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PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, Robert Ferrell, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

CIVIL IS A DUMB NAME FOR WAR

by

James I. Matray

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(First presented as a paper, "The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record" at a conference sponsored by the Korea Society)

It became fashionable more than a decade ago for historians to characterize the Korean War as a civil conflict. Scholars increasingly accepted as valid an interpretation that emphasized the domestic origins of the Korean War to the almost complete exclusion of international factors.¹ But the recent release of previously classified Soviet and Chinese documents has brought an abrupt end to the emergence of this consensus. Not surprisingly, the work of Kathryn Weathersby and others now has made possible a revival of orthodox explanations for the outbreak of the Korean War. In December 1993, Adam B. Ulam, reacting to Weathersby's early findings, signaled that this analytical shift was underway. "The notion that in 1950...the North Koreans could have invaded without Soviet permission/command," he wrote, "cannot be seriously entertained." "In an athletic event," Ulam concluded, "a race is not initiated by the runners crouching down" but "by the starter shouting 'go.' That is what Stalin did."²

¹For example, see Callum MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam*, (New York, 1986); Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (Philadelphia, 1986); Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War* (London, 1986); John Merrill, *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War* (Newark, Del., 1989).

²Adam B. Ulam, "To the Editor," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin [CWIHPB]*, 4 (Fall 1994), 21.

Korean War revisionists undoubtedly would consider Ulam's comments anathema. But the trickle of archival materials coming out of China and Russia has combined with the mounting evidence from memoirs and interviews to undermine the validity of those interpretations that portray the Korean War as a classic civil conflict. Bruce Cumings has been the *suryong* (maximum leader) of this analytical school since publication of the first volume of his *The Origins of the Korean War* in 1981. In *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes*, he contends that the origins of the Korean War "must be sought primarily in the events of the period 1945 to 1950 and secondarily in forces descending upon Korea in the period of colonial rule that left their peculiar stamp on the interwar years." As in other areas of East Asia, revolutionary nationalism was the primary political force on the Korean peninsula even before World War II ended. Cumings argues that had the United States not intervened in Korea's civil war, the popular demand for radical change would have resulted in the creation of a Communist government ruling a united Korea.³

Specialists eagerly awaited publication of Cumings' second volume, anticipating a definitive explanation for the outbreak of the Korean War. In 1990, *The Roaring of the Cataract* finally appeared, having as its stated purpose to show that Korea was "a civil and revolutionary war, to unify and transform the country." Who started the Korean War, Cumings advises in his sequel, is a question that "should not be asked" because in doing so, "we abandon history for politics." Nevertheless, he presents three "mosaics" or possible explanations for how the conflict may have begun. Predictably, he questions the accuracy of the orthodox mosaic that North Korea "suddenly opened a general invasion all along the parallel against a sleepy, unprepared South." Cumings quickly discards his third mosaic as "barely worth talking about: there is no evidence of a general southern invasion all along the parallel." In

³Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. I: *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton, N.J., 1981), xx, xxiv-xxv, 130-31.

his mosaic of choice, the author speculates that young and headstrong South Korean generals attacked first to goad the North Koreans into launching an invasion: “remote Ongjin was a perfect place to make the cut. The army can pull back quickly, suck the North deep into the South, and get the [U.S.] commitment that... [Syngman] Rhee knew was [his] only saving hope.”⁴

While blaming South Korea for provoking the attack, Cumings ultimately attributes the war to a conspiracy among policy-makers in the United States, advancing a highly imaginative metaphorical explanation that a sports enthusiast can understand. Portraying Dean Acheson as the Dick Butkus or Ray Nitschke of diplomacy, he claims that the secretary of state acted like a linebacker in football who “proffers a menu of choices to the communists, and encourages a choice...preferable from the [U.S.] standpoint.” A war might have started in the summer of 1949, but although “the South wanted the war then, the North did not, and neither did the United States.” A year later, Acheson “thought an attack...would be in the American interest.” War in Korea would persuade “Congress and the American people to support,...a permanent global role, a national security state, and the enormous increases in spending for both envisioned in NSC 68.” Acheson, in his Press Club Speech, used “studied ambiguity” in order “to make (or let) the other guy jump first.” By June 1950, South Korean generals prepared for a putsch to oust Rhee, while Dean Rusk was planning a coup against Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. “The Korean War,” Cumings writes, “was, in fact, ‘the fluke that saved Formosa’; perhaps it was no fluke.”⁵

Many readers surely concurred with the negative appraisal that Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis advanced in his review of *The Roaring of the Cataract*. “Unfortunately,” Gaddis writes, “after

⁴Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. II: *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, N.J., 1990), 667, 621, 584, 588, 599.

⁵Ibid., 432, 44, 410, 434, 430, 545, and 600.

920 pages of text and notes the origins of the Korean War remain as obscure as ever.” According to Gaddis, Cumings fails “to apply consistent and equally rigorous standards of judgment *on all sides* in explaining...the origins of the Korean War.” This was even more true in the first volume, which devoted only one chapter to events in North Korea. “Part of the difficulty,” Gaddis concedes, “resides in the limited availability of North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet sources.”⁶ Thanks to the efforts of Weathersby in particular, lack of Communist documents no longer can excuse every interpretational mistake.⁷ For example, Cumings erroneously argues that because there were few Soviet advisors in North Korea and not a single trusted Soviet Korean leader, Moscow “did *not* have advance knowledge of the attack.”⁸ But in the rush to discredit revisionism, Korean War scholars risk resurrecting traditional interpretations that distorted perceptions of the conflict for nearly three decades.

There is evidence that a “right revisionism” resembling the existing pattern in writing about the Vietnam War is emerging in the literature on the Korean War.⁹ The late John Wilz’s article titled “Encountering Korea: American Perceptions and Policies to 25

⁶John Lewis Gaddis, Review of *The Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. II: *The Roaring of the Cataract*, by Bruce Cumings, *Pacific Historical Review*, LX, 4 (November 1991), 574-76.

⁷Kathryn Weathersby directly refutes the Cumings’ provocation theory, stating that it “is simply false.” Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 2, 4 (Winter 1993), 428.

⁸Cumings, *The Roaring of the Cataract*, 637.

⁹For example, see Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York, 1982); Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, Ky., 1984); Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam* (New York, 1982); Timothy J. Lomperis, *The War Everyone Lost — and Won: America’s Intervention in Vietnam’s Twin Struggles* (Baton Rouge, La., 1984).

June 1950” and published in 1993 provides a prime example of this analytical shift to the right. There, Wilz presents a thoroughly orthodox interpretation of the origins of the Korean War. After summarizing the history of U.S. penetration of Korea in the 19th Century, he condemns President Theodore Roosevelt for endorsing Japan’s annexation of Korea, thereby encouraging “the rape of a victim” and betraying American obligations under the Korean-American Treaty of 1882. More important, Wilz restates the orthodox argument that after World War II, the United States was guilty of betraying South Korea and setting the stage for the Korean War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff successfully argued that because Korea had no strategic value, there was no reason for the United States to prevent Soviet conquest of the entire peninsula. The Truman administration removed the last U.S. forces from this “primitive backwater” in June 1949 because it viewed South Korea as an expendable “pawn on the chessboard of global politics.”¹⁰

President Harry Truman thus abandoned a U.S. commitment to defend a South Korean government that the United States had been responsible for creating. If the United States had not withdrawn its troops, Wilz passionately contends, it “could have headed off a horrendous tragedy.” But instead, Congress refused to promptly authorize economic assistance early in 1950 and Acheson excluded South Korea from the U.S. “defensive perimeter.” Joseph Stalin, having concluded that South Korea was “ripe for the plucking,” ordered the attack. Without Moscow’s knowledge and approval, any North Korean invasion plan “would have died aborning.” Branding the Cumings interpretation as “leftist,” Wilz insists that “the case in support...is entirely circumstantial.” “Not a shred of ...documentary evidence has appeared,” he concludes, “to sustain the foregoing speculation.” Wilz’s explanation of the origins of the Korean War closely resembles Senator Robert Taft’s assessment

¹⁰John E. Wilz, “Encountering Korea: American Perceptions and Policies to 25 June 1950,” in *Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*, edited by William J. Williams (Chicago, 1993), 13-55, 60. John Wilz first presented this essay as a conference paper at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1992.

during June 1950. Truman's softness on communism and Acheson's incompetence combined to produce "a mistake, of genuine historic proportions." The United States was responsible for the Korean War because it gave Stalin a "green light" to conquer the rest of the "small, poor, and backward country" of Korea.¹¹

Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai were among the first scholars to make use of Chinese archival materials released during the late 1980s. In an essay titled "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," they report that Kim Il Sung "discussed with Stalin his idea of military reunification of Korea in 1949; and when Mao visited Moscow at the end of 1949, Stalin brought up the issue with Mao [Zedong] and discussed Kim's military plans in general terms." The authors mention Kim's visit to Beijing in May 1950, but argue that China was unprepared for the Korean War because Mao was unaware of the details or the exact date of the planned invasion. "Only Stalin was informed," they conclude, "since, in Kim's mind, the Soviet Union was the only patron capable of helping him to carry out his reunification plan."¹² Endorsing Allen Whiting's thirty-five year old interpretation, Hao and Zhai point to security concerns as the primary motivation for Chinese military intervention.¹³ But more significant, they explain that Beijing used "well-disguised...force deployment" and disengagement in early November to "conceal [its] strength, deceive the enemy and prepare

¹¹Ibid., 56-60.

