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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in March or April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two others honor the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, Robert Ferrell, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

AMBASSADOR JOSEPH DAVIES
RECONSIDERED

by
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As US ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1936-1938 Joseph Davies was a more complicated figure than many people (myself included) have assumed. On the one hand, there is obviously much to disapprove. He was indeed little more than a Democratic party operator without a shred of foreign policy background. He and his social-hound wife Marjorie Merriweather Post were too much taken in Moscow with elaborate dinners and with buying icons and other art objects. The ambassador inadvertently offended members of his professional staff, above all, George Kennan (who never forgave him) but also Charles Bohlen and even the tolerant-minded Loy Henderson. And Davies played up to reporters (including the sublimely irresponsible Walter Duranty) and tried to be chummy with Stalin. Moreover, his book *Mission to Moscow* with its defense of the purge trials is still a horror to read. Partly on the basis of it, as well as other exercises by Davies in conciliatory diplomacy, he was awarded the Order of Lenin in May 1945, the highest Soviet decoration.¹ On the other hand, some of what Davies said in private correspondence to FDR and the secretary of state suggests a person alive to the grim realities of Stalinism *and* to the danger to Europe and the US posed by Hitler's Germany. Davies's argument ran something like this: True, the USSR of purges and police terror was odious, but to contain Germany

¹See Joseph Davies's *Mission to Moscow* (New York, 1941); Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs* (New York, 1989), 30.

it made sense for the United States to find means of cooperating with Stalin — at least in this one area of international security. In some of Davies's letters, he was surprisingly lucid about the need for a functioning balance of power system as a means of preventing global war.

In contrast to the testimony about the purge trials supplied by William Bullitt, Kennan, Bohlen, and that of numerous non-American observers in Moscow, Davies exonerated in public print the fairness and decent procedure of Soviet legality. In his best-selling *Mission to Moscow*, an account of his ambassadorship, Davies wrote: "All of these trials, purges, and liquidations, which seemed so violent at the time and shocked the world [were] clearly a part of a vigorous and determined effort of the Stalin government to protect itself from not only revolution from within but from attack from without. They went to work thoroughly to clear up and clean out all treasonable elements within the country. All doubts were resolved in favor of the government."² This statement was offered along with other positive assertions, including one to the effect that innocent creatures such as children and pets were irresistibly drawn to affectionate Stalin. In the movie version of *Mission*, in whose production Davies cooperated, Hollywood succeeded in making some of the purge victims (especially Bukharin) into monsters even worse than those created by the Soviet courts that sentenced them to death; but against them all, a heroic and wise Stalin prevailed. Largely as a result of his book (and the movie gave added emphasis), most historians have accepted the charges against Davies leveled by Kennan and Bohlen.³ According to them, he was

²Davies, *Mission*, 280.

³For a good account of the film version of Davies's book see David Culbert (ed.), *Mission to Moscow* (Madison, 1980). Davies wanted

appallingly ignorant of Soviet realities, filed biased and misleading reports to the State Department, was a dupe of Stalinist propaganda and a disgrace to US diplomacy. This critique is also used by scholars hostile to Roosevelt's Soviet policy as evidence of the president's incompetence (or worse) in the international field.⁴

Unqualified condemnation of Roosevelt's second ambassador to the USSR is not fair, however. To begin with, it ignores a significant body of contrary evidence supplied by non-Soviet diplomats. France's distinguished ambassador in Moscow with Davies, Robert Coulondre, later spoke approvingly of Davies and of his pleas for the cause of international peace. Despite their disagreements over matters related to diplomatic reporting and running of the embassy, Henderson also respected Davies and developed lasting affection for him; in 1958, Henderson served as a pallbearer at his interment in the

Frederic March to play the leading role; instead the honor went to the handsome Walter Huston who, unlike Davies, was not bald.

⁴Following is a sample of Davies's many critics: Robert Williams, *Russian Art and American Money 1900-1940* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 260; Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929-1969* (New York, 1973), 44, 56; Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), 82-84; Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims* (New York, 1981), 130; Robert Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941* (New York, 1990), 408, 503; Beatrice Farnsworth, *William Bullitt and the Soviet Union* (Bloomington, 1967), 174-175; Richard Ullman, "The Davies Mission and United States-Soviet Relations, 1937-1941," *World Politics* (January, 1957); Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties* (New York, 1973 version), 673.

In my *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy* (New York, 1988), I accept the Bohlen-Kennan view of Davies, 43-44. In an interview with the author (November 10, 1987), Kennan again expressed most uncompromising views about Davies.

National Cathedral.⁵ Moreover, Davies's critics ignore the evidence of writing by him that shows he was not blindly unrealistic about the USSR, and they do not allow for extenuating circumstances in the matter of *Mission to Moscow*.

Mindful of Bullitt's failures and at President Roosevelt's behest, Davies arrived in Moscow determined to avoid further disagreement with the Soviets and to seek areas of cooperation, meager though they might be. Specifically, he was ordered to reinvigorate Soviet-US trade and resolve the lingering debts issue if he could. Of greater significance, he was ordered to evaluate the political resilience, economic progress, and military strength of the USSR. The unimpeded disintegration of European politics (symbolized by Spain, then in the midst of its civil convulsion) and East Asia made this evaluation crucial to Roosevelt. Just before leaving for Moscow, Davies received this instruction from FDR, itself another evidence of the president's unsentimental views about the Soviet Union. To quote from the ambassador's diary: "Outlining his instructions [Roosevelt] again reverted to the necessity of knowing just how strong the Russians were militarily and industrially. Russian bombers, if they had them, could easily cross the Atlantic, drop their bombs, refuel at

⁵Robert Coulondre, *De Staline a Hitler* (Paris, 1950) 112; Baer (ed.), *A Question of Trust: The Origins of US-Soviet Diplomatic Relations: The Memoirs of Henderson* (Stanford, 1986), 410-423. A few historians, for example Elizabeth Kimball Maclean and Daniel Yergin, cautiously endorse Davies in their publications. Foster Rhea Dulles, writing in 1944, was enthusiastic. See Elizabeth Kimball Maclean, "Joseph E. Davies and Soviet-American Relations, 1941-1943," *Diplomatic History* (Winter 1980); Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, 1977); Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Road to Teheran: The Story of Russia and America, 1781-1943* (Princeton, 1944).

John Lewis Gaddis has written a judicious resumé of Davies's activity in Moscow. See his *Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History* (New York, 1978), 132-135.

some secret base in the Tennessee Mountains, and then hop off to Mexico. He wanted me to center on finding out how strong they were industrially and militarily, and on which side they would be in case of war.”⁶

Undeniably, much of the responsibility for problems in Davies’s ambassadorship (and in fixing a proper interpretation of it) rested squarely on him. He should have been more attentive to the concerns and sensitivities of his younger foreign service officers. Too often they felt ignored or patronized. Kennan and Bohlen bitterly recalled in later decades, after the passage of time would normally have diluted such feeling, that the ambassador treated his staff like “hired help”; he rarely exhibited an interest in their views; and he preferred the opinions and company of news reporters, including Duranty, who by then was viewed with suspicion by practically every officer in the embassy. Kennan recorded (1967) of his experience as Davies’s translator during the Pyatakov-Radek trial: “During the intermissions I was sent, regularly, to fetch the ambassador his sandwiches, while he exchanged sententious judgments with the gentlemen of the press concerning the guilt of the victims. I cannot recall, therefore, that I ever discussed the matter with him.”⁷ On another occasion, when Davies might have commended his staff for its performance in an area bearing directly on embassy security, he exhibited astonishing obtuseness. As the following entry from Davies’s diary suggests, he inflicted embarrassment on young men — one was Kennan — who thought they were doing responsible work: “One or two of the younger secretaries were excited over their detective powers.

⁶Diary, January 2, 1937, Box 3 Joseph Davies Papers. Compare the passage with the much milder version in *Mission to Moscow* (p. 6) in which no mention is made of the Soviets possibly attacking US territory.

⁷Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, 83.

Up in the garret they had found some evidence that a dictaphone had been installed between the ceiling and the floor. From what I learned from the senior staff, there were indications that someone had been up there, some traces of food, etc. So far as concrete indications of dictaphone [components], none were in evidence. I congratulated them over their diligent vigilance, but could not resist 'kidding' them a bit over their 'international sleuthing.'" Whereas his subordinates took an earnest view of their professional function and the embassy's physical integrity, Davies's attitude toward Soviet spying struck them as absurdly lighthearted: "[My] position in any event was that if the Soviets had a dictaphone installed, so much the better — the sooner they would find that we were not conspiring against them the better."⁸ Davies's habit of working more hours in his study at Spaso House than in the chancery and his frequent absences from Moscow to visit distant parts of the USSR or to travel abroad led most of his subordinates to conclude that he lacked seriousness. His well-publicized yachting expeditions on his wife's luxurious *Sea Cloud* (four masts, sailed by a crew of fifty men), frenetic acquisition of Russian art, and prodigal entertainments further offended many on his staff — particularly Kennan, for whom the banalities of diplomatic dinners and the collection of valuable souvenirs contrasted sickeningly with the drama of Soviet life. (Members of the Soviet establishment, including Litvinov and the young Andrei Gromyko, were also repelled by Davies's love of luxury, and they sneered at his extravagance.) At one point early in Davies's tenure, Kennan and others considered resigning en masse, an idea that was squelched by a stern dressing down from Henderson. Yet Davies was not entirely oblivious to the demoralizing effect he sometimes created. On taking leave of

⁸Diary, June 28, 1937, Box 5 Davies Papers.

the embassy in 1938, he apologized for his occasional rudeness and admitted that he was a difficult boss.⁹

Though not a sentiment understood by officers on his staff - Henderson was an exception — Davies actually liked and admired the men over whom he served. When because of budget constraints, the State Department proposed to reduce the embassy's stenographic pool and criticized the mission for inefficiency (during the period between Bullitt's departure from Moscow and Davies's arrival), the ambassador forwarded to Washington a spirited defense of his subordinates. To Bullitt, to Robert Kelley, to Cordell Hull, in unpublished portions of his diary, and elsewhere, Davies also gave unstinting praise of his foreign service staff. He liked Henderson for his "most sound judgment" and pronounced that his replacement as chargé d'affaires, Alexander Kirk, was "steady [and] well-balanced." In the ambassador's view, Bohlen was an exceptionally able person. As for Kennan, Davies wrote this of the sensitive young man, once thoughtlessly treated as a sandwich carrier: "[He] is of the scholarly type, most capable and thorough, and he has done a perfectly splendid job here." Out of concern for Kennan's health — not yet thirty-four, his nervous constitution had succumbed in Moscow to duodenal ulcer and shingles — Davies helped arrange for his medical leave from the USSR in 1937. "I am very fond of Kennan...and I feel that the loss to us here would be a most serious one and we would be seriously handicapped for a time...it is [unfair] to keep this

⁹Kennan to Thayer, May 22, 1935, Charles Thayer Papers; Gromyko, *Memoirs*, 27-30; Joseph O'Connor, *Laurence A. Steinhardt and American Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1939-1941* (University of Virginia, Ph.D. dissertation, 1968), 18-19, footnote 6. Davies's Speech of Farewell, June 9, 1938, Box 123 Davies Papers.

man here; the price he is paying is too high.”¹⁰ Not only was Davies more solicitous for the well-being of his staff than most of them guessed, he was also less naive about the Soviet Union than they later allowed.

