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PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter* and a journal, *Diplomatic History*.

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SPECIAL NOTICE

Editor, *Diplomatic History*. Applicants are sought for the position of editor of the journal *Diplomatic History*, sponsored by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and now located at the Ohio State University under the editorship of Michael Hogan. The position will be open as of January 1, 2002. Candidates should have experience in the field and institutional support in the form of operating costs and graduate assistantships. Those interested in being considered should send a letter of application, curriculum vita, and statement of institutional support by December 1, 2000 to:

George Herring, Chair
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HITLER'S DECISION TO DECLARE WAR
ON THE UNITED STATES REVISITED
(A SYNTHESIS OF THE
SECONDARY LITERATURE)

by
Harvey Asher
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On December 11, 1941, four days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, General Alfred Jodl, chief of operations staff in the Military High Command, hurried through a call to the chief of the Plans Section of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). He informed General Walter Warlimont that the Führer had just declared war on the United States and asked his staff to study where the bulk of American forces would initially be deployed.¹ Warlimont agreed that such an examination was necessary "for we have never even considered a war against the United States and so have no data on which to base this decision."²

The army leadership was not alone in its surprise at the new turn of events. Few Germans thought Hitler would go beyond an affirmation of solidarity with his Japanese Tripartite partner. At the very most, Germany would rupture diplomatic relations with the United States.³ All prior indications suggested that Hitler would continue to resist adamantly the entreaties of naval officials to declare war on the United States. On July 15, 1941, he had pointedly reminded Admiral Erich Raeder that he did not want to

¹Gordon A. Craig, *Germany: 1860-1945* (New York., 1978), 731.

²General Walter Warlimont, *Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-1945*, trans. by R.H. Barry (London, 1964), 208.

³Louis P. Lochner, *What About Germany?* N.Y. 1942), 199.

antagonize the United States during the campaign in the East,⁴ and he continued to resist the pleadings of Admiral Dönitz who urged an Atlantic attack on the United States.⁵ Despite numerous provocations by the Americans from the summer of 1940 on, one of the essential aims of German strategy was to keep the United States from entering the war. Indeed “the Führer had absolutely prohibited the torpedoing of passenger ships even when they were sailing in convoy, in order not to provoke neutral countries, the United States in particular.”⁶ Yet abruptly, without discussing his decision with anyone else — generals, foreign ministers, cabinet members — Hitler scuttled his cautious policy and without hesitation declared war on the United States.⁷ Hitler’s decision downright bewildered American policy makers who thought that in abandoning his policy of avoiding war with the United States and Russia, Hitler had taken leave of his senses.⁸

Numerous explanations have been offered to account for Hitler’s reversal of policy. But the only area of unanimity among writers on the subject is that Hitler made the decision alone and that he created the circumstances which effectively guaranteed Germany’s final ultimate defeat.”⁹ It bears mentioning at the outset that Hitler’s war declaration was not an automatic commitment incurred by Germany under the terms of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. Article III of the pact only committed the three powers “to

⁴Holger H. Herwig, *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941* (Boston, 1974), 228.

⁵Edwin Hoyt, *Hitler’s War* (New York, 1978), 203-204.

⁶Hans Trefousse, *German and American Neutrality* (New York, 1969), 37.

⁷Sebastian Haffner, *The Meaning of Hitler: Hitler’s Use of Power: His Successes and Failures*, trans. by Ewald Osers (N.Y., 1979), 120.

⁸Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (N.Y., 1948), 441.

⁹Norman Rich, *Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, The Nazi Staff, and the Course of Expansion* (N.Y., 1973), 238.

assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.”¹⁰ Indeed, part of the rationale of the Tripartite Pact had been to frighten the United States into staying out of the conflict by threatening Washington with war across two oceans. While the cosignatories of this document agreed to render aid to the victim of aggression by a fourth party: “whether a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article 3 of the pact shall be determined among the three Contracting Parties (Germany, Japan, Italy).”¹¹ Clearly then, Hitler was under no compulsion to come to Japan’s aid.

Nonetheless on April 14, 1941, Hitler had gone beyond the letter of the Tripartite Pact when he assured Ambassador Yosuke Matsuoka that “Germany would declare war immediately in case of a Japanese-American conflict regardless of who started it,”¹² a promise that Matsuoka did not pay attention to and may not have fully understood.¹³ It is likely that Hitler pledged unqualified support to Japan at this time to encourage her entry into the forthcoming Russian campaign. But when Japan clearly indicated its unwillingness to join in the attack on Russia, Hitler could have reverted to the original Pact terms without undo difficulty. Instead, surprisingly, Hitler quit pressing the Japanese for a *quid pro quo* and seemingly was prepared to declare war without it.¹⁴

¹⁰Nicholas Henderson, “Hitler’s Biggest Blunder,” *History Today* 43 (April 1993): 36.

¹¹Paul W. Schroeder, *The Axis Alliance and Japanese American Relations, 1941* (N.Y., 1958). 121.

¹²Quoted in Herwig, *Politics of Frustration*, 228.

¹³Eberhard Jackel, *Hitler in History* (Hanover, Mass, 1984), 71. On April 13, 1941, Japan signed a five-year neutrality pact with Russia which it carefully observed; Siberian troops pulled back from the Russo-Japanese military frontier in Manchuria and helped halt the German offensive at Moscow.

¹⁴Henderson, “Hitler’s Biggest Blunder,” 40.

Even if he felt honor bound to keep his pledge, a premise made doubtful by his previous diplomatic dealings, excuses for procrastinating implementation of his promise were readily available. As diplomatic historian Selig Adler concludes:

It certainly must have been something other than a sense of honor that led Hitler to keep his word with Japan instead of remaining neutral and letting the American public cry "on to Tokyo" while Germany conquered Europe.¹⁵

Interestingly, the evidence suggests that Hitler would have preferred that Japan enter the lists against Great Britain or the Soviet Union rather than America.¹⁶ Britain's hopes rested on Russia and the United States. If Russia dropped out of the picture, America, too, would be lost for Britain because Russia's capitulation would greatly increase Japan's power in the Far East¹⁷. Relieved of the Russian threat at its back door, Japan could then move ruthlessly forward in Asia against Britain, thereby keeping the United States occupied in the Pacific. Britain, deprived of its present aid from America, and of potential help from Russia, would collapse, while expanded U-boat warfare would diminish Roosevelt's support for Churchill across the Atlantic.¹⁸ The United States, finding itself without allies, would be forced to recognize that Hitler's European stranglehold was virtually unassailable.

When it became clear that Japan had no intention of participating in the Russian campaign or of waiting for it to conclude, but instead planned to confront the United States, Hitler might have extracted as a *quid pro quo* for his support, either Japanese agreement to stop

¹⁵*The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction* (N.Y., 1961) 290.

¹⁶James V. Compton, *The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler, the United States, and the Origins of World War II* (Boston, 1967), 238-39.

¹⁷Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Hitler's Image of the United States," *American Historical Review*, vol. LXIX, no. 4 (July 1964): 1014-1015.

¹⁸James McGregor Burns, *The Soldier of Freedom* (N.Y., 1970), 69.

American shipments to Russia via Vladivostok, or better yet, a Japanese pledge to tie down Russian troops in Siberia. If the Japanese remained unyielding, Hitler could revert to his ultra-cautious policy of not antagonizing the United States and providing her, thereby, with an excuse to come into the war against Germany. Without any apparent gain, however, Hitler chose to declare war on the United States, thereby canceling the greatest single benefit of the Japanese attack: diverting American attention from Europe to the Pacific.¹⁹ Earlier, on November 28, 1941, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop told the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, that if Japan became engaged in war with the United States, Germany would join immediately. In return, Japan said it would not leave the conflict until the war in Europe was won.²⁰ On November 30, 1941, Oshima was instructed by Foreign Minister Hideki Tojo to inform Hitler that the Washington talks had collapsed and of Japanese plans to resort to military means to curtail the American threat. Subsequent dispatches by German Ambassador Eugene Ott, almost until the day of the attack, reiterated that Japan's conflict with the United States was unavoidable.²¹ It would seem that Hitler's goal of tying down America in a Pacific conflict was assured even if he did nothing, that Japan intended to pursue her course of action against the United States regardless of whether the immediate support of her Axis partner was forthcoming. After learning of the attack (about which the Japanese did not tell Hitler of in advance), said Hitler: "Now it is impossible for us to lose the war; we now have an ally who has never been vanished in three thousand years."²² That he would declare war was a foregone conclusion; he also failed to consult his number two man, Göring, about the war declaration and ignored the advice of Ribbentrop and

¹⁹Rich, *Hitler's War Aims*, 237

²⁰Jackel, *Hitler in History*, 86

²¹Compton, *Swastika and Eagle*, 232-33.

²²Quoted in David Irving, *Hitler's War*, (New York, 1977), 352.

other cabinet members not to do so.²³ We are left with the less than satisfactory conclusion that “for reasons best known to himself, Hitler was quite ready to grant Japan the assurance (of German backing) desired.”²⁴ In effect, Hitler granted the Japanese a blank check to launch an attack at a time and place of their own choosing. “The news of the attack (on Pearl Harbor) took the Wilhelmstrasse completely by surprise.”²⁵

The timing of Hitler’s decision is especially puzzling in that it was taken while the campaign against Russia was going poorly. Early in December, 1941, following its success at Rostov, the Red Army, almost overnight, seized the initiative all along the front and administered to German Headquarters a series of shocks such as it had never known before.²⁶ The German drive ground to a halt; on December 6, Marshall Zhukov’s Red Army launched a counteroffensive west of Moscow. By mid-December, the Germans were in retreat at dozens of points. Frustrated by these reverses, the Führer announced that “in obedience to an inner voice, he had determined to take over the supreme military command, deposing the generals who had sought to undo the work accomplished in Russia.”²⁷ And most significantly, under these adverse circumstances, by declaring war Hitler relinquished the cardinal tenet of his American policy of avoiding incidents with the United States until the outcome of the Russian campaign was clear.²⁸

²³*Ibid.*, 353 (The Pact was signed on December 11, the day Germany declared war on the United States.)

²⁴Schroeder, *Axis Alliance*, 152.

²⁵Trefousse, *American Neutrality* (N.Y., 1965), 48.

²⁶Warlimont, *Inside Hitler’s Headquarters*, 203.

²⁷Quoted in Forrest Davis and Ernest Lindley, *How War Came About: An American White Paper, From the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor* (N.Y., 1942), 301.

²⁸Irving, *Hitler’s War*, 297.

