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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the society is held in the summer. The society also meets with the AHA in January.

PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly newsletter and a journal, *Diplomatic History*.

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“WHO’S IN CHARGE”

by

Peter P. Hill

(George Washington, emeritus)

In the days before instant communication, whenever a U.S. chief of mission died at his post, the role of the *chargé d'affaires ad interim* fell by right and custom to the secretary of the legation. As a Senate-approved appointee, the legation secretary was routinely expected to carry on official business with the host government until a new chief arrived. On at least one occasion in the 19th century, however, this natural order of succession backfired when, for lack of a clearly designated second in command, American relations with France were thrown into disarray at a critical juncture. It happened when Joel Barlow, U.S. minister to France in 1811-12, died in Poland during a fruitless attempt to intercept Napoleon Bonaparte as the latter fled the scene of his Russian disaster. Barlow had hoped to catch up to the French Emperor long enough to have him sign a commercial treaty and a claims convention. That the American minister had neglected to have his nephew officially confirmed as secretary of legation resulted in six months of feuding over who should represent the interests of the United States — this at a time when Bonaparte’s fading military fortunes gradually lessened any hope of reaching a detente in Franco-American relations. The consequences of Barlow’s oversight (detailed below) were so unusual as to warrant examining how substantially the *chargé d'affaires* figured in 18th and 19th century American diplomacy as a whole.

Their numbers alone are remarkable. Besides those legation secretaries who served *ad interim* whenever their chiefs died, took temporary leave, or went junketing, the U.S. Senate approved nearly 140 *chargés d'affaires en titre* to head the

approved nearly 140 *chargés d'affaires en titre* to head the country's various missions around the world in the years prior to 1900.¹ Although generalizations about this group are risky, one can assume they shared in common a sense of job insecurity; and some doubtless hoped to be rewarded with promotion to ministerial rank. That 19 of them were promoted during this period, however, appears to have owed less to an appreciation of their service than to the perception of the nation's growing sense of self-importance. Not surprisingly, eleven of the 19 were promoted in 1853-54 in the wake of our last burst of continental expansion, beneficiaries in this instance of the activism of Secretary of State William L. Marcy who, besides upgrading the diplomatic corps, managed to set a record of getting Senate approval for 25 treaties during Franklin Pierce's four-year term. Fittingly, one of those promoted to the rank of minister resident was John L. O'Sullivan, reputed coiner of the phrase, "manifest destiny," then U.S. *chargé* in Lisbon.²

Predictably, these more or less permanent personnel were favored for posts of minor importance. U.S. missions to Latin America, for example, often began grandly enough with the appointment of a minister resident only to tail off in the hands of a series of caretakers. Likewise in Europe,

¹This and other statistics are derived from the Department of State publication, *Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1988* (Washington, 1988). References to *chargés d'affaires en titre* do not include persons who though nominated did not receive Senate approval or those who received approval but declined to serve.

²Nine of the others promoted to the rank of minister resident in 1853-54 were serving as *chargés* in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Ecuador, Italy (Sardinia), Netherlands, Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Venezuela. The tenth, John R. Clay, was elevated to become envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Peru in 1853.

Washington's low priorities in the 19th century showed up clearly in the appointment of no fewer than thirteen *chargés* to Copenhagen, nine to Lisbon, and eight each to Brussels and the Hague. By contrast, in London, Paris, and Madrid, where U.S. interests called for a continuum of high-level representation, only five *chargé d'affaires en titre* appear in the record during the entire period. The experience of these five and the extent of their involvement in the issues of the day varied considerably.

Among those who saw a good deal of diplomatic action were William Short, William Carmichael, and Jonathan Russell, who served in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras; whereas Aaron Vail and Levett Harris sat out relatively quiet interludes in our relations with both Britain and France in the 1830s. Vail's stewardship in London began in 1832, two years after the Jackson administration had settled the longstanding and acrimonious West Indies trade issue, and ended just before the Canadian attack on the *Caroline* in 1837. Similarly untroubled by untoward issues, Harris took charge of the Paris legation in 1832 shortly after U.S. Minister William L. Rives had succeeded in persuading the government of Louis Philippe to settle the indemnity claims of American merchants and shipowners dating from the era of Napoleonic depredations. In both cases, the chiefs of mission had resolved major controversies which left their *chargés* free to tend mostly to housekeeping duties.

By contrast, William Short and to a lesser degree, William Carmichael, were key figures in the early phases of negotiating the 1795 treaty with Spain that opened the Mississippi to downstream traffic and gave Americans a three-year right to deposit their goods at New Orleans. Short's success in laying the groundwork for this treaty, however, was both overtaken and overshadowed by the arrival in Madrid of

proceeded to work out the final details and win the laurels. Short's role in negotiating what became known as Pinckney's treaty passed largely without notice at the time.³ Carmichael was a shadowy participant in this scenario. Sickly and probably an alcoholic, he had been left in Madrid in 1782 when John Jay went to join Adams and Franklin in negotiating the Treaty of Paris. Thereafter, for more than a decade, he had averaged less than one despatch a year. Nevertheless, in 1794, presumably because he was familiar with protocol at the Spanish court, he was jointly commissioned with Short to sound out prospects for treaty-making. Together, the two men found an opportunity to extract concessions in part because the Spanish government had begun to worry over whether the recently-negotiated Jay treaty might have signaled an Anglo-American rapprochement dangerous to its New World empire.

When Pinckney completed the mission, Carmichael resigned and disappeared from the scene. Short, however, returned to Paris where, much to his chagrin, he suffered one career disappointment after another. Arguably America's first career diplomat, he began public service as a protégé of his fellow Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, when the latter was U.S. minister to France. Having served as one of Jefferson's legation secretaries, he fully expected to succeed his mentor when the latter returned home to become secretary of state in 1790. Short might subsequently have won a major post had he heeded Jefferson's advice that he too, return home in order to build a political base from which to fulfill his ambitions.

³Samuel Flagg Bemis first noted the injustice done to Short when he wrote that "laurels which might well have gone to the capable Short . . . luckily were to fall on the brow of the elegant South Carolinian, who, through no fault of his own, crowded an able and faithful public servant off the stage of public notice" *Pinckney's Treaty: a Study of America's Advantage from Europe's Distress, 1783-1800* (Baltimore, 1926), 279.

to build a political base from which to fulfill his ambitions. As it was, Short stayed in Paris and was repeatedly passed over. He was first disappointed when Jefferson, as secretary of state, acquiesced in Washington's decision to turn the Paris post over to Gouverneur Morris. Later, he held ministerial rank while on mission to the Netherlands, but only long enough to complete the government's loan arrangement with Dutch bankers. The final blow came in 1808 when he learned that the Senate had refused to approve his nomination as minister resident to Russia. He was en route to St. Petersburg at the time. Both the Dutch and Russian posts, it might be noted, went to John Quincy Adams, a figure whose political connections were impeccable.⁴

The fifth active *chargé* to serve at a major post in this era was Jonathan Russell, a Rhode Island merchant, then U.S. consul in Hamburg, who was summoned to Paris in the fall of 1810 when the U.S. Minister John Armstrong left for home bearing the famous Cadore Letter. For more than a year, Russell set himself the task of determining whether, under the conditions spelled out in that letter, the French government truly intended to stop seizing American ships and cargoes. Convinced finally that Bonaparte was not about to abandon his predatory ways, Russell persuaded the Madison administration, for what it was worth, that the French Emperor would make no real concessions to American shipping lest Britain follow suit and thereby effect an Anglo-American reconciliation. Rather, he concluded, Bonaparte would stall indefinitely, in the reasonable prospect that Americans would ultimately decide

⁴Although Short also held ministerial rank during his earlier mission to Spain, the Madrid post went ultimately to David Humphreys (1796-1801). For details of Short's career, see George Green Shackelford, *Jefferson's Adoptive Son: the Life of William Short, 1759-1848* (Lexington, KY, 1993).

that Britain was their principal abuser and declare war on her.⁵ When Joel Barlow arrived in Paris with full powers in the fall of 1811, Russell was posted to London, still as *chargé*. Here he played out the fruitless end-game over Britain's refusal to retreat from her equally predatory maritime orders-in-council, a refusal that figured prominently in Madison's decision to ask Congress to declare war in June 1812. Later joining the American peace commissioners at Ghent (to whose deliberations he apparently contributed little), Russell ended his diplomatic career as the first U.S. minister resident to Sweden, 1814-18.

While some American *chargés d'affaires* saw varying degrees of diplomatic action in this era, their importance was nowhere more vividly illustrated than when Joel Barlow failed to regularize the appointment of his nephew as secretary of legation before taking his fateful carriage trip across Europe in the fall of 1812.⁶ News of Barlow's death reaching Paris touched off a bitter contest over who should control the legation's seals, ciphers, and correspondence. Thomas Barlow, as his uncle's secretary, undoubtedly had the best claim. Secretary of State Monroe later wrote that Washington

⁵See Russell to Monroe (private and confidential), Paris, 13 July, 1811, Department of State, Diplomatic Despatches, France (DD-F), National Archives, vol. 12; and Madison to Jefferson, Washington, 25 May 1812, Madison's *Writings* (Gaillard Hunt, ed.) vol.8, 191.

