


Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 36, Issue 1 April 2005



Inside...

*A Critique of *The Fog of War**
The Secret Nuclear Alert of 1969
The SHAFR Teaching Survey
Doing Research in Ireland

...and much more!

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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Cover Photo

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
at a meeting in the Cabinet Room, February, 1968.

Courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum

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
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Thoughts from SHAFR President David L. Anderson

This column is my thank-you note to SHAFR. My hope is that during this year I may be of service to our members as SHAFR itself has served me throughout my career. I wish that I had space to thank everyone individually who, through SHAFR specifically, played key roles in my development as a diplomatic historian. SHAFR is much larger, richer, and active than it was when I joined as a graduate student in the early 1970s, but its purpose has remained the same. It has always been a collegial, and I stress collegial, effort to support and encourage excellence in the scholarship and teaching of the history of U.S. foreign relations.

When I began graduate study in the fall of 1970, SHAFR was only three years old and had just completed the writing of its constitution. There was no journal, no annual meeting, and the first Bernath Prize had yet to be awarded. I became aware of the organization when it chose my mentor, Norman Graebner, to be president in 1972, and I paid three dollars to become a student member (a two-dollar savings over the regular membership dues). About the only benefit of membership for a graduate student was the newsletter, edited and published by Nolan Fowler at Tennessee Tech. Through it I learned of the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Fund that Gerald and Myrna Bernath had generously endowed in memory of their son. Their gifts continued and became the inspiration for others to endow the numerous awards and scholarships that today comprise one of our principal membership benefits.

My first direct experience with SHAFR was the first annual conference held at Georgetown University in 1975. Then, as now, getting that first tenure-track position was difficult. There were so many



more well-qualified historians than there were positions. I had just completed a one-year stint at the University of Montana and was in Washington doing research before I began a one-year contract at Texas Tech. I felt fortunate to be employed, but I did not yet have an institutional home. The SHAFR colleagues that I met at that first conference made me feel accepted into my chosen field and provided me with the counsel and encouragement to continue my pursuit of an academic career. Larry Kaplan and Warren Kuehl, who served as Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer, stand out especially in my memory of the welcome this "visiting assistant professor" received at that meeting from the established members of our guild. I began my career as "visiting" faculty at four institutions over seven years, and SHAFR was in many ways my institutional foundation through that period. This summer at College

Park, Maryland, the thirty-first annual SHAFR conference will be held. The annual meeting is now one of the primary functions of SHAFR. Its importance to the society remains as it has always been in the inclusiveness and mutual support that it provides for all of our members at whatever stages of their careers.

Diplomatic History is another valuable service that SHAFR now provides its members. It began in 1977 and has become the journal of record in our field. It is also the vehicle through which the skills of our members and the scope of their scholarship are expanded. I had the good fortune of having an article selected for publication in the first volume of *Diplomatic History*. The editor was Armin Rappaport. This article was the first that I had ever published, and Armin graciously and skillfully mentored me through the revisions recommended by the referees. This experience taught me how, through SHAFR, the peer mentoring process contributes to our collective advancement of the study of U.S. foreign relations.

In 1977 I became a life member of SHAFR, and I have gained much from countless SHAFR colleagues for over three decades. I urge all members to take advantage of what our society has to offer and to give back to SHAFR in time and talent as you are able. The service that I can give this year will only be a small repayment for what I have gained professionally and personally from the society. Thank you, SHAFR.

David L. Anderson is the Dean of the College of Undergraduate Programs at California State University, Monterey Bay.

Errol Morris's *The Fog of War*: A Roundtable Critique

Mark Philip Bradley, Allan R. Millett,

Moss Roberts and Marilyn B. Young

The Perils of Personal Redemption: Assessing Errol Morris's *The Fog of War*

Mark Philip Bradley

Whether confronted with the earnest somnolence of a Ken Burns PBS special or the in-your-face reductionism of Michael Moore's latest offering, historians, myself included, are often prickly about the genre of the historical documentary. Historians, painfully aware that such films attract a far larger public than their own work ever will, frequently worry about the very reach of the documentary genre. Among their common complaints: "they didn't get the facts quite right," "the visual footage substitutes for sustained analysis," or "the approach is too shallow." Errol Morris's *The Fog of War* has proved to be something of an exception. There has certainly been some criticism, generally of the "Morris didn't push McNamara enough" variety, but in the main the film has received a polite and sometimes quite favorable reception from the discipline. Those responses puzzle me, not so much because Morris's film doesn't succeed on its own limited terms. It largely does, often powerfully illustrating the complexities of McNamara's efforts to come to terms with his past. But as history *The Fog of War* ultimately fails to place the wars for Vietnam and McNamara's part in them in the broader sweep of post-1945 American and international history.

The American war in Vietnam in the 1960s has been at the center of McNamara's almost decade-long redemptive quest. It began with the mea culpas of his 1995 *In Retrospect*—"we were wrong, terribly

wrong"—and was followed up in *Argument without End* (1999), which was based on McNamara's efforts to bring American and Vietnamese policymakers together in Hanoi to explore what he termed the "missed opportunities" on both sides. Neither project had the impact McNamara intended. *In Retrospect* was greeted with hostility from many observers, especially Vietnam war veterans, who asked why McNamara did not voice his doubts when they might have made a difference: when he was still at the center of Vietnam decision making or immediately after he left the Johnson administration. The premises of the Hanoi oral history undertaking brought a sharp and revealing critique from the Vietnamese participants in it. Perhaps there were missed opportunities on the American side, they claimed, but not for the Vietnamese. If there were lessons to be learned they were largely in the inability of Cold War U.S. policy makers to recognize the decolonizing wave in the Third World, of which the Vietnamese struggle for independence was one instantiation.