¹²Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," in *Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament*, edited by Kim Chull Baum and James I. Matray (Claremont, Ca., 1993), 147-48. This article appeared first in the March 1990 issue of *China Quarterly* and was presented later that year as a conference paper in Seoul, Korea.

¹³Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, Ca., 1960).

for harder blows.”¹⁴ Apparently, the U.N. offensive to the Yalu was, as General Douglas MacArthur insisted at the time, a necessary “reconnaissance in force.”

Chen Jian provides further evidence to support this “right revisionist” interpretation of the origins of the Korean War in his book titled *China’s Road to the Korean War*. Making extensive use of newly available Chinese government documents and personal interviews with participants, Chen concludes that Mao’s decision to intervene militarily in the Korean War dated from the outbreak of hostilities. Chinese leaders not only were aware of Kim Il Sung’s invasion plans, but enthusiastically endorsed an attack. Military intervention in the Korean War in October 1950 reflected China’s consistently aggressive postwar foreign policy. Chinese “troops had laid their trap” in North Korea and sought to drive MacArthur’s forces off the peninsula. Mao expected “to win a glorious victory” that would restore China’s world status as the “Central Kingdom.” Because the triumph of Mao’s revolutionary nationalist program was vital to “the new China’s...domestic and international interests,” Chen concludes, “there was little possibility that China’s entrance into the Korean War could have been averted.” This study supports MacArthur’s contention that his offensive to the Yalu in fact thwarted a diabolical plot to bring all Asia under Chinese ideological domination.¹⁵

Chen resurrects orthodox opinion on another important issue, arguing that previous writers have exaggerated the chances for a Sino-American reconciliation after 1949. There was, he insists, “little space” for accommodation because of Mao’s ideological inflexibility and the Truman administration’s refusal to treat China as an equal. The United States could never drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing because Chinese leaders considered the Soviets

¹⁴Hao and Zhai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,” 164-65.

¹⁵Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, 1994), 212, 2, 22, and 5.

to be "true friends."¹⁶ Chen's assessment has received support from Michael Sheng in an article appearing in 1994, where he describes a relationship between Stalin and Mao that was very close, personal, and based on mutual trust. Soviet philanthropic aid to the Communists during the Chinese Civil War, he contends, was the key to victory because it was timely and sufficient.¹⁷ Both Chen and Sheng reject the "myth" that China wanted friendly relations with the United States. Beijing's fear and hatred for the United States was profound and grew during the Korean War. J. Chester Cheng discerns hidden benefit in this Sino-American estrangement, claiming in a recent article that "the heavy price paid by China [in the Korean War]...exerted a salutary effect on dissuading the Chinese from entering the Vietnam War."¹⁸

In *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai counter "right revisionist" arguments regarding the Sino-Soviet alliance. Using not only available Chinese and Korean sources, but newly released Soviet documents as well, they show that suspicion and acrimony marked the relationship between Stalin and Mao. The authors in fact claim that Stalin's fears of a Sino-American reconciliation dominated negotiations for a Sino-Soviet alliance early in 1950. During the spring of 1949, signals "carefully orchestrated by Mao"

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 44, 62, 121, 70, and 68. Chen Jian's findings confirm what Warren I. Cohen reported in 1987. His discussions with Chinese leaders revealed that while Dean Acheson may have sought reconciliation with Beijing in 1949, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai "were not contemplating any overtures to the United States." Warren I. Cohen, "Conversations with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai's Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s and the Korean War," *Diplomatic History*, 11, 3 (Summer 1987), 283-89.

¹⁷Michael Sheng, "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union," *Pacific Historical Review*, 63, 4 (November 1994), 521-36.

¹⁸J. Chester Cheng, "The Korean War Through Chinese Eyes: China Crosses the Rubicon," *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 31, 1 (1993), 23.

suggested a possibility of trade relations with the United States and American mediation in China's Civil War. The Truman administration either "misperceived or bungled" these overtures and "roundly rebuffed" the Chinese. Only then did Mao announce that China would "lean to one side" to "allay Stalin's suspicions." But Stalin's fears of a Sino-American rapprochement persisted, allowing Mao to play "the American card" and secure concessions in the final draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. The authors conclude that the United States was "the invisible partner in the Mao-Stalin dialogue" as "both leaders made repeated estimates of how Washington might respond to their actions and statements."¹⁹

Uncertain Partners thus demonstrates that the Sino-Soviet alliance was "conditional and temporary." But on balance, this study revives and sustains orthodox interpretations regarding the origins of the Korean War. For example, Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue accept the judgment that North Korea was "wholly dependent" on the Soviet Union and was "justly called a Soviet satellite." Invading South Korea was Kim Il Sung's idea, but Stalin delayed approval only because he thought that the Soviet Union was not ready for war with the United States. Endorsing the traditional interpretation, the authors claim that Stalin "*consented*" because U.S. demobilization and the Truman administration's words had indicated the United States would not intervene. If Kim reunited Korea, Moscow would gain a security buffer and political leverage against Japan, while testing Washington's resolve and diverting its attention away from Europe. Soviet absence from the Security Council was calculated to discredit the United Nations or avert a possible U.S. declaration of war if China intervened. It was Kim who set the date of the

¹⁹Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, Ca., 1993), 54-55, 104, 206, 217. This study confirms the earlier arguments that Gordon H. Chang advanced regarding Chinese reactions to U.S. overtures for a rapprochement and the underlying tensions in the Sino-Soviet partnership. Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union 1948-1972* (Stanford, Ca., 1990), 5-41.

attack, but the invasion was “preplanned, blessed, and directly assisted by Stalin and his generals, and reluctantly backed by Mao at Stalin’s insistence.”²⁰

Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue have not written the last word on the origins of the Korean War and, of course, this was not their intent. Russian President Boris Yeltsin added to the historical record in June 1994 when he presented President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea with over two hundred previously classified high level Soviet documents related to the Korean War. In the most recent issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Weathersby provides translations of seven documents on “the question of when, how, and by whom the decision was made to launch a military assault on South Korea.”²¹ Kim began to press Stalin for approval of an invasion at least as early as his visit to Moscow in May 1949. According to Kim, Stalin replied that a North Korean offensive was “not necessary” because South Korea would strike first, allowing Pyongyang to portray its invasion as a counterattack.²² During September 1949, Kim again asked for Stalin’s approval for an invasion, claiming that South Korea was preparing a series of attacks northward on the Ongjin peninsula. The Soviet embassy reported, however, that there had been “no serious incidents” along the border since August 15.²³

Moscow’s response to Kim’s September request indicated that Stalin was now ready to receive details about North Korea’s plans for an invasion. Stalin wanted to know “how real and advisable is the proposal of our friends,” requesting specific information about the

²⁰Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, 151, 161, 204, 131, and 213.

²¹Kathryn Weathersby, “Korea, 1949-50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” *CWIHPB*, 5 (Spring 1995), 1-9.

²²Terenty F. Shtykov to Andrei Vyshinsky, January 19, 1950, *ibid.*, 8.

²³Grigorii Tunkin to Vyshinsky, September 3, 1949, *ibid.*, 6.

strength of the partisan movement in South Korea. When Soviet officials met with Kim, North Korea's leader admitted that he "could not count on substantial help from the partisans." Kim sounded desperate, confessing that the invasion's success would depend on a demoralized South Korean army refusing to fight. At first, he said South Koreans would react with anger to an attack, but later predicted they would welcome the invasion. The Soviet embassy informed Stalin that Kim's army was not strong enough to win a quick victory. An attack at that time was "not advisable" because it would lead to a prolonged "civil war" and likely U.S. military intervention.²⁴ Stalin thus rejected Kim's request, explaining that "only in conditions of a peoples' uprising...which is undermining the foundations of the reactionary regime, could a military attack...play a decisive role in the...unification of all Korea into a single democratic state."²⁵

These new documents clearly reveal that Stalin hesitated to approve an invasion because North Korea had not demonstrated its military superiority north of the 38th parallel nor political strength south of that line. He even was concerned about North Korea's survival, regularly requesting estimates of the military balance on the peninsula.²⁶ Stalin feared that Kim might provoke a war, explaining his sharp reprimand of the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang for not reporting border clashes that the North Koreans instigated in October 1949.²⁷ But Kim increased the pressure on Stalin in January 1950, complaining to the Soviet ambassador that South Korea had not provided the pretext necessary to justify a counterattack. The Communist victory in China meant Korea "was

²⁴Tunkin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, September 14, 1949, *ibid.*, 6-7.

²⁵Politburo Directive for Shtykov, September 24, 1949, *ibid.*, 7-8.

²⁶Notes on Conversation, May 5, 1949, *ibid.*, 4-6.