Some writers have pointed out that the Eastern setbacks notwithstanding, Hitler remained convinced he would successfully smash Russia by the spring of 1942 at the latest. If this was the case, then from his perspective "it seemed better to split the American naval forces from the start rather than have the U.S. concentrate all her forces against Japan, resulting in all likelihood in a rapid defeat."²⁹ While it is possible to accept Hitler's monumental mis-reading of the Russia situation, it seems most unlikely that Hitler wished to alleviate American pressure on Japan by directing it against Germany. Hitler's declaration of war, while German troops were still bogged down in Russia "must be considered the single greatest mistake of his career."³⁰

But might it not simply be the case that Hitler assumed American intervention was imminent and nothing was to be gained by postponing the inevitable conflict; that following the Japanese attack, the German Foreign Office expected the United States to come in anyway.³¹ According to some accounts, Hitler's belief in imminent American intervention dated from Roosevelt's re-election in November, 1940.³² Another source contends that Roosevelt's "shoot-on-sight" order of September 11, 1941, led Hitler to conclude that isolationists like Lindbergh could no longer keep the United States out of the war.³³ In the wake of the Japanese attack the White House accused Germany of having done everything in its power to push Japan into the war.³⁴ Leaders of Congress were talking of a declaration of war not only on Japan but on the entire

²⁹Herwig, *Politics of Frustration*, 236-37.

³⁰Rich, *Hitler's War Aims*, 245.

³¹Trefousse, *German and American Neutrality*, 155.

³²Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall*, 311-14.

³³Irving, *Hitler's War*, 352-53.

³⁴*New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1941, 1

axis as well. The *New York Times* newspaper editorials reminded its readers that Hitler, not Tokyo was the greater threat to our security. "The real battle of our times will not be fought in the Far East. It will be fought in the English Channel.... If Hitler is smashed then the situation in the Far East will take care of itself automatically."³⁵ Still, there is no reason for assuming that Hitler equated press commentary with official government policy. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese attack, *before* assessing the American response, Hitler ordered that German submarines and warships might open fire on American ships on sight.³⁶ Moreover on December 8, the German Chargé d'Affaires in the United States reported that for the present Roosevelt wished to avoid any worsening of the situation in the Atlantic and "that from the standpoint of American conduct of war against Japan, it would seem logical to avoid a war on two fronts."³⁷ Hitler ignored this evaluation; indeed, he reached his decision to declare war no later than December 4th.³⁸

Hitler's views about America were contradictory. On the one hand, he asserted that the United States was the great meeting place of Nordics, who were protecting their racial purity by excluding Asiatics and by other immigrant legislation.³⁹ On the other hand, he was known to comment that the wrong side had lost the Civil War and that the American people had lost, not the South; the United States was a racial mixture after all,⁴⁰ that its internal

³⁵*Ibid.*, 22

³⁶Trefousse, *German and American Neutrality*, 147.

³⁷*Documents on German Foreign Policy*. Series D, 1936-1941, XIII, 980.

³⁸Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, *Hitler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War* (N.Y., 1979), 238-39.

³⁹Gerhard Weinberg, *World in the Balance: Behind the Scene of World War II* (London, 1981), 57.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 61

political weakness and degenerate culture would prove no match for German will.⁴¹ After all, in his previous presidential campaign, FDR had pledged to keep the United States out of the war, while in August 1941, the House of Representatives barely approved the renewal of compulsory service. Gallop polls taken in May and October of 1941 revealed only 17% favored war with Germany.⁴² More important, Hitler was aware of the American political situation and had encouraged German propaganda to stir up isolationist sentiment to defeat Roosevelt in the 1940 election, while focusing on American reasons not to be involved in the war.⁴³

While it is not possible to say for certain what America's response might have been had Hitler exercised restraint, Roosevelt did not indicate that he considered an immediate declaration of war against Germany a viable option. When Secretary of War Henry Stimson made this suggestion at the cabinet meeting of December 7, no one supported him.⁴⁴ Nor did the final American declaration of war in any way connect Germany with Japan.⁴⁵ As things stood after Pearl Harbor, despite the American military's preference for an "Atlantic first" strategy, Churchill had to face the scary possibility that the United States might become involved only in the Pacific. David Kennedy reinforces this notion, suggesting that in the absence of a legal declaration Roosevelt might have found it impossible to

⁴¹Percy Schramm, *Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader*, trans. By Donald Detwiler (Chicago, 1971), 87

⁴²Alistair Horne, "The 5 Worst Military Decisions of the 20th Century," *Forbes*, vol. 156, no. 10 (October 23, 1995), 187.

⁴³Alton Frye, *Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere* (London, 1970), 95-96. See also John Lucas, "The Transatlantic Duel: Hitler vs. Roosevelt," *American Heritage* vol. 42, no. 8 (Nov, 1991), 72

⁴⁴Robert A. Divine, *The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II* (New York., 1965), 157.

⁴⁵William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-41* (Gloucester, Mass., 1969), 938.

resist demands by the Navy and public opinion to place the maximum effort in the Pacific.⁴⁶ For various domestic reasons, including fear of congressional opposition and awareness of isolationist sentiment, the American president had placed himself in a position where the course of action he would take was largely determined by the unpredictable determination of his enemies.⁴⁷ Harold Ickes, PWA head, confided to his diary following the President's speech on May 27, 1941 that "it seems that he is still waiting for the Germans to create an 'incident'".⁴⁸

Hitler's declaration seemed to fly in the face of his previous policy toward the United States, which was geared toward avoiding any confrontation that might result in American entry into the war against Germany. He initially interpreted America's neutrality legislation to mean "that the United States considered itself absolutely out of European affairs and that Germany might follow a continental policy without danger of interference, so long as it did not violate the Monroe Doctrine."⁴⁹ As Roosevelt succeeded in removing the restrictions of the Neutrality Act of 1937 — repeal of the arms embargo, destroyer for bases deal, shoot-on-sight order, arming of American merchant ships⁵⁰ — Hitler continued to avoid provocation while refusing to permit "his impetuous admirals to inveigle him into premature adventures with the United States."⁵¹ His unwillingness to act against the United States despite numerous

⁴⁶*Freedom From Fear: The American People in the Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York, 1999), 524

⁴⁷Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 382-83.

⁴⁸David Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*, 494

⁴⁹Quoted in De Witt, C. Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Oct. 1946), 146.

⁵⁰Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," in A.A. Offner, ed., *America and the Origins of WWII* (Boston, 1971)

⁵¹Trefousse, *German and American Neutrality*, 38; Rich, *German War Aims*, 235.

opportunities to find a *casus belli*, stands in marked contrast to his precipitous action of December 11. Hitler's remarkable restraint, despite every excuse to declare war on the United States, led Admiral Stark, chief of American Naval Operations, to remark in a memo of September, 1941:

I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready; that is, it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.⁵²

This hardly seems to have been the case as we have seen. Strangely, the German war declaration, while accusing the United States of proceeding from initial violations of neutrality to open acts of war omitted any reference to the Pacific situation, which ostensibly was decisive in causing Hitler to alter his policy of ignoring American neutrality violations.⁵³

If the short term considerations do not satisfactorily explain Hitler's decision of December 11, then might not Hitler's American policy be seen within the framework of a firmly held long-term *Weltanschauung*? The argument here is that Hitler envisaged a two-phase foreign policy — the so-called *Stufenplan*. Phase One involved an alliance with Great Britain, or at least her neutrality while Germany established continental hegemony via a series of localized military campaigns against isolated opponents. After eliminating Russia and France as powers, the new "Super Germany" would stretch from the Urals to the Pyrenees. Germany would also create a colonial empire in Central Africa to supply it with raw materials and get ready to assume the struggle with

⁵²Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 380.

⁵³The War Declaration appears in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. V, no. 129 (Dec. 13, 1941), 481.

America from its advanced bases in the Atlantic. Phase One was to be reached by 1943-45.⁵⁴

Preparations for the future conflict against the United States — Phase Two — were set forth in the “Z” or *Ziel* plan of January, 1939, which spelled out the details for constructing a naval fleet by 1948, designed with the United States in mind. This phase would be completed after the death of the Führer. Temporarily shelved when Germany found itself fighting the wrong enemy — Britain instead of Russia — in 1939, the plan was rekindled after Hitler’s smashing victories in the West when it appeared to him that Britain might come to terms. The plan again receded into the distant future with the attack on Russia.⁵⁵

The “Z” plan can hardly have been instrumental in Hitler’s December 11 decision. Britain was clearly neither an ally nor a neutral; at best, the Russian campaign was inconclusive. Not only had long term naval preparations against the United States failed to get underway, but as has been noted, Hitler had no immediate plans for dealing with the American belligerency his own declaration guaranteed. As General Walter Warlimont correctly observed, “Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States was little more than an empty gesture.”⁵⁶

If Hitler’s decision was bereft of immediate military gain, was not based on treaty obligations, ignored the practicalities of

⁵⁴The following account draws heavily from Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Reich* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), esp. 20-23, 81-82 and Herwig, *Politics of Frustration*, 185. Both writers summarize the views of Andreas Hillgruber on the subject in such works as *Hitler’s Strategie: Politik und Kriegsführung, 1940-1941* (Frankfurt IM, 1965); *Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege* (Göttingen, 1967); *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler* (Düsseldorf, 1969).

⁵⁵William Carr, “National Socialism: Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht, in Walter Laqueur, ed., *Fascism: A Reader’s Guide* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), 169.

⁵⁶Warlimont, *Inside Hitler’s Headquarters*, 209

implementation, abruptly rejected his previous cautious policy, and violated his long-range plans, then how do we account for it? In his Nuremberg testimony, Ribbentrop claimed Hitler told him "If we don't stand on the side of the Japanese, the Pact is politically dead....but the chief reason is the United States is already shooting at our ships....and through their actions created a situation which is practically, let's say, a situation of war."⁵⁷ A similar argument is made by John Lucas, intent on proving that Hitler's decision was reasonable. "He could hardly betray his Japanese ally by welshing on the principle item in their alliance which required them to go to war with the United States together and simultaneously."⁵⁸ Both explanations are unsatisfactory: the first smacks of post-decision justification; the second begs the question of why Hitler agreed to joint action. A tentative answer is that the decision defies rational explanation alone and that irrational factors need to be considered. As the German historian, Sebastian Hoffner concludes, "there is to this day no comprehensible rational explanation for what one is tempted to describe as an act of lunacy."⁵⁹ It appears that Hitler's personality, rather than military considerations or miscalculation, played an important role in Hitler's baffling decision.

