elsewhere.¹⁶

But, no great surprise for those who have been closely following the Soviet historical press recently, several Soviet historians who appeared in Berlin, working from their newly opened military and other archives, suggested information which implies that Suvorov was not so far off the mark, that the arguments he drafted for proving a westerly directed Soviet military activism actually fitted long-term Soviet military doctrine, and that the dysfunctional *attack* position actually held by the Soviet forces in the west in June 1941 was one good reason for the colossal military disasters they suffered in the initial months of the war.¹⁷ M. I. Semiriaga, for example, argued recently in the Moscow-based periodical *Voprosy istorii* (*Questions of history*), and elsewhere on the basis of his archival findings, that Stalin was preparing just such an attack. But, he contended, Stalin's planned thrust to the west could not have taken place before 1942 (Suvorov, to

¹⁶Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion," XXXVII (1989): 645-72. Gorodetsky was then given the unusual opportunity to repeat the performance under the same title, albeit in shorter compass, in Bernd Wegner, ed., *Zwei Wege nach Moskau. Vom Hitler-Stalin Pakt zum "Unternehmen Barbarossa"* (Munich, 1991), 347-66. The comment quoted above is on 362.

¹⁷As Soviet military historian V. A. Semidetko wrote in "Istoki porazheniia v Belorussii," *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal*, 4/1989, 30-1, German and Soviet strength on the White Russian central front, where the first large German breakthrough occurred, and where the Red Army suffered catastrophically heavy losses, was approximately equal when the war began.

repeat, had claimed the attack was being prepared for 1941) for lack of preparation and war materiel.¹⁸

At the Berlin conference, Soviet historian Viacheslav I. Dashichev also made the same argument.¹⁹ He went even further, putting Stalin into the category of "totalitarians," along with Hitler.

The outcry which followed was obviously loud enough to arouse all conference participants, including those who might have dozed off. First of all, a number of the Germans thought they were well beyond using the antique collective, "totalitarianism" (which must at least date from Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzeziński's work of the early 'fifties), only to find some Soviet historians now rediscovering that very pod for what they perceived as similar peas. Several of the German historians in attendance also seem to have been emotionally distressed at hearing that Hitler and his crimes were being pushed aside by Stalin and the Russians from the central place of attention in the apparently bottomless barrel

¹⁸M. I. Semiriaga, "Sovetskii soiuz i predvoennyi politicheskii krizis," in number 9/1990, 61-2; also *idem.*, "17 Sentiabria 1939 goda," *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie*, number 5/1990, 15.

Joachim Hoffmann has also documented a case for establishing Stalin's plans for a *Drang nach Westen* in "Die Angriffsvorbereitungen der Sowjetunion 1941," in the Wegner-edited volume (367-88) cited above. There Gorodetsky and Hoffmann, side by side, mirror exquisitely the parable of the partially sighted and the elephant, for Gorodetsky relies mostly on British and Soviet sources to try to make the exact opposite point Hoffmann tries to make mainly from German and Soviet sources. The reader can weigh the results for himself, to be sure. But please note that neither cites Semiriaga (whose sources support Hoffmann). In the opinion of this reader, Gorodetsky should not so insistently assert findings evidently founded on partial evidence.

¹⁹See his earlier articles in *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*: "Der Pakt der beiden Banditen," and "Stalin hat den Krieg gewollt," respectively 21 and 28 April 1989.

of human disasters. These attendees could not keep themselves from finishing off the discussion, indeed, by implication, the Soviet colleagues, and the conference, by declaring the last mentioned "useless." The conference chairman was obliged to remind them that the Soviet scholars also had a right to their collegial opinions — which, having some basis in archival fact, were actually more than just opinions. He did not add that the visitors might likely be better founded in the sources explaining Soviet behavior than their critics, since only the former had so far had, as I remarked above, any significant chance to work the appropriate Soviet archives.

The issue of Soviet war plans for 1939 to 1941 (and beyond) was obviously tied closely to the issue of Soviet war aims. Both plans and aims are obviously tied directly to thinking in Moscow beyond Stalin's Pact with Hitler. Understanding what Stalin and his helpers had in mind then is central to putting together a history of World War II, as well as a history of the Cold War which came out of it. Historian Dashichev, as well as historians Semiriaga and V. I. Mal'kov, have all recently dealt with Soviet wartime aims. They have contended on the basis of their archival findings that Stalin had much more in mind than defense when he signed up with Hitler in 1939 — some Soviet evidence suggests he was thus ruminating years before then.²⁰

Reviewing the detail presently available, here is what we know of what Stalin was thinking on these issues. There is credible, and separate, Eastern and Western evidence that the Soviets first dreamed of a Red Army *Drang nach Westen* to be launched once the stalemate on the western front Stalin and

²⁰V. L. Mal'kov, "Pribaltiki glazami amerikanskikh diplomatov (iz arkhivov SShA)," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, number 5/1990, 41. See, also, above, fns 18 and 19.

