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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

“A RESEARCH NOTE: CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973.”

by

Stephen M. Leahy

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After passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, members of Congress, former government officials, and several scholars, have argued, as Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin Firmage have, that the passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was a “tardy rebuke for the actions of two presidents” in Vietnam.¹ However, describing the War

¹Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin Firmage, *To Chain the Dogs of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law*, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 15; See also United States (hereafter U.S.) Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The War Powers Resolution*, 1982, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1. This official history prepared by Foreign Affairs Committee aide John H. Sullivan will be cited hereafter as [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*. While possessing unsurpassed access to congressional sources, Sullivan readily admitted that his work was designed to be “objective,” that is, inoffensive to the egos of the various sponsors of the bill. See interview (by the author), John H. Sullivan, September 30, 1991. A 1984 article attributed to Clement J. Zablocki also described the bill as a reaction to Vietnam. However, it is questionable if Zablocki ever wrote this article, which appeared after his death. The representative usually relied upon staff members to write articles for publication. See Clement J. Zablocki, “War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise,” *Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review* 17 (No. 3, 1984): 586; Sullivan interview. For other sources that place the origins of the bill in the Vietnam War, or more specifically, the passage of the Gulf Tonkin Resolution, see Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon*, 3 Volumes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987-1991), 3: 60-62, 254; Dan Caldwell, “The Jackson-Vanik Amendment,” in *Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy*, edited by John Spanier and Joseph Noguee (New York: Pergammon Press, 1981), 5; Robert D. Clark,

Powers Resolution as a reaction to the Vietnam War has severe limitations. It fails to account for the fact that members of Congress did not introduce War Powers bills

Andrew M. Egeland, Jr., and David B. Sanford, *The War Powers Resolution: Balance of War Powers in the Eighties* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), 5; L. Gordon Crovitz, "How Ronald Reagan Weakened the Presidency," *Commentary* 86 (September, 1988), 25; John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 48; Gerald R. Ford, "Congress, The Presidency and National Security Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 16 (Spring, 1988): 201; Dean Paul Franklin, "War Powers in Modern Context," *Congress and the Presidency* 14 (Spring 1987): 78; David Locke Hall, *The Reagan Wars: A Constitutional Perspective on War Powers and the Presidency* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 2; Allan Ides, "Congress, Constitutional Responsibility and the War Power," *Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review* 17 (No. 3, 1984): 587-631; Jacob K. Javits, "War Powers Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Fall 1985): 133; Aaron S. Klieman, "Preparing for the Hour of Need: The National Emergencies Act," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 9 (Winter, 1979): 49; Harold H. Koh, *The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 38-39; Victoria Marie Kraft, *The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Policy: Terminating the Taiwan Treaty*, (New York: Westport, 1991) 30; John Lehman, *Making War: The 200-Year Old Battle Between the President and Congress over How America Goes to War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 91; Richard M. Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 178-183; Joshua Lee Prober, "Congress, the War Powers Resolution, and the Second Political Life of 'a Dead Letter,'" *Journal of Law and Politics* 7 (No. 1, 1990): 181; Eugene V. Rostow, "'Once More into the Breach:' The War Powers Resolution Revisited," *Valparaiso University Law Review* 21 (Fall, 1986): 1, 19-35; Marc E. Smyrl, *Conflict or Codetermination?: Congress, the President, and the Power to Make War* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988), 19, 28; Robert F. Turner, *Repealing the War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brassey's US Inc., 1991), 1-45.

from 1966 to 1970 as the war became increasingly unpopular.² The House floor manager of the bill, Clement J. Zablocki, even supported the Vietnam War. After the war ended, President Richard Nixon specifically thanked Zablocki for supporting the war despite strong opposition from his district.³ While an examination of just one critical figure cannot provide a conclusive answer, a study of Clement J. Zablocki's role suggests that the War Powers Resolution represented a congressional response to Nixonian excesses. Vietnam should be seen as a factor, but not the overriding cause.

Widespread questions of the president's war powers arose after the invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 1970. President Nixon ordered the attack of a sovereign, neutral nation without consulting Congress. Zablocki, an eleven-term

²In 1967, J. William Fulbright introduced the National Commitments Resolution to affirm that a national commitment derived only from a treaty or statutory authorization. The non-binding resolution stemmed from the decision of the United States to send cargo planes to help the nation of Congo, although William C. Berman asserts that frustration over the continuing Vietnam War contributed to the passage of the resolution. The non-binding resolution passed in June, 1969, by a margin of 70 to 10. See William C. Berman, *William Fulbright and the Vietnam War: The Dissent of a Political Realist* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1988), 84-86, 101, 113. According to Pat M. Holt, a scholar of the issue of executive power and an aide to Fulbright, the Arkansas senator did not intend his resolution to be the basis for further legislation. See Pat M. Holt, *The War Powers Resolution: The Role in Congress in U.S. Armed Intervention*, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 4.

³Memorandum, William Timmons to David Parker, February 5, 1973; memorandum, "Peace with Honor Reception," February 21, 1973, folder "SO 6 1/1/73-2/28/73," box 24, White House Central Files, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Papers, College Park, Maryland.

veteran of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told his constituents that the president had “not only the constitutional right, but [also] the responsibility” to take action. Zablocki’s defense of President Nixon’s claimed authority was not shared by many of his colleagues. On May 13, Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL) introduced a bill “to define the authority” of the president “to make war without the express consent of Congress.” Later, the congressional hopper bulged with sixteen bills attempting to define presidential powers. Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Thomas E. “Doc” Morgan (D-PA) then referred the various war powers bills to the Zablocki’s National Security and Scientific Developments Subcommittee.⁴

The emerging war powers debate centered on the issue of presidential prerogative, that is, the president’s ability to take action to protect the nation despite constitutional prohibitions. The *Constitution*, the *Federalist Papers*, and various Supreme Court decisions offer support for three different interpretations. One, the *Constitution* allows prerogative. Two, the *Constitution* prohibits prerogative. And three, the *Constitution* prohibits prerogative, but emergencies often

⁴Newsletter, CJZ, May 15, 1970, folder “News Releases, 1970,” box News and Views, Special Mailings, 1949-1983, Christmas, Clement J. Zablocki Papers, Department of Special Collections and University Archives, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (hereafter ZP); U. S., Congress, Text of H. R. 17598, May 13, 1970; Text of H. R. 17773, May 25, 1970; Text of H. R. 18205, June 24, 1970, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.; Thomas Morgan to CJZ, May 21, 1970, folder “Foreign Affairs May-December 1970,” box Foreign Affairs (hereafter FA) 6:12, ZP; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 55; Sullivan interview.

require strong and immediate actions from the president.⁵ By 1970, Clement J. Zablocki clearly had accepted the third opinion — that presidents need flexibility to act in emergencies despite congressional prohibitions. In his opposition to the 1957 Middle East Resolution, the representative conceded that President Dwight Eisenhower had the authority to act in emergencies. However, Zablocki argued that the president should address long term needs through normal legislative processes.⁶

Over the summer of 1970, the National Security Subcommittee held public hearings on the bill. By November Zablocki had a bill that was clearly consistent with his views of presidential power. The preamble reaffirmed the constitutional powers of the Congress and the president, but recognized the president's duty to act in "certain extraordinary and emergency circumstances." A second section, authored by Zablocki and his staff, stipulated that the president should consult with Congress. Sections three and four — authored by Representative Paul Findley (R-IL) — required the president to notify Congress after committing United States Armed Forces to action. On November 16, 1970, the House passed

⁵Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency*, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1973), 13-34; Leonard Sorenson, "The Federalist Papers on the Constitutionality of Executive Prerogative," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 19 (Spring 1989): 267-278.