⁵⁷Henderson, "Hitler's Biggest Blunder," 42

⁵⁸John Lucas, *The History of History* (New York, 1997), 154

⁵⁹Haffner, *The Meaning of History*, 117. Even writers who stress rational factors acknowledge an irrational component. Compton, p. 265 speaks of a contradiction between Hitler's "Atlantic caution and Pacific recklessness;" Trefousse, p. 155-56 notes that Hitler "had long fallen victim to his own propaganda" that "he let himself be carried along by the acts of his allies;" Rich, p. 237, remarks that Hitler gained no military or economic advantage from the war declaration; Schroeder, p. 152, states that "for reasons best known to himself, Hitler was quite ready to grant the Japanese the assurance desired;" Poole, p. 142, remarks: "We found the most baffling question in the whole Nazi story to be the prompt declaration of war on the U.S.; from Sherwood, p. 441, "It seemed at the time that German-Italian declaration of war was another 'irrational act' ..." Herwig, p. 236, says that "Hitler probably had in mind certain reasoning as he reached his fateful decision on Dec. 11, 1941."

For Hitler, “willpower (sic) was the dominating factor everywhere.”⁶⁰ It is likely that this article of faith led Hitler to misread the Russian situation, and to maintain that despite the reverses suffered in the winter of 1941, he could still crush Russia shortly by *Blitzkrieg* tactics, and be ready to confront the United States head-on by 1942.⁶¹ At the same time, belief in will power could not indefinitely permit him to deny the seriousness of the Russian situation, nor the possibility that victory was not inevitable.

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, occurring under very difficult military circumstances for Germany, likely seemed to the destiny-conscious mind of the Führer one of those fateful strokes to which a world-historical figure must respond.⁶² The man who believed providence had a special concern for him once again had been miraculously snatched from the throes of defeat by the Japanese action. His invincibility reaffirmed by divine intervention, Hitler threw caution to the winds in a bold gesture oblivious to practical concerns. Delighted at the news of Pearl Harbor, Hitler “forgot all else in his relief that at last the Japanese had taken the plunge.”⁶³ As Allan Bullock argues:

In declaring war on America first, without waiting for the Americans to act, he saw himself recapturing the psychological initiative, pursuing his favorite tactic of surprise, demonstrating to the German people the value of the Japanese alliance....and so reviving their faith in his leadership.⁶⁴

⁶⁰Percy E. Schramm, *Hitler*, 108

⁶¹The issue is more clouded than the above comment indicates. While professing public optimism about the success of the Russian campaign, on Dec. 8, Nazi spokesmen announced that hostilities in Russia would be halted until the spring. Shortly thereafter, Hitler took over the supreme military command and deposed the generals “who had sought to undo the work accomplished in Russia.” Davis and Lindley, *How War Came About*, 301.

⁶²Compton, *Swastika and Eagle*, 236.

⁶³Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 940.

⁶⁴Allan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (New York, 1997), 761.

Hence the recklessness of his declaration of war compared with the others which usually came after German troops had already invaded the country.⁶⁵ Perhaps Hitler acknowledged his impulsivity when during the final days in the Berlin Bunker, he said: “the war with America is a tragedy, illogical, devoid of fundamental reality.”⁶⁶

Let us carry this line of thought one step further. Many writers agree that Hitler was a gambler in the field of foreign policy and that circumstances in 1939 led him to undertake the wrong war, at the wrong time, against the wrong enemy.⁶⁷ The numerous military successes by which he surprised himself and others led Hitler to fall victim to his own propaganda, that he was an infallible and invincible leader. However, the deteriorating situation on the Russian front threatened to shatter his self-image of omnipotence. The alternative to this self-image was psychologically unacceptable to Hitler, for given the dichotomous nature of his self-perceptions, to be less than all-powerful was tantamount to an admission of impotency.⁶⁸ To maintain his blinders (ego integrity) in the face of the worsening military situation in Russia, Hitler recklessly threw down the gauntlet to the United States as a means of reaffirming his feelings of omnipotence. Military strategy took a back seat to Hitler’s psychological needs. He would reaffirm himself as tireless leader and fearless crusader by upping the ante — not only would

⁶⁵Herwig, *Politics of Frustration*, 236.

⁶⁶Quoted in Compton, *Swastika and Eagle*, 266.

⁶⁷A.S.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (N.Y., 1961), pioneered this thesis. Some of his particular interpretations must be handled cautiously.

⁶⁸More technically: “The ‘Führer’ personality shows all the earmarks of a reaction formation that has been created as a compensation and cover-up for deep-lying tendencies that he despises.” Walter C. Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler* (New York, 1971.), 135. Because the alternative to repudiating the Führer images of masculinity, hardness and unyielding willpower was to acknowledge that he was effeminate, soft and indecisive, an admittance that would be psychologically devastating, Hitler had compelling incentive to refute this possibility.

he master a difficult task, the conquest of Russia, but he would do so under the added handicap of simultaneously confronting the military power of the United States. Creating and then “mastering” an impossible situation would serve to re-validate his omnipotence. To justify what on the surface seemed to be an unnecessary, if not foolish decision, Hitler now rationalized that the United States was a feeble country with a loud mouth and of little military consequence,⁶⁹ an assessment which his earlier policy of restraint indicates he did not seriously believe. That emotional factors were paramount in Hitler’s decision is further attested to by his failure to formulate any plans for dealing with his new, powerful adversary.

While this scenario helps explain the immediate circumstances of Hitler’s irrational conduct, it is also possible to fit his decision into a more complicated psychological pattern — that of suicidal martyrdom. According to James McRandle, suicidal martyrdom involves the active courting of situations which in one manner or another will cause injury to the subject. In a large number of cases of chronic bad luck, there is good reason to believe that these situations are created by the sufferer.⁷⁰ McRandle cites a number of instances which suggest Hitler followed a self-destructive pattern: a) failing at school and as an artist (p. 156); b) allowing the initiative to pass into the hands of others during the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 (p. 175); c) pressing for the dissolution of the Reichstag after his July electoral success (p. 185); d) entering the war in 1935 without plans for a long-term conflict (p. 206); e) planning an offensive against Russia before the campaign against England failed (p. 211). And then there was the least understandable of Hitler’s major decisions of this time — his unnecessary declaration of war against the United States when Hitler “gratuitously brought into the ranks of his enemies the most powerful and implacable country in the world (p. 214).”

⁶⁹Weinberg, *Hitler’s Image of the United States*,” 1017.

⁷⁰James H. McRandle, *The Track of the Wolf: Essays on National Socialism and Its Leader Adolf Hitler* (Evanston, Illinois, 1965), 154.

McRandle's theme is augmented by Robert Waite⁷¹ who adds to Hitler's list of costly blunders: a) halting tank movement on the Dunkirk salient (p. 358); b) refusing to pursue a Mediterranean strategy after France's fall (p. 399); c) not asking Japan for help in launching Barbarossa (p. 401); d) naming the Russian operation after Frederick Barbarossa who failed in five campaigns against the Italian city-states to unify the Holy Roman Empire (p. 402).

There are other instances in Hitler's career which suggest that he responded to reverses or stiffening resistance not by reappraising his objectives, but by countering with one more offensive, regardless of whether such a course of action made political or military sense. It was almost as if Hitler deliberately placed himself in an exposed position and blocked all lines of retreat.⁷² Hence in December, 1932, despite the gathering gloom in the party and his weakening position *vis a vis* Chancellor Papen, Hitler stubbornly refused to join a government of national concentration.⁷³ Or one might cite Hitler's behavior in September, 1938, when he deliberately placed himself in a more perilous position over Czechoslovakia as if by upping the odds against success he could muster up latent spiritual reserves to ride out the crisis without faltering or crumbling.⁷⁴

While one may quarrel with these interpretations of particular decisions, taken as a whole they support the notion that there was a pronounced tendency towards self-destruction in Hitler. More specifically, throughout his lifetime Hitler oscillated between extreme creative and destructive roles; if he could not win everything, he was willing to lose all. The rapidly deteriorating situation on the Russian front where the German drive ground to a halt in the first week in December and was even thrown into reverse

⁷¹*The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler* (N.Y., 1977).

⁷²William Carr, *Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics* (N.Y., 1979), 97-98.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 34

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 97-98.

around Moscow, shattered Hitler's feeling of invincibility. He responded by recklessly challenging the United States as a means of speeding up the defeat he now intuited as all but certain.⁷⁵ The psychological pay-off for this seemingly perverse action — to make a bad situation worse — was to reaffirm Hitler's feelings of omnipotence, an omnipotence now hinging not on the power to conquer boldly but to destroy absolutely by ordering the death of a nation.⁷⁶

My argument obviously is not that Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was the decisive step in his self-destructive pattern, only that Hitler's action here is consistent with his long established mode of operation.⁷⁷ Hitler tended to make abrupt, spontaneous decisions. The war declaration illustrates his habit of getting overwhelmed in the moment and acting rashly. The evidence clearly supports the notion that psychological considerations, not rational factors — military strategy, loyalty to an ally, the prestige of declaring war first, feelings of vengeance towards Roosevelt, misperceptions of America's military strength — were paramount in determining the timing of Hitler's decision. Hitler had reasonable, less costly options available to him for responding to the Japanese attack, i.e., doing nothing, extracting concessions from Japan for his support. The unofficial state of war that existed in the Atlantic could have continued without full mobilization against Germany and with a relatively low level of hostilities. His declaration of war against the United States was a highly subjective decision intimately tied to the Führer's personal characteristics, the two most important of which were his belief that his destiny was in the hands of

⁷⁵According to General Jodl, it had become clear to Hitler after the Germans were stopped outside of Moscow that "victory could no longer be achieved." Schramm, *Hitler: The Man and Military Leader*, 26-27.

⁷⁶Waite, *The Psychopathic God*, 410.

⁷⁷For a useful discussion of when psychological as opposed to situational factors best explain behavior, see Faye Crosby, "Evaluating Psychohistorical Explanations," *Psychohistory Review*, vol. VII, no. 4 (Spring, 1979), esp. 9-10.

providence and his psychological need to maintain at all costs his feeling of omnipotence and invincibility.

The unnecessary declaration of war against the United States, coupled with the underestimation of American capabilities, led to the ultimate defeat of Germany in World War II. The question remains of what might have happened if Hitler hadn't made that grave mistake.