Davies's *Mission to Moscow* (ghost written) included a sanitized compilation of the reports and letters he composed while ambassador. The book's publication in late 1941 and the movie's release in 1943 were part of that massive campaign in wartime America to solidify popular support for the Soviet and Allied effort against Germany. As such, *Mission to Moscow* was a deliberately misleading account of Davies's actual reporting.¹¹ A less selective reading of his dispatches from the 1930s supports a more generous evaluation of his acumen about the USSR and international affairs. At the same time, though, such a reading raises fundamental issues about the willingness of Roosevelt's administration to present the American public with unvarnished facts about the Soviet Union. This lack of candor during World War II led to inflated expectations that the Grand Alliance would prosper in the postwar era and concomitantly to that series of disappointments manipulated by anticommunist fundamentalists in the early 1950s.

However committed Davies was to the Rooseveltian idea of preserving a working relationship with the Soviets, he was disgusted in 1936-1938 by the purges. He doubted the

¹⁰Robert Kelley to Mr. Carr, February 23, 1937, Kelley Papers; Davies to Bullitt, February 2, 1937, Box 3 Davies Papers; Davies to Cordell Hull, November 12, 1937, Box 6 Davies Papers; Diary entry, May 4, 1938, Box 7 Davies Papers; Davies to E.K., March 17, 1938, Box 7 Davies Papers; Davies to Kelley, February 10, 1937, Box 3 Davies Papers.

¹¹For a similar point on Davies's editing of his letters see: Thomas Maddux, *Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941* (Tallahassee, 1980), 182, footnote 9.

professed impartiality of Soviet law and had sympathy for a number of those injured by it. He tried unsuccessfully but in good faith to intercede with M. Kalinin on behalf of an arrested *Izvestia* reporter, Vladimir Romm. To A. F. Neymann, a Soviet expert on the United States and one-time first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington, Davies confessed that he was stunned by Soviet courtroom procedure. (Neymann himself disappeared later in 1937.) To his journal Davies confided that Valery Mezhlauk, president of Gosplan, and Arkady Rosengolts, commissar for foreign trade, were not only accomplished individuals with whom he was friendly, but it was inconceivable that they would undertake traitorous acts for which they were purged in 1937. On another occasion Davies expressed to Litvinov his dismay over what passed for Soviet justice, and he protested his respect for men falsely accused of treason in 1938. At the Bukharin trial Davies was so moved by the “desperate and hopeless plight” of the accused, many of whom he had dined with just weeks earlier, that he could not look at them “lest our eyes would meet.” Had circumstances permitted, Davies, a University of Wisconsin-trained lawyer, would have wanted to help them: “The defendant[s] [have] no rights as against the government ...The door is opened wide to coercion, duress, and tyranny. All through the trial I fairly itched to cross-examine and test the credibility of witnesses and possibly break down their testimony through their own contradictions.” This trial and others attended by Davies impressed him as they produced the government’s desired verdicts. But they were also, he assured Roosevelt, exercises in “horrifying oriental ruthlessness and cruelty,” staged for one overarching propagandistic reason: to persuade the Soviet public of the iniquities of Stalin’s

opponents. "The Revolution," he concluded, was proceeding like the French in "chewing up its own children."¹²

That Stalin's dictatorship was brutal Davies never doubted, a point rarely credited by his detractors. Even in *Mission to Moscow* there are gripping passages about the terror that reached "down into and haunts all sections of the community." Moreover, he was aware of being under continuous police surveillance, was sensibly alarmed by the OGPU's nocturnal activities, and recognized that many of their prisoners included the nation's leading intellectuals. The plight of what he called "misguided" Americans, who had earlier taken Soviet citizenship but then fallen foul of Stalin's laws and sought rescue by the embassy, was also frequently remarked upon by him. Davies's efforts to help these expatriates, usually to no avail, added to his sober understanding of the regime's nature: "This is no longer a dictatorship *of* the proletariat but a dictatorship *over* the proletariat." Davies suggested that those Americans who complained of Roosevelt "and of tyranny of Government at home ought to come over here for awhile. They would understand what a government can do to freedom." As it was, he solemnly declared, none of the revolution's vaunted economic and other achievements compensated for the denial of people's spiritual and political liberties. Ultimately, he believed, the Soviet state would fail, a victim of its own oppressive internal order: "The greatest vice is that [the communists] refuse to recognize that a police state, no matter how high its purpose, is destructive of the greatest rights

¹²Journal, January 26, 1937, Box 3; Diary, July 8, 1937, Box 5; Litvinov on the Defendants, March 4, 1934, Box 7; Journal, February 1, 1937, Box; Diary, March 2, 1938, Box 7; Davies to Dearest Bijou, March 6, 1938, Box 7; Davies to Roosevelt, February 4, 1937, Box 3; Davies to Dearest Bijou, June 30, 1937, Box 5; Davies to Colonel House, January 27, 1937, Box 3. All of the above are in the Davies Papers.

which free men cherish and demand, namely spiritual and physical liberties and freedoms. That is the rock upon which this experiment will ultimately founder." When the time came, Davies was as content as any of his predecessors to leave Russia. To one friend, he admitted: "Conditions here that constantly express authoritarian tyranny and the horror of a police state cramp down upon the mind unconsciously and [are] oppressive."¹³

Despite his appreciation for the weaknesses inherent in any tyrannical regime, and sensitive to the unfavorable impressions created in Western military-diplomatic circles by the party and Red Army purges, Davies thought Soviet Russia was still a power with which to reckon. Its sheer land mass, natural resources, industrial base, large population, and the ruthless determination of its leaders meant that the country would remain a major player in European politics for the foreseeable future. In Davies's opinion, it was inconceivable that the United States and other industrial democracies could ever share in a community of values with the USSR, but it was possible and desirable for them to maintain a spirit of cooperation with the Soviets. In answer to the president's question about Soviet power and proclivities, the crux of Davies message was encapsulated in this January 1939 statement: "In the event of so dire a calamity as an international conflict between the totalitarian and the

¹³Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, 302-303; Diary, January 22, 1937, Box 3 Davies Papers; Diary, July 5, 1937, Box 5 Davies Papers; Davies to Marvin McIntyre, October 6, 1937, Box 1911-1924 Official File, Roosevelt Papers; Davies to Pat Harrison, February 18, 1937, Box 3 Davies Papers; Davies to Birney Baruch, October 25, 1937, Box 6 Davies Papers; Diary, May 21, 1938, Box 8 Davies Papers; Davies to Joseph Tumulty, April 22, 1938, Box 7 Davies Papers; Davies to Marvin McIntyre, March 15, 1937, Box 4 Davies Papers.

democratic states, the Soviet Government is, in my opinion, a much more powerful factor than the reactionaries of Europe concede, and might be of the greatest value.”¹⁴

Davies was not a deep or an original thinker. Many of his reports about the Soviet Union, for example, were marred with superficial observations that sprang from his cheerful commitment to American-style capitalism. He mistook the introduction of modest material incentives to factory workers as proof of the inevitable rise of market forces and a phasing in of full-fledged capitalism. He gave easy credence to official Soviet claims of unrivaled economic achievements.¹⁵ In addition, his ideas about European international relations were derivative. They depended on his conversations with Coulondre and Britain’s ambassador in Moscow, Viscount Chilston — both of whom advocated, against the prevailing wisdom of their governments, an Anglo-French agreement with the Soviets. Yet the point ought to be granted that Davies did develop a lucid line about European matters and the Soviet Union’s role — a line perfectly compatible with Roosevelt’s viewpoint. Adopting as his own the vocabulary of Coulondre and Chilston, Davies converted in his early sixties to a sect of realpolitik, and he placed emphasis on the balance of power as the best means of staving off future war. To the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Key Pittman, Davies taught: “We may not like the idea, but in this world for a long, long time there will be no Peace until the physical security of each of the great powers is assured...Only ‘Balance of Power’ can do that, unless the millennium arrives

¹⁴Davies to Dear Chief, January 18, 1939, Box 3584-3617 Official File, Roosevelt Papers.

¹⁵Davies was a vulgarian, and he did not hesitate to use words such as *nigger*. See, for example, his discussion with the British ambassador in Diary, March 30, 1938, Box 7 Davies Papers.

and we have a perfect world.” An important factor in the balance of power, he told Under Secretary Sumner Welles in 1937, was the Red Army — still potent despite damage inflicted by the purges: “It definitely contributed to the balance of power. The power and strength of Russia and its relations to France and Britain have been of unquestioned value in deterring Hitler.” It would be a tragic mistake, therefore, if France and Britain discounted Soviet strength and struck a deal with Hitler that led to a fascist-imposed peace in Europe. Such a peace could not last and would end in the explosion of a second European war, with Germany the probable victor. Neither did Davies dismiss the possibility that Hitler and Stalin might compose their differences and produce an agreement that would put the rest of Europe at extreme risk. By similar reasoning, said Davies, it was important for states concerned with Japanese expansionism to find means of cooperating with the Soviet Union. To this end, Roosevelt instructed Davies to conduct secret negotiations with Stalin’s government to strike an agreement allowing for exchanges of military information regarding the Far East and Japan. These talks, begun after Japanese bombers sank the US gunboat *Panay* on the Yangtze River, were not enthusiastically pursued by the Soviets and ended in failure. Very likely, such an agreement with the Americans meant little to Stalin, who would have preferred a more all-encompassing agreement with the US (and possibly Britain and France) aimed against the Japanese. Ironically, when later Stalin did express interest in the idea to Davies, the Americans backed off. Cordell Hull responded by asking Ambassador Alexander Troyanovsky to curb Soviet involvement with the US communist party, and the administration attempted to restart discussions about the

debts issue. Despite Davies's best effort, these sputtered out.¹⁶

Conclusions

Davies embodied the president's own ambivalence and groping in the late 1930s in devising policy toward the USSR — a country whose professed values and international ambitions FDR recognized as antipathetic to the United States. In February 1940 he not only condemned the Soviet war against Finland but pronounced Stalin's regime "a dictatorship as absolute as any dictatorship in the world."¹⁷ The underlying problem, though, for Roosevelt was that in subsequent years the United States could not simultaneously check Germany and Japan without the cooperation of this same dictatorship.

Better than his predecessor Bullitt, Davies appreciated this dilemma early on. His overriding concern by 1944 was that the Soviet-US alliance should prove durable and that State Department "underlings" opposed to it not "poison" the president's mind.¹⁸ Davies was also a more enigmatic, if less

¹⁶Keith Eagles, "Ambassador Joseph E. Davies and America-Soviet Relations, 1937-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1966), 178-190; Thomas Maddux, *Years of Estrangement*, 96-97. The following are in the Davies Papers: Journal, February 19, 1937, Box 4; Davies to Sumner Welles, June 28, 1937, Box 5; Davies to Key Pittman, June 29, 1937, Box 5; Davies to Marvin McIntyre, June 10, 1937, Box 5; Diary, March 30, 1938, Box 7; Davies to Sumner Welles, March 1, 1938, Box 7; Davies to Steve Early, March 9, 1937, Box 4.

¹⁷Benson Lee Grayson (ed.), *The American Image of Russia, 1917-1977* (New York, 1978), 150-152.

