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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in March or April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two others honor the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, Robert Ferrell, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

The *Newsletter* regrets that errors appeared in Samuel Halpern's article, "Revisiting the Cuban Missile Crisis," (December, 1993) 17-25. So that the record is correct we are reprinting his article below. - the editor

REVISITING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by
Samuel Halpern

The following article was submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency's Publication Review Board for security review. Such review does not mean approval or verification by the CIA of the text. The views in it are my own.

The June 1993 issue of the *SHAFR Newsletter* contains an interesting article by Mary S. McAuliffe, Deputy Chief of the History Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Because of her position and the fact that she was the editor of a selection of 112 previously highly-classified CIA documents on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which were published by CIA in October 1992, her article most probably will be accepted as authoritative about events involving the CIA. Unfortunately there are several errors of fact and interpretation. In the interest of correcting the historical record and not perpetuating myths, certain comments are in order.

McAuliffe may be right¹ that Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) McCone's position in late September and early October

¹June 1993 *SHAFR Newsletter*, pp. 11-12.

1962 may have made possible the discovery of the Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba by his urging that flights *over* Cuba be resumed. That alone does not take into consideration the efforts of TFW² and TFW's MONGOOSE counterpart in Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both TFW and DIA took action on a CIA report disseminated on 18 September 1962 to customers in the intelligence community. A human agent told about strange activity in a large area of Pinar del Rio province in western Cuba.³

On receipt of the report, Col. John Wright of DIA met with TFW to discuss the meaning of the report and what possible courses of action might be taken. It was agreed that DIA would request an overflight *over* the area described in the agent report. As the collectors of the report it would have been inappropriate for TFW to request the overflight, particularly in view of the "Headquarters Comment" denigrating the report that McAuliffe describes. (A "Headquarters Comment" was placed in reports, to help the customer better understand them, by Reports Officers in the Clandestine Service of CIA, who processed the dissemination of the reports from clandestine sources.)

Col. Wright took on the task of submitting the overflight request to the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

²Task Force W, the CIA component charged with clandestine and covert operations against Cuba as part of the government-wide Operation MONGOOSE under General Edward Lansdale. Lansdale was Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE, under the direction of the Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

³Central Intelligence Agency. History Staff. *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, Mary S. McAuliffe, ed. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, October, 1962, pp. 103-104. Hereafter cited as *CIA Documents*.

(COMOR), a committee of the United States Intelligence Board, for approval. It was during this process that the target area came to be called the trapezoidal area.⁴ By the time McCone pressed for the U-2 flights *over* Cuba in early October 1962, as opposed to previous peripheral or limited missions, COMOR had already been considering DIA's request and faced the stubborn resistance of the Department of State, which did want to risk direct U-2 flights *over* Cuba.

While McCone gets full credit for pressing for more flights *over* Cuba in general, the targetting for the discovery flight was clearly based on the human agent report about the trapezoidal area.⁵ Col. Wright deserves credit for pushing for a flight over the specific area reported by the agent. Further evidence is to be noted in Brugioni, p. 166, which states:

On October 9, the COMOR committee met and again discussed all the possibilities for reconnaissance of Cuba. Agreement was reached that the best results, following McCone's recommendations, could be obtained from a U-2 overflight from south to north. The highest priority was accorded the western portion of the island, *especially over the trapezoidal area* (emphasis added), and the mission was to be afforded full elint and tracking support.

It should be noted that the time taken up with overcoming State's objections, the bad weather, plus the change of

⁴Brugioni, Dino. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House, 1991. See caption on photo No. 12 between p. 368 and p. 369, and pp. 164-165. See also *CIA Documents*, p. 4.

⁵Brugioni, *ibid.*, p. 164 and *CIA Documents*, *ibid.*, map p. 4.

command for U-2 flights from CIA to the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command may have been a blessing in disguise. It is possible that if the U-2 had flown over the trapezoidal area before October 14, the pictures brought back might not have been as revealing as they turned out to be. It could be said that we lucked out.

Perhaps in trying to compress too much history into one short paragraph on p. 16 of the *Newsletter*, McAuliffe gives an incorrect cast to MONGOOSE and the Missile Crisis. Several commentators on the crisis, including Raymond Garthoff, cited as one of McAuliffe's sources, have been confused about the types of teams that William K. Harvey, Chief of TFW, sent and planned to send into Cuba before and during the missile crisis.

One type was comprised of sabotage teams sent out at the increasing insistence of the Attorney General as expressed in Special Group Augmented (SGA)⁶ meetings of October 4 and October 14, 1962. There was a separate meeting on the afternoon of October 16 in the Attorney General's office. This latter meeting was attended by General Lansdale and Col. Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Robert Hurwitch of State, Hewson Ryan of USIA, and Richard Helms of CIA. The Attorney General expressed "the 'general dissatisfaction of the President' with Operation MONGOOSE." The Attorney General also stated "he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention" and would "hold a meeting every morning at 0930

⁶A committee of the National Security Council charged with authority over Operation MONGOOSE.

with the MONGOOSE operational representatives from the various agencies.”⁷

It must be noted that the October 16, 1962 meeting was held *after* the Attorney General had been briefed by the President that morning about the discovery of the Soviet MRBMs in Cuba and after the creation of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM). Not once during the missile crisis did MONGOOSE receive any change of orders about intensifying sabotage operations. Attorney General Kennedy’s admonitions at the October 16 meeting served as a spur enough to increase sabotage operations. An early report of the Church Committee of the U.S. Senate states simply “During the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged.”⁸ There can be no question that sabotage was the administration’s order of the day *during* the missile crisis. In other words, McAuliffe’s statement that “the White House appears to have forgotten about it [sabotage efforts]” is not in keeping with what actually happened. The pressure was continuously there, even though the results were meager.

It was not until the crisis was effectively over on October 28, 1962, when Khrushchev announced the cessation of further work on the missile sites, the dismantling of the weapons, and their crating and return to the USSR, that President Kennedy

⁷CIA Documents, pp. 153-154.

⁸U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. [The Church Committee.] *An Interim Report of the Committee entitled Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, November 1975. (Senate Report No. 94-465), p. 147.

and the SGA on October 30, 1962 halted all sabotage operations of Operation MONGOOSE and TFW.

The other types of teams Harvey and TFW planned to send into Cuba had two purposes: a) they were to be intelligence collection teams, and b) they were to establish intelligence assets in place in the event of military hostilities. (Such teams were referred to as “pathfinder” teams in World War II.) These teams were closely coordinated by Harvey with the JCS Planning Staff. McAuliffe misreads the documents when she refers to this as “inter-agency politics” with Harvey trying “to go around Lansdale and work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

The JCS and Harvey were simply implementing a long-standing agreement on command relationship between CIA and the U.S. military which stated that in times of hostilities, CIA organization and personnel in the field would report through the U.S. military theater commander. CIA would, in effect, become a sort of fourth force for the theater commander. McAuliffe, however, is to be complimented for selecting and getting declassified three documents on this subject, only two of which she cites in her article.

One is a memorandum, dated October 25, 1962 from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Marshall S. Carter, to DCI McCone explaining why in the situation at the time it was necessary to have JCS-CIA coordinated liaison and control rather than the cumbersome MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented mechanism.⁹

A second memorandum, dated October 26, 1962 by DCI McCone shows that the “plans to have ten teams go into Cuba

⁹*CIA Documents*, pp. 311-312.

by submarines to gather intelligence on missile bases and other points of interest..." as part of an effort "to secure intelligence in support of possible military activities..." was discussed at the morning EXCOMM meeting of October 26, 1962.¹⁰ The fact that submarines were involved should have put to rest the story that Harvey ordered teams into Cuba on his own authority. CIA had no submarines of its own; CIA had to depend on the U.S. Navy.

The last memorandum, for which McAuliffe deserves praise for achieving declassification, is dated October 29, 1962 by DCI McCone concerning a MONGOOSE meeting in the JCS Operations Room on October 26, 1962 in the afternoon. The meeting made clear that while MONGOOSE was one type of operation, it was separate from the fact that "CIA, by long-standing arrangements, details of which were most recently confirmed, are [sic] obligated to support the military to the extent desired by the JCS in any combat theatre..."¹¹ Harvey was arranging for about 50 Cubans in small teams to be transported by submarines to Cuba. It is these intelligence collection teams that have led to charges that Harvey ordered teams of agents into Cuba on his own authority to support any military operations that might occur.

The three memorandums cited above, for which we are indebted to McAuliffe, show precisely that the teams were fulfilling CIA's obligations to the U.S. military. They had nothing to do with Harvey trying "to go around Lansdale" or to dispatch teams on his own authority.

¹⁰*CIA Documents*, pp. 317-318.

¹¹*CIA Documents*, pp. 319-321.

were planned because of the activation of the U.S. military-CIA agreement concerning activities in the event of hostilities. In neither case did Harvey or TFW or CIA act on their own authority.

While it may not have mattered to the Cubans or to the Soviets what type of team was involved, it should matter to American historians, officials, and others who comment on them; they should recognize the difference and not confuse them.

One additional correction. McAuliffe states that “by Christmas eve of that year [1962] *all* the Cuban Bay of Pigs prisoners had been released (emphasis added).” In fact, *all* prisoners were *not* released then. Castro kept back several, charging them with “crimes” against Cuba before they escaped from Cuba earlier, alleged “crimes” which were not related to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Of those held back and imprisoned, one died in prison, others were released from time to time, but the last two were not released until June and October 1986.¹² Not quite *all* the Bay of Pigs prisoners were released in 1962.