“GOOD DAY SUNSHINE:
OUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG
OF SOUTH KOREA”

by

James Matray NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, William Stueck
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, and Chen Jian UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

During late April 2000, we were in Seoul, Korea to attend a conference titled “Pursuing Peace Beyond the Korean War” commemorating the 50th anniversary of the start of that conflict. The Research Institute on National Security Affairs at Korea National Defense University sponsored the meeting, in partnership with the Chosun Ilbo and the Korea Broadcasting System. To our pleasant surprise, Professor Hwang Byong-moo, who was the principal organizer, informed us that he had arranged for a meeting with the Republic of Korea's President Kim Dae-jung for the eight foreign scholars presenting at the conference. In addition to the three of us, the others were Chu Shu-long, Senior Research Fellow at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Heiner Meulemann, professor at the Institute for Sociology at the University of Cologne, Shigemura Toshimitsu, Director of the Center for Korean Studies at Taqshok University, Scott Snyder, Korea Representative at the Asia Foundation, and Vadim

Tkachenko, Director of the Center for Korean Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Professor Hwang told us that several of his colleagues asked if they could accompany us, but he refused all these requests. It would be the first time he would meet Kim Dae-jung since his election as president of the Republic of Korea.

Before describing our meeting with President Kim Dae-jung, a few words about the conference. Held over two days, it was a rather typical gathering in format, but it was very well-attended, with at least three hundred people in the audience for each session. Those attending were almost all Koreans, demonstrating the great significance that the Korean people attached to the events marking the beginning of the Korean War. Korean presenters at the conference relied heavily on recently released Soviet documents to justify an energized anger directed toward North Korea, now exposed as irrefutably responsible for initiating the conflict. But many included in their comments emotional personal recollections of the suffering that they and their relatives endured as a result of the Korean War. This was especially true of General Paik Sun Yup, who gained great fame during the war and now chairs "The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee." Still vigorous despite being eighty years old, his two presentations during the conference were moving in their depiction of the huge price the Korean people have paid — and are still paying — for this ruinous war.

Several top officials in the South Korean government made appearances at the conference, including the prime minister, the defense minister, and the minister of foreign affairs and trade. But unofficial participation in the conference was carefully controlled. A conference organizer told one of us that time allotted for questions from those attending was purposely limited to prevent veterans from presenting long and overly emotional statements about their experiences in the war. Nevertheless, a Korean in the audience was the last to speak at the final session on Friday before Professor Hwang had to cut him off after he had spoken at length about how North Korea had revealed its malevolence in starting the

war. Moreover, he said, this proved Pyongyang could not be trusted and would exploit President Kim Dae-jung's policy of engagement toward North Korea. Each of us therefore had gained a renewed sense of the deep, personal, and ongoing importance of the Korean War to the Korean people as we anticipated our meeting with Kim Dae-jung on Saturday, April 29, the day after the conference ended.

We traveled by bus the short distance from the Seoul Plaza Hotel located directly across the street from City Hall to the Blue House, the presidential residence that is located on the northern end of downtown Seoul. As we went through the front gate on what was a truly glorious spring day, many Koreans were congregating outside, presumably participants in tours. The Blue House is an impressive building constructed in the traditional pagoda style of other palace structures scattered around the capital. We entered through the front door into a large reception hall and ascended a very wide staircase facing a large stylized map of South Korea on the wall in front of us. We had left the hotel at 9:20 a.m. and, about twenty minutes later, we were relaxing and sipping tea in a small meeting room on the second floor.

At about 9:50, we were escorted into a large meeting room a few yards away where we would meet President Kim Dae-jung. The room was perhaps fifty feet wide and one hundred feet long with beautiful carpeting and little furniture. Slightly oversized chairs, six on each side, were arranged in an oval open at one end. At the other end was an identical chair for President Kim. A bevy of photographers were there briefly at the start to record the event. At precisely 10:00 a.m., we rose to greet President Kim Dae-jung as he walked into the room. Also present were his National Security Advisor, press secretary, and a female interpreter. Kim Dae-jung is now 75 years of age, having devoted much of his life to ending the military's dictatorial rule in South Korea and gaining election as president. His entry into the room was slow and deliberate, almost a shuffle. He also has a slight limp, perhaps the result of mistreatment while imprisoned for political dissent.

President Kim began our meeting with a statement in Korean that, with translation into English, lasted about twenty minutes. He first congratulated us on the success of our conference on the Korean War, expressing his confidence that our exchange of opinions had been enlightening. Kim then noted that his country soon would celebrate the fifty-year anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, remarking that this was the most important war of the postwar era. He also stated that the absence of peace on the Korean peninsula represented the last legacy of the Cold War. The president then emphasized that peaceful discussions rather than war now would determine Korea's future. He attributed his optimism to the "Sunshine Policy" that he had implemented after becoming president early in 1998. At first, North Korea and its leader Kim Jong Il, President Kim explained, had been very suspicious, thinking that Seoul had a hidden agenda aimed at undermining the control of the Communist government in the north. But Kim Dae-jung's patience had been rewarded with steadily improving relations leading to an agreement for the two leaders to meet in Pyongyang in June 2000.

President Kim Dae-jung did not make eye contact as he made these summary comments without referring to notes. His soft-spoken delivery was impressive because it conveyed to us his profound self-confidence and serenity. Kim then summarized the objectives of the "Sunshine Policy" that he had outlined during his speech the previous March at the Free University of Berlin. Known as the Berlin Declaration, his statement identified four aims. First, South Korea was prepared to assist North Korea in overcoming its economic difficulties through investment in infrastructure, joint business ventures, and agricultural help to end food shortages. Second, Seoul sought genuine reconciliation and cooperation with Pyongyang to end the Cold War confrontation and secure peace, rather than seeking reunification. Third, Kim urged action to arrange reunion of families separated as a result of the Korean War. Last, South Korea proposed opening a dialogue immediately to move toward implementation of the Basic South-North Agreement

of 1991 that had provided for a commitment to negotiations to resolve differences and promote peace.

Justifying his reputation as an intellectual, his words were those of a scholar-statesman, not a politician. His description of the challenges Korea now faces and how best to overcome them reflected a sophisticated grasp on national, regional, and international affairs. President Kim explained that in contrast to his predecessors, he had not set out preconditions for expanded cooperative contacts with North Korea. Rather, he had pursued his policy of engagement with consistency and sincerity since assuming office. He then pointed out that Seoul was providing Pyongyang with \$200 million in annual economic aid. Other achievements included joint ventures such as tourist visits to Kumgang Mountain and the reunion of more than 8,000 separated families. His "Sunshine Policy" therefore had succeeded in breaking down mutual suspicion and building a foundation of trust between the two Koreas. In concluding, the president stated that his meeting with Kim Jong Il would be the first step toward achieving this objective. His expectations were not high, explaining that while important, the summit would not answer all the questions that existed between the two Koreas. We later agreed that Kim's "Sunshine Policy" was an integrated, logical, and pragmatic approach for bringing an end to a half-century of hostility on the Korean peninsula.

Now it was time for questions. Kim Dae-jung's facial expressions and occasional nodding as he listened closely to queries, all but one in English, indicated that he may not have required the translation into Korean that followed each question. The subsequent exchanges were unhurried and provided a number of important insights on current South Korean foreign policy. Professor Chu Shu-long spoke first, asking President Kim what role he expected the People's Republic of China to play in the upcoming talks in Pyongyang. In response, Kim stated that Beijing had supported his policy of engagement with North Korea; he hoped and expected that China would continue to do so. Speaking in Korean, Professor Tkachenko observed that maintaining security on the peninsula was the most

difficult problem facing the two Koreas. He asked President Kim if the security concerns of each government would make progress difficult in the forthcoming negotiations. While Kim agreed that security was a primary concern for both sides, he was optimistic that the summit would help build a foundation for trust, thereby leading to greater cooperation between the two governments.

Stueck then commented on the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, pointing out that North Korea had been consistent in demanding withdrawal as a condition for greater engagement. Would President Kim, he asked, be flexible on this issue? If so, what would be the impact on Korean-American relations? The president responded that North Korea could not compel withdrawal because U.S. troops were deployed in South Korea in accordance with a bilateral agreement. More important, the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula acted as a stabilizing force both locally and regionally. Surprisingly, Kim stated that he suspected North Korea really wanted U.S. forces to stay, viewing them as a deterrent to a possible attack from South Korea. He emphasized the continued need for U.S. forces on the peninsula to maintain regional stability, but did imply that negotiations might lead to an arrangement for U.S. military withdrawal at some future date.

Matray next congratulated President Kim on the realism and wisdom of his "Sunshine Policy." He commented that while the American people also were commemorating the anniversary of the Korean War, few, unfortunately, paid attention to Korea or U.S. policy toward the divided country. He then asked what impact, if any, that President Kim thought the U.S. presidential election this fall might have on U.S. policy toward Korea. Kim was emphatic in stating that there would be no change because there existed a bipartisan consensus supporting his "Sunshine Policy" in the United States. As proof, he noted that William Perry, who served as National Security Advisor under President George Bush, was in charge of U.S. negotiations with North Korea. Kim lauded the "Perry Process" and predicted it would continue regardless of who became

president because both parties realized that an inflexible approach of "toughness" was counterproductive.

Professor Shigemitsu commented on press coverage of the forthcoming summit, asking whether President Kim thought North Korea would allow unfettered media access to the negotiations. Kim Dae-jung responded in the affirmative, noting that Pyongyang had issued its announcement of the dates for the summit on a Sunday to maximize media coverage the following day. Professor Muelemann then inquired about whether the negotiations might lead to greater cultural, media, and family exchanges, noting how this had accelerated the process of German reunification. After stating that this was a "good point," President Kim observed that South Koreans already could watch television programs from North Korea. There needed to be greater progress in this area, but Pyongyang had warranted concerns that providing access to information about the south would destabilize its government.

Chen Jian, in the last question, asked what Kim thought the impact of the "Sunshine Policy" would be on matters of regional strategic concern. He pointed specifically to first, the future of Taiwan, and second, the emerging closer relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. President Kim in response stated flatly that there was only one China and Taiwan was part of it. He emphasized that it was important for the issue to remain simple, but stressed that the dispute had to be resolved peacefully. He was careful to define his position as not deviating from that of the United States. Regarding U.S.-China relations, Kim explained that both Washington and Beijing supported his "Sunshine Policy" and this reinforced regional cooperation and stability. As the interpreter was finishing translation of the president's answer, the press secretary, who was sitting off to the side, rose to signal that it was time for our meeting to end. President Kim expressed his appreciation for our visit and then walked around the room and shook each of our hands before leaving promptly at 11:00 a.m.