⁶Barlow definitely intended to remedy his nephew's uncertain status, not because he foresaw his own demise, but because he was paying young Barlow's salary out of his own pocket. Writing plaintively from Vilna shortly after he arrived in Poland, he asked Monroe to secure Senate approval of the appointment so that his nephew could be shifted to the public payroll. See his despatch of 23 Nov. 1812, and a private letter to Monroe of the same date, DD-F, vol. 13.

had fully expected him to take charge.⁷ And even the French foreign ministry admitted that its own practice was to recognize legation secretaries as *chargés ad interim*. Young Barlow lost out, however, when he first announced his intention to carry the news of his uncle's death back to the United States and then changed his mind.⁸ In the interim, the U.S. consul resident in Paris, David Bailie Warden, seizing the initiative, declared himself consul-general and demanded that the foreign ministry recognize him as the U.S. government's sole representative.⁹ A testy, ambitious Irishman whose U.S. citizenship the Barlow faction questioned, Warden was admittedly experienced in handling routine matters relating mostly to U.S. shipping, but when the foreign office agreed to deal with him exclusively, the firestorm broke. Two other U.S. consuls entered their own claims.

William Lee, stationed in Bordeaux, joined the fray by reminding the foreign ministry that he had earlier served eight months as Barlow's secretary of legation and was familiar with its operations. Lee's bid, however, came too late; the French foreign minister, the duc de Bassano, replied that he

⁷To William H. Crawford, Washington, 29 May 1813, United States Ministers, Instructions, All Countries, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, vol. 7.

⁸Thomas Barlow to the duc de Bassano, 2 and 10 Feb., and to Monroe (private), 1 Feb. 1813, DD-F, vol 13; also Barlow to Bassano, 4 March 1813, Archives des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique-Etats-unis (AECPEU), vol. 67, ff. 410-14v.

⁹See Warden to Bassano, 15 Jan. 1813, *ibid.* f. 383.

had already decided to deal with Warden.¹⁰ Isaac Cox Barnet, the U.S. consul for Le Havre, received essentially the same answer. Barnet, who worked out of an office in Paris, could show that Barlow had left him in charge of passports and prisoner releases, but had no proof of having been entrusted with any other legation business. Barnet vigorously touted his connections in high places, his consular seniority, and his long-time residence in Paris. All to no avail. Bassano said he appreciated Barnet's long years of service in France, but informed him that Warden, as "consul general," was deemed the proper channel for official communication.¹¹

George Erving, the erstwhile U.S. minister to Denmark, also weighed in against Warden. Traveling in Italy when the news of Barlow's death reached him, Erving hastened to Paris in response to the family's call for help. Writing from the legation on 11 March, he threw his ministerial rank behind Thomas Barlow's claim. For his troubles, he got Bassano's offputting reply that Paris soon hoped to greet the arrival of a newly-appointed American minister.¹²

¹⁰Lee to Bassano, Bordeaux, letters of 21 and 24 Jan. 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 392-92v, 397-97v. Lee later expostulated to Warden that he had come to Paris to offer condolences to Mrs. Barlow, not to act as *chargé d'affaires*. He questioned Warden's right to style himself consul-general and warned him not to assume "any political or diplomatic character." Warden later explained to State Department clerk John Graham that he did not pretend to be *chargé*, but claimed that Russell, while himself *chargé*, had approved his taking the title of consul general to put him on an equal footing with C-Gs from other countries. For Lee and Warden's correspondence with each other and with Monroe and Graham, see Despatches from United States Consuls, France, Records of the Department of State, NA (CD-Paris), vol. 4

¹¹For Barnet's letters to Bassano of 15 and 18 Jan. 1813, and Bassano's reply of 23 Jan. 1813, see AECF-EU, Vol. 67, ff. 385-85v, 386-86v; and 396-96v.

¹²For this exchange, see *ibid.*, ff. 422, 423-23v.

Thomas Barlow, meanwhile, having renewed his own candidacy, managed to shoot it down when he insisted, somewhat absurdly, that neither he nor anyone else could transact official business without violating the Logan Act. Underscoring the Barlow faction's defiance of Warden, Barlow's widow Ruth also let it be known that she would retain all incoming diplomatic correspondence until Washington told her to do otherwise. (Ruth Barlow had been particularly offended when, while the news of her husband's death was still fresh, Warden had turned up at the legation and brusquely demanded its papers.)¹³

Why the duc de Bassano chose to deal with Warden is best explained by a memorandum he solicited from a foreign ministry official named Roux, whose carefully phrased rationale mixed technicalities with pragmatic considerations and was probably written after Bassano had already made his decision. Roux observed that although France would ordinarily deal *ad interim* with a secretary of legation, Thomas Barlow's presidential commission was valid for only one year and might be revoked by Congress at its next session. To negotiate with him on any issue of substance would be to risk disavowal. Moreover, Roux added, young Barlow's initial indecisiveness suggested "a lightness of spirit and little aptitude for business." In any event, Barlow had effectively disqualified himself when he cited the Logan Act as barring him from conducting any official business without explicit

¹³As early as 15 January, Ruth Barlow had the legation clerk, a man named Marcadier, warn Bassano that both Erving and Lee would soon be in Paris to defend against Warden's imposture. (*Ibid.*, ff. 381-82.) Joel Barlow clearly thought well of his wife's good judgment. Before he left Paris, he told Barnet that "in all cases where you think Mrs. Barlow's opinions will be of use I would thank you to state them to her." Barnet to Monroe, Paris, 23 Feb. 1813, CD-Paris, vol. 4.

authorization from Washington. Warden, he urged, was a surer channel of communication not only because of his experience, but also because his consular commission was “complete” and bore no time limitation.¹⁴

To his credit, Bassano felt uneasy enough about his decision to instruct Louis Sérurier, the French minister in Washington, to explain the choice of Warden in terms of the latter’s long residence in Paris and his familiarity with the types of commercial issues that constituted the bulk of official business at that time. Sérurier was to assure the administration, however, that Paris had not recognized Warden as *chargé d’affaires*, but had merely chosen to “correspond with him on current affairs because he was the only American agent who had legal residence in Paris.” In further justification, the French minister was to paraphrase Bassano’s correspondence with Lee, Warden, Barnet, and the Barlows, emphasizing in particular the problems the foreign office had had with Thomas Barlow’s vacillating conduct.¹⁵

There the matter rested. For the next six months, Bassano communicated only with Warden. When William Crawford, the newly accredited U.S. minister, arrived in July 1813, Warden, along with Barnet and Lee, all came in for varying degrees of censure. Warden, when told that he had overstepped his authority, snapped back that he would do it again, if only to keep legation documents out of the hands of Daniel Parker, a former Barlow partner and well-known

¹⁴Roux’s “Rapport à Son Excellence” (Paris, 11 Feb. 1813, AECPEU, Vol. 67, ff. 404-05) is a more polished and detailed version of earlier unsigned memoranda dated 1 and 22 Jan., *ibid.*, 389-90v, 394-95.

¹⁵Bassano to Sérurier, 6 March 1813, AECPEU, Vol. 70, ff. 108-112v.

beneficiary of insider information.¹⁶ The bickering went on until Crawford, fed up with Warden's bad attitude, fired him out of the Paris consulate in August 1814 and conferred it on Barnet.¹⁷

Whether this raucous hiatus in the spring of 1813 adversely affected French-American relations to any serious degree is hard to say. Joel Barlow's commercial treaty and claims convention, both in draft and left hanging, were iffy at best. The claims convention was clearly a non-starter because it proposed to create an indemnity fund from the sale of valuable French commercial licenses to American importers. Given the Madison administration's dead set against licensed trade of any sort, even the French government came to believe that Barlow had exceeded his powers.¹⁸ Washington, for its part, was shocked when it heard what Barlow had proposed.¹⁹ Nor was it likely the Senate would have approved the draft commercial treaty, had it been signed. Without an accompanying provision for indemnification — Madison's *sine qua non* — the President would almost certainly have shelved it. Moreover, by the spring of 1813, any treaty aimed at

¹⁶Crawford to Monroe, No. 4, (private), 25 Aug. 1813, DD-F, Vol. 14.

¹⁷Warden did not leave quietly. At first he challenged Crawford's right to fire him on grounds that Bonaparte's recent abdication had terminated his ministerial authority. Later, under Crawford's threat to withhold his salary, he surrendered his official papers, among them more than 40 pieces of correspondence with Bassano. Warden defended his conduct and vented his anger in letters to Crawford of 16 Sept. 1813, and 6 June and 8 Aug., 1814; to Madison, 26 July, 1814, and to John Graham, 4 Aug. 1814, all in CD-Paris, Vol. 5.

¹⁸Bassano to Sérurier, Dresden, 23 July 1813, AECPEU, Vol. 70, f. 315.

¹⁹Sérurier reported that Monroe had vehemently denied any knowledge of Barlow's indemnity plan, adding that the administration would certainly have rejected it. To Bassano, 20 April 1813, *ibid.*, ff. 187-92v.

patching things up with France would have elicited another discomfiting round of Federalist charges that Madison had led the country into war at Bonaparte's bidding.

Crawford, when he reached Paris, made no serious effort to revive the treaty of commerce. Rather, he focused his efforts on getting a straight cash indemnification for earlier property losses. This, too, failed, and not until 1831 did a French government agree to recompense American merchants and shipowners for Napoleon Bonaparte's spoliations.²⁰ Although the near-term failure to settle accounts suggests the relative unimportance of the post-Barlow lapse in diplomatic contact, the disarray in Paris at least highlighted the potential for serious damage to our relations with a major power. At a time when the State Department's communication with its outposts was measured in weeks or months, questions of succession raised the possibility for mischief unknown in our own time. Today, by contrast (it is reassuring to note) the death of a chief of mission creates no Barlow-like uncertainties. The chain of command at U.S. embassies, though it differs from post to post, is plainly spelled out. And whether it be a deputy, secretary, or a minister counselor who takes over an embassy on the death of a chief, the title of *chargé d'affaires* remains.²¹

²⁰Only in 1836 did the French government, after further delays, pay the agreed-upon sum of 25 million francs. For a detailed account of claims diplomacy in the post-Napoleonic era, see Richard Aubrey McLemore, *Franco-American Diplomatic Relations 1816-1836* (Kennikat Press, 1941).