McAuliffe is certainly correct in stating that “MONGOOSE continued to operate against Cuba throughout the crisis.” The record shows that CIA and MONGOOSE had been on the receiving end of unmitigated pressure from the President and the Attorney General to do more against Cuba. The pressure was briefly reduced after October 30 and after MONGOOSE was ended. The pressure on CIA about Cuba, however, instead of decreasing after the Missile Crisis, was intensified

¹²*The Washington Post*. June 8, 1986, A21; June 10, 1986, A24; October 12, 1986, A16; October 19, 1986, A11.

the Attorney General to do more against Cuba. The pressure was briefly reduced after October 30 and after MONGOOSE was ended. The pressure on CIA about Cuba, however, instead of decreasing after the Missile Crisis, was intensified even more in 1963. But that is another story.

(Samuel Halpern was Executive Assistant to William K. Harvey, Chief, TFW, before, during, and after the Cuban Missile Crisis. — editor)

EISENHOWER AND EXPORT CONTROLS REVISITED. A REPLY TO FØRLAND

by

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The December 1993 issue of the *SHAFR Newsletter* contained an article, "Eisenhower, Export Controls, and the Parochialism of Historians of American Foreign Relations," in which Tor Førland continued an emerging debate on the underlying causes for the very substantial 1954 reduction in the three international cold war embargo lists maintained by the pan-Western Coordinating Committee (CoCom).¹ In 1991 Førland had published an article in *Diplomatic History*

¹*SHAFR Newsletter*, December 1993, 4-17.

concluding that the list reductions were the result of a “hard-fought compromise” between British and U.S. policy.²

In 1993 I published an article, also in *Diplomatic History*, noting that in framing the embargo reduction as a battle of political wills between Britain and the United States, Mr. Førland had lost sight of the larger point; namely, that the Americans had invited British opinion on the future of export control policy and that this invitation is crucial to properly understanding the role that British suggestions played in the subsequent revision process. Because the Americans had invited British suggestions for the development of a new export control program, I thought it “wrong to suggest that Eisenhower’s drive for [export control list] revision and later European suggestions for revision arose independently.” Although Mr. Førland and I disagreed on a number of secondary questions as well, our conflicting assessments of the British proposals occupied the central place in our differing views. Our differences on this point were consequential as they led us very different appraisals of Eisenhower’s personal role in the embargo revision process.

Førland’s recent Newsletter piece brought forth additional citations from British archives to support his earlier argument and to rebut mine. In addition, Mr. Førland used the embargo revision debate as a vehicle for offering us his critical views on the state of U.S. diplomatic History,

²Tor Egil Førland, “‘Selling Firearms to the Indians’: Eisenhower’s Export Control Policy, 1953-54,” *Diplomatic History* 15 (Spring 1991): 223. Only because I suspect that some readers will welcome additional context, have I taken the liberty of summarizing Førland’s argument. Fortunately, his forceful statements allow his position on this point to be accurately summarized with this brevity. Readers are of course encouraged to read the article in its entirety.

particularly as practiced by American historians. Førland touted his imagined refutation of my explanation of the embargo revision process as a vindication of his European “internationalist” methodology and condemnation of the American parochialism that he perceived in my article. I am grateful for the opportunity to reply.³

The British archival material introduced most recently by Mr. Førland requires no substantive modification of my explanation of the embargo revision process. Førland’s additional citations certainly do not “contradict” my account as he erroneously asserts (p. 13); they have, in fact, confirmed my central point.⁴ Much of the confusion in Mr. Førland’s analysis of British actions arises from inaccurately referring interchangeably to a “British short list idea” and a “British short list proposal;” obviously two very different things.⁵ In general Førland fails to distinguish properly between the following steps in the evolution of British action: the idea of drafting a British short list (02 September 1953);

³I will forego a response to the numerous inaccurate and offensive exaggerations that were used to characterize my work; for example, that I had “pronounced Eisenhower God” or that I sought a new “gospel” on the subject (Førland, p. 9). To paraphrase Sir Eyre Crowe, the only comment that needs to be made on these astounding remarks is that they reflect discredit on the scholar who makes them. Readers will recall that my 1993 essay did not disparage earlier work.

⁴Parenthetical citations refer to Førland, “Eisenhower,” *SHAFR Newsletter*, December 1993.

⁵See for example the discussion of pp. 13-14 which opens with a statement on the origins of the “short-list idea” (p.13) and closes with an inappropriate conclusion about the “short list proposal” (p.14). On p.16 that conclusion is presented again, this time recast in terms of the “short list idea” — a statement that may be more accurate, but is far less significant in the larger argument.

Cabinet approval of the short list idea (12 October 1953); the actual drafting of the short list (October 1953-March 1954); and presentation of a short list proposal to the Americans (informally in November 1953, formally in March 1954). Of these developments, only the very first and least meaningful — the idea of drafting a British short list — *may* have occurred prior to the U.S. revelation that the new administration had altered the course of U.S. export control policy. The record shows unambiguously that the important British decisions of October 1953-March 1954 came only after the American revelation.

Førland's additional information on the existence of an extensive British list of desired embargo revisions in early September 1953 changes nothing. My own work in a half-dozen public and private German archives has shown that virtually every West German exporter, interest group, and government ministry had internally well articulated desires for specific reductions in the international lists. We can assume, as did U.S. officials in the early 1950s, that most or all West European countries had similar, extensively documented justifications for why particular export commodities ought to be freed from controls. Førland's information that Whitehall's Economic Steering Committee desired to draft "a shorter list" (p. 14) of items for future control is hardly a revelation.

Further, if the British short list idea "originated" on 02 September as Førland shows, then it was produced only *after* the U.S. State Department had already concurred (on 01 September) in Ambassador Aldrich's recommendation that he be permitted to reveal "immediately" to the British Foreign Office that a fundamental revision of U.S. policy in the form of a gradual relaxation was already underway. Aldrich's recommendations had included a policy of "fullest and promptest disclosure" and a statement to the British that the

“US would appreciate [an] opportunity to discuss policy and derivative programs with UK bilaterally in order to achieve maximum US-UK understanding.”⁶ Førland has yet to prove that even the preliminary internal formulation of a British short list idea on 02 September preceded new information received from the Americans. Førland can help clarify this problem by establishing more precisely the chronologic relationship between the Aldrich’s notification of a change in U.S. policy and the Economic Steering Committee’s suggestion that the United Kingdom draft a short list. The outcome of that clarification, if it can be achieved, may be interesting but will not be important to this debate. By itself, the simple idea of drafting a desired British short list proves nothing, regardless of when that idea was hatched.

More importantly, Førland himself has demonstrated the crucial point that the ministers did not endorse the Economic Steering Committee’s suggestion for a draft British short list until 12 October (p. 14, note #22). This decision came six weeks after Aldrich’s initial disclosure and nearly a week after State Department representatives had fully described to members of the British embassy in Washington the “shift in emphasis [in U.S. export control policy] resulting from [a] recent high level review.”⁷ In short, Cabinet approval for the drafting of a British short list came well after the British had been informed of a new direction of U.S. export control policy and had been invited by the United States to participate in discussions on implementing the new policy. Førland’s

⁶Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State, 31 August 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 1:1014; reply by State summarized in *ibid.*, 1015, note 3.

⁷The secretary of state to the embassy in London, 7 October 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 1:1018.

assertion that any resulting British short list “arose independently” of Eisenhower’s new export control policy is not tenable (p. 13).

Equally significant, the British certainly did not communicate any plans for a severe reduction of embargo lists until months after the Americans had announced that the United States had decided on a fundamental revision of U.S. export control policy. Indeed, Førland himself has introduced evidence that the British felt compelled to wait for “an appropriate moment before presenting their short list idea to the Americans (p. 14).⁸ That appropriate moment was found only in the bilateral negotiations of 20-21 November 1953 — three months after the Americans had invited the British to discuss new export control policies. A formal British memorandum to the Americans on the short list idea and a draft of the list came only in March 1954.⁹

Førland’s conclusion that “The British short list proposal, then, arose independently of Eisenhower’s export control revision” (p. 14) makes no sense because there was no British short list “proposal” (i.e. a British suggestion made to U.S. officials) until *well after* the U.S. had outlined its new

⁸A British request to postpone additional bilateral talks from 15 October to 01 November also suggests that subsequent British proposals for a drastic short list were a response to the new U.S. policy rather than a statement of well thought-out, previously existing British desires, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 1:1019, note 3.

⁹Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State, 21 November 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954* 1:1061; Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State, 1 March 1954, *ibid*:1082.

policy.¹⁰ Subsequent British suggestions for drastic export control revisions cannot be viewed as appearing “independently” of the recently announced shift in American policy. I hold to my earlier statements that “Eisenhower initiated a policy revision without relying on explicit British support” and that “the British waited for an explicit request for recommendations before daring to suggest radical reductions in export controls.”¹¹ These points, already discernable from American sources, appear now as confirmed by British archival material.

In contrast to my view, Førland continues to work in an explanatory dichotomy of the United States versus Britain. As a result of this divarication, Førland has framed what the French would call *une question mal posée*, namely: “To what degree were the list reductions eventually achieved due to U.S. policy or to the policy of other CoCom countries, meaning Britain?” (p. 10). This strict either/or question no longer makes very much sense after September 1953 when the U.S. invited British participation in discussing a new export control policy aimed at reducing the International Lists. For this reason I never argued that there might have been “equally far-reaching reductions without the British short-list initiative” as Mr. Førland misleadingly implies (p. 13).

¹⁰Alternatively, Førland may be using “proposal” here to refer to the purely internal British suggestion made by the Economic Steering Committee to the Cabinet that the UK draft a short list (additional clarity would be helpful on this point). If that is the case, then, as explained above, Førland’s statement may be correct, but has no special weight in evaluating the British contribution to the later bilateral list reduction process.

¹¹Spaulding, “Eisenhower and the Revision of Export Control Policy,” 246.