²⁷Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," 446-47. John Merrill has documented the seriousness of these border clashes which became increasingly intense after the summer of 1949. Merrill, *Korea*, 130-43.

next in line.” He requested approval to visit Moscow to discuss an invasion. Kim, who was intoxicated, then resorted to blackmail, stating that if Stalin refused to see him, he would visit Beijing and ask China to fulfill its pledge to support an invasion.²⁸

This evidence thus suggests that Acheson’s Press Club Speech did not have the impact on Stalin’s decision to approve the North Korean invasion that Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue claim. Those who live by the archival sword should prepare at least to be wounded by this same weapon. Within weeks of the Acheson’s speech Stalin informed Kim that he was “ready to help.” But the Soviet leader emphasized that the invasion “needs large preparations” and “must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk.” Early in February, the Soviet Union began sending large scale military aid to North Korea.²⁹ Thereafter, Stalin could not have ignored signs that Truman’s policy in Asia was hardening.³⁰ Following Acheson’s speech, the administration expanded its commitment to South Korea, persuading Congress to approve two years of economic aid and authorizing major increases in military assistance. John Foster Dulles’ trip to South Korea on the eve of the North Korean attack must have raised questions in Stalin’s mind about whether Washington would act to save its client if it had the chance.³¹ “After their lack of success in China,”

²⁸Shtykov to Vyshinsky, January 19, 1950. This incident has a parallel in Kim Tong-gil’s fictitious tale in his 1975 book titled *The President’s Laughter* that Stalin consented to Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an invasion of South Korea after an excess of wine and beautiful Pyongyang *kisaeng* had numbed his senses. My thanks to John Merrill for this story.

²⁹Joseph Stalin to Shtykov, January 30, 1950, *CWIHPB*, 5 (Spring 1995), 8; Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War,” 432.

³⁰Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, 215. See also, Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, 63-76.

³¹James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu, 1985), 226-52.

Soviet embassy officials in Pyongyang had warned, "the Americans probably will...apply all their strength to save Syngmann [sic] Rhee."³²

Kim Il Sung was painfully aware that he was running out of time. South Korea was gaining political, economic, and military strength, while the Soviet Union could not offer nearly as much for future development as the United States. "If...unification of the country is drawn out," Kim confessed to the Soviet ambassador in January 1950, "then I can lose the trust of the people."³³ Kim had no choice but to mislead Stalin during his April 1950 visit to Moscow, promising that an invasion "would set off a massive uprising against Rhee among the people of South Korea, that the military campaign would...take only three to four weeks, and that the Americans would thus not have time to intervene."³⁴ Stalin finally gave his approval because he was willing to gamble not that the Americans would not intervene, but that the United States would not have enough time to prevent the North Koreans from conquering South Korea. Thus, as Weathersby explains, "the idea that the war must be won quickly became the basis for planning the eventual attack on June 25."³⁵

William Stueck provided a clue for understanding Stalin's decision when over a decade ago he pointed to credibility as the explanation for U.S. military intervention in the Korean War.³⁶ "Naturally," Nikita Khrushchev recalled later, "Stalin couldn't oppose this idea," since it would undermine his reputation as a staunch defender of

³²Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, September 14, 1949.

³³Shtykov to Vyshinsky, January 19, 1950.

³⁴Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," 435.

³⁵Weathersby, "Korea, 1949-50," 3.

³⁶William Whitney Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981), 173-75.

revolutionary movements.”³⁷ When Mao asked for verification of his decision, Stalin, using his code-name of Filippov, explained that “the changed international situation” justified approving the invasion, but only if Beijing agreed.³⁸ Because of Mao’s triumph in China, Stalin could no longer reject Kim’s pleas to approve an attack without discrediting himself in Asia.³⁹ As Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue report, Acheson’s address “struck a raw nerve” with Stalin because it accurately described his policy toward China as self-serving.⁴⁰ And Mao approved the invasion for similar reasons. How could he oppose the forcible reunification of Korea when Korean Communists had helped defeat the Guomintang without destroying his image as the leader of the revolutionary movement in Asia? Additionally, Beijing could not object to invading “such a small country” without jeopardizing its efforts to obtain Soviet help in seizing Taiwan.⁴¹

Roger Dingman was prescient when he predicted in 1993 that publication of Cumings’ second volume would “mark the apogee

³⁷*Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, 1970), 367-68.

³⁸Vyshinsky to Mao Zedong, May 14, 1950, *CWIHPB*, 4 (Fall 1994), 61. China had requested confirmation after Kim Il Sung, during his visit to Beijing, reported Stalin’s approval for the invasion plan. Roshchin to Filippov, May 13, 1950, *ibid.*, 61.

³⁹Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War,” 440. Later, Kathryn Weathersby adds Dean Acheson’s speech as a possible explanation what Joseph Stalin meant when he referred to “the changed international situation.” Weathersby, “Korea, 1949-50,” 4.

⁴⁰Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, 101.

⁴¹Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War,” 442. “Tacitly,” Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai explain, “a race had begun between Mao and Kim” to see who could launch an invasion to achieve national reunification first. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, p. 149.

and the end of one phase of Korean War studies.”⁴² Scholars now face both an opportunity and a challenge. The time has come to escape the traditional versus revisionist analytical bipolarity that has trapped Korean War studies in an interpretational straightjacket for nearly a generation.⁴³ Stueck moves in a welcome direction with his new study titled *The Necessary War: An International History of the Korean War*. But any satisfactory explanation for the origins of the Korean War must recognize how human frailty and fear causes misconceptions and mistakes. *Uncertain Partners* calls for a reexamination of “high politics,”⁴⁴ but this must not contribute to the restoration of orthodoxy. On the other hand, understanding the Korean War requires acknowledging its domestic origins. As I posited a decade ago, one conclusion seems beyond serious dispute: “If North Korea had not been willing to pursue reunification..., there would have been no invasion.”⁴⁵ Worth pondering as well is Cumings’ reference to “the ultimate irony” of the words “Koreans invade Korea.”⁴⁶ Accepting the validity of the domestic origins of the Korean conflict does not alter the fact that civil still is a pretty dumb name for a war.

⁴²Roger Dingman, “Korea at Forty-plus: The Origins of the Korean War Reconsidered,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 1, 1 (Spring 1992), 143.

⁴³See, for example, Hakjoon Kim, “Trends in Korean War Studies: A Review of the Literature,” in *Korea and the Cold War*, 7-34.

⁴⁴Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, 131.

⁴⁵Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade*, 235.

⁴⁶Cumings, *The Roaring of the Cataract*, 619.

AMBASSADOR GEORGE CREWS MCGHEE
AND THE VIETNAM CRISIS:
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
AND UNITED STATES-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

by
Suzanne Brown-Fleming
MARYLAND

When the Kennedy administration appointed George McGhee ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany in May, 1963, American relations with West Germany “were marked by a substantial measure of agreement.”¹ West Germany enjoyed a reputation for economic muscle and political equanimity, and there existed no particularly divisive issues between the two governments. West Germany stood in stark contrast to another United States ally, troubled South Vietnam, which remained embroiled in a civil war with communist North Vietnam. Kennedy administration policy regarding South Vietnam was one of continually-increased support in the form of finances, material, and personnel.

Against this background, Ambassador McGhee took his post in Bonn. He did not expect America’s involvement in South Vietnam to affect the relationship between the United States and West Germany. Before his arrival in Germany, the war in South Vietnam “seemed quite innocuous” and “had not become a very sensitive problem.”² This did not remain the case. America’s involvement in South Vietnam adversely affected relations between the United States and West Germany on several fronts.

¹Roger Morgan, *The United States and West Germany, 1945-1973: A Study in Alliance Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 125.

²Interview of McGhee (Washington: 3 December 1992) by Suzanne Brown.

Vietnam: The Ambassador's Perspective

Before his appointment to the ambassadorship of the Federal Republic of Germany, George McGhee was well aware of America's increased involvement in South Vietnam. In fact, in a paper dated November 3, 1961, United States Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, suggested that McGhee might possibly replace Frederick Nolting as ambassador to South Vietnam.³ Galbraith believed McGhee capable of "holding his own with both Diem and the United States military," and further credited McGhee as someone who "would insist once and for all on government reform, and who would understand the United States political implications of developments there."⁴ Galbraith did not stand alone in this opinion. On November 15 of 1961, President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, wrote a memo to the President also suggesting McGhee replace Ambassador Nolting. "I would still consider McGhee," wrote Bundy. "For one thing, if he thinks it won't work after a good look, he'll tell you, and he has the authority of the victor of Greece."⁵ Kennedy seemed receptive to these suggestions. He expressed the view that if a general military command should be set up in South Vietnam, he "wanted to make sure that someone like George McGhee headed it; in fact, it might be well to send

³"Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)," 3 November 1961, 474-476. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961, Vol.I: Vietnam* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988). Hereafter, *Foreign Relations* is abbreviated as *FRUS*.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵"Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President (Kennedy)" 15 November 1961, 612-614. *FRUS, 1961, Vol.I: Vietnam*.

McGhee.”⁶ At the least, President Kennedy thought highly enough of McGhee to appoint him under secretary of state for Political Affairs on November 26 of 1961.

On the day after his appointment was announced, Under Secretary-Designate McGhee voiced his opinion on Vietnam to the Secretary of State:

I have read Mr. Chayes’s memorandum to you of November 16 on the subject of Vietnam. There is one consideration bearing on the introduction of substantial US combat forces into Vietnam which is not mentioned in that memorandum and which seems to me worth noting.

Domestic US dissatisfaction with what would surely be the prolonged involvement of American soldiers in these indecisive anti-guerrilla operations would mount and give rise to growing demands that we attack the source of the aggression in North Vietnam....

If we gave in to these pressures and attacked North Vietnam, we would be propelled into a widening conflict which might be hard to terminate....