¹⁸E.M.W.'s Memorandum for the President, May 18, 1944, Box 49, President's Secretary's File, Roosevelt Papers.

circumspect, diplomatic personality than Bullitt. He evidently possessed a portion of Machiavellian shrewdness about the practice and mentality of successful diplomacy. He once admitted in his journal: "It is difficult to assess what reliability one can put upon statements of men in this diplomatic game. There is much 'dual personality' in this diplomatic life. It is only on that assumption that one can safely proceed when representing one's country. There are too often two personalities in the same man: the man he would like to be, the other the man he has to be as a representative of his Foreign Office." This statement of Davies's amounts to his own version of that famous adage attributed to Sir Henry Wotton and used (usually unfairly) to explain diplomats: "An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." In any case, Davies's observation as applied to himself explains in part the disparity between his breathless friendliness toward Soviet officialdom in 1936-1938 and his more matter-of-fact reporting to Washington about Stalin's totalitarianism. In a sense Davies also used an inverted version of his and Wotton's logic in explaining the Soviet Union to his compatriots during World War II. To borrow from his terminology, *Mission to Moscow* reflected the author's dual personality in reverse. He was willing for their own sake (as he understood it) to mislead his compatriots about another country — a country whose multiple defects had to be explained away if the broad population was to embrace it as an ally and worthy recipient of billions of dollars worth of lend-lease relief. In other words, Davies was an ambassador sent abroad, who, upon returning home, lied to his countrymen for their own good.¹⁹ This orientation was absolutely in keeping with Roosevelt who admitted in 1942:

¹⁹Joseph Davies, Journal, March 26, 1937, Box 4 Davies Papers.

“I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war.”²⁰

Roosevelt not only approved of Davies’s conduct during his ambassadorship, he afterwards used him to stump the countryside to garner support for the Soviet war effort. And the president sent him in 1943 as a special envoy with the rank of ambassador to consult with Stalin and soothe his anger about continued Anglo-US delays in opening a second front. Again with the same rank, Davies acted as an advisor to Harry Truman at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. By then, however, what remained of the wartime coalition was fast eroding. At Potsdam, Davies and Harriman, then US ambassador to Moscow (and a recent convert to anti-Sovietism), clashed, with the latter referring to the Soviets as “barbarians” and Davies holding the line that a way must be found to preserve the alliance into the postwar years.²¹

²⁰Quoted in Warren Kimball’s *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, 1991), 7.

²¹Joseph Davies, Diary, July 17, 1945, Box 18 Davies Papers.

YOU CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE — BUT I DID! DETERMINISM AND THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

by

Wayne S. Cole

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This essay is an intellectual autobiography that traces the bumpy twisting paths that one historian inadvertently traveled from an unquestioning belief in freedom of the will to a belief in historical determinism. That determinism includes the conviction that circumstances — genetic, physiological, environmental, family, experiences, and conditions at home and abroad — circumstances control. Those total circumstances even control the decision-making processes that seem so free and independent from the individual's perspective.

It was not a path that I intended or wanted to follow. The destination I reached in my historiographical wanderings is not the Promised Land of the Great American Dream. In a sense the whole experience was “un-American.” The paths opened up for me as I studied, taught, researched, and wrote on the history of American foreign relations, particularly on the Franklin D. Roosevelt years from 1932 to 1945.

As a small town boy in Iowa back in the 1920s and 1930s I learned that it was possible to change things, to make life better. It required hard work, education, careful planning, cooperation of others, and democracy — but it could be done. My maternal ancestors had accomplished that for themselves and their descendants when they emigrated from Norway to America. My father had done that when as an orphaned teenager he had fled poverty and deprivation in the hills of southern Indiana to the rich soils of Iowa where he made his

living as a tradesman and small businessman. I had seen it happen in our small community when townspeople banded together to accomplish positive goals beneficial to the community and to those who lived there. And I read in my books of great persons in history who had, through heroic effort and great wisdom, made life better (or at least different) for their countries and the world. It could be done by the giants of the past — and perhaps by small town youngsters in Iowa as well. It was the American way.

President Roosevelt was demonstrating how it could be done by using New Deal measures to end the Great Depression. Our community saw little evidence of economic recovery, but many thought FDR was on the right track. Even if he were wrong, surely someone could restore prosperity by taking proper actions. Problems were meant to be solved through right thought and action. For me the study of history could help point the way. At least I proposed to find out.

That confidence took on more urgent and even deeply personal patterns with the eruption of World War II and the involvement of the United States in that war. Japanese military forces ignited war in East Asia in July 1937 — during the summer between my freshman and sophomore years in high school. Nazi Germany set off the European war when Hitler's blitzkrieg smashed into Poland in September 1939 — at the beginning of my senior year in high school. On December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into that war, I was in the middle of my sophomore year of college. It was not a good time to be a teenager. That terrible war could shatter one's dreams.

In that setting I turned to the study of diplomatic history in my quest for the wisdom and secret formulas from the past that might accomplish peace and security. I collected learned quotations that assured me that lessons for the present and future might be discovered through study of the past. And this corn-fed boy from Iowa determined to learn those vital

lessons so he might more wisely help guide to a better future. That hope, that determination, persisted for years. Whether it required an improved version of Woodrow Wilson's internationalism and League of Nations, the pacifism and democratic socialism so appealing to some of my graduate professors, the practical realism urged by political science professors, or some formula as yet undiscovered, it could be found and, God willing, could be implemented. Progress was inevitable and sooner or later solutions would be at hand. This might be the time. I determined to play a role in making that dream a reality.

That was where things stood when I laid down my duties as a military officer and pilot in the Army Air Forces in 1945 at the close of World War II. Graduation from college in 1946 and service as a high school history teacher in 1946-1947, confirmed me in that hope, that expectation for the future.

In 1947 I began my graduate studies in American diplomatic history at the University of Wisconsin under the able direction of Professor Fred Harvey Harrington, with the accomplishment of that goal in the forefront of my thinking.¹ Also on the faculty there was the Pulitzer-prize-winning historian, Merle Curti. That gentle scholar-teacher's tone encouraged students in the quest for that better life through democratic processes. Nonetheless, there the seeds of determinism were beginning to be planted in the soil of my mind.

In his brilliant, almost casual style, Professor Harrington introduced students to interpretations of historian Charles A. Beard as those perspectives projected into foreign affairs —

¹For a perceptive portrait of Professor Harrington by an able historian who completed his doctorate under Harrington's direction a few years after I did, see Walter LaFeber, "Fred Harvey Harrington," *Diplomatic History* 9 (Fall, 1985): 311-19.

particularly from Beard's book, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*, published in 1934.² The book itself was poorly organized and uneven in style and analysis. But Harrington paved the way for fuller understanding of that seminal work by providing his own more clearly enunciated variations of the Beardian views in his classes.³ The fact that that great teacher delivered his lectures without notes and with refreshing clarity made it easy for listeners to be persuaded of the validity of the ideas he advanced. In particular I remember one brilliant two-hour lecture by Harrington to his pro-seminar on "American Expansion Overseas," delivered on October 6, 1948, that put all the pieces together for me.

In brief, the Beard-Harrington analysis found the roots of American conceptions of national interest and foreign policies in the perceived self-interests of two broad socio-economic-sectional-political groupings — Alexander Hamilton's business-merchant-capitalist groups of the urban northeast, and Thomas Jefferson's farmer-agrarian groups in the rural south and west. Both groups encouraged expansion — but of two quite different sorts.⁴ The urban business groups looked abroad to commercial-creditor expansion overseas — sometimes in accord with Great Britain. That Hamiltonian urban business and capitalist expansion laid the groundwork

²Charles A. Beard with the collaboration of G. H. E. Smith, *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934).

³For a brief article by Harrington on Beard's book, see Fred Harvey Harrington, "Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations," *American Perspectives: A Quarterly Analysis of Foreign Policy* 4 (Fall, 1950): 335-45.

⁴Beard, *Idea of National Interest*, passim, but see particularly 47-54, 84-88, 549-53.

for what became in the twentieth century America's overseas empire and worldwide internationalism. In contrast, the farmer-agrarian groups looked westward for lands and continental security. Thomas Jefferson served that continental expansionism through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. That continental orientation included a distrust of Europe in general and of England in particular that came to be known in the twentieth century as American "isolationism" — nonintervention in Europe and rejection of foreign entanglements.

The particular foreign policies of the United States at any given time depended upon which of the two broad socio-economic groups, in their continuing struggles with each other, happened to be dominant or in power at that time. When he wrote his book in 1934 Beard thought he saw a merging of those two groups of interests in early phases of the Roosevelt New Deal.⁵ When it became apparent later, however, that FDR's foreign policies were more consistent with Hamilton's way than with Jefferson's, Beard parted company with Roosevelt (and with the dominant forces in American society and economy by that time). As a result Beard unintentionally self-destructed. His standing as a historian had largely been destroyed by the time he died in 1948.

That Beard-Harrington analysis underscored domestic socio-economic bases for American foreign policy, but it also included emphasis on geographic bases for differences on foreign affairs. That opened the door for the contributions of historian Frederick Jackson Turner who had taught many years at Wisconsin and later at Harvard. Turner's emphasis on sectional and frontier influences had not focused particularly on foreign affairs. Nonetheless, his approach had

⁵Ibid., 552-53.

foreign policy implications that he and others recognized.⁶ Harrington had read Turner, but Turner's impact on my thinking was pressed more explicitly by other professors at Wisconsin — Merle Curti,⁷ William B. Hesseltine,⁸ and Merrill Jensen. That Turner emphasis fit nicely with the Beard-Harrington analysis of the history of foreign relations.

In my undergraduate studies I had mastered the main details of the history of American foreign relations. But those details left me asking, "So what? What does it all mean?" The Beard-Turner analyses, as channeled through Harrington, Curti, Hesseltine, and Jensen answered those questions for me powerfully and persuasively. Through all of that there was the implication that that American expansion (of whichever variety) was less than wise in terms of peace and security. And there was, I thought, the implication (made explicit in Beard's companion book, *The Open Door at Home*) that some form of democratic socialism with its emphasis on domestic socio-economic planning and with minimal reliance on overseas activity and expansion provided the greatest hope for peace and security for the United States — and possibly, by

⁶Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920); and Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of Sections in American History* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932).

⁷Merle Curti, "The Section and the Frontier in American History: The Methodological Concepts of Frederick Jackson Turner," in *Methods in Social Science: A Case Book*, ed. Stuart Rice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 353-67; and Merle Curti, "Frederick Jackson Turner, 1861-1932," in Merle Curti, *Probing Our Past* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 32-55.

⁸William B. Hesseltine, "Regions, Classes and Sections in American History," *Journal of Land and Public Utilities* 20 (February, 1944): 35-44.

example, for the rest of the world.⁹ I had my historically based “secret formula” for peace and security.

In 1950 I went off to my first full-time university teaching position at the University of Arkansas. The courses I taught there in the midst of the Ozark mountains of northwest Arkansas were straight Beard-Harrington-Curti et al. It all fit together perfectly. I had already made the first steps toward determinism — without realizing what I had done. I did so without questioning in the slightest my continued faith in the ability of informed persons, with clear historical awareness, to guide America and the world toward enlightened peace and security.

Other variables gradually were added to that intellectual compound that strengthened the still unrecognized determinist element in my evolving thinking. For example, Albert K. Weinberg’s book, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*, cranked the spirit of nationalism and ideas into the mix. As Merle Curti had done in his studies of intellectual history, Weinberg demonstrated the intimate relationship between interests and ideas. He did so without cynically suggesting that the ideas were hypocritical or that ideas were not real forces in their own right. As Weinberg phrased it, “Moral ideology was the partner of self-interest in the intimate alliance of which expansionism was the offspring.” Throughout Weinberg was “conceding sincerity to ideology but assuming its unconscious determination by self-interest.”¹⁰

⁹Charles A. Beard with the collaboration of G. H. E. Smith, *The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934). See also Beard, *Idea of National Interest*, 552.