Finally, although the differences in interpretation between Mr. Førland and myself are serious and significant, I do not see our competing explanations in the nationalist terms in which he seeks to cast them, i.e. as the work of an American scholar versus that of a European scholar. Nor do I see the debate as an epochal clash of methodologies. (If there is a larger methodological issue here, I would suggest that it is the archival fetishism practiced too frequently on both sides of the Atlantic.) My differences with Mr. Førland have little to do with the “internationalist,” “realist,” or “progressive” perspectives that he mentions (p. 6). Rather, this debate is about chronology, causation, cogency of argument, and framing the proper questions — concepts and skills that are basic to the historian’s craft regardless of *a priori* methodological declarations.

I continue to believe that the editors and referees at *Diplomatic History* and other leading journals judge essays by the potency, subtlety, and logic of the explanation offered. I am content to have my recent essay evaluated by these criteria.

IS DOMESTIC POLITICS BEING SLIGHTED AS AN INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK?¹

by
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At the time when many of the essays that were later published in the book *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (1991) appeared in the *Journal of American History*, I was delighted that fellow diplomatic historians whose work I admired were being allowed to explain emerging trends in our field to the broader community of American historians. And when the book came out, ably edited by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, I joined other diplomatic historians in thinking that it would be useful for many purposes, one of which would be to acquaint advanced undergraduates and graduate students with current thinking in diplomatic history.

Three years later, I still find much to admire in the book, including the plea to learn from political science and other disciplines (something I try to do in my own work) and the emphasis on awareness of both internal and external influences on policy-making. I also like Robert J. McMahan's identification of the two key questions that students of

¹I wish to thank Professor Earl Edmondson of Davidson College and Professor Melvin Small of Wayne State University for reading this essay and offering many valuable suggestions. After completing the essay, I learned that Professor Small has written a survey of domestic politics (broadly conceived) and foreign policy throughout U.S. history that is scheduled to be published in 1995 in the "American Moment" series from Johns Hopkins University Press. This useful book, which I have read in manuscript, addresses some of the concerns expressed in this essay.

American foreign relations seek to answer: "Why has the United States followed the international course that it has? How have important policy decisions been reached?"²

In my judgment the book has one glaring gap: the failure of any of the authors to offer a serious, detailed analysis of the role of domestic politics in shaping American foreign relations.³ Except for Melvin Small in his essay on public opinion, most of the authors make little or no reference to such important subjects as elections, Congress, interest groups, and the news media.⁴ Moreover, I believe that Professor Small, in an otherwise excellent overview of his subject, underestimates the importance of elections and Congress in the making of U.S. foreign policy.⁵

²Robert J. McMahon, "The Study of American Foreign Relations: National History or International History?" in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1991), p. 15.

³In fairness, Professors Hogan and Paterson point out in the introduction that the essays included in the book do not "detail all topics worthy of inquiry, or summarize all methods and interpretive frameworks..." (p. 7).

⁴In the index, "elections" has only one reference, p. 171 (actually there is a brief paragraph on p. 172 as well); "Congress" has only one reference, p. 173; there is no reference to "interest groups," but there is one to "economic organizations" on p. 173; and there are three references to "media": pp. 49-52, 170, and 171. Some of the authors — notably Michael J. Hogan on "Corporatism" and Louis A. Perez, Jr., on "Dependency" — discuss the influence of economic interest groups on U.S. foreign policy, but not in the context of electoral politics.

⁵As I argue later in this essay, I especially disagree with Professor Small's statement that "foreign policy rarely has figured significantly in U.S. congressional and even presidential elections" (p. 172). Although Professor Small's emphasis on Congress as an "opinion source" (p. 173) for the

Frankly, the general absence of serious analysis of domestic politics in this volume puzzles and disturbs me. Viewed from a president's perspective, the next election (whether mid-term or presidential) will arrive all too soon, and presidents are well aware that the voters are quite capable of giving incumbent parties the boot (with one exception — 1980 instead of 1984 — they have done so every other presidential election since 1945: 1952, 1960, 1968, 1976, 1980, and 1992).⁶ Moreover, the overall state of a president's relations with Congress and his or her standing in public opinion deeply affect his or her ability to get key bills passed and, in general, to lead effectively. Finally, as Jimmy Carter and other presidents could testify, the way in which trend setters among the news media portray a president and his or her administration has a huge impact on Congress, on U.S. public opinion, and even on foreign leaders and publics.⁷ The media, public opinion polls, economic and idealistic interest

president is useful, I see Congress as frequently exerting direct and powerful influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Professor Small is on target early in the essay when he writes: "American presidents must share their power with legislators who may have their own international and domestic agendas" (p. 166). I feel sure that Professor Small would have developed this point more fully if his focus had been "domestic politics" instead of "public opinion."

⁶As political scientist Robert Weissberg has noted, "In effect, elections allow citizens to say collectively: 'We may not be able to get what we want, but we can at least get rid of what we don't want'." Weissberg, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1976), p. 204.

⁷Ever since the leading news media became noticeably more adversarial in their day-by-day coverage of elected and appointed officials in the 1960s and early 1970s, the media — at least in foreign policy — have truly lived up to the appellation "the fourth branch of government."

groups, the Congress, elections, and other domestic political influences on a president's overall performance in foreign policy clearly are interrelated, and each one needs to be studied in conjunction with the others.

I especially challenge diplomatic historians to give more attention to elections — and electoral politics between elections — as a potentially fruitful approach to answering Professor McMahon's first question, "Why has the United States followed the international course that it has?" Robert S. Strauss, an influential Democrat and Washington insider, made the obvious but highly pertinent observation in 1984 that "presidential campaigns are particularly important for foreign policy because of the pre-eminent role the eventual winner plays in guiding the country's fortunes abroad."⁸ Elections also are significant because presidents and their advisers shape their policies and rhetoric partly out of fear of what the voters might do in the next election. President Kennedy, for example, told several aides and senators in 1963 that he would not risk pulling U.S. troops out of Vietnam until after the 1964 election due to fear of voters' susceptibility to Republican criticisms of such a move, and President Reagan's political advisers wanted him to soften his anti-Soviet rhetoric during the year or so leading up to the 1984 election in order to reassure voters of his peaceful intentions. Finally, political campaigns are significant because they indicate which foreign policy issues each candidate believes that his or her opponent(s) are vulnerable on, and which issues each candidate believes are likely to strike a responsive chord in the voting public. The interplay between candidates and voters, culminating in the voting first in the primaries and then in the

⁸Robert S. Strauss, "What's Right with U.S. Campaigns," *Foreign Policy* 55 (Summer 1984), p. 4.

general election in November, thus establishes (a) the winners who will have the primary responsibility for shaping U.S. foreign policy, and (b) the broad parameters of acceptable political discourse on foreign policy for the foreseeable future.⁹

Recent studies by political scientists challenge the older view that foreign policy issues have played only a minor role in most post-1945 presidential elections. In an impressive article published in the *American Political Science Review* in March 1989, John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida argue that many voters do have well-formed, deeply held opinions about foreign policy and defense issues, and that presidential candidates throughout the period since 1945 have wisely stressed these issues in their campaigns in order to try to garner a majority of the votes. These issues have had a "large effect," the authors argue, in campaigns in which foreign policy issues had "high salience" and the views of the two major candidates were easily contrasted (e.g., 1972, 1980, and 1984); "low to some effect" when the issues had "high salience" but the candidates' views came across as being fairly similar (1968 and possibly 1960); and "low effect" when the salience and the differences between the candidates were both low (1976).¹⁰ Other observers have

⁹It can be argued that the constraints reflected in electoral politics have been greater for Democratic than for Republican presidents since World War II. Many scholars believe, for example, that Richard Nixon found it easier politically to open relations with China in the early 1970s than a Democrat probably would have.

¹⁰John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" *American Political Science Review* 83 (March 1989), pp. 123-41. The phrases quoted are from Figure 1 on page 136. A useful list of

argued that foreign policy issues have tended to favor Republicans in most elections after 1950.¹¹

Diplomatic historians should not accept any of the above conclusions as gospel. Instead, we should conduct our own exhaustive studies of elections during the Cold War — beginning with the election of 1946 — to examine which of the political scientists' generalizations hold up in particular cases.¹² Except for Barry Goldwater's ill-fated campaign in 1964, which came fairly soon after the Democrats demonstrated their "toughness" during the Cuban missile crisis, it is interesting to note that the Republicans won every presidential campaign during the Cold War (1948-1988) in which their presidential candidates sharply criticized the Democrats for "weakness" or for other failings on foreign policy: 1952, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984, and 1988. They also won in 1956, of course, giving them seven victories in eleven

references is found on pages 140-41. For a more recent discussion of electoral politics and foreign policy, including additional references, see chapter 8 of Jerel A. Rosati, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy* (Fort Worth, 1993). The works by Aldrich *et al.* and by Rosati — plus the many references they cite — demonstrate that political scientists take domestic influences on U.S. foreign policy very seriously.

¹¹See, for example, William A. Galston and Christopher J. Makins, "Campaign '88 and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 71 (Summer 1988), pp. 4-8.

¹²Historians working on presidential elections will want to consult Robert A. Divine's *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940-1960*, 2 vols. (New York, 1974).

elections.¹³ Although the Cold War clearly was winding down by 1988, George Bush shrewdly followed the proven Republican script of taking a hard anti-Soviet line and accusing his opponent of weakness and wooly-headed thinking. Aware of the line he would be taking during the upcoming campaign, Bush told Mikhail Gorbachev in a meeting on December 10, 1987, that he wanted continued improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and that Gorbachev should ignore the anti-Soviet statements that he would have to make in order to demonstrate his toughness.¹⁴

¹³The experience of subsequent elections suggests that the Republicans probably would have sharply criticized the Democrats for “weakness” in 1948 — and thus quite likely would have won the presidency that year — if President Truman had followed Henry Wallace’s advice and adopted a conciliatory approach toward the Soviet Union in 1946-47. By pursuing the “tough” approach that he did, Truman was able to neutralize the Republican (and media, religious, ethnic, and interest group) heavy artillery on his right flank and thus keep the 1948 election focused primarily on domestic issues, where the Democrats tended to have the advantage.