The failure of these projects clearly shapes McNamara's presentation of the role he played in America's Vietnam policy in *The Fog of War*, and Morris casts an only partially critical gaze on that presentation. McNamara takes on the "why didn't he say so earlier" critique by foregrounding the doubts he raised about Vietnam as secretary of defense. Here Morris largely plays along, juxtaposing selected taped conversations in which McNamara voices his hesitations to Kennedy and Johnson with McNamara's more recent revisionism. What goes missing in both cases, of course, is McNamara's simultaneous support for the rigorous prosecution of the war. If he voiced doubts at particular moments, much of his private and almost all of his public

statements were considerably more hawkish.

The conceit of "lessons" that frames the film, though a good fit for illuminating McNamara's relentless didacticism, might also be viewed as an extended apologia, one which Morris does little to interrogate critically. In the lessons McNamara articulates—whether centered on the perils of World War II strategic bombing, the Cuban missile crisis, his quest for passenger safety at Ford Motor Company or the escalation of the war in Vietnam—he seeks to convey his own extraordinary Olympian detachment, common decency and public-spirited good sense. Tellingly, McNamara uses General Curtis LeMay as his foil in this endeavor. LeMay, McNamara tells us, may have enthusiastically directed the strategic bombing of Japan with its massive and unnecessary loss of life or urged the use of nuclear weapons in Cuba and Vietnam despite the potential for an atomic apocalypse. But not McNamara. Indeed, the unspoken implication is that major policy debates in the United States revolved around the clash between LeMay's barbaric aggression and the statesman-like humanity of McNamara. We can all be glad that McNamara usually had the upper hand (and we should be indebted to him for his efforts). The main lines of American diplomacy, of course, did not hover around this imagined LeMay/McNamara axis, and choosing LeMay as his alter ego is a bit like saying "well, compared to Genghis Khan's reign my watch looks pretty good." Indeed it does, but what does that really tell us? Morris obliges McNamara by never even hinting at these contradictions.

LeMay aside, there is an oddly insular and sometimes distorted quality to McNamara's telling of the cases that inform his lessons of war.

For example, his rendition of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents does make it clear that they were considerably more ambiguous than they were made out to be by U.S. policymakers, himself included, at the time. Echoing the careful conclusions of Edwin E. Moise's close study of the incidents in *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (1996), he admits that the second incident probably didn't happen. "Belief and seeing," McNamara intones, "are both often wrong." And yet he makes no mention of the escalating clandestine American war in North Vietnam itself and how it might have precipitated the first Vietnamese attack. In McNamara's telling there is no place for real American culpability, only for the somewhat murky confusion of the fog of war.

There is also the matter of the sheer number of lessons themselves—there are eleven altogether (with an even more elaborate, and often confusing, parsing of them in the special features section of the DVD version of the film)—and their ultimate utility. Even in the most thoughtful reaches of the Bush administration, an admittedly slender territory, it is hard to imagine Colin Powell or Condoleezza Rice keeping all of them straight. As Gary Trudeau might write: "Damn, what was number 9. CONDI!?" "It's OK Mr. President, I can't always remember either." More seriously, if we strip the United States of culpability for the Gulf of Tonkin incident and blame the fog of war, how can its lessons help us understand, for instance, the current administration's willful misreading of the intelligence on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction or the distressing parallels between the congressional blank check that followed the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the recent show of support for the use of force against Iraq in Congress?

While Morris leaves the problematic nature of McNamara's lessons largely unexamined, he is considerably stronger in shaping a deft psychological portrait of the conflictual desires that appear to have shaped McNamara's past actions and his more recent drive for redemption. On the one hand, McNamara's imperiousness, his self-regard and the

sureness of his wearying insistence that he had and has the right answers to the big questions comes across very sharply and help us recall that many of McNamara's contemporaries saw him as arrogant. In the sleek and arresting use of visual imagery that characterizes the film, Morris rapidly (almost eye-poppingly) projects the largely pejorative adjectives the popular press used to describe McNamara's meteoric rise to power in Washington. In addition, McNamara's retrospective voiceover details his service to Ford and in Washington in ways that at times support the critiques of his contemporary critics to a surprising degree.

But Morris also shows a less familiar side of McNamara and reveals insecurities that seem to lie just beneath the surface. Perhaps the most striking example of these, which leaves the viewer torn between empathy and scorn, is displayed when McNamara describes his role in the decision of where to bury President Kennedy. His clear regard and even love for Kennedy comes across in quite moving ways. Fighting back tears, he narrates how he came to choose Kennedy's burial site at Arlington National Cemetery. And yet there is an air of self-importance here, as McNamara is determined to let his listeners know that of all the Kennedy retainers it was he that the president's widow turned to in carrying out this symbolically fraught task. McNamara also emphasizes repeatedly that the site he selected was the "most beautiful" one at Arlington. If the audience has any doubt, he marshals the testimony of experts: the park ranger in charge of the cemetery agreed with him, as did Bobby Kennedy, who later told McNamara his brother had remarked on the beauty of the spot in one of his visits to the cemetery. In highlighting this brief story, Morris displays the ways in which McNamara unconsciously reveals many of the essential contradictions of his personality. On the one hand, he conveys McNamara's boundless capacity for loyalty and his deep admiration for the presidents whom he served; on the other, he shows McNamara's endless craving for recognition and Svengali-like

insistence on his ability to make the right choices. But he also reveals the more unexpected and endearing fragility underlying McNamara's sense of himself and his public displays of confidence. One cannot help but think, couldn't the site he selected for the burial have simply been beautiful? Did his choice really require the validation of experts?