Readers naturally will wonder why the president of the Republic of Korea chose to meet with our group. Obviously, Kim Dae-jung was attempting to sell his "Sunshine Policy" to people who he thought were careful observers of recent events on the Korean peninsula. He did a good job on this count, but it is fair to say that he was preaching to the choir. Also, President Kim was striving to cultivate an international audience, as Korean statesmen have tried to do since shortly after Pak Chung-hui seized power in 1961. He has done this with success since assuming office, resulting in world opinion of President Kim Dae-jung being far more favorable than was the case for any of his predecessors. Finally, President Kim was operating in accordance with a common Korean misconception that all of us have noticed. South Koreans believe that academics in the countries that we represented, especially the United States, are much better connected and influential than in fact they are. Despite discussing recent developments in Korea during meetings with U.S. Ambassadors Donald Gregg and James Lilley on prior visits to Seoul, it would be foolish to think that our views had any impact on U.S. Korea policy. Korean academics, by contrast, influence policy much more directly, many occupying government jobs or serving in various advisory capacities.

Fifty years ago a war began in Korea that would result in the deaths of two million Koreans and the devastation of a divided country. Despite the end of the Cold War in 1989, a state of war continues on the Korean peninsula and little real progress has occurred toward eliminating the danger of renewed conflict, let alone reunification. President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea may have taken the first step toward opening a new era in Korea's history that at least will replace confrontation with engagement as the basis for cooperative relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. Chen Jian spoke for all of us when he congratulated the president during our meeting for adopting a "Sunshine Policy" that was "wise and farsighted." There can be no doubt that success will require patience and perseverance, but these are among Kim Dae-jung's strongest qualities. It is remarkable that a person who has suffered so much as a victim of political repression, including imprisonment and

torture, now has established a reputation as a great statesman. His election as president of the Republic of Korea came at a critical moment in Korea's history. After suffering under the control of foreign powers for almost the entire twentieth century, Koreans now control their own destiny. Perhaps the summit that Kim Dae-jung arranged with Kim Jong Il for June 2000 will be the first step toward ending the most tragic era.

“YOU CAN'T SPIT ON A FOREIGN POLICY”

by
Russ Olson¹

Richard M. Nixon went to Caracas, Venezuela, as Vice President in May, 1958. In his book, *Six Crises*, Nixon described that experience, which he called one of the worst of his life, in some detail. But how did we ever get in a position in which the Vice President of the United States of America and his wife suffered gross indignities and actually came close to losing their lives? There are a number of explanations - one more succinct and to the point than all the others. Someone, I believe it was Lewis Hanke of Colombia University, asked former Costa Rican President Jose “Pepe” Figueres why people had stooped so low as to spit on the Vice President of the United States. Don Pepe replied, “It’s simple. You can’t spit on a foreign policy.”

That which follows differs significantly from Nixon’s *Six Crises*. Nixon’s account was written from the perspective of a public and political figure who benefitted politically from the events, and my account is written from the perspective of a very junior Embassy

¹A veteran of World War II, Russ Olson, after a few years of teaching, entered the Foreign Service in 1956 and retired in 1982. He served in Washington rarely. His overseas posts included Caracas, San Jose, La Paz, Bogota, Montevideo, and Port Moresby.

officer who was shocked with events and fed up both with the Venezuelans and the American policies which made it so easy for the Communists to agitate so successfully against Nixon's presence.

My family and I arrived in Caracas on July 3, 1957, for our first tour in the Foreign Service. Thus, only slightly over ten months had elapsed between our arrival and the Nixon visit. Even in that very short time we saw enough to understand clearly why it had been so easy for the Communists to stir up anti-American feelings.

In mid-1957 Venezuelans were suffering under the heel of a brutal military dictator, Marcos Perez Jimenez, a pompous general to whom the Pentagon decided to award the U.S. Legion of Merit. The American Ambassador at the time was Dempster MacIntosh, a successful businessman with a friend on the Republican National Committee. MacIntosh spoke not a word of Spanish but was able to hurt us anyway - giving speeches which were translated. At a time during which a colleague and I saw National Security police fire their guns through a school fence at school children who were chanting, "Down with the dictatorship," the American Ambassador was telling Venezuelans how lucky they were to be living in an economic democracy. What he really meant was that United States Steel (he was a steel magnate) had access to 17 million tons of iron ore annually and the oil companies, American, British and Dutch to three million barrels of oil a day. One American oil company, Creole Petroleum, produced half as much oil as the Soviet Union which was then the world's third largest producing country.

On New Year's Day of 1958 the Venezuelans had had enough. They revolted with support of part of the Air Force but were put down. A general strike followed within days and, once the Navy joined the rebels, Perez Jimenez fled the country in a small plane at precisely 2:09 a.m. (He flew from a small military air strip in eastern Caracas, the same field from which we shortly thereafter considered extricating Richard Nixon.) Perez Jimenez was replaced by a five man junta of military and civilians headed by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal.

The pent up hatred towards the dictator and his Seguridad Nacional (National Security police) and its chief, Pedro Estrada, was given vent the next morning. I was a block from Seguridad headquarters when the mobs tried to storm it shortly after dawn. Panic stricken Seguridad agents began to fire on the crowds which were forced back. I saw one agent caught on the street and literally torn apart. However, the gunfire from inside was too intense for them to enter. That job fell to Army tanks which did the job effectively and the mobs were soon inside. Among the most publicized pieces of paper they found inside was a Christmas card and accompanying letter from the American Ambassador to Turkey (he had been in Venezuela.) telling the head of the Security Police to "keep up the good work." Not only the Communist press played that up.

Other American moves were almost as unpopular, adding fuel to the fires of discontent. The junta decided to increase the taxes on the oil companies. Duke Haight, President of Creole Petroleum, largest of the oil companies, got word of the new tax back in Texas. He roared, "They can't do that to us!" The Venezuelan Government didn't argue one bit. It simply canceled his visa, and he couldn't get back to his oil company again. The Eisenhower administration wisely sided with the Venezuelans on that but Haight's attitude had its impact on the man in the street. Then the administration started talking about reducing oil imports from Venezuela (for domestic reasons unrelated to our Venezuelan policy) and the screams in Caracas changed from cries that we were stealing their God-given resources to cries that we were trying to ruin their economy. We couldn't win either way.

It was in this atmosphere that the Eisenhower administration decided to send Richard Nixon to Venezuela. The visit was to come at the end of a long and arduous swing through Latin America following Nixon's attendance at the inauguration of President Frondizi of Argentina. The trip may have helped Richard Nixon; it did not help the United States. For the most part it consisted of a series of confrontations which brought out the worst in many people and, surprisingly, the best in Richard Nixon.

Just days after Nixon's arrival in Caracas, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "...the purpose of the Vice President's tour was to promote better understanding and good will between this country and our southern neighbors. They had been kind enough to extend invitations, in most cases quite insistent invitations."

Murphy's statement was not true with respect to Venezuela. The Eisenhower administration had given refuge to both the former dictator and his chief of security police and a new government was trying to get its feet on the ground and to prepare for democratic elections. The Government of Venezuela did not want Nixon to come to Venezuela at that point in history, and the American Embassy in Caracas made clear to Washington that it was not the time for Nixon to come. However, our protests were of no avail as the White House, through the State Department, told us Nixon would visit in May and instructed the Embassy in no uncertain terms to obtain the invitation within 24 hours. It did.

As Murphy told the Senate on May 19,

As the tour progressed and particularly after Peru, the increasing amount of communist inspired and directed tactics were known and reported and the increasing possibility of trouble in Venezuela was understood. It was also understood by the governments involved.

On May 14, with Nixon still besieged in Caracas, President Eisenhower told a press conference, "These things (the demonstrations) were discussed, but there was no thought given to canceling Mr. Nixon's visit to these countries."

On May 2, in a letter to my brother, I had written,

Nixon sure is having a rough time so far. We don't know how the demonstrations will develop here. The Commies are very active. We have alternative programs set up in case we get leads on demonstrations but it's impossible to anticipate everything.

Our security measures had been as adequate as we could make them. The major obstacle to our having as close to complete security as was possible came from Nixon himself. He wanted to divorce himself from the Latin American military and had ruled out our (actually the Venezuelans') having troops lining his route which covered over 17 kilometers from the airport to the city. We had gone over security arrangements in great detail with the Venezuelans. We had maps showing exactly where both uniformed police and plainclothesmen would be posted - every few yards along the entire route, excluding only part of the limited access super highway running through rugged, unpopulated mountains from the airport on the coast up to the city. (By pure chance, I had kept those maps. I was too new and inexperienced bureaucratically to realize all that was going on at the time but later came to realize that the CIA and other security people were looking for a scapegoat. Had I not been able to produce proof of what had been arranged I believe I would have been blamed for what had happened, even though they had been involved all along and I was the junior officer in on the plans.)

Nixon knew full well he was going to face trouble in Caracas. The only question was how serious it would be. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy subsequently told the Senators, "Three reports of possible assassination attempts were forwarded to the Vice President and the matter was made public by the Secret Service on the eve of the Vice President's departure from Colombia for Caracas." If that weren't enough warning, he had CIA and other reports and he also had it first hand from Chuck Burrows, the Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, who had flown to Bogota to accompany (and brief) the Vice President to Caracas. Burrows laid out the problem. In his book, Nixon claimed he had been misled, that security had been inadequately arranged by the Venezuelans. The root of the problem was neither the Embassy (which had suggested as strongly as it could that he not come) nor the Venezuelan security measures. The real problem was Nixon's insistence on keeping the military at arm's length in order to avoid adverse impact on the American media. He later claimed that the Venezuelan police did nothing to

protect him - and he was absolutely correct. During the January revolution, less than five months before, the people had turned on all aspects of the vicious dictatorship, including the police, most of whom escaped only by burning their uniforms and disappearing from their home neighborhoods. Consequently, the police, when Nixon came, were both green and well aware of the public's attitude towards the uniforms. They weren't about to fight people in the streets. The only respected forces, the Navy, the Air Force and the National Guard (but not the Army, which had stood by Perez Jimenez until the last moment) could have protected the Nixons easily if only he had let them.

With that background, the Nixon party flew into Maiquetia airport on the morning of May 13 (maybe the date was the problem?). The Vice President, in a dark blue suit, and Mrs. Nixon, in a red suit and hat, stepped from the US Air Force DC-6 with its red, white and blue propeller tips, to face the usual group of dignitaries lined up along the traditional red carpet in order of protocol. The waves and broad smiles of the Nixons quickly disappeared as they saw the hostile crowd on the balcony of the terminal and along their path. By the time they reached the bottom of the plane's steps, a very grim Vice President and lady stepped onto the tarmac, hearing anti-Nixon shouts and looking at banners reading, "Go home, Nixon," "Go away, Nixon," "Out, dog," "We won't forget Guatemala" (a reference to the ouster of the left-wing Arbenz regime in Guatemala with US assistance), etc.

