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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

by

Raymond L. Garthoff

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

All of us lived most our lives in the shadow of the Cold War. Yet, as you are all aware, there are perils in thinking through and writing recent remembered and contemporary history. Nonetheless, there is not only a challenge, but also an unparalleled opportunity in addressing the history of the Cold War — especially now that oral history has begun to expand on traditional memoirs in making early reminiscences available to match up with documentary materials. It is now, however, nearly half a century since the Cold War began, and the opportunity to draw on the contribution that participants can make is declining each year as their ranks thin.

I shall note several examples of the value, and hazards, of nondocumentary sources, and of their use in conjunction with documentary records, drawn from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

As many of you will recall, at the first of a series of conferences on the missile crisis held in 1987 on its 25th anniversary, Dean Rusk revealed that at the critical juncture on October 27, when a deal seemed to hinge on whether the United States would remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a concession to match Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba, President Kennedy instructed him to call Andrew Cordier, the former Undersecretary of the UN, to be ready, if later asked, to request UN Secretary General U Thant to propose that the Soviet Union withdraw its missiles from

Cuba, and the U.S. its missiles from Turkey. It would, of course, have been much easier for Kennedy to accede to a request from the UN Secretary General than to a demand from Khrushchev. Khrushchev, meanwhile, accepted Kennedy's proposal for a settlement that did not require the U.S. to agree publicly to withdraw its missiles from Turkey (although we did give a confidential oral statement of U.S. intention to do so within five months). So the "Cordier ploy" was never activated. Moreover, it is not certain that Kennedy would have used it even if Khrushchev had not accepted the deal proposed on October 27 — it was an option Kennedy wanted to be able to call upon if there was no preferable alternative.

Now, as many of you also may recall from an interesting communication in the September 1994 SHAFR *Newsletter*, Mark White, a British scholar, recently discovered in declassified Foreign Office records a message from the British UN representative on October 25, earlier during the crisis, which referred to reports that Cordier had been in touch with top level US officials on a possible UN commission to monitor the Soviet missiles in Cuba, in which case the United States might be willing to allow the same thing at the U.S. missile base in Turkey. This is not at all the same thing that Rusk reported, although it did refer to a Cordier role in something relating both to Soviet and U.S. missiles.

Mr. White concluded that the October 25 report "plainly refers to the Cordier ploy unveiled by Rusk," though he noted there were important differences. His conclusion was that it "makes sense to place greater faith in a document from 1962 than in a 25 year old memory." So he dismissed the Rusk report of a Cordier ploy on October 27 on trading away missiles.

Perhaps. But it is *far* from clear that the report from Oct. 25 refers to the same Cordier ploy that Rusk described. It is, in my judgment, far more likely that Cordier was a potential middleman on October 25, when the U.S. concern was to get monitors to check on a cessation of construction on the Soviet missile launchers, and that Kennedy and Rusk on October 27 considered a new, further possible Cordier-U Thant ploy for trading off withdrawal of our missiles in Turkey for withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. But I do not know; nor does anyone else. After the Newsletter report, I intended to call it to Dean Rusk's attention and ask him: were there perhaps two different Cordier ploys, or could he have been mistaken on the timing and nature of a Cordier role? But I put off doing so until it was too late; Dean Rusk was no longer among us. To my knowledge, no one else asked him either. So we have probably lost the only chance to clarify this important detail.

Another important example of revelations from the recollections of a participant also, it so happens, comes from Dean Rusk.

While everyone is aware that the Romanian leadership publicly began to distance itself from the Warsaw Pact and Moscow's domination in April 1964, it had not been known why it had launched on such a path at that time. I first reported on the reason in a Moscow conference sponsored by the Cold War International History Project in 1993, reported in the current *CWIHP Bulletin* (Issue 5). In a word, the reason was Romanian alarm over the risk dramatically highlighted in the Cuban missile crisis that Romania could be brought under U.S. nuclear attack if a Soviet adventure anywhere led to a general nuclear war.

At the first opportunity, when Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu was in New York for the UN General Assembly in October 1963, he asked to see Secretary Rusk privately. Manescu said that Romania had not been consulted on the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba, and was therefore not a party to that dispute. The Romanian leadership wanted the US government to understand that Romania would remain neutral in any conflict generated by such actions as the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba, and sought assurances that in the event of hostilities arising from such a situation the United States would not strike Romania on the mistaken assumption that it would be allied with the Soviet Union in such a war. This was a remarkable secret unilateral Romanian repudiation of its Warsaw Pact alliance obligations — yet it did not “leak” for thirty years, until I disclosed it.

I had been told about the exchange by Dean Rusk some time after it occurred, and I confirmed it with him in correspondence in 1990, after the Romanian communist regime had collapsed. Rusk told me that to his knowledge the matter had never entered written U.S. records, and McGeorge Bundy confirms that. I have not sought to confirm his account with Manescu, who lives in retirement, and I do not know if it was ever written in Romanian records — probably not, for evident reasons. This is, however, a lead I hope someone working on the Balkan front of the Cold War will follow through on. It would also be interesting to know if Soviet intelligence ever learned of this Romanian initiative.

In the case of the history of the Cold War we have the unusual situation that not only has one side lost (let us leave aside whether the other side “won”), but the losing protagonist has disappeared, no longer exists. Consequently, both records and recollections of participants are more readily

available, and much sooner than usual (although, to be sure, in a not very neutral context of succession, first with eager repudiation of Soviet policies — and then a rebound defense of Russian interests believed to have been thrown out with the dirty laundry). There has of course also been some advance, though still much too slow, in availability of U.S. archival records, and many American participants are still available.

My third example drawn from the Cuban missile crisis concerns the role of the KGB station chief in Washington, known as Alexander Fomin (his real name is Aleksandr Feklisov). According to the early accounts of the crisis by participants from the Kennedy Administration, Fomin had contacted ABC news correspondent John Scali at the critical juncture in the crisis, on October 26, and proposed a basis for possible agreement, in greater specificity and detail than a confidential message received from Khrushchev a few hours later, seeming to propose a similar withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for an American pledge not to invade. Kennedy and his EXCOMM responded favorably to what they saw as the Khrushchev-Fomin package. The Fomin-Scali exchange was often cited as a deft use by Khrushchev of a back-channel of contact carefully coordinated with his more vague direct message. Moreover, there were precedents for such informal back channel contacts through Soviet intelligence officers.

At a Moscow conference on the missile crisis held in 1989, Fomin-Feklisov denied not only that he had been authorized by anyone in Moscow to make such a proposal, but also insisted that he had not made any proposal — he attributed it to Scali! Scali vehemently denies that, but there remains a standoff between them.

What has now been established is that Feklisov was not authorized to make any such proposal. Moreover, when he reported the conversation to Ambassador Dobrynin and attributed the proposal to Scali, Dobrynin (and his deputy Kornienko) have both told me they were so unsure of who had proposed what that they refused to send a cable of the report to Moscow until it was clarified. Feklisov did belatedly send it by his own KGB channel, but KGB archival records confirm that the message arrived too late to have played any part in Khrushchev's decision to accept Kennedy's proposal. Moreover, Feklisov has told me (although this is uncorroborated) that his own KGB chief in Moscow was so wary that he asked Feklisov to have it sent as an Embassy message, over Dobrynin's name — which of course Dobrynin had already declined to do. So the report of the Fomin/Feklisov or Scali proposal, given weight not only in American accounts of the crisis but by President Kennedy himself, was a luckily helpful bit of misinformation in Washington, and was not even known to policymakers in Moscow. There is an interesting account of the KGB records on the Feklisov-Scali channel in the current *CWIHP Bulletin*. (Feklisov, by the way, had been Klaus Fuchs case officer in London in the early 1950s.)