Morris, however, does not always appear to know what to do with this nuanced portrait of McNamara and how it might help us understand the Vietnam War and McNamara's place in it. The trope of redemption reappears in the final frame of the film and hovers over it. In a familiar and tired cinematic convention, we are portentously told that "Robert S. McNamara served as president of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. Since his retirement, he has continued to work on problems of poverty, world health and economic development." This ennobling coda conceals more than it reveals. Under McNamara's leadership, the bank and its place in America's larger modernizing project in the non-Western world have been the subject of sustained and persuasive critical scholarship that unpacks the ways in which the failed high modernist schemes of American development experts paralleled the political and military dimensions of American Cold War diplomacy toward the Third World. (See, for example, Nils Gilman's *Mandarins of the Future* [2004]). In many ways, McNamara's tenure at the bank was less an occasion for his redemption than a continuation by other means and on other fronts of the policies that brought American defeat in Vietnam and prompted the suffering of millions of Vietnamese civilians on all sides of the conflict.

This larger context matters, not only for understanding the problematic nature of McNamara's lesson-driven vision of the past, but more important, for contextualizing its larger significance. In the end, the Vietnam War was not, as his critics argued during the war, McNamara's war. If personality and agency are a necessary part of assessing the war and McNamara's culpability in it, so too are the more capacious structural frames of state and society

in Cold War America. McNamara was perhaps an über representative of the broader social and intellectual currents circulating in and shaping the contours of post-1945 America. In critical ways his approach to the world reflects the larger patterns of the culture of manliness so eloquently captured in Robert D. Dean's *Imperial Brotherhood* (2001). Moreover, McNamara was both a product and an agent of the exceptionalist can-do attitude that, as Dan Rodgers argues in *Atlantic Crossings* (2000), conditioned the paradoxically parochial globalism of Cold War America.

The Fog of War, as they say, doesn't go there. Perhaps it would be asking too much of a film produced in a climate in which the cultural politics of the Vietnam War and its legacies remain highly unstable. And by contrast to the frustratingly one-dimensional and quasi-utopian narratives that govern popular representations of World War II, like the "Boys of Pointe du Hoc" and the "Greatest Generation," Morris's film does convey a more measured understanding of McNamara and the world he confronted. But if it captures aspects of the perils of McNamara's struggle for redemption, *The Fog of War* only gets us part of the way toward apprehending the larger processes that brought McNamara and American society to war in Vietnam and the place of the war in the domestic and international history of the last half-century.

Mark Philip Bradley is Associate Professor of History at Northwestern University.

The Fog of Self Delusion

Allan R. Millett

Critics of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara still stress his middle name—Strange—when they curse his conduct of the war in Vietnam. His detractors argue that by allowing the North Vietnamese to establish sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia and by restricting Rolling Thunder air strikes to narrowly defined military

targets, he doomed the American war effort. Another variant of this criticism stresses his failure to reform the South Vietnamese armed forces, to expand the pacification campaign, to push for economic development, and to introduce grass-roots democracy into Vietnamese rural society. It is not certain that McNamara understood all these non-quantifiable factors in 1961-67, and *The Fog of War* does not establish that he understands these issues now. The "we could have won" school of Vietnam obsessives will find more evidence in *The Fog of War* that Secretary McNamara knew very little about Southeast Asia and nothing about the nature of warfare.

The anti-war school of Vietnam obsessives will find plenty of evidence in the movie to confirm their view that McNamara was either a duplicitous knave or a sycophantic courtier who allowed himself to be charmed by John F. Kennedy and bullied by Lyndon Johnson. According to this school of thought, McNamara was a capitalist technocrat whose manic lust for mathematical expressions of reality blinded him to the insurmountable odds the United States was facing when it tried to stop a powerful, legitimate, revolutionary movement in postcolonial Vietnam. McNamara could have mustered enough experts to advance this view in the White House and persuade Lyndon Johnson that killing Vietnamese did nothing to contain the Chinese.

The real Robert S. McNamara remains elusive, a confessant who never quite confesses, an apostate convert to the anti-war school who remains loyal to an American commitment gone wrong. He still cannot explain why the American intervention failed. And no wonder: his background was in systems analyses, and win or lose, the United States could not justify the Vietnam War by analyzing its cost-effectiveness.

The producer-director of *The Fog of War*, Errol Morris, is a newcomer to documentaries on foreign and military affairs. His questions for McNamara and his selection of film footage reveal a low level of preparation; he needs some lessons from Ted Koppel and Charlie Rose. Nevertheless, he makes

a brave attempt to study McNamara's pre-public life (1916-1961), his struggle with the cold war crises of the Kennedy administration and the specter of nuclear war, and his role in Vietnam decision-making. However, he beats the obvious points to death and ignores the more promising clues to McNamara's Vietnam War experience.

Morris is fixated on isolated events that cast the armed forces senior commanders as villains and McNamara as a victim. He concentrates, for example, on the Gulf of Tonkin incident, only one of many alarming events in 1964. He also allows McNamara to focus on the air campaign against North Vietnam. With some contextual legerdemain that impresses Morris, whose light grasp of World War II history is obvious, McNamara compares the bombing of North Vietnam to the strategic bombing of Japan and makes it clear that he sees himself as having been tasked with curbing a bombing-happy Air Force. He hardly discusses the conduct of ground operations within Vietnam or the risks of a search and destroy campaign controlled by the Communists' willingness to stand and fight or to fade away to their sanctuaries in the mountains, jungles, and tunnels. In 1994 I crawled in the Cu Chi tunnels, built under an American division's base camp in Tay Ninh Province. I wish Secretary McNamara could have the same experience.

Morris wonders how someone as highly intelligent and deeply moral as McNamara could go so wrong on Vietnam. *The Fog of War* provides some answers that border on psychobiography. McNamara grew up poor enough to have class anxiety. He insists that he grew up in San Francisco when his home was really in Oakland. His striving at Berkeley led him to the Harvard Business School, where he taught from 1940-43. Interestingly, both before and after World War II, McNamara preferred being a HBS faculty member to being an industrial mogul. In the wartime U.S. Army Air Forces, he excelled in the operational analysis of strategic bombing, especially the bombing of Japan by Curtis E. LeMay's Twentieth

Air Force. McNamara is obviously bothered by an operation he now regards as "criminal." He both praises and condemns LeMay, but he is clearly intimidated by LeMay's force of character.