In short, once we committed combat troops to Vietnam we would tend to lose control of subsequent events — either in that theater or more generally — by reason of the popular reactions that our continued involvement would likely trigger.⁷

⁶“Memorandum From the President (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State (Rusk) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)” 14 November 1961, 603-604. *FRUS, 1961, Vol.I: Vietnam.*

⁷“Memorandum From the Under Secretary-Designate for Political Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State (Rusk)” 27 November 1961, 672. *FRUS, 1961, Vol.I: Vietnam.*

A decade later, Under Secretary McGhee's predictions would be proven correct. As ambassador to West Germany between 1963 and 1968, McGhee did not participate in policy planning for South Vietnam. Privately, however, he became concerned by August of 1964, when he learned that American personnel in Vietnam participated in combat operations.⁸ "The big change came," observed McGhee thirty years later, "when we sent the first combat people [during the Johnson administration]. The government concealed this from the American public; they said they were experts on irrigation but they were actually authorized to shoot. Once we started shooting it was our war."⁹

Nevertheless, Ambassador McGhee did not allow his personal feelings to affect his requirements to both explain and support United States policy. He actively spoke about the American stance on the hotly-debated topic of Vietnam at clubs, universities, and amongst political circles. In a speech to the Evangelische Akademie in July of 1964, the Ambassador reminded the Germans of their own responsibility "as the second strongest nation in the free world" toward stemming the tide of Communist aggression in faraway South Vietnam.¹⁰ Even today, Ambassador McGhee clearly recalls the basis for his public defense of American policy. "The point I made in my speeches was an important one," insists McGhee. "We had undertaken to defend people under the Truman doctrine, which could be construed as a universal doctrine. Having done this in

⁸George McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany, From Adenauer to Brandt: An Ambassador's Account* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 156.

⁹Interview of McGhee (Washington: 3 December 1992) by Suzanne Brown.

¹⁰McGhee, "Speech to the Evangelische Akademie," 16 July 1964, In George Crews McGhee Papers (Series XV: Germany — Miscellaneous Files, Box 2) Lauinger Library, Georgetown University. The George McGhee Papers are available in Lauinger Library's Special Collections division.

countries such as Greece and Turkey, how could we ignore other countries that were subject to the same pressures?"¹¹

If America's responsibilities in Vietnam were questionable, Ambassador McGhee's responsibilities as an official United States representative to West Germany were not. His task embodied upholding American policy, *especially* in the face of assault. However, this task was made difficult by McGhee's private misgivings concerning Vietnam.

Vietnam and the "Anti-authoritarian"¹² Student Movement

Beginning in 1964, Vietnam became the focal point of protest in a seemingly endless wave of student unrest breaking over the Federal Republic of Germany during Ambassador McGhee's appointment. Indeed, nowhere did the "system" put itself more terribly in the wrong, in the eyes of young people, than Vietnam.¹³ Dissatisfied German students rejected most forms of traditional authority. They protested against elder generations in schools, in universities, in their government, and even in their own families on the basis of what, to this younger generation, seemed to be a "tarnished Nazi past."¹⁴ Now, students eagerly sought new and "unblemished" voices of authority.

Student opposition in Germany was led by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an offshoot of the Social Democratic

¹¹Interview of McGhee (Washington: 3 December 1992) by Suzanne Brown.

¹²Richard Lowenthal, "Cultural Change and Generation Change in Postwar Western Germany," *The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States: Changing Political, Social, and Economic Relations* (London: Westview Press, 1984), 41.

¹³Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960 to 1975* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976), 200.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

Party (SPD). The SDS had broken away from the SPD when the SPD abandoned its Marxist affiliations in 1959.¹⁵ The German student opposition sought to obliterate “social injustices” that included apartheid in South Africa, the Vietnam War, and political repression in Iran.¹⁶

Anti-authoritarian German student leaders could be characterized as neo-Marxists who referred to American policy as “the necessary product of a declining capitalism turning into fascism.”¹⁷ The deeply-felt fervor over United States policy in Vietnam stemmed from both American military presence in West Germany and from the “Americanization” of the FRG since World War II. This “Americanization forbade the misfortunes of Germany’s most powerful partner to be greeted with indifference.” Idols to the neo-Marxist youth included Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and Herbert Marcuse.¹⁸

Anti-authoritarian student agitation focused most centrally around the German universities. Sources of acute dissatisfaction included the “ossified, hierarchical, and authoritarian structure” of the universities, the “absolute power” wielded by the full professor “in all matters of curriculum, examinations, appointments, and promotions,” and the rapid growth of the student body from 244,000 in 1961 to 316,000 in 1968.¹⁹ Ambassador McGhee observed further causes for the explosion of student agitation, including exaggeration of the “student threat” in the press and the

¹⁵McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 167.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Lowenthal, “Cultural Change and Generation Change in Postwar Western Germany,” *The Federal Republic and the United States*, 41.

¹⁸Brandt, *People and Politics*, 200.

¹⁹Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A “Special Relationship?”* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 214.

aloof reaction to student demands on the part of the University professors.²⁰

Student “reformers” actually sought to move beyond the universities and to become a recognized force in West German national politics. In 1966, the Federal Republic of Germany suffered an economic downturn, giving rise to significant membership growth in the National Democratic Party, a small political party residing on the extreme right of the spectrum. The National Democrats created a fairly significant “extra parliamentary opposition” against the currently ruling “Grand Coalition” government (a combination of the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrat Party). Radical students hoped to play a role similar to that of the National Democratic Party by creating an identical opposition on the extreme left of the political spectrum.²¹ Their efforts did not meet with any real or lasting success in the realm of national politics. In fact, the most recognizable mark of the radical student opposition was its violent nature — SDS demonstrations resulted in several student deaths.

Life at the American embassy in Bonn remained uninterrupted by these widespread student demonstrations. However, demonstrations against American involvement in Vietnam presented an intriguing challenge for Ambassador McGhee and for his staff. United States Information Service (USIS) Officer Albert Hemsing recalled Ambassador McGhee’s “idea that the USIS must do something to support [American] policy in Vietnam every day, 365 days a year.”²² This idea seemed problematic to Hemsing. Hemsing

²⁰McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 167.

²¹Lowenthal, “Cultural Change and Generation Change in Postwar Western Germany,” *The Federal Republic and the United States*, 42.

²²Albert E. Hemsing, Oral History Interview, Georgetown University Library, 18 April 1989, 45. The series of oral history interviews used in this article may be found in the Special Collections division of Lauinger Library.

found that supplying Embassy or USIS officers for discussion of American policy, per the ever-growing requests of German organizations, “became counter-productive.” Often, students would “run an open-to-all meeting to have an American to throw bricks at.”²³ Instead, Hemsing preferred the idea of allowing American officers to speak only in controlled situations, such as in small, closed seminars.

After he himself experienced numerous difficulties, Ambassador McGhee concurred with Hemsing’s advice. During an incident on February 7, 1966, at Cologne University, “the Rector had to sneak Ambassador McGhee out the back door when a well-organized band of students used the occasion to stage a riot about United States involvement in Vietnam.”²⁴ This incident was by no means isolated. Ambassador McGhee had previously confronted vicious hecklers while giving lectures at German universities. One of several noteworthy occasions occurred at Munich University on May 15, 1965. The Ambassador delivered a speech entitled “The Atlantic Partnership and European Unity” to a group of political science students and found himself interrupted by “a weird moaning sound.”²⁵ The disconcerting sound originated from a member of the audience seated in the balcony, and as McGhee recalled the situation:

The student had a gas mask over his face and was dropping leaflets on the audience below, while moaning “Vietnam, Vietnam.” I appealed to the gentleman to quit so as to allow me to speak, and offered the gentleman the opportunity to ask the first question. The chairman made an appeal to him, and when he didn’t respond, a group of normal German students kicked him out. I don’t know what they did to him, but we

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., 46.

²⁵McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 170.

didn't hear from him again. I just stood back and didn't sit down.²⁶

Ambassador McGhee handled insincere or hostile questioning by "coming back hard" until the questions became more reasonable. He responded to student charges of American imperialism in South Vietnam by insisting that the United States "owed it to" the Vietnamese people to help save them from communist subjugation.²⁷ Some German students with whom he spoke would come to appreciate his position. On other occasions, no such change of heart occurred. Generally speaking, the venom of student demonstrations against American policy in Vietnam increased steadily between the Ambassador's arrival in 1963 and his departure in 1968.

One example of the increasing seriousness of student attacks against American policy took place in April of 1967, during United States Vice President Hubert Humphrey's visit to Berlin. According to reports, a bomb attack against Humphrey had been planned by students. The police did discover "explosives" — consisting of bags of custard and cottage cheese, dyes, flowers, and smoke sticks!²⁸ Neither the press nor the police found the students' joke overly amusing. Older German politicians also condemned the student movement for its irresponsible and dangerous tendencies. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, chancellor of West Germany between 1966 and 1969, labeled the increasingly violent tendencies of the student movement as "an expression of the forces of anarchy."²⁹

²⁶Interview of McGhee (Washington: 3 December 1992) by Suzanne Brown.

²⁷McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 171.

²⁸Rob Burns, *Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extraparliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1988), 108.

²⁹Terence Prittie, *The Velvet Chancellors: A History of Postwar Germany* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), 150.