For evidence supporting this line of argument, see the discussion later in this essay of recent research by Louis Liebovich and Robert D. Ubrico, Jr. For the Republicans’ extensive — and apparently successful — use of the communist issue in the 1946 election, see Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-48* (New York, 1977), p. 231. That year’s “feverish campaigns against communism” by urban Catholic organizations and the “heavy campaign” of the United States Chamber of Commerce are discussed on page 234.

¹⁴Bush’s anti-Soviet strategy in the 1988 election and Michael Dukakis’s inept response are discussed in Sidney Blumenthal, *Pledging Allegiance: The Last Campaign of the Cold War* (New York, 1990), pp. 295-99. The discussion of Bush’s conversation with Gorbachev is in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, 1993), pp. 3-4.

One of the important unanswered questions in the historiography of the Cold War is precisely what role domestic politics played in the Truman administration's gradual adoption of a hard-line anti-Soviet policy between late 1945 and early 1947. Thus far, this issue has divided students of the early Cold War. Melvyn P. Leffler, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas G. Paterson, for example, have argued that domestic politics was at best a dependent variable: dependent (inter alia) either because the public and Congress were not inherently anti-Soviet in early 1946 (Leffler), or because the administration easily manipulated public opinion in an anti-Soviet direction (LaFeber and Paterson).¹⁵

Others, including John Lewis Gaddis, Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, Louis Liebovich, Robert D. Ubrico, Jr., and me, have argued that domestic political factors were important, that Truman was especially influenced by the strongly anti-Soviet views held by such powerful senators as Tom Connally (Dem., Texas) and Arthur Vandenberg (Rep., Michigan) and by his chief White House adviser on foreign policy, Admiral William D. Leahy. All three men were representative of the anti-communist, anti-Soviet outlook that had existed throughout the war — especially among conservative Republicans and southern Democrats, and among northern Catholics who formed the backbone of the Democratic strength in the Northeast and Midwest — and that emerged as a potent political force within a few months after

¹⁵See Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992), pp. 14-15, 53-54, 106-7; Walter LaFeber, "American Policy-Makers, Public Opinion, and the Outbreak of the Cold War, 1945-1950," in Yonosuke Nagi and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York, 1977), pp. 43-65; and Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War* (New York, 1992), pp. 139-62.

the war ended in August 1945. Truman also was influenced by electoral politics, especially by the Republican sweep in the 1946 mid-term elections that provided strong evidence that his own campaign for reelection in 1948 would be an uphill fight.¹⁶

In my judgment, the best recent work on domestic political influences on Truman's policies toward the Soviet Union is contained in chapter 4 of Woods and Jones's *Dawning of the Cold War* (1991), in chapters 9 and 10 of Liebovich's *The Press and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1947* (1988), and in Ubriaco's 1992 dissertation that was written under the direction of an outstanding student of domestic political influences on U.S. foreign policy, Professor William C. Widenor of the University of Illinois. Woods and Jones detail the strength and influence of conservative, anti-Soviet senators and business leaders during the winter of 1945-46, when Truman's policy moved sharply in an anti-Soviet direction. Liebovich is especially insightful on how and why media coverage of Russia became increasingly negative during 1946, despite several Soviet actions that might have been seen as conciliatory. Liebovich argues that Winston Churchill's

¹⁶John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, 1972), pp. 353-61, passim; Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War* (Athens, GA, 1991), 98-118, passim; Robert M. Ubriaco, Jr., "Harry S Truman, the Politics of Yalta, and the Domestic Origins of the Truman Doctrine" (Phd. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992); Louis Liebovich, *The Press and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1947* (New York, 1988), 111-52; and Ralph B. Levering, *The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History* (Arlington Heights, IL, 1994), 31-32, passim. Levering cites Gallup polls showing how strongly public opinion turned against Russia in 1946 — well before the Truman Doctrine speech — in *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978* (New York, 1978), p. 97.

famous speech in March 1946 had the greatest impact on coverage in the journals he studied. "The newspapers and magazine changed their editorial thrusts in the months after Fulton," Liebovich observes. "The [New York] *Herald Tribune* and [San Francisco] *Chronicle* more carefully focused on Soviet moves in Europe and the Middle East, and *Time* and the *Chicago Tribune* expressed more self-assurance in their damnations of Soviet communism."¹⁷ Liebovich summarizes his argument concerning domestic political influences during 1946 and early 1947 as follows:

the news organizations came to accept the inevitability of the Cold War because right-wing elements in the United States had a stronger case to make and made their case better. The British seized upon U.S. bewilderment to push the United States away from the Soviet Union. The Henry Wallace debacle and the Republicans' ability to capitalize on the confusion shifted public opinion further and cornered Truman. The announced British pullout from Greece forced the president's hand.¹⁸

In the 1946 election, as Professor Ubriaco has demonstrated, angry Polish-American voters ousted several incumbent

¹⁷Liebovich, *The Press and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 128. The book that has made the strongest case for Churchill's importance in American thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations in 1946 is Fraser J. Harbutt's *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York, 1986). Liebovich, a professor of communications, apparently arrived at his conclusions independently of Harbutt, for I found no reference to Harbutt's path-breaking study in Liebovich's endnotes or bibliography.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 152. In fairness, it should be pointed out that this summary oversimplifies Liebovich's argument and makes it seem much more deterministic than it really is in the context of the entire book.

Democrats in Chicago and Milwaukee (two of the three cities he studied in depth) because of anger about President Franklin D. Roosevelt's alleged "betrayal at Yalta." The day after the election, several of Truman's advisers met and concluded that the president would have to take definite steps to put the Democratic coalition back together if he was to have any chance of winning the 1948 election. One of these steps would involve making it clear that Truman strongly opposed Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.¹⁹

Like all of us who have argued for one side or the other on this issue, Woods/Jones, Liebovich, and Ubriaco focus on one — or at most a few — factors, and thus do not include analysis of the full range of domestic political influences and the ways in which each of them affected President Truman and his top advisers.²⁰ Like other writers on both sides of the debate, therefore, their analyses remain more suggestive than conclusive. Although I have begun researching a book that will attempt to offer a comprehensive analysis of the domestic American context of U.S.-Soviet relations from 1945 through 1948, I hope that others will continue working on this important, controversial subject as well.

A broader issue in regard to public opinion that divides both political scientists and historians — and that helps to shape interpretations of domestic political factors in the coming of

¹⁹These ideas, fully developed in Ubriaco's dissertation, are summarized in a paper he presented at the 1992 SHAFR conference: "Challenging the Top-Down Orthodoxy: Polish-American Politicians and the Domestic Origins of the Truman Doctrine."

²⁰Thomas G. Paterson has offered the best analysis to date of how President Truman and his close advisers thought about the role of public opinion. See Paterson, *On Every Front*, pp. 139-55.

the Cold War — is whether elites largely determine majority opinion on key issues of public policy, or whether the majority of the politically relevant public — that is, voters — make up their own minds. I lean toward the latter school of thought and believe, for example, that the majority (or, in some cases, the plurality) of the electorate as a whole had good reasons for voting the way it did in every election after 1945.²¹ And while I agree with public opinion specialists Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro in their 1992 book that some government/media manipulation of opinion has occurred, especially on foreign policy issues, I concur with their overall thesis that “the American public, as a collectivity, holds a number of real, stable, and sensible opinions about public policy and that these opinions develop and change in a reasonable fashion, responding to changing circumstances and to new information.”²² Finally, because public opinion on foreign policy grows out of a wide variety of influences — respected people in one’s community, labor unions, business groups, affinity groups (e.g., Veterans of Foreign Wars, Americans for Democratic Action), ethnic and

²¹A well-argued elaboration of this viewpoint, now a generation old, is V.O. Key’s *The Responsible Electorate; Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960* (Cambridge, 1966). Key’s overall conclusion is that “the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect.” As an example, Key points out that the 1952 election “may illustrate the role of the electorate as judge and executioner” (p. 77). The “many 1948 Democrats who regarded our entry into the Korean War as a mistake” (p. 74) and ended up voting Republican contributed greatly to Eisenhower’s victory. The fact that only half as many 1948 Democratic voters who believed that Truman had been right to enter the Korean War switched to the Republicans in 1952 is evidence of the electorate’s overall rationality, Key argues.

²²Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public* (Chicago, 1992), p. 1.

religious organizations, the numerous competing components of the mass media, the president and other administration officials, respected members of Congress, and others — I am not persuaded that elites shape public attitudes on foreign policy, unless “elites” is defined so broadly as to be virtually meaningless.

More specifically, I believe that the overwhelming majority of the American people in the mid-1940s, having just fought a long and bloody war against two expanding totalitarian powers, were fully capable of concluding — albeit reluctantly at first — that it made sense to take a strong stand against the third major totalitarian power, especially when the leaders of that nation systematically oppressed their own people and their new “fraternal allies” and believed in inevitable conflict between “progressive” and “bourgeois” ideals. Moreover, Americans leaders and voters in the mid-1940s overwhelmingly believed that U.S. “isolationism” in the 1920s and 1930s had made World War II possible — indeed virtually inevitable — and that U.S. “leadership” in world affairs after the war was necessary to prevent the international disorder that could easily lead to a third world war. U.S. leadership also satisfied another widely-shared, practical desire: not to let the hard-earned fruits of victory slip out of America’s hands. These and other convictions, featuring assorted mixtures of national interest and idealism, contributed to what John Lewis Gaddis has called “the profound impact of the domestic political system on the conduct of American foreign policy” in the 1940s.²³

My initial research in North Carolina newspapers and in manuscript collections for late 1945 and 1946 has found

²³Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 357.

considerable public and media anger both at Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and Iran and at the Soviet-controlled organization that many perceived as a more immediate threat, the American Communist party. My research in *Time* and *Newsweek* from 1945 through 1948 suggests a continuation of wartime ways of looking at both domestic and world affairs, with a much greater and more persistent emphasis on “security” and on correct thinking in the face of internal and external enemies than I believe one would find in a study of these or other ideologically mainstream magazines that covered a similar period a decade earlier (1935-38). Because of the continuities in ways of thinking between what I found in my earlier research in newsmagazines during World War II and what I am finding in my current work, I am more convinced than ever that U.S. history in the 1940s should be studied as a whole, and that efforts to divide modern U.S. history at 1945 are extremely misleading.²⁴

My research thus far has also persuaded me that scholars who work on attitudes toward Russia during the early postwar period must examine possible links in people’s thinking between domestic communists and foreign communists. As Gaddis pointed out in his 1972 book, general public hostility toward American communists remained strong during World War II despite a substantial shift toward more friendly attitudes toward the Soviet Union.²⁵ A question that neither

²⁴In my opinion the 1940s in America began in September 1939, for the outbreak of the war in Europe quickly led to the development of the national security state and the national security mentality that was so apparent in *Newsweek* and other magazines during and after the war.