Morris allows McNamara to make the case that his major challenge as secretary of defense was preventing LeMay from starting World War III during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. LeMay had left the JCS by the time the great negative decisions of 1965 and 1966 were made, but McNamara still asserts that dealing with the pressure for escalations of violence from the JCS, whose members simply parroted LeMay's advice to bomb the Vietnamese "back into the stone age," was his greatest problem. H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* (1997) is hard on the service chiefs, but he acknowledges that the JCS contingency plans of 1965 envisioned more than just a crushing air campaign. As in many similar cases, McNamara's recollections, unexamined by Morris, are selective and self-serving.

McNamara's years with the Ford Motor Company did little to transform him from a great staff officer of exceptional analytic skill to a national security leader. He had been president of Ford for five whole weeks before he switched masters from Henry Ford III to JFK. His deep interest in international and defense affairs before 1961 is part of the Camelot myth. What did McNamara bring to the Office of the Secretary of Defense? He provided a method-driven approach (systems analysis) to defense problems that provided "cost-effective" solutions. However, he brought absolutely no interest or prior knowledge about wars of national liberation to his office, and he ignored expert advice on the subject from people like Edward G. Lansdale, John Mecklin, Sir Robert Thompson, and George Carver. What did he achieve? His pseudoscientific solutions of budget problems confused Congress, cowed the military departments, and corralled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Defense spending during his tenure increased by a higher percentage than it did in the 1980s. He brought some order to strategic nuclear planning

and weapons procurement, and he advanced the careers of a generation of "whiz kids," OSD civilians, two of whom later became the secretary of defense (Harold Brown and Les Aspin).

Around 1967 McNamara developed serious doubts about the war, largely because of his study of the bombing results of Operation Rolling Thunder. By that time it was too late to get LBJ to surrender or win because of the perceived international and domestic costs. Could something have been done earlier? McNamara believes JFK had an exit strategy, but we will never know for sure. McNamara likes to draw lessons from history, but he knew nothing of Charles de Gaulle's honorable retreat from Algeria and says nothing now about the United States exiting El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, and Lebanon. Even when McNamara started the study that would come to be known as the Pentagon Papers, he was unaware that Secretary of State Dean Acheson had conducted a similar review of the Korean War in 1953-54. Spare us from political appointees (for McNamara was neither politician nor bureaucrat) who define history in terms of their personal experience.

The Fog of War should be retitled *The Fog of Robert McNamara*, since it deals with McNamara more than the Vietnam War. The war is a complex subject, and because Morris does not know enough about it to ask the right questions, the movie will do little to help unprepared students understand it. Yet even Morris's portrait of McNamara is not quite convincing. Obviously, McNamara's very selective memory is an obstacle to comprehension. The author-journalist David Halberstam, who has covered American politics and wars for forty-plus years, recently told me that McNamara had more trouble with the truth than any official he had ever met, and that is quite a universe from which to draw comparisons. Morris does his best to give us the essential Robert S. McNamara, but his subject has become an expert in making himself seem more complex than he really is. In reality McNamara is a simple technocrat seduced by the chance for historical immortality

through public office. He will certainly be remembered, but the McNamara he would like us to remember—the victimized man of good intentions led astray by hubris, misplaced loyalty, and bad advice—is not the one that will go down in history.

Allan Millett is Lt. Gen. Raymond E. Mason Chair of Military History at The Ohio State University.

Mr. Secretary: A Review of Errol Morris's *The Fog of War*

Moss Roberts and
Marilyn B. Young

This essay is dedicated to the memory of Georges Boudarel, educator and opponent of Franco-American imperialism in Vietnam.

"Never answer the question that was asked of you. Answer the question that you wish had been asked of you. It's a good rule." --Robert S. McNamara

Errol Morris's documentary *The Fog of War* is organized around eleven lessons that Robert Strange McNamara derived from his experiences as a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force in World War II and as secretary of defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson. In this review, we test some of these lessons by examining what McNamara said and did then and what he thinks now.

"I've been part of wars...."

Morris's main interest is the Vietnam War, and the introductory frames of the film show the young McNamara standing and pointing didactically at a map of Vietnam with his pointer. He is every inch the war bureaucrat, suited, as always, in what Baudelaire calls "the necessary garb of our suffering age, which wears the symbol of perpetual mourning on its thin black shoulders." The scene shifts from the map lesson to the operational theatre, in this case sailors at sea

tending their weapons. The next logical image, showing the sailors' target, does not follow; instead, Morris begins the film proper with his main subject, now in his mid-eighties, squarely facing the camera, his long fingers admonishing Morris—and the viewer—with great energy. He speaks in a tone that both pleads for understanding and exerts authority. "Any military commander, if he is honest with himself, will admit he has made mistakes in the application of military power," he says. "He's killed people . . . unnecessarily, hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands, even 100,000 [he is thinking of the firebombing of Tokyo]. But an atomic bomb destroys whole nations."

His point is that nuclear war dwarfs the horrors of conventional war and continues to threaten humankind. He believes that in 1962 he and the Kennedy administration saved the world from nuclear war. Whatever he feels about the rest of his career, McNamara takes pride in the way the Cuban missile crisis was defused. Here McNamara and Morris offer Lesson Number 1: empathize with your enemy. Peace was maintained because "we got inside [the Russians'] skins. We understood that Khrushchev had to be able to say that he headed off a U.S. invasion of Cuba before he could remove the missiles."

McNamara credits the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Tommy Thompson, with having had the strength of character to oppose Kennedy's initial belligerence toward the USSR. Yet the rest of *The Fog of War* demonstrates McNamara's inability to follow Thompson's example. Obedience—he calls it loyalty—is his credo. He has been part of two wars, but his role, he protests, was to serve his commanding officers: General Curtis LeMay in World War II, Kennedy and Johnson during the Vietnam War.