Molotov imagined developing, *à la* 1914-18, actually came about. (I have written elsewhere about some essential evidence for the argument that these were indeed the Soviet leaders' plans.²¹) When the prospectively war-exhausted Western proletarians themselves at last realized what the Russian and German proletariat had learned by 1917 and 1918, so the Soviet leaders initially imagined, they would revolt at the front and behind the lines against their bourgeois leaders and call upon Moscow for help. It would be generously granted. As a result, Lenin's earlier prophesies of the expansion of the Soviet system would be further fulfilled. Much, if not all, of western and central Europe would be bolshevized in the aftermath of World War II.

Strangely enough, these Muscovite fantasies (or were they?) were significantly elaborated in various pep talks by Molotov and some of Stalin's other close aides in June and July 1940 — even *after* the fall of France radically changed European political and military weightings. But the evidence of these harangues, which is non-Soviet, has manifestly not been so far discovered by scholars in the Soviet Union, as indeed, it has been overlooked or ignored for years by most other historians.²²

What must be emphasized here is that Stalin, the new Soviet confirming evidence suggests, seems not at all to have altered his earlier plan, even after the reconstituted military and naval situation following the fall of France became manifest. The

²¹R. C. Raack, "Stalin's Plans for World War II," *Journal of Contemporary History*, XXVI (1991): 215-27.

²²*Ibid.*. Since first evaluating this evidence in print, indeed even before my article appeared, the new Soviet evidence supporting the reports I found began to appear in the Soviet historical press. Not only these confirming bits of evidence, but my own further investigations as well have convinced me even more that the accounts I reported of what the Soviet diplomatic representatives actually said in 1940 were accurate.

idea of a Soviet thrust to the west was clearly still fully alive and operative in his mind when the Nazi *Wehrmacht* knifed through the mispositioned, but well equipped, Red Army to achieve some of the greatest victories in military history in the summer of 1941.

This evidence and these historical arguments, taken together, are revolutionary historical substance, all of a piece. They come from both sides of the former Iron Curtain.²³ It is clear from the results of these conferences as well as from the provocative, albeit traditionally and tendentiously organized and explained,²⁴ photographic exhibition on the

²³See above, fn 17. Soviet historian D. A. Volkogonov has discovered in one of Stalin's speeches of 1934 evidence that he held at least some of these notions that far back: see "Drama reshennii 1939 goda," in *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, number 4/1989, 10.

²⁴I noted the following extremely serious failings in the exhibit and catalogue, some perhaps deliberate.

1) One large section of the exhibition was to establish that the Germans had long been propagandized into an unrealistic fear of the Soviets, and therefore were prepared to condone drastic treatment of the Soviet peoples and armies once the second war came. (Much of this discussion harks back to the issues of the *Historikerstreit*.) Toward the end of establishing that the fears were unrealistic, the exhibitors (credits went to Professor Reinhard Rürup and Dr. Peter Jahn) ignored the enormously bad behavior of the Russian army in its invasion of East Prussia in 1914. They failed to mention that the Russians had twice before been in Berlin (a point Stalin certainly didn't forget, and neither did the Berliners), whereas German armies had never before marched into Moscow or St. Petersburg (Leningrad). They neglected to mention the Red Army's march to the Vistula in 1920 ("the miracle on the Vistula"), to a point less than 500 hard-to-defend miles from Berlin, and far closer to East Prussia and Silesia, in the failed course of bringing Lenin's revolution to Germany, and they left out the terrors of the revolution and civil war in Russia (and the terrible Red Army brutalities during its failed invasion of Poland). These events brought countless refugees to Germany and elsewhere to western and central Europe, each one bearing and spreading tales of horror about

revolutionary intentions and accomplishments. Much of this information was, to be sure, widely broadcast.

My point is that the German fears of a Red Army march west, and of its prospective bad behavior in the course of such a campaign, were founded in reality. During the period of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans, limited in weapons and equipment, were restricted to an army of 100,000 men; that is, were virtually defenseless. It was easy for sophisticated propagandists like Joseph Goebbels to quicken these fears, given the fact that their basis was utterly real.

2) In spite of the title of the exhibit and catalogue, *Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941-1945*, it is manifest that the Soviets were also conducting a war against Germany (no matter who attacked whom first), and that the Soviet side of the war deserves a fair place in the history. Such the viewer, or reader, never receives. There is a brief section on "Soviet Society in the War," and the enigmatic notice early on that sections of Soviet society greeted the German attackers when they arrived (seemingly strange behavior never explained here).

The section on Soviet society must be evaluated as overwhelmingly positive. As a result, some of the most prominent aspects of wartime behavior on both sides, such as the original enthusiasm of masses of Stalin's subjects for Hitler's "liberators," defies explanation on the basis of the information provided. Perhaps some readers will recall that even Stalin's Polish subjects, in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland, after just two years of life in this Soviet paradise, came out to greet the *Wehrmacht* in 1941. That was the same *Wehrmacht* which played its ghastly role in the sack of western, Nazi-occupied, Poland during the same period.