²⁵Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 56-61. Gaddis deserves praise for his careful analysis of attitudes toward domestic communists during the war, including Republican efforts to link the

Gaddis nor other scholars of U.S. foreign relations has sought to answer, however, is whether the negative attitudes toward domestic communists intensified after the Grand Alliance fell apart in late 1945 and early 1946 and after American communists played key roles in several of the postwar strikes that angered President Truman and many other Americans. A more important question for students of foreign policy, of course, is whether the widespread antipathy toward domestic communists solidified anti-Soviet feelings and thus made it harder for proposals like those contained in Henry Wallace's September 1946 speech at Madison Square Garden — or more moderate anti-Cold War viewpoints like those that Professor Liebovich found frequently on the editorial pages of the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1946 — to receive a fair hearing. Coverage of Wallace's speech in the mainstream media offers a clue: the fact that American communists were known to be in the audience — a point emphasized in news stories and editorials — appears to have accentuated the negative media coverage of the address.²⁶

Two recent speakers at Davidson College underscored the importance of domestic political considerations in the making of U.S. foreign policy. In September 1993 a mid-level State Department specialist on the Balkans, who had to speak off

Democratic party to domestic communism during the 1944 election. In contrast, the absence of discussion of attitudes toward domestic communists in the early Cold War years is conspicuous in virtually all studies (including my own) cited in the footnotes for this article. For example, I did not find an index entry for this subject in Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, or in Paterson, *On Every Front*.

²⁶*Time* magazine, for example, noted in its lead story that the audience contained "a mixture of liberal and radical Democrats, well peppered with Reds..." "The Presidency," *Time* 48 (September 23, 1946), p. 21.

the record because of his superiors' sensitivity to criticisms of the largely indecisive U.S. policy that had found their way into news stories, commented that he and most other State Department experts on the region supported stronger steps by the United States, including if necessary the use of military force, to stop the dismemberment of, and the ethnic cleansing in, Bosnia. But every time they discussed their policy recommendations with their superiors — often heatedly and at length — they received variations on this terse reply: “The public simply won't buy it.”²⁷

Two months later McGeorge Bundy, who served as national security adviser under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, emphasized that both presidents considered themselves experts on the domestic politics of foreign policy and were careful to keep all decisions on major issues in their own hands. I asked Bundy whether he or Bobby Kennedy had been President Kennedy's closest adviser on foreign affairs. His answer, “Bobby, definitely,” did not surprise me, but his main reason did: “Bobby thought like a politician; I didn't.” Bundy noted that Bobby Kennedy had good instincts in regard to whether a particular approach was likely to help or to hurt the president politically.

As an example of what he sees as his own lack of political astuteness, Bundy recalled an incident in which he and Undersecretary of State George Ball unwisely issued a public

²⁷A sentiment similar to the one contained in the quotation was offered by columnist Richard Cohen of the *Washington Post* in October: “What's been disturbing about the arguments of the interventionists is how little they seem to know their own country. They have advanced their arguments as if American public opinion and, indeed, what you might call the American political character, did not matter.” *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, October 4-10, 1993.

statement, without the president's approval, that (a) worsened the already strained U.S. relations with the Canadian government headed by John Diefenbaker, and (b) resulted in media coverage that made the administration look bad. Kennedy set up a meeting with the errant officials and, after making them wait for a while, marched into the office and, looking at Ball, proclaimed: "I knew Bundy had no political sense, but what the hell got into you?" Bundy still marvels at this demonstration of Kennedy's skill in berating two subordinates in one breath!

One other story that I have heard repeatedly likewise attests to the importance of domestic politics in Kennedy's thinking on foreign policy. In 1962 (according to his recollection) my father, Samuel R. Levering, a foreign policy activist, was part of a group of six leading Quakers who visited with Kennedy in the oval office to urge him to send surplus U.S. food to alleviate hunger in the People's Republic of China. "Well, I might recommend that," Kennedy responded, "but what good would it do if Congress turned me down? There are six of you working on me. How many do you have on Capitol Hill?" "About eighty," my father responded. The president said, "Send more."²⁸

I conclude with a story of my own. Several years ago I was attending a history conference — probably SHAFR — and began to talk with a relatively young, well-published diplomatic historian whom I had not previously met. He brought up my textbook on the Cold War, saying that he used it in his classes and that his students enjoyed it. And then he said roughly the following: "But for the life of me, I can't

²⁸This story is contained in Samuel R. Levering, *Quaker Peacemakers; Sam and Miriam Levering* (Ararat, VA, 1993), pp. 34-35.

understand why you include so much information on public opinion and domestic politics.” This comment, which he elaborated on for a couple minutes, caught me by surprise, and I remember mumbling something like “Well, I do think they’re important.”

My more considered response — to which I would appreciate reactions from colleagues in diplomatic history — is summarized in the following two paragraphs from the preface of my extensively revised textbook on the Cold War:

More than other surveys of the Cold War years, this text emphasizes the role of domestic politics and public opinion — including ideology — in the making of foreign policy, especially in the United States (without ignoring perceptions of the international environment and other important factors). This emphasis on domestic factors is vital for understanding the making of U.S. foreign policy, for American presidents are deeply influenced by main currents of thought in the Congress, in the media, and in the voting public (which includes such interest groups as large corporations and labor unions). As politicians concerned about their own futures and the fate of their parties, presidents and members of Congress seek to establish — and are reluctant to change — domestic and foreign policies that appear to enjoy broad support. In particular, political leaders seek to avoid taking stands that might antagonize significant numbers of their constituents — as, for example, a statement that could be perceived as condoning Soviet expansion in the late 1940s would have done. The French writer Alexis de Tocqueville correctly brought attention to the “tyranny of the majority” in American public life; but because elections usually are decided by not more than 10 to 20 percent of the vote — hence requiring a shift of not more

than 5 to 10 percent of the voters from one party to another — one can also note the power of the shifting minority in American politics. Accordingly, politicians often take great care to tailor their words and deeds to reflect popular sentiment, in the hope of attaining both financial support and the most possible votes in the next election.

Understanding these political realities is crucial in understanding why, for example, the United States did not have formal diplomatic relations with communist China for thirty years after 1949, or why President John F. Kennedy felt that his only realistic choice was to demand the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962. Those scholars who seek to minimize the role of domestic politics in the making of U.S. foreign policy, and those who claim that the media and the public are easily manipulated by economic and political elites, betray a gross misunderstanding of how the American political system actually works.²⁹

²⁹Levering, *The Cold War*, pp. xiii-xiv. I also might have told my colleague that other texts on the Cold War include domestic politics. See, for example, Walter LaFeber's analysis of the reasons Ronald Reagan won in 1980 in *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990* (New York, 1991), p. 301.

MINING THE ARCHIVES OF ISRAEL

by

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Since the Age of Bemis, historians of American foreign relations have endeavored to base their inquiries on multiarchival, multinational research. Yet for specialists of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, this ambition has often been frustrated by the unavailability of primary sources, especially government records, in the states of that region.¹ In recent years, however, Israel's official archives have matured into major repositories brimming with records important to understanding that country's internal and foreign relations history. For experts in U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East or in American-Israeli political, economic, or interesting and useful information. Having spent October 1993 mining the archives of Israel, I hope in this report to share with other interested researchers some of the lessons I learned.

Two major Israeli archives rank as essential to scholars studying U.S. diplomacy in Israel. One is the David Ben-Gurion Research Center and Archives at Midreshet Sde Boqer. Containing some 700,000 documents in more than 4,000 files, the collection is organized into sixteen groups of records, several of which seem vital to understanding Israeli foreign policy. Perhaps the most important group is Ben-Gurion's diary. Now open through 1960, the diary is arranged chronologically, with each year of entries occupying three to

¹See, for example, Paul Rich, "Pursuing Qatari History in Qatar: Frustrations of the Gulf," *SHAFR Newsletter* 24:3 (September 1993): 1-4.

six inches of shelf space. One may choose to read photocopies of the original diary in Ben-Gurion's own handwriting, an extremely difficult undertaking due to his poor penmanship, or to read typed transcripts produced by archives staff and refer to the original to confirm unclear or controversial passages. Both the original diary and transcripts are in Hebrew.

Entries in the diary range from the latest gossip to summaries of meetings with journalists, colleagues, and foreign diplomats. Ben-Gurion seems to have recorded more of what he heard from others and less of his own thoughts and words, but he reveals his own thinking frequently enough to justify reading the entire manuscript. He did not add to his diary daily or with any consistent regularity. On some days he wrote copiously, on other days, nothing, and while in temporary retirement (1953-1955) he wrote sparingly but in a surprisingly reflective mood.