²¹Maria Sotiropoulos at the Office of Protocol, Department of State, affirms that whoever succeeds a chief of mission, of whatever rank, is addressed thereafter in official correspondence as *chargé d'affaires*.

A PLAN TO SAVE SOUTH VIETNAM
IN APRIL 1975:
NGUYEN HUY HAN'S ABORTED COUP

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY MELVIN SMALL (WAYNE STATE)

Several days before the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, Nguyen Huy Han, the thirty-nine year old former director-general of taxation for South Vietnam, was prepared to launch a coup against President Nguyen Van Thieu, which, Han believes, offered a good possibility of turning back the North Vietnamese offensive and preserving his country's independence. It would not have been a simple changing of the guard in the presidential palace. Had the coup succeeded, Han is confident he could have transformed almost immediately South Vietnam's political culture and military capabilities.

Han has been in the United States since 1975, after fleeing his country on April 29, along with his family. Although he had talked to me and my Vietnam War classes many times in general about his plot and, more importantly, his blueprint for a democratic South Vietnam, he had been reluctant to discuss the details until recently because he feared that few Vietnamese would believe that such a mild-mannered and seemingly apolitical man had planned to take over his government. They knew him as a capable administrator but never would have suspected that he was also the promoter of a military coup and political revolution. I argued with him for many years about the importance of getting his story into print and succeeded only this year in convincing him to present the material in this article. No one has heard his story before,

including his four co-conspirators, each of whom knew only parts of the complicated scheme.

Han was born in 1935 in Hung-Yen, a town forty-five kilometers south of Hanoi, whose name means Promotion of Peace. He grew up in a nominally Buddhist family, headed by his father, who was chief officer of a district. His family left the north for the south in 1954 after the signing of the Geneva Accords. He entered Saigon University in 1957, graduating with a bachelor of law degree in 1959. During the same period through 1960, he attended the National Institute of Administration, which was sponsored by Michigan State University, and graduated with the highest honors from the economics and finance section. He passed the national bar exam in 1965 and began postgraduate study at the Faculty of Law in Saigon, where he was awarded his Master's degree two years later. From 1968 through 1975, he was a doctoral candidate at the law school, working on a dissertation on "Legislative Power in Contemporary Democracy" that was to be defended in May 1975.

From 1960 through 1967, he worked in a variety of positions at the General Directorate of Taxation, after which time he served as an advisor to the Vietnamese Senate on economics and legal affairs and as a professor of finance and taxation at the National Institute of Administration through 1972. At that point, although well respected by his colleagues in the administration, the universities, and elsewhere in Saigon he was not yet a national figure. But he was developing contacts among civil servants, businesspeople, and other professionals who shared his concerns about the future of their country.

In 1961, with his mother's verbal permission, he decided to live as a bachelor to more easily sacrifice himself to his family, his country, and to the world. That same year, he

launched his revolutionary life by founding the "Volunteer Group" of "kind and honest Vietnamese, whose aim was to help each other and to serve society efficiently." He was also chair of the alumni organization of the Administration Institute from 1968-75 and publisher and editor of its magazine. More important, he was founder and manager of the Peach Garden Restaurant Club, a sort of tea-house and cooperative eating club for over 500 members of his Volunteer Group in the Saigon area. In 1970, he began a private business, the Vietnam Development and Investment Corporation, whose profits, along with those of the Peace Garden, he used to finance the Volunteer Group.

Thus, he had become well-known to a large group of like-minded middle-level bureaucrats and white-collar workers in Saigon who recognized his leadership skills and unchallenged honesty. Han never joined any of the existing political parties because he did not admire their leaders or policies. He never tried to form his own party because he maintains that parties limit the freedom of their members.

He was and is an ascetic philosopher with a strong mission to serve humankind. Meek, affable, and virtuous, he was called by his close friends, "Ong Do" (a rural Confucian teacher). He never married, did not drink or date, nor did he spend much time on any activity aside from those related to family responsibilities and work. He has lived a remarkably simple and austere life to the present day.

In 1973, he became director-general of taxation, a position similar to that of director of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. From that position he soon developed the national reputation that he knew would serve him in good stead after his planned coup against President Thieu. Other high South Vietnamese officials traveled in automobiles with large

retinues of aides and bodyguards. Han traveled around Saigon on a bicycle, wearing second-hand clothes, as he successfully labored to clean up one of the most inefficient and corrupt government services. The newspapers soon began to write about him and his programs, dubbing him "Dao Thue," translated loosely as the austere monk of taxation. In a few short months on the job, he doubled tax revenues, and then tripled them. He claims that this occurred not only because of his reorganization of the 6,000 person department but also because the people of Vietnam recognized that for the first time, tax collection was an honest government activity. Further he made headlines with the establishment of Special Tax Teams, reporting directly to him, which employed secret investigations and raids on businesses that had been evading their tax responsibilities. Many of these businesses had close connections to the president, whose public image he hoped to damage through his raids. Han's anti-corruption campaign was so popular that it would have been difficult for the president to remove him from office.

In February 1975, because of a cabinet crisis, his mentor, the secretary of the treasury resigned and Han followed suit. His departure from the tax department pleased many in the Saigon establishment whose enterprises he had investigated. His experiences at the highest level of government, working with the Thieu administration, convinced him that unless there were dramatic structural, and, above all, spiritual changes in South Vietnamese political culture and society, his nation was doomed to fall to communism. As early as 1973, he had begun thinking about his coup and then revolution, composing a draft of his revolutionary proclamation that he hoped to use during the first days of the new regime. Despite the fact that he kept his plans to himself, fearing Thieu's secret police, he hid the scraps of paper in his kitchen cabinets in a stack of dishes.

As it turned out, he was not ready to act on those plans until the eleventh hour in 1975. The reason for the delay, he now admits, had to do with "filial piety." He did not care about his own life but feared that if his plot failed, his mother might be executed along with him. Thus, he did not begin setting plans in motion until February 1975, when he thought he had a 95 percent chance of succeeding and also when his resignation relieved him of his burdens at the tax office.

There were two parts to his plan, the coup itself and the revolution to follow, both of which he kept to himself until he was ready to make his move. This was not surprising. He ran the taxation bureau out of his vest pocket, rarely telling even his closest aides what new reform was about to be introduced. What follows (in bold type) is Han's own description of his planned coup, which depended upon first capturing President Thieu and then reorganizing his nation.

The president lived in a palace that was encircled by two iron fences with two gates. He was protected by two special forces, a special brigade of the United Army and a company of guards. The special brigade consisted of 2000 soldiers and their officers whose headquarters were about 500 meters from the palace. The brigade's responsibility was to defend the palace against outside attacks as well as to keep a close watch on the first gate and to control all exits and entries. The guard company included 36 martial arts experts divided into three groups, who, in rotation watched and controlled exits and entries to the other gates and to the halls leading to Thieu's office and residence. Beneath the president's chair in his office was a button that could be used to lower him through a trap door to the basement of the building, which was equipped as a small, fortified command center.

The deposition of the president was to be accomplished swiftly and quietly. V. Khiem, the administrative director of the presidential palace and my chief collaborator, would arrange with the minister of finance, C.K.Nhan, to invite Colonel V.V. Cam, Thieu's chief of cabinet, to come to Nhan's house for breakfast. While he was out, other conspirators would go to Cam's house to seize his family members whom they would hold as hostages. Then, while eating breakfast at Nhan's house, Cam himself would be seized and given a dose of a slow-acting poison. We would then present our plans for revolution and beg him to support it. If his answer would be yes, he could save himself, his family, and his country, as well as receive a promotion. If his answer was no, he would lose because the drug was very powerful—after twelve hours it would cause permanent impairment if an antidote was not administered. If his answer still was no after twenty-four hours, we would kill his wife. To help him make a correct decision, we would permit him to talk by telephone with his wife. Moreover, in the case that the revolution failed, we would assure him that he would not be guilty of treason because of the great duress we had put him under. Further, we promised to protect Thieu's life so Cam would feel no remorse for betraying him. We thought with such judicious arguments, Cam would be persuaded to collaborate with us.

As part of his collaboration, he would drive us (V. Khiem and two other comrades) later that morning to the palace. Thanks to his presence, we would easily pass through both gates. Major P.V. Ty, another member of our group and chief of operation services of the Special Brigade, would be stationed at the first gate to support us if necessary and to be ready to command his brigade after we had captured Thieu in his office. Once inside the palace, Cam would

lead us to his office adjacent to Thieu's. Their offices shared a common wall with a doorway through which Cam brought official papers and other matters to Thieu's attention. As we waited in Cam's office, he would inform Thieu that we would like to see him to reveal a treason plot headed by former Prime Minister T.T. Khiem (no relation to my comrade, V. Khiem) and others. We knew that this false information would catch Thieu's attention and that he would be anxious to summon us to see him.