⁶Notecards, CJZ, undated, folder "Resolution Middle East Solution 1957," box FA box 3-1:4, ZP.

the bill. The Senate, however, took no action, and it died at the end of the 91st Congress.⁷

Meanwhile, Senator Jacob Javits introduced his own proposal. Influential prowar Senator John Stennis (D-MS) and antiwar Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) then endorsed Javits's bill. With the backing of these legislators, Senate passage of Javits's approach was assured. In December 1971, the Senate produced a bill that narrowly interpreted the president's war powers. The Senate bill defined only four situations in which the president could act without specific authorization. These were: to protect United States territory and its possessions; to repel or forestall attacks on American armed forces stationed overseas; to protect American citizens abroad during an evacuation; or as part of a treaty commitment ratified by Congress. Other sections limited any presidential commitment of troops to 30 days, unless Congress authorized or terminated such action. The Vietnam War was specifically exempted from the bill's stipulations. Like the House bill, the Senate approach contained a reporting provision.⁸

The passage of the Senate bill led to a game of "legislative chicken" between the House and the Senate. Each body refused to consider the other's bill. Although the Senate and the House remained far apart, the Nixon Administration feared

⁷U.S., Congress, Text of H. J. Res. 1355, 1970, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.; memorandum, unsigned, most likely John H. Sullivan, undated, folder "Miscellaneous Foreign Aid, 1969-1972," box FA 3-2:5, ZP.

⁸Jacob Javits, with Rafael Steinberg, *Javits: The Autobiography of a Public Man* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), 402-409; Thomas F. Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender* (New York: Liveright, 1974), 119-123; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 82; U. S., Congress, Text of S. 2956, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.

a compromise. If it appeared that the president was unwilling to compromise, Secretary of State William Rogers warned that Zablocki would accept Javits's language. Such a combination, Rogers wrote, could possibly generate enough support to override a veto. Rogers recommended that "strictly as a final fallback position," the administration tell Zablocki that the Javits-Eagleton-Stennis language would be acceptable only if it were nonbinding. Intrigued by Rogers's suggestion, Zablocki and his subcommittee amended the Senate bill to contain the House language, which allowed the creation of a conference committee.⁹

National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger then prevented any compromise in 1972. Kissinger told the president that appearing to compromise could lead to "the best possible outcome," a deadlocked Congress. However, any legislation would "erect formidable political constraints" on future actions. Kissinger recommended that administration officials advise Zablocki that any proposal containing Javits's language was unacceptable. On September 13, the conference committee met. That day, Rogers told Zablocki that the administration would only support the House bill.

Consequently, Zablocki had little leeway to bargain. At this single meeting, he offered to accept a nonbinding definitions

⁹Memorandum, William Rogers to Richard M. Nixon, April 28, 1972, folder "War Powers of the President [1 of 2]," box 73, John W. Dean Files, Nixon Papers; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 99-100; memoranda, John H. Sullivan to CJZ, May 3, June 20, 1972, folder "War Powers Bill Information, 1972," box FA 2-2:1, ZP; *Congressional Record*, August 14, 1972, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 28080.

section. Javits refused. Again, Congress adjourned without producing a bill.¹⁰

In his book *No More Vietnams* (1985), Richard Nixon wrote that he had “miscalculated” the nature of his congressional opponents. He had believed that their complaints about executive power would largely subside after the end of American involvement in the Vietnam War, which ended on January 27, 1973. Had he been right, his obstructionist strategy would have worked. The War Powers Resolution would have lacked sufficient interest to be revived. Instead, Nixon learned that Congress had problems with more than his handling of the war.¹¹

When the 93rd Congress convened in 1973, the managers of the various proposals had developed a more favorable attitude of each other. Senators apologized for refusing to consider the House bill during the previous session. Zablocki’s new bill even had a nonbinding definitions section, and he called Senator Javits as his leadoff witness during new hearings. Later, the Foreign Affairs Committee (with Zablocki’s support) did strike the definitions section. However, the committee (again with Zablocki’s support) added a key component of Javits’s bill. It included a termination of military commitments by a concurrent resolution. A new

¹⁰Henry A. Kissinger to Richard M. Nixon, June 22, 1972, folder “War Powers of the President [1 of 2],” box 73, John W. Dean Files, Nixon Papers; William Rogers to CJZ, September 13, 1972; memorandum, John H. Sullivan to CJZ, undated; “Version #1,” September 6, 1972, folder “War Powers Bill Information, 1972,” box FA 2-2:1, ZP; Javits, *Javits*, 409; Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power*, 142; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 99-100.

¹¹Nixon, *No More Vietnams*, 178-183.

section stated that the resolution conferred no new authority upon the president.¹²

Such a section was deemed necessary. The cease-fire in Cambodia quickly fell apart. President Nixon immediately ordered a bombing campaign to enforce the unratified Paris Peace Accords. Congress pointedly refused to fund this bombing. Rather than allow a prospective constitutional crisis to continue, Congress agreed to fund the bombing, but only for 45 more days. Domestically, Nixon announced the doctrines of executive privilege and impoundment. Finally, the Watergate Scandal revealed the existence of corruption in the White House. Evidence even surfaced that implicated the president in the coverup.¹³

In 1973, the Javits bill again passed the Senate by a wide margin. After House passage on July 18, a conference committee met during August and September. Javits and Zablocki again differed over the definitions section. Zablocki pointed out that many members of both Houses opposed the Senate bill as either too restrictive or an invitation for a brief presidential war. Javits voiced similar criticisms about the House bill.¹⁴ At this point, Zablocki's small stake poker

¹²U.S., Congress, Texts of H.J. Res. 2, 542, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.; Javits, *Javits*, 409—410; Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power*, 146—147; interview, Ivo Spalatin (by the author), April 11, 1989; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 119.

¹³Ambrose, *Nixon*, 3: 59-80, 165-178.

¹⁴Javits, *Javits*, 411; memorandum, John H. Sullivan, September 7, 1973, folder "War Powers 1970-1975 (1)," box 26N43B, Donald M. Fraser Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 139-144; Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power*, 201.

skills carried the day. The representative had learned that Javits had written a book on the war powers controversy. Zablocki told his aides that Javits would compromise first, because otherwise without a bill, his book would become worthless. For whatever reason, Zablocki's assessment that Javits would compromise proved correct.¹⁵

On October 4, the conference adopted the House bill as the basis for the final version. Javits consented to a nonbinding section defining presidential power. The consultation and the reporting sections remained roughly the same. A time limit for presidential commitments of military forces was set at 60 days, but the conference allowed a 30-day emergency extension. Another section interpreted the law. The victory in conference, however, created new problems. Staunch opponents of presidential prerogative, such as Senator Eagleton, immediately dissociated themselves from the bill.¹⁶ While the conference report passed the Senate by a wide margin, the House passed it 238-123. This victory margin needed at least eight more affirmative votes to override the expected veto.

The War Powers Resolution passed the House and Senate as several crises confronted President Nixon. On October 6, Nixon sent supplies to Israel as it resisted a Syrian and Egyptian invasion. Three days later, Vice-President Spiro

¹⁵Jacob K. Javits with Don Kellerman, *Who Makes War: The President Verses Congress* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1973); Sullivan interview; Javits, *Javits*, 411.

¹⁶Javits, *Javits*, 412; U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Text of House Report 93-547, the Conference Report for H. J. Res. 542, the War Powers Resolution, October 4, 1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.; Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power*, 204-205.

