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PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed thorough the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly newsletter and a journal, *Diplomatic History*.

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HITLER'S MISUNDERSTOOD DECLARATION OF WAR ON THE U.S.

by

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[Professor Hill is replying to Professor Harvey Asher's September 2000 *SHAFR Newsletter* article that explained why Hitler declared war on the U.S.; as well as to Professor Manfred Jonas' response in the March 2001 *SHAFR Newsletter*.]

On December 11, 1941, approximately one hour after receiving a German declaration of war, the United States reciprocated by legislating not only its own declaration, but also a military invasion of Europe and Germany. Historians have thus agreed since World War II that Hitler's declaration was the reason why the U.S. entered the European war at that time.¹ However, no historian has ever investigated this agreed upon causal connection in depth, until recently. This recent research demonstrates that the general historiographical agreement regarding Hitler's declaration is actually mistaken, and that it was a concoction invented by historians in 1945.² They did so because it was then that captured Axis records revealed that the actual, but now forgotten, wartime U.S. *casus belli* against Germany had been based on a misconception.

In December 1941, and throughout the war, the actual primary U.S. justification for the total war with Germany was not based on Hitler's declaration. Rather, it was based on the U.S. blame of Germany for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Most Americans charged

¹See the *SHAFR Newsletter* for September 2000 and the related article by Professor Harvey Asher; as well as the reply by Professor Manfred Jonas in the March 2001 *SHAFR Newsletter*.

²See Richard Hill, *Pearl Harbor Month: why the United States went to war with Germany* (Georgetown University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2001).

that Germany was guilty of that attack either because Germany was a material accomplice of Japan, or because Germany actually controlled a subservient Japan. Many Americans even said that German military forces had actually participated in the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. charge that a complicit and conspiratorial Germany was guilty of the attack on Pearl Harbor was a charge that launched the United States into total war in Europe in December 1941, and it was a charge that endured throughout the war.³

This fact is evidently why no history book ever has, or ever could credibly focus on Hitler's declaration of war, and its being an important historical event. The reason is because Hitler's declaration had, in reality, no important effect upon the American people, politics, or government in December 1941. This is why there has never been a history book focused on what Hitler's declaration meant to Americans, which in itself is a stunning void considering how much importance historians have imputed to it. Their imputation also seems to be the reason why no historian has ever revealed that on December 12, 1941 the German government actually denied that it had declared war on the United States the day before. This denial was acknowledged by the American public and was understood to be a virtual retraction of Hitler's declaration of war. This is abundantly demonstrated by the contemporary evidence.

All of the contemporary public political sources in December 1941 overwhelmingly demonstrate what was, and what was not important to the majority of Americans. These public political sources are President Roosevelt's speeches, the *Congressional Record*, the

³Since 1945, however, most historians of World War II era U.S.-German foreign relations have dismissed the validity of the wartime Axis conspiracy thesis enunciated by the U.S. That is why they have emphasized Hitler's declaration of war as being decisive. See Warren Kimball, ed., *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the World Crisis, 1937-1945* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1973), p. xvii.

public opinion polls, and the nation's press. These most important sources consistently and overwhelmingly demonstrate how a vast majority of Americans explained their justification for war with Germany, during and after December 1941. Accordingly, these sources entirely debunk the post-1945 explanation.

For a quick verification of the political reality that underlay the U.S. entry into the European war, one need only read President Roosevelt's speeches during December 1941 and January 1942. President Roosevelt's speeches are the single most important and informative piece of evidence explaining the basis of U.S. policy at that time. President Roosevelt repeatedly blamed Germany for Pearl Harbor, but only once during this period did he even mention Hitler's declaration of war. That sole mention was limited to the day of December 11, 1941. But thereafter, President Roosevelt never again mentioned Hitler's declaration, although President Roosevelt repeatedly and pointedly "mentioned" Hitler's guilt for Pearl Harbor.

President Roosevelt's only major statements during "Pearl Harbor month" explaining the new U.S. justification for total war with Germany were on December 9 and 15, 1941, and January 6, 1942. While all these statements offered the same justification, December 9 was the pre-eminent explanation. Its single most important theme accused Japan and Germany of "actual collaboration" in perpetrating the crime at Pearl Harbor. The President repeated this assessment in his January 6 State of the Union Address when he again labeled Japan as being merely one of Germany's subservient "chessmen" in the attack "they" had launched against Pearl Harbor.⁴ After all these Presidential proclamations, and throughout the war, the press, politicians, and historians seconded the President's repeated justification. But after 1945, they did not. It was then that they invented Hitler's declaration as being important.

The real and factual explanation of why the United States decided

⁴See Samuel Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950).

to invade Germany began being reported in the press on December 8, 1941 when most American politicians and pundits blamed Germany at least as much as Japan for the assaults on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and British Malaya. Because of this popular perception, there was widespread and unprecedented speculation in the American press that President Roosevelt could have gotten at least a majority in Congress to declare war on Germany on December 8, 1941. This was a sudden and radical transformation, since throughout 1941 before Pearl Harbor, Americans opposed to such a declaration fluctuated between approximately 70 and 80 per cent of those polled. *Time* magazine reported that during the weeks before Pearl Harbor, interventionist sentiment was actually on the decline.⁵

After Pearl Harbor, however, the sudden radical reversal of public political opinion towards Germany was overwhelmingly evident well before the famous date of December 11. This radical reversal is demonstrated by an overwhelming amount of contemporary evidence, and was encapsulated in the Gallup Poll published on December 10 in which 90 per cent of Americans polled said that President Roosevelt should have declared war on Germany on December 8. Some historians have subsequently suggested that Roosevelt waited until he did to ask for a declaration because he was convinced, from intelligence sources and decrypts, that Germany would soon declare war on the United States. By waiting, President Roosevelt apparently calculated that he could assure himself of an even larger vote in Congress for a declaration of war against Germany, and thus guarantee himself a freer hand in prosecuting the war.⁶

⁵*Time*, December 22, 1941, p. 63. Wayne Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 12, 364, 465; George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion, 1935-48*, v.1 (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 263-311, 319, 321, 326, 346, 301, 295, 334.

⁶*Public Opinion, 1935-46*, Hadley Cantril, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 1173. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), p. 441.

The events of December 11-13 also require detailed explanation because of their complexity. Simply put, however, while Hitler may have declared war on December 11, he essentially retracted the declaration on December 12, in an apparent continuation of his practice of double-dealing. His shifty maneuvers were apparently designed to resolve his dilemma, which was how to encourage and associate himself with Japanese victories over Britain, Russia, and the United States, while simultaneously continuing his longstanding policy of non-provocation of the United States until he was in a strong enough position to engage the United States militarily. In sum then, Hitler's two-faced rhetorical policy was to issue what sounded very much like a declaration of war against the United States on December 11 — in order to appease his Japanese and domestic allies, while on December 12 denying that declaration in order to appease the United States — which he was not yet ready to fight. This declaration denial or virtual retraction, although reported in the U.S. press at the time, has been lost to history and historians.

Despite historians' emphasis upon Germany's declaration of war of December 11, 1941, any importance that most contemporary Americans attached to it peaked on that day. After December 12, any American opinion regarding the importance of Hitler's declaration virtually disappeared overnight, so that almost no one cited it as a significant justification for the new U.S. policy. The December 12 denial/retraction story was distributed by the AP and it ran in a large number of newspapers across the United States. The *Chicago Tribune*, for example, ran it under the headline, "Hitler speech no war opener, Germans insist." Relegated to page 7, this story was datelined Berlin, December 12 (Official Radio received by AP).

Spokesman at the Wilhelmstrasse declared today that Adolf Hitler's speech yesterday was not a declaration of war against the United States. Technically they said it was "nothing else but a statement of facts created by President Roosevelt's aggressive policy" — a "registration of a condition already existing between the United States and Germany."

This was the AP news report in its entirety, but some of these newspapers chose to also print an addendum that the AP had tacked on to the end, in parentheses and italics that read:

Germany's declaration left at the State Department yesterday morning by Hans Thomsen, German Charge d'Affaires, said that Germany "as from today considers herself as being in a state of war with the United States of America."⁷

The American reaction to this news item, as well as to the German declaration of war in general, is a story in itself. It reveals that most Americans attached little importance to either of Germany's statements of December 11 or 12. This American opinion includes the former isolationists, the crucial "swing-vote" centered predominantly in the midwest and west, who needed to be persuaded to make war on Hitler. They, as most Americans, attached little importance to Hitler's declaration, even before his denial/retraction of December 12. One example could be seen in the nation's leading isolationist newspaper, the *Chicago Tribune*, which immediately supported the U.S. declaration of war on Germany, while simultaneously recalling that the United States had not needed to wait for a German declaration of war in 1917 before declaring its own war upon Germany.⁸

Examination of both the interventionist and the former isolationist press at the time reveals that after December 11, the major U.S. justification for the new war against Germany remained what it had been after December 7. This justification was based on blaming Germany for the assaults on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Malaya. Most Americans believed that Germany had financed, planned, ordered, and probably militarily participated in these new offensives in the Pacific. The American belief that the German military itself had actually bombed Pearl Harbor was prevalent in

⁷*Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 13, 1941, p. 7.

⁸*Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 12, 1941, p. 5. *Washington Post*, December 14, 1941, Section 2, p. 1.

the United States for at least nine days following December 7, and to a lesser degree for somewhat longer.

When material evidence to support the belief in German raids in the Pacific was not forthcoming, this belief began slowly to erode. It was then that the other concurrent but related belief about German guilt for Pearl Harbor thereupon assumed primacy in American public opinion. This other belief was comprised of two separate and distinct notions. One notion held that Germany and Japan were equally guilty co-conspiring partners. At the same time, most Americans also believed that Japan was a mere political, economic, and military puppet of Germany. Either way, most Americans believed Germany to be at least as guilty as Japan for the crime at Pearl Harbor.

Although both interpretations were regularly offered, most Americans seemed much more partial to the puppetmaster theory, which prevailed well into 1942. Briefly stated, the puppetmaster theory rested on the assumption that the Japanese were incapable, without German arms and expertise, to run their war machine so successfully. Americans, from the President on down, continually and consistently told themselves that German power had enabled, and even forced, an inferior subservient Japan to do its bidding at Pearl Harbor. Hence most Americans argued that Japan was a mere political puppet of Germany, occupying the same subordinate position of power in the Axis constellation as did the other "satellites" like Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, and Albania. President Roosevelt and most Americans repeatedly labeled Japan, during Pearl Harbor month, not so much as an equal alliance partner of Germany, but more as a military and economic dependent that took orders from Berlin. In this way, Americans perceived the Japanese relationship to Germany much as Americans in 1950 perceived the People's Republic of China and North Korea to be inferior and subservient to Moscow during the Korean War.

Both the puppetmaster and the co-conspirator theories were

conceptually related to the theory that the German military had participated in the bombing of Pearl Harbor. That attack could have been executed by equal partners, or it could have been led by tactically dominant German units. No matter who may or may not have actually raided Pearl Harbor, most Americans were certain in December 1941 that its probable greatest significance was more as a portent than as a crime. Beginning December 8, American politicians and newspapers expressed the view that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was simply the leading arm of an all-out and coordinated Axis pincers attack on the United States. Hence, Americans expressed an unprecedented level of terrified anticipation that the Pearl Harbor operation in the west foreshadowed German air raids on the continental eastern United States. It was this widespread set of beliefs that was the prime motivator of U.S. policy in December 1941.