V. Khiem and I would then come into the president's office while our other two comrades stayed back to guard Cam in his office. After observing Thieu's position and watching carefully where he was in his chair with the button that could send him to the basement, we suddenly would pull our revolvers to force him to leave the chair and then proceed on behalf of our national revolutionary force to capture him. We would handcuff him, inject him with a strong sleeping drug, and confine him to a small office next door.

On our signal, Major Ty and his allies would disarm Thieu's palace guards and confine them to one room. Then Cam, allegedly acting for Thieu, would order Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Lan, the commander of the Special Brigade, to the presidential office where he in turn would be captured. At this point, Ty would replace Lan as chief of the Special Brigade, presumably appointed by Thieu, and order his men and tanks to keep everyone except those we designated from entering the palace. While this was taking place, Cam, again allegedly on behalf of Thieu, would invite to the president's office the prime minister, the commander of the army in the Special Capital Region, the director general of the national police and public security, and the four commanders of the four

army corps. As each arrived, he would be arrested and confined. All of this could be accomplished in less than one day.

By 8 in the morning of the next day, we would stabilize the leadership of the nation by establishing a National Governing Council which would temporarily replace the president, the prime minister, and the National Congress. The Council would immediately assume military and civil functions to assure the security of Saigon and its suburbs. Using radio and newspapers, we would issue the National Proclamation of the Governing Council, explaining the success of the revolution and the rapid transfer of power to a new leadership. In addition, we would select a list of popular and respected figures who would be invited to become members of a National Affairs Advisory Council. This council would advise and supervise the Governing Council and draw up the third constitution of the Republic of Vietnam based on true democracy, which would be voted on by plebiscite after the war.

The first order of business for the new government would be the establishment of a new defense policy to halt the North Vietnamese advance. The Governing Council would announce a National Order requiring all citizens to become involved in the battle against the Communist invasion. The slogan for the renewed battle would be "We Fight to the Death to Defend Ourselves." All businesses and public services would be closed except necessary ones such as hospitals, health services, the post office, public utilities, and the like. All public officials would appear at their department headquarters for new assignments. If necessary, all private means of transportation would be requisitioned and the government would assume control of rice, fish sauce, salt, gas, oil and other essential items.

We would also temporarily close all schools. Students who did not have to pass an exam would automatically be promoted; those who had exams would be allowed to pass them on the condition that they had to enroll in the People Reassuring Corps (a kind of Peace Corps), and, in the postwar era, they would make up their schoolwork by attending special supplementary courses. The People Reassuring Corps would have a military-like structure, with units organized in each university that would include college students and junior and seniors from high schools in the region. The Corps would be commanded by a general with an advisory team including the rector and deans of the faculty and would be advised as well by professors and student representatives. It would collaborate with the police and security forces to assure order and assume some government responsibilities in regions where communist military forces were not present. The existing local militia forces in each province would become the People Protecting Corps under the provincial chief.

Ex-service officers under 65 would be mobilized and given priority to serve as officers of the People Protecting Corps or local military forces in their residence area. Officers over 65 could volunteer for such service as well. Former officers who were Cao-Daist or Hoa-Haoist would be dispatched to their original provinces where they would have the duty of reassuring their co-religionists.

All political prisoners, except for communists, would be released from jail.

Sudden curfews would be announced, such as during the 5-10 a.m. hours, in order to capture communists in hiding.

All Vietnamese would be prohibited from leaving the country.

All civil servants, up to and including those in the National Governing Council and the cabinet, would stop receiving a monthly salary. They and their families would be issued only rice and other necessary items on the basis of their needs.

We would establish a General Supply Center to organize and monitor the supply and demand of necessary items in Saigon and to supply special and additional rations for soldiers on the battlefield. A related General Service Center would resolve distributional problems, especially those involving providing adequate food and shelter for front-line soldiers' families. Every soldier who was killed or disabled in battle would receive suitable compensation from the state. The state would assure the soldiers' families, including their elderly parents, that they would have an acceptable level of living standards, at least better than the current situation.

To mobilize the army in the "National Fight to the Death to Defend Ourselves," the commander of each unit from battalion up would be elected by all officers of his unit. If the newly elected commander had a low rank, he would immediately be promoted to a suitable rank. The former commanders would return to general headquarters to await new assignments. During battle, the new officers would have to advance with their soldiers.

All of the above would be announced publicly. General military strategy, however, would remain secret. The revolutionary government would follow a new battlefield program, employing active rather than passive approaches.

Before our revolution, most South Vietnamese forces followed a defensive strategy, and thus found themselves in a disadvantageous position because they had always to be ready to defend their territory against sudden attacks of the communist forces who chose their most opportune time to strike.

Under the new program, we would concentrate most of the army at the battlefront. In the relatively safe rear, local militia forces, the People Protecting Corps, and the People Reassuring Corps would have the responsibility for regional security and temporarily defending their areas against sudden attack. If necessary, within each region, we would maintain a battalion of well-trained militia, with helicopters, which would relieve the regional forces in danger, before stronger reinforcements could arrive.

The national forces themselves would be reorganized into two separate forces, an Attack Force, which would be made up of two-thirds of the most competent elements of the existing forces, and a Defense Force. The Attack Force would have two main tasks — to advance from Saigon to the north to reoccupy towns and provinces temporarily controlled by the communists and to return to the south to attack the communists from the rear. The advance to the north would be accomplished as soon as possible, and would last not more than five days. The Attack Force would be transported secretly on national warships or merchant ships to the central region of South Vietnam. To catch our enemies unawares, these operations would have to be disguised. All embarkations and landings would take place at night. Ships would not fly South Vietnamese flags.

The Attack Force would be divided into three groups accompanied by a team of engineers armed with mines and a team of administrators who would reorganize local administrations as well as local militia forces. The team of administrators would be selected from civil servants who had graduated from the National Institute of Administration and a military school. Those with experience in the central region would enjoy priority in the selection process. The chief of the team of administrators would be nominated as the representative of the government in the central region and be given the rank of colonel. The members of the team of administrators would nominate provincial chiefs with a rank of lieutenant colonel and district chiefs with the rank of major.

The first of the Attack Forces would land at Da Nang at 3 in the morning to reoccupy the town and neutralize the communist forces in the area. One portion of this group, accompanied by the engineering team, would quickly move to Dong-Ha, the frontier between North and South Vietnam in Quang Tri province, where they would lay minefields to make it more difficult for the North Vietnamese to send relief troops south. Once these tasks were completed, the bulk of the Attack Force would return south to begin the reoccupation of Hue. Warships from Da Nang would transport, weaponry, ammunition, and sustenance to Hue to supply the troops and would carry troops from Hue to their new headquarters being established in Nha-Trang.

The other portion of the first group of Attack Forces would leave Da Nang for the south to reoccupy the provinces of Quang-Nam, Quang-Tin, Quang-Ngai, and would go to Binh-Dinh (Qui-Nhon port) to use warships to rendezvous at the Nha-Trang headquarters.

The second group, led by the commander of the Attack Forces, would land at Cam-Ranh Bay on the same early morning that the first group attacked Da Nang and would reoccupy Nha-Trang City to set up Attack Force Headquarters. After being joined by the other troops, they would set about the reoccupation of Ninh-Thuan and Bin-Thuan. The third group would invade Qui-Nhon as soon as possible after the second group reoccupied Binh-Dinh province, and then move on to Quang-Ngai and Nha-Trang City.

In Nha Trang, the tired soldiers from the Attack Force would enjoy one day of R and R, with special food imported from Saigon brought on merchant vessels. At this point, all officers from the Attack Force from battalion rank up would attend a meeting to review the situation and to suggest attack strategies. From the ideas presented at that meeting, the elected commandants of the Attack Force would devise a final plan to attack the Communist forces from the rear.

While waiting for the Attack Force to accomplish the reoccupation campaign, the Defense Force would energetically protect the rest of the territory. Its leaders would establish a "Fearless in the Face of Death Troops," which would include 2,000 soldiers selected from well-trained, bold, and resourceful parachutists. They would be automatically promoted one grade and would receive one million piasters as a reward. (At the time, my monthly salary was only 40,000 piasters.) If any member of this group was killed or disabled, his family would be cared for by the state until his children graduated from high school.

The "Fearless in the Face of Death Troops" would specialize in lightning attacks on communist headquarters

and their rear guard to destroy artillery and ammunition and to create anxiety among the enemy. They would wear communist uniforms to confuse the enemy and make it easier for them both to attack and to evade capture.

We would also reenforce and improve the "Frontline Military Intelligence Troops." They would enjoy the same benefits as the "Fearless Troops" and would receive generous rewards for important items of intelligence they produced.

The Defense Force itself would be divided into passive and mobile units. The passive units would block enemy advances, but, if necessary, yield temporary control of their bases to the enemy, before returning to counterattack. The mobile units would operate on the enemy's flanks during each encounter and pursue them when they fled. When the Attack Forces would begin pressuring the enemy from the rear, the Defense Forces would then become part of the Attack Force as well, as they tightened the pressure on the communists. Using leaflets and radio, we would call on them to lay down their arms to save their lives. Whoever wanted to stay in the south would receive resettlement assistance. Whoever wanted to go back north would be accommodated. After three days, those who rejected our offers would be subject to attacks from C.B.U. and Daisy Cutter bombs.