¹⁰Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 12, 38.

Thomas A. Bailey of Stanford University was the author of the textbook used in the first course I took as an undergraduate on diplomatic history, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. First published in 1940, it went through ten editions before its author died in 1983.¹¹ As student or teacher I used the first seven and last two editions of that popular textbook. Bailey emphasized the impact of public opinion (often ill-informed or misinformed) on foreign affairs. He advanced his interpretation even more clearly and persuasively in his book, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy*, published in 1948. The topical chapters in that free-wheeling book were weak on the socio-economic-geographic influences so powerful in the approaches of Beard-Harrington-Curti et al. But it successfully highlighted various other domestic variables — notably ethnic influences. It also included chapters on ideological, political, and even religious influences. He wrote of the roles of the press and radio in shaping thinking on foreign affairs.¹² Bailey's treatment of the impact of public opinion on foreign affairs forced me to broaden the socio-economic-sectional emphases I had brought with me from Wisconsin to Arkansas, and then took with me in the middle of the 1950s to Iowa State University in central Iowa.

¹¹Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 10th ed. (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980). See also, Thomas A. Bailey, *The American Pageant Revisited: Recollections of a Stanford Historian* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982); Alexander DeConde and Armin Rappaport, "Biographical Introduction," in *Essays Diplomatic and Undiplomatic of Thomas A. Bailey*, eds. Alexander DeConde and Armin Rappaport (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), vii-xiii; and Raymond G. O'Connor, "Thomas A. Bailey: His Impact," *Diplomatic History* 9 (Fall, 1985): 303-309.

¹²Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948).

In Iowa two quite different major developments moved me further down the paths toward historical determinism. One deepened an aspect of the Beard-Harrington interpretation, and the other provided a comprehensive theoretical construct for viewing and understanding the history of foreign relations.

The first grew out of my research on Gerald P. Nye, Republican senator from North Dakota. It was an expansion of my earlier research and writing on the America First Committee. In my thesis and dissertation on America First I had taken brief looks at the foreign policy views of Senator Nye in 1941. In that context he appeared like one of several conservative Republican isolationists from the middle west and great plains who had opposed President Roosevelt's foreign policies.¹³

While in Arkansas, far from essential manuscript collections, I had studied Nye's career in periodicals available there. I quickly discovered that despite his conservative image by 1941, during the greater part of his public career Nye had been a progressive and had supported much of FDR's New Deal. In tracing the evolution of his thought and politics I noted the senator's changing attitudes toward presidential power in general and Roosevelt's power in particular. I thought I saw in those changing attitudes the "hinges" by which the North Dakota senator swung from his earlier progressivism toward conservatism — all the while retaining his isolationism.

When I got to Iowa State (still far from essential archives and manuscripts) I resolved to test my theory by tracing Nye's views through the twenty years of his senate career by studying his speeches published in the *Congressional Record*.

¹³Wayne S. Cole, *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), 23, 39, 45, 56, 58, 110, 129, 140, 156, 161, 170, 187, 188, 264.

At Iowa State in the 1950s those massive volumes were stored in a poorly heated metal warehouse. To use them I had to get a special key for the building, place my trusty Smith-Corona typewriter on a high metal shelf, prop myself up by sitting on a couple of volumes of the *Record* piled on a rickety chair, and go to work. Through long hours and days those volumes allowed me to move mentally back to the United States senate of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. And the outlines of my theory on the significance of changing attitudes toward presidential power (modified in the process) gradually fell into place.

As the days and weeks passed, however, a new and quite unexpected theme began to emerge from my researches. I found thoughts and patterns in Senator Nye's speeches that sounded surprisingly familiar. And I came to realize that they were the agrarian thoughts I had studied long before in the person of Virginia's Thomas Jefferson and, in different terms, in Nebraska's Populist-Democratic William Jennings Bryan.

It was not far fetched to link Nye of North Dakota with Bryan of Nebraska. Neither had won the hero's mantle in America's folklore. And after Pearl Harbor (and even before) leading isolationists (including both Beard and Nye) had been discredited in public and professional eyes. The beating that Nye and his fellow isolationists had taken at the hands of Roosevelt and the interventionists before and during World War II had left his public image badly tarnished.

To link the besmirched Nye with one of America's most honored Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, seemed shocking to many. There was no way that that learned and beloved author of America's magnificent Declaration of Independence could be linked with the rustic discredited Republican senator from the dusty great plains state of North Dakota. It could not be.

Nonetheless, when one put the two men under the research microscope the fundamental similarities were there. Both

Jefferson and Nye emerged from agricultural sectors of America's society and economy. Both spoke out for an agrarian-based democracy. Both were critical of political dominance by urban business and creditor interests. Both distrusted foreign policy projections of the economic interests of those urban groups. Both were critical of big navy interests. Both distrusted Great Britain. Both saw America's national interests as predominantly continental with emphasis on North America. Both opposed "entangling alliances." Both treasured the culture and values they associated with rural America. There were differences between Jefferson and Nye, of course, but when one analyzed the socio-economic bases for the views of the two men the lines of continuity were striking. And that fitted perfectly with the Hamilton-Jefferson Beard-Harrington analysis of the socio-economic bases for the history of American foreign relations.

For that small-town young man pounding away on his portable typewriter in that old warehouse at Iowa State, the discovery was nothing short of sensational. It matters not that it may have been "old hat" to more sophisticated and learned scholars. It matters not that others may have found the discovery either mistaken or unimportant. For me (then and since) it has been one of the most exciting and revealing intellectual discoveries of my lifetime. When, through further research, I found that Nye in his agrarian Jeffersonian perspective was only one among a whole passel of western agrarian progressives whose domestic views projected into isolationist perspectives in foreign affairs, it made the findings even more exciting for me.¹⁴

¹⁴Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), *passim*, but see especially 8, 34-38, 50, 128-29.

Later I met the former senator, did research in the personal papers he had stored in his suburban Maryland home, and studied the newspapers that he had edited as a young man in Wisconsin, Iowa, and North Dakota. But I made my central discovery in that old warehouse while pouring over the senator's speeches printed in the *Congressional Record*. The book I subsequently wrote, *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations*, was published in 1962. It was the most intellectually exciting accomplishment of my professional career.¹⁵ The whole experience reinforced my convictions on the soundness of the Beard-Harrington analysis of socio-economic bases for foreign policies.

If that analysis of Nye and more generally on the Beard-Harrington interpretation were correct, then the rise and fall of the foreign policy projections of those agrarian socio-economic interests lay less in the talents or wisdom of those agrarian spokesmen than in the power (or lack of power) those agrarian interests commanded within the United States relative to the urban business-commercial-creditor interests. Insofar as that may have been true, then it was, broadly speaking, the ever conquering industrial revolution and the accompanying urbanization of American society that accounted for the rise of American overseas imperialism and internationalism, and for the decline of America's traditional isolationism. Circumstances were controlling rather more than the wisdom and political skills of individual Americans. Now that was getting terribly close to determinism in foreign affairs — whether that skinny young history professor in Iowa realized it or not!

¹⁵Wayne S. Cole, *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), *passim*, but see particularly chapters 1 and 13.

At the same time that I was making those interpretive discoveries on agrarian bases for the rise and fall of isolationism, I was also shaping a more generalized paradigm to explain the history of American foreign relations. My studies through the early 1950s had accounted for the general outlines of domestic influences on the history of American foreign relations, and for the continuity of expansion in foreign affairs. But all of that gave little attention to the world scene — to England's George III, France's Napoleon, Germany's Kaiser William II and Adolf Hitler, Britain's Winston Churchill, the Soviet Union's Joseph Stalin, and China's Mao Tse-tung. They were all there, but the Beard-Harrington-Cole perspectives on American foreign affairs might not have been radically different even if they had not been. The dominant domestic influences projected into foreign affairs mattered most — not overseas challenges or threats to national security and survival.

Enter Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago and his fellow "Realists." I had taken world politics courses as an undergraduate, had taught high school government, and had minored in political science-international relations in graduate school. I had read Walter Lippmann, Nicholas J. Spykman, and George Kennan. But it had not really "taken" in my mind; I thought they were "missing the point" that my history professors at Wisconsin had elucidated so clearly.

When I moved to Iowa State, however, I was required to teach political science courses on World Politics and International Organization and on International Relations, as well as history courses. In those days that made it imperative that I read and understand what Professor Morgenthau and his fellow "Realists" had to tell me. Of seminal importance was Morgenthau's volume, *Politics Among Nations; The Struggle*

for *Power and Peace*.¹⁶ I quickly learned that if a reader accepted Morgenthau's assumptions and definitions, and if one followed his logic closely, one was likely to be hooked. Morgenthau's brilliant mind could overpower the reader.

In addition, Morgenthau's perspectives had an enthusiastic spokesman in the person of Professor Norman A. Graebner, one of my more talented colleagues at Iowa State. Graebner had studied at the University of Chicago, had become a doctrinaire "Realist," and was a devoted disciple of Morgenthau. In a sense Graebner was to my study of Morgenthau and the Realists what Harrington had been to my study of Beard. Morgenthau and Graebner could not compel me to turn away from my earlier perspectives, but they did lead me to add important new dimensions to my analysis.

Professor Morgenthau wrote about power. That was not new. I already knew that the struggle for power within the United States between the urban business groups and the rural farming groups determined which would define American policies at home and abroad. But in the hands of Morgenthau power became all. "The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest and must be supported with adequate power."¹⁷ "Diplomacy without power is feeble, and power without diplomacy is destructive and blind."¹⁸ Power was not intrinsically good or bad, wise or unwise; it simply was. Nothing good or bad, wise or unwise, could prevail without supporting power broadly defined. A state's power was always relative to the power of the states

¹⁶Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954).

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 528.

¹⁸Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952), 242.

with which it was dealing. Morgenthau defined power broadly, including geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of government, and quality of diplomacy.¹⁹ That ever present role of power determined patterns in world affairs far more than law, morality, international organization, or world opinion. In Morgenthau's view there was no hope for actions or objectives not supported with adequate power.

Room for maneuver by world leaders lay in their techniques for maximizing and martialling power, and in diplomacy backed by power. Morgenthau's rules for diplomacy provided no hope for utopian solutions not backed with sufficient power.²⁰ Professor Morgenthau, more than any other scholar, sensitized me to the role of power and to external influences on foreign affairs. He and his fellow Realists provided missing pieces for my formula for understanding the history of foreign relations.

Consequently by 1957 I was ready to put all the pieces together in a complete restructuring of my courses on the history of American foreign relations. The hypothesis that I began using as the format for my diplomatic history courses at that time was expressed simply and compactly: American foreign affairs are the product of both external influences in the drive for peace and security, and of internal influences in the efforts to satisfy the needs and desires of the dominant groups within the United States. Those external and internal influences could take many forms and have many different consequences, but one of the frequently encountered consequences of those influences was expansion by the United States in one form or another.

¹⁹Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 102-37.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 526-35.

In that construct the emphasis on external influences grew out of the intellectual input of Morgenthau and other Realists. The domestic influences (social, economic, political, ideological, and military) grew out of the intellectual input of Beard, Harrington, Curti, Weinberg, Bailey, and others. The theme of expansion was straight Harrington.