Agnew resigned after pleading no contest on corruption charges. On October 20, Nixon ordered the firing of the Watergate special prosecutor rather than produce subpoenaed records. This “Saturday Night Massacre” led to many calls for impeachment. Nixon vetoed the war powers bill on October 24; the next day, he placed American forces on alert due to the crisis in the Middle East. As these problems distracted Nixon, Zablocki helped convince four Democratic supporters of presidential prerogative to switch their votes. Three members lobbied by Zablocki did not vote. This relieved the representative of finding two votes to counter their expected negative votes. Desiring his first override of a president, Speaker of the House Carl Albert persuaded six Democratic opponents of prerogative to support the resolution anyway. After a close vote on November 7, the House overrode the veto, 284-135. That same day, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to override.¹⁷

The war powers controversy represented the continuation of the 200-years-old debate over prerogative. Nixon claimed presidential prerogative. Javits denied the existence of prerogative. Zablocki believed that Congress could not define the president’s war powers. He argued that a president should have the flexibility to act, if he could later justify his actions. The law envisioned an arrangement, not a binding limitation on the powers of the president. While the origins of a law

¹⁷Ambrose, *Nixon*, 3: 229-262, 254-255; memoranda, October 31, November 2, 1973, folder “Roll/Call Voting Records — War Powers, July 19-November 1973,” box 2, Legislation on War Powers Series (hereafter LWP), ZP; [Sullivan], *War Powers Resolution*, 163-165; Carl Albert with Danney Goble, *Little Giant: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 357; [Madison] *Capital Times*, November 8, 1973, *Milwaukee Journal*, November 18, 1973, folder “Clippings on War Powers, November, 1973,” box LWP 2, ZP.

cannot be derived from the study of one key author, the case of Zablocki suggests that the War Powers debate transcended concerns over the Vietnam War. Evidence instead points to a different cause. Had the bill been considered solely on its merits in 1973, it would have failed. As the excesses of the Nixon Administration became known later in 1973, many members of Congress warmed to the House bill. According to Representative Robert Drinan S.J. (D-MA), the resolution became law, because members of Congress hated Nixon "more than they loved the *Constitution*."¹⁸

THE TEMPLE UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE
OF APRIL 12-13, 1996:
EXPLORING THE "NEW" COLD WAR HISTORY
AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT
RESOLUTION

by
Peter Kindsvatter
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On February 12 and 13, 1996, Temple University's Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy hosted a highly successful conference on "The Origins of the Cold War: New Evidence, New Interpretations, and New Implications." Funded by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, the conference had a dual purpose: to reexamine the history of the origins of the cold war in light of the recently declassified record and to evaluate that history within the broader context of conflict avoidance and resolution. Twenty-eight

¹⁸*Milwaukee Journal*, November 18, 1973, folder "Clippings on the War Powers, November, 1973," box LWP 2, ZP.

historians and political scientists with interests in diplomatic history, international relations, political psychology, and conflict resolution attended.

The keynote speaker, John Lewis Gaddis, presented a paper entitled "The New Cold War History: Some First Impressions." Commentaries were provided by William Wohlforth, professor of Soviet politics and foreign policy at Princeton University; Vladislav Zubok, historian and Soviet studies expert at the National Security Archive whose book on foreign policy under Stalin and Khrushchev was recently published; Odd Arne Westad, a historian at the Nobel Institute in Stockholm, Sweden, who specializes in Soviet-United States-Chinese Cold War relations; and Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations at Columbia University. The commentaries were followed by a general and very lively round-table discussion.

The conference was designed to dovetail with an earlier conference at Princeton University on March 29-30, 1996, at which former high-ranking American and Soviet officials met to discuss the factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

In his paper Dr. Gaddis posited, given the end of the Cold War and the concomitant increase in access to archives and documents, that a "new" Cold War history will emerge. This new history will be multi-archival, stress "second" and "third-world" influences, and emphasize the importance of ideas and political legitimacy. The new Cold War history will thus differ from the "old," which did not have access to the evidence from all sides, tended to stress military and economic factors, and focused excessively on the bipolar confrontation between the US and the USSR. Gaddis went on to enumerate six hypotheses about the findings that would emerge from this new Cold War history.

First, the new Cold War history will emphasize the "diversification of power," both in its various forms (military, economic,

ideological, and cultural) and in its interaction among the many nations of the world. The new Cold War history will thus avoid the pitfalls of the “monodimensional” old history, which focused primarily upon the military aspects of power and the bipolar (US-USSR) balance of that power. (Gaddis admits to revising his own thoughts on this issue.)

Second, the new Cold War history will examine the ways in which the US and USSR built their “empires,” and in so doing will reveal a critical difference in the functioning of those empires. At the end of World War II, both the US and the USSR moved to fill the power vacuums left by the defeat of Germany and Japan. In succeeding years, both superpowers further jockeyed, with increasing vigor but decidedly mixed results, for influence over allies and third-world neutrals. In the long run, the US succeeded in this empire building while the USSR failed. Gaddis attributed the USSR failure to the excessively coercive, authoritarian nature of the Soviet empire, especially in the critical area of Eastern Europe, where the USSR never achieved a sufficient measure of legitimacy. The American empire, conversely, was founded upon “invitation.” Many nations, most importantly those in Western Europe, actively sought alliance with the United States and welcomed an American presence to offset the perceived threat from the Communist bloc. Hence the American empire was more viable, stable, and cohesive, given its allies’ willingness, even eagerness, to participate.

Third, the new Cold War history will show that the authoritarian Communist bloc in general, and Stalin and Mao in particular, were far less pragmatic in the field of diplomacy than commonly portrayed in the old Cold War history. Indeed, Stalin and Mao were “revolutionary romantics” who were often constrained, or even misled, by their own ideological beliefs. They genuinely if erroneously anticipated an eventual falling out among the nations of the capitalistic West and believed that Communists would be welcomed as liberators in such regions as East Europe, Latin America, and East Asia.

Fourth, as a corollary to the third hypothesis, the new Cold War history will demonstrate that the United States was far more pragmatic and successful in pursuing *Realpolitik* after World War II than generally credited by the realist school of the old Cold War history. The realists often condemned US foreign policy for its impractical, often self-defeating, emphasis on democratic ideals in a world where power was all that mattered. In actuality, the United States succeeded admirably in building a Western military and economic empire, as exemplified by NATO and the emergence of a prosperous, pro-US West Germany and Japan, without forsaking democratic ideals.

Fifth, the new Cold War history will show that the West had achieved a decisive advantage over the Communist bloc by the early 1960s. Only the democratic, capitalistic West was able to provide guns and butter. Coercive authoritarianism and a crumbling economy eventually undermined Communist legitimacy and led to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. Yet if this process was well underway in the 1960s, then why did the Cold War drag on for so long? Gaddis attributed this to both sides' obsession with military power, notably the nuclear arms race. Military power was the one aspect of the Soviet empire that "worked," right up to the end. This excessive focus on the arms race obscured the real problems that were mounting in the USSR and precluded an earlier East-West reconciliation.

Finally, while the new Cold War history will generate the fresh interpretations noted thus far, it will also validate some of the conclusions reached by old, "orthodox" Cold War histories. Perhaps most significantly, new evidence strengthens the thesis that, as long as Stalin was in charge, a Cold War confrontation was unavoidable. The growing body of information about Stalin, from his personal life to how he ran his regime, only serves to confirm his confrontational and brutal nature. He generated an atmosphere of distrust and antagonism toward the West that long survived his death and efforts at "de-Stalinization." This does not mean,

however, that the US does not share the blame for generating and sustaining the Cold War.