I estimated this plan would take from one to three months to succeed. In order to make certain that our military was well supplied with weapons, ammunition, and food, we would hold weekly press conferences demonstrating to the world our successes and asking friendly countries for assistance. We would also work with embassies in Saigon to request assistance as well. We would organize

battlefield visits for journalists and diplomats to meet with our Fearless Troops and members of the People Reassuring and People Protecting Corps. We would also organize battlefield visits for members of soldiers' families to instill enthusiasm for the sacred fight. If foreign military aid were not forthcoming, the government would buy weapons on credit or use gold deposits in the national bank or borrow gold from the people.

Han's coup and revolution never took place. For several weeks in April, the conspirators found it impossible to get Cam to come to breakfast at Nanh's house. On Saturday, April 19, V. Khiem informed Han that Cam might be ready for the breakfast meeting on Wednesday, April 25. But suddenly in the morning of Monday, April 21, Khiem warned Han that President Thieu was going to resign that evening in favor of his vice president, T.V. Huong. Very disappointed, Han called a meeting of his four colleagues at his house that evening to consider alternatives. Unlike Thieu, Huong was an elderly statesperson who enjoyed some respect among the population. Han, a young man from the north, doubted he could rouse the country around him as the deposer of Huong. In addition, it would appear that by the time that the plotters were prepared to act, the North Vietnamese offensive would have been so successful that it is difficult to imagine that Han could have rallied his troops and the nation before the enemy reached Saigon. At the time, of course, he, like most South Vietnamese, did not realize the gravity of the military situation. Indeed, the North Vietnamese themselves never expected to be so close to Saigon by the end of April.

But all was not lost. N.P. Loc, the general director of South Vietnamese intelligence, informed Han that his father-in-law, who was close to the President Huong, could influence him to set up a war cabinet in which Han would be a member. Han

told Loc he would welcome the opportunity to serve, particularly as head of the Department of the Interior with control over the police and public security. Han told his friends that Huong was virtuous but too weak to prepare a defense against the communists. Once in government, Han thought he could seize the levers of power to rally the nation around him. But he never had the chance since Huong and his advisors rejected fighting on, opting for a conciliatory approach to the communists in hopes of saving some remnant of independence.

Confronted by what he now knows about the disposition of the enemy's troops and the state of his own nation's military during the last weeks of April, Han still contends that had his coup occurred even as late as April 23, he and his colleagues could have saved the day, primarily by swiftly providing the people of South Vietnam with effective and inspiring leadership. He also was not concerned about the problem he would face with Communist moles or double agents who had penetrated so much of the administrative structure of South Vietnam and was confident that, as he had demonstrated in his work at the Taxation Department, he was quite capable of dramatically reorganizing the political and military structure of South Vietnam in a very short time.

Years later, as he looked back on his abortive plan, he used the analogy of the creative Israeli defense effort after May 14, 1948, when that new nation, facing overwhelming invasion forces on every front, was able to unite virtually overnight to fight to the death for survival. With internal lines of defense, he claims, the South Vietnamese Army was not in as bad a shape as it appeared. The North Vietnamese had thrown four divisions into the offensive, the South Vietnamese had roughly three to meet the attack. In addition, while Hanoi enjoyed a significant advantage in artillery and tanks, Saigon's navy and

air force enjoyed superiority over their enemy. But numbers and firepower were not the key to the successful defense of South Vietnam. It depended upon the rallying of the entire nation to arms by a trusted and inspirational leader. As for his own lack of military expertise, he is certain that the general outlines of his offensive and defensive strategies could have been quickly developed by the patriotic and competent generals and other officers that he had identified.

As an indication of Han's unusual organizational ability and creativity, two years after he and his sister came to the United States, he opened a small cooperative restaurant in Pontiac, Michigan, despite the fact that neither had money, fluency in English, or hands-on experience in the business. He was proud to have accomplished this feat by relying on their meager monthly welfare payments of \$63 and \$50 worth of foodstamps. In December 1977, after six months in business, he declared a profit of \$10,000 and returned 30 percent of it to members of the cooperative.

The restaurant, its facilities, and its experiment in "consumption capitalism" was tied into his larger program, in many ways more ambitious than his 1975 coup. In 1978, Han began to organize a nationwide non-profit food distribution system for Vietnamese immigrants, which, in two years, was operating on a budget of \$1,500,000 and was providing Asian foods and products, at low prices, to virtually all of the major Vietnamese-American communities. This was part of his larger plan in which his Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Program, which was incorporated in 1981, would spawn the Vietnamese Community Overseas Economic Development Project, which itself would serve as a springboard for recapturing his country from the communists. To this end, he organized a three-day conference in Pontiac, Michigan in August 1982 that attracted 30,000 participants and was the

first national conference of Vietnamese in the United States. Through this conference, aimed at developing Vietnamese self-sufficiency while preserving the culture and traditions of Vietnamese society, he hoped to unite the fragmented American Vietnamese community into one democratic organization, a Free Vietnam Resident State. At this point, owing to economic conditions, the development of alternate sources for cheap rice, the establishment of local Vietnamese-American political institutions, and the difficulty of bringing a rather contentious and suspicious community together, Han's long-range plans, which he confided to no one, did not come to fruition. Nonetheless, the restaurant and the assistance program were impressive accomplishments in their own right.

Looking at these small miracles, which Han characteristically developed entirely on his own, as he had his tax reforms and planned coup, one can understand how he still passionately believes that he had the ability to save South Vietnam from the communists.

As Han explained, even as late as April 1975: **the South Vietnamese people and military could have defended themselves against the communist invasion, but unfortunately they did not have a capable and respected leader. For a long time, South Vietnam had been entrapped in a vicious circle, which was breaking apart. People passively relied on the army; the army unfortunately depended on an incapable commander in chief; the commander in chief trusted the American president; and the American president, on behalf of the American people, had been trusted to support the people of South Vietnam. The vicious circle was broken when the Americans could no longer support the Vietnamese commander in chief. Very quickly, the people, the army,**

and the commander in chief were separated and finally all failed.

Our secret plot started from my sincere heart and enthusiastic patriotism to keep this vicious circle from breaking further as well as to transform it into a new collaborative relationship. If among the people, the army, and the commander in chief there was a close and sincere collaboration, it would have been a spectacular event that would have had the effect of making the Free World, especially the United States, trust and support us. And we would have won our fight for freedom.

The primordial point of the secret plot was to create the spectacular collaborations described above. I believe that thanks to my national reputation and careful plan, I could have brought about this transformation.

PAST PRESIDENTS' COLUMN

This is the second essay in the series by a past SHAFR President. The topics were completely at the discretion of the writers.

Robert Ferrell, emeritus Indiana University, was president in 1971.

Writing A Dissertation

The late Samuel Flagg Bemis (d. 1973) was simply a wonderful supervisor of dissertations, and recently I was attempting to think how he would have advised students today, what he would wish to tell them, in what ways he could help them.

Let me begin by remarking that Sam (after a sort of ordeal by fire, my dissertation, he said one day that I should address him as Sam) would have been the first to admit that anything he told a doctoral student was not original and had come out of the experience of other writers. He had written his dissertation with Edward Channing at Harvard, the quizzical little man with the pince nez who accosted after a lecture by a student who inquired, "Are you related to the great Channing?" meaning the theologian of Unitarianism, William Ellery Channing. The historian drew himself up as high as he could and answered, "I *am* the great Channing." But in terms of helping young Sam Bemis from Worcester he was not so great; he did not amount to much as a teacher and adviser. When Sam entered his seminar he was doing his multivolume *History of the United States* and had gotten up to the 1790s and was assigning topics in that era — for Bemis that meant Jay's Treaty, which was all right. Thereafter he paid little attention, for the *History* came first, which was not all right. Nor was he helpful in finding Bemis a job. By his own means Sam managed a year at Colorado College, in Colorado Springs, and then went out to the Far West to Whitman College in Walla Walla. A few years later he met J. Franklin Jameson who managed an appointment at George Washington University and sent him abroad to photostat records pertaining to American history in the French foreign office and other archives. Jameson taught the later remarkable teacher at Yale what he needed to know.

I think that if Sam could teach another seminar he would open it by saying something about a topic — what would be a good subject for a dissertation. That, he would say, with a grin, required a beginning and end and an easily discovered body of unused material. The beginning and end was important. If the subject stretched on, no place to start or stop, some professorial wisecrack, he would say, could announce an incomplete piece of work and banish the dissertation into outer darkness. Similarly it was necessary to have material at hand or know where it was. So many topics did not have possible grounding in archives or private papers, ideally diaries; they were poor topics for dissertations and good only for essays.

To which I would add that ideal topics often are in diplomatic, political, or legal history, less frequently in social history because of the amorphous nature of that subdiscipline. The issue between some of us and our colleagues in recent years has not been because they were wrong about the attractions of social history but because those undoubted virtues were not for beginning students, could require years of research, and especially took analytical powers that few graduate students can be expected to possess. They are good for second books, not first, for a graduate student upon finishing or nearly finishing his dissertation needs accomplishment, not a five year plan.

To which I would add that any dissertation that rests on newspapers is a bad choice, as the newspapers either will have no index or a bad index it is a waste of good time to spend one's days in a library turning pages. There is a temptation to look at stories that have nothing to do with the subject, or look at the pictures or advertisements.