Germany's declaration of war was therefore viewed in the blindingly bright light of this overriding perception. During Pearl Harbor week and beyond most Americans apparently believed that the German declaration of war's greatest significance was as an admission that Germany had either participated in, ordered, or was complicit in the Pacific raids against the United States. Most Americans were thus persuaded that Hitler's declaration was a warning that German air raids on the United States were imminent. When Hitler denied or retracted his declaration on December 12, Americans viewed this as no more than Hitler's latest refusal to admit his guilt, this time for "his" attacks against the United States in the Pacific.

The beliefs that motivated a large majority of Americans during this period were eloquently expressed by President Roosevelt, and supported by the public opinion polling data. On virtually all issues, and especially on the highly sensitive issue of World War II, historians generally agree that President Roosevelt's public

statements concurred with the views of the majority.⁹ The contemporary public opinion polls confirmed that President Roosevelt's public statements did reflect majority public opinion. The major national public opinion polls of the time were the Gallup Poll and the Roper/Fortune magazine poll. They reveal that in the period covering December 11, 1941 through February 1942, somewhere between 64 and 68.5 per cent of Americans surveyed agreed with President Roosevelt's public statements that blamed Germany for Pearl Harbor by asserting that Germany was the "driving force" behind the actions of its Japanese "puppet."¹⁰

A majority of the members of Congress shared the views and rationale of President Roosevelt and the polls. The *Congressional Record* for the month of December 1941 demonstrates that the views expressed by President Roosevelt, public opinion polls, and the Congress were all in accord on the rationale for U.S. foreign policy at that time. President Roosevelt, public opinion (as reflected in national polls and the press), and the Congress all blamed Germany for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They blamed Germany because they believed that Japan was a satellite-state under the control of Germany, or because Germany was, at the very least, a guilty co-conspirator with Japan in the attack on Pearl Harbor. This was the pre-eminent and predominant reason enunciated by American public political opinion for the U.S. escalation to total war against Germany in December 1941.

This overwhelming preponderance of contemporary evidence clearly demonstrates why the U.S. entered the European war at this time. Yet historians have insisted ever since World War II that the United States decided to declare war on and invade Germany on December 11, 1941 because Germany declared war on the United States. The

⁹See, for example, James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956) pp. 313-4, 481-7.

¹⁰George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-71*, pp. 263-311; Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935-46*, p. 1078.

evidence demonstrates that during December 1941 and throughout the war that the U.S. did not go to war with Germany in response to a German declaration of war. Moreover, previous to Pearl Harbor, the evidence likewise indicates that a large majority of Americans, their Congressmen, and their President would not have agreed to declare war on and invade Germany simply in response to a German declaration of war.

The evidence for this assertion is to be found in the pre-December 7 Congressional and Presidential pronouncements on this subject, which made it all the more noteworthy that the U.S. declaration of war on Germany later passed unanimously and without debate.¹¹ Prior to Pearl Harbor week, interventionist Congressmen insisted on several occasions that they would not be stamped into any greater warlike policy by a mere declaration from the mouth of Adolf Hitler. Interventionist Congressmen were forced to make this promise in order to counter isolationist and moderate charges that U.S. Navy activity could provoke Germany to declare war on the U.S. Interventionists needed to counter isolationist and moderate charges in order to garner enough support for their naval policies, particularly the revision of the Neutrality Act in early November 1941.¹² Before Pearl Harbor week, it was not the policy of either the isolationists or even the interventionists that an escalation of U.S. participation in the war, including a U.S. declaration of war, would be the inevitable result of a German declaration of war.

Before December 11, U.S. policy was that anything less than an Axis military attack, such as an Axis declaration of war, would not elicit an escalated U.S. military response. This widespread pre-December 11 Congressional policy concurred with President Roosevelt's own policy. The only known instance in which President Roosevelt directly answered the question of what would

¹¹Rep. Jeanette Rankin abstained.

¹²*Congressional Record*, Appendix, Nov. 7, 1941, p. A5047; Nov. 12, 1941, p. A5073, A5083; Dec. 4, 1941, p. A5439.

be the U.S. response to a possible German declaration or ultimatum, was recorded on the FDR Oval Office tapes. Although President Roosevelt kept relatively quiet on this speculative issue in public, he took care to leak his opinion, as early as October 4, 1940, to and through House Speaker Sam Rayburn (D., Tx.) and Floor Leader John McCormack (D., Mass.). President Roosevelt mused that

Hitler and Mussolini, and Japan, united, might — ah — feel that if they could stop American munitions from flowing to England — planes, guns, ships, airplanes, ammunition, and so forth, that they could lick England. Now, they might send us an ultimatum: “if you continue to send anything to England, we will regard that as an attack on us: (FDR emphasized this point by rapping on his desk) I’ll say: I’m terribly sorry, we don’t want any war with you. We have contracts, and under our neutrality laws any belligerent has a right to come and buy things in this country and take them away.” They’ll thereupon say: “Well, if after such and such a date you are continuing to ship munitions to England — and planes — we will regard you as a belligerent.” All right, what have we got to say to this?...I’ll say: “I’m terribly sorry. We don’t consider ourselves (FDR began to chuckle) a belligerent. We’re not going to declare war on you. If you regard us as a belligerent, we’re dreadfully sorry for you, because we don’t. Now, all we can say to you is that, of course, if you act on that assumption — that we’re a belligerent — and make any form of attack on us, we’re going to defend our own — we’re going to defend our own — and nothing further.”¹³

Historian Gerhard Weinberg paraphrased this by saying Roosevelt explained to the Democratic leaders of the House that if Germany, Italy, or Japan threatened to declare war on the United States if it did not cease aiding Britain, he would reply that was their problem; the United States would not declare war on them. They could consider themselves belligerents if they wished, but the Americans

¹³*American Heritage magazine*, Feb./March, 1982, pp. 16-18.

would defend themselves only if others attacked them.¹⁴

President Roosevelt's remarks during a policy discussion with his Congressional leaders were wholly consistent with his longstanding publicly announced policy. In one of his most famous utterances, President Roosevelt told the nation on October 23, 1940, "I repeat again that I stand on the Platform of our Party: 'We will not participate in any foreign wars and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas except in case of attack'." This was not simply a partisan Democratic Party policy: Congressmen and commentators pointed out right through December 1941 that both candidates in the 1940 presidential election had endorsed this policy. This policy became codified as that part of the 1940 Selective Service Act that forbade sending an American Expeditionary Force (AEF) outside of the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵

In November and December 1941, *Newsweek* magazine also reflected the national consensus attitude as it repeatedly made clear the Administration's policy that naval incidents would not provoke a U.S. declaration or the sending of an AEF to Europe. Therefore, before Pearl Harbor week, U.S. policy was clear: the United States would declare war on Germany and send an AEF to Europe only if Germany attacked some part of the Americas, or if Russia or Britain went down in defeat. There is no evidence that there was any major political opinion in the U.S. before Pearl Harbor week that a German declaration would automatically trigger a U.S. declaration and AEF in response. In fact, the evidence is all to the contrary.¹⁶

¹⁴Gerhard Weinberg, *Germany, Hitler, and World War II* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 1872.

¹⁵*Roosevelt Papers*, v.1940, p.495. *Des Moines (Iowa) Register*, Dec. 7, 1941, p.14. *Congressional Record*, Appendix, Nov. 12, 1941, p. A5083.

¹⁶*Newsweek*, Oct. 6, 1941, p.9; Oct. 27, 1941, p.16; Nov. 3, 1941, p.9; Nov. 24, 1941, pp.25-26; Dec. 1, 1941, p.13; Dec. 8, 1941, p.13. *New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1941, p.8.

This consistently held U.S. policy formulation was reiterated on December 12, 1941 by the *Cincinnati Enquirer* in its editorial on Germany's declaration of war, entitled "Confirming the Obvious."

It was clear to most Americans months ago that we were engaged in an undeclared war with Germany, on a limited basis. It was clear to virtually all Americans last Sunday that the treacherous Japanese attack involved us in all-out war with the entire Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. Thursday morning Germany and Italy confirmed this by formal declarations of war. The unanimous and swift action of Congress was no more than a formal expression of the resolve, shared by all loyal Americans, to face the blunt facts.¹⁷

"Virtually all Americans," therefore, had understood since December 7 that the U.S. would enter the European war, whether or not there occurred the "mere formality" of a Hitler declaration. This widespread understanding was evident throughout an American press that was being read all over the world, including in Germany. Some contemporary newspapers, and even a few historians have reported that Hitler understood this too, and in the process they thus imply that the German declaration itself did not cause U.S. entry into the European war. These historians have argued that Hitler wanted to declare war before the United States could do so, thus demonstrating his need for "prestige," to never be humiliated by passively accepting the first blow, military or diplomatic.¹⁸

The *Grand Forks (North Dakota) Herald* explained the American perspective on December 13, 1941 as to why the United States did not beat Hitler to the punch on December 11.

Declarations of war against the United States by Germany and

¹⁷*Cincinnati Enquirer*, December 12, 1941, p. 6.

¹⁸Curt Riess, *The Self Betrayed: Glory and Doom of the German Generals* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p. 295. John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 244.

Italy on Thursday came as an anti-climax. The sensational and spectacular event was the sudden attack by Japan on Sunday. Everywhere it was taken for granted that within a very short time formal, technical war with Germany and Italy would follow. There was speculation, though no uncertainty, as to the technical manner in which this would be brought about, but on that point there was no very intense interest.

After Pearl Harbor, most Americans were certain that the United States would now declare war on Germany, even though they were speculating whether that would occur before or after a German declaration against the United States. This question of formal or legal declarations had become a relatively insignificant issue that was pointed out, most significantly, by those now former-isolationists, like the *Sacramento Union*. On December 12, it highlighted the relationship between a decisive act of war, and the mere declaration of it, by labeling Pearl Harbor as “the Hitler-inspired Japanese declaration of five days ago. Calm to the point of boredom was our government’s acceptance of the ‘fait accompli’ of war with Nazi Germany,” on December 11. On December 15, the *Union* commented again on the inevitable anti-climax that had occurred on December 11, recalling that “That day also brought the final break between the U.S. and German and Italy, an event which by then seemed almost like a humdrum change of diplomatic notes.” By December 13, Americans had indeed proved their relative lack of interest in technical, formal declarations by their indifference to Germany’s December 12 denial that it had ever declared war on the United States.¹⁹

American political opinion reached an unprecedented consensus immediately after Pearl Harbor, and before December 11, when a substantial majority decided for the first time that the United States must now declare war on, and attack and invade Germany. Americans had been persuaded to delay this formal decision

¹⁹*Grand Forks Herald*, December 13, 1941, p. 4. *Sacramento Union*, December 12, 1941, p. 4; December 15, 1941, p. 6.

temporarily until the receipt of the expected German declaration, in order to expand a pro-declaration U.S. majority into a supermajority, or even a unanimity. This delay, however, ultimately proved to have been unnecessarily cautious when it became apparent, after Germany's December 12 denial/retraction of its December 11 declaration, that there arose no voices asking for a reconsideration of the U.S. declaration against Germany. This was because the fundamental American justification for its new total war, and its declaration of it, was based not on Hitler's declaration, but rather on Germany's "guilt" for Pearl Harbor. The public political evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that throughout Pearl Harbor month — from December 7, 1941 through early 1942, and beyond — that the United States went to war with Germany for reasons far more compelling than the German declaration of war — a speech and a note.