During the commentaries and general discussion that followed on Saturday, Gaddis's concept of a new Cold War history was well received. The conference participants agreed that the end of the Cold War would, indeed, generate new evidence and encourage new themes in the researching and writing of Cold War history and by extension influence future scholarship on international relations and conflict resolution. (Although not everyone concurred with the need for designating a "new" school of Cold War history as distinct from the "old.")

Not surprisingly, however, the conference participants took issue with some of Gaddis's hypotheses. They also presented some hypotheses of their own or sought to expand upon some of his ideas. Gaddis's call for an increased emphasis on ideological factors generated the most debate. Several participants questioned the extent to which the Communist regime, especially in Stalin's era, was motivated by idealistic, revolutionary romanticism. Stalin was primarily interested in Soviet power and national security. He sought retribution from Germany and its World War II allies and was far less concerned about being welcomed as a liberator. (Several participants were willing to concede, however, that revolutionary romanticism might have motivated Khrushchev to support wars of revolution and Castro's regime in Cuba.) On a broader plane, some participants questioned the extent to which any government's actions are motivated by ideology. Ideological beliefs rarely translate into concrete behavior — immediate security or economic concerns drive decisions, not ideology.

Most participants agreed with Dr. Gaddis that the arms race helped sustain the Cold War, but military power per se was less a factor than was the confrontational attitude of the superpowers. (Participants were not in accord, however, over which power was the more aggressive and antagonistic.) The Cold War only ended

when a Soviet leader (Mikhail Gorbachev) came to power who was willing to eschew a confrontational stance for cooperation.

Few took issue with Gaddis's assertion that Soviet authoritarianism and efforts to coerce support from erstwhile allies and neutrals damaged the legitimacy of the Communist "empire," but some participants were quick to point out that Soviet policies were not uniformly repressive. The Soviets made genuine efforts, albeit with limited success, to provide economic assistance and to generate goodwill in its satellite countries and potential third-world allies. Nor should Cold War historians forget that the Soviet regime retained a large measure of legitimacy and support among its subjects, at least through the 1960s. Finally, relationships within the Soviet empire were not completely dictated by Moscow. Soviet client states and Warsaw Pact allies were able, with varying degrees of success, to manipulate the Moscow regime for their own purposes — coercion was a two-way street.

Gaddis's hypothesis that the US was a more successful empire builder than the USSR met with little dissent, but some conference attendees saw an unwarranted moral judgment implicit in this hypothesis — the "good," democratic American empire-building process had triumphed over the "evil," coercive Communist effort at empire. This dichotomy overlooks the fact that the US often sought to impose its system and values on people who did not want it, that the US usually attended to its own economic interests first, and that the US frequently resorted to very undemocratic methods, notably in the area of covert operations, in building and maintaining its empire.

In addition to questioning or qualifying some of Gaddis's hypotheses, participants also suggested additional areas of emphasis for the new Cold War history. Historians must assess the impact of time, specifically the extent to which leaders viewed it as being on their side or not. If one side viewed time as running against it in the arms race, for example, then a frantic spurt of rearmament resulted. Similarly, one side's willingness to negotiate or to seek

better relations often hinged upon whether it perceived its future bargaining position as likely to improve or deteriorate.

Another area recommended for further emphasis by new Cold War historians lies in organizational structure and institutional process. As more archives and documents become available, especially in the former Soviet Union and its allies, historians must examine the military, economic, and intelligence records to understand what information was available to each side, how the decision-making process worked, and how operations were carried out below the cabinet and Politburo level.

The critical decade of the 1970s also requires further investigation. Given the conference's focus on Cold War origins, Gaddis drew most of his supporting examples from the 1945 to 1970 period. This leaves out an additional hypothesis worthy of examination: In the era of detente, starting in the 1970s, Soviet leaders seriously began to consider the USSR as the superpower equal of the United States, and thus they began to act in "superpower" ways, generating military and economic aid programs, sponsoring proxy states, and building an ever-larger military machine capable of global projection. The Soviet economy could not sustain this superpower image, and the resulting overextension helped to hasten the USSR's demise.

Finally, as indicated by the above, the implications of the history of the Cold War for examining issues of conflict resolution and avoidance was inherent in discussions throughout the conference. The history of the origins of the Cold War is, unfortunately, the history of "missed opportunities" for conflict resolution. Some of those missed opportunities and the reasons for them have already been touched upon. Personality sometimes played a role, as in the case of Stalin, whose confrontational and suspicious nature generated rather than mitigated conflict.

Time was another factor. If one side believed time was on its side in the arms race or in the process of empire building, then conflict

resolution was not likely to occur, because the passage of time would only strengthen that side's perception of its bargaining power. It would likewise be less concerned about the prospect for general war because of a concomitant strengthening of its deterrent capabilities. Several of the conference participants cited John Foster Dulles as an example. At some point in the 1953 to 1956 period, Dulles became significantly more optimistic about the United States's ability to gain the upperhand, militarily and economically, over the Soviet Union. Hence he lost interest in short-term negotiations, preferring instead to emphasize long-term economic pressure. The Communists may have viewed time as on their side as well — eventually the capitalistic West would suffer a fatal falling out. Only when the Soviet leadership, notably Gorbachev, came to realize that time was against them, given the Soviet Union's crumbling economy and their regime's falling political stock, did they seek to resolve the Cold War confrontation, which in turn would allow a lessening of the costly arms race.

The superpowers' excessive focus on military strength and the nuclear balance of power also worked against conflict resolution. The arms race and the wars waged by superpower-proxy states fueled Cold War antagonism and suspicions during the 1945-1970 period. (Conversely, after 1970, Soviet overextension caused by the arms race and regional conflicts such as Afghanistan needs further examination as a factor leading to conflict resolution.)

Although by no means comprehensive, this summary indicates the depth and scope of the debate. Gaddis presented a provocative, thought-provoking paper which was subjected to a vigorous, productive cross examination by his peers. All the participants benefitted from the exposure to some fresh ideas, or at least to new perspectives on long-standing issues.

BRITISH RECORDS AVAILABLE ON CD-ROM

by

John W. Young

UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER

Gillian Staerck and Michael Kandiah, eds., *PROfiles 1964 on CD-ROM: Set 1, Prime Minister's and Cabinet Documents* (\$595.00; ISBN 0-11-526478-7); *Set 2, Documents on External Affairs* (\$695.00; ISBN 0-11-526487-6); *Set 3, Cabinet Committees and Defence Documents* (\$595.00; ISBN 0-11-526488-4); *Set 4, Comprehensive Index and Library CD-ROM* (\$400.00; ISBN 0-11-526489-2). Discount for purchase of all four sets: \$1,785.00. Published by HMSO Electronic Publishing Sales, HMSO Publications Centre, 51 Nine Elms Lane, PO Box 276, London SW8 5DT (Tel: David Blake or Andrew Evans on UK 171-873-8236; Fax: UK 171-873-8203). The US and Canadian agent is UNIPUB, 4611 F Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-4391 (Tel: Toll Free 800 274-4888; Fax: 800 865-3450).