Subject chosen, the question of notes arises, the taking of notes. Here Bemis had a system that does not recommend

itself to graduate students of the present day. That is, he had the services of Geneva Walsh, who sat at a Remington “noiseless” typewriter, a manual of course, in the room adjoining Sam’s study and spent half-days typing his drafts. Like his good friend at Harvard, Samuel Eliot Morison, he wrote everything out in longhand—ugh, just think of it. Sam — the Yale Sam — would gather half a dozen books on his desk, each with paper tufts sticking out, books he had just read, the tufts to remind him of quotations or ideas. He consulted the tufts and brought in the points as he wrote, and the scribbling would go in a box for Geneva next morning. Thereafter he wrote from triplespace typescript on which he would caret in additions from a second half dozen books similarly on the desk. After five drafts he would be through. One time in a considerable innocence I asked if he ever took notes. He pulled out a little drawer for three-by-five cards and therein was a grouping of scribbles, notes to himself, laundry lists, grocery lists that he and Ruth had forgotten, menus, an utter mess. He grinned, “There they are.”

In passing let me advocate a personal system based on cards, and not three-by-fives, too small, nor five-by-eights that are for people who either like to write notes by hand or cut pieces from typing paper, but four-by-sixes, just right for individuals like myself who learned touch typing in Miss Florence Sleeman’s class at Emerson Junior High in Lakewood, Ohio. One of my ineradicable beliefs is that if something is not on a four-by-six card it does not exist. I might have twenty thousand or forty thousand in this room right now. Admittedly they became easier to turn out when the Xerox age began in 1960s; I xeroxed pages and cut out material and used sticky tape to put it on cards. I file notes behind chapter and subchapter dividers.

No one seems to like my system, which for years I advocated in seminars and talked up to anyone who would listen. Someone said that David Donald uses note cards — maybe it was Sam who I think announced the point with another grin.

I do see occasional researchers taking notes on yellow legal pads, just like lawyers, which is as bad as Sam's note taking. Rita Giacalone of Venezuela, some years ago at Indiana University, told me at a party that she was having trouble with her dissertation and I inquired about her notes and she said she had four or eight legal pads, all full, line after line. I congratulated her and advised a large pair of scissors, separating each quotation or idea from its cousins and great nephews, meanwhile the purchase of several dozen packs of five-by-eight card — the emergency, all in manuscript, demanded the odd size — together with lots of sticky tape. Rita spent the next week in this interesting work and finished the dissertation and grinned as if she were Sam Bemis.

I see much note taking on the little portable word processors known as laptops. My first concern here would be the cost of the machines, which are not cheap; as I write this morning I have a throwaway brochure, courtesy of Sears, advertising a back to school laptop, a Compaq, and after \$200 savings and \$100 mail-in rebate it is \$1,399.99. Having bitten this bullet, a researcher seeking to organize his or her notes, presumably would print each note, for the machine will not bring up more than one note at a time and it is impossible to compare them or, particularly, shuffle them. A well-known writer, a professional, circulated a group of historians to which I belong inquiring about software by which he could bring up several notes simultaneously, and I sadly informed him that there was none. He continues to write a great deal and I would like to think he has resorted to a typewriter. Which reminds me of

a purchase I made after listening to an expert for fifteen minutes who said no self-respecting high school student would buy a typewriter. I bought a Japanese typewriter for \$99 that has a slot in the back in which I insert four-by-six card. It has a line or so of memory and hence can erase errors. It looks like a laptop and makes a good impression in airports.

Sam Bemis did not have to bother with the machines of the information age, having installed Geneva Walsh at that awful Remington. He had another string to his bow, which was an ancient boxy Underwood with a bell that didn't work.

David McCullough writes — the story comes to mind — with a Royal portable. He has trouble finding them. Before he buys one he gives it a test by throwing it against a wall, and usually it bounces back, looks at him, and is ready for business.

Bemis always inquired about organization — what would be the chapters? He showed me how an introductory chapter and a concluding chapter left only the middle and we guessed out six or eight chapter titles. Each would be perhaps six or eight or ten thousand words. If one has note cards (or Mrs. Walsh) it is not difficult to produce the chapters. Sam did not tell me this, but I add again a personal suggestion, that a dissertation writer begin with the second chapter, not the introduction, for that will come easily after one has written the bulk of the chapters.

The architecture of each chapter would be obvious. Three, say, sections or parts to each chapter set off with arabic numbers or typescript (!) breaks — there is something memorable about three, a mystical number. Open with a long paragraph of introduction or two or three short ones. Write by topic sentences, the first sentence of the introductory

paragraph or paragraphs of the chapter should relate what is in the chapter, similarly the initial sentence of each section or part what is in it.

Every paragraph needs a topic sentence, at the front rather than rear, and only two kinds of paragraphs are acceptable. One is a reiteration of the topic sentence. I once heard the Reverend Billy Graham give a public lecture in which he did it with his hands, left hand announcing a one-idea (repetition of the topic sentence) paragraph, usually with one phrase, "It is not..." Then the right hand, "It is..." Very effective. Impossible not to get the point. One might describe this sort of paragraph as "A." Also acceptable is the "ABA," topic sentence, reiteration, a turning of the subject anywhere the writer (or speaker) desires, followed by a return to "A," the latter symbolized by a turn word — but, however, nevertheless. If there is no return, just "AB," or the paragraph has two turn words, it has no unity. Bemis used to cut all turn words, in belief that the student could put back one if he or she needed it. He told me one time that he kept a barrel of buts next to his desk.

The way to check the paragraphing is to read the chapter or section by topic sentences only, to see if they make sense.

Sam disliked paragraphs beginning with turn words, which to his mind were signs of uncertainty, and took pleasure in bringing a certain book to class, a book he disliked because it poked fun at manifest destiny, which he considered one of the leading principles of American foreign policy; it was full of turn words and he would read them off, one after another. I can hear him growling those words, however, but, nevertheless.

He did not like dates in conspicuous places, such as the beginning of a sentence, least of all the beginning of a paragraph.

He would pencil out all double uses of the connective “the,” a trick he learned from his father who worked on the Worcester newspaper. Similarly he cut all doubles of adjectives and adverbs, which called upon reader to choose and therefore created uncertainty. (Which reminds of one Henry Commager’s tricks, which was to cut all adjectives and adverbs, even singles, on the theory that their use subtracted from nouns and verbs, creating weak prose.)

It is easy to see that as a dissertation director Bemis saw the research of his students as only part, perhaps no more than half, of their task, the other being the way that they brought their research together in a finished manuscript. What a difference between this point of view and the scrambled dissertationese that most students produce, the tangle of no topic sentences, circling paragraphs, passive-voice verbs (in which the writer in his or her mind has rushed to a conclusion and then puts thoughts in similar inversion).

Bemis was a notable teacher in other ways — which is not my point here but I remark it anyway. He was charismatic, to use the Kennedy word. One dreary afternoon, it had to be 4:30, the rain pelting down on the leaded windows of 230 Hall of Graduate Studies, the teacher (as Bemis liked to be known, “hello, professor” being reserved for me when I went to Indiana and he called on the telephone) was talking about the great four-volume work by Henri Doniol. He took in the scene, stood up at his desk, walked around — talking all the while — behind Arthur Richmond to the second shelf by the window, picked up all those outsize books and kept going, until he was next to someone, I think Lawrence S. Kaplan,

and dropped the books on the floor, a frightful crash, which brought all of us to red alert. Another time he was talking about the truth in history and we were all asleep. He turned from the desk to the miscellany of framed pictures behind him on the wall, including the squinting Channing and the sad-faced Hunter Miller and other worthies, and seized the frame showing the goddess of liberty or truth or something, c. 1917. The goddess was holding a torch. She did not seem to have any clothes on and we stared at her, thinking bad thoughts. He was speaking, and he meant it, of truth; I don't think he had anything else in mind. We did wake up, keeping our faces straight.

Dissertations with Sam Bemis were serious and no one ever talked to him about "getting the dissertation out of the way." It is so sad to listen to graduate student conversation in recent years about what a bother a dissertation is. Or how it will all be in vain anyway for it will be impossible to "find work," get a job. Half a century ago most of us did not immediately find teaching posts, as the veterans of World War II (we were veterans too) had finished their undergraduate studies, enrollments were dropping, there were few jobs out there. Several of us descended into Washington for uninteresting government jobs, good for the moment. But our teacher told us to be of cheer, as he has done when he left Harvard for a year on a New Mexico ranch, to recover from tuberculosis, after which came Colorado Springs and Walla Walla. We took his advice, kept our eyes on the dissertation, which in each case was enjoyable and in no sense a chore, and the tide turned.

SOME MORE "SMOKING GUNS"? THE VIETNAM WAR AND KISSINGER'S SUMMITRY WITH MOSCOW AND BEIJING, 1971-73

BY

JUSSI M. HANHIMAKI

(GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND)

I enjoyed reading Jeffrey Kimball's recent brief regarding Nixon and Kissinger's search for a 'decent interval' rather than a 'peace with honor.'¹ While somewhat uncharitable to Larry Berman, Kimball did make an important point about a topic that has remained at the forefront of Kissingerology — particularly as it pertains to research on the last years of American involvement in the Vietnam War — for the past several decades.

My point is, as the title shows, to simply add an additional angle to this discussion. Although I am personally more obsessed with the issue of triangular diplomacy rather than the end of the Vietnam War, I have found a number revealing citations in the recently declassified conversations between Kissinger and his key Chinese and Soviet interlocutors.² They certainly seem to indicate that — whatever the public posture of the Nixon administration and the assurances of continued support given to Nguyen Thieu's South Vietnamese government — Kissinger was doing his best, in 1971-72, to sell the 'decent interval' solution to Hanoi via the Soviets and

¹Jeffrey Kimball, "The Case of the 'Decent Interval': Do We Now Have a Smoking Gun?" *SHAFR Newsletter* 32:3 (September 2001), 35-39.