Indeed, it should actually be apparent from the historical record that it would be illogical to assume that the U.S. declared war on Germany simply in response to a German declaration of war on the U.S. It is illogical to assume that the U.S. had no choice but to respond in kind to a declaration of war, from Germany for example, seeing as how the U.S. conspicuously chose to ignore the declarations of war made on it by Germany's Balkan Axis allies. President Roosevelt's attitude here was connected to his public and private assessments of the Balkans as German "puppets," such as when he told the nation on December 15, 1941 that Rumania, probably the most powerful of the Axis Balkans, was only a "puppet of Berlin."²⁰

If it was the coherent policy of the U.S. not to declare war on "puppets," then this presumably meant that the U.S. did not

²⁰Freidel, Frank, *Franklin D. Roosevelt, a rendezvous with destiny*, (Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1990), p.408. *FDR, his personal letters, 1928-45*, v.2, eds. Elliot Roosevelt and Joseph Lash, (Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, New York, 1950), p.1257. *New York Times*, December 16, 1941, p.4.

consider Italy to be a German puppet when the U.S. declared war on Italy in “response” to its December 11 declaration against the U.S. One example of the Roosevelt Administration view was published in October 1941 by *Newsweek*, which quoted Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, “the New Deal’s trial balloonist,” who called Italy one Hitler’s “satellites.” President Roosevelt himself adhered to this analysis in his January 6, 1942 State of the Union Address in which he referred to Italy as one of Hitler’s “chessmen.”²¹

This contradictory U.S. policy regarding the receipt of declarations of war clearly demonstrates their actual impotence in provoking a U.S. response. This is what underlay the previous discussion in the American press about the German declaration being no more than a “mere formality.” Historians who would argue otherwise must be implicitly arguing that U.S. policy was solidly based on some strict interpretation of international law. Yet nowhere in this traditional historiographical consensus can one find an elaborated discussion of this implicit argument. Such a void exists because there is no evidence to support such an international law argument.

The majority of Americans, in reality, did not view Hitler’s declaration against the U.S. as an intolerable threat. On the contrary, most Americans characterized Hitler’s declaration as what it really was: a propaganda boast in which Hitler was attempting to claim some credit for the “Axis victory” at Pearl Harbor by associating himself with Japan. Most Americans understood that Hitler’s declaration was thus, in reality, a desperate expression of Germany’s recent weakness in the war. Americans understood that the situation in December 1941, and for some time beforehand, had afforded the U.S. a rising optimism caused by the late-1941 German stagnation, retreats and defeats in all three theaters of war: Russia,

²¹*Newsweek*, Oct. 13, 1941, p.19; Dec. 22, 1941. *Congressional Record*, appendix, Dec. 4, 1941, Sen. John Danaher quotes Sec. Knox’s October statement, p.A5437. *Roosevelt Papers*, v.1942, p.35.

North Africa, and the Atlantic.²² The prevailing American feeling about the entire Axis threat during Pearl Harbor month, and for some weeks beforehand as well, was not the fearful prospect of Axis world domination, but rather the anticipation of aggressive raids from weakened but desperate rogue states.

By the time of Pearl Harbor, Americans well understood Germany's weakened and desperate condition. This was why Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, far from being an outrageous "aggression," was viewed more as a pathetic and contemptible curiosity. On December 12, for example, the now formerly-isolationist *Sacramento Union* tried to explain why Hitler, for the first time, had declared war before launching an all-out German blitzkrieg, by surmising that "the best guess in this country is that he simply didn't have the power to put over a crippling initial blow," and that "the manner in which Adolf Hitler declared war, however, was not the only admission of weakness contained in his bitter tirade to the Reichstag."²³

That same day the *Wyoming State Tribune* redefined this perception in one of Herblock's syndicated cartoons that explained why Hitler "pulls" the Axis along into his schemes. Hitler, wearing a "Japanazi" armband, directed the "Axis" attack on Pearl Harbor to counter the continuing Axis failures in China, Britain, and Russia, where his victory was being "postponed." Herblock predicted that Hitler's attack on the United States would also similarly fail. This cartoon is a snapshot of the complex American perception of an Axis "master" Hitler whose aggressions had become those of the failing and desperate rogue state. It is a depiction of the description

²²Thomas Greiss, ed., *The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean* (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1989, for West Point, New York: Department of History, United States Military Academy), Chapters 4, 5, 6.

²³*Sacramento Union*, December 12, 1941, p. 4.

offered by the Sacramento Union on December 16 that explained the failure-induced aggression by arguing that “the Japanese, at Hitler’s command, have come into the war to engage the United States while Hitler rebuilds his eastern front.”²⁴

Most Americans thus understood that the primary reason motivating Hitler’s declaration of war on the U.S. was his domestic propaganda need to deliver a “victory” to the German people during a period when German forces had been experiencing mostly defeats and retreats on all fronts for quite some time. Hitler could deliver such a victory by associating himself with Pearl Harbor and the Japanese, with whom he signed another treaty, also on December 11. For most Americans, the new Axis Pact represented another example of a real and material German-Japanese association, in line with the U.S. belief that Japan was just one more of Germany’s puppets, or “chessmen,” as President Roosevelt put it in his January 6, 1942 State of the Union Address.

Americans may even have been aided in this belief during, and for sometime after Pearl Harbor month into 1942 by the explanations of the German Propaganda Ministry itself. German propaganda broadcasts regularly claimed that Japan was dependent upon German technology and science, which in turn allowed Germany, and the Nazi regime, to claim partial credit, and responsibility, for Japanese victories. In 1942 it was German Propaganda Minister Goebbels’ strategy to present each Japanese victory as a British defeat and, by extension, a German victory.²⁵

Most Americans were inclined to share this view of both Germany

²⁴*Wyoming State Tribune*, December 12, 1941, p. 4. *Sacramento Union*, December 16, 1941, p. 2.

²⁵*New York Times*, February 8, 1942, 1942, p. 19; February 9, 1942, p. 14. Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda: A Report on Home Broadcasts During the War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 266-270.

and Japan during Pearl Harbor month, and even throughout the war. According to John Dower, this American perception of an inferior and incompetent Japan subordinate to the German colonial schoolmaster was based on a racism that considered the Japanese to be “subhuman” in that the Japanese race was “a cross between the human being and the ape.” Dower concludes that such perceptions were at the root of many Americans’ “long-standing assumption that the Japanese were too unimaginative and servile to plan and execute such a stunning military maneuver on their own. Germany, it was widely and erroneously believed, must have put them up to this,” the attack on Pearl Harbor.²⁶

The American thesis that the German imperial overlord controlled its satellites via German technicians, or “Fifth Columnists,” was kept alive throughout World War II by various propagandists including many highly respected intellectuals such as historians Allan Nevins and Louis Hacker. In their 1943 book, *The United States and its Place in the World*, they reiterated the German criminal conspiracy against the United States, i.e., the Fifth Columnist premise to puppetmaster guilt. They repeated the charge that “1500 Nazi engineers, industrial experts, military and naval officers, and other technicians were in Japan helping to make plans for the blow delivered at Pearl Harbor and the campaigns that followed.”²⁷ To varying degrees, most Americans blamed Germany throughout the war for Pearl Harbor. “Remember Pearl Harbor” was the pre-eminent American slogan of the whole war, not just the war in the Pacific.

This U.S. analytical perspective and indictment was powerful enough during World War II to have also survived, in mutated

²⁶John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 71. *Atlanta Journal*, December 21, 1941, p. 2A.

²⁷Allan Nevins, Louis Hacker, *The United States and its Place in World Affairs, 1918-1943* (Boston: DC Heath and Co., 1943), p. 530.

form, into the post-war period. This conspiracy theory's survival, however, did not come so much in the form of a continued U.S. historical emphasis on the wartime German Fifth Column threat to the world. Rather, the wartime fear became the model for the U.S. Cold War fear of Soviet Communist infiltration, subversion and control of various governments in the rest of the world. In this regard, as in so many others, the U.S. experience in World War II became the model and the foundation for U.S. policy in the Cold War.

[A copy of this essay was transmitted to Professor Gaddis for any comment he might wish to make. He declined to comment. - Editor]

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS AND KNOWING NOW:
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
AND THE NEW HISTORY

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"I am persuaded no constitution was ever before as well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government."

Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 27, 1809

This paper seeks to critique John L. Gaddis's "new"¹ history on the origins of the Cold War. Gaddis's assertion that Stalin was a primary cause of Cold War is given too much importance. In a

¹The "new" history in this paper is primarily in reference to John Lewis Gaddis's writings, *infra*, fn. 2, 8.

series of recent publications, this new history is revealing but is weakened by certain value-based principles that justify empire; it lessens the contributions of the American empire; it uses the myth of the “peaceful” democracy against the “evil” tyranny. Gaddis minimizes the Allied contribution to the origins of the Cold War. His work also falls into conceptual traps: Gaddis believes in reactive, unplanned empires, making Stalin a grand imperialist; he rejects moral equivalence (the U. S. empire was better); he focuses on exclusive causative agents (Stalin was a romantic, individual agent of causation). Finally, he cites few dissenting opinions, opposing arguments, or the broader setting of Soviet actions in the origins of the Cold War.

Which condition was necessary and sufficient for causing the Cold War? The new history is unequivocal from the start: it was Generalissimo Stalin. Gaddis, using new sources to find old conclusions, places the dictator at the crib of the Cold War. “Here I think the new history is bringing us back to the old answer: that as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union a cold war was unavoidable.”² Stalin was a mirror of domestic and international policy. He “waged cold war” within alliances, his family, his party.³ This psychological picture, while being accurate,⁴ underscores the context of American contributions to the Cold War dynamic. Gaddis sees Stalin as a lone historical agent. He pushes the hero (or tyrant) version of history, a method flawed in explaining meta-historical movements like the Bolsheviks.

Gaddis’s underlying assumption that Stalin had supreme agential

²John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 292.

³*Ibid.*, p. 293.

⁴Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 13, 15.

power has weaknesses. As Philip Pomper has claimed, the period between 1914 and 1991 has challenged the exclusive individual agent of history. It “violates the historian’s sense or proportion” to attribute the deaths of millions to the agency of a select few.⁵ Vast power in the hands of Stalin does not explain the social picture that produced it. It simplifies Cold War origins if nothing more.

Gaddis’ concept of agency is weak on several levels. Firstly, advisers, ambassadors and close comrades fall into the background. Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, Internal Security Chief Lavrenti Beria, and advisers who analyzed Allied movements in the first few years of the conflict become ineffectual.⁶ Secondly, the broader incidents of economics and social history are discounted as valid modes of historical analysis.⁷ Why Gaddis quoted William A. Williams in his SHAFR address becomes a mystery. Williams saw the American Empire as a tragic miscalculation of *collective* forces and ideas, but Gaddis only intended using him as a starting point to show why such a tragedy was in fact exclusively one of *ideas*.⁸ The expansiveness of the American Zeitgeist diminishes in the Gaddis purview — it is crammed into a noble vision of good or lesser evil; instead Stalin’s ideas remain the dominant theme in starting Cold War aggression, ideas detached from Soviet society.⁹

⁵Philip Pomper, “Historians and Individual Agency,” *History and Theory* 35, 3 (1996): 281-308, 281.