At Venezuelan insistence, the motorcade was parked in front of the terminal. Consequently the Vice President's party had to walk under the balcony from which hundreds of people were spitting down on us, through the terminal and out to the front. We were spat upon all the way out to the cars and literally had to shove people aside to get the Vice President inside. We thought the worst was over. It wasn't.

The motorcade was "buzzed" by cars on the highway up to the city. Ironically, Communist propaganda had been so effective that a

group (mob would be a better word) of teenage kids and their organizers attacked us as we entered the city streets. That point could have been catastrophic, and it did get bad enough that one of the Secret Service men drew his gun. Had he fired, the mob might have become incensed enough to have really gone after us. However, a decision was made to run for it directly to the American Ambassador's residence, where the Nixons holed up for the rest of their visit. American troops, drawn from the Embassy Marine guards and the US Military Mission, came to stand guard at the residence for the duration of the visit. No one knew what to expect but no attack ever materialized at the residence, a lovely home on a hilltop in a suburban neighborhood and an area too far to walk from any public transport, a key factor. Years in Latin America have convinced me that Latin revolutionaries, rioters and the like, will risk being beaten, shot, and even tortured but they will neither walk very far nor stay out in the streets and get wet if it rains. In any event, Nixon was safe for the moment.

The decision to flee to the security of the residence saved the Nixons' lives and ours. Unknown to those of us in the motorcade, several of our people waiting at the National Pantheon with the wreaths Nixon was to have laid at the tomb of Simon Bolivar, were attacked by a mob. The commander of the Venezuelan Honor Guard there called for help. When the troops moved in they picked up over two hundred Communists with Molotov cocktails. Had the motorcade of big Cadillacs turned into that area of the old city with its very narrow streets, we would have been burned to death. That mob of kids had saved us from the professionals.

Once we were settled in the residence, I went outside for some air and happened to look at the car. It was hard to believe that that black Cadillac with diplomatic license plates 63-CD had borne the Vice President of the United States. The rear windows were shattered, sputum was all over it and the windshield was just a white smear as the driver had tried to remove the spit with the wipers. It was difficult at that moment not to hate Venezuelans.

You have to give Richard Nixon credit. He and his wife had gone through a harrowing experience. Yet, shortly after arriving at the residence he held a press conference on the veranda. Col. Vernon Walters (later lieutenant general and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) interpreted for him. He was completely composed and in control, said all the right things and handled himself magnificently. He also handled himself very well in another respect.

President Eisenhower had ordered US troops to the Caribbean. He told a White House press conference the next day,

...[the despatch of US troops to the Caribbean] is the simplest precautionary type of measure in the world. We had reports yesterday that were serious. We knew nothing of the facts. We could get no reports from the outside other than telephone calls from the Embassy [at Caracas] and, not knowing what was happening and not knowing whether the Venezuelan Government might not want some aid from us, we simply put it [the military force] at places it would be available in reasonable amounts and in bases that were well within the American zone. That was all there was to it. There was no offer made to the Venezuelans. The idea was: only in the case they would want to ask it would we even think of it.

When I wrote that last paragraph I assumed that the phone connections to which President Eisenhower referred as being the only contact with Caracas, had been the normal international commercial lines the Embassy used. I learned only in April 1984, that communications in Caracas had been disrupted when Nixon arrived. As luck would have it, some of the Air Force officers with Nixon were ham operators who had brought with them a Collins single sideband radio to pursue their hobby on the trip. Following the attack on the Vice President, they stuck an antenna out the window of their room in the Circulo Militar (the Venezuelan Officers' Club), set up a phone patch with the Ambassador's residence, and then were able to reach a ham operator in Silver Spring, Maryland, who, in turn phone-patched into the State

Department. It was via this amateur hook-up that the White House and State were kept informed of the situation until international service was restored. Who knows what would have happened if this jerry-rigged operation hadn't worked? Would Eisenhower have sent troops in to "save" his Vice President?

To Nixon's credit he immediately saw the severely adverse foreign policy ramifications and convinced Eisenhower to call off the troops. But all that is public record. What is not on the record is Nixon's triumphant return, rather some of the background on his triumphant return to the United States after the Caracas incident. The day before he was to leave Nixon got word that the White House and the State Department wanted time to prepare a reception at the Washington National Airport for him and Pat. He couldn't very well prolong his stay in Venezuela so he decided to call Governor Luis Munoz Marin in Puerto Rico to ask if he could spend a night there to give Washington the time it needed to prepare the appropriate welcoming ceremony. Nixon used the phone in the Ambassador's living room and called Munoz, saying (as best I can recall), "Luis, this is Dick Nixon. I wonder if Pat and I could spend tomorrow night with you?" There apparently was a long silence on the other end and Nixon asked, "Luis?" Munoz finally recovered and relented. He was a liberal with little love for Richard Nixon.

When the time came for Nixon to leave he came over to me and said, "Russ, this has been a difficult few days but I want you to know how much Pat and I appreciate all you've done." He said precisely what a young officer would want to hear from his Vice President, but I had the feeling that he was saying them almost automatically and without warmth.

Nixon's departure was something to behold. Our stated policy was one of a warm *abrazo* for our democratic friends in Latin America and a polite handshake for the dictators and the military. Nevertheless, our prior instructions to exclude troops from around Nixon were forgotten. When Nixon left there were troops almost

arm to arm on both sides of the more than 20 kilometer route from the Military Club where he lunched with the Junta (the only time he left the residence during the entire visit) to the airport. And, as Nixon states in *Six Crises*, he was happy to have them. The troops in the city portion of the route wore gas masks as the streets had been tear gassed to discourage any onlookers or potential demonstrators. What a change a couple of days can bring!

Immediate hindsight is better than the hindsight of more than a quarter century. Here is a portion of a letter I wrote to my brother the day after Nixon left Caracas, giving my immediate reaction to events:

Thought you might like an inside fill in on the Nixon visit here this week. I remember telling some of you that I was one of the two control officers assigned - consequently I was with the Vice President during his entire stay in Caracas.

We don't know yet what the US press has been saying but here is some background. I was in on all the security measures taken and they were adequate even though we didn't anticipate such a vicious attack. The police just didn't act. For instance, we have one picture at a roadblock which stopped us in the heart of town - four police motorcycles (with six more just out of the photo) were in front of the Vice President's car and two were immediately behind. The shot shows the mob attacking the car and the police making absolutely no efforts to stop them. This occurred on the way in from the airport. Upon our arrival at the Embassy (residence), all windows in his car were smashed (luckily we'd absolutely refused the open car he had insisted on) and Col. Walters, the Foreign Minister and the Vice President were showered with glass, the sides of the car were all dented, etc.

On the spur of the moment we decided to make a run for the Ambassador's residence — we now know that if we had turned up the side street to the Pantheon (1st scheduled stop for wreath laying) Nixon would have been killed on the spot. Two of our

boys, 3 Secret Service men and 2 of our Military Attaches who were waiting there were lucky to escape alive.

Don't let anyone kid you, while this was communist led and organized, thousands of other people joined in heartily. Our Latin policies have been ridiculous and some protest was expected and justified. However, this went beyond a civilized demonstration as you know.

The schedule was junked and the Nixons and some of the party, including Jinx Falkenburg, spent the entire visit at the residence. We had troops and police surrounding the place continuously and contemplated sneaking the party out to a nearby military airfield and taking a small plane to a nearby island where the VP's plane would meet them. As it turned out, the Venezuelan Army cleared a path to the Officers' Club (at many points they used tear gas to disperse crowds) where Nixon had lunch with the President. We then made a dash for the airport (9 hours ahead of schedule) under protection of tear gas, machine guns and machetes. There was maximum security, although it is a hell of a note when the Vice President of the United States has to make a run for it to get out of a country.

We had Washington on the phone almost constantly and President Eisenhower was furious - that's what caused the fact that US troops were on the way to the Caribbean to be publicized - a dreadful mistake (the announcement, not the move.)

Some good came out of this though - the administration may now believe what we've told them about needing a new policy here and many of us gained a great respect for Mr. and Mrs. Nixon. They handled themselves magnificently and were wonderful to work with. He never should have come, but he conducted himself beautifully in spite of some rough moments.

He said that the worst was watching these pigs (his words, not mine) spit in his wife's face. He got plenty, too, by the way.

The Nixon visit had passed into history but thinking back to it for a moment, it seemed to be one of those situations in which everything goes wrong.

NEW ELECTRONIC ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST NOW AVAILABLE

by

Amy L. S. Staples

MIDDLE TENNESSEE STATE

Looking for a colleague's address? A commentator for your SHAFR session? Someone to suggest a text for the U.S. diplomatic history survey? Now you can search SHAFR's roster and research list electronically at <<http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/shafr>>. This service is free of charge and provided as a service to SHAFR members. However, we need your help to make the site as useful as possible. Currently, the only information available on the site are the names and mailing addresses of SHAFR members, which have been downloaded from Blackwell's mailing list for *Diplomatic History*. We ask all members to log on to the site and supplement this information with your current research interests, the courses you have taught, your e-mail address, and a phone and/or fax number where you can be reached. Of course, you may also log on in order to request that your information remain unlisted. To log onto the site, all you need is the mailing label from your most recent issue of *Diplomatic History*. In the top left-hand corner of the label is your customer number, which you will need to receive

your password. If you have lost this information, you may also e-mail Blackwell at:

<e-help@blackwellpublishers.co.uk>.

This website is the result of joint action by the SHAFR Council and Blackwell Publishers over the last year. At the January Council meeting, the ad hoc committee on publications that was chaired by Chester Pach suggested and the Council agreed that the print version of the roster and research list last published in 1996 should be replaced by a wholly electronic version. The main advantage of such a move, the committee argued, was the ability to maintain a more up-to-date and accessible version of the information than was currently possible in print form. Financial provision for the roster had already been made in SHAFR's contract with Blackwell, and it was decided that all these funds should be put toward the construction and maintenance of the electronic roster and research list on Blackwell's website. At the June Council meeting, Amy Staples, acting as facilitator for the project, reported on the site's progress and received a number of helpful suggestions for the operation of the site, which became fully operational at the end of July thanks to the tireless efforts of the Blackwell staff led by Malcolm Crystal, Jess Sanderson, and Jane Waters.