²Most of the documents cited below were released in April 2001.

the Chinese. Thus, they seem to add a few extra 'smoking guns' to the debate over the decent interval.

Let me begin by citing a few examples of Kissinger's discussions with his main Chinese interlocutor, Zhou Enlai. In early July 1971, amidst great secrecy as is well known, Kissinger boarded a plane from Pakistan to Beijing where he spent two days in discussions with the Chinese premier. While the most public outcome of these talks was the July 15, 1971 announcement that President Nixon would be travelling to China in the spring of 1972, much of the Kissinger-Zhou dialogue focussed on Vietnam. They provided, I presume, the first instance when Kissinger effectively stated the Nixon administration's willingness to comply with a 'decent interval' solution.

While in Beijing Kissinger told Zhou although the U.S. needed to look at the Vietnam situation "from the point of view of a great country, not in terms of a local problem," he was ready to set a deadline for American troop withdrawals provided that they were complemented by a ceasefire. More significantly, Kissinger added to Zhou, there should be "some attempt at negotiations [between the Vietnamese parties]. If the agreement breaks down, then it is quite possible that the people of Vietnam will fight it out." He further added that: "We cannot participate in the overthrow of people with whom we have been allied, whatever the origins of the alliance. If the government [of South Vietnam] is as unpopular as you seem to think, then the quicker our forces are withdrawn the quicker it will be overthrown." Most significantly, Kissinger offered that "if it is overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene." Later on, he volunteered that the ceasefire could have "a time limit, say 18 months." Pressed by the Chinese premier on this issue, Kissinger ultimately told Zhou that "What we require is a transition period between the

military withdrawal and the political evolution.... If after complete American withdrawal, the Indochinese people change their government, the US will not interfere.”³

Kissinger next went to China in October 1971. Again, while discussions focussed on the forthcoming presidential visit, Zhou and Kissinger continued their exchange on Vietnam. This time his point was less explicit than during the secret trip; Kissinger simply asked: “Why should we want to maintain bases in one little corner of Asia when the whole trend of our policy is to form a new relationship with the most important country in Asia?”⁴ A few months later Nixon was rather less explicit but again assured Zhou that “I am removing this *irritant* as fast as anyone in my position could.”⁵

The true ‘smoking guns’ come, though, from Kissinger’s last trip to China prior to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements; a trip to which Kissinger, incidentally, devotes a mere paragraph in his memoirs.⁶ The major purpose of the June 1972 visit was to brief Beijing on the Soviet-American

³Kissinger, Zhou et.al., July 9 and 10, 1971, “China visit: Record of previous meetings,” box 90, HAK Office Files, NPMP.

⁴Kissinger and Zhou, October 21, 1971, “China visit: Record of previous meetings,” box 90, HAK Office Files, NPMP.

⁵Memcon: Nixon, Zhou et.al, February 22, 1972, POF, Memoranda for the President, box 87: “Beginning February 20, 1972,” NPMP. Emphasis added.

⁶According to Kissinger’s memoirs there were “no new developments on Vietnam” during these talks. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), 1304.

discussions at the Moscow summit the previous month. Zhou Enlai, however, peppered Kissinger on Vietnam and elicited an interesting series of responses. On June 20, for example, Kissinger volunteered that: "if our May 8 proposal were accepted, which has a four-month withdrawal and four months for exchange of prisoners, if in the fifth month the war starts again, it is quite possible we would say this was just a trick to get us out and we cannot accept this. If the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, engage in a serious negotiation with the South Vietnamese, and if after a long period it starts again after we were all disengaged, my personal judgement is that it is much less likely that we will go back again, much less likely." The following day, following Zhou's long expose regarding the criminal nature of American policy, Kissinger, perhaps frustrated by what he, much like Nixon, considered an "irritant," exploded: "It should be self-evident that in the second term we would not be looking for excuses to re-enter Indochina. But still it is important that there is a *reasonable interval* between the agreement on the ceasefire, and a reasonable opportunity for political negotiation...the outcome of my logic is that *we are putting a time interval between the military outcome and the political outcome.*"⁷

One can find similar examples of an effort to sell the decent interval from Kissinger's discussions with the Soviets. During his secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, for example, Kissinger told Leonid Brezhnev: "We have two principal objectives. One is to bring about an honorable withdrawal of all our forces; secondly, to put a time frame between our

⁷Kissinger and Zhou, June 20 and 21, 1972, "Dr. Kissinger's visit June 1972," box 97, HAK Office Files, NPMP. Emphasis added.

withdrawal and the political process which would then start.”⁸ During the Moscow Summit the following month Kissinger continued along the same lines. “If North Vietnam were wise,” he told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “it would make an agreement now and not haggle over every detail, because one year after the agreement there would be a new condition, a new reality.” Kissinger further added that: “If the DRV were creative, it would have great possibilities.... All we ask is *a degree of time so as to leave Vietnam for Americans in a better perspective....* We are prepared to leave so that a communist victory is not excluded, though not guaranteed.” When Gromyko asked whether this was the “official” U.S. perspective, Kissinger simply replied: “You can communicate this to the North Vietnamese.”⁹ In September 1972, in between meetings with the North Vietnamese in Paris and the South Vietnamese in Saigon, Kissinger once again visited Moscow. This time he assured Brezhnev that “we are realists. We know that if we stopped certain activities, it would be hard to resume them.”¹⁰

The above are, naturally, only a few examples from Kissinger’s 1971-72 conversations with the top Chinese and Soviet leaders. Yet, they do seem to indicate that the decent

⁸Memcon: Kissinger, Brezhnev et.al., April 21, 1972, “HAK Moscow Trip – April 1972 Memcons,” Country Files Europe/USSR, box 72, HAK Office Files, NPMP.

⁹Memcon: Kissinger, Gromyko et.al., May 27, 1972, “Mr. Kissinger’s conversations in Moscow May 1972,” box 21, NSC HAK Office files, NPMP.

¹⁰Memcon: Kissinger, Brezhnev et.al., September 13, 1972, “HAK Trip to Moscow September 1972 Memcons,” box 74, HAK Office Files, NPMP.

interval (fallback) option — which may have emerged as early as the fall of 1970 but was most certainly a serious policy option by the summer of 1971 — was much more than a secret Nixon-Kissinger scheme. It was, in fact, a ‘carrot’ used on several occasions in trying to elicit the help of North Vietnam’s two major benefactors in bringing about an ‘honorable’ end to American engagement in Vietnam. Effectively, Kissinger told Zhou, Brezhnev and Gromyko that the United States wanted to get out but could only do so provided that the collapse of the Saigon government would take place immediately afterwards.

Lastly, it is necessary to ask what impact Kissinger’s signalling had on the respective relations of the Chinese and the Soviets with Hanoi. Did they transfer Kissinger’s assurances of future U.S. non-intervention? Did they press the North Vietnamese to settle?

Without getting into a detailed discussion on these issues let me simply stress that the latest evidence on the Soviet and Chinese role in bringing about the January 1973 Paris Agreements seem to confirm that both Beijing and Moscow did urge a negotiated settlement throughout 1972. That they also increased their aid to Vietnam at that time also indicates, however, the degree to which ‘post-US’ Vietnam was seen as an important subject for future Sino-Soviet competition.¹¹ Whether this was the result of Kissinger’s efforts to sell what amounted to a ‘decent interval’ or not I will leave, at this point, for others to judge.

¹¹See, for example: Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars* (Chapel Hill, 2000) and Iliya Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago, 1996).

ANNOUNCEMENTS

West Point Conference

The Department of History of the United States Military Academy at West Point will host a conference 7-9 March 2002 entitled "Making History: West Point at 200 Years." Commemorating the bicentennial of the Military Academy; the event will include lectures by distinguished scholars on the service of USMA graduates, officership, civil-military, and the military and society.

For information contact:

Cpt. Kevin Clark, Department of History, U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, NY 10996

Tel: (845) 938-5689

Fax: (845) 938-3932

E-mail: kk7457@usma.edu

45th MVHC

The 45th annual Missouri Valley History Conference will take place in Omaha, Nebraska, March 7-9, 2002. The Society for Military History will sponsor several sessions at the 2002 MVHC. Since 1957, Omaha and UN-Omaha have hosted the Missouri Valley History Conference. This year, the conference will be held at the Sheraton Omaha, a historic hotel adjacent to Omaha's Old Market district, known for its restaurants, nightlife, and shopping. Linda K. Kerber, author of the prize-winning *No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* will be the MVHC luncheon speaker.

U Conn Foreign Policy Seminar

On 1 March 2002, Sayuri Shimizu will speak on "Baseball and Modernity: The Diffusion of the American National Pastime in

Japan, 1870-1935” and On 5 April, Matt Connelly will lecture on “The Algerian War for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era.” For further information contact Frank Costigliola at: costig@uconnvm.uconn.edu

PUBLICATIONS

Thomas Rorstelmann (Cornell), *The Cold War and the Color Line, Race Relations and American Foreign Policy*. Harvard Press, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-674-00597-X, \$35.00.

H.W. Brands (Texas A&M), *The Strange Death of American Liberalism*. Yale Press, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-300-09021-8, \$22.50.

Alessandro Brogi (New Haven, CT), *A Question of Self-Esteem, The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958*. Praeger, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-275-97293-3, \$64.00.

Francis M. Carroll (Manitoba), *A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian- American Boundary, 1783-1842*. University of Toronto Press, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-8020-4829-3, \$75.00; Paper: ISBN 0-9020-8358-7, \$29.95.