3) I found no mention of the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939, which of course played a role in the Finns joining Hitler in 1941. Nor was there any mention of Finland's role in the blockade of Leningrad (now again St. Petersburg, whose citizens, by the way, seemed to have joyfully celebrated, so film evidence shows, the grand Red Army victory over the Finns in 1940). The exhibitors allowed the Germans to take on all the guilt for that terrible episode, also forgetting to note that Stalin had made no effort to have the city evacuated, thus making it hostage to Hitler's crackpot whims.

4) I noticed two serious errors of fact. The Baltic states were not annexed to the Soviet Union in June (as is asserted), but in August, 1940. The Soviet occupations leading to the annexations began in June.

German-Soviet war mentioned above, that a recasting of the history of the entire period stands immediately before us. Historian Semiriaga reminded his Western listeners in Berlin that many Soviet historians, still mired in the past, are wholly unable to grasp the radical changes in historical thinking which are now necessary. This also appears to be the case with some of their German counterparts. So long used to being bottom dog (a psychotic role which can actually serve a number of personality needs in individuals) in the European, if not in the human hierarchy, some of those present appeared to wish to reject out of hand the prospect of finding out that

Far more serious: Perhaps in order to clean up the crude level (which can easily be discerned in the tragi-comical level of hate slogans in wartime Soviet media) of Soviet propaganda (and to obscure Soviet behavior which the propaganda manifestly was calculated to provoke) directed against the enemy one pictured Soviet propaganda sign directed to Red Army men had to have been deliberately — or can two obviously tendentious mistranslations in the same few sentences be otherwise explained? — mistranslated, as follows (in the German): "... (here) through German bestiality 35 houses were burned and 12 inhabitants were shot.... Revenge them. Annihilate the fascists." In fact there is no passive in the first sentence (in the Russian original, which translates as follows): "... (here) the German beasts burned (*nemetskoe zver'e sozhglo...*) 35 houses and shot 12 inhabitants. Take revenge on the fascist monsters (*izvergi*)." The Germans were regularly termed "*zver'e*" and "*izvergi*," when not "*vyrodki*" (degenerates, or monsters) in Soviet propaganda all during the war. (And not only the Germans — indeed, Molotov termed the entire nation of Poland a "*vyrodok*" in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939.) It appears that the organizers of the exhibit themselves exhibit the syndrome of that "German psychosis" I refer to in the text.

Those interested in Soviet early wartime film propaganda may consult my article, "Poor Light on the 'Dark Side of the Moon': Soviet Actuality Film Sources for the Early Days of World War II," *Film and History*, XX (1990): 3-15. This is only an introduction to a fascinating subject on which other scholars are also now working.

Stalin might have been as bad as, or worse than Hitler. ("Bad" here estimated by the global dimensions of his fanciful calculations to carry out, whatever the method, his own absurd fantasy for human purification, in Stalin's case, the realization of the universal Soviet paradise,²⁵ and by the Soviet chieftain's seeming measureless capacity for amateurish, adventurist calculation leading to his share of the Soviet, and world, disaster in World War II. In any case, few historians would deny that Hitler had most of these weaknesses, whatever flaws they might attribute to his one-time ally.) For historian Dashichev, these were two dilettantes, twin masters of human destruction, leading humankind into the holocaust wherein individuals, "races," and "classes" who were in the way would be relentlessly sacrificed to achieve utterly fantastic goals.

If these new Soviet findings are correct, or even partly correct, they, added to the evidence Western scholars have produced, certainly must effect our understanding of our own recent diplomatic history. Certainly the archival openings in the former East Bloc states will lead to sweeping new findings whether or not the conclusions reported in these early discussions prove themselves in the long run substantial. Colleagues well prepared will be ready to meet the coming challenges of a deluge of some kinds of information, and the evident problems of a continuing and calculated limitation of access to other sources of information. The former will change much of the recent past as it has previously been described; the latter, not a new problem, but now an especially urgent one considering the importance of the

²⁵This point is well made by Tucker, who views Stalin as striving to fill, in his own peculiar way, Lenin's role. To repeat, Tucker's book is must reading.

information being regulated, may raise multi-dimensional ethical problems for those of us involved.

SOME ADDITIONAL CITATIONS ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

by
Joseph A. Fry
UNLV

In a brief introduction accompanying the bibliography of methodological and historiographical commentaries that appeared in the September 1989 issue of this *Newsletter*, I apologized for any omissions and issued an invitation for citations that could be included in an updated listing. Several scholars responded with useful suggestions. Therefore, this bibliography, like the first, is very much a collaborative effort. Even with the aid of Kinley Brauer, Thomas Paterson, and others, I am sure I have again missed important materials. I shall reiterate my apology, but not the request for additional suggestions. These two modest efforts have more than satisfied any inclinations I have harbored for being a bibliographer!