⁶To name a few: Nikolai Novikov, Moscow’s Chargés D’Affaire to Washington (early 1945); Counselor Tarasenko, Soviet Embassy in Washington; Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War*, pp. 102-3.

⁷Mark L. Kleinman, (Review Essay), “Revision of “Revisionism” or Return to Orthodoxy,” *Peace and Change* 23,3, (July 1998): 386-398, 389.

⁸John Lewis Gaddis’s SHAFR Presidential Address, 29 December 1992, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” *Diplomatic History* 17(1) (1993): 1-15, 1-2.

⁹John Lewis Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” at pp. 11,12.

Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the Gaddis edifice is his unconditional acceptance of the person over the event. History is often a complicated dialectic between the controller of history and the figure controlled by it. Stalin's nemesis was closer to the mark: "As a steam-hammer converts a sphere and cube alike into sheet metal, so under the blow of too great and inexorable events resistance is smashed and the boundaries of 'individuality' lost."¹⁰ Events overtake historical figures. Stalin and the Allies were glancing at a Europe without a centre of power. Nazism had placed them in a situation where power had to be shared. Explaining the rupture of the failed project took two players, two emporiums. Stalin was not the lone iconoclast.

It would seem that Gaddis has become less amenable to structures. In such works as *The Long Peace*, ideas underscore a play of power structures.¹¹ The old Gaddis acknowledged bi-polarity as a structured game, where "systemic interests tend to take precedence over ideological interests." Ideologues are functionaries in a scheme that prefers "predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality."¹² But the Stalin of *We Now Know* is liberated from such interpretations. He becomes an autocrat who linked the fate of communist world revolution to the territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union.¹³ Gaddis' revised historiography is repackaged orthodox history under another name: the good coalition fighting an evil empire. Gaddis has shed his neo-revisionist skin that mediated

¹⁰Leon D. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. Max Eastman, 3 Vols. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1932), I, p. 93.

¹¹John L. Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 1-44; *We Now Know*, esp. Chapter 7.

¹²Gaddis, "The Long Peace," pp. 33, 34, 40.

¹³Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 203.

between empires and strategic goals.¹⁴ His born-again orthodoxy in the post-revisionist fever of 1993 has diminished his role as a serious navigator between orthodox history and revisionist scholarship.¹⁵

Gaddis attributes complete control to Stalin the empire builder. His Stalin is aware, controlling, a romantic, the single greatest causal agent of the Cold War. He omits studies that conflict with the image of a less autonomous Stalin.¹⁶ This is not surprising — any such studies tend to focus on Stalin's role within a binding social structure. They focus on depersonalization, individuals as tools of culture, and locate agents within a wide historical framework.¹⁷ The historian of ideas tends to downplay the structure in favour of ideas. Consequently, Gaddis ignores other factors within the Soviet bureaucracy, power structure and society that may have inhibited, influenced or controlled Stalin. George F. Kennan illustrated this point when he wrote that Stalin did not have "effective control over the machinery of Soviet Government."¹⁸

Gaddis assumes that these prior histories have become irrelevant. A classic study, Isaac Deutscher's 1949 portrait of Stalin, is notably absent. Deutscher's Stalin was a somnambulist prone to mad

¹⁴John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Carolyn Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). p. 198.

¹⁵John L. Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," p. 2; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Know Now'?" *American Historical Review* 104(2) (April 1999): 501-524, 503.

¹⁶Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 11, 25. I make generous use of these examples from P. Pomper, "Historians and Individual Agency," pp. 289-295, 301-4.

¹⁷Pomper, "Historians and Individual Agency," pp. 286-8.

¹⁸George F. Kennan, "Excerpts from a Draft Letter," *Slavic Review* (1968): 481-84.

schemes, with all the tendencies of an oriental despot. His anti-western orientation was very much a provincial contempt nurtured in the Georgia. Stalin was the raw matter of other tyrannical dynasts: Deutscher referred to other events, other revolutions for precedents. This Stalin is a condition rather than a man, an archetype: the condition of European tyrants stretching over centuries.¹⁹

Stalin was the bureaucrat, if anything, unromantic, coloured by the system that reflected an indefatigable lack of adventure. Gaddis' constructed Stalin is an adventurer with "unlimited ambitions" and no "time-table".²⁰ Leon Trotsky, Stalin's intellectual opposite and true romantic, vanishes from *We Now Know*, appearing in neither footnotes nor text. It was Trotsky who wrote as part of his theory of permanent revolution that Russia should "give a push to the socialist development of Europe" once Russian socialism had been consolidated.²¹ Stalin becomes Trotsky's mirror in Gaddis's study, an inversion mastered by the speculative study of Richard C. Raack, who claimed the dictator ran on a "secret Trotskyite programmatic leitmotif of war and revolution".²² Both authors, without sufficient evidence, subvert the bureaucratic Stalin with the romantic world revolutionary.

Robert C. Tucker in a more coherent study juggles structure and agency, using structuralist methods that do not entirely destroy individual agency, but recognize the individual as a product of

¹⁹Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin, A Political Biography*, 2nd Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 326, 229-230, 327, 343.

²⁰Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 290, 29-31.

²¹L. D. Trotsky, *Permanentnaya revolyutsiya* (Berlin, 1930), p. 16; Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, trans. Harold Shukman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1995), p. 104.

²²Richard C. Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 20.

social norms and variations. His Stalin is a picture of several political cultures.²³ The party had its own logic but Stalin took it upon himself to accelerate the terror. The Purges were fed by the custom of how to dispose of “traitors.” Stalin thus became a creator of a system that was also creating him. Gaddis cites Tucker, but never evaluates his dialectical premises. In fact, a dialectics free Tucker is a favourite citation for Gaddis, who merely scans Tucker without analysis.²⁴ These histories illustrate the dangers of placing ideas in an exclusive criterion.

Gaddis’s evaluation of Stalin as a conscious romantic does not sit easily with the conclusions of other historians. Ideology must be analyzed within a broad social frame.²⁵ Stalin combined universalism with security, the language of expansion with the language of security.²⁶ Zubok and Pleshakov’s Stalin fostered a cautious expansionism without a master plan. Their Stalin is cautious; “he wanted to avoid confrontation with the West,” preferring cooperation to assist building influence. Their Stalin, different from Gaddis’ monolith, feared both economic and military encirclement from a West determined to undermine his order from within.²⁷ The Stalin of Kennedy-Pipe is another variant, another version: cooperative, calculating but not imperial. The Soviets were

²³Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1929-1941* (New York: Norton, 1990), Ch. 12; Pomper, “Historians and Individual Agency,” p. 301.

²⁴Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” p. 5, footnote 17.

²⁵See Odd Arne Westad, “Russian Archives and Cold War History,” *Diplomatic History* 21 (Spring 1997): 264-266.

²⁶Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War*, p. 12.

²⁷Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War*, pp. 74, 75, 275-6, 70, 276.

invited to take part in occupying *all* liberated territories.²⁸ Instead, they were willing to cede areas of influence in the West to Allied forces. Kennedy-Pipe advances the proposition that Stalin was willing to use the presence of Allied troops in Europe to his advantage. The Soviets did not see themselves as alone in post-War Europe even viewing Anglo-American influence as essential in checking German revanchism.²⁹

Vojtech Mastny by the nature of his work tends to parallel Gaddis. His Stalin did not want Cold War but created it because he was psychologically menaced. Whilst Mastny conveys a dangerous Stalin, he does not define the parameters of his ideological analysis. He notes that the Kremlin “exaggerated” the threats, but this was a common feature of Stalin’s enemies as well.³⁰ This reconstructed Stalin is similar to Gaddis’s. Whilst Mastny’s study is useful, his failure to focus on the American contribution weakens the new history’s focus on unilateral aggression on Stalin’s part.

Gaddis falls into a conceptual trap when he makes a value judgment about democracies and autocracies.³¹ The Russian system is rendered unique, Tsarist and wicked.³² Gaddis’ SHAFR address can be taken as the starting point for eliminating Williams’ pieties

²⁸Implicit in the American delegation’s suggestion: Summary of the Proceedings of the Third Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 21, 1943, *FRUS* General 1943, I, p. 596-7, especially Clause 2.

²⁹Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 44.

³⁰Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11, 23,83.

³¹See John Lewis Gaddis, “Face-Off,” *U.S. News and the World Report*, October 18, 1999, p. 38.

³²Anatol Levin, “Against Russophobia,” *World Policy Journal*, Winter 2000, 17(4): 25, 25-7.

and writing history as a nationalist act.³³ Tyrants start cold wars; democratic enterprises do not. Gaddis is not the only one to entertain this sophism. The central proposition of American orthodox history on the Cold War idealizes good nations fighting against evil essences from the outside. Transparent, relative evils never figure in such studies as Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s who wrote that the, "Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression."³⁴ This analytical mistake has rendered the American empire invisible, necessary, reactive. The free and brave became the reaction to the cause of Communist expansion. The chief agent became Stalin, raised in the despotic milieu of tsarist repression that encroached into Eastern Europe and the Asiatic steppes. America had no such imperial sentiments, raised on the empire dimming universalism of Woodrow Wilson that spread good news through benevolent design. Russia on the other hand was merely a player of sphere-of-influence games.

Schlesinger made a similar mistake to Gaddis, with a slight difference. The former saw universalism as incompatible with empire. The latter believes that both are compatible, as Gaddis endorses felicitous imperialism. Both universalize American values. If American values are universal, it follows that Stalin and his detractors were irrational and evil; but if its values are universal and good, no empire can come about since empires are inconsistent with the Atlantic Charter and United Nations polity.³⁵ This carefully contrived image renders Realpolitik subordinate to benevolence. Good nations don't oppress, expand their frontiers or violate the rules of war. When they do, the thesis is justified by assuming that

³³Michael H. Hunt, "Commentaries: The Three Realms Revisited," in Michael J. Hogan, *America in the World*, pp. 148-155, 151-2.

³⁴Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (October 1967), 22-52, available in J. Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I. Susman, eds. *The Origins of the Cold War* (Waltham, MA: Ginn-Blainsdell, 1970), 41-77, at p. 43.

³⁵Schlesinger, "The Origins of the Cold War," pp. 43.50.

enemies not in line with American universalism deserve such harsh punishment, whether through retribution or occupation.

The fairy tale of good empires (or benevolent polities of brave and free coalitions) binds Gaddis's new framework for Cold War analysis.³⁶ Lacking what Bruce Cumings calls "the fallacy of insufficient cynicism," Gaddis approaches the good empire as a contradiction. He admits the existence of an American empire, but denies its imperial habits: it was anti-colonial, even democratic.³⁷ For Gaddis, the Soviet empire was a straight forward model of belligerency, tyrannical, imperial. This dual concept of good-bad empires enables Gaddis to draw the next conclusion: that the good American empire was benign due to its leaning towards democracy. Democracies tend to be peaceful, authoritarian regimes belligerent. Implicitly, Gaddis's history makes the tyrant untouched by checks and balances force reactions from innocent opponents. More consensus-oriented policy, it is implied, would have lessened Stalin as a cause. Democracies in Gaddis speak could not have created a Cold War.³⁸ No Stalin no Cold War.

Democracies do build empires and cause wars. A "democratic" Athenian Republic sought possessions through war; Great Britain, equipped with a formally representative Parliament and a Bill of

³⁶Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 286-7; John Lewis Gaddis, "On Starting Over: A Naive Approach to the Study of the Cold War," in Arthur L. Rosenbaum, Chae-Jin Lee (eds.), *The Cold War - Reassessments* (Claremont McKenna College: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 1-25, 20-22.