Unfortunately, the diary suffers a gap in entries between January 1955 and June 1956, a crucial period that witnessed the Gaza Raid, the Alpha peace plan, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, the British withdrawal from Egypt, and other events on the road to the Suez Crisis. Archivists have searched the Ben-Gurion Archives, Israeli Defense Force records, and elsewhere but found no trace of the missing portion. Several theoretical explanations currently circulate in Israel: perhaps Ben-Gurion took a sabbatical from writing; perhaps he or someone else destroyed the missing section; perhaps it was simply misplaced; perhaps Soviet intelligence agents stole it. Advocates of the last theory hope someday to find the missing link in some Moscow archive.

On the brighter side, staff members of the Ben-Gurion Archives are nearly finished scanning the entire on to an

electronic database and plan to make it available to researchers at computer terminals at the Ben-Gurion university in Beersheva. They are also investigating the prospect of making it available via computer links to researchers worldwide.

In addition to the diary, there are several other valuable groups of records at Sde Boqer. In the Correspondence File, for example, archivists have consciously tried to gather from around the world all letters sent to and by Ben-Gurion. Thus, copies of letters deposited in the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower libraries are mixed among carbons of letters dispatched from the Prime Minister's Office. I came upon letters from Ben-Gurion to Eisenhower that were not yet declassified by the U.S. government, and I found in its entirety one letter from Eisenhower to Ben-Gurion that was sanitized upon its release in the United States. The Correspondence File is arranged chronologically and open to [sic] 1960. Most letters are in Hebrew, although those from and to Americans are in English. Although the immense size of the file is daunting, the staff has composed a computerized name index, for the years through 1957, that pinpoints the dates of Ben-Gurion's correspondence with any single individual. On the other hand, experts such as Dr. Tuvia Friling, director of the center, believe that Ben-Gurion often revealed his inherent innermost thinking on certain matters in letters to apparently uninvolved persons. Friling encourages researchers to read the entire file.

Scholars might also find useful the Protocols of Meetings group, the Protocols group, the General Chronological Documents group, and the Oral History Interviews. The Protocols of Meetings group contains all sorts of transcripts of encounters between Ben-Gurion and foreign dignitaries, journalists, and Israeli individuals and entourages. Yet this source is uneven; its only record of Ben-Gurion's meeting

with Eisenhower on 10 March 1960, for example, is a copy of the American memorandum, complete with portions sanitized, taken from the Eisenhower Library. The Protocols group (a separate collection despite its similar name) contain a vast number of files on numerous matters ranging from the Woodhead Commission to the St. James Conference, from the Knesset to the Histadrut. Diplomatic historians interested in pre-1948 activities might take interest in files devoted to the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, the Mandate, and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

The General Chronological Documents group [T.K.K. by its Hebrew acronym] is comprised of notes for the record, reports, memoranda, and notes between individuals. Perhaps its greatest treasure for researchers interested in diplomacy is a 350-page collection of documents and commentary about the Suez Crisis that was composed by Abba Eban in 1957. Finally, the Oral History Interviews collection includes transcripts of some 175 interviews with persons who knew and worked with Ben-Gurion. Golda Meir, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, Teddy Kollek, and many others spoke for the record. Most of the other groups of records — ranging from newspaper clippings to speeches, from Ben-Gurion's book manuscripts to greeting cards — would likely be of little use to diplomatic historians.

The Ben-Gurion Center is staffed by dedicated, talented, and helpful archivists under the direction of Dr. Frilling. They maintain excellent indexes and finding aids, many of them computerized; they provide superb advice on all of the collections; and they retrieve documents almost immediately. The center also houses the research offices of faculty at the Ben-Gurion University in Beersheva. The adjacent Ben-Gurion library has a respectable collection of books and journals and maintains a computerized data base of virtually

every publication (including newspaper articles) on Ben-Gurion. Photocopies of documents can be ordered easily and at the cost of some 23 cents per page.² The archives is generally open Sundays to Thursdays from 8:00 to 2:30, although the staff is willing to extend the closing hour to 5:00 twice per week, upon request. Israeli academics like to think of the Ben-Gurion Center as their country's version of the U.S. presidential libraries, and in terms of its holdings and staff, they are on the mark. For further information, write The Ben-Gurion Research Center and Archives, Midreshet Sde Boqer, 84 993, Negev, Israel: or phone 57-565-843 (fax: 57-565-847).

The most difficult aspect of conducting research at the Ben-Gurion Archives is finding suitable overnight accommodations. True to Ben-Gurion's vision that Israel's future promise lay in the Negev, the research facility was constructed in the remote desert outpost at Sde Boqer, a small community adjacent to Ben-Gurion's kibbutz that also includes a solar energy research center, a desert field school, and a few other similar establishments. Surrounded by stark natural beauty, Sde Boqer would undoubtedly be a fabulous place to reside (if one could learn to ignore the round-the-clock thuds of artillery at nearby military firing ranges). Yet the visitor will encounter a guest house that resembles an unkept undergraduate dormitory, a lone cafeteria boasting two unchanging and unappetizing menu choices, a small and expensive grocery, and complete absence of evening social activities. After a week, the distinctions in one's mind between, say, Abilene and Washington begin to fade. The only alternative for those accustomed to small degrees of

²Costs in this essay calculated at the October 1993 exchange rate of 1 U.S. dollar = 2.82 new Israeli shekels.

comfort is to stay in a modern hotel in Beersheva, thirty miles distant, and commute daily by car or bus.

The second Israeli repository that historians of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East would find valuable is the Israel State Archives (ISA) in Jerusalem. Maintained by the Prime Minister's Office, the ISA resembles the National Archives in the sense that it houses voluminous records from numerous government branches and departments. For foreign policy experts, two record groups seem important. Record Group (RG) 93, "Israeli Missions Abroad," Contains files created in Israeli embassies and legations worldwide. Not surprisingly, the largest subgroups are the papers of the missions to Washington and New York, comprised of 115 and 215 boxes, respectively. Many of the files, of course, deal with routine and unexceptional matters, but several of them contain assessments of U.S. policy by Israeli officials, minutes of meetings within the embassies, cable traffic to and from Jerusalem, and correspondence between Israeli diplomats and members of Congress, labor union leaders, and other private American citizens. A clear index, in Hebrew, lists file titles. Perhaps as much as half of the material of the first few years of Israeli statehood appears in English; thereafter, Hebrew gradually becomes the normal language of discourse (except, of course, in the correspondence with Americans).

The other valuable source is RG 130, "Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Head Office," particularly subgroups 130.02 (foreign minister and director-general), 130.20 (North America Division), and 130.23 (central registry, political files). These subgroups include various sorts of documents—cables, minutes of meetings, letters, and so forth—that detail American-Israeli relations, reveal how Israeli officials tried to influence U.S. policy, and shed light on Israeli diplomacy in innumerable Middle Eastern and global matters. Subgroups 130.02 and

130.20 cover the years 1948-1956, and 130.23 deals with the following years. Very good indexes exist for all three collections. Most of the records are in Hebrew; perhaps one third are in English; a handful appear in French.

The staff at the ISA is very good at providing indexes and retrieving records. Ten files may be ordered at once, and ten more upon delivery of the first batch, making it possible to arrange a steady stream of records. Delivery time averages about ninety minutes (although my first order took twenty-four hours to fill). The reading room is open Sundays to Thursdays, 8:00 to 3:00, holidays excepted. Photocopies are ordered easily at the cost of some 30 cents per page. Contact Gil'ad Livne, Research Room Director, ISA, 35 Meqor Hayim St., Jerusalem; or phone 2-705-485 (fax: 2-793-375).

The ISA reading room was relocated in early 1993 to a newly renovated facility in Meqor Hayim, a semi-industrial neighborhood in southern Jerusalem. Although seemingly isolated among vacant lots and warehouses, the facility is actually within a fifteen-minute bus ride or thirty-minute walk of downtown West Jerusalem, where hotels, hospices, restaurants, and other attractions abound.

In addition to the papers found at the ISA and at Sde Boqer, several minor collections are also available in Israel. At the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, for example, one can examine portions of the personal papers of Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol, Nahum Goldmann, and others. There are also numerous small collections of manuscripts, held in a wide variety of places, that might prove useful to historians exploring certain topics.

Researchers venturing to Israel will encounter several problems in the availability of records. Israel generally

declassifies documents according to a thirty-year rule, on the British model, but for key records such as the Cabinet minutes, the Army general staff papers, and the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee records, a fifty-year rule applies. Moreover, officials withdrew files from several record groups released under the thirty-year rule. Worse, the files that remain under lock and key cannot be easily identified; they simply do not appear on index rosters even though they are occasionally cited in the ISA's publication series *Documents in the Foreign Policy of Israel*. Furthermore, individual documents have been pulled from files that have released, yet no notice (comparable to the "document withdrawn" cards that one encounters at the National Archives) appears in the file to alert readers to the omission.

These problems aside, Israeli archives contain voluminous records on the country's relationships with the United States and other states. By consulting this important documentary base, historians of U.S. policy in the Middle East can aspire toward a multinational perspective.

OBITUARIES

Maurice Matloff died on July 14 at his home in Rockville, Maryland, of liver and kidney ailments. Matloff was a retired chief historian of the army who specialized in military and diplomatic history, international relations, national security, and coalition problems.

Matloff received a B.A. from Columbia in 1936 and a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1956. He began his career as a military historian while serving in the army during World War II. In

1946 he joined the army's Center for Military History, where he served as chief historian from 1970 until 1981, when he retired. Matloff, who was considered an expert on strategic planning in the war, was coauthor of *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, and *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, standard works on the U.S. role in directing strategy during World War II. Matloff also wrote *Command Decisions* and *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*. In addition, he edited *American Military History*, a popular college textbook.

Besides his work with the Center for Military History, Matloff held a number of teaching appointments. Between 1983 and 1992, he was an adjunct professor of military history at Georgetown University, and he also held appointments at American University; the University of California, Berkeley; the University of California, Davis; Harvard University; the University of Georgia; Dartmouth College; and the U.S. Military Academy. Matloff was also a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars in 1981-82.