For those wishing to consult British national archives for the year 1964, a new publication begun by the official government publisher, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, should prove valuable. Two British scholars have worked through some of the most popular series at the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew, London and selected about 120,000 pages of documents for inclusion in this set of four CD-ROMS. Much that is reproduced concerns British domestic issues but, aware of their potential audience, the editors devote considerable attention to international relations, especially Anglo-American diplomacy, the Cold War, North-South relations and European integration. One of the editors, Gillian Staerck, is herself working on a Ph.D on US-British-French relations in the late

1950s and early 1960s and the hope is to produce similar sets of CD-ROMs for subsequent years. The first set includes all the minutes and memoranda of the principal executive body in the United Kingdom, the Cabinet (series CAB.128 and CAB.129 at the PRO) with meetings taking place about twice per week and providing the best 'snapshot' of what was of most concern to decision-makers. But also included are a selection of papers and correspondence from the Prime Minister's Office in Downing Street, again at the centre of the executive (series PREM. 11 and PREM 13 at the PRO). The selection criteria used by the editors with PREM series has been to select files on important political and economic issues in the UK, international economic relations and foreign political relations, whilst omitting any poor quality documents. Again Anglo-American relations and the Cold War figure prominently on the international side.

Set Two of the CD-ROMS is completely dedicated to external affairs and is largely made up of the most important series of Foreign Office correspondence, FO 371, which should be familiar to all American researchers who have worked on twentieth century international issues at Kew. The US, USSR, NATO, European Community, China and Afro-Asian states all figure prominently as do particular problems in which the British were involved at the time. These include unrest in the Aden Colony and the 'Confrontation' between Malaysia (a former colony, with a large British military presence) and Indonesia, as well as the situation in Vietnam and the rest of South-east Asia. Economic relations are not well-covered principally, the editors say, 'because they fall outside the Cold War/hot spots remit.' Apart from FO371 selections are included from the frequently-undervalued FO 370 series of Foreign Office Research Office memoranda, useful when looking at the planning side of diplomacy. The Third Set has, in effect, three diverse collections of

documents, but ones in which international issues are again important. First come the records from the Cabinet's various sub committees (CAB.130, 133, and 134) and the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (CAB.148). This Committee, a new innovation in 1964, succeeded the old Defence Committee and sought to improve on its predecessor by dealing with a wide range of international and defence problems. Chaired by the Prime Minister, it included all ministers in the foreign and defence field, as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces, and can be considered the nearest British equivalent to the American National Security Council. Other committees of relevance to the international scene include permanent sub-committees on External Economic Policy, Economic Development and Satellite Communications and *ad hoc* committees on the Cyprus problem, Commonwealth policy and the American *Polaris* base at Holy Loch. Set three also includes the meetings and correspondence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (roughly equivalent to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff) and their Planning Staff (DEFE. 4, 5 and 6). Finally Set three includes the papers of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's office (T171), mainly concerned with domestic economic and financial issues. It should be noted that documents on the CD-ROMS only include those released under Britain's 'Thirty Year Rule'. Other papers relevant to 1964 may well appear at the PRO in years to come.

Those wishing to install the system need an IBM 386, or preferably a 486, computer with a CD-ROM drive, a VGA or super VGA graphic card compatible with Microsoft Windows 3.1, 2 mb of RAM and disk space and, for printers, 1mb of printer memory. Those, like myself, who use an Apple Macintosh, will therefore have to get access to an alternative machine. The 64-page User-Guide which comes with each set offers a wide range of search facilities (including a 'sounds

like' option) for finding the documents of relevance to you as well as basic information on installation, printing (as many copies of documents as needed) and altering the size of images. I still needed to make a telephone call for advice on how to install the system, but this may have been due to my lack of familiarity with CD-ROM, and once the system was installed I found it very 'user-friendly'. The documents which you see on the screen appear like microfilms of the originals and as with microfilms some blank pages appear from the original file. The documents have not been digitally transferred to CD-ROM, so it is impossible for example, to search them for key words. For that you must rely on the index. But given that many of the most interesting entries in, for example FO371 are hand-written minutes, it would have been prohibitively expensive to transfer the original source into digital information. I had some initial concern that the selection of documents by the editors might be inappropriate. There can be few academics, I guess, who really trust someone else to gather their material for them! But, with two colleagues, I did an experiment for the purpose of this review — travelling to the PRO to search through files on a particular subject, then returning to my Department to see how *PROfiles 1964* compared with the documents we had selected. On British sales of arms to South Africa in 1964 I found that a fair number of documents were on *PROfiles* including, it must be said, the most important although most of the detailed decision making in the Foreign Office was omitted. A Ph.D student had a similar experience when researching relations with Vietnam and was rather exasperated that he had already spent money on several, now redundant trips to Kew. The third member of our team, looking at the Multilateral Nuclear Force proposal, felt that *all* the vital papers were in *PROfiles*: those documents which were omitted were ones, he felt, that he would have omitted himself. Obviously, those who are writing Ph.Ds on dedicated British subjects will always have

to visit London to carry out their research. But if they are working on 1964 and have prior access to *PROfiles* it will make that stay quicker and easier, whilst those academics who wish to use British sources as background to issues like Vietnam, the Johnson administration's policy towards Europe or developments in NATO will find these CD-ROMS an important source.

LETTERS

8 November 1996

Dear Editor:

This letter constitutes a footnote to Robert H. Johnson's letter (September 1996 issue of the *Newsletter*) commenting upon a note by Shane Maddock on U.S. thinking about the Chinese nuclear capabilities in the mid-1960s that appeared in the *Newsletter's* March 1996 issue. The report by George Rathgens, "Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Capabilities", which Maddock included in his note, has recently been fully declassified by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. In his letter, Mr. Johnson expressed doubt that two of the four possible methods of destruction described in the Rathgens paper referred to the use of proxies, but the declassified version confirms Mr. Maddock's conjecture. The first part of item 2, hitherto sanitized, reads "GRC [Government of the Republic of China] bombing. This is judged not feasible because of inadequate GRC capabilities." The excised word from item 4, relating to the air drop of sabotage teams, is "GRC".

With respect to Mr. Johnson's argument about U.S. official thinking in 1964 concerning a preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities, a recently declassified memorandum to William Bundy by Mr. Johnson himself, dated 4 September 1964, confirms his recollection about low interest in such an attack except under fairly restrictive circumstances. As Mr. Johnson then wrote, his studies on preemption had led him to the conclusion, apparently reflecting a "broad interdepartmental consensus", that the preemptive option should be exercised "only as a part of a response to major, identifiable Chinese communist aggression."¹⁹ Mr. Maddock's study will no doubt enlighten us about the extent to which the Gilpatric Committee's members saw preemptive action against the Chinese program as an "enticing" option. Nevertheless, as Mr. Johnson suggests, U.S. officials who thought about the issue - Edward E. Rice, the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong is a good example - found preemptive nuclear strikes unattractive for either moral and practical reasons (for example, the unquestionably disastrous impact that unprovoked action would have had on U.S. relations with Japan, among other important bilateral relationships in East Asia.)

William Burr

¹⁹Johnson to Bundy, "The Secretary's Speech on the Far East and the ChiCom Nuclear Problem," 4 September 1964, Record Group 59, State Department Records, Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, DEF 12-1 Chicom.

To the Editor:

Marilyn Young's otherwise fine review of Gar Alperovitz's book, *The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (AHR December 1995) is diminished by the credibility she extends to Barton Bernstein's thesis. Who states in effect that there was an amorphous confluence of men and events which foreordained the dropping of the atom bomb. This view, of course, absolves Truman of any responsibility. However Truman throughout his life gladly accepted responsibility on the grounds the atom bomb was a military weapon and that he gave the order in order to shorten the war thereby saving lives. As to whether the atom bomb was just a military weapon, this is questionable in view of the fact that the Interim Committee established in order to advise Truman on the atom bomb there was not one single military man appointed to the committee. In any case it was Truman who made the decision as to when the bomb was to be dropped and agreed to the target.