³⁷Bruce Cumings, "'Revising Postrevisionism' Revisited," in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 127-139, 135; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 155, 289.

³⁸Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 289, 198, 220.

Rights, controlled a quarter of the globe by 1900;³⁹ and World War I was caused by, if not actual, then formal democracies. Abundant literature analyzing the mutual antagonism, even conflict, between democratic industrialized systems in their quest for possessions and territories, disappears in Gaddis's history.⁴⁰ Aware of these trends, Molotov and Stalin tried exploiting what they erroneously thought to be antagonistic contradictions in the Anglo-American alliance.⁴¹ Democratic capitalist nations existed as mutually hostile entities in their concept of Realpolitik.

Gaddis tries to add weight to this "democratic" argument by denying the American empire's imperial habits. The United States anticipated to dominate the post-war international scene "well and before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and present antagonist." Gaddis sees this domination without sting or consequence; one can lead the world order without rivals, "acting in concert rather than in competition." He admits Woodrow Wilson's subterfuge in hiding self-interest through disinterested benevolence. He admits that the United States prepared militarily for an international role in a world order it wanted to lead, but it was consensus building, using coalitions, permitting choice amongst allies.⁴² Ignoring parts of the empire that did not fit into this consensus paradigm, Gaddis overcomes the moral ambiguity of American empire through omission. Latin America is excluded — Gaddis seems to labour

³⁹See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian Wars*, trans. Benjamin Howett (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1963).

⁴⁰For a classic study see Vladimir Dedijer's *On Military Conventions*, cited by Jean-Paul Sartre, "Vietnam: Imperialism and Genocide," in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, trans. John Matthews (London: Atlantic Highlands Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 67-83, 68-9.

⁴¹ Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, p. 96; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 193.

⁴²Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," pp. 34.

under Jeffersonian assumptions that the western hemisphere could only contain American governments.⁴³ The Shah's Iran, a CIA creation, is an aside, and the Indo-China misadventures become accidental to the good empire.

The "consensus" empire argument distorts the impositions from above and justifies the empire. It says nothing of causation — even consensus empires cause wars. Nor does Gaddis realize that the American empire of 1945 was not as consensual as he sees it. It was a de facto oligarchy.⁴⁴ One study, using public polling records, actually shows that during the Cold War, it was the decisions of American leaders rather than public opinion which drove the engine-room of global anti-communism — another sure indicia of oligarchic decision making.⁴⁵

What is perhaps most glaring in the "New" history are its limited horizons. Where is the organic, long-term history? Gaddis is trapped in the Cold War as an inescapable medium. He rarely, with the exception of brief notes in the first chapter, focuses on what came *before* the Cold War.⁴⁶ This enables him to sever the imperial link between pre-1945 America and the founding of the National Security State.

Thomas Jefferson, suffering the imperial itch, believed that no one

⁴³Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Alexander von Humboldt, December 6, 1813, in Thomas Jefferson, *Writings* (New York: Library of America, 1984), pp. 1311-4, 1312.

⁴⁴Gore Vidal, "The Day the American Empire Ran Out of Gas," *The Nation*, January 11, 1986 in Gore Vidal, *United States: Essays, 1952-1992* (London: Abacus, 1994), p. 1010.

⁴⁵George H. Quester, "Origins of the Cold War: Some Clues from Public Opinion," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (1978-79): 647-663.

⁴⁶In contrast to his earlier history *Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978).

could "limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively".⁴⁷ Jefferson also endorsed empire-speak, fusing federalist and republican philosophies in an imperial crusade that made him repudiate Montesquieu's small republic model in favour of James Madison's expansive vision of government. Gaddis's assertion that America possessed "an anti-imperial tradition dating back to the American Revolution"⁴⁸ is unfounded. He persists in insisting that Americans have always had an anti-colonial disposition, actually calling the colonization of the Philippines an accident. He cites the most imperial of documents, *The Federalist*, writings that emanated from writers in search of strong centralized government and the elimination of confederacies.⁴⁹

Through a concerted, perhaps unconscious omission, the grand dynasty of American planners who shaped the coming empire vanish in Gaddis' reverent tone. Gaddis' American Empire lacks its Jeffersons, but it also omits the Teddy Roosevelts and James K. Polks. A. T. Mahan, who advocated the logic of American empire early in 1890 through exemplary studies of sea power, is also absent. He had no illusions that America wanted an external empire.⁵⁰ Mayan's world had rivals, balances and fellow empires. World War II erased them. Moscow and Washington acted in a world where the old empires had imploded, where

⁴⁷Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1805; Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, April 27, 1809, in William A. Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. v. Jefferson has said, "We all republicans, we are all federalists."

⁴⁸Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 39.

⁴⁹See especially Alexander Hamilton's commentary on Federalist 6, "To the People of the State of New York, N. Y., November 14, 1787," *The Independent Journal or the General Advertiser*, "The Federalist No. 6" in Harold C. Syrett, Jacob E. Cooke, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), IV, pp. 309-317, 310.

⁵⁰Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea power Upon History Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little Brown, 1890).

vacuum was filled by bipolarity. This glaring oversight by Gaddis is again a feature of his conversion to orthodoxy.

Shifting the argument away from an autonomous American policy enables Gaddis to find reactions rather than plans when America did more than react.⁵¹ Containment of Stalin, exemplified by such devices as the Marshall Plan, would not have occurred “had there been nothing to contain.” Why, asks Gaddis, was there no American empire in the 1920s in the wake of an unstable Europe torn by World War?⁵²

The answer is simple: the American empire stalled in 1920. The League of Nations would have been a perfect platform to realize President Wilson’s borderless market revolution and transparent government. Even Gaddis concedes that Wilson desired to alter world politics and the global economy, though he refuses to accept an imperial content in those motives.⁵³ Isolationism had the last word and the American empire went into the hibernation of a “return to normalcy” under President Warren Harding. This is not to say that Harding never discounted the possibility of an empire beyond the western hemisphere, provided the threat was sufficient: “Our eyes never will be blind to a developing menace, our ears never deaf to the call of civilization.”⁵⁴ Gaddis follows Harding’s caveat to a tee: a fortuitous American empire arose against “a perceived external danger powerful enough to overcome American isolationism.”⁵⁵

⁵¹See William O. Walker III, “We Now Know: Re-Thinking Cold War History,” *The Historian* 61(4) (Summer 1999): 904-5.

⁵²Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 38.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵⁴Warren Harding, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1921.

⁵⁵Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 38.

Secondly, Wilson's "non-existent" American empire was very active in intervening in the affairs of the fledgling Bolshevik state of Lenin's creation. There was a perceived threat to the American Weltanschauung even then, enough to send servicemen to the Russian landmass: "*In failing to meet the challenge by honouring the principle of self-determination in dealing with the Bolshevik Revolution, Wilson and other Americans began the corrupting and dangerous practice of equating freedom with similarity to the United States.*"⁵⁶ French historian Andre Fontaine went further, claiming that the origins of Cold War found their roots in that same coalition intervention.⁵⁷

Gaddis, by abstracting America's push for hegemony, distorts Stalin's contribution to the Cold War. While Truman's decisions may have been necessary conditions, they were not it would seem, *sufficient* for Cold War. Gaddis increases Stalin's causal potency by showing a dictator in conflict with a benign empire. This is the result of some Gaddis magic: contrasting "benign" and "malignant" authoritarianism. In other words, on the point of who caused the Cold War, the abnormal conditions that created the necessary and sufficient factors for conflict came from the Soviet Union and not Washington. Gaddis's interpretation lessens the imperial sting in American hegemony, making it reactive — a response "to the manner in which Stalin managed his own empire."⁵⁸

The new history tries to synthesize the good empire with foreign policy. Thus Gaddis must make the following observations: empires in Gaddisland can arise accidentally; the respective empires were

⁵⁶William A. Williams, "American Intervention in Russia: 1917-1920," in David Horowitz (ed.), *Containment and Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 26-75, 69.[Williams's emphasis].

⁵⁷Andre Fontaine, *Histoire de la guerre froide* (Paris: Fayard, 1965-7), I, p. 15; Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973*, trans. Frank Jellinek (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1974), p. 9.

⁵⁸Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 35, 39.

“not of the same kind;” the Europeans and Japan invited empire; the Soviets imposed theirs.⁵⁹ Moral equivalence would be wrong here.⁶⁰ American control of Europe and Northeast Asia had the ring of collaboration about it.⁶¹

The first conclusion is easily dealt with by showing that no empire is ever accidental. As early as 1943-4, planners within the Pentagon envisaged a world system of bases to counter threats.⁶² These recipes do not suggest a cessation in the American drive for overseas security. What they do suggest is the potential for conflict with a rival who interfered with the expansive albeit loose strategy of American foreign policy. Empires arise because plans are hatched at the highest level to act or omit to do something in foreign policy. Truman’s Doctrine was a calculated move to expand American influence using a policy “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities by outside pressure.”⁶³ The Marshall plan added the other half of American security.⁶⁴ According to Melvyn P. Leffler, the American vision (its “core values”) of democracy, free enterprise and territorial integrity were threatened.⁶⁵ The refusal to negotiate with the Soviets over security interests became the correlative of simplifying

⁵⁹Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 284, 285.

⁶⁰Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 51; “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy,” pp. 8-9.

⁶¹Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 285.

⁶²Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Concept of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War,” *American Historical Review* 89(2) (1984): 346-381.

⁶³The Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 93, Pt. 2, March 12, 1947, pp. 1980-1.

⁶⁴The expression is from Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992*, 7th Ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993), pp. 49-73.

⁶⁵Melvyn P. Leffler, “National Security,” *Journal of American History* 77 (June 1990): 148-9.

the Soviet threat as a dilemma of power. Such simplification was needless. Kennan's advice to Washington mechanized the Soviet behemoth: it was linear, concise and understandable. It clashed with the new role America was fashioning for itself; even by Gaddis's own admission, the United States sought to "lead the new world order."⁶⁶ Hence any American response, empire or otherwise, was *planned*. Containment became code for empire.

Second, the invitation argument as pressed by Geir Lundestad, hardly elevates Stalin as a greater cause relative to American contributions. Europeans, he claims, invited the American empire. NATO was a European, not American initiation.⁶⁷ Stalin hoped for a similar gesture that never came. Invitees do not cause cold wars. It does not occur to Gaddis that invitation might well have provoked Stalin, who surmised that the Americans "have their Allies to fight for them in Western Europe."⁶⁸ The comment that NATO was also a response to "clear and present danger"⁶⁹ is fictitious. Stalin anticipated a joint military control of Europe with the Soviets ordering their zone and the Allies theirs.⁷⁰

Invention and supposition was necessary to justify the security status of the new empire. Kennan claimed that it did not matter what threat existed — communist or otherwise, it would have to have been invented, "to create a sense of urgency we need to bring us to

⁶⁶Gaddis, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy," p. 4.

⁶⁷Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (Sept. 1986): 263-77; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 285, 49.

⁶⁸Minutes of the Conversation with com[rade] Stalin of leaders of the SED W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, and O. Grotewohl, 7 April, 1952, APRF, Fond 45, opis 1, delo 303, list 179.

⁶⁹Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 168.