In conclusion, results of the student revolt against Vietnam and, speaking more generally, against the institutions of traditional authority, could be noted on several fronts. For instance, a series of university reforms was enacted. These reforms included increased student influence on curriculum, examination standards, and professional appointments. Unfortunately, these changes actually *lowered* the level of many German universities for several years.³⁰

Perhaps more disturbing was the heightened criticism of most things American. Ambassador McGhee must be admired for remaining steadfast against the storm of disapproval spreading across West Germany's younger generations like a tempest. He displayed an unflagging forbearance in the face of direct hostility on the part of many students he encountered. Furthermore, he attempted to expose the students with whom he spoke to a fresh perspective. His justification for American policy remained steadfast: an American commitment to Vietnam could not be denied under the universal Truman doctrine.³¹ In this sense, Berlin and Saigon shared the *same* birthright.

The Berlin-Saigon Analogy

In his "perilous" visit to Berlin in April of 1967, Vice-President Humphrey defended the integrity of the United States position on Vietnam in a speech to the Berlin House of Representatives. In a specific reference to the relationship between aid to Berlin and aid to Saigon, he reminded his audience that "American commitment to freedom in one place is no less than American commitment to

³⁰Lowenthal, "Cultural Change and Generation Change in Postwar Western Germany," *The Federal Republic and the United States*, 42.

³¹Interview of McGhee (Washington: 3 December 1992) by Suzanne Brown.

freedom in another.”³² Or, in the words of Dean Rusk, “one could not expect the United States to be a virgin in the Atlantic and a whore in the Pacific.”³³

The Berlin-Saigon analogy cited by Vice-President Humphrey during his speech to the Berlin House of Representatives already existed as early as 1965. In June of that year, President Johnson discussed the parallels between West Germany and Vietnam with German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard during a one-on-one meeting held in the President’s office in Washington. Johnson questioned Erhard about the general attitude of Germans regarding American commitment to South Vietnam. Erhard replied that “Vietnam was important to most Germans, because they regarded it as a kind of testing ground as to how firmly the United States honors its commitments. In that respect, there existed a parallel between Saigon and Berlin.”³⁴

However, two months *before* the Johnson-Erhard meeting, the German Minister for Special Tasks, Heinrich Krone, told an American audience at Notre Dame University that “analogies apply only to a very limited extent; in Vietnam, other laws apply than [those that do] in Germany. Nevertheless, things [happening in

³²Hubert Humphrey, “Remarks to the Berlin House of Representatives,” 6 April 1967, In George Crews McGhee Papers (Series XV: Germany — Miscellaneous Files, Box 1), Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

³³Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It, by Dean Rusk as Told to Richard Rusk* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 455.

³⁴“Memorandum to McGhee Regarding Meeting Between Erhard and Johnson,” 4 June 1965. Fiche 4: George McGhee Files (unpublished), United States Department of State. The George McGhee Files are available in the State Department Historical Office.

Vietnam] do not fail to leave their mark upon us.”³⁵ Other noteworthy German politicians only partially accepted the idea of a parallel between Germany and Vietnam. For example, Willy Brandt, foreign minister of West Germany at that time, sharply attacked the “oversimplified and unfounded” nature of the comparison between Vietnam and Berlin.³⁶

Skepticism concerning an analogous relationship between Germany and Vietnam did *not* translate itself into anti-Americanism. The student movement aside, most German politicians and adult generations generally avoided making moral judgements on United States policy. Brandt himself was “irritated by anti-American prejudice where the Vietnam campaigns were concerned.”³⁷ Elder Germans preferred to avoid conflict with “the American Protecting Power”; it seemed irresponsible to “develop an overly critical attitude towards [the German’s] most important guarantor.”³⁸ Therefore, as a rule, German political leaders did not participate in the open condemnation of American policy in Vietnam.

One outstanding exception to this rule occurred in August of 1966, when former chancellor Adenauer (now famous for his pro-French leanings) publicly announced his opinion that the United States should withdraw troops from South Vietnam. Ambassador McGhee performed the delicate task of relaying Johnson’s response to Adenauer. McGhee reminded Adenauer that in the future, Johnson would appreciate learning of such views through Ambassador McGhee instead of through the *New York Times* or the *Washington*

³⁵“Memorandum to McGhee Regarding Krone’s Speech at Notre Dame University,” 26 April 1965. Fiche 8: George McGhee Files (unpublished), United States Department of State.

³⁶Brandt, *People and Politics*, 321.

³⁷Ibid., 320.

³⁸Ibid., 318.

Post.³⁹ Adenauer “reacted rather sheepishly, like a schoolboy caught with his hand in the cookie jar,” and admitted to deliberately provoking President Johnson.⁴⁰ He succeeded.

Adenauer’s imprudent comments created only a minor stir in comparison to the havoc wreaked in 1966 by the discord concerning German offset payments to America for the cost of stationing United States troops in the Federal Republic.

The Vicious Triangle: Vietnam, the Balance of Payments Crisis, and United States Troops in West Germany

Both President Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard entered office with the glow of optimism left behind by their larger-than-life predecessors, John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Konrad “the Giant” Adenauer. Shadows closed in quickly for both Johnson and Erhard in the form of economic distress. Had only one of these two nations experienced a recession during the years of 1965 and 1966, perhaps the end result might have been a happier one.

As it were, however, both nations suffered from a similar malaise. In the United States, the increasing burden of the Vietnam War caused the balance of payments deficit to grow from \$1.3 billion in 1965 to \$2.3 billion in 1966. As the deficit ballooned, so did the reluctance of Congress to maintain large numbers of forces in Germany.⁴¹ During the Kennedy administration, American military costs in Germany had been offset by the sale of American military equipment to the West German Bundeswehr’s weapon arsenal. By 1966, these sales had ceased to be mutually profitable.

³⁹“Memorandum From McGhee to the Special Assistant of the President (Walt Rostow),” 1 September 1966. Fiche 4: George McGhee Files (unpublished), United States Department of State.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Morgan, *The United States and West Germany*, 144.

The Bundeswehr was fully equipped, and, in light of the 1965 trade deficit in the FRG, further purchase of American military equipment became highly controversial.⁴²

Johnson insisted that Erhard's government pay an increased percentage of American troop-stationing costs and further stipulated that the German government purchase the amount of American military equipment agreed upon in 1964 negotiations. Otherwise, warned Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, the number of American troops stationed in West Germany would be reduced.⁴³

Alfred Puhan, director of the Office of German Affairs, wrote to Ambassador McGhee in order to convey the urgency of the situation. "The offset is indeed a sacred cow in certain Washington circles," noted Puhan. "We should not allow our worship of it, however, to blind us to the really important issues in our relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. I hope you share these sentiments," added Puhan.⁴⁴ McGhee did share a similar attitude. In a memorandum to John J. McCloy, member of Johnson's Senior Advisory Group and consultant on the offset payments crisis, McGhee pleaded the case of the Erhard government:

The German defense effort has for years been smaller — as measured in percentages of gross national product and numbers of men under arms — than the United States, British, and French efforts. A really massive increase in the German effort

⁴²Frank Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 146.

⁴³Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 303.

⁴⁴"Memorandum from the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Puhan) to the Ambassador (McGhee)," 6 May 1965. Fiche 8: George McGhee Files (unpublished), United States Department of State.

is *out of the question*, both for economic and political reasons, and on political grounds would not even be desirable.⁴⁵

Chancellor Erhard desperately needed the supportive efforts of Ambassador McGhee. As West Germany's own economy struggled in 1965, Erhard could not easily comply with Johnson's request. Paradoxically, Erhard considered American troop commitment in Germany to be "a most vital common interest" shared by the two nations.⁴⁶ Erhard visited Washington in the late summer of 1966 seeking relief from the controversial payments for United States military supplies and for the stationing of United States troops according to the agreement made in 1964.⁴⁷ Before his departure to Washington, Erhard had pledged in the German Bundestag to reduce the current ceiling on offset payments. Johnson "knew that Erhard was facing serious political problems within his own party [the Christian Democratic Union]," but nevertheless refused to lower the ceiling of the payments.⁴⁸

Johnson did not arrive at his decision arbitrarily. Despite West Germany's 1966 trade deficit, the German mark enjoyed greater vitality than both the American dollar and the British pound. Moreover, the British government insisted that "a prompt and satisfactory offset arrangement be made with the Germans [in which the Germans kept their commitment of 1964], or British troops would be brought home [from Germany]." Thus, to President Johnson, the reduction of British or American troops in West

⁴⁵"Memorandum from the Ambassador (McGhee) to John J. McCloy," 3 November 1966. Fiche 7: George McGhee Files (unpublished), United States Department of State.

⁴⁶McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 156.

⁴⁷Dennis Bark and David Gress, *Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1988* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 56.

⁴⁸Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 306.

Germany meant the demise of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁴⁹ In summary, President Johnson had no intentions of risking the NATO alliance, and frankly, the Germans stood in the best position to “pay up.” Therefore, against the advice of McGhee, Johnson refused to relent to Erhard’s pleas.

Unfortunately, the German Bundestag disliked Johnson’s decision, and Chancellor Erhard would be the one to pay up. When Erhard returned from Washington unable to deliver on his pledge, he fell from grace in the Bundestag and faced defeat in the fall elections. McGhee personally felt that the inflexibility of the United States position contributed greatly to the political demise of Ludwig Erhard.⁵⁰ Erhard also bore blame. In his efforts to cement a solid relationship with the American president, he lost touch with the more significant demand of his own people — the reversal of Germany’s budget deficit.

