


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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

EUROPE, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND GREAT POWER ACTIVITY IN THE CARIBBEAN AND ASIA

by

Thomas Schoonover

SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA

The 1890s were catastrophic for Spain. It struggled with domestic civil tensions and various imperial disorders including a devastating and bloody revolt in 1895 in Cuba. Cuban insurgents caused much of Spain's distress between 1895 and 1898, and elevated U.S. pressure on Spain. The severe U.S. depression of 1893 and its social disorders also heightened U.S. interest in Spain's colonial war in Cuba and encouraged the U.S. government to expel Spain from its Caribbean (and Asian!) colonies and to assume the quest of Christopher Columbus (and all of Europe) for a quicker, less costly route to the wealth of Asia. U.S. policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fulfilled the Columbian vision, but they had more secular and specific political objectives. U.S. political leaders seized the opportunity arising from the Cuban revolt to initiate social imperialist policies in the Caribbean and the Pacific-Asian area; they intended to ameliorate domestic U.S. socio-economic problems through international relations. Scholars commonly note the transforming effect of 1898 upon Asian societies and their histories. Despite rhetoric about alleged civilizing quests and humanitarian duty, the Spanish and U.S. governments ignored the Cuban and the Filipino insurgents during and after the war. Neither metropole power responded well to nationalist, anti-imperialist locals. And both societies paid a price for ignoring popular self-government movements.¹ During the 1880 to 1917 years, however the U.S. government pursued the adventure of Columbus primarily because it wanted to interact with Asian societies.

The Spanish-American War rests in the time and space between Christopher Columbus's, or a general European, vision to reach the

rich, exotic Asia and the acceleration of Asian anti-foreign, anti-imperial, and anti-western reactions to western missionaries, businesses, military, and diplomats. I intend to explore the objectives of U.S. intervention in the Spanish colonial conflict and how other interested countries evaluated the U.S. intervention. I will look at the response of the independent isthmian states — Mexico and Central America — and Germany and France to the war and peace agreement of 1898, to the belated fulfillment of the Columbus-European vision, and to the altered and transformed objective of U.S. officials, military, missionaries, and entrepreneurs. “That splendid little war” of 1898 left a mark upon the Caribbean basin, the Pacific basin, and the colonial and imperial powers of Europe as well as the United States.

Norman A. Graebner, one of the most prominent U.S. diplomatic historians, opened his book, *An Uncertain Tradition*, with a story which captures one theme of this paper:

At the turn of the century a foreign ambassador in Washington observed that, although he had been at his post only a brief time, he had seen two different countries — the United States before the war with Spain and the United States after that war. In this picturesque remark, the diplomat recognized what some thoughtful Americans had already sensed — that 1898 was a turning point in the history of the Republic.²

The war was also a turning point for Spain, Cuba, Colombia, Panama, Central America, Mexico, and much of the Pacific basin.

Walter LaFeber, another prominent U.S. diplomatic historian, used a cryptic title, “Two Crises, One War” for a section of his survey of U.S. foreign relations, *The American Age*, which reveals another theme of this paper. In LaFeber’s words:

During the early 1898 run-up to the war with Spain, McKinley closely associated the crises in the Caribbean and Asian theaters. As revolution threatened Cuba, so European imperialism endangered China. The U.S. business community tried to keep Asia in the forefront of the nation’s debate.³

The world depression of 1893 produced a domestic U.S. economic downturn that effected Spanish Cuba and the threat of a division of China. These two combined to become "Two Crises and Three Wars" if one adds the Philippine insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion to the Spanish-Cuban-American War.

The surge of U.S. activity in the Caribbean and Central American isthmus in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was motivated in large part by the same vision, greed, and curiosity as the European adventurers who quested for a route to Asia in the fifteenth century. In the 1490s and the 1890s, fame and great wealth awaited the opening of a cheaper, quicker route to Asia and the whole Pacific basin. Whereas the fifteenth and sixteenth century adventurers sought primarily luxury goods and souls to save, the later visionaries and businessmen sought souls to save, raw materials, investment opportunities, markets for manufactured products, and cheaper access to luxury goods. While Columbus and other maritime adventurers took considerable personal risks to reach Asia, four hundred years later, U.S. expansion into the Caribbean and across the isthmus toward Asia entailed less personal and physical risk, but indeed risks of a strategic and political nature. During the twentieth century, the U.S. involvement in conflict in the Philippines, China, Korea, Vietnam, and almost everywhere else in Asia and throughout the Caribbean region attested to the risks.⁴ The age of discovery gave way to an age of diversified risk and conflict.

The European adventurers and merchants of the 1490s and the 16th century found no easy or cheap access to Asia; that had to wait until the Suez canal was completed in 1869. By then, the center of European economic activity and wealth accumulation had drifted north and west from Spain and Italy toward Great Britain, northern Europe, and the United States. This new locus of wealth and economic demand decreased the value of Suez as a way to east Asia for much of the industrializing world. The isthmus of the New World would better link production, financial, and consumer centers of the north Atlantic world to eastern Asia. The North Atlantic leadership had recognized this for decades before the 1890s. In

fact, the conqueror of Suez, French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, won the right to build a canal on the isthmus in 1878. While the U.S. business community and politicians were not prepared in 1878 to assume the risks of a canal project, they deeply resented the “foreign intrusion” in an area that most considered had a “special relationship” to U.S. society and security. The U.S. government was displeased with the selection of a French project and it designated the isthmian shore lines as part of U.S. territory. And in a more concrete reaction to the French project, U.S. entrepreneurs with some encouragement from the executive and legislative branches obtained a canal concession in Nicaragua.⁵

Within two decades, however, the U.S. government and society again faced a decision relative to the future of the Caribbean, the isthmus, and transoceanic transit — in other words, a U.S. version of Columbus’s dream. The U.S. vision was largely realized during the Spanish-Cuban-American War, its peace agreement, and related activity from 1895 to 1917, which collectively established an impressive U.S. presence in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and east Asia. In addition to the protectorate over Cuba (and a naval base at Guantanamo), the U.S. government acquired Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, a long-term lease on the Panama Canal zone, and it occupied Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua for long periods, and parts of Mexico and Honduras briefly to implement “civilizing missions.” On the west side of the isthmus, it added Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines, part of Samoa, and extensive extraterritorial rights in China to its pre-1890s possessions of Alaska, Midway, and about 50 guano islands.⁶

Numerous events outline a story of continual U.S. activity to penetrate the Pacific basin that place the 1890s under a different light — the Caribbean as facilitator and protector of transit to Asia. The U.S. vision of expanding commerce, security and military interests, and an ill-defined civilizing mission was rooted in the European heritage and by no means limited to the New World. The British North American colonists had long kept a whaling fleet in the Pacific, and these operations continued after independence as

U.S. enterprises. In 1784, the first U.S. merchant vessel left for China and returned a year later; its 30% profit on capital insured that other merchants would follow. Just as the 1780s depression drove early U.S. trading interests to eye a China (Asian) market, so did the 1890s depression invoke strong interest in Asian trade.

Between the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the [Theodore] Roosevelt Corollary (1905), U.S. expansion and global interests altered the meaning of the Caribbean and the Pacific from a U.S. perspective. The large and profitable whaling fleets built strong ties with southern Alaska, the west coast of the continent, and Hawaii. The Edmund Roberts diplomatic mission had some success in Asia in 1830, U.S. diplomats concluded the Treaty of Wanghia (China) in 1844, and in the peace negotiations of the Mexican War, U.S. diplomats acquired the ports of San Francisco and San Diego and a part of a railroad route to the Pacific along the southern U.S. border. The rest was purchased in 1853. Neither the Panama Railroad, the first transcontinental transit in 1854, nor the joint Union-Central Pacific railroad line of 1869, was a suitable alternative to a canal for the bulk transfer of goods and people that those with grandiose world trade dreams needed. U.S. diplomats failed to acquire the Tehuantepec railroad project, but they did obtain concessions relative to Panama and Central America — the Bidlack Treaty (1846), the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850), and the Maritime Canal Company concession from Nicaragua as a response to the French canal project. The record of the Pacific Mail Steamship Line in the 1850s and 1860s is instructive of the link between the circum-Caribbean and the Pacific basin. As several steamship lines bound New York and the east coast ports to the Panama isthmus, the Pacific Mail first tied Panama City to the ports of California and the west coast of the New World, and then it ventured west across the Pacific.⁷