"If we had lost [World War II] we could have been tried as war criminals. He, and I'd say I, were behaving as war criminals..."

McNamara's memories of the firebombing of Japanese cities at the end of World War II follow his account of the Cuban missile crisis. The sequence

is powerful. McNamara declines the pose of moral superiority assumed to justify allied atrocities in World War II to speak bluntly about what war means to civilians. He consistently uses the words "burned to death" and corrects himself when he slips and says "bombed." In Tokyo, the United States "burned to death 100,000 Japanese civilians in a single night—men, women, children." Were you aware of this, Morris asks him? "I was part of a mechanism that in a sense

recommended it," McNamara replies. Morris asks why incendiaries were used, but McNamara sidesteps the question. The real issue, he asks, is whether "in order to win a war should you kill 100,000 people in a single night by firebombs or any other way?" LeMay's answer, McNamara adds, had been an unequivocal "yes."

Characteristically, McNamara's attempts at moral reasoning abort. He neither agrees nor disagrees with LeMay but instead describes the toll



Fourth Annual Sherman Emerging Scholar Lecture University of North Carolina at Wilmington

A Call for Nominations. The Department of History at UNCW invites applications for the 2005 Virginia and Derrick Sherman Emerging Scholar Lecture. This year's topic will be:

"Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe: Lessons from Recent History"

The Sherman Lecture provides a forum for outstanding junior scholars (untenured assistant professors or young researchers) to offer their perspective on a selected topic in the recent history of international relations. The Sherman scholar will meet with graduate and undergraduate classes, share his or her expertise with faculty members in history and political science and be available to local media. The centerpiece of the scholar's visit will be the presentation of a major public address, which the university will subsequently publish. Applicants will be evaluated on the basis of scholarly accomplishment, relevance of the proposed talk to the year's theme, and evidence of ability in public speaking and in interacting with diverse audiences. The scholar will receive an honorarium of \$5,000. This year's lectureship will take place on the UNCW campus October 18-21.

Nominations and self-nominations are welcome. Please send a letter of interest, current c.v., the name of three references and a recent scholarly publication to Dr. Susan P. McCaffray, Dept. of History, UNCW, 601 S. College Rd., Wilmington, NC 28403-5957. Deadline for submissions is May 30, 2005. UNCW is an EEO/AA Institution.

the attack on Japan took: sixty-seven cities destroyed, two with nuclear bombs. He names the Japanese cities and their U.S. equivalents, by population and by area destroyed: 58% of Yokohama, McNamara intones, a city the size of Cleveland. As he speaks, the bombs, represented as numerals, descend in slow motion, soundlessly, without landing, upon aerial scans of the devastated areas. They fall slowly, then faster and faster, the data flitting by. McNamara's lesson? "Proportionality should be a guideline in war." (In the DVD supplement this is Lesson Number 1.)

"In the minds of some people" (but not himself), the use of two nuclear bombs was overkill, McNamara says. Nevertheless, he doesn't "fault Truman." Answering a question he had not been asked, he merely says that the "U.S.-Japan war was one of the most brutal in human history," and he advises Morris to look beyond tactics to the failure of humanity to grapple with the rules of war. But does not this statement undermine the concept of agency and therefore responsibility, drawing no distinction between victim and perpetrator? McNamara says he agrees with LeMay: had the U.S. lost, "we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." But then he asks, "what makes it immoral if you lose and not if you win?" The camera moves closer to McNamara's clean-shaven, sad-eyed, compressed face. He does not answer his own question. Morris seems to honor him for having asked it. The question of Vietnam has now reappeared, silent as Banquo's ghost.

Morris's next frames quote taped telephone exchanges between Johnson and McNamara in the spring of 1964. They are fretting over public relations tactics. Then suddenly we are back in the present moment. Morris's voice is distant and tentative, as if the director were afraid McNamara might turn skittish. "At some point we have to approach Vietnam and I wonder how you can best set that up for me," he says. McNamara's eyes shift away from the camera and back again. "It's a hard question," he answers after a long pause. "We have to approach it in the context of the Cold War—but first I'll have to talk about Ford [the

words tumble out]. I've got to go back to the end of the war." Logical enough: after all, 1945 *was* the real beginning of the Vietnam War, when the U.S. government began to support the return of French forces. But McNamara is not thinking of Vietnam. At this moment he is remembering himself as a victim, because autumn 1945 is the time when he and his wife were stricken with polio. He does not dwell on their illness, however, but moves the story swiftly forward to his years at Ford, when he tried to reduce auto injuries and fatalities by promoting safety features like seat belts and cushioned dash boards. Ten handsomely illustrated minutes go by before McNamara returns to the business at hand.

The discussion then focuses on the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August 1964, which the administration exploited to convince Congress to issue a war resolution. McNamara had earlier misrepresented the Cuban missile crisis by failing to provide the context of U.S. sabotage in which it arose. Similarly, he now avoids any mention of the provocative behavior of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces that preceded the only Vietnamese PT boat attack in the Gulf. Instead, he recalls Johnson's stated belief that the Vietnamese attack was a deliberate escalation that indicated "they would not stop short of winning." The point is puzzling: why would they be fighting, if not to win? After a pause McNamara says, "We were wrong." The Vietnamese attack on August 2 did not signal deliberate escalation; and the second attack, on August 4, never occurred at all. The report of that attack stemmed from a misreading of sonar data. "We see what we want to believe," Morris suggests helpfully. Emphatically agreeing, McNamara adds another lesson, sometimes "belief [and] seeing, are both wrong." Neither McNamara nor Morris asks what causes beliefs to be wrong.