Another example illustrates the problem of establishing facts from incomplete reminiscences and records.

At the time of the crisis and for 30 years thereafter, virtually all accounts assumed that there had not been any *tactical* nuclear weapons in Cuba. This seemed to be confirmed when General Dmitri Volkogonov, then chief of the Institute of Military History, in response to a direct question told me in 1989 that there had not been. Then, three years later in Havana, General Anatoly Gribkov, who had been in charge of planning the missile transfer to Cuba, startled another

conference by asserting that there had been in Cuba nine tactical nuclear warheads for delivery by *Luna* tactical missiles (short range rockets for close troop support). Moreover, he said that the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, had been predelegated authority *in extremis* to fire the tactical nuclear rockets against invading American troops. This disclosure caused some consternation — as much for the revelation of reported predelegation as for the report of the presence of tactical nuclear weapons. Gribkov later quoted from a “General Staff document” referring to predelegation for the *Luna* missiles as proof of his assertion.

As for Volkogonov, he simply did not know and because his research (undertaken by a major on his staff) had not come across anything on tactical nuclear weapons, he assumed there were none.

To make a long story short, other former Soviet officers and some documents from the General Staff archives, and eventually even General Gribkov, have now clarified the facts: 60 nuclear warheads for the medium and intermediate range missiles had arrived in Cuba. In addition, there were twelve (not nine) tactical *Luna* nuclear warheads — plus six nuclear bombs for IL-28 bombers, and 80 nuclear warheads for ground-launched tactical cruise missiles — in all, 98 tactical nuclear warheads were in Cuba to meet an invasion force, in addition to 60 strategic missile warheads.

On the other hand, there was no predelegation to the local Soviet commander in Cuba to use any of these nuclear weapons without express approval from the Commander in Chief, Khrushchev.

Gribkov had quoted from a “General Staff document” — but it was a draft that Marshal Malinovsky had declined to sign. The General Staff had interpreted something Khrushchev had said as meaning he was prepared to sanction predelegation, but it was not made explicit. In any case, there *were* explicit orders sent again to Cuba on October 22 when the crisis began, and repeated on October 26, reiterating that there must be *no* nuclear weapon use without Moscow’s express authorization. (Gribkov also later explained that he had only mentioned the *Luna* warheads because the General Staff document had referred only to them, not to the other 86 tactical warheads; he confirms the new figures.)

It has taken some effort to pry out the documents and set the record straight, and there may well yet be further “revisions” of the story of the crisis.

One interesting new question that our new information raises is what the effect would have been in 1962 if we had then known there were 98 tactical nuclear warheads in Cuba — and, for that matter, a Soviet expeditionary force of over 40,000 men, three times as many as we estimated at the start of the crisis, and nearly twice our estimate even after the crisis was over. At the least, there would have been strong pressures to insist upon removal of all Soviet forces from Cuba, and in view of the small tactical nuclear systems also strong pressure to insist on inspection in Cuba to assure they had all been removed. It would certainly have made it more difficult to resolve the crisis.

Finally, I should use this occasion to note briefly another final illustration from the missile crisis of partial confirmation, and important correction, of hearsay evidence by archival records. In 1987 I reported that according to a CIA officer our spy in Moscow, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, before his arrest at the

time of the crisis had sounded a danger alert of possible Soviet attack. I noted that this report was uncorroborated. Now CIA has released records which correct that version. Such a signal was given, but on November 2, not October 22, and not by Penkovsky but by his captors, as we learned when an Embassy officer that same day was briefly detained by security police when trying to pick up an explanatory message that Penkovsky was supposed to have left after sounding the alarm. The danger alert was thus less dangerous than it had appeared from the earlier version. Incidentally, this is a good example of how even operational espionage records revealing “sources and methods” can be safely declassified, and can have historical value.

I do not plan to devote the balance of our time to further discussion of such illustrative details about the use of sources other than conventional documentary records. I want to move now from the “micro” to the “macro” level of discussion.

Most study of the Cold War, and of the diplomacy of the Cold War, until recently has concentrated on its origins and early years. One reason was an effort to see the roots, causes, actions and reactions during a period of rising tension — and to assign responsibility and blame for the Cold War. Another reason was simply to allow more time to gain perspective, and because for many years there was more material on the early period.

In recent years there has been increasing attention to the nuclear dimension, and to crisis episodes during the mid-years of the Cold War, in particular the Cuban missile crisis and the Berlin Crisis, and to the rise and fall of the *détente* of the 70s. But the coincidence of the Cold War and the first 45 years of the nuclear era was just that — a coincidence. There would have been a Cold War even if nuclear weapons had never

been devised. Nuclear weapons posed an unprecedented danger to the world, but on balance they helped to keep the Cold War “cold.”

Now there is attention also to the final period of the Cold War, the 1980s. As in the earlier study of the origins of the Cold War, we see efforts to determine responsibility, that is credit for the termination of the Cold War, or for winning it, as well as to investigate a complex period in Soviet history as well as in East-West relations.

But the end of the Cold War does more than mark a closing chapter, or a final winning round. The end of the Cold War helps to define the era, it throws new light on the nature of the Cold War, and on its history as an entirety.

Earlier, some believed the détente of the mid-1960s, and more the détente of the early to mid-70s, represented an end of the Cold War, at least in its classical form. Hence, too, the early 1980s were sometimes seen as a “second Cold War.” But the *real* end of the Cold War made clear that it had been a single historical process from 1946-47 to 1989-90, with alternating phases of tension and détente.

Some would even date the Cold War from 1917. But it was the combination of old ideological and new geopolitical realities after World War II that marked the beginning of the Cold War and determined its central protagonists.

There was an ideological foundation for the Cold War — or, if you will, an ideologically-grounded operational code based on a struggle of two worlds, on the part of one protagonist, the Soviet Union, which in turn generated a countering ideology and operational code of containment, on the part of the other. To be sure, the Cold War was waged overtly and

covertly in political, propaganda, economic, and military dimensions. And the Cold War and its various engagements had many important underlying as well as overlaying causes. The Cold War was waged politically and geopolitically, but in an ideologically sanctioned framework of conflict. Ideology, Marxism-Leninism, as an impetus to a Soviet expansionist drive was much overdrawn, but ideological conditioning as a perceptual filter and influence was often underrated.

In the final analysis, only a Soviet leader could have ended the Cold War — and only when a Soviet leadership was aware that the Marxist-Leninist vision of historically destined victory in an inevitable continuing conflict of two systems was fatally flawed.

Gorbachev was that leader. He set out to end the Cold War, and he did; by ending the political division of Europe and military confrontation of two blocs, by ending the arms race through concessionary arms agreements, and by banishing the image of an enemy by no longer *being* an enemy.

Gorbachev failed, spectacularly, in his attempt to restructure and transform the Soviet Union by reforming the Party, the state, the economy, the society and the political process — although he did more than merely destroy the old system. But he succeeded, just as spectacularly, in ending the Cold War, despite failing in efforts to reform a socialist commonwealth based on consent of the peoples. It was a remarkable achievement, accomplished despite serious obstacles and difficulties in the USSR — and only slow and grudging acceptance in the West.