The issues of offset payments and troop commitments moved beyond the halls of the Bundestag; indeed, West Germans at large concerned themselves greatly with the possible implications of American commitment to Germany as affected by American commitment to Vietnam. Ambassador McGhee made a concerted effort to dispel false rumors on the subject and to quell unfounded German fears of abandonment by America. At a press conference in Bremen on October 11, 1965, the Ambassador assured reporters that “the United States had at its disposal satisfactory military potential, to have sufficient troops stationed in both Europe and Vietnam.” Furthermore, no American troops stationed in Europe would be transferred to Vietnam.⁵¹

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 182.

⁵¹*Nordwest Zeitung* (October 11, 1965). One of many newspaper clippings collected by Ambassador McGhee. These clippings may be found in the George McGhee Papers (Special Collections, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University).

By the end of the decade, the divisive issues surrounding offset payments and American troop levels had been expedited with only a minor reduction of United States forces. Major solutions involved German purchases of U.S. treasury bonds, to be redeemed *after* America's balance of payments crisis had been solved, a promise by the Bundesbank to halt dollar conversions into gold, and German financial assistance for renovation of American military bases in Germany.⁵² This strong medicine was further boosted by several upward revaluations of the Deutschemark.

Some Germans did not find these solutions altogether welcome. Helmut Schmidt, Brandt's successor to the chancellorship in the mid-1970s, recalled that "none of these maneuvers led to any lasting resolution."⁵³ In fact, noted Schmidt, these "constant interventions" in the German mark led to unwelcome high money supplies in Germany. The interventions further contributed to the beginnings of an inflationary cycle.

The offset payments crisis involved more than a tug-of-war over monetary issues. Western Europeans at large, and especially West Germans, felt cheated of the attentions they had enjoyed for decades — attentions that were now lavished upon South Vietnam.

American "Neglect" of Europe?

The underlying concern on the part of the Germans rested on the fear that "America was becoming so obsessed with South-east Asia that it was neglecting the security of Europe."⁵⁴ Ambassador McGhee described the relationship between the United States and West Germany as one "down in the doldrums" by late February of

⁵²Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States*, 147.

⁵³Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* (New York: Random House, 1989), 154.

⁵⁴Bark and Gress, *Democracy and its Discontents*, 53.

1967 — a condition owing itself to perceived American neglect of Europe.⁵⁵ Ambassador McGhee refuted charges of American negligence. America's changed relationship with Europe, stated McGhee, "need not represent the subordination of Europe to [American] interests elsewhere or [American] preoccupation with the war in South Vietnam."⁵⁶

He acceded that relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany had been transformed by 1967, but he credited the change to "a clearer separation, but not necessarily a divergence, of German policy from our own."⁵⁷ The Germans still remained dependent on the United States for defense. However, in economic and political matters, the Germans now "looked out for themselves."⁵⁸ West Germany's reliance on the United States for economic and political stability during the Adenauer era was now neither desirable nor necessary. Chancellor Kiesinger confirmed McGhee's assessment of the changed relationship between the United States and West Germany. In August of 1966, Kiesinger remarked to the Washington National Press Club that "Germany would not come running to the United States to solve all of its problems."⁵⁹

⁵⁵McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 215.

⁵⁶McGhee, "The Changing Relations Between the United States and Europe," 17 October 1966. George McGhee Speeches, Articles, and Essays (27 January 1965 — 16 December 1968, Volume VIII), Ambassador George C. McGhee Library, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. The Ambassador George C. McGhee Library is a room containing McGhee's personal book collection, and is available to interested scholars.

⁵⁷McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany*, 229.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹McGhee, "The Changing Relations Between the United States and Europe," McGhee Speeches, Articles, and Essays, Ambassador George C. McGhee Library, Georgetown University.

Ambassador McGhee could not convince the majority of West Germany's government and populace that America could uphold its commitments to Europe while simultaneously carrying the ungrudging weight of the Vietnam albatross. However, in light of West Germany's own newly discovered self-sufficiency, America's former level of commitment to the Federal Republic of Germany ceased to be appropriate. By 1968, an increasingly egalitarian relationship existed between the two nations. As ambassador, McGhee was attuned to these changes, and he guided the efforts of the American embassy in Bonn accordingly.

FREAK SHOWS, HUMOR, AND THE U.S. EMBASSY, MOSCOW, 1945

by
Thomas G. Paterson
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

Geo. Bartow of Thomas Funland Shows, Springfield, Missouri, did not seem to know that a Cold war had begun. As Robert Bogdan tells us in his fascinating book, *Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit* (University of Chicago Press, 1988), carnivals, circuses, amusement parks, fairs, and other traveling shows cared about business, not great-power competition. Reenforcing for ethnocentric, superior-minded Americans images of foreigners and foreign lands as strange, bizarre, exotic, odd, primitive, and culturally peculiar — that is, inferior — popular freak shows and other exhibits presented “wild men and women,” “savages,” serpent queens, sword swallowers, human ostriches (which could ingest almost anything), giants, dwarfs, Siamese twins, microcephalic people, and others for entertainment. Often these individuals dressed in non-Western garb and acted on stages bedecked with jungle props. When the United States surged as an imperial power in the early twentieth century, the Philippines and Latin America increasingly provided the backdrop. Ringling Brothers, Barnum and Bailey Circus and others searched worldwide for freak-show exhibits.

So, following tradition and certainly seeing nothing improper or unseemly about his request, Geo. Bartow of Thomas Funland Shows wrote on June 2, 1945 to the U.S. embassy in Moscow asking for help in locating “a two Headed Baby that is supposed to of been born in Moscow.” Bartow hoped to use “it” for “exhibition purposed.” As the first letter reprinted below also reveals, Bartow would appreciate information about “any other out-standing Freak in Russia, or the world.”

Bartow's letter, addressed to "American Council-Moscow, Russia," found its way to the desk of a consular officer. It appears from the initials "PD" (on the second letter reprinted below) and the *Foreign Service List*, Vice Consul Paul M Dutko took on the task of answering Bartow's query. The State Department's *Biographic Register* reports that Dutko, born in 1894 in Pennsylvania and educated at Dickinson College (A.B., 1917), had joined the Foreign Service during World War I. Before his appointment as Vice Consul at Moscow in June 1943 he had served in a number of posts, including Vladivostok, Harbin, Vienna, and Leipzig.

In a humorous yet pointedly critical letter, dated September 22, 1945, but probably never sent, Dutko sarcastically established his distaste for freak shows, parodied Soviet politics, and ribbed the Foreign Service. No doubt these documents circulated for amusement among embassy staffers. Indeed, I discovered the Bartow and Dutko letters in the papers of the American ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time, W. Averell Harriman (Box 205, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).

The Bartow Letter:

Jefferson City, Mo.
June 2nd, 1945

American Council
Moscow, Russia

Dear Sir:

I am writing you to see if you can give me any information on a two Headed Baby that is supposed to of Been born in Moscow, and is still living. I am in the carnival Business and would appreciate any information you can give me on it. Would also like to know if there is any possibility of Contracting it for a tour of the United States for exhibition purposes, and if there is any other out-standing

Freak in Russia, or the world, that you know of, I would appreciate information on it. Thanking you in advance for any information you can give me, I Beg to Remain,

Yours Very Truly
Geo. Bartow
335-East Kearney
Springfield, Missouri
U.S.A.

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**Permanent address - 335 East Kearney
Springfield, Mo.**

SHOWS

CONCESSIONS

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Moscow
September 22, 1945

Mr. George Bartow
335 East Kearney Street
Springfield, Missouri

Dear Mr. Bartow:

With reference to your letter of June 2, 1945, I have been authorized by the Ambassador to ***** No, No, No, Mr Bartow, with you I cannot adhere to the style manual. Not for you the stereotype, the departmental phrase, the diplomatic cliché. Not for you the insts., the "in replys", the semi-colon. For you, Mr. Bartow, are a rare spirit in an all-too-average world.

Your perspicacious letter was wafted into my office in the beak of a Griffin as I was in the midst of sorting out the daily afternoon shipment of ---- yes, Mr. Bartow ---- two-headed babies. All still living. Think of it, Mr. Bartow, hundreds of two-headed babies in all their four-eyed winsomeness crying for a spot in your Funland show.

But alas, in this best of all possible Soviet worlds, a small difficulty has arisen that would make it appear that those adorable double-noggled little darlings will never know the caress of your portable kleig lights. Visas, Mr. Bartow. Disagreeable word, but I must not spare you. Visas.

The sordid facts are that the Soviet Government is not willing to share the fulsomeness of its dual-pated baby crop. No, Mr. Bartow, that is not what you've read about Marx. But into your carefree

carnival life a few grim facts must fall. And do not feel too bitter about the "haves" and the "have nots". We must be fair, Mr. Bartow, and I appeal to you to ask yourself objectively: "Who needs those quadruple-eared cuties most, Geo. Bartow or J. Stalin?"

You see how simple it is to come to equitable decisions if you only think clearly?

About your other request, Mr. Bartow. Again, I fear, I can offer you nothing but disappointment. Due to wartime exigencies the staff of our Out-Standing Freak File has been cut to the bone. I repeat, Mr. Bartow, to the bone. Our Out-Standing Freak File (Russian) has gotten terribly gappy and I shudder to describe the state of our Out-Standing Freak File (World). Frankly, Mr. Bartow, things are so bad that our python-armed chief clerk finds that the pelican-nosed Stakanovites keep getting mixed up with the zebra-striped Komsomols. So, as you can see, Mr. Bartow, there is nothing we can do for you.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Bartow, if I may offer a friendly word of advice — I note that your business card describes your Exhibitional Institution as possessing Quality, Distinction and Respectability. May I suggest that what you require for such a genteel cultural establishment are not Leninist two-headed babies and proletarian freaks but rather something more refined. May I offer you the services of a spat-stained, only slightly-used diplomat who specializes in tight-rope walking over jagged edges of aides memoires while reciting Heinrich Heine in Russian backwards. Surely an act worthy of your high-class establishment, Mr. Bartow.