Throughout this and the following sequences McNamara blames the escalating war squarely on President Johnson. His own role is supportive, but also questioning. However, in a forthcoming study, *Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War*

in Vietnam, Gareth Porter argues the opposite, that McNamara and the National Security Council insistently pushed a reluctant president towards ever more daring and decisive military action and may even have concealed relevant information from him.

"Each of us could have achieved our objectives without the terrible loss of life."

McNamara is blind to the realities of U.S. foreign policy; for him, the Cold War absolves the United States from any charge of colonialism. He expresses astonishment at the Vietnamese belief that "we had simply replaced the French as a colonial power . . . [That] was absolutely absurd." Even today the simple truth about his government's colonial policies, obvious to people around the world, escapes him. When he meets his Vietnamese counterparts in Hanoi, almost thirty years after leaving office, McNamara asks what they thought they had achieved with all that death. "You didn't get any more than we were willing to give you at the beginning of the war. You could have had the whole damn thing: independence, unification." This statement is as false as it is condescending. Vietnamese and U.S. goals were opposed, not identical. McNamara's meaning, it emerges, is that for the United States, Vietnam was not a war of colonization but a Cold War front or, as McNamara puts it, a "Cold War activity." The former foreign minister of the DRV spoke from a more local perspective and mocked McNamara's ignorance: China was Vietnam's historical enemy, and Vietnam had never been a Chinese pawn. The Vietnamese fought for their independence; the United States tried to enslave them.

Despite the lesson that McNamara says he drew from the Cuban missile crisis, "empathize with the enemy," he still cannot empathize, cannot get inside the skin of the colonized. Neither McNamara nor his colleagues at the war table showed anything but boundless indifference to the Vietnamese, or for that matter the Cubans. Does McNamara intend the audience to believe that Johnson's war council, and he himself, could have

forestalled the escalation of 1964-65 by empathizing with the Vietnamese? If so, it is a case he does not make. Indeed, the manner in which McNamara laughs off the idea that the Americans were conquerors like the French, as he does when meeting with Vietnamese historians and officials in 1995, suggests that he will never be able to see the United States and the war as the Vietnamese did and do. At best, his visits to Vietnam and to Cuba can be read as gestures towards empathy in hindsight, gambits in his ongoing effort at self-justification.

Reflecting on the Hanoi meeting, McNamara insists that the United States must never engage in unilateral military action. No ally supported the United States in its war in Vietnam, he claims, forgetting the three hundred thousand South Korean troops and smaller contingents of Australians, Filipinos and other nationals who fought there. "If we had not acted unilaterally, we wouldn't have been there." But what if there had been greater international support for the Vietnam War, as there was for the Korean and other U.S.-dominated wars? Would that alone have justified it? Unilateral action has always characterized U.S. foreign policy, as it has the foreign policies of other nations.

Morris asks McNamara if he felt that he was "the author of stuff, or that you were an instrument of things outside your control." Neither, McNamara answers. "I was serving an elected president and my responsibility was to help him carry out policies he believed were in the interests of the country." Although he has long been out of government, he also uses this answer to explain his reticence on the war in Iraq. At a Berkeley campus forum on *The Fog of War* held in February 2004, McNamara tells the host, Mark Danner, and fellow guest Errol Morris that he has declined more than 170 invitations from reporters to share his thoughts on Iraq. When he deflects Danner's invitation as well, Danner confronts McNamara with a statement he had given to the *Toronto Globe and Mail* a week before. "It's just wrong what we're doing [in Iraq]," McNamara had said, "It's morally wrong, it's politically wrong,

it's economically wrong." To the American audience he refused these plain truths and justified himself on the grounds that his criticism would endanger American soldiers. The opposite is as true for Iraq as it was for Vietnam.

McNamara has arrived where he started but knows the place no better, unable to live up to T.S. Eliot's words of wisdom from a poem that he professes to admire: We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time (Little Gidding).

"We have certain ideals, certain responsibilities. Recognize that at times you will have to engage in evil, but minimize it."

McNamara draws this moral from Sherman's torching of Atlanta, LeMay's fire bombing of Japan and, surprisingly, Norman Morrison's self-immolation. Morrison, he reminds the viewer, was a Quaker who burned himself to death in front of the Pentagon. He was carrying his infant daughter and in McNamara's version of the story (which is at odds with Paul Hendrickson's detailed account) released her only in response to a bystander's appeal. At the time of his death, Morrison's wife had issued a statement that moved McNamara: "Human beings," she said, "must stop killing other human beings." It's a belief McNamara says he shares, but he then observes again that evil must be done "in order to do good." This is a "very, very difficult position for sensitive people to be in. Morrison was one of those people. I think I was." He does not explain what good the war wrought. On one subject McNamara maintains his silence: asked what effect the anti-war movement had on his views, McNamara denies there was any, adding brusquely that it was a "tense" time within his family and that he won't discuss it further.

Whatever he believed, McNamara resigned, or was fired, or both, in the midst of the Vietnam and Cold Wars. In a "beautiful ceremony," Johnson gave him the Medal of Freedom, but when McNamara tried to express his thanks, he could not speak. In

contemporary footage, he seems hardly to be able to stand up straight. As Johnson eyes him intently from the side, McNamara manages only to say that he "cannot find the words to express what is in his heart" and that he would "respond on another occasion." In 1995 he finally did so. "We were wrong, terribly wrong," he wrote. "We owe it to future generations to find out why." It seems likely, in retrospect, that what was in McNamara's heart in 1967 could not be spoken or expressed because he had lost faith in the cause.

In the epilogue McNamara is behind the wheel of his car; sitting beside him as they drive, Morris presses him to explain why he didn't speak out after his resignation. "I'm not going to say any more than I have," McNamara replies curtly. "These are the kinds of questions that get me in trouble. You don't know how inflammatory my words can appear. A lot of people misunderstand the war, misunderstand me. Some people think I'm a son of a bitch." Morris is relentless here. Does McNamara feel any guilt or responsibility? McNamara stonewalls. "I don't want to go any further in the discussion. It just adds to the controversy. It's too complex." Morris, with a pang of empathy for his subject, suggests that "you're damned if you do and damned if you don't." "Yeah," McNamara agrees, "and I'd rather be damned if I don't." These are McNamara's last words in the film.