Yet virtually everyone quickly recognized the end of the Cold War in the climactic year from November 1989 to November 1990 — the year from dismantling the Wall to the Paris

Charter reflecting the dismantling of the East-West confrontation. Events moved so rapidly that it is now sometimes forgotten that the Cold War ended by 1990 — well before the collapse of communist rule in the USSR and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself. If Gorbachev's internal perestroika had not failed, and the Soviet Union had transformed itself into a new looser voluntary union, even a socialist or "Soviet" state could have continued into the post-Cold War world — as it did for a year or so that brought further fruitful developments internationally, notwithstanding growing internal stresses and eventual implosion.

Before concluding, I want to go back and pick up two points that I set aside in tracing through the ideological-political underpinnings of the Cold War.

First, I identified a kind of "ideology of the Cold War," predicated on the belief that history was a zero-sum conflict, that I believe was fundamental. Yet in reality US-Soviet relations, and East-West relations, were never only zero-sum, and moreover this was recognized in practice in varying degree throughout the Cold War. Reality never matched the Cold War paradigm. But it was sufficiently congruent that the paradigm could still be held on grounds of prudence if not faith, and each side (and "history") provided enough fuel to the dynamic of conflict that leaders on both sides were led for four decades to act in ways that sustained the myth, and the Cold War.

More work needs to be done on perceptions and evaluations of each side by the other. More attention needs to be directed to the interaction of the two protagonists in the Cold War, and to study of the strategies and dynamics of interaction.

This brings me to the other point I wish to raise: the question of American contributions to what I have suggested was a reactive “counter-ideology” of containment, one that emerged in Western thinking and policy in response to the perceived challenge of the Marxist-Leninist conception of two worlds in conflict held by leaders of the USSR.

As I have said, I believe an underlying “ideology of the Cold War,” predicated on a zero-sum conflict, emerged, primarily stemming from the Marxist-Leninist view, together with the Western reaction. Not all will agree. But in any case, including for those of us who do see such a relationship, it is necessary to revisit the much debated views on sources of American conduct of the Cold War — our own objectives and interests, as well as our responses; in a sense, our share of responsibility for the emergence of the Cold War — and for its long travail.

Although there were a few early dissenting voices, notably Henry Wallace, there was an early consensus. After the Soviet Union consolidated its hegemony in Eastern Europe, and then got the Bomb, and China went Communist, and the Korean War erupted — there was a very broad and strong consensus in support of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist containment. The debate was (even if largely rhetorical) over whether containment was enough, not whether it was needed.

Recall, too, that the crusaders for rollback were often liberals, including those who were later called neoconservatives. “Liberation” was seen as an altruistic goal, rather than reflecting any hegemonical interests of our own. Not by accident, as the expression goes, did my friend Cord Meyer, one of the founders of the liberal internationalist World Federalist movement in the late 1940s, become chief of the International Organizations division of the covert directorate

of CIA by the mid-1950s. Similarly, William Sloane Coffin, Jr., a colleague of Cord Meyer's in keeping the postwar American Veterans Committee a liberal rather than a communist-front alternative to the American Legion, and later a well-known leader in civil disobedience protests against the Vietnam War, served three years in CIA in the early 1950s dispatching Soviet emigres clandestinely air-dropped into the Soviet Union.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (initially, Liberation) were strongly supported by liberals — as were later campaigns against Soviet violations of human rights.

But I believe both liberal crusaders and realpolitik geopoliticians held variations on an implicit acceptance of the idea that if the Soviet leaders believed that there existed an inevitable conflict to the death between two systems, then it did exist, and we had to wage it too; even, to some extent, to wage it in the same way. This was the foundation for containment and deterrence, as well as a wide range of overt and covert anti-Soviet policies and actions, even if there were also other unacknowledged contributing considerations behind these policies.

These are by no means entirely new issues I have been posing, but I believe they need to be examined in a new light, as we look back to reexamine the history of the Cold War.

I certainly won't try to take on as well the emerging history of the *post*-Cold War world, but in closing I would suggest that we need to take into account the legacy of Cold War ways of thinking, and even of "end of the Cold War" ways of thinking. There is too much of a tendency — not among historians, but among political figures as well as the public — to think of ourselves as the victors of the Cold War, and thus

empowered to serve as arbiters of a new world order, and even of a new order in the successor states to the former Soviet Union.

Needless to say, the impact of the end of the Cold War has been greatest in Russia, causing a traumatic need for national re-identification. There is also a powerful negative impact of American statements and actions that convey the image of an overbearing United States seeking to dominate and to hold down a vanquished nation.

I will note but three of regrettably many current examples. First, Russian sale of safeguarded reactors to Iran may be unwise, and we may urge it should not be done, but to treat it as the touchstone of our entire relationship, higher than our interest in seeing a democratic market society develop in Russia, is feckless.

Second, while in no way condoning a Russian hegemony over the other former republics of the Soviet Union, is the Russian view that they have a vital interest in what in fact is their "near abroad," any more reprehensible than, for example, our view of what we call with even less delicacy "our own backyard" in the Caribbean basin? This is not a plea for no standard of behavior by great powers; it is a plea not to use a double standard.

Finally, it would be a bitter irony if, in an attempt to keep post-Cold War NATO alive by Eastward expansion, mainly as a way of ensuring a strong American voice in Europe, we were to engender the very Russian reaction that we purportedly were seeking to insure against. It is one thing to inherit an alliance with an existing eastern border; it is quite another to draw a new line and in effect to constitute a new alliance, especially in preference to building a new pan-

European security arrangement including Russia for a new undivided Europe and a new post-Cold War world.

Writing the history of the Cold War needs no policy justification. But in fact there is a current and future policy relevance that reinforces other good reasons for directing our attention to a reevaluation of the Cold War. I wish all of you who are engaged in this pursuit success in your endeavors.

AMERICA'S MISSING SISTERS*

by

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For much of the nineteenth century, women in the United States were in the van of international feminism, at the same time more liberated and more assertive than their sisters in other countries.¹ From the very beginning, they were assumed to have a distinctive attitude to foreign policy. For example, the participation of women in the 1796 elections in New Jersey (where female householders had the vote between

*This essay develops a theme touched on but not fully explored in the author's book *Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917-1994* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995).

¹According to William L. O'Neill, "... the emergence of women proceeded more rapidly in the United States [than in England] — until the twentieth century, at any rate": *The Woman Movement: Feminism in the United States and England* (London and New York, 1969), 18. Cf. Christine Bolt, *The Women's Movements in the United States and Britain from the 1970s to the 1920s* (Hemel Hempstead, England, 1993), 1,3.

1709 and 1807) provoked a lively debate including an anonymous poem with the concluding lines:

Now one and all proclaim
the fall of tyrants! open wide your throats,
And welcome in the peaceful scene
of government in Petticoats!!!²

The tradition continued, and at the start of the twentieth century American women gave leadership to the international peace movement: Jane Addams was in 1915 chosen president of the International Congress of Women at the Hague and in 1919 she became president also of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.³

However, after the suffrage triumph of 1920, a reaction set in. In the wake of the Red Scare, feminists were dubbed "Pink Sisters." Just like labor agitators or the radicals who demanded equal rights for African Americans, they were treated as "unAmerican." What gave added force to a growing view that women could be written off as a serious political force was the critique offered by those who had previously held high hopes for feminism. To their dismay, just when women achieved the power to reform society and end the scourge of war, they appeared to lose interest in politics and became flappers instead. Meantime, women in

²Quoted in Augusta Genevieve Violette, *Economic Feminism in American Literature Prior to 1848* (1925. Reprint: New York, 1971), 37. On the New Jersey election law of 1709, see Willi Paul Adams, *The First American Constitutions* (1973 in German. Transl.: Chapel Hill, NC, 1980), 299.