To visualize my hypothesis I used a parallelogram with one vector symbolizing external influences, the other vector symbolizing domestic influences, and the resultant of those two vectors including a prominent element of expansion. I then divided the history of American foreign relations into six chronological periods. The first lecture for each period described the world scene with emphasis on changing power relationships. The second lecture described domestic circumstances within the United States that affected policies abroad. Then followed lectures that traced the actual course of foreign affairs in that period, with emphasis on the controlling external and internal influences and on the contributions of those two categories of influences on American expansion. It was impossible for any historian to know all the variables involved, but for me the hypothesis accounted for nearly everything that went into shaping the history of foreign affairs — except people.

The first time I used that hypothesis and its parallelogram to introduce my course on the history of American foreign relations one of my brighter graduate students challenged it (and me). A doctoral student in economics, he was accustomed to the use of statistical methods. He thought the general logic of my hypothesis was reasonable and useful intellectually. But he objected to my use of the parallelogram. He contended that the parallelogram implied that there was one fixed resultant of the external and internal influences operating on foreign affairs in any particular situation. That fixed resultant left no room for the possibility of freedom of will, or for choice among alternative courses of action. In

other words he objected to the determinism implied by my hypothesis and parallelogram. He suggested that rather than using the geometric figure I should shift to the statistician's figure of speech. Given certain external influences, and given certain domestic influences, there was a high statistical probability that one outcome would prevail and that others would not. But those probabilities did not rule out alternative courses — however unlikely. That statistical language left room for the possibility of freedom of choice — albeit within confines narrowed by statistical probabilities. The student and I both realized that historians and statesmen lacked the capacity for the geometric or statistical precision that either of the figures of speech implied. I was grateful for the student's contribution. At that time I had no intention of ruling out freedom of choice or the individual's control over destiny — though I realized that the rigidity of my format narrowed the range for choices considerably.

I labored long and hard to prepare lectures consistent with my hypothesis. Students found it helpful. It made sense of episodes that were less meaningful without its help. And for me it turned on lights all over the place.

If the idea was intellectually sound and helpful, perhaps others might benefit if I put it in the form of a textbook on the history of American foreign affairs. I approached publishers, found some interest, signed an agreement with Dorsey Press, and began converting my lectures into chapters for a textbook.

It was then that I left Iowa State University in 1965 and took a position at the University of Maryland, just outside of Washington, D. C. That move allowed me to teach exclusively in the field of American diplomatic history, work more with graduate students, have sabbatical leaves, have better opportunities to win research grants, and most important, move closer to the rich research facilities in the Library of Congress, National Archives, and other manuscript depositories in the eastern part of the United States. I

proposed to make the best possible use of the opportunities that my new position made available, within the limits of my energies and abilities. It was, for me, the culmination of my professional ambitions.

When I began my duties at the University of Maryland I continued to convert my lectures into chapters for the diplomatic history textbook for which I had contracted, while at the same time using those same lectures for the classes I was teaching. Dorsey Press published my book, *An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations*, in 1968 and a revised edition in 1974.²¹ I was pleased with it, most of my students liked it, and it won respectable numbers of adoptions.

Since my lectures were now in the textbook that I was using for my course, I had to decide how to handle my class lectures at that juncture. One of my graduate students at Maryland inadvertently gave me the idea for handling that problem. He told me that he thought my lectures (i.e. the lectures I was at that moment converting into a textbook) were "history without heroes." He probably did not know that that description had been applied long before to Charles A. Beard and others.

In any event, when students began using my textbook, I began using a biographical approach in my lectures. At each class meeting I lectured on a different individual who was significant in the history of American foreign relations. I divided each lecture into four parts: First, an introduction and overview showing how the individual had significance in broader patterns of the history of foreign relations; second, a biographical sketch of the individual's background, values,

²¹Wayne S. Cole, *An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1968), rev. ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1974).

methods, and style; third, a summary of the individual's specific roles in foreign affairs; and finally, a conclusion underscoring the significance of the individual in American foreign relations.

I really threw myself into the task of preparing those biographical lectures. I read more biographies than I had ever read before — and delighted in doing so. It was fun and intellectually exciting both to prepare and to present the lectures. Most students understood how the lectures and the text were supposed to compliment each other.

Courses on great people tend toward “Great Man” or “Devil” theories of history. I almost expected that to happen with the biographical lectures I prepared and presented at Maryland beginning in 1968. Nonetheless, in practice the opposite pattern evolved in my lectures — and in my intellectual development. It is impossible for the biographer to know all the subtle variables that go into making an individual. But by the time I understood an individual well and had sketched the person's background and values for a given lecture, that individual's actual conduct in foreign affairs fell naturally into the patterns one should have expected. There were, for me, no real surprises. That was true whether I was lecturing on such giants as Hamilton, Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Webster, Polk, Seward, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, or Franklin D. Roosevelt, or on more obscure persons such as Nicholas P. Trist, William Walker, Casius M. Clay, John A. Kasson, Horace N. Allen, or John L. Stevens. I worried that in my eagerness to fit individuals into my hypothesis I may have been bending and squeezing them into unnatural forms. But I persuaded myself that I was not doing that.

Consequently the combination of using my textbook and its hypothesis, along with my biographical lectures, had the effect of moving my thinking further and further in determinist directions. Then, for the first time, I became troubled by the

determinism in my thinking. I sometimes expressed my uneasiness about the role of determinism in my historiographical thinking and invited counter arguments from students and colleagues. None could dissuade me. One semester I even gave a special course that I called "Heroes and Determinism in the History of American Foreign Relations." But it failed to disabuse me.

In the spring of 1990 I delivered a major lecture on our campus on, "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Great Man or Man for His Times," in which I advanced the most fully developed determinist interpretation I had ever presented. In that lecture I said: "Each individual (no matter how great or obscure) is a product of, is shaped by, his or her background, experiences, opportunities, environment, and times. No individual has any control over whether he or she will be born or not, or over the time, place, or circumstances of that birth — whether in primitive pre-historic times or in modern America, whether into Western Civilization or into one of the non-Western cultures. No one has the slightest control over his or her genetic inheritance: the physical, mental, and emotional equipment with which the individual is endowed genetically. One has no control over the choice of one's race, ethnic background, or sex. The child cannot choose his or her parents, family, socio-economic class level, initial religious training, or educational opportunities, facilities, or teachers. Few of us depart very radically from the patterns and directions set for us by our backgrounds, families, and environments. Even as adults one may have little or no control over one's natural energies or body chemistry that may affect personality, emotions, and general effectiveness." I concluded that "Franklin D. Roosevelt was the right person in the right place at the right time — but circumstances in his background, within the United States, and on the world scene made his times; FDR did not." The lecture went well, but most who discussed the issue with me parted company so far

as determinism was concerned — without persuading me that I was mistaken.

Now here I stand at the end (or at very nearly the end) of my intellectual journey. I cannot with certainty prove that my analysis is correct. One can never know all the relevant variables that go into making an individual, or all the functional variables at home and abroad. My analysis is not emotionally satisfying and is not consistent with the near-universal assumptions prevailing among the American people (and scholars). Nonetheless, at the present state of historical methodology, I am persuaded that scholars cannot, with certainty, prove that I am wrong.

FDR'S DAY OF INFAMY: FIFTY YEARS LATER

by

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Is it not time for students of the Pacific War — Japanese and Americans alike — to stop pinning the blame on Tokyo? Granted, Japan's assault on 7 December 1941 was brutal. But the fact is — and it is one of the best kept secrets of American history — that what happened on 7 December was not the first "sneak attack" in U.S.-Japanese relations. There were at least five other instances during the 1930s of galling surprise, all of them directed by Washington against Tokyo, not the reverse, and together they shed more than a little light on why it was that Pearl Harbor awoke to a dawn of fire and fury.

Let us rehearse them. The first of the shocks came in 1934 when Roosevelt, after holding out hope for a non-aggression pact with Japan, along with a summit meeting, dropped his

initiative like a hot potato without any apparent reason after the government of Makoto Saito had committed its prestige. And with what result? Saito was swept from power. A second instance of diplomatic assault and battery occurred in 1939 when Washington engaged Tokyo in a series of talks aimed at renegotiation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty. Roosevelt required a reopening of the Yangtze River as well as a satisfactory settlement of American war claims in the China theater. Tokyo yielded on both points until it became obvious that Washington had no intention of following through. The upshot is that another Japanese ministry, that of General Nobuyuki Abe, came to an untimely end. Diplomatic shock treatment #3 dates to 1940 when FDR sounded Tokyo on the possibility of a non-aggression pact hinging on American mediation of the China Incident. True to form, Japanese leaders responded positively. But no sooner had they come forward than FDR, once again, unaccountably slammed the door.

Two months later, after Hitler had crushed France and commenced his bombing of England, Roosevelt revived the idea of a non-aggression pact. He resumed talks and through his press secretary Steve Early announced that he envisioned a world of three Monroe Doctrines — one for the western hemisphere, one for Europe (presumably with Nazi Germany as arbiter), and one for the Far East (implying Japanese hegemony). The following day, however, FDR executed a typical 180° turn, flatly repudiating his proposals and thereby sending still another round of talks off into nowhere. The final absurdity took place in 1941 when Roosevelt forced Japan's hand by cutting off her oil, without which she could not live. I say "absurdity" because he was so obviously determined to prevent the ensuing round of negotiations from reaching fruition. Virtually every step forward taken by Tokyo was met by a backward step on the part of Washington, and with the usual signs of contradiction.

Roosevelt proposed a summit conference and then a *modus vivendi* only to renege in each case once Prince Konoye had committed himself. Thus did he succeed in bringing down a third Japanese government. What is interesting is that the circumstances of American duplicity attending the fall of the governments of General Abe and Prince Konoye in 1940-41 are practically a carbon copy of those surrounding the fall of Saito. In fact, the first performance may almost be viewed as a dress rehearsal for those that followed, so striking is the resemblance. The surprise here is not so much that war came in 1941, which is easily obscured by the smokescreen of last-minute events, becomes more intelligible when seen as part of a consistent pattern of stalling and prevarication dating to 1933.

Now I would be the first to admit that it is not easy to criticize FDR given the fact that America emerged from World War II as a global colossus. At the same time, I think most would agree that no national glory, however sweet, no amount of wealth and power, can justify the tragedy of a war which cost the lives of fifty million people, in which there occurred a holocaust of bestial proportions, and which resulted in a total destruction of the balance of power in both Europe and the Far East, assuming such a war could have been avoided in whole or in part.

The assumption is a big one, I realize. So let me begin by setting forth my thesis in its entirety. First, I am convinced that if Roosevelt's America had been strong militarily, it might well have given Hitler pause before invading Poland. It would almost certainly have deterred the attack on Pearl Harbor. Secondly, I believe that such strength lay well within FDR's reach, well within the parameters of American public opinion, and well within the requirements of the New Deal domestic agenda. Thirdly, I believe that war could have been avoided if Roosevelt had not made a completely false issue of

Japanese imperialism; and here again, public opinion placed few, if any, restrictions on executive policy making.

Taking these propositions in order, let us begin with the question of preparedness. Could war have been averted if the United States had approached the end of the decade as a strong man armed? We all know that Hitler's decision to invade Poland was taken in the face of resistance by the German high command, just as Tojo's gamble in the Pacific ran counter to the advice of the Japanese admiralty. These decisions were close decisions. We know further that in each case the American factor was weighed in the scales and found wanting. When Hitler's national security adviser Walter Schellenberg worried aloud that Washington might enter the war, he was told by Herman Göring to see a psychiatrist. Göring was of course Hitler's chief counselor. Hitler, for his part, assured his generals that, according to the best intelligence estimates, America was in no position to field a sizable force on the European continent until 1945, by which time the war would likely be over. German observers in Washington were flabbergasted by how little Roosevelt was doing to prepare. As for Japanese naval strategists, they felt that while war with the United States might be risky business, their prospects would be bright in the short run, and perhaps equally rosy over a longer stretch, especially if German arms prevailed in Europe. Admiral Nagano, chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, after carefully weighing the combined strength of the American and British fleets, announced at an Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941 that such a grouping could be defeated: "the ratio of our fleet to that of the United States," said Nagano, "is 7.5-10; but 40% of the American fleet is in the Atlantic....The United States would need considerable time [to]...withdraw ships from the Atlantic....We are therefore confident of victory. We can destroy their fleet if they want a decisive battle."