In the mid- and late-nineteenth century, repeated efforts to annex Hawaii, the U.S. role in opening Japan and Korea, and the acquisitions of Alaska, Midway, and part of Samoa demonstrated continuing U.S. interest in east Asia and the Pacific. In fact,

historian James W. Gould has described how U.S. consular officials, naval officers, and entrepreneurs also intervened, colonized, and used or threatened to use force frequently in southeast Asia during the nineteenth century. The Pacific basin and Asia are geographically large areas with enormous populations and resources. Thus, they had a high risk/reward profile for those seeking material rewards. As much as Caribbeanists and Latin Americanists might cringe at the thought, both Columbus and the U.S. leadership considered Asia the goal of their ventures. The Caribbean was a necessary way station on the route to Asia.⁸

In the late nineteenth century, U.S. leaders believed that the dynamic and productive, but chaotic and unpredictable U.S. economy needed to export its overproduction to remain vital. The U.S. economy went through three spikes of panic — 1873-1878, 1882-1885, and 1893-1898 — during a long world economic disturbance from 1873 to 1898. These crises played havoc on the lives of all Americans because orders for raw materials, food stuffs, demands for labor (even cheap Hispanic labor), markets for manufactured products or capital, all shriveled. Industrialists, investors, distributors, and workers suffered together, if not equally. Even the unemployed, the marginalized, and the outcasts suffered because the thin mesh of social aid that held them above water weakened and frayed in these unpredictable economic times.⁹

U.S. intellectuals, economists, and some business people explored “overproduction” or “glut” explanations — the argument that surplus production forced factory closures, layoffs, and social suffering — for the recurring economic crises. The U.S. government and a few political leaders moved towards social imperialism — reacting to domestic social problems through international activity. Exporting to stimulate domestic economic activity would ameliorate domestic social problems. Cheaper and quicker communications would increase exports. The U.S. government needed more trade, some investment opportunities, cheaper raw materials, security of communications, and even options for businessmen, laborers, and capital to seek short-term

engagement and profit. To obtain these, the United States and the western, industrializing states became increasingly competitive and imperialistic. The specific social imperialist response adopted at the turn of the century was an open door policy. Asia, Africa, and the middle east — those areas less closely integrated into the North Atlantic economic order — should remain open economically to all on equal terms.¹⁰

The isthmus was the facilitating means to reach Asia, but the French held that concession. The French hold on the Panama route, however, weakened after 1890 when de Lesseps' Universal Interoceanic Canal Company went bankrupt. But French and European capitalists were not indifferent to the fate of the bankrupt canal company. The losses, heavy for investors, however, poured cold water on schemes to revive European financing. U.S. leaders feared that continued alienation of the canal route might lead to problems. The Caribbean-Central American region was judged vital for security and to distribute surplus entrepreneurial energy, capital, and products. The competition in Central America was linked closely to the perceived value of the canal in achieving these goals.¹¹

There was a long history of U.S. interest in transcontinental communications; there were factions supporting railroads and more than one alternative — Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, and the Darien region come readily to mind — to the canal route between Colon and Panama City. Regardless of which route was promoted, the core idea was often just an isthmian canal under U.S. control. There are thousands of examples of enthusiasts hyping their special canal project. Since the French canal project was wounded, not dead in the 1890s, many of the U.S. groups supported the Maritime Canal Company in Nicaragua as the U.S. project. In March 1892, a California Nicaragua Canal Convention memorialized the U.S. congress that “the construction of the Nicaragua Canal is necessary to the successful defense of the Pacific Coast...and to the commercial success of the whole nation.” The benefits from such a wise policy were astronomical: “New York will soon control the world's exchanges...new fields will be open to labor, and safer

investments afforded to capital.” In December, 1895, the St. Louis Merchants Exchange declared the national and international interests in the Nicaraguan canal project “so vast and varied that...[no] other power...[should] acquire a controlling interest.”¹²

The voices calling for a canal were persistent and often pointed to Asia. In December 1897, a National Board of Trade resolution underscored the importance of the Asian experience for America’s outward thrust. Six months before the U.S. warship *Oregon* fastened attention on the naval-military justification for a canal — it arrived too late from the Pacific to participate in the Cuban operation — the Board of Trade observed:

the growing commerce of the United States with the west coast of South America, the islands of the Pacific and Asia, as well as with Alaska and our own Pacific States, ...[and] the development of China with its four hundred million people would seem to demand that the United States should be prepared to share in the commercial development ...therefore...the National Board of Trade commends the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal by the United States Government.¹³

The St. Louis Merchant Exchange heartily endorsed the National Board of Trade’s resolution. U.S. engineer Lewis Haupt argued that the canal would “enable us to compete effectually with European Nations in the Asiatic trade.”¹⁴ Then in 1897, President William McKinley appointed Admiral John Walker to head a committee to recommend a site for a U.S. canal.

In the late nineteenth century, tension grew between European and U.S. objectives in Central America because the isthmus’ place in world trade and communications apparently lent it the military and economic primacy necessary to secure hegemony. The raw materials, trade, and investment options on the isthmus were a bonus; the prize was the transit routes that would tie the labor and raw materials of the Pacific basin and Asian periphery to the technology, industrial capacity, and organization of accumulation of the metropole states. Competition came not only from Britain and

France, but Germany, Japan, and Russia which sought to bolster their belated position in the world order.¹⁵

At the turn of the century, the leaders of the industrializing nations were commonly motivated and driven to hasty action as the result of what Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* refers to as the “theory of the Three [or Four] World Empires.”

This common belief that:

only the three (or, in some accounts, four) largest and most powerful nation-states would remain independent — exercised many an imperial statesman. ‘It seems to me,’ the British minister for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, informed an 1897 audience, ‘that the tendency of the time is to throw all power into the hands of the greater empires, and the minor kingdoms...seem to fall into a secondary and subordinate place....’ It was vital for Germany, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz urged Kaiser Wilhelm, to build a big navy, so that it would be one of the ‘four World Powers: Russia, England, America and Germany.’...For the long-established powers, Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary, the issue was whether they could maintain themselves in the face of these new challenges to the international status quo. For the new powers, [the United States], Germany, Italy, and Japan, the problem was whether they could break through to what Berlin termed a ‘world-political freedom’ before it was too late.¹⁶

U.S. well-being and power were defined in terms of ties to Latin America and Asia. The Japanese and Germans were considered special threats to the U.S. position in the Caribbean and Asia. Japanese activity in the Pacific basin, but especially in Hawaii and on the isthmus, provoked U.S. security concerns (and racial fears). German conduct in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Philippines, Cuba, and Samoa unsettled public figures and officials in the United States. The growing numbers of Germans residing in Mexico, Haiti, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala had disturbed some observers for decades.¹⁷

The Russian government also had aspirations in Asia. The Trans-Siberian Railroad made Russian access to the Pacific even more important. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, leader of the French New Panama Canal Company, successor to de Lesseps's bankrupt firm, advised the Russian government to seek a role on the Central American isthmus because the Panama canal would link "all the great peoples" who border on the two great oceans. On 31 January 1898 the U.S. government contemplated its options in Spanish Cuba, LaFeber described how U.S. Minister to China Charles Denby "wired excitedly to the State Department that Germany and Russia [lusting to partition China] had to be stopped: 'Partition would tend to destroy our markets. The Pacific Ocean is destined to bear on its bosom a larger commerce than the Atlantic,' and in the whole, noncolonized Asia, 'we are destined to find our best customers'."¹⁸ The view that the Pacific offered greater commercial prospects for the United States than the Atlantic was not new to those discussing overproduction and the U.S. future, nor that Russia was a competitor for that trade.