³See the later chapters in Allen F. Davis, *American Heroine: The Life and Legend of Jane Addams* (Oxford, 1973) and Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1993).

other countries forged ahead. American women had become the Missing Sisters of world politics.⁴

America does sometimes give the appearance of having a split collective personality — being on the one hand libertarian and tolerant of pioneering social movements, and on the other strongly resistant to serious social change. For example, the labor movement was tolerated and gave an international lead in the 1820s and 1830s, but by the 1920s had run into the entrenched opposition of large sections of American capitalism.⁵ It could be argued that the history of American feminism has followed a similar course, running at last into the resistance power of American patriarchy. The labor movement in many ways adopted a business philosophy — if you can't beat 'em, join 'em — and applied it to foreign policy. Could a similar verdict be delivered on women? Have they, as is often complained about the labor movement,

⁴For a summary of the view that “the feminist movement reached its apogee” with the nineteenth amendment, see Andrew Sinclair, *The Better Half: The Emancipation of American Woman* (New York, 1965), 343ff; on anti-radicalism, see Joan M. Jensen, “All Pink Sisters: The War Department and the Feminist Movement in the 1920s,” in Lois Scharf and Joan M. Jensen, *Decades of Discontent: The Women's Movement, 1920-1940* (Westport, Conn., 1983). The view that women became politically supine in the 1920s is currently under challenge — see William H. Chafe, *The Paradox of Change: American Women in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1991), 27. However, Christine Bolt thinks that “the first phase of organised feminism . . . has been deemed to have petered out in the 1920s” and that “though the United States initially produced more sex radicals than Britain, the balance between the two countries had evened up somewhat by the early twentieth century”: Bolt, *Women's Movements*, 2,4.

⁵A celebrated if fatalistic account of this opposition is to be found in Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York, 1928), 154-162, 207-219.

lost their distinctiveness as well as much of their effectiveness, in particular in their approach to foreign policy?⁶

To measure the progress of American women in their attempts to shape foreign policy, one needs a model which allows comparisons between one decade and another in U.S. history, and between the U.S. and foreign countries. In 1929 Florence Boeckel, education director for the National Council for Prevention of War, suggested such a model. She thought that women could influence international affairs in three ways: as actors in the legislative and executive branches of government; within political parties; and via public opinion. Only in the last respect, she thought, had women had an impact in the 1920s.⁷

American women did make some gains over the next forty years, but from the feminist perspective such progress was grindingly slow. The United States was by no means in the forefront in regard to the political status of women. For example, whereas 112 women were elected to the German Reichstag between 1919 and 1932, only 95 served in the U.S. Congress in the fifty-year period 1926-1976.⁸

⁶For a critique of the accommodationist foreign-policy stances of organized, mainstream labor, see Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy: The Cold War in the Unions from Gompers to Lovestone* (New York, 1970). Prompted by a reconsideration of the Vietnam War, some historians are having second thoughts on labor's foreign-policy role. See Peter B. Levy, "The New Left, Labor, and the Vietnam War," *Peace and Change*, 15 (January 1990): 46-49, and Christian G. Appy, *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993).

⁷Florence Brewer Boeckel, "Women in International Affairs," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Sciences*, 143 (1929), 238-243.

⁸Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics* (London, 1987), 30.

In the 1960s, the position began to look more promising. This was a decade symbolically punctuated by the publication of Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* and the sight of Jane Fonda bestride a North Vietnamese cannon. As the Movement swung the Pill liberated; California's Ronald Reagan spoke alluringly of sex orgies on the Left; affirmative action was in the making, and the prospects for women and other repressed groups looked bright.⁹

Yet the 1960s were in some important respects a false dawn for those women seeking to win a say in politics and foreign policy. Intolerance was to be found in surprising quarters, notably in the case of the male-dominated protest movement against the Vietnam War. As Gloria Steinem put it, "There was this idea, 'Women say Yes to men who say No.' Women were not meant to do only the mimeography but supply the sex besides. At least in the Republican Party you only had to do the mimeographing."¹⁰ Women in the sixties did not make major inroads into the policymaking circles of the major political parties, indeed were enfeebled compared with the

⁹The 1960s is, of course, as imprecise a chronological term as "the generation of '68." Reprinted many times subsequently, Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* first appeared in 1963. Jane Fonda visited Hanoi in 1972: see Charles DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1990), 337 and Tom Hayden, *Reunion: A Memoir* (New York, 1988), ch.18. "The preservation of free speech does not justify letting beatniks, and advocates of sexual orgies, drug usage and filthy speech disrupt the academic community and interfere with our universities' purpose": Reagan press release, April 10, 1966, in Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Collection, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford, California.

¹⁰Gloria Steinem interviewed by Andrew Billen, *Life: The Observer Magazine*, May 15, 1994. For a discussion of the Vietnam War's damaging effect on women, see Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War* (Bloomington, Ind., 1989).

women of the 1930s who had created a powerful political “network” in the nation’s capital.¹¹

Turning to one of Boeckel’s main categories, women made significant inroads at neither end of Pennsylvania Avenue. There has never been a woman chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the prospects for change in the 1960s were particularly bleak, for the number of women in Congress actually declined — from a pitiful twenty in 1961 to an even more dire eleven in 1969.¹² President John F. Kennedy re-appointed Eleanor Roosevelt to the U.S. delegation to the U.N., but it is debatable whether U.N. jobs confer real power on women.¹³ There was no serious talk, in the 1960s, of a female Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine took a doomed, courageous, tilt at the Republican Vice-Presidential nomination in 1964 and was a respected member of the Armed Services Committee,

¹¹Susan Ware, *Beyond Suffrage: Women in the New Deal* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 8-9.

¹²Mildred L. Amer, *Women in the United States Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1991), 67.

¹³See the self-doubts of President Reagan’s ambassador to the U.N. recounted in Judith Ewell, “Barely in the Inner Circle: Jeane Kirkpatrick,” in Edward P. Crapol, ed., *Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders*, 2nd ed. (Wilmington, Del., 1992), 165. However, Kirkpatrick’s biographer and former counsel at the U.N. believes she had “greater influence over the formulation and articulation of U.S. foreign policy than any other U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations”: Allan Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy without Apology: America at the United Nations* (New York, 1991), xvi. It should be remembered that Eleanor Roosevelt had been responsible, perhaps more than any other person, for the U.N.’s adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Blanche Wiesen Cooke, “Eleanor Roosevelt and Human Rights: The Battle for Peace and Planetary Decency,” in Crapol, op. cit., 91-118.

becoming its minority leader. But the possibility of a woman President or Vice-President remained remote in the decade of "liberation".

All this was thrown into dramatic relief by contemporary developments on the international scene. In 1960, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the world's first elected female leader, became prime minister of Ceylon.¹⁴ In 1966, Indira Gandhi was elected prime minister of India, and in 1969 Golda Meir became prime minister of Israel. Somehow, America had been left behind by South Asian nations — often assumed to be "backward" especially where the treatment of women was concerned — and by a young Mediterranean country sometimes considered to be under U.S. protection and even tutelage.¹⁵ Nor could any of this be explained away in terms of autocratic royalism — all three nations concerned were democracies. None of the three women prime ministers were "token" women. Indeed, if one sets aside the great Nehru in the case of India, all three of them have a claim to having been dominant political figures in their post-independent nations. All three of them left a deep (if often controversial) imprint on the foreign policies of their respective states, Bandaranaike as a pioneer of non-alignment, Gandhi and Meir with respect to their respective Moslem neighbors.