⁷⁰See particularly Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War*, pp. 44-5.

the point of decisive action.”⁷¹ As a highly secret Pentagon history written by a panel of historians and political scientists observed (specifically on nuclear arms), “The history of the Soviet strategic program is at the same time a history of U.S. perceptions.” Create a perception of fear, then the hearts and minds will follow. Senator Vandenberg’s advice for Truman to, “Scare the hell out of the American people” illustrated the point. In fact, according to the Secret History, Stalin’s post-war decisions gave “little provocation” for a “stepped up competition in armaments.”⁷² In a broader sense the American empire often acted independently of the evil empire.

As Gaddis’ acceptance of the invitation argument tacitly denies that invitee empires caused the Cold War, it should follow that Stalin’s ‘invited’ empire in East Asia need not have accelerated the Cold War in 1950. Gaddis’s argument would have to apply in reverse: Mao Zedong’s alliance with Stalin, his fawning for the dictator, his desire for a strong alliance with the Soviets would indicate that Stalin’s imperial ‘foothold’ in China and East Asia was “invited”.⁷³ Kim Il Sung who likewise invited Soviet support acquiesced in Soviet imperial ambitions. After all, his badgering of Stalin to invade South Korea, being given “the green light”,⁷⁴ should not have caused an acceleration of Cold War hostility. The fact that it did should not make an invited NATO any less causative of Cold War. Invitees cause wars.

⁷¹Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 36.

⁷²Ernest May, John Steinbruner, and Thomas Wolfe, *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972*, ed. Alfred Goldberg (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, March 1981 declassified with deletions, December 1990), p. 634, 96-105.

⁷³Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pps. 7, 193.

⁷⁴Kathryn Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (Fall, 1993), 1, 14-18.

Thirdly, the idea of moral-equivalence is legitimate in determining the strategic form of empire. The new history's overestimation of benevolent empire impairs interpretations of the American imperium. On the rarefied level of power an empire ceases to be a noble concept: it assumes meaning through acts. On this level, the acts of the American empire cease to become "good" — they are only intelligible in an instrumental sense. The Soviet empire is likewise unintelligible as evil except through its ambitions. In this context, both empires had similar aims. The Soviets did not conceive of a post-war Europe free of U.S. or British cooperation. Nor was Truman entirely inflexible to Soviet cooperation even after his famous confrontation with Molotov on 23 April, 1945.⁷⁵

Gaddis's "good" empire becomes unintelligible towards issues such as German unification where "benevolent" designs constrained American goodwill for a united Germany. The label is inappropriate for calculating empires. Carolyn Eisenberg has shown that the Allied powers found the creation of the West German state useful as it enabled them to retain some control over the new German government. Her study emphasizes an inflexible Allied response to Soviet gestures for re-unification, exemplified by such dissimulating representatives as Secretary of State Acheson who was willing to sacrifice a unified Germany for an antagonistic Western Europe.⁷⁶ Rather than seeking durable peace, the good empire preferred creating a potential battleground in central Europe. This liking for Realpolitik calls into question the whole dualistic paradigm that Gaddis would like us to believe: would a good empire have refused to negotiate in the name of peaceful co-existence?

The benevolent empire was terrified at Truman's attempts to placate Stalin in the course of the Berlin airlift begun by the Soviets to *halt*

⁷⁵Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War*, pp. 44-5.

⁷⁶Carolyn W. Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 480-1.

partition.⁷⁷ It is remarkable to hear Truman at one address late 1948 when he stated, to the chagrin of observers that “rival powers can exist peacefully in the world.”⁷⁸ While “Munich” appeasements were to avoided there was no excuse not to *negotiate*. Against his diplomats Truman wanted a diplomatic channel. The question the new history must ask is whether benevolent-good empires that refused to negotiate with rivals on the eve of potential world war remained “good”. The dualism in such a framework, the good and evil, falls flat. Yes, British and American governments cited Soviet atrocities in the Eastern Zone for their obstruction to negotiations but the real motivations lay in refusing to consider Soviet terms of re-unification.⁷⁹

Finally, “good-evil” assumptions are weak if for no other reason that they distort the behaviour of nations and collectives. Gaddis’s history is not a history of the gulag but a history of diplomatic relations. Within the gulag, moral equivalence becomes crude; in diplomacy it is unavoidable. The good state will kill if it has to; the evil state will concede ground if it furthers their interest. To unpack diplomatic relations, moral equivalence becomes an essential tool.

In the final analysis what can be said of the new Gaddis? Stalin had no world program, though the new history asserts this. The new history uses ideas as an exclusive criterion. This has two problems: it distorts the context of those ideas and neglects the structure that produces them. In placing ideology in a bracket above society, Gaddis’s Stalin becomes a creature free of a society that made him. As an exclusive historical agent, the new history does not consider the society that controls its representative agents.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 444-5,491.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 445.

⁷⁹Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line*, p. 487.

Historical experience falls out of the picture in the analysis of Soviet history while ignoring the organic nature of American history. The new history misreads the original sources of American empire. In doing so it also suffers from value based assumptions: the American empire was a good that triumphed over evil condemning moral equivalence as a mistake. An empire is hardly comprehensible within a duality of good and evil. Manichean self-interest eliminates this duality altogether. Seeing empires as morally equivalent creatures breaks down the fiction of benevolence and passivity.

The new history also promotes a few myths: the possibility of good empires with moral scales of whether it is "imposed" or invited through "consensus;" and the assumption that all democratic powers practice benign aggression-free foreign policy. Closer analysis shows that the acts of "good" empire do not match the premises. The new history is selective, excluding parts of Freeland that did not fit into this "consensual" empire. Nor does an "invitee" empire lessen its potency in causing Cold War. Finally, democracies of past have caused wars vis-à-vis one another.

The final problem with the Gaddis's new history is its unilateral assumptions. If ever there was a conflict based more on perception than truth, the Cold War remains that conflict. Stalin did not act alone. His conduct is impossible to understand without the complex of American-Allied decisions. In making Stalin an appellation that was unique and individual, the new history distorts the underlying reasons why two empires fought each other. Within this triumphalism the new Cold War will rest alongside the orthodox histories of old. A new history beyond the Cold War will have to be written — a history that will find heroes not in its statesmen but in those who had to endure them.

A MID-LEVEL BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM TO SAVE CHINA

by

Charles R. Lilley

Northern Virginia CC

Mid-level bureaucrats rarely make front page news, unless you're Linda Tripp. But Nguyen Huy Han was no Linda Tripp. Indeed, after reading the Melvin Small and Nguyen Huy Han's piece on "A Plan to Save South Vietnam in April 1975: Nguyen Huy Han's Aborted Coup" in the December 2001 issue of the *SHAFR Newsletter*, Han impressed me as a rigorously upright Neo-Confucian gentleman who had received training as a modern accountant. He was also, not surprisingly, a staunch anti-Communist. However, it was something of a surprise to see that the *SHAFR Newsletter* used the Small/Han piece as the lead article. Surprise, because it shattered my theory about mid-level bureaucrats not making the front-page.

I have spent many more years that I prefer to recall studying the life Tsiang T'ing-fu (1895-1965), a mid-level bureaucrat similar to Mr. Nguyen Huy Han. Except for my doctoral dissertation on Tsiang, he has drawn little or no attention from other scholars, perhaps deservedly so. He was, after all, a mere mid-level bureaucrat. But the Small/Han article gave me hope that there may be an audience for mid-level bureaucrats who devise, what appears in hindsight, to be the most fantastic of plans to save a declining or defeated regime. It was with these thoughts in mind that I decided to offer the *SHAFR Newsletter* the following summary of Tsiang's fantastic plans to save China from both the declining Kuomintang and the rising Communists.

In response to the decisive defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's armies at the Battle of Huai-Hai in November-December 1948, the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Tsiang T'ing-fu dreamed and schemed of ways to save China from both the Kuomintang and the Communists. His fantasy was to create a political party made up of

Western-educated liberals like himself. They would come together to create the Chinese Liberal Party, use it to displace the moribund Kuomintang, force Chiang Kai Shek to step down from power in favor of Hu Shih, and somehow (?) militarily rescue China from the victorious People's Liberation Army.

By the time of the defeat of Chiang's armies at Huai-Hai, Tsiang had been faithfully serving the National Government of China since 1935. His career trajectory had not been an even one. In 1936, he had briefly moved up the bureaucratic ladder to become China's ambassador to the Soviet Union. Then, in 1938, he moved back down the ladder into the Secretariat of the Executive yuan, where he had begun. In 1944, President Chiang promoted him to be Director-General of China's National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRRA).¹ This important job called upon him to oversee the initial stages of the reconstruction of the country's shattered economy. However, because the G-mo's priorities lay elsewhere — the military defeat of his Communist opponents — few of the remaining resources were allotted to economic recovery. In the political battle of the bureaucrats to win control of the remaining scraps, Tsiang lost, and, with the loss, he was forced to resign his post as Director General of CNRRRA in October 1946. For a brief period thereafter, he stayed out of government, until the spring of 1947, when President Chiang appointed him to become China's ambassador to the new United Nations.

The appointment to the United Nations was a grave disappointment to Tsiang, for several reasons. It was a post with neither prestige nor power, and he wanted both. Since the mid-1930s, he had tied his political future and fortunes to a group whom historian William

¹Charles R. Lilley, "Tsiang T'ing-fu, CNRRRA, and the Politics of Postwar Planning, "50th Anniversary of the Ending of World War II in the Pacific and East Asia." National Archives Building, College Park, Maryland, October 13-14, 1995.

C. Kirby identifies as the “economic planners.”² Like Tsiang they were mid-level bureaucrats (more precisely, perhaps, technocrats) engaged in the heady business of planning and building a modern industrial economy, and, as Kirby’s works show, they had established by the late 1940s a substantial power base within the National Government. As noted, Tsiang T’ing-fu had linked his fortunes with theirs, and he wanted to continue participating in their work because he thought it would save China. There was also a third reason why he didn’t want to leave the country. After his dismissal from CNRRA, he had moved to Shanghai with his girlfriend, and together they had enjoyed the delights of the city. Meanwhile, his estranged wife was living in New York City. As early as 1944, he had asked her for a divorce; she angrily rejected that first request, and she would reject every subsequent request. In 1948, he ultimately resorted to a Mexican divorce.³ So one can easily understand that Tsiang T’ing-fu had both professional and personal reasons for wanting to stay in China.

Yet neither the professional nor the personal reasons explain why beginning in December 1948 mid-level bureaucrat Tsiang T’ing-fu set out to create a Chinese Liberal Party that would displace the Kuomintang, relieve Chiang Kai-shek of his position and power, and militarily (?) resist the victorious Communists. The entries in his diaries suggest two reasons why he took that remarkably fantastic (and dangerous) step. First, was disillusionment. It had accumulated over the years until the debacle of 1948 convinced him that the “medieval” — his word — Kuomintang must be replaced by a truly “modern” political party made up of “modern-minded-men”

²William C. Kirby, “The Chinese War Economy,” in *China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan 1937-1945*, edited by James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (M.E. Sharpe, 1992) and William C. Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford University Press, 1984).