In the nineteenth century, Mexico and the Central American societies reacted with considerable reserve to the idea of U.S. domination of the transit route and the circum-Caribbean region. A canal meant greater U.S. involvement on the isthmus to the chagrin of Mexico, Colombia, and the isthmian states. Mexican officials were especially disturbed, but their ambitions on the isthmus seemed contained. In fact, Mexican policy sought to placate U.S. officials overtly, while it hoped to subvert the U.S. drive for hegemony covertly. In early 1898, French agent Emile Jore judged that most Costa Ricans favored Cuban independence, but a larger number definitely opposed U.S. intervention in the dispute. Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans feared that a U.S. assumption of the defensive responsibility of the canal route would threaten their independence.¹⁹

In April 1898 the U.S. government underscored its willingness to use force to define and extend its control in the Caribbean. Thomas McCormick in *The China Market* cogently rejected the oft-cited "explanations" for U.S. intervention in Cuba. He argued:

America's insular acquisitions of 1898 were not products of 'large policy' imperialism. Hawaii, Wake, Guam, and the Philippines were not taken principally for their own economic worth, or for their fulfillment of Manifest Destiny, or for their venting of the 'psychic crisis.' They were obtained, instead, largely in an eclectic effort to construct a system of coaling, cable, and naval stations for an integrated trade route which could help realize America's overriding ambition in the Pacific — the penetration and ultimate domination of the fabled China market.²⁰

The U.S. government went to war with Spain to secure the Caribbean basin and the isthmian routes to the Pacific basin (which encompassed close to half the world's population), and to expel a feeble European power whose uncontrolled colony, Cuba, might become prey to a rival European metropole. After all, each ambitious North Atlantic state and Japan envisioned a chain of coaling, cable, and naval stations, and a canal to advance its world competitive position.

The conduct of the Spanish-Cuban-American War revealed the objectives of U.S. leadership. Senator William P. Frye of Maine, later appointed one of five peace commissioners, knew the goal was securing the canal access and an entrepot harbor in east Asia — what some contemporaries called an "American Hong Kong": "The fear I have about this war is that peace will be declared before we can get full occupation of the Philippines and Porto Rico [sic]."²¹ The Pacific theatre was key. The United States acquired what it needed there before it even sent troops to Cuba and Puerto Rico. War was declared on 20 April 1898, the first battle occurred in Manila on 30 April, then Guam and Wake Island were taken, and only after 20 June did the U.S. Army land in Cuba. The island was conquered within 4 weeks and Puerto Rico fell about a week later. Frye's fear was groundless; the administration knew its goals. A contemporary newspaper, not gender sensitive, asked: 'Why is Uncle Sam like a lady throwing a stone? Because it aimed at Cuba and hit the Philippines.'²² A miss of about 8,500 miles.

Once the fighting was over, McKinley appointed Whitelaw Reid, expansionist and editor-owner of the *New York Tribune*, to head a team of negotiators to make peace on the right terms. Naturally, here also the Pacific basin was the key. In his diary, Reid explained one objective of his mission:

If to [Hawaii] we now added the Philippines, it would be possible for American energy to build up such a commercial marine on the Pacific coast as should ultimately convert the Pacific Ocean into an American lake, making it far more our own than the Atlantic is now Great Britain's. Such a possession therefore would tend to stimulate shipbuilding industry and commerce, and could not but add immensely to the national prosperity.²³

The U.S. naval survey of the Pacific made in the 1830s and 1840s had described three great island harbors in the Pacific outside of Japan — Pago Pago, Manila, and Pearl Harbor. Pago Pago was in U.S. hands from a pre-Spanish-Cuban-American War agreement with Great Britain and Germany. Hawaii was acquired during the war. Reid negotiated to place the last in U.S. hands. Winning all three prizes was not a normal draw of the lottery, but a fixed game.

The desire for U.S. commercial expansion was not just the domain of imperialists. Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts was a determined anti-imperialist, but he also saw the need for the U.S. political economy to share in the wealth of Asia. In early 1898, Hoar had urged McKinley to choose peaceful means rather than war to settle the Cuban situation. After opposing the annexation of Hawaii in the late 1890s, Hoar relented because Hawaii was essential “in order to help us get our share of China.” One of the quirks of human nature is innocent honesty. If the U.S. anti-imperialists of the 1890s had kept the United States from acquiring any possessions except for those which one or more of the chief anti-imperialist spokesmen saw as necessary for a prosperous and secure United States, the U.S. empire would have looked almost exactly as it did when the “expansionists” ruled from the White House and Capitol Hill.²⁴

The Pacific was not the only area of U.S. expansion. The aggressive U.S. role in Cuba and Panama disturbed many leaders in Latin America. The leaders of Porfirian Mexico assumed that isthmian disorder and conflict would jeopardize their nation's development. Historian Jürgen Buchenau in his recent book, *In the Shadow of the Giant*, described the Mexican reaction to the events of 1898: the reaction "can best be characterized as Mexico's 'Cuba Shock': a sudden awareness of the danger of U.S. intervention in Latin America." He explained: "the [Porfirio] Diaz regime feared that the U.S. meddling in Cuba, which culminated in the 1898 war with Spain, might lead to subsequent imperialist actions in Mexico and Central America. Therefore, Diaz attempted to mediate between Spain and the United States. When this effort failed...Diaz realized that diplomatic skill alone would not prevent U.S. unilateral action in the Caribbean."²⁵

Many Mexican leaders considered U.S. action in Spanish Cuba disturbing, but U.S. subversion of Colombian sovereignty to make a client state in Panama was a dangerous precedent. Unwilling to expose itself needlessly to U.S. scorn, Mexico tried quietly to persuade other Latin American governments to withhold recognition of the new Panamanian state. President Diaz and Foreign Minister Ignacio Mariscal considered the U.S. government which had covertly aided a revolutionary movement against a friendly government solely and selfishly to obtain a favorable canal treaty, a threat to the independence of every Latin American state. The Mexican leaders were displeased when no European state condemned this action because they could not curb the U.S. government without the assistance of one or more metropole.²⁶

Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya understood that the U.S. canal project at Panama meant economic hardship for Nicaragua. A U.S.-sponsored interoceanic canal in Nicaragua would have brought great material improvement for Nicaraguans and the Nicaraguan economy. The decision to build at Panama was a devastating blow. Zelaya refused to accept the U.S. determination of Nicaragua's future. He sent a prominent Nicaraguan to Europe

and Japan to solicit aid for a joint canal venture. U.S. officials considered his negotiations with European and Japanese interests to construct an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua near criminal. One complained that "since the final selection of the Panama Canal route by our Government, [Zelaya] has...schemed to thwart the great enterprise by covertly exploiting the rejected Nicaraguan site." Colombia was also displeased. The U.S. and Panamanian governments were concerned that Zelaya might make a canal concession to one or more foreign nations, or that Colombia might persuade Europeans to undertake a canal at the Atrato River.²⁷ From Mexico to Colombia, the isthmus housed many governments discontented with a sole U.S. canal at Panama.

The gap of understanding between United States and Mexico about the future of the isthmus widened. The U.S. and Mexican governments used surrogates to pursue their objectives and to undermine each other's policies on the isthmus. U.S. officials expected Guatemalan President Manuel Estrada Cabrera to remove the obstreperous Zelaya from office. The U.S. government viewed Zelaya's scheming as a threat to its economic goals and Caribbean security. Mexican officials supported Zelaya in order to block Estrada Cabrera's efforts to dominate Central America. Mexico opposed Guatemala and U.S. hegemony on the isthmus because the combination threatened its northern and southern borders simultaneously.²⁸

Although Mexico's geography, population, and economy required special attention, the U.S. government normally limited the sovereignty of all the states in regard to sites for naval stations near the entrances to the canal. It prevented Danish plans to transfer the Virgin Islands to Germany on several occasions. It stymied German efforts to obtain control of the Galapagos Islands from Ecuador. When Secretary of State Elihu Root learned that Costa Rica contemplated the sale of the Cocos Islands, he repeated U.S. unwillingness to purchase them, yet cautioned that the U.S. government would view "occupation of the Cocos Islands by any European power...[as] a menace to the United States." After the

U.S. government acquired the canal concession, Costa Rican officials feared that their ability to resolve the persisting border dispute with Panama would suffer from the U.S.-Panamanian relationship. El Salvador, largely ignored by U.S. diplomats until the late nineteenth century, received more attention after the Spanish-Cuban-American War. The 1897 and 1901 Walker Canal Commissions and the open door in Asia enhanced El Salvador's strategic and commercial value, especially its excellent Fonseca Bay harbor facilities.²⁹ The sovereignty of the Caribbean or isthmian states eroded slowly before 1898 and more noticeably after 1903.