The emergence of the three women premiers was the start of an accelerating trend (a trend that appears to have been firmly associated with the phenomena of peace and democracy). In the thirty years following Bandaranaike's triumph, ten women

¹⁴Sri Lanka, as Ceylon has since been called, in 1994 became also the first nation to produce a *second* female premier: Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.

¹⁵For a stereotypical critique of Asian women, see Katherine Mayo, *Mother India* (New York, 1927).

in all led their countries as prime ministers or presidents. Between 1990 and 1994, no fewer than twelve further were thus chosen.¹⁶ Many women in foreign countries have also reached other senior positions where they have been able to influence foreign policy. Yet in the United States only Geraldine Ferraro has bid for high office, and that was only for the Vice-Presidency, and she was defeated. Considered in this way, American women appear to have been well and truly eclipsed.

American women who consider themselves to be in the vanguard of international feminism must clearly rethink their position. On the other hand, the notion of a Missing Sister should not be confused with that of the Irredeemably Lost Sister. Modern American women are as capable of expressing themselves differently as the women of New Jersey in the 1790s. There has been evidence of a "gender gap" on foreign policy ever since polling on the issue began (in secret) in World War II.¹⁷ American women have shown a consistently distinctive collective tendency to oppose "hot" wars involving conventional ground fighting.

The Vietnam War is a major case in point. The tendency of women to oppose it became increasingly evident as the fighting dragged on. The participation of female "stars" in the protest movement helped to highlight the tendency: the

¹⁶See the table, "Women Prime Ministers and Presidents, 1960-1994" in Jeffreys-Jones, *Changing Differences*, 156.

¹⁷Office of War Information, Bureau of Intelligence, Report no. 31, "Women and the War," Record Group 44, Entry 164, Box 1798, National Archives, Washington, D.C. The report was declassified on August 31, 1945. For some extrapolations from this report, see D'Ann Campbell, *Women at War with America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 7.

pro-war lobby could not match names like Joan Baez, Eartha Kitt, Donna Reed, Jane Fonda and Shirley MacLaine — or literary luminaries of the caliber of Marguerite Higgins, Joan Didion, Mary McCarthy and Frances Fitzgerald. In other words, women could claim to be as strong in the realm of *public opinion* bearing on foreign policy as when Boeckel invented her categories in 1929. In fact, their protest against the war had wide repercussions, not least the political awakening of a future female prime minister of Pakistan — Benazir Bhutto protested the war when a student at Harvard.¹⁸

In America itself, the war, while possibly an initial setback for women, proved to be a galvanizing force. Congresswomen Ella Grasso, Shirley Chisholm, Patsy Mink and Bella Abzug came out against the war and helped to legitimize opposition to it; Abzug, in particular, proved to be an inspirational icon for future exploiters of the gender gap in relation to foreign policy.¹⁹ The number of women in Congress began to increase. By 1993, there were 55 women members of Congress (ten percent of the total membership), including seven female senators.²⁰ Overall, seven women had by 1990 served on the House Armed Services Committee, and thirteen on the House Foreign Affairs Committee — the last only a

¹⁸Nancy Fix Anderson, "Benazir Bhutto and Dynastic Politics: Her Father's Daughter, Her People's Sister," in Michael A. Genovese, ed., *Women as National Leaders* (Newbury Park, Calif., 1993), 46.

¹⁹As the "major gender gap issues," Abzug identified "peace, equal rights, unemployment, the economy, the environment": Bella Abzug, *Gender Gap* (Boston, 1984), x.

²⁰Susan J. Tolchin and Linda Feinstein, "Women in Congress," in Donald C. Bacon, Roger H. Davidson, and Morton Keller, eds., *The Encyclopedia of the United States Congress*, 4 vols. (New York, 1995), IV, 2135.

slight under-representation in proportion to their numbers on Capitol Hill.

Thanks in part to class action suits, women's position in foreign-policy-related bureaucracies has been improving. By 1990, women made up 24.3 percent of the officers in America's foreign service.²¹ Outside politics and the foreign service, it has been held that U.S. women lag behind only those in Sweden and Finland in terms of general progress toward equality.²² Thus, it could be argued that American women are advancing on a broad base, and that when they do break through into policymaking circles, as surely they must in due course, it will be on a solid foundation, and not a flash in the diplomatic pan.

American women have already helped to shape the foreign policy of their country in some significant ways. For example, they effectively lobbied for the Washington naval conference and agreements of 1921-1922, the Nye investigation of the munitions industry in 1934-1935 and associated neutrality legislation, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. All this leads to a final and important issue. To adapt Crèvecoeur's question, what then is the American, this new woman?²³ In what distinctive ways, if any, is the emergent gender influencing U.S. foreign policy?

²¹Nancy E. McGlen and Meredith Reid Sarkees, *Women in Foreign Policy: The Insiders* (New York, 1993), 76.

²²Arvonne, S. Fraser, "Women and International Development: The Road to Nairobi and Back," in Sara E Rix, ed., *The American Woman 1990-91: A Status Report* (New York, 1990), 287.

²³J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur asked his famous question "What then, is the American, this new man?" in 1782: Crèvecoeur, *Letters From an American Farmer* (reprint: New York, 1971), 43.

The examples just given of women's influence on foreign policy suggest that it has been and may still be predominantly in the realm of promoting peace. However, two qualifications must be considered, one based on firm evidence, the other less so. On firm evidence, it may be said that women have never been associated with peace to the exclusion of other foreign-policy issues. In the 1920s and 1930s, women campaigned for free trade; indeed, this is a hidden chapter in the histories of both women and foreign policy. Leading women's organizations such as the National League of Women Voters conducted major educative programs, the thrust of which was that as "housewives" were the nation's main consumers (they spent more than 95 percent of family budgets), they had an interest in low prices, and thus in low tariffs. Hazel Kyrk and a spate of other female economists, forerunners of the Chicago School, gave respectability to the argument.²⁴ In the 1932 presidential campaign, President Herbert Hoover was so worried by the women's arguments that in its last days he made a special appeal to the female voter (this carefully-orchestrated strategy is another under-explored dimension of women's and diplomatic history). He boasted of the Republicans' peacekeeping record — and tried to woo women's support for protectionism. His logic was good but his audience unreceptive — a factor in the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt.²⁵

²⁴See, for example, Hazel Kyrk, *A Theory of Consumption* (Boston, 1923), in which she argued that women, "the heads of modern households" with the task of "making market choices," were "deputed to speak for the whole body of consumers" (p. 20, 292). There is information on the tariff debate in the Records of the National League of Women Voters, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

²⁵There is information on President Hoover's electoral appeals to women in the following collections at the Herbert Hoover library, West Branch, Iowa: Papers of French Strother; Records of the Women's Division, Republican National Committee (in the Presidential Subject File).

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 could be said to owe much to women's support — a welcome boost to the ailing farmer's lobby in an increasingly-urban America. But America was about to undergo another social change. Women became ever more job conscious and thus as much producer-as consumer-oriented. Meanwhile, men were coming into their own as consumers. They had already discovered automobiles, and within a generation were "into" designer clothes and plastic money. Gender difference on the tariff is thus a finite historical phenomenon — though undoubtedly verifiable.

More tenuous is the idea that when women acquire power they become, in political terms, just like men. America's leading women had been pacifists before World War I, but joined the war effort when President Woodrow Wilson promised them the vote. They favored neutrality in the 1930s, then supported the 1941-45 war when further gains were in sight. There is a popular notion that women who break through into the male world of politics are not just tough, but hawkish, and that women as a whole will gain political acceptance only when they accept the male discourse of force and war. This is the second ground upon which it might be argued that women's love of peace is not an irreducible difference between the sexes.