Thanking you for your interest, Mr. Bartow, and hoping that I have been of some small assistance, I beg to remain Teeteringly yours.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR Activities at the AHA

Cash Bar Reception:

Jan. 5, 5-7 pm Stockholm Room

Council Meeting:

Jan. 6, 7:30 am McKenzie Room

Luncheon:

Jan. 6, 12:15 pm International Salon C

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**The Akira Iriye International History Book Award
The Foundation For Pacific Quest**

The biennial Award was created by the Foundation in 1994 to encourage and recognize excellence in international scholarship in honor of Akira Iriye for his indelible contribution to the study of international history.

Qualifications for Entry: Any scholarly book in English published for the first time between January 1994 and December 1995, and written on a subject covering historical relations between two or more countries or cultures, or on a historical subject with an international theme, may enter the contest for this award. An independent panel of judges will evaluate entries on their contribution to the understanding of international history.

Entries may be submitted by the authors, editors, or their publishers. For further details contact: The Foundation for Pacific Quest, The Iriye Book Award Committee, 520 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 840, Chicago, IL 60611. Entries must be received no later than December 31, 1995.

Call for Papers

**Second Inter-Disciplinary Conference:
Inter-American Relations**

Proposals for individual papers, complete panels, session chairpersons and commentators in all fields of study are sought for an October 12-14, 1996 Inter-American meeting in Jacksonville, FL. Send proposals to: Tom Leonard, Conference Coordinator, International Studies Program, College of Arts and Sciences, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32224. TEL (904) 646-2886.

Carter Presidency Conference

The Carter Presidential Library will host a conference to recognize the twentieth anniversary of Jimmy Carter's inauguration and the tenth anniversary of the opening of the Carter Library. While evolving policy choices will be emphasized during the conference, proposals relating to the personalities, politics, and other issues of the Carter years are welcomed. Send a one-page prospectus by June 1, 1996 to: Gary Fink, Department of History, Georgia State U., University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083; FAX 404-651-1745. E-MAIL hisgmf@gsusgi2.gsu.edu

New Journal Announced
Global Society

Global Society will cover the new agenda in international relations and encourage innovative approaches to the study of international issues from a range of disciplines. It will promote the analysis of international transactions at multiple levels, in particular the way in which these transactions blur the distinction between the sub-national, national and transnational levels.

The editor invites contributions from a variety of disciplines including International Relations, International Political Economy, Political Science, Political Philosophy, International Law, International Conflict Analysis, and Sociology. The emphasis of the articles should be to advance an understanding of the processes of transnationalization and globalization at various levels, and the tensions that are caused by them.

For information contact: Jarrod Wiener, Editor, Graduate School of International Relations, Rutherford College, The University of Kent, CANTERBURY CT2 7NX, U.K. E-mail J.Wiener@ukc.ac.uk Tel: +44 1227 764000 ext. 3379; Fax: +44 827033;

A British International History Group

In 1988 British scholars with an interest in international history gathered together at the University of the West of England in Bristol to establish the British International History Group (BIHG). Its first annual conference was held in September 1989 at the University of Cambridge. BIHG now numbers about 120 members and its last three-day conference, in the south coast seaport of Southampton, attracted about

sixty academics, including a handful of Americans. Although the papers are predominantly linked to British issues, this is not always the case: the last programme featured Japanese policy in China in the 1930s and the regional organisation of post war Europe. Other papers ranged from the British conquest of India, through Anglo-American relations in the Second World War to the origins of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s. Most offerings were on twentieth century subjects but the organisers hope to increase the number in earlier periods at future conferences.

BIHG is a sub-group of the much larger British International Studies Association, which holds its own annual conference (with a small number of international history papers) every December, and whose journal is the *Review of International Studies*. BIHG also helped organise a large number of papers on historical topics for the September 1995 Pan-European Conference on international relations in Paris. The founding chairman of the group was Richard Langhorne. The current chairman is Michael Dockrill of King's College, London. Anyone who would like to receive information about BIHG and its activities should write to the organisation's secretary: Dr. Glyn Stone, Faculty of Humanities, University of the West of England, St. Matthias, Oldbury Court Road, Fishponds, Bristol, BS16 2JP, UNITED KINGDOM.

Research Request

A Dutch SHAFR member and a colleague are studying the history of the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service (Inlichtingendienst Buitenland) which existed between 1946 and 1994. They are looking for information concerning the activities of the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service in Europe, the Soviet Union, Asia (especially Indonesia) and the Middle

East. They also would like to meet retired members of the American and British intelligence community or the American foreign service who have cooperated with the Dutch service and who are willing to grant an interview (whether or not strictly 'off-the-record') to the authors. Any suggestions from members of SHAFR as regards available archival materials or persons we should interview are most welcome. Please contact: Dr. Cees Wiebes, University of Amsterdam, TEL: 31 20 626 03 49; FAX: 31 20 626 03 49

NHC FELLOWSHIP, GRANT, AND INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES, 1996 — 1997

The Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, offers research support for established scholars, doctoral candidates, and undergraduate history majors.

ESTABLISHED SCHOLARS. The center will make two research Grants, named in honor of Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, of up to \$2,500 each to individuals undertaking research and writing in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants should have either the Ph.D. or equivalent credentials, and they must be U.S. citizens. The deadline for submitting applications is February 28, 1996.

DOCTORAL CANDIDATES. The Center will award the Rear Admiral John B. Hayes fellowship of \$8,000 to a pre-doctoral candidate who is undertaking research and writing on a dissertation in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants must be U.S. citizens enrolled in an accredited graduate school who will have completed all requirements for the Ph.D. except the dissertation by June 30, 1996. The deadline for applications is February 28, 1996.

HISTORY MAJORS. The Center welcomes internship applications from undergraduate history majors who wish to spend up to four weeks engaged in applied history projects in

the Washington Navy Yard. Limited funds are available to support living expenses. Historical research, archival, and curatorial assignments are available. Applications should be filed at least two months before the desired beginning date of the internship.

Application forms for the research grant, pre-doctoral fellowship, and internships may be obtained by writing: Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, 901 M Street SE, Washington, DC 20374-5060.

BICENTENNIAL AWARD COMPETITION

To mark the bicentennial of USS CONSTITUTION, which was authorized in 1794, launched in 1797, and ordered on its first cruise in 1798, as well as the bicentennial of the establishment of the Department of the Navy (1798), the Naval Historical Center plans to make an award of \$750 for an article and an award of \$2,500 for a book, related to a bicentennial theme and based on original research, published or accepted for publication between 1994 and 1998. Articles and books whose subject relates to any aspect of the history of USS CONSTITUTION in any time period, or to any aspect of the history of the Federal Navy, ca. 1798 to 1801 are eligible.

Nominations should be made by June 30, 1998, and must include one copy of the article or book, or, if the work is not yet in print, of the manuscript along with evidence that the work has been accepted for publication. Announcement of the awards will be in December 1998. Nominations should be made to: Senior Historian, Naval Historical Center, Washington Naval Yard, 901 M Street SE, Washington, DC. 20374

CALENDAR

1996

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02142.
- January 4-7 The 110th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Atlanta.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Submissions due for Warren Kuehl Award.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- March 28-31 The 89th meeting of the OAH will take place in Chicago with headquarters at the Palmer House Hilton.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 21-24 SHAFR's 21th annual conference will meet at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Diane Kunz is program chair, Bob Schulzinger is local arrangements chair.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- November 15 Deadline for Myrna F. Bernath research fellowship proposals.

The OAH will meet at the Hilton in San Francisco, April 17-20, 1997. Program co-chairs are Ramón Gutiérrez (UC-San Diego) and Mary Ryan (UC-Berkeley). Send proposals to: 1997 Program Committee, OAH, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47408-4199. Deadline for proposals is January 12, 1996.

Meetings will be in Indianapolis (Westin Hotel and Indiana Convention Center), April 2-5, 1998; and in Toronto (Sheraton Centre) in 1999.

The AHA will meet in New York City in 1997. The program co-chairs are Margaret Strobel, University of Illinois at Chicago and Michael J. Galgano, James Madison University. The first deadline for proposals is October 27, 1995.

SHAFR will meet at Georgetown University, June 19-22, 1997. David Painter will serve as local arrangements chair.

PERSONALS

Sarah-Jane Corke (New Brunswick), Patrick Hearden (Purdue), Galen Johnson (Kansas), Kelly Woestman (Pittsburg State, KS), and Christian Ostermann (Hamburg) have received grants from the Truman Library Institute.

Robert Edwin Herzstein has been appointed Carolina Distinguished Professor at the University of S. Carolina and has been elected vice-chair of the European History Section of the SHA.

Detlef Junker (Heidelberg) has become director of German Historical Institute in Washington D.C.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes (USC) received the 1995-96 Marine Corps Dissertation Fellowship, and will spend the Fall in

residence at the Marine Corps History Center. He also received grants from the Truman Library and the Douglas MacArthur foundation.