Early in the twentieth century, the U.S. government's unwavering opposition to potential metropole competitors acquiring strategic locations killed a Japanese-Mexican project for development near the port of La Paz in Baja California. This U.S. restriction of territorial sovereignty became known as the [Henry Cabot] Lodge corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The [Theodore] Roosevelt corollary underscored U.S. determination to restrict the financial independence of Latin American states. In Latin America, the U.S. government and entrepreneurs did not expect an open door or "fair field and no favor," but rather the favored field they presumed was theirs under the Monroe Doctrine. U.S. leaders were shocked when Zelaya or others in the circum-Caribbean looked elsewhere to counterbalance U.S. influence or for alternatives to U.S. development schemes. The U.S. government particularly distrusted German and Japanese objectives in Middle America.³⁰ The French and British were not commonly viewed as determined opponents of U.S. policies.³¹

The U.S. government and the European Latin states used all available sentiments to bolster their positions after the Spanish-Cuban-American War. The U.S. government resurrected panamericanism in an effort to establish yet another tool for managing its dominance of the circum-Caribbean. It asked Mexico to call the first Pan-American conference in a dozen years for late 1901, just as it was determining a wide variety of matters relative to Latin America.

Europe's chief Latin states — Spain, France, and Italy — maneuvered to circumvent the erosion of their political influence and economic and cultural ties. In Spain the “generation of 1898,” intellectuals who had objected to the lack of political and social reform long before 1898, represented a spiritual protest. After the defeat, humiliation, and loss of Spain's colonial remnants, urban and rural groups protested ever more fervently. One step to counter the panamericanism involved a revival of Hispanic and Latin cultural ties. Spain called a Hispano-American conference to meet in Madrid in 1901. The Central American republics showed a marked pride in participation, but little serious interest in the concrete plans of the Madrid conference.³² Don Quijote and *los toros* were no match for the House of Morgan, United Fruit, and the U.S. Marines.

Two European states — Germany and France — often slighted in the study of the Caribbean region responded to U.S. expansion after the U.S. Civil War, and in particular U.S. activity in the 1890s and the pre-World War I years. German overseas expansion has roots in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, but it manifested more concrete activity beginning in the 1880s. Prussia had explored for a naval base in Costa Rica in the late 1860s and German imperial naval forces had occupied temporarily the port of Corinto, Nicaragua, in 1878. But the German Empire was more visible in Africa and Asia. Germany established protectorates in Africa in 1884, in Samoa in 1889, and in China (Kiaochou) in 1897. Bismarck, a reluctant participant, had focused upon Europe and considered informal empire cheaper and less obtrusive. Still, for many German entrepreneurs, the combination of formal and informal empire offered an opportunity for a mixed exploitation of land, labor, capital — sites of raw materials, local work force or a place for surplus German population, and investment ventures. Leaders of Germany also judged participation in the world economy essential for prestige, well-being, and security and to be one of the “Three World Empires” destined to survive the lottery of power.

In addition to clashes in Samoa, the Philippines, China, the Congo, and over the sale of U.S. pork in Germany, the United States and Germany competed for access to the canal, naval stations, investment, commerce, and political influences in the circum-Caribbean. Prior to World War I, German investments in Central America were greater than U.S. investment and there were more German settlers and firms. The nature of imperial competition and the peculiar U.S. sense of insecurity (it acted as if it posed no threat to any power when it increased its investment and markets, but all other powers threatened it if they did) prompted the U.S. government to improve its economic and strategic position in Central America where it considered German interests the most aggressive and threatening.³³

German officials envisioned a chain of naval and cable stations from the homeland over St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, across an isthmian canal site, to the Galapagos and Samoa, and finally to Kiaochou, China. The German naval attache in Washington, DC, assumed that German dignity and its commercial and strategic objectives needed a secure naval station in the West Indies. The Empire did not have to dominate Middle America, he noted, but its aspirations demanded a strong point near any canal.³⁴ Securing suitable communications explained many German actions at Manila Bay, Samoa, and Kiaochou or in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Haiti and the Virgin Islands.

U.S. acquisitions in and after the war of 1898 — Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the canal zone, Virgin Islands, and Manila — challenged German aspirations and investments in the circum-Caribbean and Pacific basins. The worldwide U.S.-German competition stimulated the German government to draft operational war plans which were reviewed and revised periodically. German naval plans assumed that the United States was most vulnerable in the Caribbean and isthmian region. U.S. naval possessions in the Caribbean protected the canal, but German naval officials, at least until 1902-1903, planned to seize these poorly fortified bases if necessary and to use them to attack U.S. trade centers.³⁵

While a military response to pushy U.S. policies remained one option, German leaders differed about how best to respond to the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. hegemony in the New World. Few German officials and political economists presumed that German entrepreneurs could withdraw from Latin America's economy and still deliver a high standard of living at home. The stakes, a comfortable future for the German nation, were simply too high to risk withdrawing. Yet, the expansionist activities of German nationals challenged U.S. geopolitical interests on the isthmus.³⁶ German officials found no simple response to this complex situation.

German entrepreneurs recognized the competitive value of the isthmus in the world market. Albert Ballin, director of the Hamburg-America Passenger Company (HAPAG), claimed that a Panama canal would be a powerful weapon in U.S. hands. One of his associates reflected upon the "unhealthy consequences [which sole U.S. control over the canal] would have for German trade and navigation and even for its position in East Asia." Secretary of the Navy Admiral Tirpitz claimed that the fighting navy and merchant marine shared interests in a shortened route from Europe to the Pacific Ocean "because our growing foreign interests will constantly compel us to increase our occupation of foreign stations." He cautioned that "Germany's strategic position in the eastern areas of the Pacific Ocean...would be very tangibly weakened by a transfer of the future isthmian canal to sole North American control." The Imperial government, Tirpitz warned, had to recognize "the possibility of military entanglements in the Central American-Caribbean region...given the present and future significance of our varied economic relations to Latin America and the Pacific." But German insistence upon its perceived rights and interests in the Caribbean and Asia clashed with U.S. perceptions and objectives. After 1903, the burden of naval competition with Britain, increased tension with France, and events in North Africa slowly pulled German military planning away from confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean.³⁷

The French government was less confrontational than the German, but nevertheless desirous of curtailing U.S. expansionism which threatened to overrun French entrepreneurs and firms. French participation in the world economy became better organized about 1890 with the formation of the Union Coloniale Française. The Union focused upon recreating a colonial empire, but it generated interest in foreign areas, foreign relations, and world economic ties. Yet in the Caribbean basin, French agent Emile Jore feared that the U.S. victory over Spain in 1898 and the seductive belief that European businesses could acquire wealth where informal U.S. protectorates were in place had lulled European diplomats into inactivity.³⁸

In the 1890s, French investors, burned by the bankruptcy of de Lesseps's Universal Interoceanic Canal Company, formed a New Panama Canal Company in an effort to save French pride and reputation and as many francs as circumstances would allow. A French canal which tied the Atlantic and Pacific half-worlds together still held out the prospect for rejuvenation of France's geopolitical and economic importance. French officials quietly supported the Panama project and opposed U.S. efforts to develop the Nicaraguan route. When U.S. officials made clear their intention to acquire the French canal concession at Panama, the British reluctantly surrendered their rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 to share in protecting the transit. The French New Panama Canal Company was sold to the U.S. government in 1903.³⁹

By 1900, French influence on the isthmus was linked increasingly to several military missions and French cultural institutions, and financial circles which continued to play a major role in Central America. Many French politicians and businessmen expected a revival of foreign trade to vitalize the nation's stagnate domestic production. French leaders wanted to weave commercial revitalization into its civilizing mission. Moreover, as some French leaders argued, U.S. goodwill might be useful in the struggle between France and its entente allies on one side and Germany and the central powers on the other.⁴⁰ French officials were divided on

the desirability of competing or cooperating with the United States, but their opposition seldom did more than delay U.S. activity.