Released during the war in Iraq, *The Fog of War* raises many conveniently forgotten questions for what Gore Vidal calls "the United States of Amnesia." McNamara's lessons—proportionality, empathy, skepticism—have immediate and obvious significance. His appearance in this film, in the course of which he reveals so much of his divided self, is a gesture not lightly made, nor should we take it lightly.

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New Evidence on the Secret Nuclear Alert of October 1969: The Henry A. Kissinger Telcons

William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball

In two articles we published in January 2003 on President Richard M. Nixon's secret nuclear alert of October 13-28, 1969, we were able to establish that the rumored operation had in fact taken place, to describe the manner of its execution, and to solve the mystery of why Nixon ordered it.¹ Intent upon settling the Vietnam War on his own terms, Nixon hoped the alert would "jar" both the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) into making concessions. The alert, whose official name was "Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test," failed in its purpose, but it was one of the early exercises of Nixon's self-styled "madman theory" — "the principle of the threat of excessive force."²

Even though our articles drew on a substantial body of recently declassified documents in the archives of the White House, several military headquarters commands, and the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, important questions remained partially or wholly unanswered. Did anyone else know about the purpose of the alert besides a small inner circle composed of President Nixon, his assistant for national security affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Kissinger's aide Colonel Alexander M. Haig, Nixon's chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Laird's aide Colonel Robert E. Pursley? On precisely what date did Nixon and Kissinger order Laird and Earle J. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to begin planning the alert? When and how did the Department of State learn about the alert? Did the White House inform Secretary of State William P. Rogers about the purpose of the alert? How did the Soviets, Chinese, and North Vietnamese interpret the alert and respond to it? Did American military intelligence detect Soviet, Chinese,

and North Vietnamese reactions? To what extent were Nixon and Kissinger concerned about the anti-Vietnam War movement and the larger American public learning of their strategy? Released by the National Archives and Records Administration on May 26, 2004, Henry A. Kissinger's Telephone Conversation Transcripts (telcons) shed more light on these questions, provide surprising answers to some of them, and raise additional questions about the history of the alert.³

Previously declassified documents had led us to conclude that it was President Nixon who had ordered Laird on the evening of October 6 to begin planning the secret nuclear alert. His purpose was to compensate for having recently decided to cancel the massive bombing and mining operation — secretly code-named duck hook — that he had threatened to unleash against North Vietnam unless Hanoi yielded to Washington's terms by November 1. Nixon may have wanted the Soviets and North Vietnamese to think the alert was a lead-up to duck hook before Moscow and Hanoi discovered that the operation had been scratched. Perhaps he was hoping that the alert itself would jar Hanoi into concessions or send a signal to Moscow about the risks of its support for Hanoi, thus leveraging the Soviets into putting pressure on the North Vietnamese to soften their diplomatic position. But even if the bluff failed, Nixon thought, it might salvage his reputation for toughness and irrationality despite his having backed down from launching duck hook.⁴ We still believe this analysis of purpose is correct, but the transcript of a conversation between Kissinger and Laird on the morning of October 6 indicates that the planning process for the alert had begun earlier than the evening of the sixth and that it was Kissinger, acting for Nixon, who first brought the matter up with Laird.

On instructions from Nixon, Kissinger was primed that morning to urge Laird to prepare an operation that had nuclear implications; namely to put U.S. strategic forces on a higher defcon⁵ alert status. Kissinger initially brought up the subject by remarking that he had noticed that a "SAC [Strategic Air Command] exercise" was scheduled to take place in October. "I'm all for it," he said, "but I just want to know what it is. Has it been announced?" When Laird answered that it had not been announced, Kissinger asked: "Will the other side pick this up? We want them to." Laird responded: "They will pick it up. The fact that we are exercising our bombers." But Kissinger was not satisfied that the exercise was of sufficient magnitude: "Could you exercise the defcons for a day or so in October? I'll give you a brief as to why." Laird said, "we can," to which Kissinger replied, "the president will appreciate it very much."⁶

In the days following October 6, the Pentagon prepared recommendations for military measures designed to get the attention of Moscow and Hanoi. According to an October 10 telcon between Kissinger and Laird, Nixon had approved on the night of October 9 "the exercises that are to be laid on for October 13 and 14 and running through that week." Laird, however, was "concerned" about two issues. The first had to do with the requirement that allies were supposed to be notified about defcons. Laird asked: "We will not be contacting our allies (Canada or NATO) on any of these?" Kissinger confirmed that the United States would not contact allies, because "we were worried about getting the allies involved." The next part of the discussion is murky. Kissinger remarked that "all of these activities will get some sort of signal — they will get the word, but there will be no defcon. There is no military

significance to this." "They" could refer to the allies or the Soviets.

Laird's other concern was whether the alert was connected with or "contingent in any way on the other operation that is going to be discussed on Saturday [October 11]." As written down by the transcriber, Laird's reference to the "other operation" is vague, but he may have been referring to a previously scheduled exercise involving nuclear missile submarines. In any event, Kissinger "affirmed it has nothing to do with that," and "he told L to go ahead and execute this—he has a signed paper from the president that he wants it."⁷

What Kissinger was saying was that he wanted nuclear signals for political rather than military purposes, and, in order to preserve the operation's secrecy, the signals could not be called a defcon. Appreciating Laird's concern, as well as his reluctance to sign on, Kissinger referred to "a signed paper" from Nixon, which may or may not have existed (at least it has not yet surfaced in White House papers).