While compiling and reading through much of this material, I was impressed anew by the vitality of the United States foreign relations subfield. Certainly, the round table in the *Journal of American History* and the symposium in *Diplomatic History* vividly demonstrate the ongoing self-examination by historians in this area and the greatly-broadened purview of their methodologies and research. Works cited below by John Gaddis, Ole Holsti, Stephen Pelz, William Walker, and

Donald Cameron Watt extend these explorations in other intriguing directions. Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson have gathered a representative and informative cross-section of these materials in their excellent volume, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. Indeed, the accessibility of much of this methodological debate and of quality historiographical analyses has clearly resulted from Hogan's aggressive solicitation of these materials for *Diplomatic History*. Previous articles, such as Robert McMahan's examination of the cold war in Asia, and ones cited below by Kinley Brauer, Rosemary Foot, Brian McKercher, Robert Schulzinger, and J. Samuel Walker, are most helpful and suggestive.

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MINUTES

SHAFR Council Meeting, December 27, 1991, Private Dining Room #3, Chicago Hilton, Gary Hess presiding.

The meeting opened at 8 p.m. Council members present were John Gaddis, George Herring, Gary Hess, Robert Schulzinger, Allan Spetter and Michael Schaller. Others present were David Anderson, John Gimbel, Michael Hogan, Richard Hopper, Warren Kimball, Page Putnam Miller, Oliver Schmidt, David Schmitz, Tom Schoonover, Geoffrey Smith and William Walker.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, brought Council up to date on pending legislation dealing with a variety of areas of interest to SHAFR and on the status of the new National

Archives facility in Maryland. She also informed Council that SHAFR, along with all organizations which have board member status in the NCC, is being asked to increase its annual contribution from \$2,000 to \$2,500.

2. Richard Hopper, representing Scholarly Resources, spoke to Council about SR's offer to extend for three years its contract to publish *Diplomatic History*. Because of differences of opinion over reprint policy and the need to plan in advance for contract renewal, Gary Hess proposed creation of a Publications Committee as follows: The Publications Committee will be comprised of three appointed members, named by the President, and the editor of *Diplomatic History* as an ex officio, non-voting member. The appointed members will serve staggered three-year terms that begin on January 1 each year. The Committee will be responsible for assuring that the Society's interests are served by *Diplomatic History* and its publisher, for monitoring the relationship between SHAFR and the publisher, and for recommending to Council the terms of publication contracts in a timely manner. When the term of the editor expires or the office is otherwise vacant, the Committee will solicit and screen candidates for the position and will recommend a nominee to Council. Council voted unanimously to create the Publications Committee. Michael Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History*, then asked Council to endorse the following proposal to SR as part of ongoing negotiations: Scholarly Resources will transfer to SHAFR the copyright to Volumes 1-14 of *Diplomatic History*. SHAFR will consider requests from SR to reprint individual works from *Diplomatic History* on a case-by-case basis. Permission will not be unreasonably withheld. When republishing collected works derived from *Diplomatic History*, SR will contribute two per cent of net proceeds to the Rappaport Fund in the SHAFR Endowment. Council voted

unanimously to endorse the proposal, with the understanding that the president would have latitude in reaching agreement with SR on these issues as part of contract renewal negotiations.

3. Gary Hess reported for Mel Leffler, chair of the Committee on Documentation, bringing Council up to date about ongoing negotiations with the Department of State involving declassification policy.

4. David Anderson, program chair for the 1992 summer conference, informed Council that his committee had received a very large number of proposals. There will be five sessions each at three different times of Friday and Saturday and five sessions as well at two different times on Sunday.

5. Gary Hess reminded Council that the 1993 summer conference should be in the Washington, D.C., area. Among possible sites is the University of Virginia. Hess informed Council that the University of Tennessee at Knoxville has extended an invitation for a future summer conference.

6. Gary Hess informed Council that the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic has proposed a joint summer conference with SHAFR in 1995. SHEAR suggested that we explore the possibility of meeting in England. Some discussion followed. There was general agreement that meeting in England would sharply limit attendance. Council indicated that the two organizations could meet in a variety of other locations, including perhaps Montreal or Toronto.

7. David Schmitz, chair of the Bernath Dissertation Prize Committee, reported to Council that changes in the description of the award had produced a number of highly qualified

applicants. The committee selected Eileen Scully of Georgetown University as the winner of the prize for 1991.

8. Warren Kimball, chair of the committee to select the winner of the first Arthur Link Prize for Documentary Editing, informed Council that the committee had made its choice: Justus Doenecke, for *In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee* (Hoover Institution Press).