Neither France nor Germany could lessen the magnitude of the U.S. victory in the 1890s. Fallout from the Spanish-American War included more canal frenzy, new markets and investment links with Latin America, the open-door notes in China, rapidly increasing expansion of U.S. and other industrial nations' activity in Asia, and heightened expectations of benefits from "social imperialism." The new external markets, investment opportunities, and plentiful raw material sources in the New World and Asia ameliorated the internal crisis in the United States for a few years of the early twentieth century. The U.S. role in Panama's successful "revolution" in 1903 and the consequent canal treaty diverted attention from U.S. domestic problems, made many critics feel proud, supplied jobs, and created a market for several key sectors of the economy — construction, technology, and heavy industry. The new image of U.S. relations with Latin America incorporated communications lines, tariff arrangements, and an increasing number of investors and bankers. A canal would facilitate access to the west coast of Latin America, the Pacific, and Asia, and it would integrate the two U.S. coastal areas and the Mississippi Valley more closely.⁴¹

Implementing actions to bind the North Atlantic area to the Pacific basin involved a variety of activities. The canal — facilitated and made securer as a consequence of the Spanish-Cuban-American War — was the engine of this vision. An isthmian canal lent greater significance to the Caribbean area. The U.S. government created a Caribbean Division within the North Atlantic Station on October 4, 1902, soon after the time that it decided to acquire the Panama canal rights. The Division's duties and responsibilities reflected the altered goals of U.S. foreign policy. The Caribbean Division was charged with fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations in the Caribbean area, and it was expected to "protect" and to "advance" U.S. interests. This subtle shift in U.S. overseas policy objectives — to promote (aggressive) as well as to protect (passive) — was adopted in the State Department several decades earlier.⁴² Thus, the Navy was

also enlisted in pursuit of this policy objective. The need to promote U.S. interests drove many of the arguments for going to war over Cuba and for acquiring the insular possessions in the Caribbean and Pacific basins. What the president, the cabinet, and congress had begun earlier, the navy would continue during the 1890s and early twentieth century in the Caribbean and Pacific basins.

Columbus and the U.S. government invested considerable time and energy in the Caribbean, yet both eyeballed Asia. However, the British, German, Dutch, French, and Japanese also recognized that the Caribbean and the isthmus were merely vital mid-points between the wealth, consumption needs, technology, and productive energy of the North Atlantic states and the teeming masses of Asia. While western activity in Asia created trade, investment, raw materials, cultural exchange, and Christian missionary activity, the balance sheet goes further.

Many of these Asian societies responded with suspicion, distrust, anger, and hatred. The Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1902, and the bloody, cruel, and deadly Philippine War against U.S. occupation of the islands, 1899-1903, also represented Asian nationalist responses to encroaching foreign powers which were altering the culture, undermining local authority, and challenging the sovereignty of the Asian societies. The Chinese civil war of 1911 which adopted a more anti-foreign, anti-imperial character after 1919, was also, in part, a consequence of the Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Panama Canal which facilitated a more frequent and more penetrating U.S. and world interference in Asian societies. Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi-Minh did not create the tensions in Asia. The revolutions they headed merely expressed a common Asian reaction in a determined form to four centuries of gradual western intrusion followed by several decades of rapid march toward the fulfillment of Christopher Columbus's (and Uncle Sam's) vision of penetration and extraction of value and their self-proclaimed missions to alter the religion and culture of the Asian societies.

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A COMMENT ON THE DISCUSSION OF "LBJ, CHINA AND THE BOMB"

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The research note by Shane Maddock on "LBJ, China and the Bomb: New Archival Evidence" in the March 1996 issue of the *SHAFR Newsletter*, the subsequent comment by Robert Johnson in the September 1996 issue, and a reply by Maddock in the March 1997 issue all contribute to clarifying an important issue. There is no question but that the possibility of resort to military action first to prevent, and later to "roll back," Chinese Communist acquisition of nuclear weapons was considered in the U.S. government at several junctures. In particular, this possibility was raised by the Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear Proliferation in November 1964-January 1965.

I served as the staff director for liaison of the Gilpatric Committee with the Department of State. (I was, incidentally, also the only person working with all of the other four committees dealing with implications of the Chinese nuclear capability referred to by Mr. Maddock in his March 1997 comments.) While I cannot answer all questions with respect to consideration of U.S. military action against the Chinese nuclear facilities, I can help to clarify a few.

Mr. Maddock notes that Mr. Johnson (and he) were discussing a “sanitized version of the Gilpatric Report,” that was “heavily censored and makes no mention of China.” This latter assertion is not correct; the most recent LBJ Library sanitized version (and an earlier one) include a paragraph (4.d.) on China on page 18, which recommended a “major high-level reexamination of our policies toward China.” Mr. Maddock, especially perhaps having overlooked the paragraph on p. 18, was led to “surmise that any passages discussing policy toward Beijing had disappeared under the censor’s pen.” In fact, however, there was *no* mention of China in *any* of the passages excised.

The Department of State on February 2, 1996, declassified the entire Gilpatric Report, with no deletions, and it has now been printed in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament (1997), pp. 173-182. The roughly six and a half pages previously deleted from the twenty-two page report dealt with: India, Japan, Israel-UAR, MLF/ANF, France, UK, Euratom, NATO strategy, and Permissive Action Links (PALs)--not China. The only discussion or recommendation about China was the paragraph on page 18 recommending further study.

The Gilpatric Committee in its internal work program, not in the final report, had on Gilpatric’s initiative outlined four possible overall courses of policy action on nonproliferation: Course I: “selective relaxation of efforts to retard proliferation”; Course II: “the current ‘prudent course’”; Course III: “positive efforts to hold the line where it is”; and Course IV: “an all-out effort to stop and roll back nuclear proliferation.” The main focus was, in familiar bureaucratic terms, on a choice between some variant of Course II or Course III, the outer alternatives being generally considered too soft or too hard. Gilpatric himself considered Course II “inadequate,” and argued for a vigorous Course III. And that is generally where the Report came out (although with some equivocation and divided views on the NATO MLF/ANF nuclear sharing issue).

In our studies of Course IV, not adopted for the Report, military action against China was examined. An undated Working Paper on "Problem Areas" (declassified on February 6, 1996) sketched out briefly consequences of military action against the Chinese nuclear facilities as follows:

- c. Might serve as a powerful influence upon Nth nations, and would reduce or eliminate pressures upon India and Japan so long as the [Chinese nuclear] capability remained impaired. Risk of nuclear retaliation on U.S. or on Taiwan or elsewhere in Far East, probably extremely small. Risk of conventional response in SEA. Permanent elimination of the capability would be impossible; a single attack could make it more difficult than ever to bring Chinese to responsibility; consolidation of Afro-Asian hostility likely.
- d. Lessened tensions with Soviets unless attacks on China made some Soviet response seem appropriate.

That is not much of an analysis, but it does illustrate some of the uncertainty as to the consequences. But the most important point is that the Gilpatric Committee did not endorse Course IV, or draft anything for its final report dealing with military action against China.

Contrary to Mr. Maddock's assertion, military elimination of Chinese facilities did *not* "appear[s] on every list of the study questions which the Gilpatric Committee considered." Moreover, while China did, naturally, receive attention, it was far less than Mr. Maddock's commentary suggests. The declassified minutes of the discussions of the Gilpatric Committee, some of which are printed in *FRUS*, as well as the Report itself, show clearly that the greatest attention by far was placed on Europe: the MLF/ANF, German reunification, France; and in Asia, on dealing with India and Japan rather than an action against China, although of course Chinese nuclear weapons were considered a major factor for those Asian states. In our meetings, very little attention was given to the possibility of military action against China.

There was another instance of U.S. government consideration of military action against a budding Chinese nuclear attack capability. At some point in 1965-66, I cannot be more precise as I am relying entirely on memory, intelligence reported that the first Chinese ballistic missile launching submarine, a copy of the Soviet G-class diesel submarine, had been launched, and there was speculation as to whether it would be sent into the Pacific Ocean on its sea trial and for later deployment. In fact, it was not, but that was known at the time, and there was concern that Communist China might be acquiring a capability to strike U.S. targets on Guam, Hawaii and even the West Coast of the United States. At a meeting of the "Thompson Committee" on nuclear proliferation (chaired by Ambassador Tommy Thompson; I served as executive secretary) Paul Nitze, then Secretary of the Navy, proposed that if the Chinese missile submarine sailed into the open Pacific, the U.S. Navy should be ordered to sink it. The action would be taken without warning and without publicity; there would be no requirement for a public justification, and the Chinese would presumably guess its fate and understand that the United States simply would not permit China to obtain such a capability.

Ambassador Thompson clearly did not support Nitze's proposal, and did not even authorize a "study" of it. So far as I am aware, Nitze did not pursue the matter with a higher authority, although he may have authorized a Navy study. In any case, because the Chinese submarine for a long time did not leave port, and remained in closed waters, the issue did not to my knowledge ever reach a point of serious high level consideration. Nonetheless, Nitze's proposal showed the extent of concern by some in the U.S. government that China began to develop a nuclear capability, and the extent to which some would go to meet that perceived threat.