The site itself is not password-protected (except for the pages where members can add or revise their individual information) so that the information will be accessible to other scholars as well as news organizations that might be seeking expert opinions on issues. This decision was in keeping with the discussions at this year's plenary session on the necessity of SHAFR's reaching out to a broader academic and policymaking community. Searches on the site can be conducted by a specific term, such as a last name or a course

title, or by a specific geographical, chronological, or topical category, each of which has a pull-down menu. These menus are revised versions of those that appeared in the print version of the research list with additions drawn from Edward Goedecken's annual dissertation list, which appears annually in the *SHAFR Newsletter*. But recognizing that such categorization often does not convey the true character of our research interests, members can explain their research in a 100-word statement that is a new feature of this version of the roster and research list.

We hope that this will be valuable new resource for the SHAFR membership as well as the broader academic and policymaking community, but it will only be as useful as the SHAFR membership makes it by recording their research and teaching interests. Also, as you make use of the site, we hope that you will report any problems, concerns, or suggestions to Amy Staples <astaples@mtsu.edu> and/or Blackwell Publishers <e-help@blackwellpublishers.co.uk>. We anticipate making changes to the site after we have had some time to evaluate the site as currently constructed and to collect feedback from the SHAFR membership.

SHAFR COUNCIL MINUTES
205 PITMAN HALL
RYERSON POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
JUNE 23, 2000, 7:30 A.M.

Robert Schulzinger presiding. Those present: Thomas Schoonover, Bob Beisner, Bill Walker, Anna Nelson, Mark Stoler, Allan Spetter, Jim Matray, Bill Brands, David Anderson, Amy Staples, David Painter, Geoff Smith, Bob Wintermute, Phil Gibbon, Margaret Zusky, Margaret MacMillan, and William Brinker.

Bob Schulzinger reported that Michael Hogan has become Dean of Humanities at Ohio State and will be stepping down as editor of *DH* in December, 2001.

Jim Matray announced that former SHAFR president Robert Divine (Texas) was the committee's selection for the Graebner Award.

Schulzinger, reporting for Doug Little, announced that this year's winners of the Holt Award are: Jason Parker (Florida) for "Wilson's Curse: The U.S., Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1939-62" and Jeffrey Engells (Wisconsin) for "Cold War at 30,000 Feet: Anglo-American Technology Control, Aircraft Sales, and Trading With the Enemy at the Dawn of the Jet Age."

Bob Beisner presented an update on the SHAFR Guide. Current target dates are for February 2001 submission by editors to ABC Clio and for publication by ABC Clio in late 2001 or early 2002. A new name for the publication is under consideration. Beisner also presented information regarding the plans for keeping current supplementary information on-line. Those accepting this task include Beisner, Chester Pach, Kurt Hanson, and John Tolley.

Reporting for the Roster and Research Guide, Amy Staples is working with Blackwell to maintain future Rosters and Research Lists on the SHAFR Website. Staples plans a mid-to-late summer, 2000 implementation.

Margaret Zusky, representing Malcolm Crystal of Blackwell, discussed membership maintenance and proposed changes in costs for institutional members.

Geoff Smith speaking for the Toronto conference organizers made suggestions for future conferences. Local arrangement and program chairs present were receptive to the suggestions.

Anna Nelson, local arrangements chair for the American University 2001 meeting, reaffirmed the dates of June 14-16, 2001. Bill Walker of the Program Committee urged electronic submission for papers and entire panels. The deadline for submissions is December 1, 2000.

The SHAFR 2002 summer meeting will be hosted by Georgia State in Atlanta.

Anna Nelson forwarded a request from the American Historical Association that SHAFR participate in a June 2001 AHA Teacher's conference which will emphasize the Cold War. It was noted that the timing will coincide with the American University meeting and that area members will be urged to support the conference.

Bill Brands proposed approval for a Betty Unterberger Dissertation Award. Council approval will be sought for the solicitation of funds to support this project.

Allan Spetter reported on the SHAFR Endowment earnings. Discussion followed regarding optimum distribution of investments.

Schulzinger will circulate a proposal to reestablish the Life Membership category. He also discussed status of legislation and the Moynihan Report relative to declassification. (The AHA, OAH, and SHAFR had previously objected to creation of a board to oversee "targeted" declassification of documents. - See *SHAFR Newsletter*, Vol. 31, No. 1, page 32.) Nelson added the little noticed or appreciated fact that funds supporting the declassification process could be cut under current appropriations legislation, thus undermining the deliberative process.

Katherine Sibley, for the Myrna Bernath Book Prize, announced co-winners: Cecilia Lynch (Cornell) and Jessica Gienow-Hecht (LSU). Lynch's book: *Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Peace Movements in World Politics*. Gienow-Hecht's: *Transmission*

Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Post-War Germany, 1945-1955.

Members present unanimously passed a resolution thanking Geoff Smith and Margaret MacMillan for an excellent job of preparing for and executing this Toronto meeting.

OBITUARY

Diplomatic historian Robert L. Jones died May 30. He was 106 years-old. He earned his BA from Southern Methodist University in 1917, the MA degree from the University of Texas in 1920 and his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1923. A Texas native, Jones taught at Trinity University and East Texas State Teacher's College/East Texas State College, which is now known as Texas A&M University—Commerce. He was chairman of his department at both institutions. He wrote two books of diplomatic history that he designed with the general public and undergraduates in mind as the main audience *The Eighteenth Amendment and Our Foreign Relations* (1933) and *History of the Foreign Policy of the United States* (1933). In the 1940s he turned his attention towards local history and compiled several cemetery registers that were significant sources about the past in Hunt County, Texas.

After his retirement in 1965, he and his wife moved to Arlington, Texas where they were quite active in the Presbyterian Church. Faculty that knew him described him and his wife as being generous with their hospitality. Jones was recently recognized as the oldest living Rotarian, a distinction of which he was quite proud. He is survived by two children, four grandchildren, and eight great-grandchildren.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes (Texas A&M-Commerce)

GWU-WWC FACULTY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM IN ASIAN POLICY STUDIES

NEW FELLOWSHIP OPPORTUNITY FOR RECENTLY TENURED ASIA SPECIALISTS

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University announce a new fellowship program for recently tenured faculty members in Asian studies. Selected applicants will spend a semester each at the Wilson Center and the Elliott School to explore the policy implications of their research.

This competition is open to recently tenured faculty at American institutions who specialize in modern East Asia and who are interested in pursuing research topics that will help bridge the gap between the academy and the world of policymaking. Only scholars whose research is relevant to contemporary Asia-related policy issues will be considered. Applicants must have received tenure within the past **seven** years.

The **application deadline** for the August 2001–May 2002 academic year is **January 15, 2001**. For eligibility requirements and application guidelines, please visit our web site at

www.wilsoncenter.org/asia/gwu-wwc.htm



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EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion. Norman A. Graebner. 278pp. Reprint ed. (1983) \$14.95 paper,
SHAFR Price (pap) \$8.00

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTER-NATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. 165pp. (1971, 1982)
\$12.95 paper **SHAFR Price (pap) \$8.00**

U.S. DIPLOMATS IN EUROPE, 1919-1941. Kenneth Paul Jones, ed. (1981) cloth \$16.95, paper \$12.95 **SHAFR Price (pap) \$7.00**

PANAMA, THE CANAL & THE UNITED STATES. Thomas M. Leonard. (1993) 144pp. \$11.95 pape **SHAFR Price (pap) \$6.00**

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1770s-1990s: A Survey of Issues and Literature. James K. Libbey (1989), 202 pp. \$12.95 paper **SHAFR Price (pap) \$6.00**

AMERICA AND THE INDOCHINA WARS, 1945-1990: A Bibliographical Guide. Lester H. Brune & Richard Dean Burns, eds (1992) 352pp. \$39.95 cloth **SHAFR Price (cloth) \$13.00**

CALENDAR

2000

- November 1 Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.
November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

2001

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
January 4-7 115th annual meeting of the AHA in Boston.
January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
February 1 Deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
April 15 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
April 26-29 The 94th meeting of the OAH will take place at the Westin Bonaventure in Los Angeles.
May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June 14-16 SHAFR's 28th annual conference will meet at American University. Randall Woods is Program Chair, Anna Nelson is Local Arrangements Chair. See notice on page 47 in this newsletter.
August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

The 2002 AHA meeting will be in San Francisco, January 3-6. The co-chairs are Philippa Levine (USC) and Paul Ropp (Clark). Deadline for submissions is Feb. 15, 2001. See the AHA Program committee Guidelines on page 52 in the

September 2000 *Perspectives*. Subsequent meetings are: Chicago, January 2-5, 2003; and Washington, January 8-11, 2004.

The 2002 SHAFR annual meeting will be held in Atlanta.

The 2002 meeting of the OAH will be held in Washington, April 11-14, at the Renaissance Hotel.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

DeBenedetti Prize

The Peace History Society invites submissions for the Charles DeBenedetti Prize in Peace History, to be given to the author or authors of an outstanding article published in English in 1999 or 2000. Articles reflecting new, cutting-edge research appearing either in edited works or journals may focus on the history of peace movements, the response of individuals to peace and war issues, the relationship between peace and other reform movements, gender issues in welfare and peacemaking, comparative analyses, or quantitative studies. The prize includes a cash award of \$500.

Articles should be submitted in triplicate by February 1, 2001 to Prof. Robert Shaffer, Department of History, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, PA. 17257. For further information, you may also contact Prof. Shaffer via e-mail at: roshaf@ark.ship.edu

SHAFR Call for Papers American University 2001

SHAFR invites submissions for its Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference, hosted by American University in Washington DC, June 14 - 16, 2001.

We invite proposals that deal with the broadest possible range of topics in U.S. foreign relations, national security, and international history. Preference will be given to complete panels and roundtables. As always, we welcome submissions from graduate students.

Please send proposal-including a one page abstract for each paper, a current one-page c.v., and mailing and e-mail address for each participant. We strongly encourage the submission of proposals and supporting material by e-mail, either as attachments (preferably saved in "RTF" format) or "pasted text."

The deadline for submissions is December 1, 2000. Proposals and supporting materials should be addressed to Richard H. Immerman at: shافر2001@hotmail.com. The mailing address is: Department of History, Temple University, 9th Floor Gladfelter Hall (025-24), 1115 W. Berks Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122-6089

Tel: (215)204-7466

Fax: (215)204-5891

For information on local conference arrangements, contact: Anna K. Nelson, Department of History, American University.

Tel: (202)885-2404

E-mail: anelson@american.edu

Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation Grants-in-Aid for Research

The Foundation offers a limited number of semi-annual research grants. Funds are rewarded for the purpose of defraying travel, living, and related expenses incurred while conducting research at the LBJ Library. Grants range from \$500 to \$2000.