9. Gary Hess reported for Joan Hoff, chair of the committee which evaluated the studies nominated for the first Myrna L. Bernath Book Award. He informed Council that the committee decided upon co-winners: Diane Kunz, for *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (University of North Carolina Press), and Betty Unterberger, *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (University of North Carolina Press).

10. Gary Hess informed Council that Calvin Davis had agreed to chair the committee which will evaluate studies nominated for the first Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize. William Kamman and Joyce Goldberg will serve on the committee. Hess also appointed Thomas Schwartz to the vacancy on the W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee. He nominated George Herring, Emily Rosenberg, and Mark Stoler to the reorganized State Department Advisory Committee.

11. Michael Hogan asked Council to approve three new appointments to the editorial board of *Diplomatic History*: Garry Clifford, Mel Leffler, and Mark Lytle. Council gave unanimous approval.

12. Michael Hogan then presented his annual report. (I will forward a copy to Bill Brinker). He asked Council to endorse a resolution of appreciation to Ohio State University for the support provided to *Diplomatic History*. Council unanimously passed such a resolution.

13. Gary Hess reported for William Brinker, editor of the *SHAFR Newsletter*. He informed Council that Tennessee Tech has cut back its support of the *Newsletter* and may be forced to eliminate support. It may be necessary to provide between \$4,000 and \$5,000 a year in financial support from the Gerald Bernath Scholarship Support Fund and/or the SHAFR Endowment.

14. Gary Hess reported to council as chair of the Finance Committee. He explained that the various endowment funds have grown substantially in the past year, but continued growth could be affected by a combination of the need to support such activities as the *Newsletter* and declining interest rates.

15. Allan Spetter presented a report on SHAFR's operating budget for 1992. As was the case with the 1991 budget, he predicted a small deficit for 1992. Costs continue to increase, as in the case of SHAFR's contribution to the NCC, and income remains stable — with increases in membership balanced by declining interest rates. Spetter informed Council that dues should be increased in Oct., 1992, which would be the first dues increases in five years. (I will forward my report to Brinker).

16. Allan Spetter reported to Council on the election results: joining John Gaddis as the new president will be Warren Kimball as Vice President, Emily Rosenberg and Michael

Schaller as new members of the Council and Geoffrey Smith as the new member of the Nominating Committee.

17. Council then discussed at length SHAFR financing of a proposal by Richard Burns to update the *Guide to American Foreign Relations*. Council asked incoming president John Gaddis to try to obtain clarification of various aspects of the project.

The meeting adjourned at 11:00 p.m.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Foreign Policy Conference

“Making Foreign Policy in the Cold War Years,” sponsored by *The Journal of Policy History* and the St. Louis University History Department, will be held April 10-11, 1992. For information contact Michael Ruddy, History Dept., St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO 63101; (314) 658-2910.

Reagan Library and Museum Opens

The Ronald Reagan Library was dedicated on November 4, 1991, when the Reagan Presidential Library Foundation turned it over to the Archivist of the United States. The library opened its research facilities on Tuesday, November 12. Approximately 6,350,000 pages of material documenting the Reagan administration is available to for research. The address is: Ronald Reagan Library, 40 Presidential Drive, Simi Valley, California 93065.

Journal of Chinese Historians

Chinese Historians, the journal of Chinese historians in the U.S., will publish a special issue on "China and the Cold War" in Spring 1992. Besides two articles, He Di's "The CCP's Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-1950" and Yang Kuisong's "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy Toward the United States in the 1940s," which are based on previously unavailable Chinese archival sources, this issue will introduce translations of important Chinese documents and memoirs. The subscription rate of the biannual journal is \$12 for individual and \$20 for institution. Please send orders or inquiries to: Professor Chen Jian, Chinese Historians, Department of History, SUNY-Geneseo, Geneseo, New York 14454.

Naval Historical Center Fellowship, Grant, and Internship Opportunities 1992-1993

[The *Newsletter* appreciates that the deadlines for the Hooper and Hayes grants will have passed upon the members' receipt of the March issue. Notification of the awards came too late for inclusion in the December issue and, as these are annual awards, the membership might keep the dates in mind for 1993.)

Established Scholars: The Center will make two research grants, named in honor of Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, of up to \$2,500 each to individuals undertaking research and writing in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants should have either the Ph.D. or equivalent credentials, and they must

be U.S. citizens. The deadline for submitting applications is February 29, 1992.

Doctoral Candidates: The Center will award the Rear Admiral John D. Hayes fellowship of \$8,000 to a pre-doctoral candidate who is undertaking research and writing on a dissertation in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants must be U.S. citizens enrolled in an accredited graduate school who will have completed all requirements for the Ph.D. except the dissertation by June 30, 1992. The deadline for applications is February 29, 1992.

History Majors: The Center welcomes internship applications from undergraduate history majors who wish to spend up to four weeks engaged in applied history projects in the Washington Navy Yard. Limited funds are available to support living expenses. Historical research, archival, and curatorial assignments are available. Applications should be filed two months before the desired beginning date of the internship.