I do not know whether a written record of this discussion exists in the still classified records of the Thompson Committee in the State Department or in Nitze's records in the Pentagon. I have only my recollection of it. Perhaps someone will find further information about this, and conceivably other, cases of such concern.

I hope that this small addendum will contribute to discussion of this issue, and that continuing research will further clarify the question of U.S. Government consideration in the 1960s of possible military action against Chinese nuclear facilities or forces. [An informal article using new archival materials has recently appeared: William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "A Chinese Puzzle," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July/August 1997): 42-47.]

IDEOLOGY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

Melvyn P. Leffler

VIRGINIA

In the Fall 1996 issue of *Diplomatic History* William O. Walker III, reviews my book, *The Specter of Communism*, and tries to place it in the larger context of my work on the Cold War. He criticizes me for equivocating about the role of ideology, finessing the issue of motivation, misconstruing the meaning of my own evidence about American perceptions of the Soviet threat, and ignoring the implications of the work of William A. Williams. My book, Walker says, are riddled with interpretive ambiguity.

I am puzzled that Walker does not see the importance I assign to the role of ideology. In the first paragraph of the preface of *Specter* I state "The Cold War took shape when a sense of ideological rivalry merged with the fear of Soviet power.... The fusion of ideological competition with geostrategic threat made American officials keenly sensitive to the vulnerability of their domestic political and economic institutions."

I develop this theme quite systematically throughout the text of the book. In the first sentence of chapter one, I write, "From the beginning there was an ideological threat." Yet the ideological threat alone did not suffice to create the Cold War, as we came to know it after 1945. In fact, notwithstanding the ideological

antipathy, the United States and the Soviet Union could become allies in World War II. "Ideological antipathy persisted," I write at the end of chapter one, but "common strategic and geopolitical interests brought the United States and the Soviet Union together."

In chapter two of *Specter* I explain that "The Cold War took shape when a sense of ideological rivalry merged with a fear of Soviet power." At the end of the chapter (p.62) I write:

By the Middle of 1947, most Americans were inclined to view the struggle with the Soviet Union as an ideological one between contrasting ways of life. This was an apt characterization because American policymakers saw themselves as waging a geopolitical battle over correlations of power in the international system, a battle whose reverberations carried enormous implications for the political economy at home.... If under worst-case scenarios the United States was compelled to protect itself against a totalitarian foe with a command economy and a resource base covering much of Eurasia, the American government might have to regiment its own economy, hike defense spending, monitor potential subversives, and curtail personal liberties. The United States, Truman acknowledged, might 'have to become a garrison state' with 'a system of centralized regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.'

In order to make certain that I was not obfuscating the issue of ideology, I concluded my book with the following paragraph:

That Americans tend to forget the suffering of the Koreans and Vietnamese is not surprising, because in waging the Cold War their principal aim was not so much to help others as to protect themselves from the specter of Communism. Thinking that geopolitical configurations were inextricably tied to economic relationships, they tried to integrate the industrial core and the Third World periphery, even while the ties were being sundered by revolutionary nationalist movements. In the view of U.S. officials, Democrats and Republicans alike, these links had to be maintained lest the power centers of Western Europe,

West Germany, and Japan be weakened or sucked into the Soviet/Communist world. Should the latter occur, the Kremlin might grow strong enough to challenge the United States. The possibilities of an attack would always remain small. If, however, the Soviets gained domination over Eurasia or if there was a significant expansion of Communist influence, the United States might have to reshape its own political and economic system and become a garrison state. Hence correlations of power were seen to have profound consequences for American institutions; hence, ultimately, the Cold War was waged abroad to maintain a political economy of freedom at home.

I decided to write *Specter* with several considerations in mind. I wanted to focus some additional attention on domestic politics, society, and anti-communism. I felt that in *Preponderance of Power* I had not sufficiently clarified the extent to which correlations of power in the international system were linked to the preservation of America's core values, that is, a system of democratic capitalism at home. Part of the reason was that *Preponderance of Power* dealt so extensively with the efforts to contain Soviet communism, rebuild Western Europe, coopt German and Japanese strength, and integrate the industrial core of the globe with the underdeveloped periphery that the key motivations behind these efforts did not emerge as clearly as I had hoped they would. I thought I had emphasized those motives at the outset of *Preponderance* (12-14,23-24), but I did not develop them sufficiently through the body of the work.

In reviewing *Specter*, Walker continues to associate my work with a meaning of national security that highlights geopolitics and that minimizes the linkages I draw between geopolitics and domestic core values. Perhaps he does this because I do continue to stress that the perception of threat emanated from a real fear of a external foe who might directly or indirectly accumulate considerable power rather than from worries about the internal failings of capitalism or from corporatist pressures to reconfigure the New Deal political economy.

I make no apologies about my emphasis on an external threat. But Walker does not accurately recapitulate my view of American threat perception in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Walker states that in *Specter*, as in *Preponderance*, I claim that American fears were a “realistic response to Soviet policy initiatives.” He then shows the many times I present evidence demonstrating that American policy-makers were not fearful of a Soviet attack. He, therefore, concludes that my interpretive line is inconsistent and wrongheaded. How could there be a threat if American analysts did not think the Kremlin would launch an attack? The Soviet threat, in Walker’s view, was “nebulous.” American officials, asserts Walker, did not fear the Soviet Union; they feared popular democracy.

Careful readers of my work know, of course, that I do NOT argue that U.S. apprehensions were primarily a “realistic response to Soviet policy initiatives.” I consistently argue that Soviet policy initiatives were NOT the major source of American threat perception. I stress that Soviet actions were mixed. Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere was only one source of American fears. The other sources, discussed at great length throughout *Preponderance*, included the rise of the left, the vacuums of power inside Germany and Japan, and the emergence of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. For readers who might not have had the patience to plow their way through *Preponderance*, I reiterated these themes as clearly and succinctly as possible in the conclusion of that book (pp. 497, 511, and 515). Although U.S. policymakers were not fearful of a Soviet attack, they were still worried that the Kremlin could aggrandize power by capitalizing on the success of Communist Parties, luring German and Japan into its orbit, and taking advantage of revolutionary nationalist uprisings in the Third World

The point of my writings is not that American actions were a “realistic response to Soviet initiatives,” but that they were an understandable and prudent response to *the multitude of opportunities that the Kremlin had to aggrandize its power*. No where in either book do I say that the Kremlin would have used its

power to take advantage of all these opportunities. My argument is that U.S. policymakers feared that these trends could play into Stalin's hands. Hence I conclude that, overall, U.S. actions were understandable and prudent. And why do I feel this way? Because "the very existence of the Soviet Union, situated in a predominant position in the center of Eurasia, with a totalitarian regime, a rival ideology, and expansive security interests of its own, cast harrowing shadows and accentuated anxieties." (*Preponderance*, pp.515-16)

I do not whitewash American policies, as Walker suggests I do. He criticizes my work for not stressing the extent to which the United States opposed self-determination and thwarted revolutionary nationalism. Yet in both books I stress that American policies in the Third World were often foolish, countereffective, and inhumane. My last paragraphs of *Specter* are written to highlight the incredibly unnecessary pain, anguish, and destruction that U.S. actions inflicted on Koreans and Vietnamese. At the end of *Preponderance* I summarize hundreds of pages of narrative by saying:

So obsessed were U.S. officials about the Communist threat in the Third World areas that they frequently confused revolutionary nationalism and indigenous discontent with externally supported Communist movements.... Throughout the Third World, the United States established linkages with discredited elites who, in the pursuit of their own ends, were willing to work with the Americans (as they often had done with the British and French).... Fear of upsetting the status quo that comported with Western interests exceeded the desire for progressive change, the consequences of which remained unclear. (508-9)

Walker accuses me throughout of interpretive ambiguity. I don't think I am ambiguous; I think I convey nuance and complexity. I don't think it is ambiguous to say that specific policies were wise; others prudent; and still others foolish. I don't think it wrong to argue that the Marshall Plan was wise and that American occupation policies in Germany and Japan were successful. I don't think it ambiguous to say that notwithstanding these successes, American

policies elsewhere were foolish and brutish. And I don't think it ambiguous to recreate the mindsets of officials and highlight how difficult it was to judge whether indigenous communists in France and Italy (and elsewhere) were likely to gain power, and, if they did, whether they were likely to sign agreements with the Kremlin that might redound to the benefit of Soviet rulers. Nor am I ambiguous at the end of *Specter* (p.128) when I state quite clearly that U.S. policymakers exaggerated the dangers that inhered in these situations.