But here, the historian of foreign policy must be on guard against reverse stereotyping and the myth of the Boadicean leader. After all, TASS, the Soviet news agency that conferred the epithet "Iron Lady" on Margaret Thatcher, is unlikely to be remembered by future generations for its objectivity. The truth is that, measured in blood spilt as distinct from rhetoric, the Thatcher premiership was one of the most peaceful in British history. Both Indira and Golda were dubbed "the only man in the cabinet," and the fact that

they fought successful wars still causes shock waves — but were they really more bloodthirsty than their male predecessors? Amongst international stateswomen, the iron *dove* is an identifiable entity. That label would also fit the likes of Bella Abzug: perhaps she is a straw in the wind in American history.

SHAFR COUNCIL MINUTES

June 24, 1995

The meeting opened at 7:35 a.m. with Allan Spetter (Executive Secretary-Treasurer) presiding at the suggestion of Vice-President Mark Gilderhus. Attendance: Lloyd Ambrosius, David Anderson, Bill Brinker, John Gaddis, Mark Gilderhus, Joyce Goldberg, Richard Immerman, Diane Kunz, Mel Leffler, Bill Miscamble, Emily Rosenberg, Bob Schulzinger, Katie Siegel, Allen Spetter, Jonathan Utley, and Bill Walker.

1. Spetter opened the meeting with the announcement that the Kuehl Book Prize had been awarded to Lawrence S. Wittner.
2. Bob Schulzinger reported on the 1995 Annual Meeting. Over three hundred proposals had been submitted — the largest number ever. The total number of sessions was the same as last year but the quality was higher in his judgment. Schulzinger emphasized the importance of good collaboration between the program and the local arrangements chairs. He noted that all matters concerning the program must come under the purview of the program chair.

In response to a question about the number of graduate students on the program, Schulzinger thought it similar to last year's conference. He also noted that graduate students are the key to the profession's future and that he saw no discernible difference in the quality of proposals submitted by graduate students and established faculty.

Mel Leffler suggested that the occasion for the SHAFR presidential address be changed to the Annual Meeting. This will be an agenda item for the January Council meeting.

Richard Immerman asked why there was no graduate student registration fee at the 1995 meeting. After some discussion Jonathan Utley moved with Mel Leffler as second that:

SHAFR Council establish as standard policy that the graduate student registration fee for the Annual Meeting be set at 50 percent of the regular registration fee as established by the chair of the local arrangements committee. The motion passed by a vote of 8 to 0.

3. The 1996 Annual Meeting will be held at the University of Colorado at Boulder, June 21-24 with Diane Kunz as program chair and Bob Schulzinger as local arrangements chair. Schulzinger drew attention to an earlier submission date for paper and panel proposals for this conference — November 15. Kunz noted that her committee preferred proposals for complete panels and also indicated plans to organize certain sessions and workshops devoted to graduate students. She plans a plenary session on the Bosnian Crisis.

4. The 1997 meeting will be hosted by Georgetown University with David Painter serving as local arrangements chair. This meeting is scheduled for June 19-22, 1997.

Council members expressed a preference for a conference which runs from Thursday to Sunday.

Discussion followed regarding sites for future conferences. The possibility of the conference being held at a hotel in the Washington area was raised.

5. Emily Rosenberg asked the Council to reconsider an earlier decision to decline support for the OAH publication *Connections*. She spoke to the value of supporting an international network designed to share information on academic work, educational and exchange possibilities.

Concern was raised that this publication is redundant in light of internet technology. After discussion Lloyd Ambrosius moved with Richard Immerman as second that:

SHAFR make a onetime only donation of \$500 to support the publication of *Connections*. The motion passed 8 to 0.

6. Mel Leffler addressed the issue of the revision for SHAFR's *Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700*. He noted the significance of the undertaking and the need to involve senior figures in the field to carry it through. He suggested that Council take Mary Guinta's report under advisement and consider it carefully at the January meeting. Utley noted that SHAFR has been talking on this matter for some time and it needed to act on it. Leffler suggested that Gilderhus take on responsibility for nominating a strong committee to work on this matter and that it include some persons with database management experience.

7. David Anderson spoke briefly to the written report from Anne Jones, Executive Editor of Blackwell Publishers — publishers of *Diplomatic History*. As of June 5, SHAFR

members totaled 1719 (Life Members 138, Regular Members 914, Retired/Unemployed 172, Students 495). Anderson gave details of the new Research and Membership Guide which he will edit and Blackwell will produce. Members are invited to update their present entries. E-mail addresses will be included in the new guide. Utley requested an estimate of the revenue which SHAFR will receive from Blackwell this year and Spetter said that on March 31st SHAFR received \$11,800 — the first of two payments. Utley also suggested that SHAFR develop a World Wide Web page.

8. Mel Leffler raised the issue of providing some compensation for Associate Editor Mary Ann Heiss in light of the significant time she devotes to her work on *Diplomatic History*. Leffler moved with Immerman as second that:

SHAFR provide \$2,500 to Mary Ann Heiss to compensate her for her service as Associate Editor of *Diplomatic History*. The motion passed 8 to 0.

9. Katherine Siegel reported for the Holt Fellowship Award Committee. The winner is John Dwyer (Illinois) who is working on U.S.-Mexican Relations in the 1930s. Allan Spetter reported that Arnold Taylor had overseen the selection process to provide grants to permit minority students to attend the Annual Meeting.

10. Jonathan Utley reported for the Endowment Committee and provided details of the performance of the Schafer Cullen Capital Management. SHAFR endowments stood at \$178,000 in the General Fund and \$254,000 in the Bernath Fund. Utley noted the importance of determining what cash demands would be made on endowment funds so as to plan the most effective investment strategy.

11. The issue of annual student dues was raised. A number of members noted that the cost of *Diplomatic History* to SHAFR was \$15. The consensus was that student dues should cover this basic cost to the organization. Immerman moved and Leffler seconded that:

the annual graduate student dues be raised to \$15.00.
The motion passed 8 to 0.

12. Bill Walker expressed concern about the lack of involvement of the SHAFR president in the activities of the organization. Sentiment was voiced that the nominating committee should determine prior to the nomination of candidates if they are able and willing to fulfill the obligations of the presidency. Leffler moved with Utley as second that:

the Executive Secretary-Treasurer be instructed to write to the current president to express disappointment at his failure to attend the annual meeting. After some discussion this motion was defeated — (3 in favor and 5 against.)

13. The Council considered a motion to:

thank Robert Love, Robert Schulzinger and others for the local arrangements and the program for the 1995 SHAFR Conference. The motion passed unanimously.

The meeting ended at 9:00.

Submitted by Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C.

Extracts from a letter — Anne Jones, Executive Editor,
Blackwell Publishers to SHAFR

On June 21, Ms. Jones wrote to SHAFR regarding SHAFR membership, the membership roster, finances, and *Diplomatic History*. Below are some items that may be of interest to the membership — Editor

— As of June 5, SHAFR members totaled 1719, a 1.05% increase over 1994's total of 1638.

— The breakdown of 1995 members includes:

| | |
|--------------------|------------|
| Life Members | 138 |
| Regular Members | 914 |
| Retired/Unemployed | 172 |
| Students | <u>495</u> |
| totals | 1719 |

— As of June 5, the worldwide total of institutional subscribers for 1995 was 775, an increase of 50 over 1994's total of 725.