As to whether or not Roosevelt could have sponsored rearmament without jeopardizing his popularity, along with his legislative program, one notes that newspaper czars William Randolph Hearst and Roy Howard were favorably disposed in 1933, and according to George Gallup, the public in 1935 remained “overwhelmingly in favor of building up our defenses...ninety per cent of the people wanted to build up our Air Force.” In December 1936, polls showed a full 70% desirous of a larger navy. Significantly, mainline pressure to fortify America’s Pacific possessions came not from the executive but from the legislature, with Roosevelt dragging his feet, cutting and slashing at the military budget. In 1940, popular opinion continued to outstrip presidential leadership as Roosevelt’s request for \$1 billion in defense appropriations and his rejection of the concept of a two-ocean navy ricocheted off an independent-minded Congress. Lawmakers insisted on voting \$5 billion for defense along with a two-ocean navy.

It made no difference that virtually all of the president’s advisers counseled more emphasis on defense — Hornbeck, Baruch, Davis, Grew, Hull, and others. Hull even offered to help job Congress for the necessary funds. Nor did it make any difference that New Deal reform legislation was safely in the bag or that FDR won reelection by a landslide in 1936 or that American military feebleness scandalized our overseas allies as much as it tempted potential adversaries. President Roosevelt remained resolutely insistent on inaction. He even went so far as to chide the British in 1937 for what he termed a “rearmament complex.” The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that it was FDR, and FDR alone, who sabotaged the nation’s chance for preparedness.

Turning to the second major issue under consideration, we must ask ourselves whether Roosevelt was justified on moral grounds for opposing Japanese intervention in Manchuria and North China. Although American historians have been

practically unanimous in condemning Tokyo on this score and thus, by implication, justifying Roosevelt's diplomatic shenanigans, this was not the judgment of well informed contemporaries in the field. And in this number I include American ambassador to China, Nelson T. Johnson, American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, and John Van Antwerp MacMurray, one-time American ambassador to China and former chief of the Far East Division at State. Japanese treaty rights had been seriously and repeatedly violated. Even the League of Nations Lytton Commission, which could not very well approve of Japan's resort to force, did not deny that Tokyo had a case.

Report after report from American enjoys stationed in the Far East indicate first, that Japan was morally justified in defending its rights; second, that the movement leading to the independence of Manchukuo was legitimate; third, that the people of Manchukuo were better off than they had been, and generally content with the new order sponsored by Tokyo. It is often assumed that since the Manchus looked Chinese and spoke Chinese that they were therefore Chinese in their loyalties. In truth, they were no more Chinese than the American colonists who fought at Lexington and Concord were English. For centuries, the Manchus had led a separate life with their own army, ministries, flag, and tax collection, not to mention distinctive pony tail. They had ruled all of China from 1644 (the end of the Ming dynasty) down to 1911 while their homeland flourished as a semi-independent state discouraging immigration from South China. Recalling, too, that it had been to exclude the Manchus that China had originally built its Great Wall, one would gather that little love was lost between the two groups. The primary threat to Manchuria came not from Tokyo, or even from Moscow, but rather from Nanking and the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The Manchus merely turned to Tokyo for help, much as the Mongols had turned to Moscow in the early 1920s, the only

difference being that Moscow made good on its offer of aid against South China and did not stand condemned, as did Tokyo.

To be sure, Japanese armies sought to erect buffer states along the border of Manchukuo and for military-strategic reasons supported local Mongolian and North Chinese separatism. Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Tang Yu-jen admitted that Japan had no need to send troops to North China to effect a separation; it needed only to "supply arms to discontented elements."

What, then, if not morality, could possibly justify Roosevelt's opposition when it came to Japanese attempts to maintain their economic stake on the Mainland? Was it some kind of threat to American trade and commerce? Unlikely. Britain regarded Manchukuo as a net plus for its commerce, and American trade with the Manchus increased substantially after the creation of the new state. In 1935, the report of the National Foreign Trade Council projected a fine future for the China trade even though Japan's back-stage presence could be more or less taken for granted. Signals on the China trade were mixed. In addition, from a purely economic standpoint, most Americans with interests in the Far East were involved with Japan and thus would have been the last to welcome war with Tokyo. Economics does not provide the key.

Was FDR driven by public opinion? Again unlikely. From all indications, important sectors of public sentiment would have been as happy with a policy of *détente* as they were with the idea of preparing the nation's defenses. Mr. Howard of the powerful Scripps-Howard chain of 1200 newspapers took the position in 1933 that the united States should welcome Japanese immigration and review its stand on Manchukuo. The following year, Mr. Hearst printed a public letter in all his papers declaring that Manchuria was no concern of the United States. It is true that the Protestant missionary

movement was strongly pro-Chinese, but Roosevelt had viable options.

Interestingly enough, British, French, and Russian leaders would have given Japan a free hand in Manchuria and North China, but they held back for fear of alienating Washington, which again underscores the importance of Roosevelt's role. In essence, it was Washington's nay which produced the West's nay which in turn caused hostilities to spread from Manchuria to North China to all of China whence it could be argued, in the wake of Hitler's offensive, that the security of the West itself was threatened.

We may pass over FDR's blatant bias against the Japanese, including his assumption that they suffered from underdeveloped skulls. Setting aside his disdain for their ability, his attempts to deceive and humiliate them, his cavalier attitude toward war in general, and passing over the many myths upon which he based his policy, including a false dichotomy between the military and civilian classes in Japan as indicators of the national will and the equally false notion that powerful nations such as Japan, Germany and Italy could be cowed by resort to economic sanctions, what in the last analysis, are we to conclude?

Historians have had a tendency to latch onto one or two factors in 1941 as explanations for American belligerency — either Nomura's alleged difficulty with the English language or the alleged inadequacy of a pair of Maryknoll priests employed by Washington and Tokyo as diplomatic go-betweens, or some kind of bureaucratic snafu, or Roosevelt's alleged belief that an oil embargo was needed to avert a Japanese strike against Russia. Such explanations, intriguing as they may be, have not, in my opinion, stood the test of evidence. For example, in the case of Moscow, nowhere did FDR ever say, in so many words, that Germany's invasion of Russia made an oil embargo imperative or that less drastic

steps would have entailed an unacceptable risk of Chinese surrender on the Mainland.

But even if such explanations were eminently defensible, they would still relate only to proximate reasons for the war rather than to underlying causes. One would still, in my view, have to go back considerably beyond 1941 for an understanding of general attitudes and circumstances. For instance, it is significant in the case of the 1941 oil embargo that Roosevelt had been trying since 1933 to force an economic showdown by organizing international sanctions. It so happened that circumstances were not propitious before 1941, but his aim from the outset had been clear.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that John Jones were to come along and say that he intended to blow your house down, and he huffed and he puffed but couldn't blow it down and if Jones got ten accomplices to join in the demolition effort, and the huffed and puffed and couldn't blow it down, and if, by accident, a twelfth individual with a huge chest came along and made the difference, so that your house came down, would you blame man #12? Does fairness not dictate that primary blame be shifted away from #12, and even away from the group of ten, back to Jones himself who set the process in motion?

I submit that Franklin Roosevelt, alias John Jones in our story, was huffing and puffing on the house of Japanese-American relations from day one, and that when the house fell he was neither particularly surprised, nor particularly fearful, nor particularly disappointed; and I submit further that such an attitude was fatal to any and all prospects for peace.

ON STUDYING CONTEMPORAY VIETNAM IN-COUNTRY

by
Sandra Taylor
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

As a long-time teacher of the history of the Vietnam War and three time visitor to that country since the war I have some perspective from which to proffer observations about how my colleagues in diplomatic history might best travel to and understand that misbegotten land.

My first visit came with the first educational exchange organized by John McAuliff of the U.S.-Indochina Reconciliation Project in December 1985-January 1986. The land was desolate, memories of the war were everywhere, and the group, composed of old-time lefties and peaceniks (not a vet among them) were easily caught up in the memories of war and the devastation that the U.S. had wrought. McAuliff, himself a veteran of the antiwar movement, has many friends among the Vietnamese, and he has always been able to mount tours that are packed with visits to exciting people, to war museums, and to the postwar institutions of government. A number of SHAFR members have traveled with John, and his trips are still to be highly recommended. The strongest point in his favor is his intimate familiarity with the land and its people; they know him, trust him, and accept the people he brings as friends of Vietnam (at least until they prove to be otherwise.)

In the last year a second group has arisen to rival the US-IRP. This is the Faculty Development project organized by the Council on International Educational Exchange in New York. Since its sponsorship is prestigious and its schedule of meetings with scholars at the Universities of Hanoi and Ho

Chi Minh City attractive to faculty members eager to obtain institutional support, it has quickly surpassed the US-IRP group in popularity. It took one group in January 1991 and a second, much larger group in January 1992. Since I was a sometimes-participant in the second group, I can make some observations comparing the two experiences.

First, the Vietnamese are not equipped to handle large groups, and second, the universities do not generally cooperate with one another. This situation makes for anarchy, bedlam, and general confusion. There were too many cooks and not enough Indians in January 1992; I had arrived a week early and found it impossible even to locate the group, and I lost them again in Ho Chi Minh City even though we arrived there on the same day. The interpretation was shoddy, even inept, the participants ranged from the extremely well-informed to the ill-informed and biased. Perhaps what marked the group the most was its lack of understanding of what has taken place in Vietnam since late 1986. The change to a market economy, the removal of the Soviet presence, the withdrawal from Cambodia, and the move towards normalization of relations with the United States have made the scene very dynamic. Yet it is too easy to assume that since the Soviet Union has collapsed, Vietnam will succumb to capitalism just as easily. The Party is still there, it still commands the loyalty of the countryside, and this is still very much a one-party state.

Americans who visit Vietnam are still obsessed with the war — our war in Vietnam. The visible reminders of that war are almost entirely gone. The famed tunnels of Cu Chi have almost been turned into a wartime version of Disneyland, and cheap replicas of VC pith helmets are quickly bought by the eager Japanese tourists. The huge cemetery at Cu Chi village is not a usual stopping point, and even fewer go behind the large war memorial to see the thousands of unmarked graves and the memorial covering the pit where the body parts were

buried. That is not a town in which an American face elicits friendly responses from the inhabitants. But after all, the American war was two wars ago, and as one travels down Highway One (as I did with a group of students in September 1991) the monuments one sees in front of old American installations or at small or large cemeteries are mementoes of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign of 1975. On driving out to Tay Ninh province (as I did in January, after the CIEE trip left Vietnam) the war memorials I saw were to the Cambodian conflict, and the one-legged veterans came from that woeful war.

Yet memories of the American war are to be found. Many English-speakers are to be found in Ho Chi Minh City today, and with the newfound emphasis on learning English they are more willing to come out. One woman at the Open University quickly picked up my microphone to tell me her story of working with the Rand Corporation as a translator: "Tell them [Brian Jenkins *et al.*] that Kim Vinh is still alive." A cyclo driver who had been a student in 1972 asked me wistfully if I thought the present regime could survive more than two more years.