In judging American threat perception, Walker claims that American officials were more afraid of popular democracy than they were afraid of communist influence and Soviet power. I disagree. I don't think the documents support Walker's assertion. Yes, American officials sometimes feared that popular movements could be exploited by communists or by foreign powers. Yes, even before the Cold War, American officials sometimes feared that popular movements could endanger American strategic and economic interests. But as a general explanation of American threat perception during the Cold War, I think it is wrong, very wrong, to assert that U.S. officials were more afraid of popular democracy than of Communism and Soviet power.

Indeed what is striking about Walker's critique is his total disregard of the perceived adversary and its record of horrendous deeds. He suggests that the United States should be indicted more strongly for failing to support self-determination. But had the power of the Kremlin grown in the late 1940s, would that growth have aided the cause of popular democracy and self-determination in the world? Should not the jubilation that accompanied the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, should not the record of Stalinist crimes and barbarities, should not the documents illuminating Soviet deportations and Chinese communist suppression of minorities and opponents suggest that, as bad as the American record sometimes was, there was nevertheless reason to be skeptical of the good behavior of the governments of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and their communist comrades abroad? In short,

would the cause of self-determination in the world have been helped if the United States had not tried to thwart the growth of Soviet power? Would the Kremlin have been more supportive of democratic government?

I don't think that it would have been. But keep in mind that no where do I argue that the promotion of self-determination abroad was the motive for American actions. Indeed I lament that U.S. policy was not more responsive to the needs, sensibilities, and yearnings of peoples around the globe. American officials, I argue, did what they did primarily to protect American strategic and economic interests and, most of all, to safeguard America's core values *inside* the United States. In *Specter* I am very clear about U.S. objectives. Rather than finessing the matter of motivation, as Walker suggests I do, my last words in *Specter* are rather clear and unequivocal: "the cold war was waged abroad to maintain a political economy of freedom at home."

Walker concludes his critique by noting that although I claimed in my SHAFR presidential address that the writings of William A. Williams had profoundly affected my intellectual development, "No mention of Williams graces the pages of *Preponderance* or *Specter*." Rather than elucidating my intellectual debt to Williams, Walker prefers to quote my criticisms of Williams.

In fact, I continue to feel that Williams "neglected the international system, understated the threats and pressures that emanated from abroad, and discounted the real evil that existed in the world." Notwithstanding such comments, I think that Williams would have grasped quite clearly who and what I had in mind when I concluded my book by stating that "the Cold War was waged abroad to maintain a political economy of freedom at home." It surprises me that William Walker could not quite see, or chose not to see, what I was getting at.

Nonetheless, I am grateful to Walker for prompting me to write these comments. I hope that he and others will come to understand

that the test of one's scholarly credentials and ethical values is not whether one genuflects before a name or whether one engages in unrelenting criticism of the United States. The real test, as I see it, is whether one is committed to history as a way of learning about how to preserve a more decent and humane world.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Request for Assistance

The Department of English at Annaba University has recently decided to launch an American studies postgraduate program (MA level) for the first time in Algeria. The American studies curriculum will include the course of "US Foreign Relations." As a member of the department's Board of Postgraduate Studies (concerning American history) and an associate lecturer in this department, I am trying to contact American historians and institutions to help us collect adequate material (articles, back issues of journals, reviews, and used books). Any contribution will be of extreme importance to us because we seriously lack adequate material sources. We need information about documents linked with the teaching of American foreign relations.

[The requestor included the following which I thought might be of interest to the SHAFR membership. — editor] Much to my regret, I have to inform you in advance that I could not subscribe or be a member of your society because our national currency is not convertible into U.S. dollars. The Algerian banking system does not deal with...the check/credit card system. I hope you will favorably take my present request into account.

Ladi Toulgui
Logements du Nouveau Technicum
Bloc D 246/Appt. 20
Héliopolis 24180
W. Guelma
Algeria

Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-57 — a Colloquium

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada) is hosting a one-day colloquium on "Canada and the Early Cold War," November 24, 1997. There is no registration fee, but those wishing to attend are asked to register in advance. Please contact: Greg Donaghy, Historical Section, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G7.

TEL: 613-992-6288

FAX: 613-992-9346

Copies of SHAFR Guide

Copies of the SHAFR Guide to Foreign Relations can be obtained from the office of the Executive Secretary, Allan Spetter, History Department, Wright State University, Dayton OH 45435. The price is \$30.00.

Call for Papers

The Vietnam War subsection of Popular Culture Association solicits proposals for presentations at the Popular Culture Association meeting, April 8-11, 1998, Orlando, Florida. The conference is interdisciplinary, multicultural, and creative. Send a 250 word abstract to: Tony Edmonds, History Dept., Ball State Univ., Muncie, IN 47306.

E-mail: 00aoedmonds@bsuvc.bsu.edu

FAX: (765) 285-5612

Call for Papers

The Los Alamos Historical Society and the University of New Mexico-Los Alamos are convening the Second Los Alamos International History Conference on "The Cold War and its Implications: Locally, Nationally and Internationally," August 9-12, 1998 at the Los Alamos Campus. Papers on the Cold War and its implications from the fields of political, economic, social, military, scientific and international history will be accepted. The deadline for submission is January 30, 1998. Contact: Marjorie Bell Chambers, 336 Andanada, Los Alamos, NM 87544

TEL: (505) 662-7481

Call for Papers

Siena College History and American Studies Departments are sponsoring a multi-disciplinary conference, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Dawn of the 'American Century'," April 18-19, 1998. Topics will include military and naval history, American expansionism and exceptionalism. Contact: Thomas O. Kelly, II, History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Rd., Loudonville, NY 12211-1462

TEL: (518) 783-2595

FAX: 518-783-42983

E-mail: kelly@siena.edu

American Diplomacy the electronic journal

American Diplomacy announces publication of its latest edition, Vol. 2, No.2, dated July 4, 1997. The editor and publisher invite you to tune in at: www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/

Call for Papers — Call for Subscriptions

Rethinking History — a new journal

A new publication (first issue July 1997), *Rethinking History: the Journal of Theory and Practice*, is dedicated to examining how historians today are challenging accepted ways of 'doing' history. To become an active forum for scholarly debate, *Rethinking History* is issuing a call for both papers and subscribers. Topics can include anything that fits under the rubric of historical theory and practice. The journal will appear three times a year, and the editors plan to have one themed issue for each volume. Right now they are interested in papers that will fit into issues on the following themes: History and Fiction, Innovative (or Experimental) Historical Writing, History and Film. Inquiries about or suggestions for papers should be sent to one of the following editors:

For scholars in the Western hemisphere:

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Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 228-77

California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125

Phone: (626) 395-4069 /FAX: (626) 793-8580 /E-mail: rr@hss.caltech.edu

For scholars in the rest of the world:

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United Kingdom

Phone: (0) 1782 294 532

FAX (0) 1782 294 363

E-mail: artam@staffs.ac.uk

For book reviews:

Laura Mason, Book Reviews Editor of *Rethinking History*
Department of History, University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602

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FAX: (706) 542-2455

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Call for Papers Southeast World History Association (SEWHA)

The Southeast World History Association, regional affiliate of the World History Association, announces that its 10th Annual Meeting will be hosted by The College of Charleston on November 14 and 15, 1997, at the Francis Marion Hotel in Charleston's Historic District. Dual Themes for 1997: "The Origin and Character of Dominance" and "The Art of Teaching World History." Proposals for individual papers, complete panels, or roundtable sessions may be sent to SEWHA president, Alan

LeBaron, at the address or e-mail listed below. Preference will be given to complete panels which address the conference themes, however, SEWHA welcomes individual proposals on all topics.