His stated desire to end the war as soon as possible was a laudable goal and of course no right thinking person would object to it. Let us examine how well he carried this out. Truman, at the Potsdam Conference gave the order for the bomb to be dropped no earlier than August 3. The bomb was ready for delivery on July 30. For those who believe that the bomb was decisive in triggering the Japanese surrender it is possible the first bomb could have been used before August 6, and thereby resulting in Japan's surrender before August 14. It is true we are only talking about a few days but those few days for Japan were devastating. On August 14, the very day that Japan agreed to surrender, the Air Force mounted the most massive bombing attack of the entire war involving more than 1,000 planes.

There are other decisions of Truman that contradict his claim to end the war as soon as possible. On May 28, he agreed with the then Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, of the need to retain the emperor. However he never informed the Japanese of this. The significance of this, is that when the Japanese agreed to a conditional surrender the one and only condition they laid down was precisely the retention of the emperor.

After the U.S. had successfully tested the atom bomb Truman hoped that the war could be ended before the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. This would supposedly justify him in not honoring the agreements made at the Yalta Conference regarding Stalin's plans in the Far East. President Roosevelt had agreed to help implement these agreements in the ensuing negotiations with the Chinese. Stalin had promised that he would enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the war in Europe and after he had a *signed* agreement with China agreeing to the agreements reached at Yalta. Soviet negotiations with the Chinese were discontinued on July 1. On July 23, Truman sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek to resume negotiations. This would seem to be a contradiction of his hope to end the war before the Soviet Union entered the war. This was not a contradiction. Truman was engaging in a plan that even Machiavelli would envy. Truman figured that as long as Stalin was negotiating with the Chinese and if at the same time the Chinese were told to stall it would be possible that the war could be over before a signed agreement was achieved. Stalin foiled Truman. If one would pardon a digression, this may be one of the 31 out of 32 agreements that Truman claimed that Stalin broke. The significance of Truman's mind boggling attempt to delay the Soviet entry into the war is that in the official British history of the war in the Pacific, edited by Major General Kirby, states flatly that it was the Soviet Union's entrance into the

war that triggered the Japanese surrender. Perhaps, on this event the British may be more impartial than we in the U.S. In any case an agreement was signed on August 14, between China and the Soviet Union.

As the war was entering the final months many peace feelers of the Japanese were being reported, but Truman never made the slightest attempt to determine how serious they were. The U.S. having broken the Japanese code, were aware of the attempt through Moscow. The Japanese were imploring the Soviet Union to receive Prince Konoye, a three time prime minister, who was delegated in the hopeful negotiations, to end the war. As stated, Truman even in this case never indicated the slightest interest.

In October 1944 at the Quebec Conference President Roosevelt and Churchill agreed a warning would be given to Japan regarding the use of the atom bomb against them. Truman never gave any warning. After the defeat of Germany there was no need to keep secret, work on the atom bomb. In fact, if the Japanese were kept informed of the progress that was being made it may have certainly added the pressure on Japan to surrender.

There were other acts of commission and omission that belie Truman's claim that he wanted to end the war as soon as possible. In 1954 at the inquiry held to determine J. R. Oppenheimer's security clearance he made a revealing remark. Oppenheimer stated it was important to drop the bomb *before* the war ended. From this perspective dropping the bomb had nothing to do with winning the war, nor did it have anything to do with ending the war, it had everything to do with Truman's post-war strategic interests. With the end of World War II no nation could be the first to detonate the awesome atom bomb and maintain credibility as a humane power. With

the Axis Powers defeated, and the people expecting a peaceful society after the most brutal war in history, there could be no justification for developing the atom bomb, and for any nation to do so would be recognized as a threat to all nations. The bomb had to be dropped under the cover of war. The war had to be prolonged in order to drop the bomb. Truman agreed to the targeting of the atom bomb. Regardless of all the justifications made to justify Truman's decision to drop the bomb on Japan, the fact remains, the target was civilians, women, children, the elderly, and the disabled. No military man had to be told that military installations or munition factories are legitimate targets but adding the phrase SURROUNDED BY WORKER'S HOUSES made Truman's decision a crime against humanity. As though to emphasize this, you had the spectacle of General Groves's obscene apology complaining that only 40,000 people were killed at Nagasaki because the terrain was not favorable. Since the American people were not consulted on the decision to drop the bomb, it is time that we repudiate Truman's decision.

Ephraim Schulman

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To the Editor:

The exchange between Stanley Goldberg and Barton Bernstein in the September 1996 *Newsletter* illuminates a major problem plaguing the study of atomic diplomacy. Too often we are told that to uncover the mysteries of this subject we only need to consider the events surrounding Hiroshima. In chastising Dr. Goldberg, which I believe he was correct to do, Dr. Bernstein contends that Dr. Goldberg "should have carefully

read the records, starting well before the 23 July [1945] memorandum, to determine whether there had been a long-run assumption, since at least about early 1944, that the bombs would be detonated high in the air, and if so, why?"²⁰ Dr. Bernstein and other atomic scholars assume that early nuclear history begins no earlier than in mid-World War II.

I believe we must start even earlier, to when men and women first began to think seriously about an atomic bomb. In my soon to be completed dissertation, I study Anglo-American atomic diplomacy beginning in 1939. While I am concerned with how the atomic bomb — or the idea of an atomic bomb — impacted the postwar national security strategies developed by both nations between 1939 and 1945, my research can offer a very simple word or two about the question of pre-Hiroshima thinking about radioactivity.

I agree with Dr. Bernstein that the decision to explode the bomb at a high altitude had nothing to do with the desire to shield Hiroshima from radioactive fallout. Early documents, by early I mean pre-1944, clearly demonstrate that the British considered it unlikely that an atomic weapon could be used without exposing the target to deadly levels of radiation. In the Frisch-Peierls memorandum, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls wrote:

As a weapon, the super-bomb would be practically irresistible. There is no material structure that could be expected to resist the force of the explosion...Owing to the spreading of radioactive substances with the wind, the bomb could probably not be used without killing large numbers of civilians, and this may make it unsuitable as a weapon for use by this country...It

²⁰Barton Bernstein, "Doing Nuclear History: Treating Scholarship Fairly and Interpreting Pre-Hiroshima Thinking About "Radioactive Poisoning," *The SHAFR Newsletter* 26:3 (September 1996): 28.

is quite conceivable that Germany is, in fact, developing this weapon...If one works on the assumption that Germany is, or will be, in the possession of this weapon, it must be realized that no shelters are available that would be effective and could be used on a large scale. The most effective reply would be a counter-threat with a similar weapon.²¹

The British shared these thoughts with their American allies.

I also distinctly remember seeing a document from the early 1940s in the United States National Archives which discussed the option of constructing a radioactive weapon in the event that an explosive was deemed impossible. This weapon would act like a neutron bomb. Since this memorandum is not germane to my current research, I did not make a copy of it. Nor did I write down its location, though I should have. This document, if I remember it correctly, might corroborate Dr. Bernstein's belief that Harvey Bundy was disingenuous when he claimed that the Target Committee chose to explode the atomic bomb at a high altitude in order to minimize the risk of radioactive fallout over a Japanese civilian population.