There are many ways to return to Vietnam — or to make a first visit. I think that anyone who teaches about the war ought to do so, because that conflict is still so much in America's consciousness that the land itself has to communicate its message. Only by viewing its harsh beauty, seeing the many cemeteries, and talking to those in north and south who lost family members can one appreciate how truly foolish is America's quest for its mythical live POWs. Only by seeing the poverty and the pain inflicted by the American embargo can one appreciate the cruelty of America's postwar policy of continuing to punish Vietnam for having won the war. Only by visiting Tay Ninh (and Phnom Penh too) can one understand the realities of the Cambodian invasion of Vietnam and the horrors of the Pol Pot regime.

Just one word before the traveler embarks: learn about Vietnam today. Much has happened since 1975. The US may not care much about Vietnam Today, but we still have a role to play in affecting its future, even if our role is a negative one. Many veterans have returned to help restore the country, to build medical clinics for the people, and to find their own peace of mind. I would suggest that historians of the American experience in Vietnam should do no less, for only then can they truly explain the American experience in Vietnam and its continuing impact to their students.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CHANGE IN SHAFR DUES

By action of the SHAFR Council, dues for 1993 will be increased to \$30 for regular members, \$300 for life memberships, and \$10 for all other categories. Further information regarding action will be forthcoming.

SUMMER CONFERENCE INFORMATION

Douglas Little has agreed to chair the program for the 1993 Summer SHAFR Conference which will be held at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, June 17-20. Mel Leffler is in charge of local arrangements. Proposals for panels and papers should be sent to: Douglas Little, Department of History, Clark University, Worcester, MA 01610. The deadline for proposals is December 1, 1992.

BERNATH LECTURE PRIZE INFORMATION

Kinley Brauer advises that Larry Berman (University of California, Davis) has been named the 1992 winner of the Bernath Lecture Prize. Brauer requests the SHAFR membership to send nominations for the 1993 Bernath Lecture Prize (for the Spring 1994 lecture) to: Kinley Brauer, Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455

INFORMATION SOUGHT ABOUT TSIEN HSUE-SHEN

A biography of Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen, internationally renowned as "the Father of the Chinese Missile," is currently being written for Basic Books of HarperCollins under the auspices of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundations.

Dr. Tsien, a famous Caltech aerodynamicist who first came to this country on a Boxer Rebellion Indemnity fund scholarship, was falsely accused of espionage during the McCarthy era in 1950. Stripped of his security clearance and imprisoned, Dr. Tsien was eventually deported to China in 1955 after a long series of negotiations were conducted in Geneva between ambassadors Wang Ping-nan and U. Alexis Johnson. Under Tsien's guidance, China developed her first short-range, medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The author, Iris Chang, is interested in talking with experts in the area of U.S.-Chinese diplomacy who may have come across Tsien's name during the course of their historical research. Please write to her at: 50 South Patterson Ave., #207, Santa Barbara, CA 93111. Telephone (805) 967-8554.

PROPOSALS SOUGHT FOR THE 1993 SHA

Thomas Schoonover informs us that the SHA program committee would welcome sessions which incorporate Florida into the program — the Cuban or Haitian migrations, filibustering, or Florida and the Caribbean area. The committee will consider proposals which deal with any aspect of U.S. history or any aspect of Latin American history.

For information: Thomas Schoonover, 172 Antigua Drive, Lafayette, LA 70503 or James Cobb, History Department, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-0411

**AMERICA AND VIETNAM: FROM WAR TO PEACE
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE**

The University of Notre Dame will sponsor a conference, concurrent with the Great Lakes American Studies Association, which will extend the conference theme of Reconciliation to include all aspects of the Vietnam War and the Vietnam Era. Deadline for paper and panel proposals is May 31, 1993. Submissions should be sent to: America/Vietnam Conference 1993, c/o English Department, Notre Dame, IN 46556

WESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION MEETING

The Western Social Science association calls for papers for its 35th annual meeting to be held at Corpus Christi, Texas, April 21-24, 1993. Papers on most aspects of U.S. diplomatic history will receive a sympathetic reception. Deadline for proposals is December 1, 1992. Proposals should include an abstract of the presentation and a brief *c.v.* Moderators and discussants are also sought. Send proposals to: Benjamin D. Rhodes, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Whitewater, WI 53190

USAF ACADEMY KOREAN CONFERENCE

**"A REVOLUTIONARY WAR: KOREA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE POSTWAR WORLD"**

Fifteenth Military History Symposium

The October 14-16, 1992 symposium will reexamine the Korean War as a seminal event in the history of the postwar world. The sessions will explore the war's extraordinary, transforming impact on American diplomacy; on Korea, China and Japan; on the American military; and on airpower. For information: Major Tim Castle, HQ USAFA/DFH, USAF Academy, CO 80840-05701

RUTGERS HISTORICAL ANALYSIS PROJECT

"War, Peace and Society in Historical Perspective" Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis Project for 1993-95 invites applications for fellowships

or proposals for papers at the weekly seminars or semiannual conferences. Comparative analysis of the socio-cultural aspects of war and peace is particularly encouraged.

For information: John Whiteclay Chambers II, Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis, 88 College Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08903

VIETNAM: PARIS + 20

The Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University announces "Vietnam: Paris + 20," a conference to take place April 22-24, 1993 marking the 20th anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords. Proposals are sought for papers by participants in the war or by academics in any discipline relating to Vietnam. Deadline for proposals is November 1, 1992.

For information: James R. Reckner, Director, Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict, Texas Tech University, Box 4529, Lubbock, TX 79409-1013

U-CONN FOREIGN POLICY SEMINAR

The University of Connecticut announces its 7th annual foreign policy seminar for 1992-1993. The seminar welcomes instructors and students of the history of foreign relations, foreign policy analysis, area studies, and international studies in general. This year the seminar will be at Suffolk University in Boston, under the sponsorship of Robert Hannigan.

For information: Thomas G. Paterson, Coordinator, U-Conn Foreign Policy Seminar, Department of History, 241 Glenbrook Road, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-2103

CONGRESO CENTROAMERICANO DE HISTORIA

At the first Congreso Centroamericano de Historia, which met July 13-16, 1992, a resolution was approved to appoint a provisional organizing committee for the purpose of creating a permanent international organization of specialists in Central American history. The second Congress will meet July, 1994. The site and exact dates will be announced later.

For information: Dra. Olga Joya, Carrera de Historia, Edificio 1-2° Piso, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras, Ciudad Universitaria, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, C.A.

**CALL FOR PAPERS
LEWIS B. HERSHEY COMMEMORATIVE CONFERENCE**

Tri-State University announces a conference commemorating the centennial birthday of General Lewis B. Hershey. The conference theme is "War and Military Conscription in a Free Society." Though wishing to emphasize military conscription, conference planners shall consider topics associated with American wars between 1941 and 1970, the period in which General Hershey directed the Selective Service System.

For information: James A. Zimmerman, Department of History, Tri-State University, Angola, IN 46703.

**EXCERPTS FROM PAGE MILLER'S "DIRECTOR'S REPORT"
NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

As a result of increased security concerns, the Library of Congress has closed the stacks to all researchers and to many of its staff.

The Library began on May 16 closing the Manuscript Reading Room on Saturdays.

If you wish to comment on the above changes, write to: Dr. James Billington, The Librarian of Congress, the Library of Congress, Washington, DC 20540.

Update on Copyright Legislation on Fair Use of Unpublished Material. H.R. 4412, introduced by Rep. William Hughes (D-NJ) and designed to clarify the fair use of unpublished copyrighted material, is making slow progress. The House Judiciary Committee voted on April 30 to recommend H.R. 4412. However, it has not been brought to the floor for a vote. A similar bill, S. 1035, passed the Senate last year. These bills respond to rulings of the U.S. Second Circuit Court which have had a chilling effect on research and publication of scholarly monographs, making it legally dangerous to quote small amounts of unpublished material without obtaining authorized consent for use.

The New War/Peace Bibliography Series

Richard Dean Burns, General Editor

#2: AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, 1775-1990. A Bibliographical Guide. [Published sources on espionage, covert action, counterintelligence, domestic intelligence, technical collection, cryptology, research and analysis, policy and process, organization and oversight, and other aspects of U.S. intelligence operations since the American Revolution.] Comp. by Neal H. Petersen. 416 pp. \$49.95. Cloth
Special SHAFR Discount \$30.00

This compilation is designed as a practical guide for the scholarly study of intelligence. It comprises over 6,000 entries including books, articles from scholarly and professional periodicals, and selected items from newspapers and news/opinion magazines.

The effort is made to address those topics that are commonly treated in present-day professional intelligence journals, which are widely regarded by practitioners as part of their heritage, and which are considered part of intelligence by the informed public. The Congressional intelligence investigations of the 1970s devoted great attention to domestic intelligence and internal security. Military intelligence traces its roots to scouting and reconnaissance. Secret diplomacy, White House covert missions and political action of the present era have a rich historical lineage. The emphasis on paramilitary operations of the first national U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services of World War II, left an imprint on its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency. These subjects receive treatment as part of this basic intelligence bibliography.

This bibliography is largely arranged chronologically and by historical event. Many sections include lead-in paragraphs defining the subject under reference and highlighting leading sources. There are separate chapters on the period 1775-1939, World War II, the Vietnam War, the Congressional investigations of the 1970s, and on Presidential administrations. Reference sources and surveys appear in the initial chapter. This bibliography includes an extensive chapter on postwar counterintelligence and internal security. Another chapter contains works on intelligence production. Sources on postwar intelligence generally and organizations, technical collection, and new and intelligence-related subjects are grouped in three chapters. This arrangement is designed to facilitate location of sources on specific episodes, cases, and events.

Author and subject indexes offer additional means of access to citations relevant to the user's particular field of interest.

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

#1 **America and the Indochina Wars, 1945-1990 A Bibliographical Guide** (ISBN 0-941690-43-1) *Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns* 370 pp. \$39.95 **Special SHAFR Discount \$23.00**

This work supplements two earlier volumes published by Richard Dean Burns and Milton Leitenberg—*The Vietnam Conflict: Its Geographical Dimensions, Political Traumas & Military Developments* (1973) and *The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographical Guide* (1984).

It focuses principally on the American involvement in Indochina's three wars since 1945 and the consequences of that involvement on American politics and society. Its initial purpose is to assist individuals who are writing and teaching about the Vietnam Era in locating the basic source materials. In line with this objective, the sources cited here are in the English language and are usually readily available in most American libraries.

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MINUTES OF THE SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

2 April 1992

Chicago Palmer House

John Gaddis presiding

The meeting opened at 8 p.m. Council members present were John Gaddis, Linda Killen, Robert McMahon, Emily Rosenberg, Michael Schaller, Robert Schulzinger and Allan Spetter. Others present were Kinley Brauer, William Brinker, Mary Giunta, Peter Hahn, Richard Hopper, William Kamman, and Page Putnam Miller.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, brought Council up to date on various items of interest to SHAFR.

2. Bill Kamman, reporting for the Robert Ferrell Book Prize Committee, informed Council that the first prize would be shared by David Anderson, for *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1061* (Columbia University Press), and Diane Kunz, for *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (University of North Carolina Press).

3. John Gaddis reported for the Bernath Article Prize Committee. He informed Council that the committee awarded the prize to Marc Gallicchio, for "The Kuriles Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy in the Soviet-Japan Border Dispute, 1941-1956." *Pacific Historical Review*.