Alan LeBaron, Kennesaw State University, Department of History, 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw, GA 30144

Phone: 770-423-6589

Fax: 770-423-6432

E-mail: alebaron@ksumail.kennesaw.edu

Bradley Berlin-Prague Seminar - June 1998

From June 21 to July 4, 1998, Bradley University sponsors its annual English language seminar in Berlin and Prague for college faculty in diplomatic history, international affairs and European History and Politics. Invitations for forty participants will be sent in October 1997. Faculty interested in attending during 1998 or 1999 should contact the address below. Please indicate if you would like to serve as a commentator for sessions addressed by German or Czechoslovakian personnel.

Contact: Lester H. Brune, International Programs Office

Bradley University, Peoria, IL 61625

FAX: 309-677-3687

E-mail: bontemps@bradley.bradley.edu

Call for Papers

The Annual Meeting of the International Intelligence History Group (<http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de>) will focus its conference on "THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES" and the "SIGNIFICANCE OF ESPIONAGE IN WORLD WAR I." The conference will be held at the Akademie für Politische Bildung, Tutzing (near Munich), Germany, 24-26 April 1998.

The conference program will be structured around four broad issues:

1. The significance of intelligence for wartime diplomacy
2. The significance of intelligence for the military conduct of the war
3. Technical means of intelligence
4. The methodology of intelligence history

Please note the following rules:

Papers should focus on the 1914-1918 period.

Papers are to be delivered in English.

Papers will be limited to 20 minutes each.

Send advance copies (20-30 typed pages) for distribution to the conference participants.

Send proposals to:

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Krieger
Philipps-Universität Marburg
Wilhelm-Röpke-Strasse 6c VIII
35032 Marburg
Germany

Tel.: ++49-6421-284600

Fax: ++49-6421-284600

**Cold War Forum
November 11-12, 1997
Mississippi State University**

The Department of History, Mississippi State University, will hold its 16th Annual Presidential Forum on **Turning Points in History**, November 11-12, 1997. This year's topic is "Rethinking America's Cold War: New Perspectives on the Containment Doctrine." Featured speakers will be Michael J. Hogan, Walter L. Hixson, Christian F. Ostermann, and Carol E. Anderson. All sessions will be held in Simrall Auditorium on the MSU Campus, and are free and open to the public. For further information contact: Richard Damms, Department of History, P.O. Drawer H, Mississippi State, MS 39762

TEL: 601-325-3604

FAX: 601-325-1139

E-Mail: rdamms@Ra.MsState.edu

PERSONALS

Kinley Brauer has bitten the bullet and accepted another term as chair at Minnesota. (We wish him a quieter second term - no threats to tenure etc.).

Russell Buhite has accepted a deanship at University of Missouri at Rolla.

Ole R. Holsti (Duke) has received The Alumni Distinguished Undergraduate Teaching Award.

Joan Huff is joining the faculty at Ohio University.

Howard Jones (Alabama) continues with good news regarding his "Mutiny on the Amistad." It is to be a November 1997 selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club, History Book club, and Quality Paperback Book Club! While in Hollywood (reported in June), he was involved in the making of three TV specials relating to the movie - a panel discussion of the Middle Passage for the History Channel, a biography of Joseph Cinque for A & E, and an HBO special on the making of the movie "Amistad."

Mel Leffler has accepted the Deanship of the college and graduate school of arts and sciences at the University of Virginia.

Lo Soo Chun is joining the faculty at Middle Tennessee State University.

Nicholas E. Sarantakes received his PhD from USC in May and is now an assistant professor at Texas A&M - Commerce.

CALENDAR

1997

- November 1 Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.
November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
November 15 Deadline for Myrna F. Bernath research fellowship proposals.

1998

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
January 2-5 The 112th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Seattle.
January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
February 1 Submissions due for Warren Kuehl Award, deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
April 2-5 The 91st meeting of the OAH will take place in Indianapolis.
May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June SHAFR's 23rd annual conference will meet at the University of Maryland.
August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

Future OAH meetings will be in Toronto (Sheraton Centre) in 1999 and in St. Louis, March 30-April 2, 2000. Proposals for the Toronto meeting in 1999 must be postmarked no later than January 12, 1998 and sent to: 1999 Program Committee - OAH, 112 N. Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47408-4199.

Future AHA meeting will be in Washington, D.C., Jan. 7-10, 1999 and Chicago, Jan. 6-9, 2000.

PUBLICATIONS

Calvin Christman (Cedar Valley) ed., Collected by Ann Bennett Mix and Susan Johnson Hadler, *Lost in Victory: Reflections of American War Orphans of World War II*. University of North Texas Press. ISBN 1-57441-033-4, \$32.50.

Warren I. Cohen (Maryland) and Li Zhao, eds., *Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule: The Economic and Political Implications of Reversion*. Cambridge, 1997. Cloth: ISBN 0-521-62158-5, \$59.95; paper: ISBN 0-521-62761-3, \$19.95.

Paolo E. Coletta (USNA Ret.), *Admiral Marc A. Mitscher and U.S. Naval Aviation*. Edwin Mellen Press, 1997. ISBN 0-7734-8676-3, \$109.95.

Rosemary Foot (Oxford), *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949*. Oxford, 1997. New in paperback ISBN 0-19-829292-9, \$18.95.

John Lewis Gaddis (Yale), *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford, 1997. ISBN 0-19-878070-2, \$30.00.

Irene L. Gendzier (Boston U), *Noted from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958*. Columbia, 1996. ISBN 0-231-10474-x, \$39.95.

Peter Grose (New York, NY), *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles*. U. of Mass., 1996. ISBN 1-55849-044-2, \$19.95.

Akira Iriye (Harvard), *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*. Johns Hopkins, 1997. ISBN 0-8018-5457-1, \$32.50.

Klaus Larres (Queen's U - Belfast) and Torsten Oppelland eds., *Germany and the USA in the 20th Century: A Political History* publ. in German, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997. ISBN 3-534-13043-x.

Lorraine M. Lees (Old Dominion), *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*. Penn State, 1997. ISBN 0-271-01629-9, \$40.00.

Clifford R. Lovin (Western Carolina), *A School for Diplomats: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. University Press of America, 1997. ISBN 0-7618-0755-1, \$32.50.

Ole R. Holsti (Duke), *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. University of Michigan Press, 1996. Cloth: ISBN 0-472-09619-2, \$42.50; paper: ISBN 0-472-06619-6, \$19.95.

Rafael Medoff (SUNY Purchase), *Zionism and the Arabs: An American Jewish Dilemma, 1898-1948*. Westport: Praeger, 1997. ISBN 0-275-95824-8, \$55.00.

This is a correction of an earlier erroneous entry.

William N. Tilchin (Boston U), *Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft*. St. Martin's, 1997. ISBN 0-312-12091-5, \$45.00.

J. Samuel Walker (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.), *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*. U. of North Carolina, 1997. Cloth ISBN 0-8078-2361-9, \$34.95; paper ISBN 0-8078-4662-7, \$14.95.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

Complete details regarding SHAFR awards, prizes, and funds are found in the June and December issues of the *Newsletter*, abbreviated information in the March and September issues. Recent changes or corrections appear in **bold print**.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: **Tim Borstelmann, Department of History, McGraw Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853**. Books (five copies of each) may be sent at any time during 1997, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1998.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners deliver a lecture, comparable in style and scope to the SHAFR presidential address, at the SHAFR meeting during the annual OAH conference. Nomination is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent

excellence in teaching and research. Send nominating letter and *curriculum vita* no later than 15 February 1998 to: Robert Messer, Department of History, University of Illinois, Chicago IL 60680.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. Chairperson of the committee: Nick Cullather, Department of History, Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Applications should be sent to: Bill Miscamble, CSC, History, Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556.

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. The next prize will be awarded to a book published in 1996-1997. Contact: Anders Stephanson, History, Columbia U., New York, NY 10027.

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Carolyn Eisenberg, History, Hofstra U., Hempstead NY 11550.

Deadline for applications is 15 November 1998.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. (Applicants need to complete comprehensive doctoral exams before April 1998.) Contact: Keith Nelson, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history. Contact: Chester Pach, History Department, Ohio University, Athens OH 45701. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 1997.

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture." Contact: Thomas Knock, Department of History, Southern Methodist, Dallas, TX 77275 (Southern Methodist).

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents

to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Contact: George Herring, Department of History, University of Kentucky, Lexington KY 40506.

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact Allan Spetter, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1995, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. Contact: James E. Miller, 132 13th St. SE., Washington DC 20003.

I think this
means since 1995.