While I agree with Dr. Bernstein, I do not mean to offer a specific historical argument. My point is that atomic scholars would do well to move away from a Hiroshima-centered study of atomic diplomacy in favor of a project which focuses on the entire atomic energy program beginning in 1939.

Panajiotis Kyriacos Parides (SUNY at Stony Brook)

²¹"Frisch-Peierls Memorandum"; in Ronald Clark, *Tizard* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), 216. No original copy of this memorandum exists in London or Washington.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

AHA Call for Papers

The 1998 meeting of the AHA will be held in Seattle, January 8-11. The second and final deadline for submissions of entire panels or workshops is February 15, 1997. Mail four copies of the complete proposal (including the checklist and cover sheet and a two-page vita for participants that indicates recent papers read or works published) to Sara Evans, History, University of Minnesota, 267 19th Ave. South, Minneapolis, MN 55455

The Furniss Book Award

The Mershon Center of The Ohio State University invites submissions for the 1997 Furniss Book Award. The award will be given to the author of a book published in 1994, 1995, or 1996 that makes an exceptional contribution to the study of national and international security. The award, which commemorates the founding director of the Mershon Center, is restricted to the author's first published book. The winning author receives \$1000 and is invited to address the faculty of the Mershon Center.

We invite submissions from authors, publishers and third parties. More than one book from the same publisher may be nominated, but edited volumes will not be considered.

The competition will proceed in two rounds. One copy of each book is required upon nomination for the first round. Publishers of books included in the second round of semifinalists will be asked to provide three additional copies. Books will be evaluated by the Mershon Awards Committee on the basis of relevance to the award subject, originality of contribution, scholarship, and clarity of exposition.

Submissions must have a publication date for the calendar years 1994, 1995, or 1996. Nominations will be accepted through February 28, 1997. Letters of nomination (with copies to the publisher and/or author) accompanied by a nonreturnable copy of the book should be sent to:

Bill Ayres, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1501 Neil Ave., Columbus OH 43201-2602, phone (614) 292-1681

Call For Papers

The International Intelligence History Study Group will hold its annual conference, May 2-4, 1997, in Waldbröl (near Cologne), Germany. The theme of this years meeting is "The Origins of Intelligence Organizations," Papers may focus on the establishment of the CIA 50 years ago, but the organizers are also particularly interested in papers on motives, interests, and aims of individuals, institutions and governments that created intelligence organizations in other countries and periods, i.e. Stasi or KGB.

All colleagues in Intelligence Studies and related fields, particularly younger scholars, are invited to submit proposals for speakers, papers, and whole sessions.

Proposals together with a short *cv* should be sent, no later than January 31, 1997, to: Prof. Jürgen Heideking, Universität Köln, Historisches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany

Tel: Germany 221-4702307

Fax: Germany 221-4704996

Call for Papers

Siena College is sponsoring a multi-disciplinary conference entitled "Theodore Roosevelt and the Dawn of the 'American Century,'" April 18-19, 1998. Topics of interest will include, but are not limited to literature, art, education, Pragmatism, Progressivism, muckraking, military and naval history, American expansionism and exceptionalism, urban expansion and reform, immigration and religion.

Deadline for proposals: October 1, 1997. Send a brief (1-3 pg) outline or abstract of the proposal with some sense of sources, archival materials, etc., consulted and a recent *cv* or brief current biographical sketch.

Final papers due: February 15, 1998

Replies and inquires to: Professor Thomas O. Kelly, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville NY 12211-1462.

Tel: (518) 783-2595

FAX: 518-783-4293

Call for Contributors

The editors invite proposals for contributions to volume five of **BOOKS ON ISRAEL**. The series is co-sponsored by SUNY Press and the Association for Israel Studies. In the tradition of the preceding four volumes, this collection will be interdisciplinary in nature.

Prospective contributors are asked to identify several recent books (or one seminal work) dealing with Israel which lie within their field(s) of expertise. The proposed chapter should go beyond the normal "review essay" to use the chosen work(s) as a point of departure for a broad critical examination of the state of scholarship within the prescribed field and/or the state of Israeli society as seen from the perspective of the contributor's field of expertise.

The editors welcome proposals no more than two pages long consisting of a list of the work(s) to be reviewed; a summary of the salient points which emerge from a consideration of these works; and an abstract discussing the direction and thesis of the author's proposed essay.

Hard copies should be sent to both editors, below. Inquiries via e-mail. Deadline: December 31, 1996. Proposals accepted for inclusion in the volume should result in essays of 15-25 pages. Contact: Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, Department of History, Carnegie Mellon University, 240 Baker Hall, Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 le3a@andrew.cmu.edu
or:

Neil Caplan, Humanities Department, Vanier College, 821 Ste Croix Avenue, Saint-Laurent QC H4L 3X9 Canada

caplann@vaniercollege.qc.ca

Call for Papers

1997 Bluegrass Symposium

February 28-March 2, 1997

Lexington, Kentucky

The University of Kentucky's 1997 Bluegrass Symposium invites proposals for papers and/or panels for its fifth annual conference. This year's primary focus will concern new approaches to American Foreign Relations

History from the eighteenth century to the present. The Program Committee also encourages the submission of papers and panels on other aspects of American and World history, papers on the domestic impact of the Vietnam War would be especially helpful and welcome.

More information on the Symposium should be available by the end of November at the following WEBSITE:

<http://www.uky.edu/StudentOrgs/HGSA.bluegrass.html>

Graduate and advanced undergraduate students are welcome to submit papers and serve as commentators. Proposals should include a one-page abstract of each paper and curriculum vitas of presenters and commentators. Send the entire application packet, postmarked no later than December 31, to: The 1997 Bluegrass symposium, c/o Daniel E. Crowe, Department of History, University of Kentucky, Lexington KY 40506-0027

Tel: 606-257-4431

Fax: 606-323-3885

e-mail: decrow00@ukcc.uky.edu

SHFG Symposium

The Society for History in the Federal Government and the National Archives Assembly are pleased to announce joint sponsorship of a symposium: **Looking Backward, Looking Forward**, April 3-4, 1997, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Nineteen ninety-seven is the fiftieth anniversary of what many consider to be the beginning of the Cold War. Therefore, a major theme of the symposium will be the passage of the National Security Act, which created new agencies and procedures having enormous impact upon the Federal Government. Suggested topics include the establishment of these and other federal agencies at the time.

In addition, SHFG and the Assembly invite discussion of possible directions and problems of historical research in the next fifty years, as historians and archivists, long accustomed to simple retrieval of records from paper and micro graphics systems, will be faced with complex technological issues in preserving and using records stored in a variety of electronic formats and systems.

The program committee also welcomes papers and sessions on other areas of federal history.

Submit proposals with short *cv* of participants by January 1, 1997, to either program committee co-chair: James G. Cassidy, National Archives and Records Administration, Center for Electronic Records, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001.

Tel: 301-713-6630, ext. 237

Fax: 301-713-6911

e-mail: james.cassedy@arch2.nara.gov

Dr. Rebecca H. Cameron, Air Force History Office, 170 Luke Avenue, Suite 405, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. 20332-8050.

Tel: 202-767-5088, ext. 224

Fax: 202-767-5527

Call for Papers

Augusta State University will host a multi-disciplinary conference on the Impact of the Cold War on Southern Institutions and Culture, 26 April 1997. The Cold War involved a huge expansion of the American national security establishment, including the production of nuclear weapons, a standing conventional army and an expanded navy and air force. Many of these activities were located in the South and introduced a large number of Americans to the region for the first time since Reconstruction. The changes in the South during the period included the end of segregation, an economic explosion, and a political resurgence. What role, if any, did the Cold War play in these changes? The Cold War started fifty years ago and ended five years ago. Is it time to re-assess or assess this period and its impact for the first time?