4. Linda Killen, reporting for the Bernath Lecture Committee, informed Council that the committee had selected Larry Berman of UC-Davis to present the lecture in 1993.

5. John Gaddis reported for the Bernath Book Prize Committee. He informed Council that the committee had chosen Thomas Schwartz, for *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Harvard University Press), to receive the award.

6. William Brinker, editor of the *Newsletter*, reported to Council that Tennessee Tech would continue to provide about 2/3s of his annual budget of about \$6,500. SHAFR would have to provide the remaining \$2,000 to \$2,500 a year.

7. John Gaddis, along with Richard Hopper of Scholarly Resources, then led a lengthy discussion of contract negotiations with SR, publisher of *Diplomatic History*. Council authorized Gaddis to make every effort to reach agreement and report back for approval of the contract.

8. Peter Hahn then reported for Michael Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History*. He informed Council that the journal would need \$2,000 to pay copy editors to clear up the backlog over the summer. Allan Spetter advised Council that the \$2,000 would be available from Endowment funds and the Council approved its expenditure to use for this purpose. Hahn then informed Council that the journal requires the services of a Managing Editor who would work 30 to 35 hours a week. Council decided that the Publications Committee should be instructed to look into the matter.

9. John Gaddis then led a discussion of the proposal by Richard Burns to prepare a new edition of the *Guide* in two volumes. The proposal involved a cost to SHAFR of \$18,000 over two to three years. Council decided not to pursue this proposal at this time, but to ask the Publications Committee to review alternative possibilities, including CD-ROM publication.

10. John Gaddis then led a discussion of proposed summer meeting sites for 1993 and 1994. Council agreed to explore the possibility of meeting at the University of Virginia in 1993. The University of Tennessee has extended an invitation to meet there in 1994.

11. Allan Spetter then reported to Council, emphasizing the increasing costs involved in maintaining *Diplomatic History*, the *Newsletter*, and other SHAFR activities. Spetter informed Council that he will recommend a dues increase at the summer meeting, the first dues increase in five years.

The meeting adjourned at 11:00 p.m.

ANTI-BONERS

[Perhaps, SHAFR members might consider making this section a regular feature of the *Newsletter*. The following is from Robert Divine (Texas). - editor]

While I have always chuckled at the student boners printed from time to time in the SHAFR *Newsletter*, I have often felt it was a little condescending for historians to make fun of student mistakes. In order to balance the account, I would like to offer a few student gems that I encountered this past semester.

For many years, I have asked the undergraduates in my course in 20th century diplomatic history to write an essay on a book chosen from a list of several hundred standard accounts. Since the class is large, on the order of 200 students, I have relied on graduate assistants to grade the tests and exams, but I have always read the outside reading essays myself. Although I encourage the students to write essays giving their reactions and responses to the books they have read, I find that most simply offer a summary of the author's ideas. Occasionally, however, enterprising students take me up on the invitation to give their personal impressions, and as a result each spring I have the pleasure of reading a few really original essays.

This year I was struck by passages in two of the essays that offered what I thought were particularly telling insights. The first, by Gregory Ahlgren, came from a review of David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*. "If David Halberstam were to paraphrase Winston Churchill," Ahlgren wrote, "he would, I am sure, observe that Vietnam was a riddle within an enigma within a quagmire." The second passage was from a review of Larry Berman, *Lyndon Johnson's War*, by Thomas Evans. "History does not need scapegoats;" Evans wrote, "only historians do."

One of the most rewarding trends I have noticed in recent years is the increasing number of older students in my classes. When we begin exploring the recent past, they can offer examples and insights from their own personal experience that help illuminate aspects of the Cold War. This year I was particularly struck by a paragraph on the Cuban missile crisis in an essay by Jonathan Martin, a student in his forties, who had read Stephen Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*. Martin commented:

I have clear memories of the Cuban missile crisis. While my friend's parents were having a swimming pool put in their backyard, my father was building a bomb shelter in

our backyard. I remember his saying "I hope I have just wasted \$5,000." I also remember the constant reminders of the "communist threat", and the "tuck and duck" drills in school. The cold warriors wanted to be sure we, the American people, were afraid. We were. In Los Angeles, California, the last Thursday of every month at 10:00 in the morning we would time the sirens and count the changes to see if it was a drill, or the "real thing". I remember JFK on the T.V. telling the American people that war with the Soviets was now possible and we should prepare. For the next several days my father had us run drills for the run into the shelter. We could make it from the house to the shelter, including the closing of the shelter lid, in 30 seconds. Ambrose notes that nine seconds after the blast of the H-bomb everything within a hundred miles turns to ash.

As the Cold War begins to recede into the past, there will be the very human tendency to romanticize it as we have nearly all our wars. Personal recollections like Martin's are very helpful in reminding us of the hidden toll the rivalry with the Soviet Union took on the lives of American who lived so long under the nuclear shadow. When I handed Martin's paper back and began to discuss with him the debate in the early 1960s over the ethical question of inviting your neighbors into your shelter or keeping them out at the point of a gun, the other students looked puzzled. We might just as well have been discussing how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. Yet thanks to the personal experience of another student, they had gained an insight into the personal history of the Cold War that they could get from neither their teacher nor their text.

CALENDAR

1992

- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
December 1 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
December 27-30 The 107th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Washington, headquarters at the Washington Sheraton and Omni. Deadline for proposals has passed.

1993

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
January 15 Deadline for the 1992 Bernath article award.
February 1 Deadline for the 1992 Bernath book award.
February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
February 15 Deadline for the 1993 Bernath lecture prize.
April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
April 15-18 The 86th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Anaheim with headquarters at the Anaheim Hilton and Towers.
May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June 17-20 The 19th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the University of Virginia. Douglas Little is Program Chair and Mel Leffler is in charge of local arrangements. (See notice in ANNOUNCEMENTS).
August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

The OAH will meet in Atlanta, April 14-17, 1994. The program co-chairs are Ellen DuBois and Steven Hahn. Send proposals to: Steven Hahn, Dept. of History, University of California-San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093. Deadline for proposals is February 15, 1993.

The OAH will meet in Washington, March 30-April 2, 1995.

The 1994 meeting (108th) of the AHA will be held in San Francisco, January 6-9. (*There will be no December 1993 AHA meeting!*) The Program Chair is Linda Levy Peck, Dept. of History, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. The deadline for panels is October 31, 1992; the final deadline for submission of completed proposals is February 8, 1993.

PERSONALS

Dean Allard (Naval Historical Center) was one of four U.S. historians attending a conference on the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea at the Australian National Maritime Museum in Sydney. Dr. Allard delivered a paper on U.S. Naval policy in the Pacific during the past fifty years.

Michael Dunne (Sussex, U.K.) was awarded a Gerald Ford Foundation grant for research on "Foreign Policy and the Institutional Crisis of the 1970s: Case Studies from the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford."

John Gaddis (SHAFR President, Ohio U.) left the U.S. in late August to spend a year at Queens College, Oxford.

Lawrence University announced the appointment of **Richard A. Harrison** as dean of faculty. Harrison has been the Warren Finney Day Professor of History at Pomona College.

The Kennedy Library Foundation has awarded the first Abba Schwartz Fellowship to **Charles Stewart Kennedy** and William Morgan of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program (Georgetown).

Warren Kimball (Rutgers) spoke on "Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship" on March 19th as part of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library-sponsored "The Progress of the War" series.

Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College) has been awarded a NEH Summer Grant for a comparative study of the American civil rights movement and African de-colonization, 1945-1985.

Steve Potts (University of Nebraska) has been awarded research grants from the Truman Library and the Kennedy Library for work on "Federal Policy Toward Native Americans."

Donald Ritchie (U.S. Senate Historical Office), was recognized by the OAH in 1992 as the author of the best book written by a government historian over the previous year. Mr. Ritchie's book is: *Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents*.

Robert D. Schulzinger (Colorado) was awarded a Gerald Ford Foundation grant for research on "The War in Vietnam and Its Legacy."

Stephen A. Schuker (Virginia) presented "John Maynard Keynes, Carl Melchior, and the Sexual Politics of Reparations" in the Spring 1992 Lecture Series at the German Historical Institute, Washington DC.

David Sheinin (Trent University) has been named J. Franklin Jameson Fellow for the 1992-93 by the AHA and the Library of Congress. He will spend early 1993 in residence at the Library of Congress investigating "The United States and the Early Development of the Pan American Union, 1900-1940."

Thomas A. Schwartz (Vanderbilt) and Roy E. Appleman were co-winners of the Truman Institute's 1992 Harry S. Truman Book Award. Schwartz's winning book is *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*.

Donald R. Whitnah (Northern Iowa) has been awarded a Gerald R. Ford Foundation grant for research on the "U.S. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies: A Reference History."

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

The information which follows is a summary including only recent changes in the descriptions, names of new committee chairs, deadlines, and most recent winners. Full information about the Awards, Prizes, and Funds appears in the June and December newsletters.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

New Committee Chair: Bruce Kuniholm, Institute for Policy Sciences, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706. Deadline for submissions, February 1, 1993. Most recent winner: Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt).

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

New Committee Chair: Kinley Brauer, Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455. Deadline for nominations, February 15, 1993. Most recent winner: Larry Berman (UC-Davis).

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

New Committee Chair: Klaus Schwabe, Hasselholzer Weg 133, 5100 Aachen, Germany. Deadline for nominations, January 15, 1993. Most recent winner: Marc Gallicchio (Villanova).

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize and Research Fellowship

Most recent winners: Diane Kunz (Yale) and Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements of the doctoral degree.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) a one-page curriculum vitae of the applicant and a dissertation prospectus;
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value to the study;
 - (c) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (d) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1000.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications should be sent to: Henry William Brands, Department of History, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843. The deadline is November 1, 1992.

Most recent winner: Eileen Scully (Georgetown)

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

New committee chair: Wilton Fowler, Department of History, University of Washington, Seattle WA 98195. Deadline for application, April 1, 1993. Most recent winner: Robert Brigham (Kentucky)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

No changes.

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

New committee chair: Harold Josephson, International Studies, UNC-Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223. Deadline for submissions, February 1, 1993. Most recent winners: Charles DeBenedetti (deceased) and Charles Chatfield (Wittenberg)

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

New committee chair: M. Giunta, Acting Director NHJRPC, Washington, DC 20408. Most recent winner: Justus Doenecke (New College, U. of S. Florida)

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

No changes.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1992, which is a history of American Foreign relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. A letter of nomination should be sent to the Ferrell Prize committee chairman, and a copy of the book should be sent directly to each member of the committee at the addresses listed below.

William Kamman
Chair, Ferrell Book
Prize Committee
Department of History
Univ. of North Texas
Denton, TX 76203

Joyce Goldberg
Department of History
Box 19529
Univ. of Texas-
Arlington
Arlington, TX 76019

Ted Wilson
Department of History
3001 Wescoe Hall
Univ. of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 1993.

Recent Winners: David Anderson (Indianapolis) and Diane Kunz (Yale)

The SHAFR Newsletter

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EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Nanci Long and Katherine Fansler.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Send changes of address to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$1.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$2.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication should be typed, double-spaced; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)	1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara)	1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)	1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)	1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)	1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)	1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)	1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
1975 Armin H. Rappaport (CA-San Diego)	1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)	1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)	1989 George Herring (Kentucky)
1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)	1990 Michael Hunt (North Carolina)
1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)	1991 Gary Hess (Bowling Green)