J. Garry Clifford (Connecticut) and Samuel Spencer (Kansas), *The First Peacetime Draft*. Back in print. Kansas Press. ISBN 0-7006-1102-9, \$19.95.

Robert Dallek (Boston U), *Hail To The Chief, The Making and Unmaking of American Presidents*. Oxford, 2001. New in Paper: ISBN 0-19-514582-8, \$15.95.

Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood, Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy*. Massachusetts Press, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 1-55849-312-3, \$29.95.

Wilson Dizard, Jr. (Georgetown), *Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age*. Praeger, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-275-97227-5 \$69.95; Paper: ISBN 0-275-97228-5, \$24.95.

Catherine Forslund (Misericordia), *Anna Chennault: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations*. Scholarly Resources, 2002. ISBN 0-8420-2833-1, \$19.95.

Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory), *The Cold War Era*. Blackwell, 2001. Cloth: ISBN: I-57718-052-8 Paper: ISBN: I-57718-051-6

Izumi Hirobe (Nagoya), *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act*. Stanford, 2001. ISBN 0-8047-3813-0, \$49.50.

Howard Jones (Alabama), *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations to 1913*. Scholarly Resources, 2002. ISBN: 0-8420-2916-8, \$31.95.

----, *Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897*. Scholarly Resources, 2001. ISBN: 0-8420-2918-4, \$37.95.

Robert S. Jordan (New Orleans), *International Organization: A Comparative Approach to the Management of Cooperation*. Greenwood/Praeger, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-275-96549-X, \$69.95.

David M. Kennedy (Stanford), *Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945*. Vol. 9. Oxford, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-503834-7, \$39.95; Paper: ISBN 0-19-514403-1 \$19.95

Ralph B. Levering (Davidson), Vladimir O. Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart-Viehe (Westminster), and C. Earl Edmonson (Davidson), *Debating the Origins of the Cold War*. Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9407-0, \$65.00 ; Paper: ISBN 0-8476-9408-9, \$17.95.

Robert Franklin Maddox (Marshall), *The War within World War II: The United States and International Cartels*. Praeger, 2001. Cloth: ISBN: 0-275-96274-11, \$64.00.

Edward J. Marolda, ed. (Naval Historical Center), *Theodore Roosevelt, The U.S. Navy, and The Spanish American War*. Palgrave, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-312-24023-6, \$49.95.

Ernest R. May (Harvard), *Strange Victory, Hitler's Conquest of France*. Hill and Wang, 2001. Paper: ISBN 0-08090-8854-1, \$15.00.

Linda McFarland (Granbury, TX), *Cold War Strategist: Stuart Symington and the Search for National Security*. Praeger, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-275-97190-2, \$62.00.

Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Ohio State), *A War to be Won, Fighting the Second World War*. Belknap Press, 2001. Paper: ISBN 0-674-00680-1, \$18.95.

Michael Schaller (Arizona), *The U.S. and China, Into the Twenty-first Century*. Oxford, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-513758-2, \$45.00; Paper: ISBN 0-19-513759-0, \$22.95.

Robert D. Schulzinger (Colorado), *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. 5th Edition, Oxford, 2001. Paper: ISBN 0-19-514221-7, \$29.95.

David F. Trask (Kansas), *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918*. Back in Print. Kansas Press. Paper: ISBN 0-7006-1115-0, \$19.95.

Henry Burke Wend (Boston U), *Recovery and Restoration: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Politics of Reconstruction of West Germany's Shipbuilding Industry*. Praeger. Cloth: ISBN 0-275-96990-8, \$70.00.

Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas), *The First Summit, Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941*. Back in Print. Kansas Press. Paper: ISBN: 0-7006-0485-5, \$17.95.

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


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CALENDAR

2002

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
- January 3-6 116th annual meeting of the AHA in San Francisco. Deadline has passed.
- January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
- February 1 Deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- April 11-14 The 95th meeting of the OAH will take place at the Renaissance Hotel in Washington DC.
- April 15 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 20-23 SHAFR's 28th annual conference will meet at the University of Georgia. William Walker III is Program Chair, William Stueck is Local Arrangements Chair.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the Sept. *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for Dec. *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

Sites for future AHA meetings are: Chicago, January 2-5, 2003; and Washington, January 8-11, 2004.

The 2003 SHAFR annual meeting will be held at George Washington University, June 19-21.

The 2003 meeting of the OAH will be held April 3-6 in Memphis, Tennessee. The 2004 Meeting will be in Boston, March 25-28.

PERSONALS

H. W. Brands (Texas A&M) has been named Distinguished Professor.

Michael L. Krenn has taken the job as chair of the Department of History at Appalachian State University.

Allan R. Millet, Mason Professor of Military History, Ohio State University, presented the George C. Marshall Lecture at the Society for Military History's Annual Conference at the University of Calgary on May 26.

Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Marshall Foundation), Associate Editor of *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, served as a judge at the National History Day 2001 competition in mid-June at the University of Maryland-College Park.

Lawrence S. Wittner (SUNY-Albany) has been awarded a senior fellowship for 2002 by the United States Institute for Peace for work on his final volume in the trilogy, *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, to be published by Stanford U. Press.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Garry Clifford, Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, Storrs CT 06269

Books may be sent at any time during 2001, but should not arrive later than February 1, 2002.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 2002 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 2002.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

RECENT WINNERS:

1998 Penny Von Eschen
1999 Eric Roorda
Kurk Dorsey

2000 Fred Logevall
Jessica Gienow-Hecht
2001 Gregory Mitrovich
Joseph Henning

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The winner of the 2001 competition will deliver a lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 2002. The Chairperson of the Committee is: Bob Buzzanco, University of Houston, Houston TX 77204-3785

RECENT WINNERS:

1995 Thomas Schwartz
1996 Douglas Brinkley
1997 Elizabeth Cobbs

1998 Peter Hahn
1999 Robert Buzzanco
2000 Odd Arne Westad

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that

is published during 2001. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 2002. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Fredrik Logevall, Department of History, UC/Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara CA 93106. The award is given at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the OAH annual meeting.

RECENT WINNERS:

1996 David Fitzsimons
1997 Robert Vitalis
1998 Nancy Bernhard

1999 Robert Dean
Michael Latham
2000 Joseph Manzione

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications, in triplicate, must include:
 - (a) applicant's vita;
 - (b) a brief dissertation prospectus focusing on the significance of the thesis (2-4 pages will suffice);
 - (c) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value;
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately to the selection committee chair.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1,500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

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Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to: Lorena Oropeza, History, University of California at Davis, Davis CA 95616. The deadline for application is November 1, 2001.

RECENT WINNERS:

1998 Max Friedman	2000 Joseph Henning
1999 Elizabeth Kopelman Borgwardt Deborah Kisatsky	2001 Hiroshi Kitamura Clea Bunch

Georgetown Travel Grants

The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee also administers grants to be funded from the SHAFR Georgetown fund to support travel for research in the Washington area. The amounts are determined by the committee.

RECENT WINNERS

Brian C. Etheridge	Elisse Wright
Hiroshi Kitamura	

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 2002 and 2003 will be considered in 2003. Submission deadline is November 15, 2003. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Carol Adams, Salt Lake Community College, 4600 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, UT 84130

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Diane Kunz and Betty Unterberger	2000 Cecilia Lynch
1996 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker	Jessica Gienow-Hecht

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Award

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a

letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Carol Adams, Salt Lake Community College, 4600 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, UT 84130. Submission deadline is November 15, 2002.

RECENT WINNERS:

1994 Regina Gramer
Jaclyn Stanke
Christine Skwiot

1997 Deborah Kisatsky
Mary Elise Savotte

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 2002, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 2002 to: Stephen G. Rabe, Arts & Humanities, JO 31, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson TX 75083. Holt Memorial Fellowships carry awards of \$2000, \$1500, and \$1000. Announcements of the recipients will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowships will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used. A version of the report of the first-place winner will subsequently be published in the *SHAFR Newsletter*.

RECENT WINNERS:

1999 (1st) Michael Donoghue
(2nd) Gregg Brazinsky
(3rd) Carol Chin

2000 (1st) Jason Parker
(2nd) Jeffrey Engels
2001 Mary Montgomery

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 2002.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Department of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln NE 68588-0327. Phone: 403-472-2414, Fax: 402-472-8839, email: lambrosius@unl.edu

WINNERS:

1988 Alexander DeConde	1996 Walter LaFeber
1990 Richard W. Leopold	1998 Robert Ferrell
1992 Bradford Perkins	2000 Robert Divine
1994 Wayne Cole	

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of

peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and that are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 2001 and 2002. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 2003. Current Chairperson: Mary Ann Heiss, History, Kent State University, Kent OH 44242-0001.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1991 Charles DeBenedetti and
Charles Chatfield
1993 Thomas Knock

1995 Lawrence S. Wittner
1999 Frances Early
2001 Fredrik Logevall

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Mary Giunta, NHPRC - Room 300, National Archives, Washington DC 20408.

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PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Justus Doenecke

2001 Warren Kimball

1996 John C.A. Stagg

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact: Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 2001, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 2002.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Current chairperson: Chester Pach, History, Ohio University, Athens OH 45701.

Previous Winners:

1995 John L. Harper

1998 Jeffrey Kimball

1996 Norman Saul

1999 Emily S. Rosenberg

1997 Robert Schulzinger

2000 Mark Gallichio

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742