Application forms for the research grant, pre-doctoral fellowship, and internship may be obtained by writing: Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard — Building 57, Washington, D.C. 20374-0571.

SHAFR Contributors to the Society

SHAFR has three new Life members: Mary Alice Deasey, Priscilla Roberts, and Mark Lytle.

Two members have made generous contributions to the Ferrell Fund: Thomas Buckley and Kenneth Stevens.

The following have made contributions to the Endowment: Frederick Aandahl, Wayne Cole, George Constantinides, Martin Cramer, Calvin Davis, Vincent DeSantis, Nolan Fowler, John Gaddis, Rebecca Goodman, Fred Harvey Harrington, Darryl Higa, David Hirst, Lawrence Kaplan, Jules Karlin, Andreas Klose, David Krajcovic, Richard Leopold, Delber McKee, David Pletcher, Forrest Pogue, L. Fletcher Prouty, Clifford Reutter, Charles Stefan, Harold Sylwester, J.A. Thompson and Gerald Wheeler.

**CALL FOR PAPERS
CONFERENCE ON THE VIETNAM WAR
REMEMBERING TET**

A conference on TET will be held November 19-21, 1992, at Salisbury State University. Papers are invited that will address military, political and diplomatic issues of the Vietnam War in general and the Tet Offensive in particular, since the conference anticipates the 25th anniversary of Tet. Deadline for proposals is May 15, 1992. Please submit proposals to Professor Harry Basehart, Department of Political Science, Salisbury State University, Salisbury, MD 21801-6837 Telephone: (410) 543-6242 FAX (410) 543-6068

NASOH Meeting

The fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic will be the focus of the 1992 annual meeting of the North American Society for Oceanic History (NASOH) on April 23-25, 1992. The conference will be hosted by the Naval Historical Center

at the Washington Navy Yard. For information: Dr. William S. Dudley, Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center, Building 57, Washington Navy Yard, Washington DC 20374-0571.

Editorial Search

The Council on Peace Research in History announces a search for a co-editor of *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research*, a scholarly quarterly published jointly with the Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED). It would be helpful if the candidate can obtain support in the form of a research assistantship or office expenses from his or her institution. For more information, please write to Mel Small, 3119 FAB, History Department, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202.

German Historical Institute Conference

The German Historical Institute will sponsor a conference, "On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871," to be held in Washington, DC, April 1-4, 1992.

BONERS

"Roosevelt realized that Russia would demand a spear of influence in Eastern Europe."

— Ralph Levering
Davidson College

LETTERS

To the Editor:

Joseph Siracusa's article "Will the Real Author of Containment Please Stand Up: The Strange Case of George Kennan and Frank Roberts" (*SHAFR Newsletter*, September 1991) reminds me of a line from *Macbeth*: "It is a tale... full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Far from undermining George Kennan's stature as an original thinker or honorable man, all it does is illustrate the similarity of outlook of two diplomats stationed in Moscow at the onset of the Cold War — not a particularly startling revelation.

Neither George Kennan nor Frank Roberts considered their relationship "strange," and Siracusa's effort to uncover personal conflicts or jealousies strikes me as petty, to say the least. The compatibility of their views was hardly "strange." Kennan was a life-long Anglophile; he had more in common with his British colleagues than he did with his own countrymen. The diplomatic establishment in Moscow during the 1930s and 1940s was close and, although it was certainly not monolithic, it did share many of the same perceptions about Russian history, Stalin, and Soviet foreign policy. What is strange about the Kennan-Roberts case is not the parallel thinking of these two diplomats but Siracusa's great surprise at discovering the parallels.

Who was the "real author" of containment? This question has been much debated. George Kennan never claimed to be the exclusive author of the containment policy; indeed, he has tried for over forty years to disclaim authorship of the containment policy. He has only claimed ownership of the Long Telegram and the "X" Article. Personally, I can't tell whether Siracusa is insinuating that Kennan was a plagiarist.

Is he suggesting that Kennan was not the “real author” of the Long Telegram? If Kennan borrowed liberally from Frank Roberts’ Despatch 189, dated March 17, 1946, how does he explain the earlier date of the Long Telegram?

Siracusa reads a 1980 letter from Kennan as confirmation of his assessment of “Kennan’s ambitious nature and his obvious determination not to let hard-won fame slip away.” So, what’s the point? “Where’s the beef?” That Kennan may have been ambitious in pursuit of his career does not mean that he was intellectually dishonest or uncharitable in his treatment of a colleague. In my opinion, the conclusions Siracusa reaches are neither obvious nor fair.

Frank Roberts, on the other hand, echoed the sentiments of most of Kennan’s peers when he informed Siracusa that he had “benefitted greatly from George Kennan’s profound knowledge of Russia and the Soviet system” and that he had “learned to respect very highly George Kennan’s courage and character.” Unlike Siracusa, I take Roberts at his word.