Marshal Zeringue (UVA at Charlottesville) has been awarded a grant from the Eisenhower Library for work on Eisenhower and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

PUBLICATIONS

Scott L. Bills (Stephen F. Austin), *The Libyan Arena: The United States, Britain, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1948*. Kent State, 1995. ISBN 0-87338-551-x, \$30.00.

H.W. Brands (Texas A&M at Austin), *Since Vietnam: The United States in World Affairs, 1973-1994*. McGraw-Hill, 1995. ISBN 0-07-007196-9.

Russell D. Buhite (Tennessee), *Lives at Risk: Hostages and Victims in American Foreign Policy*. Scholarly Resources, 1995. ISBN 0-8420-2553-7, \$16.95.

Charles W. Calhoun, ed. (East Carolina), *The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern America*. Scholarly Resources, 1995. ISBN 0-8420-2500-6, \$17.95.

John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Kentucky) eds., *Modern American Diplomacy*. Revised and enlarged. Scholarly Resources, 1995. ISBN 0-8420-2555-3, \$17.95.

Robert Dallek (UCLA), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword*. Oxford, 1995. ISBN 0-19-5097327, \$18.95.

Antonio Donno (Universita' Degli Studi Di Lecce), *Gli Stati Uniti, il sionismo e Israele, 1938-1956*. Bonacci Editore Roma, 1992. ISBN 88-7573-245-0, L30.000.

David S. Foglesong (Rutgers), *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920*. North Carolina, 1995. ISBN 0-8078-22280, \$45.00.

Robert E. Herzstein (South Carolina), *Henry R. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man who Created the American Century*. Scribner, 1994. ISBN 0-684-193604, \$30.00.

Michael Hunt (North Carolina), *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*. Columbia, 1996. ISBN 0-231-10310-7, \$34.50.

Raimund Lammersdorf (Technische Universität Chemnitz), *Anfänge einer Weltmacht: Theodore Roosevelt und die transatlantischen Beziehungen der USA, 1901-1909 [Beginnings of a World Power: Theodore Roosevelt and U.S. Transatlantic Relations, 1901-1909]*. Berlin, Akademie Verlag, ISBN 3-05-002490-9, DM 98.

Stephen R. Niblo (La Trobe, Australia), *War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico, 1938-1954*. Scholarly Resources, 1995. ISBN 0-8420-2550-2, \$50.00.

Frank A. Ninkovich (St. Johns), *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*.

Imprint Publications, 1995. Paper, ISBN 1-879176-23-8, \$19.95.

David Reynolds (Christ Church, Cambridge), *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain 1942-1945*. Random House, 1995. ISBN 0-679-42161-0, \$30.00.

Melvin Small (Wayne State), *Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994*. Johns Hopkins, 1996. Cloth ISBN 0-8018-5177-7, \$38.95; paper ISBN 0-8018-5178-5, \$13.95.

Ronald Steel (USC), *Temptations of a Superpower*. Harvard, 1995. ISBN 0-674-87340-8, \$18.95.

Stephen J. Valone (St. John Fisher College) ed., *Two Centuries of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Documentary Record*, Praeger, 1995. ISBN 0-275-95324-6, \$59.95. Paper, ISBN 0-275-95325-4, \$17.95.

Randall Bennett Woods (Arkansas) *Fulbright: A Biography*. Cambridge, 1995. ISBN 0-521-482623, \$29.95.

Marilyn B Young (NYU), Marvin E. Gettleman, Jane Franklin, and H. Bruce Franklin eds., *Vietnam and America*. Revised and enlarged. Grove, 1995. ISBN 0-8021-3362-2, \$16.95.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Emily Rosenberg, Department of History, Macalester College, St. Paul, MN 55105.

Books may be sent at any time during 1995, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1996.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 1995 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 1996.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1972 Joan Hoff Wilson Kenneth E. Shewmaker	1983 Richard Immerman
1973 John L. Gaddis	1984 Michael H. Hunt
1974 Michael H. Hunt	1985 David Wyman
1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. Stephen E. Pelz	1986 Thomas J. Noer
1976 Martin J. Sherwin	1987 Fraser J. Harbutt James Edward Miller
1977 Roger V. Dingman	1988 Michael Hogan
1978 James R. Leutze	1989 Stephen G. Rabe
1979 Phillip J. Baram	1990 Walter Hixson Anders Stephanson
1980 Michael Schaller	1991 Gordon H. Chang
1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm Hugh DeSantis	1992 Thomas Schwartz
1982 David Reynolds	1993 Elizabeth Cobbs
	1994 Tim Borstelmann

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners normally deliver their lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evicence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 1996. The Chairperson of the Committee for 1995-1996 is: Cecilia Cornell, History Program, U. of Illinois at Springfield, Springfield, IL 62794-9243.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1977 Joan Hoff Wilson	1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
1978 David S. Patterson	1988 William O. Walker III
1979 Marilyn B. Young	1989 Stephen G. Rabe
1980 John L. Gaddis	1990 Richard Immerman
1981 Burton Spivak	1991 Robert McMahon
1982 Charles DeBenedetti	1992 H.W. Brands
1983 Melvyn P. Leffler	1993 Larry Berman
1984 Michael J. Hogan	1994 Diane Kunz
1985 Michael Schaller	1995 Thomas Schwartz
1986 William Stueck	

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1995. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1996. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Elizabeth Cobbs, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA 92110.

The next award will be announced at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH in Spring, 1996.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1977 John C.A. Stagg	1986 Duane Tananbaum
1978 Michael H. Hunt	1987 David McLean
1979 Brian L. Villa	1988 Dennis Merrill
1980 James I. Matray	1989 Robert J. McMahon
David A. Rosenberg	1990 Lester Foltos
1981 Douglas Little	1991 William Earl Weeks
1982 Fred Pollock	1992 Marc Gallicchio
1983 Chester Pach	1993 Daniel P. O'C. Greene
1985 Melvyn Leffler	1994 Frederick Logevall
	1995 Heike Bungert

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) a one-page curriculum vitae of the applicant and a dissertation prospectus;
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value to the study;
 - (c) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (d) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1000.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications should be sent to: Thomas W. Zeiler, Department of History, University of Colorado, Boulder CO 80309-0234. The deadline is November 1, 1996.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1985 Jon Nielson

1986 Valdinia C. Winn

Walter L. Hixson

1987 Janet M. Manson

Thomas M. Gaskin

W. Michael Weis

Michael Wala

1988 Elizabeth Cobbs

Madhu Bhalla

1989 Thomas Zeiler

Russel Van Wyk

1990 David McFadden

1991 Eileen Scully

1992 Shannon Smith

1993 R. Tyler Priest

Christian Ostermann

1994 Delia Pergande

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 1994-95 will be considered in 1995. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Anders Stephanson, History Department, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Deadline for nomination is December 1, 1995.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Diane Kunz
Betty Unterberger

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowship

The society announces two Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships, 2,500 USD each, to encourage the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The awards alternate with the Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize and application dates are thus in "even" years. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Professor Anders Stephanson, Department of History, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Submission deadline is November 15, 1996.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1992 Shannon Smith
1994 Regina Gramer
Jacklyn Stanke
Christine Skwiot

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research

on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1996, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation, are required.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1996 to: David Foglesong, Hoover Institute, Stanford CA 94305-2323 19131.

The Holt Memorial Fellowship carries an award of \$1,500.00. Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Committee Members:

David Foglesong
Hoover Institute
Stanford, CA 94305

Roger Dingman
History Department
U of S. California
Los Angeles, CA
90089

Keith Nelson
History Department
U of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA 92717

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1984 Louis Gomolak
1986 Kurt Schultz
1987 David McFadden
1988 Mary Ann Heiss
1990 Katherine A.S. Siegel

1991 Kyle Longley
1992 Robert Brigham
1993 Darlene Rivas
1994 Christian Ostermann
1995 John Dwyer

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted

to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Committee Members:

James Matray
History Department
New Mexico State U
Las Cruces, NM 88003

Leon Boothe
President
1 University Dr.
Highland Hts, KY
41099

Chester Pach
History Department
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1986 Dorothy Borg
1988 Alexander DeConde
1990 Richard W. Leopold

1992 Bradford Perkins
1994 Wayne Cole

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1995 and 1996. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1996. One copy of each submission should be sent to each member of the selection committee.

Thomas Knock
Dept. of History
Southern Methodist
Dallas TX 75275

Melvin Small
Dept. of History
Wayne State University
Detroit, MI 48202

David Schmitz
Dept. of History
Whitman College
Walla Walla, WA
99362

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1987 Harold Josephson
- 1989 Melvin Small
- 1991 Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield
- 1993 Thomas Knock
- 1995 Lawrence S. Wittner

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Mary A. Giunta.

M. Giunta, Act. Dir.
Documentary History
of US Foreign
Relations,
National Archives
Washington, DC 20408

Justus Doenecke
New College, U. of S.
Florida
Tampa, FL 33620

George Herring
Dept. of History
Univ. of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

PREVIOUS WINNER 1991 Justus Doenecke

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings from their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1995, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 1996.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. A letter of nomination should be sent to the Ferrell Prize committee chairman, and a copy of the book should be sent directly to each member of the committee at the addresses listed below.

Jim Miller
132 13th Street S.E.
Washington DC 20003

Ted Wilson, chair
Department of History
U. of Kansas
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Doug Brinkley
Department of History
Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11550

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

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