— the geographical breakdown of institutional subscribers includes:

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| US | 546 |
| Canada | 33 |
| UK | 46 |
| Europe | 77 |
| Japan | 39 |
| Rest of world | 34 |

— We are delighted with the interest the special issue on *Hiroshima in History and Memory* has attracted. We've received phone calls from ABC network and *The New York Review of Books* (which will be reviewing the issue) among many others.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR Call for Papers

SHAFR's 22nd Annual Conference will meet at the University of Colorado, Boulder, June 21-24, 1996. Preference will be given to proposals for complete panels and roundtables but all submissions will be considered. Submit a one-page abstract and a current one-page c.v. to: Diane Kunz, Chair, SHAFR Program Committee, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Box 208206, New Haven, CT 06520. FAX (203) 432-5963. E-mail: dkunz@minerva.cis.yale.edu. The Deadline for proposals is November 15, 1995.

SHA Call for Papers

The Southern Historical Association will hold its 62nd Annual Meeting at Little Rock, Arkansas, October 30 - November 2, 1996. The Program Committee asks that Twentieth Century proposals be sent to Nan Woodruff and all others to Julie Saville. Nan Woodruff, History, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802. Julie Saville, History, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637. The deadline for proposals is October 1, 1995.

SMH Call for Papers

The Central Intelligence Agency will host the Society for Military History's 63rd Annual Meeting, April 18-21, 1996, at the Key Bridge Marriot, Rosslyn, VA. The theme will be "Intelligence and National Security in Peace, Crisis, and War." Papers or complete sessions submitted should include: a one-page abstract for each paper; a one-page statement of session purpose for a panel; and a brief vita for each presenter. These should be sent to: Kevin Ruffner, SMH 1996 Program Coordinator, History Staff, Central

Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Tel: (703) 351-2621. FAX: (703) 522-9280. The deadline for proposals is November 1, 1995.

Call for Session Participants Seminar on Sino-Israeli Relations

The International Studies Association and the Japan Association for International Relations will be meeting jointly in Makuhari, Chiba, Japan (near Tokyo). Anyone interested in presenting a paper at a sub-session on "Fresh Perspectives on Sino-Israeli Relations, 1948-1996," should contact Jonathan Goldstein, History, West Georgia College, Carrollton, GA 30118.

1995 Chinard Prize

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Society for French Historical Studies and the Institut Français de Washington for distinguished scholarly books on the history of themes shared by France and North, Central, and South America published by Canadian or American authors. The Prize of \$1000 is awarded annually for a book, or manuscript in page-proof. The deadline for nominations is December 14, 1995. Three copies of each entry should be sent to: Richard Kuisel, Dept. of History, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 22794-4348. TEL (516) 632-7500. FAX (516) 632-7367.

John Carter Brown Fellowships

The John Carter Brown Library will award approximately fifteen short- and long-term Research Fellowships for the year June 1, 1996-May 31, 1997. Short-term fellowships are available for periods of two to four months and carry a stipend of \$1000 per month. These scholarships are open to scholars engaged in pre- and

post-doctoral, or independent, research. Long-term fellowships funded by the NEH, are for six months and carry a stipend of approximately \$2600 per month. In addition the Library offers a single ten-month fellowship each year to a senior scholar from Argentina, Brazil, or Chile, funded by the Lampadia Foundation. For scholars wishing to work at the Library for a period of two to seven weeks, the Library offers a limited number of travel reimbursement grants of up to \$600. The application deadline for fellowships during the 1996-97 year is January 15, 1996. Travel grants may be applied for year round, allowing four months lead time. For applications and information: Director, John Carter Brown Library, Box 1894, Providence, RI 02912. TEL (401) 863-2725. FAX: (401) 863-3477. E-mail: Karen_Demaria@brown.edu.

Indexing Service

Paul Zohav, Foxfire Indexing Services, Rt. 2, Box 343, Afton, VA 22920, TEL: 1-800 671-4357, offers SHAFR members his services as an indexer. He has worked for the Office of the Historian at the Dept. of State. Indexes are submitted in your word processing, ASCII computer format, or with typesetting codes.

NEH \$ deadline

Applications for summer stipends for research in the humanities are due October 1. Contact: Tom O'Brien, Division of Research Programs, NEH, 1100 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Room 318, Washington 20506. TEL: (202) 606-8551. E-mail: tobrien@neh.fed.us.

Internet News

Reinhold Wagnleitner (University of Salzburg) provides members with information about a new "Liberation Force/Occupation Power" project on the internet. It seeks to document the "Encounter of the People of Austria with U.S. Soldiers after World War II." Visit the home page at <http://www.image.co.at/image/salzburg>.

Oral History Awards

The Oral History association invites applications for three awards to be presented in 1996 that will recognize outstanding work in the field. Awards will be given for a *published article or essay* that uses oral history to advance an important historical interpretation or addresses significant theoretical or methodological issues; for a *completed oral history project* that addresses a significant historical subject or theme and exemplifies excellence in oral history methodology; and to a *postsecondary educator* involved in undergraduate, graduate, continuing, or professional education who has made outstanding use of oral history in the classroom. In all cases, awards will be given for work published or completed between January 1, 1995 and March 30, 1996.

For information contact: Rebecca Sharpless, Executive Secretary, Oral History association, Baylor University, PO Box 97234, Waco, TX 76798-7234; E-mail: OHA_Support@Baylor.edu. Deadline for all nominations materials is April 1, 1996.

AICGS/GHI Fellowships in Post-War German History

With a grant from the *Volkswagen-Stiftung*, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies of The Johns Hopkins University in Washington/Baltimore and the German Institute in Washington offer three one-year resident research fellowships for the 1996-97

academic year at the junior level (ca \$25,000) and the advanced level (ca \$30,000). Historians and political scientists specializing in post-World War II German history and German-American relations, particularly the period 1945-1955, are eligible. Ph.D. required. The Program welcomes applicants from Eastern Germany and applications dealing with GDR history. Residency should begin no later than October 1, 1996.

Applications, which must be written in English, should contain the following:

- (1) a *curriculum vitae*, including a list of publications;
- (2) a project proposal of no more than 10 pages, including statement of purpose, hypotheses, methodology, resources to be used in Washington, and relationship to prior research;
- (3) three letters of recommendation, in sealed envelopes accompanying the application;
- (4) information concerning annual salary, sabbatical leave, or other research support.

Applications should be received no later than January 1, 1996 by VW-Fellowship Committee, AICGS, Suite 420, 1400 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-2217, USA. Fellowships will be awarded about March 15, 1996.

LETTERS

To the Editor [from Jonathan Utley]:

SHAFR needs its own home page on the World Wide Web. At least that is what we concluded at our table during the SHAFR banquet on Friday evening, June 23. The possibilities seemed endless to us at that evening so I share them here with the members who were not at the annual meeting or were at a table with fewer creative thinkers.

A SHAFR home page could give every member access to a constantly updated membership list and research roster, including e-mail addresses. David Anderson is again undertaking the task of producing a research roster this winter and it will be the last one in a printed format. That roster, constantly updated, could provide the backbone of the SHAFR home page.

And Bill Brinker could publish this newsletter there as well. That would save quite a bit on postage and printing. Members who really wanted their printed copy would pay a surcharge and receive it.

The real excitement at dinner came when we contemplated publishing the SHAFR program on the World Wide Web. H:DIPLO did a great service by making it available this last time but as we thought of having it on our own home page the discussion became particularly interesting.

We had all spent two days suffering through sessions where participants had not shown up or papers had been presented to commentators hours before the panel met. We estimated that 20-25% of the papers at the conference were never presented, were presented by someone other than the author, or were given to the commentator too late to allow for any meaningful commentary. (I enjoyed a lively session in which the chair/commentator was absent and sent no comments, one paper was never delivered, and a second paper was delivered by a friend of the author!)