³The following entries are representative examples of Tsiang’s demand for a divorce from Madame Tsiang and her replies. The Diaries of Tsiang T’ing-fu, Harvard University Library System, November 25, 1944 (Chungking); November 26, 1944; December 3, 1944; January 19, 1946; May 26, 1946; October 15, 1946 and so on. Entry in Tsiang Diaries, May 4, 1948, New York City, shows that he had sought and received a Mexican divorce. Hereinafter cited as Tsiang Diaries.

like himself. The second factor was resentment, probably fostered by disillusionment. In Tsiang's view and those of his "planner" cohorts, the regime scarcely knew how to use the dozens of modern-educated men serving the Nationalist regime. He grew to resent the power of the old party hacks.⁴

All of these developments came to a head in November as Tsiang headed off to Paris for the 1948 General Assembly. After his arrival, the decisive battle of the Civil War in the Huai-Hai region had been fought and the PLA had emerged victorious. In response, over the next two weeks, Tsiang called three delegation meetings to discuss the meaning of the defeat. The first met on December 1, "at the close of which I briefly referred to our duties in face of the emergency in China, & urged them all to think what could be done. What I had in mind was this:"

The Chinese people don't know that communism is not the road to freedom or the road to economic development to rid China of poverty. This educational mission should be done by us. The Government has not had modern-trained people in positions of power. Its reforms program is either reactionary, or bureaucratic, or utopian. We should demand immediate & practical reforms and push them through. Internationally, we must let the world know that a communist China means a totalitarian China, which will be a satelete [sic] of USSR. To perform the above tasks, we should set up com[mi]t[tee]es among the overseas Chinese as well as in China.⁵

Four days later, Tsiang assembled the delegation for a second meeting "to discuss the situation at home."

The young ones were hot for action — against both communists and Kuomintang. The upper ranks thought it impolitic to weaken the Gov't. At the end, I stated my convictions. We

⁴Ibid, May 31, 1949, New York. This entry illustrates something of the resentment toward old KMT members. Tsiang writes: "Office in morning. Gov't has asked Chu Cheng to be head of the Executive [yuan]; the Kuomintang is totally & absolutely bankrupt if at this decisive hour it cannot produce a better man than old Chu Cheng."

⁵Ibid, December 1, 1948, Paris.

must strive for nationalism, democracy, and socialism. I pointed out that with communism, China would be a satellite of USSR, there would be no individual freedom, and economic progress would be slow. Communism admitted no compromise. Whatever might appear to be compromise now is only tactics. If China should go down without our stirring a finger, history will everlastingly blame us. The reception to my discourse was splendid. People wished to take action immediately. But I cautioned further meditation.⁶

Having cautioned further meditation, Tsiang waited ten more days before calling a third meeting.

Afternoon, long tea-conversation with staff. Decide to push Movement for Chinese Freedom, [wrote in Chinese] *Chung-kuo tzu-yu yun-tung*. For the present, not to assume form of a party. Independent: not an apnage [sic] of any existing party, not open war on anybody except the communists. To educate on the evils of communism throughout the world.⁷

So began Tsiang T'ing-fu's brief and fantastic dream of saving China through organizing a political party of Chinese liberals. Without intending to be sarcastic, his plan of action, so far, sounds more like an anti-communist lecture he might have given his students at Tsing Hua University back in the early 1930s than a plan of action that would defeat the powerful PLA.

Yet, more was on T.F. Tsiang's mind than anti-communism. A deep sense of having failed to "save China" lurked close to the surface. "Saving China," in the parlance of the day, meant its modernization, and he and his generation thought that destiny had appointed them (particularly, the "economic planners") to restore China's wealth and power and thus lead the nation into the modern world. Listen as Tsiang writes his friend Hu Shih: "On the 16th [of December] I wrote to Hu Shih that the crisis in China *meant the*

⁶Tsiang Diaries, December 5, 1948, Paris

⁷Ibid, December 15, 1948, Paris.

failure of a generation. He & I & our friends have all failed."⁸ However much we may now "all regret our past inactivity," he told another friend, "we must rise above all training & our temperament" and save our beloved China from the communists.⁹

Of all the Chinese liberals one meets in T.F.Tsiang's diaries, he alone pushed for action. The outline of his plan of action is quite simple and deeply flawed. First the plan called upon all his friends — modern educated men like himself,¹⁰ most of whom were living in the United States and some in China — to organize a single party, the Chinese Liberal Party.¹¹ (He preferred "Chinese Socialist Party" but deferred to his friends who were more oriented towards "free enterprise" economics. Tsiang's own economic views mirrored those of the British Labour Party.) The second part of the plan called for Hu Shih to assume leadership of the new party. Hu adamantly and repeatedly refused to accept the honor. Even Ambassador V.K. Wellington Koo, who, according to Tsiang, used all his "eloquence to persuade Hu to take up [the] premiership" as the head of the CLP, Hu again refused. Tsiang wrote: "Hu was obdurate."¹² Why Hu Shih? because he alone among Chinese intellectuals everywhere (in either the United States or China) had the respect and prestige among American and Chinese officials that would give the CLP a degree of legitimacy, however slight that degree might be in actuality. In short, no Hu, no success. Moreover, as Tsiang's diaries explain, "his assuming high office would enhance our chances of getting American aid, more so than

⁸Ibid, December 19, 1948, aboard ship to New York. Emphasis added.

⁹Ibid, March 20, 1949, New York.

¹⁰For this idea of "modern educated men," see Ibid, June 9, 1949.

¹¹For the individuals Tsiang hoped would create the foundation of the CLP see the following entries: Ibid, March 14, 1949, April 27, 1949, May 23, 1949, June 9, 1949, and August 29, 1949 for the most complete list.

¹²Ibid, June 23, 1949.

any other Chinese living." Hu understood that, but he still wanted no part of politics. Repeated attempts by Tsiang to change his mind all failed. At one point, Hu told him that "our cabinet-making [was] a fantasy."¹³

The third part of the plan called upon Ku Ming-yu, Tung Kuan-hsien, and Fu Ssu-nien to organize branches of the CLP in China. The diaries say nothing about their efforts, except to offer list of names of individuals Tsiang hoped would enroll in the party.¹⁴ Fourth, it was Koo's idea and Tsiang concurred that "power should be [immediately] transferred to the Liberals," that Chiang Kai-shek would throw his support behind them, and, "for this purpose," writes Tsiang, "he would be ready to sacrifice [his] position." In other words, when the CLP took power, Chiang would sacrifice not only his office but his power as well.¹⁵ In retrospect, this seems to have been a critical but the most naïve (and dangerous) part of Tsiang's plan. One can scarcely imagine Chiang Kai-shek giving up his power. Yet, Tsiang T'ing-fu naively believed that the Generalissimo would willingly and unhesitatingly walk away from the power he had held for twenty five years. He would walk away, Tsiang believed, because the G-mo would throw his support behind "any really anti-communist movement." He was equally naïve in his belief that Mme. Chiang would also support the CLP. On October 26, 1949, "[I] explained to her my plans for a Liberal Party, & urged her to lend us her support. She was non-committal."¹⁶

¹³Ibid, June 24, 1949.

¹⁴Ibid, August 29, 1949. This entry contains "the list of people who might constitute the nucleus of the Liberal party."

¹⁵Ibid, August 18, 1949.

¹⁶Ibid, October 26, 1949.

Unwilling to accept the facts of the December defeat at the hands of the PLA, Tsiang and his friends went on freely talking about a Third Force and a Chinese Liberal Party until November 16, 1949. Then the sky fell. Read the following entry from Tsiang's diary and watch as the sky falls.

Frank Carpenter of A.P., a good friend, has been after me for a special interview. Gave it to him to-day: on the Chinese Liberal Party. *What astonished me was his question: does this mean a break with Chiang?* It was an angle which I had never considered. I fell back on the constitution — not forbidding of new political parties. The answer amounted really to this: a new party could not be illegal; I could not be accused of violating the law.¹⁷

Soon afterwards, Tsiang and Hu Shih went to the hospital where former President Li Tsung-jen was recovering from an operation for a stomach ulcer. During the course of their conversation, Hu "mentioned [to Tsiang] the brutality of the secret police during the Ming dynasty & the indignities which intellectuals of the age were subject to."¹⁸

Obviously, old-friend Hu was hinting that his friend's party organizing activities was dangerous to one's health, perhaps even his life. Although Tsiang did not directly respond to Hu's remark, subsequent entries in the diaries made clear that after November 1949 mid-level bureaucrat Tsiang made certain that his long-time patron, Chiang Kai-shek, was fully informed of any and all developments related to the Chinese Liberal Party.¹⁹ We do not know what the Generalissimo might have thought about his long time servant's political activities, though the Tsiang's diaries give

¹⁷Ibid, November 16, 1949.

¹⁸Ibid, December 23, 1949.

¹⁹See, for example, Ibid, January 2, 1950 entry. It reports a discuss about the CLP with N.C. Nyi, whom he asked "to convey my ideas to C." "C" was Tsiang's code for Chiang Kai-shek.

at least one hint. Let me conclude with the full quotation of that hint:

T.K. Chang came from Formosa. He said he was confident that the island could be defended (last fall, he wrote it could not). In the Nanking-Shanghai areas, no communist air base could be built. The economic conditions [are] better than on the mainland. *He said that Chen Cheng²⁰ selected me for vice-premier but C[hiang]. thought I should be kept at Lake Success.*²¹

In short, Tsiang's punishment was not the brutality of the secret police about which Hu Shih had warned him but permanent exile in the United States, ambassador to the United Nations (1947-1965) and to the United States (1962-1965). His ambassadorship made him an outsider of the inner circle of the G-mo, and treated, he once remarked, as "an intimate foreigner" by his cohorts in Taipei. It was a deeply felt hurt to a man that had dedicated his life to saving China. From 1948 until his death in 1965, he bore quietly the burden that his generation had failed to achieve their announced goal, and even smiled one day in the early 1960s when he stumbled upon his fantastic 1948-1950 plans to save the nation. He had survived his plans. He died of cancer in New York City in October 1965.

²⁰Chen Cheng [Ch'en Ch'eng] was the G-mo's right hand man; the second more powerful person in his regime.

²¹Ibid., March 16, 1950. Emphasis added.

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Fellowships are usually awarded for 10 months beginning in October. The Program attempts to match the recipient's earned income during the year preceding, up to a maximum of \$80,000 for 10 months. The award includes the costs of health insurance and travel to and from Washington for fellows and dependents. The deadline for receipt of applications for 2003-04 is September 16, 2002.

For information and an application, please download materials from the Institute's website

Mailing address: Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace; 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200; Washington DC 20036-3011.

Tel: (202)429-3886

Fax: (202) 429-6063

www.usip.org/fellows.html

Call For Papers
World War II — A 60 Year Perspective

Siena College is sponsoring its eighteenth annual, international, multi-disciplinary conference on **The 60th Anniversary of World War II** on June 5-6, 2003. The focus for 2003 will be 1943. Other papers dealing with the issues of the war years will be welcome.

Topics include, Fascism and Nazism, New Guinea and the Southwest Pacific Theatre, Central Pacific Campaigns, the Air War, Sicily and Italy, the North Atlantic, Literature, Art, Film, Diplomatic, Political and Military History, Popular Culture, Minority Affairs and Women's and Jewish Studies dealing with the era, Asian, African, Latin American and Near Eastern topics of relevance are solicited. Collaboration and collaborationists' regimes, the events on the home front, religion, conscription and dissent will be welcomed. Deadline for submissions: November 15, 2002. Contact: Thomas O. Kelly, II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY 12211

Tel: (518) 783-2512

Fax: (518) 786-5052

E-mail: legendziewic@siena.edu

Centerpoint Subscriptions

Information about meetings, new initiatives, and publications by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History project are available free by subscribing to the Center's monthly newsletter CENTERPOINT. E-mail your full address to Christina O'Brien at <obriench@wwic.si.edu> to get on the mailing list.