C. Ben Wright

Editor’s note:

C. Ben Wright is Vice President of Institutional Advancement at Dunwoody Institute in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and a member of the Community Faculty at Metropolitan State University. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the diplomatic career of George Kennan and in 1976 he engaged Mr. Kennan in a public debate over Kennan’s early views about containment. See C. Ben Wright, “Mr. X and Containment,” *Slavic Review* (March, 1976): 1-31; “George F. Kennan Replies,” *ibid.*, 32-36; “A Reply to George F. Kennan,” *Slavic Review* (June 1976): 318-320.

Siracusa replies:

Mr. Wright is fully entitled to express his opinion of my essay, "Will the Real Author of the Containment Please Stand Up." He also has an obligation as one of America's leading Kennan scholars to help us understand *why* Roberts' Despatch 189 and Kennan's Long Telegram mirror each other to the extent they do. A simple content analysis of the two works in question reveals striking similarities. For myself I am not quite certain what to make of it.

Kenneth Jensen's *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946*, published by the US Institute of Peace recently, offers our colleagues a convenient opportunity to make up their own minds. Perhaps Mr. Wright could find a few moments to compare the Kennan/Roberts despatches himself before offering another opinion.

The earlier date of the Long Telegram is beside the point. Who sent what cable first is not the question. Or is it? Perhaps someone ought to ask Mr. Kennan.

Joseph M. Siracusa
Reader in American Diplomacy
University of Queensland
Australia

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

U.S. DIPLOMATS IN EUROPE, 1919-1941. Kenneth Paul Jones, ed.

Essays on Thomas Lamont, Alanson B. Houghton, Owen D. Young, Hugh Gibson, John B. Stetson, Jr. Prentiss Gilbert, George Meessersmith, Claude Bowers, Loy Henderson, Joseph Kennedy.

(1981) cloth \$16.95, paper \$12.95, text \$9.95 **SHAFR Price \$7.00.**

20TH CENTURY LOS ANGELES: Power, Promotion, and Social Conflict. Norman Klein & Martin J. Schiesl, eds.

Essays which concentrate on the hidden Los Angeles: minorities, minority politics, the police, and other institutions.

Cloth \$26.95, paper \$12.95, text \$9.95 **SHAFR Price \$7.00.**

HOOVER AND THE HISTORIANS. Ellis Hawley, et al.

Essays reviewing historian's changing assessment of Hoover and his policies. Alexander DeConde surveys Hoover's foreign policy. (1989)

(1990) Cloth \$17.95, paper \$10.95, text \$9.00. **SHAFR Price \$6.00**

EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion. Norman A. Graebner.

Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages. (1983) \$19.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], \$11.95 pbk, \$9.95 text **SHAFR Price \$7.00**

AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM/CHALLENGE TO LIBERTY. Herbert Hoover

(reprint, 1989). Cloth \$19.95, paper \$11.95, text \$9.95. **SHAFR Price \$7.00**

Offer expires JUNE 15, 1991

Individuals only, please

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

165 pages. (1971, 1982) \$9.25 text SHAFR Price \$6.00

THE MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962: A Review of Issues and References. Lester Brune.

"Brune skillfully...scrutinizes the origins of the major issues and analyses the reaction and response of Washington and Moscow, relating them to domestic politics and international affairs....Highly recommended as a brief, analytical review of the crisis situation." —*Choice* (April 1986)

165 pages (1985)\$ 7.95 text SHAFR Price \$6.00

Jones. <i>U. S. Diplomats</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Klein. <i>20th Century L.A.</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Hawley. <i>Hoover</i>	price \$6.00	_____
Graebner. <i>Empire on Pacific</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Hoover. <i>Individualism</i>	price \$7.00	_____
Esthus. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	price \$6.00	_____
Brune. <i>Missle Crisis</i>	price \$7.00	_____

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CALENDAR

1992

- April 1** Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 2-5** The 85th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Chicago with headquarters at the Palmer House.
- May 1** Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 18-21** The 18th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and Vassar College. David Anderson of the University of Indianapolis is in charge of the program.
- August 1** Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1** Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15** Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1** Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15** Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- December 27-30** The 107th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Washington, headquarters at the

- 1993**
- January 1** Washington Sheraton and Omni. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 1** Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15** Deadline for the 1992 Bernath article award.
- February 1** Deadline for the 1992 Bernath book award.
- February 1** Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1** Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1** Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.

The OAH will meet in Anaheim, April 15-18, 1993 (the deadline for proposals has passed); in Atlanta, April 14-17, 1994; and in Washington, March 30-April 2, 1995.

There will be no December 1993 meeting! The following AHA meeting will be held in January 1994 in a yet-to-be-designated-city. Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.

PERSONALS

Dirk Ballendorf of the Micronesia Area Research Center (Guam) has won the 1991 Colonel Robert Debs Heintz Jr. Award in Marine Corps History, for his research into the life of Earl Hancock Ellis and for the publication of his findings about Ellis in the November 1990 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette.