The idea we developed was to poll chairs of the sessions 21 days before the conference was to start and if the author had not submitted the paper, the author's name and paper would begin blinking on computer monitors around the world. If the author had not supplied the paper 14 days before the start of the conference, he or she would be deleted from the program and would not be allowed to present the paper at the conference.

The more militant among us suggested that if the errant colleague failed to provide a good excuse, his or her name should be lined out but not erased; the author would be left twisting slowly in the virtual wind of cyberspace and held up to the ridicule of the profession.

For a few moments, some of us may have thought this was a bit extreme. Then we listened to General Vernon Walters give his banquet address and concluded that this was really a very modest proposal.

PUBLICATIONS

H. W. Brands (Texas A&M), *Since Vietnam: The U.S. in World Affairs, 1973-1995*. McGraw-Hill, 1995. ISBN 0-07-007196-9 \$13.95

Günter Bischof (New Orleans-Lakefront) and Stephen E. Ambrose (Louisiana State University) eds., *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*. ISBN 08071-19432, \$30.00.

Gordon Craig and Alexander L. George (Stanford), *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. Third edition. Oxford, 1995. Cloth ISBN 509243-0, \$39.95; Paper ISBN 509244-9, \$16.95.

Richard W. Fanning (Mississippi State), *Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922-1933*. Kentucky, 1995. ISBN 0-8131-1878-6, \$35.00.

David Fogelson (Rutgers), *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920*. ISBN 0-8078-2228-0, \$45.00.

Rosemary Foot (St. Antony's, Oxford), *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949*. Oxford (Clarendon), 1995. ISBN 0-19-827878-0, \$30.00.

David Fromkin (Syracuse, NY), *In the Time of the Americans: FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur — The Generation That Changed America's Role in the World*. Knopf, 1995. ISBN 0-0394-58901-7, \$30.00.

Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers), *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam*. Ivan Dee, 1995. ISBN 1-56663-087-9, \$35.00.

Detlef Junker (Heidelberg), *The Manichaeian Trap: American Perceptions of the German Empire, 1871-1945*. [With a comment by Paul W. Schroeder (Illinois)]. Occasional Paper no. 12. German Historical Institute, Washington, 1995.

Robert E. May, ed., *The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim*. Purdue 1995. [Contains essays by SHAFR members Thomas Schoonover and Howard Jones]. ISBN 1-55753-060-2, \$24.95; paper ISBN 1-55753-061-0, \$12.95.

Morris H. Morley (MacQuarie, Australia), *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua, 1969-1981*. Cambridge, 1994. ISBN 0-521-45081, \$69.95.

Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut), *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*. Oxford, 1995. Paper ISBN 0-19-510120-0, \$14.95.

John Prados (Washington, DC), *Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II*. Kramer, 1995. ISBN 0-67-94301-0, \$37.50.

David Reynolds (Cambridge), *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945*. Random House, New York, 1995. ISBN 0-679-42161-0, \$30.00. HarperCollins, London, ISBN 0-00-255127-6, £25.00.

Michael Sherman, *The Political Legacy of George D. Aiken: Wise Old Owl of the U.S. Senate*. Countryman Press, Woodstock, VT, 1995. ISBN 0-88150-352-5. [Contains chapters by SHAFR members Donald A. Ritchie, Anna Kasten Nelson, Thomas G. Paterson, and Mark A. Stoler.]

William Stueck (Georgia), *The Necessary War: An International History of the Korean War*. Princeton, 1995. ISBN 0-691-03767-1, \$34.95.

Brian Vandemark (Cincinnati), *Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*. Oxford, 1995. New in paper, ISBN 509650-9, \$13.95.

PERSONALS

Jeff Broadwater has joined the Department of History and Government at Texas Woman's University in Denton.

Joseph (Andy) Fry (UNLV) has received the William Morris Award for Excellence in Teaching. Andy has also begun serving as executive assistant to the president!

John Gaddis (Ohio) is spending a month at the Nobel Institute in Oslo and then returning to wear his hat as a Wilson Fellow.

Tom Paterson (Connecticut) presented a paper titled "The Limits of Hegemony: The United States and the Cuban Revolution" at the II Seminario Internacional de Estudios del Caribe, held at the Universidad de Cartagena, Cartagena, Colombia, July 31-August 4, 1995.

Renate Strelau (Arlington, VA) exhibited thirty-two drawings and paintings at the Riggs Bank of Virginia, Rosslyn branch, February - June, 1995.

Bill Stueck (Georgia) is now Coordinator of Instruction (both graduate and undergraduate) in the History Department. He is spending the fall semester at Hanguk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, Korea as a Fulbright Scholar.

Ted Wilson (Kansas) is the Mary Ball Washington Professor at Dublin, Ireland for the 1995-96 year.

CALENDAR

- 1995
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- November 15 Deadline for M. Bernath Research Fellowship
- 1996
- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02142.
- January 4-7 The 110th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Atlanta. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- March 28-31 The 89th meeting of the OAH will take place in Chicago with headquarters at the Palmer House Hilton.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 21-24 SHAFR's 21th annual conference will meet at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Diane Kunz is program chair, Bob Schulzinger is local arrangements chair. Deadline for proposals is November 15. Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

August 1

The OAH will meet at the Hilton in San Francisco, April 17-20, 1997. Program co-chairs are Ramón Gutiérrez (UC-San Diego) and Mary Ryan (UC-Berkeley). Send proposals to: 1997 Program Committee, OAH, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47408-4199. Deadline for proposals is January 12, 1996.

Future meetings will be held in Indianapolis (Westin Hotel and Indiana Convention Center), April 2-5, 1998; and in Toronto (Sheraton Centre) in 1999.

The AHA will meet in New York City in 1997. The program co-chairs are Margaret Strobel, University of Illinois at Chicago and Michael J. Galgano, James Madison University. The first deadline for proposals is October 27, 1995.

SHAFR will meet at Georgetown University, June 19-22, 1997. David Painter will serve as local arrangements chair.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

Complete details regarding SHAFR awards, prizes, and funds are found in the June and December issues of the *Newsletter*, abbreviated information in the March and September issues.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Richard Immerman, Department of History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. Books may be sent at any time during 1995, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1996.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners deliver a lecture, comparable in style and scope to the SHAFR presidential address, at the SHAFR meeting during the annual OAH conference. Nomination is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Send nominating letter and *curriculum vita* no later than 15 February 1996 to: Charles F. Brower, Department of History, U.S.M.A., West Point, NY 10996.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. Chairperson of the committee: Mary Ann Heiss, Kent State University, Kent OH 44242

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Applications should be sent to Thomas W. Zeiler, Department of History, University of Colorado, Boulder CO 80309-0234. The deadline for application is November 1, 1995.

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Contact: Anders Stephanson, Department of History, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Submission deadline is November 15, 1995.

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships

The society announces two Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships, \$2,500 each, to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Anders Stephanson, Department of History, Columbia University, New York NY 10027. Deadline for applications is 15 November 1995.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Contact: Katherine Siegel, Department of History, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA 19131.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history. Contact: James Matray, History Department, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM 88003. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 1996.99

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture." Contact: Thomas Knock, Department of History, Southern Methodist, Dallas, TX 77275 (Southern Methodist).

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Contact: Mary A. Giunta, National Archives, Washington, DC 20408.

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact Allan Spetter, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1995, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. Contact: Ted Wilson, Department of History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045.