In addition to the AHA, Matloff belonged to the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Organization of American Historians, SHAFR, and the American Military Institute.

Matloff, a recipient of the army's Meritorious, Exceptional, and Outstanding Civilian Service medal, is survived by his wife of fifty years, his mother, two brothers, three children, and two grandchildren.

[from the AHA *Perspectives*]

* * * * *

Frank Beach succumbed to pneumonia and cancer on January 12, 1994.

Professor Beach spent much of his life at the University of San Francisco, first arriving on campus as a student in 1949 and graduating as a History major in 1953. He took his Master's degree in American history in 1957 and his doctorate from UC Berkeley in 1963. After teaching at LSU and Fresno State, Beach returned to the Hilltop where he became a full-time faculty member in 1966. Beach spent the next twenty-seven years at USF.

Beach taught the entire range of American history courses offered at USF, and pioneered in developing courses that would better serve students and catch their attention. In the late 1970s, with two colleagues from the Sociology Department, he developed an inter-disciplinary, team-taught course called "The City." The focus was on San Francisco, its past, its current problems, and its possible solutions. Beach developed a special introductory course on American history called "U.S. History for International Students." He launched a new course called "The World Since 1945," a team-taught effort with colleagues from the Politics Department.

Although he served as chairman of the History Department since 1980, he maintained his interest in diplomatic history. A particular interest was Kennedy's foreign policy, especially with regard to China.

Beach was born in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, in 1932. He is survived by a brother, James Beach. Contributions in his memory can be made to the Frank Beach Scholarship Fund, in care of the College of Arts and Sciences Dean's Office at USF.

SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

January 8, 1994

San Francisco Hilton

Present: Warren Kimball, Mel Leffler, Allan Spetter, Michael Schaller, Emily Rosenberg, Robert McMahan, Michael Hogan, Tom Paterson, Steven Kerbow, Mark Stoler, Mary Guinta, William Brinker, Jonathan Utley. President Kimball called the meeting to order at 7:30 a.m.

In June, the Council had decided that all terms of office would expire "in conjunction with" the AHA meeting in January. Kimball interpreted this to mean following the business meeting at the AHA. Kimball said that this meant Utley's term began after this meeting but that it was tradition to have the junior member of the council take minutes and even though Utley was not yet on the Council he would have the honor of taking minutes.

Election of Officers: Mark Stoler reported Robert Dallek elected Vice President, Richard Immerman and Jonathan Utley elected to Council, Linda Killen elected to nominating committee. The Council voted to accept the results.

Myrna Bernath Prize: Some confusion about the membership of the Myrna Bernath committee caused a delay in presenting the award. Kimball and Leffler will try to get it straightened out.

Bernath Dissertation Award: The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee had informed Spetter that the dissertation winners are R. Tyler Priest of the University of Wisconsin and Christian Ostermann of the University of Hamburg. This will be announced at the SHAFR luncheon this date.

Program Committee: Tom Schwartz reported by letter that there were 80 papers including 18 complete panels proposed. Women accounted for 25% of the papers, up from 15% the year before. Schwartz inquired whether SHAFR would pay part of the expenses involved in attracting a prominent person to participate in a panel. After some discussion it was concluded that such payments would not be made.

There was discussion of whether to have a theme for a conference and the consensus was that no theme or special topic was necessary but if a program committee wanted to establish one it could do so.

Mark Stoler raised the problem of late papers and urged a policy that panel chairs be authorized not to accept late papers. Rosenberg and Leffler recalled no particular problem and after some discussion it was concluded that panel chairs would be given no guidance on this issue and they could handle any late papers as each saw fit.

Annual Meeting Location: Council accepted the invitation of the U.S. Naval Academy (Bob Love) to host the conference in the summer of 1995. Leffler asked for suggestions for 1996 and after some discussion agreed he would look into the possibility of Georgetown University. Kimball suggested the Council begin considering holding a meeting in Canada and suggested Toronto. Leffler will look into it.

Liability Insurance: Liability insurance for officers is being negotiated. Underwriter's report just missed this meeting but should be ready by the next.

Distribution of *Diplomatic History*: Eduard Marks proposed SHAFR finance placement of the journal in six Russian institutions. Kimball endorsed the proposal and Leffler urged

a time limit which was set at three years. Hogan expressed reservations about the effectiveness of such a program ever producing paid subscriptions. Paterson suggested that shipment be coordinated with the *Journal of American History*. This led to a discussion of how cooperation with the OAH could be advantageous in various ways. Rosenberg agreed to check with OAH to see what relationship might be established between the OAH and *Diplomatic History*.

Another proposal originating outside the Council to send copies of *DH* to 100 U.S. libraries was filed indefinitely after a brief discussion.

Minority Access: The Minority access committee recommended that in order to increase the number of minorities entering the field, SHAFR should undertake to identify and publicize minority fellowships in the field, sponsor minority undergraduate and first year graduate student institutes focusing on the field, hold a conference on African-American diplomatic relations, provide money for minority travel to SHAFR meetings, commit \$10,000 to support these items, and keep the committee in existence.

There was considerable discussion about these ideas with the general conclusions being that it was within the means of SHAFR to encourage a program committee to recruit papers on African-American relations, include foreign relations sessions in existing workshops designed to recruit minority students into graduate work in history, and fund minority student travel to SHAFR annual meetings. On this last matter, the council voted to earmark \$2,000.00 to defray expenses involved in minority students attending a SHAFR meeting beginning with the 1994 meeting. A cap of \$500.00 per student was set. The Minority Access Committee will be asked to handle the logistics of this program. The Council

defined minorities as including African-Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans. The Council concluded that an institute or summer program was beyond the resources of SHAFR. The University of Florida and Virginia Tech have minority recruitment summer programs and Bob McMahon was designated as the person to see what could be done to get a larger foreign relations presence in those programs. An effort would also be made to see how SHAFR could coordinate its minority recruitment efforts with the OAH and AHA. Suggestion of a dissertation year fellowship for minority students met with less than enthusiastic endorsement since the idea was to recruit students into the field and the money should be at the front end. The idea of a minority scholarship for beginning students was seen as redundant as there was ample money for any qualified minority student a graduate program could recruit regardless of the field. There was a general agreement that better publicity of such minority assistance might be useful to SHAFR members. It was agreed that the Minority Access Committee should continue exploring this issue.

Diplomatic History: Joan Hoff joined the meeting to report that serious bids have been received from four publishers to publish the journal. Hogan will comment on the proposals submitted and note what additional provisions are desirable. Since the Scholarly Resources contract expires December 1994, it will be necessary to undertake negotiations before the SHAFR June meeting.

Hogan moved and Paterson seconded adding Walter Hixson, Diane Kunz, and Stephen Rabe to editorial board. Approved by Council.

SHAFR Guide: Mary Giunta presented a report on proposed revisions of the *Guide to American Foreign Relations Since*

1700. She recommended that the SHAFR membership and libraries be surveyed to determine the most desirable format and price. Whatever format or formats the final product takes (new book, supplemental volume, disc, CD) there would need to be a bibliographic data base housed somewhere. It will be necessary to get bids on the costs of a data base home. There was some confusion about who had the tapes of the old volume and whether it was in a format that could be used for a new database or whether the material would have to be scanned from the printed pages which would require cleaning up the scanned page. Guinta suggested that the next volume should avoid evaluations of works such as judging their significance but include information indicating the type of sources the work drew upon as well as the focus of the work. The new edition must be edited by a diplomatic historian who has hands on control of the volume and who has data base management experience. There needs to be careful oversight and standardized control over the contributing editors. The current organization seems satisfactory to people contacted.

SHAFR Finances: Gary Hess reported by letter that his committee on finance was investigating ways to earn a better return on SHAFR endowments than is currently being received. A financial planner has been interviewed. Members of the Council suggested that the AHA be contacted to see if it is possible to take advantage of their more sophisticated investment program. The SHAFR endowment amounts to about \$400,000. Various options will be explored and a recommendation will be made to the Council at its June meeting. Kimball noted that the William R. Castle family might be interested in establishing a memorial fund and the Council agreed that Leffler should correspond with the family.

Kimball raised a final issue. That since SHAFR pays \$2,500 to support the N.C.C. we should get a written report.

Paterson suggested that the written reports in the OAH newsletter were sufficient but Kimball thought we could provide greater direction if we had a chance to respond to a specific report. Leffler will approach this issue.

The meeting adjourned at 10:30 a.m.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Cuban Scholar Seeks Collaboration

Manuel de Jesús Velázquez León of Holguin University (Holguin, Cuba) has written offering his cooperation to SHAFR members who might be interested in his knowledge of Cuban affairs and experience teaching U.S. History to English speaking Cuban students. His address:

4^a Ed 3 Apto 1 e/13y15

R. Quintana 80600

Holguin, Cuba

Call for Papers

On October 22, 1994 the New England Historical Association (NEHA) will hold its Fall conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge. Papers or proposals on any historical topic, area, or period may be submitted by July 15. For membership or proposal information, contact Peter Holloran, NEHA Executive Secretary, Pine Manor College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167.

AFHRA Research Grants

The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) announces research grants to encourage scholars to study the history of air power through the use of the USAF historical document collection at the Agency. Awards range from \$250 to \$2500. Selectees must meet the criteria stated in this announcement and be willing to visit the Agency for research during Fiscal Year 1995 (which ends 30 September 1995). Recipients will be designated "Research Associates of the Air Force Historical Research Agency."

Criteria

Applicants must have a graduate degree in History or related fields, or equivalent scholarly accomplishments. Their specialty or professional experience must be in aeronautics, astronautics, or military related subjects. They must not be in residence at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and must be willing to visit the Air Force Historical Research Agency for a sufficient time to use the research materials for their proposed projects. Active duty military personnel are eligible to receive a grant.