Justus Doenecke (New College — University of South Florida) has been selected the winner of the inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize for Documentary Editing for his book, *In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee* (Hoover Institution Press, 1990).

Reinhard R. Doerries since October 1988 holds the Chair of Professor for Foreign Studies at the Faculty of Economic and Social Science at the Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg.

Dorothy V. Jones (Newberry Library), author of *Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord States* (University of Chicago Press), has been awarded the 1991 Lionel Gelber Prize. This award was established in 1989 by the late Lionel Gelber to honor the best book published in English or in English translation on the subject of international relations.

Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State) served as a panelist at the first annual Gerald R. Ford Colloquium which dealt with "German Reunification, the Atlantic Alliance, and American Foreign Policy" held in April 1991.

Diane Kunz (Yale) was awarded a grant from the Gerald R. Ford Foundation to support research on "The Financial Diplomacy of the American Century."

Christian Ostermann (University of Cologne) was awarded a research grant by the German Historical Institute in Washington in the fall of 1991. He is currently working on a study of US — East German relations 1948-1961.

Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A&M) has been appointed to the Secretary of the Navy's Historical Advisory Committee.

Theodore Wilson (while at the U.S. Army Center of Military History) was one of the speakers at the Eisenhower Library celebrating Ike's 101st birthday.

PUBLICATIONS

Russell D. Buhite (Tennessee) and David W. Levy eds., *The Fireside Chats of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. ISBN 0-8061-2370-2, \$24.95.

John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein in collaboration with Larry Berman and Richard Immerman (Hawaii), *How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965*. Russell Sage, 1991. Paper, ISBN 0-87154-176-9, \$14.95.

Edward P. Crapol (William and Mary) ed., *Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders*. Scholarly Resources (cloth edition originally published by Greenwood Press), 1992. Paper, ISBN 0-8420-2430-1. \$14.95.

Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana) ed., *Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers*. University of Missouri Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8262-0790-1, \$37.50.

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio), *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*. Oxford University Press, 1992. ISBN 0-19-50521-3, \$24.95.

Alonzo Hamby (Ohio), *Liberalism and Its Challengers: From FDR to Bush*. Oxford University Press, 1992. Paper, ISBN 0-19-507030-5, \$16.95.

Manfred Jonas (Union College), *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941*. Imprint Publications, 1990. Paper, ISBN 1-879176-01-7, \$15.95.

James I. Matray (New Mexico State), *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War*. Greenwood Press, 1991. ISBN 0-313-25924-0, \$85.00.

Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C. (Notre Dame), *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*. Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN 0-691-086206-6, \$35.00.

Jerel A. Rosati (South Carolina), *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior*. U. of South Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-87249-787-9, \$16.95.

David Reynolds (Cambridge), *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century*. Longman, 1991. ISBN 0-528-08427-X, \$49.95; Paper, ISBN 0-582-55276-1, \$21.95.

Melvin Small (Wayne State) and Otto Feinstein eds., *Appeasing Fascism: Articles from the Wayne State University Conference on Munich After Fifty Years*. University Press of America, 1991. ISBN 0-8191-8440-3, \$18.00.

E. Timothy Smith (Barry), *The United States, Italy, and NATO, 1947-52*. St. Martin's Press, 1991. ISBN 0-312-05559-5, \$59.95.

Joseph Smith (Exeter, England), *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930*. U. of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8229-3676-3, \$39.95.

Cornelis A. van Minnen and John F. Sears (Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute) eds., *FDR and His Contemporaries: Foreign Perceptions of an American President*. St. Martin's Press, 1992. ISBN 0-312-06712-7, \$45.00.

Brian Vandemark (Naval Academy), *Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*. Oxford University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-19-506506-9 \$22.95.

Russell F. Weigley (Temple), *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*. Indiana University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-253-36380-2, \$35.00.

Donald R. Whitnah (Northern Iowa) and Florentine E. Whitnah, *Salzburg Under Siege: U.S. Occupation, 1945-1955*. Greenwood Press, 1991. ISBN 0-313-28116-5, \$46.00.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Prize

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR to finance travel to conduct dissertation research.

The amount of the award has been increased to \$1,000.

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE

FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book which is a history of American Foreign relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.

Procedures:

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five copies of each book must be submitted with the

nomination. The books should be sent directly to the committee chair (to be announced).

Books may be sent at any time during 1991, but must arrive no later than February 1, 1992, for the 1992 prize.

The 1991 award will be approximately \$1,000, and it will be announced at the annual luncheon of SHAFR held in conjunction with the OAH convention in 1992.

(Donations to the Ferrell Prize fund may be sent to the SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer Allan Spetter.)

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Nanci Long and Katherine Fansler.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Send changes of address to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$1.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$2.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication should be typed, double-spaced; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

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1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara)	1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
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