There are two grant periods each year. Grant applications must be received by July 31 for the period from September 1 through February 28. Grant applications must be received by January 31 for the period from March 1 through August 31.

To receive more information, along with a grant application, please provide your name and mailing address to the Executive Director, LBJ Foundation, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705, Tel: 512-478-7829, or send e-mail to: mparrish@utxvms.cc.utexas.edu

Gerald R. Ford Library Travel Grants

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation semi-annually awards travel grants of up to \$2000 in support of significant research in Gerald R. Ford Library collections. Collections focus on Federal policies, institutions, and politics in the 1970s. Processed archival collections contain materials on foreign affairs and national security issues such as the Vietnamese war, foreign aid, the Middle East peace process, the Mayaguez incident, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, trade, and foreign economic policy. Application postmark deadlines are September 15 and March 15. For information on Library collections and a grant application contact:

Mr. Geir Gundersen, Grants Coordinator

Gerald R. Ford Library, 1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Tel: 734-741-2218, ext. 232

Fax: 734-741-2341

E-mail: library@fordlib.nara.gov

Website: <http://www.ford.utexas.edu>

Woodrow Wilson Fellowships Reminder of October 1 Application Deadline

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is currently accepting applications for its 2000-2001 Fellowship competition. The Center annually awards approximately 21 academic year, residential fellowships to individuals with outstanding project proposals in the social sciences and humanities on national and/or international issues-topics that intersect with questions of public policy. Fellows should be prepared to interact with policymakers in Washington and with Wilson Center staff who are working on similar issues.

Woodrow Wilson Fellows receive a stipend, private office, use of IBM-compatible computer, and part-time research assistance.

Eligibility: For academic applicants, eligibility is limited to the postdoctoral level, and normally to applicants with publications beyond the Ph.D. dissertation. For other applicants, an equivalent level of professional achievement is expected. Applications from any country are welcome. All applicants should have a good command of spoken English.

The Center seeks a diverse group of Fellows and welcomes applications from women and minorities.

Information/Applications: For further information and application, please see our website at www.wilsoncenter.org, or contact us by e-mail at fellowship@wwic.si.edu. You may also reach us by telephone (202)691-4170, fax (202)691-4001 or by writing Scholar Selection and Services Offices, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania, NW, Washington, DC 20004-3027.

**The NEWSLETTER of the International Intelligence
History Study Group**

IIHSG-NEWSLETTER, Vol 7, No 1 is now available in a WWW version on our WWW site:

<http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de>

For further information contact: Michael Wala Editor, International Intelligence History Study group NEWSLETTER, University of Erlangen-Nuernberg

**Call for Papers
AHA-Pacific Coast Branch**

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association will hold its annual meeting in 2001 in Vancouver, British Columbia, on August 9-12, 2001. The program committee requests individual paper or full-panel proposals on any aspect of history or historical writing. Full-panel proposals are especially encouraged. Proposals should include (1) a cover page summarizing the panel and identifying each participant, (2) a 1-page synopsis of each paper, and (3) a 1-2 page vitae for each presenter. Be sure to include names, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses of all participants. Also indicate any audio-visual requirements for your presentation. Send proposal via e-mail attachment (MS Word or Word Perfect format) to both program co-chairs, Samuel Truett (truett@unm.edu) and Lon Kurashige (kurashig@usc.edu).

For other formats contact: Lon Kurashige, Department of History, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0034 (Tel: (213)740-1657; Fax: (213)740-6999). DEADLINE: December 1, 2000. Expect notification regarding acceptance in January 2001.

New Journal

The organizers announce the *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, an on line multidisciplinary publication running from tenth century (M.E.) to the contemporary period, and covering the world. The journal is refereed and will appear three times a year. The first issue (Fall) was published in August, the second (Winter) will come out in December, and the third (Spring) in April, 2001. The *JCCH* is published by the Johns Hopkins University Press as part of Project Muse.

Submissions are welcome in all areas concerning colonialism and imperialism. For information please contact: Patricia W. Romero, Editor, Dept./ of History, Towson University, Towson MD 21252.

E-mail: promero@towson.edu

PERSONALS

Bruce Field (Northern Illinois) has been awarded a grant from the Minnesota Historical Society to research the roles that forty U.S. Congresswomen played in American foreign policy during the Cold War.

John Flynn was named an Archives By-Fellow at the Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge UK for the fall and winter semesters, 2000-2001. He is working on a book dealing with the civic activities of German women in the British and American zones of occupation from 1945 through the early 1950s.

Ole R. Holsti (Duke) has been awarded the "Lifetime Achievement Award" from the American Political Science Association, Conflict Process Section. He has also been awarded the "Teacher-Scholar

Award," from the International Studies Association, Active Learning Section.

Klaus Larres has been awarded a Jean Monnet Chair for European Foreign & Security Policy by the Commission of the European Union. The chair is based in the School of Politics of the Queen's University of Belfast and includes an annual stipend for teaching and conducting research on European foreign policy and transatlantic relations.

Wayne Patterson (St. Norbert) has been named visiting professor of Korean history at Harvard.

Katie Sibley (St. Joseph's) has received research grants from the Kennan Institute and the Harry S. Truman Library.

PUBLICATIONS

Kendrick Clements (South Carolina), *Hoover, Conservation, and Consumerism: Engineering the Good Life*. Kansas, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 0-7006-1033-2, \$35.00.

Martin Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45*. Macmillan (UK), St. Martin's (US), 2000. ISBN 0-333-75446-8

Marc Gallicchio (Villanova), *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945*. North Carolina, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 0-8078-2559-x, \$45.00; paper: ISBN 0-8078-4867-0, \$17.95.

Walter L. Hixson (Akron) ed., *The United States and the Vietnam War: Significant Scholarly Articles* in six volumes. Garland, 2000. ISBN 0-8153-3530-x, \$570/or by volume.

Michael Hogan (Ohio State) ed., *Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941* Cambridge, 2000. ISBN 0-521-66287-7, \$49.95.

Charles E. Neu, (Brown) ed., *After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War*. Johns Hopkins, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 0-8018-6327-9, \$34.95; paper: ISBN 0-8018-6332-5, \$14.95.

Wayne Patterson (St. Norbert) and Yur-Bok Lee eds., *Korean-American Relations, 1866-1997*. SUNY Press, 1999. Cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4025-7, \$65.50; Paper: ISBN 0-7914-4025-5, \$21.95.

Wayne Patterson, *The Ilse: First-Generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaii, 1903-1973*. U. of Hawaii, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 0-8248-2093-2, \$49.00; Paper: ISBN 0-8248-2241-2, \$24.95.

Patrick Reagan (Tennessee Tech), *Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890-1943*. U. Mass, 1999. Cloth: ISBN 1-55849-230-5, \$40.00.

David Reynolds (Christ's College, Cambridge), *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945*. New York: Norton, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04821-7, \$35. London: Penguin, 2000. ISBN 0-813-90461-4, £25.

Kevin Ruane (Canterbury Christ Church College), *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-1955*. St. Martin's, 2000. ISBN 9-312-23482-1.

David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones eds., (Edinburgh), *ABC: American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations, 1939-2000*. Frank Cass, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 07146 51036 UK Pounds, 45. Paper: ISBN 0 7146 8142 3, UK pounds, 18.50.

Mark A. Stoler (Vermont), *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*. North Carolina, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 0-8078-2557-3, \$39.95.

Jerry K. Sweeney (South Dakota State) and Margaret B. Denning (Slippery Rock) and Stephen J. Valone (Saint John Fisher), *America and the World, 1776-1998: A Handbook of United States Diplomatic History*. Waveland Press, 2000. ISBN 1-57766-149-4, \$13.95.

Spencer C. Tucker, Jinwung Kim, Michael R. Nichols, Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr. (Lexington, VA), Priscilla Roberts (Hong Kong) eds., *Encyclopedia of the Korean War*. 3 vols. ABC-Clio, 2000. ISBN 1-57607-029-8.

Betty Miller Unterberger (Texas A&M), *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia*. Texas A&M, 2000. Paper: ISBN 0-89096-931-0, \$24.95.

Walter L. Hixson (Akron) ed., *The Cold War*. A CD (Gale Group, 2000).

Patrick Reagan (Tennessee Tech) ed., *American Journey: World War I and the Jazz Age*. A CD (Gale Group, 2000)

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

Complete details regarding SHAFR awards, prizes, and funds are found in the June and December issues of the *Newsletter*, abbreviated information in the March and September issues. Changes and updates are presented here in italics.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976,

respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Randall Woods, Main 416, Department of History, U. of Arkansas, Fayetteville AR 72701.

Books may be sent at any time during 2000, but should not arrive later than February 1, 2001.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The winner of the 2001 competition will deliver a lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 2001. The Chairperson of the Committee is: Darlene Rivas, Humanities Division, Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Hwy., Malibu CA 90263-4225.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 2000. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. Nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 2001. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Priscilla Roberts, Department of History, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Rd., Hong Kong.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to: Ted Wilson, History, University of Kansas, Lawrence KS 66045. The deadline for application is November 1, 2000.

Georgetown Travel Grants

The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee also administers grants to be funded from the SHAFR Georgetown fund to support travel for research in the Washington area. The amounts are determined by the committee.

The Myrna F. Bernath Book and Fellowship Awards

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 2000 and 2001 will be considered in 2002. Submission deadline is November 15, 2001. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Carol Adams, Salt Lake Community College, 4600 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, UT 84130

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Carol Adams (address above). Submission deadline is November 15, 2001.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 2001 to: Carol Anderson, History Dept., University of Missouri at Columbia, Columbia, MO 65211.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 2002. Current chairman: James Matray, History, Box 3H, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, 88003-8001. Tel: 505-646-1515, Fax: 505-646-8148, e-mail: jmatray@nmsu.edu

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture." Deadline for submissions is February 1, 2001. Current Chairperson: Mel Small, History, Wayne State U., Detroit MI 48202.

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Current Chairperson: Mary Giunta, NHPRC - Room 300, National Archives, Washington DC 20408.

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact: Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 2000, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 2001. Current chairperson: Frank Ninkovich, History, St. John's University, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Jamaica NY 11439.

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Box 5154, Cookeville, TN 38505
Tel. (931) 372-3332; e-mail Wbrinker@TNTECH.edu; FAX (931) 372-6142.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Thomas R. Greer.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of many back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$2.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$3.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Papers and other submissions should be typed and the author's name and full address should be noted. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 3½" diskettes. A paper submitted in WordPerfect is preferred. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* goes to the printer on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should arrive at least four weeks prior.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

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