Topics of Research

Proposed topics of research may include, but are not restricted to, Air Force history, military operations, education, training, administration, strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technology, organization, policy, activities, and institutions. Broader subjects suitable for a grant include military history, civil military relations, history of aeronautics or astronautics, relations among U.S. branches of service, military biographies, and international military relations.

Application Deadline

Applicants can request an application from the Commander, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6678. The completed applications must be returned by 1 October 1994.

World War II Symposium

The Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, The Netherlands, and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute will jointly host a symposium on "World War II in Europe: The Final Year" in Middelburg, 1-3 June 1994. The symposium will reconsider some of the key military and political questions of that period and includes sessions on grand strategy, military operations to defeat Germany, the liberation of the Netherlands, the human dimensions of war, and implications for the future of European collective security. The symposium is open to those interested in the period. For information contact either Charles Brower or Kees van Minnen at the Roosevelt Study Center, Box 6001, 4330 LA Middelburg, The Netherlands (tel. 31.1180-31590/fax. 31-1189-31593).

New Life Members

Tim Borstelmann, Jian Chen, Saki Dockrill, John Gaddis, Yoshinobu Higurashi, Yoshikazu Hirose, Dennis Kux, Hiroshi Nakanishi, Jeff Roberts, Kazuya Sakamoto, and Robert Shulzinger.

Contributors to the Endowment

Frederick Aandahl, Nathan Anthony, Robert Branyan, Wayne Cole, Martin Cramer, Calvin Davis, Richard Davis, Vincent DeSantis, Richard Donnelly, Howard Duff, Nolan Fowler, Robert Goldbaum, Rebecca Goodman, Peter Grose, Fred Harvey Harrington, Morrell Heald, David Hirst, Larry Kaplan, Jules Karlin, Andreas Klose, Richard Leopold, Anders Lewis, Jonathan Lewis, Delber McKee, J. Kenneth McDonald, Robert Pastor, David Pletcher, Carmela Santoro, Charles Stefan, William Stueck, J.A. Thompson, Robert Tucker, Daun Van Ee, and Marshal Zeringue.

Contributors to the Rappaport Fund

(which supports the operations of Diplomatic History)

John Gaddis and Wayne Thompson

Call for Authors and Papers

Cathal Nolan (British Columbia) is preparing to edit a reference volume entitled *Notable U.S. Ambassadors, 1775-1995: A Biographical Dictionary* for Greenwood Press. He would be please to hear from scholars working on American foreign policy any and all suggestions as to prominent American diplomats whose lives and careers might warrant inclusion. Nolan would be happy to entertain offers to contribute to the book, to supplement the group of historians and political scientists already on board. Ideally, a willing contributor should be prepared to commit to a minimum of three (3) biographical entries at 3,000 words apiece. And they should be prepared to submit these articles in final form no later than April, 1995.

Persons with suggestions for inclusion may send these to Nolan directly, or through Ms. Mildred Vasan at Greenwood. All those interested in becoming contributors should contact Nolan directly, including their preferred topics, a list of relevant publications, and a writing sample. Please contact: Cathal Nolan, Dept. of Political Science, Univ. of British Columbia, C472-1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, B.C. Canada V6T-1Z1. Fax: (604) 467-7274.

PERSONALS

Robert L. Beisner (The American University) is serving as Director of General Education effective 9/1/93.

Joan Hoff has spent the past academic year as the Mary Ball Washington Chair at University College, Dublin. She also received an honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree from Montana State University.

Lorna Jaffe (JCS) has been promoted to Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Historical Branch, Joint History Office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Larry Kaplan (retired from Kent State) has been teaching during the Fall Semester at Georgetown and will teach at the Honors College at the U. of Maryland in the spring.

Walter F. LaFeber (Cornell University) has been elected to the AHA Council for a three-year term.

Lester D. Langley (Georgia) is editor of a projected 15-volume series, "The United States and the Americas," published by the University of Georgia Press. A Spanish-

language edition of the volume on *The United States in the Western Hemisphere* (sponsored by the USIA) has been published by Ediciones Devenir in Buenos Aires.

Hong-Kyu Park (formerly at Jarvis Christian College) has joined the history faculty of Kilgore College in Kilgore, Texas.

William B. Pickett (Rose-Hulman) serves as president of the Indiana Association of Historians.

Walter S. Poole (JCS) has been promoted to Chief of the Joint Staff Historical Branch, Joint History Office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Betty Unterberger, the Patricia and Bookman Peters Chair at Texas A&M, is continuing her study of Woodrow Wilson and has lectured recently on the Swadhyaya movement in India.

Christine A. White (Penn State) has won the George Louis Beer Prize for *British and American Commercial Relations with Soviet Russia, 1918-1924* (North Carolina, 1992).

CALENDAR

1994

- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 15-18 The 87th meeting of the OAH will take place in Atlanta with headquarters at the Atlanta Hilton and Towers.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.

- June 23-26 The 20th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at Bentley College, Waltham, MA.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- 1995
- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 6-9 The 109th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Chicago. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1994 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1994 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 15 Deadline for the 1995 Bernath lecture prize.

The OAH will meet at the Washington Hilton, March 30-April 2, 1995; the program chair is Michael Frisch, Dept. of History, Park Hall, SUNY-Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260. The OAH will meet at the Palmer House Hilton (Chicago), March 28-31, 1996 and the San Francisco Hilton, April 17-20, 1997.

PUBLICATIONS

Stephen E. Ambrose (New Orleans), *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* Seventh Revised Edition. Penguin, 1994. Paper, ISBN 0-14-017536-9. \$12.00.

Thomas Borstelmann (Cornell University), *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War*. Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0-19-507942-6. \$35.00.

Peter G. Boyle (University of Nottingham, England), *American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism*. Routledge, 1993. Cloth, ISBN 0-415-02020-4. \$59.95; paper, ISBN 0-415-09327-9. \$18.95.

Russell D. Buhite (Tennessee) and David W. Levy, *FDR's Fireside Chats*. Penguin, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-14-017905-4. \$12.50.

Robert A. Divine (University of Texas, Austin), *The Sputnik Challenge*. Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0-19-505008-8. \$25.00.

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University), *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*. Oxford, 1994. Paper, ISBN 0-19-508551-5. \$11.95.

Kenneth J. Hagan (US Naval Academy), *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*. The Free Press, 1992. ISBN 0-02-913471-4. \$14.95.

Lorna S. Jaffe (Joint History Office), *The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992*. US Government Printing Office, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-16-043081-6. \$4.50.

D. Clayton James (VMI), *Antebellum Natchez*. Louisiana State, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-8071-1860-5. \$12.95.

William R. Keylor (Boston), *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, Second Edition. Oxford, 1992. Paper, ISBN 0-19-506804-1. \$17.95.

Walter LaFeber (Cornell), *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*, Second Edition. Norton, 1993. Paper. Volume One, ISBN 0-393-96475-2. \$21.95; Volume Two, 0-393-96476-0. \$21.95.

Walter LaFeber (Cornell), *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* Second Edition. Norton, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-393-30964-9. \$12.95.

Melvyn Leffler (Virginia) and David S. Painter (Virginia), eds., *The Origins of the Cold War*. Routledge, 1994. Paper, ISBN 0-415-09694-4. \$16.95; Cloth, ISBN 0-415-09693-6. \$65.00.

Robert Love (Naval Academy) ed., *Pearl Harbor Revisited*. St. Martin's, 1994. ISBN 0-213-09593-7. \$45.00.

Robert J. McMahon (University of Florida), *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*. Columbia, 1994. ISBN 0-231-08226-6. \$.

Cathal J. Nolan (British Columbia), *Principled Diplomacy Security and Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Greenwood, 1994. ISSN 0147-1066. \$55.00.

Raymond G. O'Connor (Emeritus), *Origins of The American Navy: Sea Power in the Colonies and the New Nation*. University Press of America, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-8191-9161-2. \$34.50.

Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War*. Revised Edition. Norton, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-393-03060-1. \$22.95.

David Reynolds (Cambridge), Warren Kimball (Rutgers - Newark) and Alexander Chubarian eds., *Allies' at War: The Soviets, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945*. St. Martin's, 1994. ISBN 0-312-10259-3. \$59.95.

Michael Schaller (Arizona), *Reckoning with Reagan*. Oxford, 1994. Paper, ISBN 0-19-509049-7. \$9.95.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (C U N Y), *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. Norton, 1993. Cloth ISBN 0-393-03380-5. \$15.95.

Robert D. Schulzinger (Colorado at Boulder), *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* Third Edition. Oxford, 1993. Cloth ISBN 0-19-508060-2, \$35.00; paper ISBN 0-19-508061-0. \$16.95.

Gaddis Smith (Yale), *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993*. Hill and Wang, 1994. ISBN 8090-6475-8. \$25.00.

Gerhard L. Weinberg (North Carolina), *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II*. Cambridge, 1993. ISBN 0-521-44317-2. \$34.95.

Samuel R. Williamson and Steven L. Rearden (Herndon, VA) eds., *The Origins of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy*. St. Martin's, 1993. ISBN 0-312-08964-3. \$45.00.

[Abbreviated notes describing the society's awards, prizes, and funds appear in the March and September issues of the *Newsletter*. Full descriptions appear in the June and December issues. — editor]

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The lecture, to be delivered at the annual meetings of the Organization of American Historians, will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for research and teaching. Each lecturer will address not specifically his/her own research interests, but broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Full details appear in the June and December 1993 *Newsletters*.

Applications should be sent to the new chairperson: Peter L. Hahn, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1367

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award will be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies.

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowship

A research fellowship awarded every two years (apply in even-numbered years) for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

New: Tom Knock, chair, Dept. of History, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship.

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

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EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Brent W. York.

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BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$1.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$2.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication should be typed, double-spaced; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

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