Fifteen to twenty page double-spaced papers should be submitted by 14 February 1997 to: "The Cold War and the South," Jim Birdseye, Department of History and Anthropology, Augusta State University, 2500 Walton Way, Augusta, GA 30904

Robert Albion Fellowship

American Maritime History. Mystic Seaport and Williams College invite applications for the *Robert G. Albion Fellowship in American Maritime History*. This is a two-year appointment, beginning 1 July 1997, to teach

one course each semester in American Maritime History to twenty-three liberal arts undergraduates in the Williams-Mystic Maritime Studies Program. \$26,000 stipend. Candidates must have or be near completion of the Ph.D. Send application letter, C.V. and three references by 10 January to: Dr. James T. Carlton, Director, Williams College - Mystic Seaport, Maritime Studies Program, PO Box 6000, Mystic CT 06355-0990. For complete job description call (860) 572-5359, fax (860) 572-5329, e-mail: munson@mystic.org. AA/EOE.

Carter Presidency Conference

A conference on "The Carter Presidency: Policy choices in the Post New Deal Era" will be held at the Carter Library and Presidential Center, Atlanta, on February 20-22, 1997. The sponsors include Georgia Tech, Georgia State, Jimmy Carter Library, U. of Georgia, and Vanderbilt U. The program includes three plenary sessions, fourteen domestic and twelve international issue panels. For information contact: Gary Fink, History, Georgia State U., Atlanta GA 30303-3083.

Tel: (404) 377-1132

Fax: 404-377-8286

e-mail: hisgmf@panther.gsu.edu

PUBLICATIONS

Ewell, Judith (William and Mary), *Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe's Hemisphere to Petroleum's Empire*, University of Georgia Press, 1996. Cloth ISBN 08203-17859, \$50.00; paper ISBN 0--82203-1783-7, \$20.00.

Hunt, Michael H. (North Carolina - Chapel Hill), *Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968*. Hill & Wang, 1996, ISBN 08090-50234, \$18.00.

Petersen, Neal H. (Arlington, VA) ed., *From Hitler's Doorstep: the War-Time Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles*,

1942-1945. Penn State Press, 1996. ISBN 0271-014857, \$85.00.

Trask, Roger R., *Defender of the Public Interest: The General Accounting Office, 1921—1966*(Washington: GAO, 1996). ISBN 0-16-048728-5, \$38.00.

CALENDAR

1997

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02142.
- January 2-5 The 111th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in New York.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Submissions due for Warren Kuehl Award.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the 1996 Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 17-20 The 90th meeting of the OAH will take place at the San Francisco Hilton.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 19-22 SHAFR's 22nd annual conference will meet at Georgetown University.
Program chair - Maarten Pereboom, local arrangements chair - David Painter & Nancy B. Tucker.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

- November 1 Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.
November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
November 15 Deadline for Myrna F. Bernath research fellowship proposals.
November 22 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

Future OAH meetings will be in Indianapolis (Westin Hotel and Indiana Convention Center), April 2-5, 1998. The deadline for proposals is January 17, 1997; Toronto (Sheraton Centre) April 22-25, 1999; St. Louis (Adam's Mark) March 30-April 2, 2000.

Future AHA meeting will be in Seattle, Jan. 8-11, 1998 (see the note in Announcements regarding final deadline); Washington, D.C., Jan. 7-10, 1999; and Chicago, Jan. 6-9, 2000.

PERSONALS

David M. Esposito (Penn State Altoona) has been awarded a Senior Fulbright Fellowship to teach and study at Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang (in central Java), Indonesia, September 1996-July 1997.

David Reynolds (Cambridge) has been awarded the Society for Military History's 1996 Distinguished Book Award for *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945*.

Betty A. Dessants (Florida State University) spent the 1995-96 academic year as a postdoctoral fellow at The Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Public Policy at Ohio State University. She has been awarded a research grant from the Air Force Historical Research Agency for her study of the relationship between the government, philanthropic

foundations, and Harvard University's Russian Research Center during the early Cold War.

Tony Smith (Tufts) has been appointed a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship for the academic year 1996-97.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Frank Costigliola, History, U. of Rhode Island, Kingston RI 02881.

Books may be sent at any time during 1996, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1997.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 1996 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 1997.

RECENT WINNERS:

1990	Walter Hixson	1992	Thomas Schwartz
	Anders Stephanson	1993	Elizabeth Cobbs
1991	Gordon H. Chang	1994	Tim Borstelmann

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners normally deliver their lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 1997. The Chairperson of the Committee for 1996-1997 is: Arnold Offner, Department of History, Lafayette College, Easton PA 18042.

RECENT WINNERS:

1990	Richard Immerman	1993	Larry Berman
1991	Robert McMahon	1994	Diane Kunz
1992	H.W. Brands	1995	Thomas Schwartz

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1996. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if

more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1997. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Ralph Levering, Department of History, Davidson College, Davidson NC 28036.

The award is given at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the OAH annual meeting.

RECENT WINNERS:

1990 Lester Foltos	1993 Daniel P. O'C. Greene
1991 William Earl Weeks	1994 Frederick Logevall
1992 Marc Gallicchio	1995 Heike Bungert

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) a one-page curriculum vitae of the applicant and a dissertation prospectus;
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value to the study;
 - (c) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (d) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1000.

6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications should be sent to: Bill Miscamble, CSC, History, Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556. The deadline is November 1, 1997.

RECENT WINNERS:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1991 Eileen Scully | 1994 Delia Pergande |
| 1992 Shannon Smith | 1995 Amy L.S. Staples |
| 1993 R. Tyler Priest
Christian Ostermann | |

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 1996 and 1997 will be considered in 1997. Submission deadline is November 15, 1997. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Carolyn Eisenberg, Department of History, Hofstra University, Hempstead NY 11550.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- 1991 Diane Kunz and Betty Unterberger

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowship

The society announces two Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships, 2,500 USD each, to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The awards are granted every other year. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Carolyn Eisenberg, Department of History, Hofstra University, Hempstead NY 11550. Submission deadline is November 15, 1998.

RECENT WINNERS:

1992 Shannon Smith

1994 Regina Gramer
Jacklyn Stanke
Christine Skwiot

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1996, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation, are required.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1997 to: Roger Dingman, History Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles CA 90089-0034.

The Holt Memorial Fellowship carries an award of \$1,500.00. Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

RECENT WINNERS:

1991 Kyle Longley
1992 Robert Brigham
1993 Darlene Rivas

1994 Christian Ostermann
1995 John Dwyer
1996 Philip E. Catton

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize is awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: Chester Pach, History Department, Ohio University, Athens OH 45701.

RECENT WINNERS:

1986 Dorothy Borg

1992 Bradford Perkins

1988 Alexander DeConde

1994 Wayne Cole

1990 Richard W. Leopold

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address

voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1995 and 1996. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1997.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1987 Harold Josephson

1993 Thomas Knock

1988 Melvin Small

1995 Lawrence S. Witner

1991 Charles DeBenedetti and
Charles Chatfield

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: George Herring, History, Lexington, KY 40506-0027.

PREVIOUS WINNER 1991 Justus Doenecke

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings from their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This competition is for a book, published in 1995, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 1997.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Current chairperson: James E. Miller, 132 13th St. SE., Washington DC 20003.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1992 David Anderson and Diane Kunz

1994 Mel Leffler

1995 John L. Harper