PUBLICATIONS

William T. Allison (Weber State), *Witness To Revolution, The Russian Revolution Diary and Letters of J. Butler Wright*. Praeger, 2002. ISBN 0-275-97474-X \$64.95.

David L. Anderson (Indianapolis), *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. Columbia, 2002. Cloth, ISBN 0-231-11492-3, \$45.00.

Guenter Bischof, ed. (New Orleans) (with Anton Pelinka and Ruth Wodak), *Austrian Neutrality* (Contemporary Austrian Studies vol. IX). Transaction, 2001.

-----, ed. (with Anton Pelinka and Michael Gehler), *Austria in the European Union* (Contemporary Austrian Studies vol. X). Transaction, 2002.

-----, ed. (with Wolfgang Krieger), *Die Invasion in der Normandie 1944: Internationale Perspektiven [The Normandy Invasion 1944: International Perspectives]* (Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte vol. 16). STUDIENVerlag, 2001.

Wayne S. Cole (Maryland), *A Life in Twentieth Century America: From Small Town Iowa to Suburban Maryland*. Xlibris, 2002. Cloth, ISBN 1-4010-3802-6, \$32.40; Paper, ISBN 1-4010-3801-8, \$22.35.

Daniele De Luca (University of Lecce, Italy), *La difficile amicizia. Alle radici dell'alleanza israelo-americana, 1956-1963 [The Uneasy Friendship: The Roots of Israeli-American Alliance, 1956-1963]*. Lacaita, 2001.

Mary L. Dudziak (USC-Law), *Cold War Civil Rights, Race and the Image of American Democracy*. Princeton, 2002. Paper, ISBN 0-691-09513-2, \$18.95.

Steven Z. Freiburger (Middlesex School), *Dawn Over Suez, The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957*. Ivan R. Dee. Cloth, ISBN 0-929587-83-9, \$26.50.

Irwin F. Gellman (Corona Del Mar, CA), *Secret Affairs: FDR, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles*. Enigma, 2002. Paper, ISBN 1-929631-11-1, \$22.00.

Robert E. Hannigan (Bentley), *The New World Power, American Foreign Policy, 1889-1917*. Pennsylvania. Cloth, \$49.95.

David Healy (Wisconsin), *James G. Blaine and Latin America*. Missouri, 2001. Cloth, ISBN 0-8262-1374-X, \$39.95.

Howard Jones (Alabama), *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War*. Nebraska, 2002. Paper, ISBN 0-8032-7565-X, \$16.95.

Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State), *Alexander Hamilton: Ambivalent Anglophile*. Scholarly Resources, 2002. Paper, ISBN 0-8420-2878-1, \$19.95.

Lester D. Langley (Georgia), *The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934*. Revised Edition. Scholarly Resources, 2001. Paper, 0-8420-5047-7, \$19.95.

Mitchell B. Lerner (Ohio State), *The Pueblo Incident, A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Kansas, 2002. Cloth, ISBN 0-7006-1171-1, \$34.95.

J. Robert Moskin (New York City), *Mr. Truman's War, The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World*. Kansas. Paper, ISBN 0-7006-1184-3, \$19.95.

John Prados, ed. (Silver Spring, MD), *America Confronts Terrorism: Understanding the Danger and How to Think about It*. Ivan R. Dee. Cloth, ISBN 1-56663-444-X, \$27.50.

David Reynolds (Christ's Church, Cambridge), *From Munich to Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War*. Ivan R. Dee. Cloth, ISBN 1-56663-389-3, \$24.95.

Darlene Rivas (Pepperdine) *Nelson Rockefeller in Venezuela*. North Carolina, 2002. ISBN 0-8078-2684-7, \$49.95; Paper, ISBN 0-8078-5350-X, \$19.95.

Michael Schaller and George Rising (both of Arizona), *The Republican Ascendancy: American Politics, 1968-2001*. Harlan Davidson, 2002. Paper, ISBN 0-88295-970-0, \$12.95.

PERSONALS

Three SHAFR members pulled off a collective "hat trick" at Madison, Wisconsin in April. Each was awarded a 2002 Distinguished Book Award of the Society for Military History. They are: Mark Stoler (Vermont) for *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (U. of North Carolina Press); Ronald Spector (George Washington) for *At War At Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century* (Viking/ Penguin, 2001); and Robert Ferrell (emeritus, Indiana) editor of William S. Triplet's trilogy, *A Youth in the Meuse-Argonne; A Colonel in the Armored Divisions; and In the Philippines and Okinawa* (U. of Missouri Press, 2000-2001).

Robert Divine (Emeritus, Texas), Michael Ebner (Lake Forest College), Akira Iriye (Harvard), and Richard Kirkendall (U of Washington) will participate in the 2002-2003 OAH Distinguished Lecturer Program.

William Thomas Allison (Weber State) has been promoted to Associate Professor and will be Visiting Professor of Doctrine, Strategy, and Air Power at the Air War College for 2002-2003.

Kinley Brauer (Minnesota) and Thomas Borstelmann (Cornell) have been selected to serve on George Louis Beer Prize Committee for the AHA.

John Dumbrell (Keele, UK) has received a 2002 Cambridge Donner Book Prize of £2000 for his *A Special Relationship Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

Jussi Hanhimaki (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland) has been awarded a Woodrow Wilson Center fellowship for 2002-2003 academic year for research and writing on Henry Kissinger and U.S. foreign policy.

Richard Immerman has been appointed to the Committee on the Herbert Feis Award for the AHA.

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers) has been appointed a Mark W. Clark Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina.

James I. Matray has retired from New Mexico State University. In August 2000, he will join the faculty at California State, Chico as professor and chair of history.

Ernest R. May (Harvard) was one of two historians selected for an AHA 2001 Award for Scholarly Distinction, an award established in 1984. May was cited for his "innovative research on American foreign policy, pathbreaking work on the role of intelligence in the conduct of international relations, and pivotal analyses of the impact of bureaucracy and organizational structures on policy formation."

Christopher O'Sullivan (Santa Rosa Junior College) and Kenneth Steuer (Indiana) were recipients of Gutenberg-e Prizes at the AHA annual meeting. The prizes are "intended to encourage and support publication of the best history dissertations, especially in fields where the traditional monograph has become endangered." The prizes in 2001 were in the fields of military history and history of foreign relations.

CALENDAR

2002

- June 20 Tour of the Carter Library.
June 21-23 SHAFR's 28th annual conference will meet at the University of Georgia. William Walker III is Program Chair, William Stueck is Local Arrangements Chair.
August 1 Deadline, materials for the Sept. *Newsletter*.
November 1 Deadline, materials for Dec. *Newsletter*.
November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

2003

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
January 2-5 117th annual meeting of the AHA will be in Chicago.
Deadline has passed.
January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
February 1 Deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
April 3-6 The 96th meeting of the OAH will take place in Memphis.
April 15 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.

Sites for future AHA meetings are: Washington, January 8-11, 2004; Seattle, January 6-9, 2005; and Philadelphia, January 5-8, 2006.

The 2003 SHAFR annual meeting will be held at George Washington University, June 6-8.

The 2004 meeting of the OAH will be in Boston, March 25-28.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Katherine Sibley, Department of History, St. Josephs University, 5600 City Ave., Philadelphia PA 19131-1395. Books may be sent at any time during 2002, but should not arrive later than February 1, 2003.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 2002 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 2003.

RECENT WINNERS:

2001 Gregory Mitrovich
Joseph Henning

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The winner of the 2001 competition will deliver a lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 2003. The Chairperson of the Committee is: William Walker, History, Florida International U., University Park, Miami FL 33199.

RECENT WINNERS:

1998 Peter Hahn
1999 Robert Buzzanco

2000 Odd Arne Westad

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 2001. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 2003. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Walter Hixson, Department of History, University of Akron, 201 Olin Hall, Akron OH 44325-1902. The award is given at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the OAH annual meeting.

RECENT WINNERS:

1999 Robert Dean
Michael Latham

2000 Joseph Manzione

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

REQUIREMENTS

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications, in triplicate, must include:
 - (a) applicant's vita;
 - (b) a brief prospectus focusing on the significance of the thesis (2-4 pages will suffice);
 - (c) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value;
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (Sent separately to the selection committee chair.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1,500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to: Terry Anderson, History Texas A&M, College Station TX 77843. The deadline for application is November 1, 2002.

RECENT WINNERS:

2000 Joseph Henning
2001 Hiroshi Kitamura
Clea Bunch

Georgetown Travel Grants

The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee also administers grants to be funded from the SHAFR Georgetown fund to support travel for research in the Washington area. The amounts are determined by the committee.

RECENT WINNERS

Brian C. Etheridge
Hiroshi Kitamura

Elisse Wright

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic

studies. Books published in 2002 and 2003 will be considered in 2003. Submission deadline is November 15, 2003. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Catherine Forslund, History, Rockford College, 5050 E. State Street, Rockford, IL 61108-2393.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Diane Kunz and Betty Unterberger

2000 Cecilia Lynch

1996 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

Jessica Gienow-Hecht

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Award

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D.'s. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Catherine Forslund, History, Rockford College, 5050 E. State St., Rockford, IL 61108-2393. Submission deadline is November 15, 2002.

RECENT WINNERS:

1994 Regina Gramer

1997 Deborah Kisatsky

Jaelyn Stanke

Mary Elise Savotte

Christine Skwiot

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 2003, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 2003 to: Anne Foster, History, St. Anselm College, Box 1648, 100 St. Anselm Drive, Manchester NH 03102-1310.

Memorial Fellowships carry awards of \$2000, \$1500, and \$1000. Announcements of the recipients will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowships will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used. A version of the report of the first-place winner will subsequently be published in the *SHAFR Newsletter*.

RECENT WINNERS:

1999 (1st) Michael Donoghue
(2nd) Gregg Brazinsky
(3rd) Carol Chin

2000 (1st) Jason Parker
(2nd) Jeffrey Engells
2001 Mary Montgomery

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 2004.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Department of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln NE 68588-0327. Phone: 403-472-2414, Fax: 402-472-8839, E-mail: lambrosius@unl.edu

WINNERS:

1988 Alexander DeConde
1990 Richard W. Leopold
1992 Bradford Perkins
1994 Wayne Cole

1996 Walter LaFeber
1998 Robert Ferrell
2000 Robert Divine

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The

subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and that are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 2001 and 2002. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 2003. Current Chairperson: Mary Ann Heiss, History, Kent State University, Kent OH 44242.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1991 Charles DeBenedetti and
Charles Chatfield
1993 Thomas Knock

1995 Lawrence S. Wittner
1999 Frances Early
2001 Fredrik Logevall

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Milton Gustafson, 2796 Shawn Ct., Ft. Washington MD 20744-2566C 20408.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Justus Doenecke
1996 John C.A. Stagg

2001 Warren Kimball

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the

journal's editorial office. Contact: Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 2001, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 2004.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Current chairperson: Kinley Brauer, 884 Fearington Post, Pittsboro, NC 27312-8503.

Previous Winners:

1995 John L. Harper

1996 Norman Saul

1997 Robert Schulzinger

1998 Jeffrey Kimball

1999 Emily S. Rosenberg

2000 Mark Gallicchio

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742