The exercise that got under way on October 13 included a "stand down" of SAC's nuclear bomber force, which had the effect of increasing the number of bombers on ground alert and signaling that steps were being taken to improve force readiness. The telcons reveal that even at this late date no one had yet informed the Department of State about the operation. When Kissinger asked about it, Laird said he had not told Secretary Rogers but that his military aide would soon report to State's executive secretary, Theodore Eliot, that a "routine SAC exercise" was under way and that Nixon was aware of it. In a telcon the next day, Kissinger learned from Laird that Eliot had been told and he had also briefed Elliot Richardson, Rogers' deputy. Still, no one at State had been informed about the purpose of the alert. Even after Eliot and Richardson had asked "what it was all about," they were advised that "they would have to ask the highest authority about it." The telcons yield no answers, however, to the question of whether Rogers or Richardson ever learned about the purpose of the alert.

In any event, the press and others took notice of the stand down. On the fourteenth, Laird told Kissinger that reporters near a SAC base were asking "why there were no planes flying" and that SAC headquarters was also receiving press inquiries about the matter. When Laird requested guidance for the Defense Department's response, Kissinger asked him to hold off until the next day, October 15. The first Moratorium against the Vietnam War was to occur that day, and Kissinger told Laird that he "would hate to see the peaceniks worked up about this."⁸

Kissinger, of course, wanted the Soviets to notice and react to the operation, and by October 17 he thought he had reason to believe they had. Late in the afternoon of that day, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had phoned Kissinger to say that he had a message on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that he wanted to deliver to President Nixon and "that there may also be some further discussion on Soviet/American relations." (Dobrynin's request would soon result in the scheduling of a meeting between Nixon, Kissinger, and Dobrynin on October 20.) Apparently persuaded that Dobrynin's phone call was a response to the nuclear alert, Kissinger told Laird the next day that "the game plan seems to be working" and that there might be a "little payoff."⁹

A cryptic record of an October 14 Kissinger conversation with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, one of his most important patrons, suggests that Kissinger had brought the governor into the secret shortly after the alert got underway. When he spoke with Rockefeller again on the morning of October 20, just hours before the Nixon-Kissinger-Dobrynin meeting, he told him that "the thing they had discussed the other day—it's gotten down to producing little twitches." In addition, he said that "there's now a 30 percent chance—it would be sheer gold if we could get away with it." An hour or so later, in a conversation with Pentagon planner Fritz Kraemer, an early mentor who had a formative influence on his career, Kissinger was far more cautious. Now he saw

only a "10 percent chance" of success and admitted that "it has no business succeeding, but it may." Perhaps Kissinger was more careful when speaking with Kraemer because he recognized that the chances of the Soviets falling for the administration's bluff were remote.¹⁰

The much anticipated meeting with Dobrynin turned out to be a disappointment for Nixon and Kissinger. The nuclear alert did not come up for discussion. Dobrynin offered nothing new on the Vietnam question, and he countered Nixon's pre-meeting big stick diplomacy by offering carrots of negotiation on arms control and European security issues.¹¹ In a telephone conversation after the meeting, Nixon suggested that Kissinger meet again with Dobrynin in the morning of the twenty-first and engage in madman playacting: "If the Vietnam thing is raised (try to get it raised)," the transcriber wrote, "the P wants K to shake his head and say 'I am sorry Mr. Ambassador, but he is out of control. . . . He's made up his mind and unless there's some movement,' just shake your head and walk out."¹²

Perhaps when Dobrynin's side of the back channel is published, a better understanding will emerge of what motivated his October 17 phone call and whether it was a reaction to the U.S. alert, as Kissinger had originally believed. In any event, U.S. intelligence continued looking and listening for signs of Soviet responses. The telcons give us a few clues about what was picked up. They suggest, for example, that at least as early as October 14 U.S. intelligence had detected Soviet reactions or countermeasures to the alert, one day after it began.¹³

The alert also had an unintended consequence. On October 21 Laird informed Kissinger that Beijing had reacted: "they have gone on alert." The next day, the two men discussed the memo on the Chinese alert that Laird had forwarded. Kissinger said that he "didn't know whether it was a reaction to us or what the Soviets did in reaction to us." Laird said that "he didn't know either."¹⁴ Alarming the Chinese was not part of the game plan. The American alert came at the end of

a tense period in Sino-Soviet relations, and Beijing was in all likelihood more nervous than before about the intent of the Soviets' actions. The Chinese reaction indicates that Nixon's nuclear alert may have been more dangerous than we first thought.

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Notes

1. William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969," *Cold War History* 3 (January 2003): 113-156; and "Nixon's Nuclear Ploy," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 59, 1 (January/February 2003): 28-37, 72-73. Earlier, in *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), pp. 124-125, Seymour M. Hersh, using information from his informants, briefly

discussed one element of the alert and suggested that it was a manifestation of Nixon's threat strategy against the Soviet Union and its "allies," implying it was in some way related to duck hook. Based on a documented analysis of Nixon's strategic thinking and his administration's steps before and during October, and building on Hersh's limited information about the nature of the alert, Jeffrey Kimball, in *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 164, made a more direct link between the alert, Nixon's madman theory, and the several threats Nixon directed against Hanoi in connection with duck hook. With access to the Strategic Air Command's history of the JCS Readiness Test, Wayne Thompson, in *To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973* (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program/USAF, 2000), 167-168, described the alert as an attempt by Nixon "to underline the seriousness of his ultimatum to Moscow and Hanoi." We were unaware of Thompson's brief account when we wrote papers and articles on the alert in 2001-2002, in which we drew upon the SAC history of the alert and a host of other documents. Scott Sagan and Jeremy Suri, who had originally argued in a 2002

conference paper that the alert was related to the Sino-Soviet crisis, followed our interpretation of Nixon's actions in their later article, "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969," *International Security*, 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 150-183.

2. "Jar" is from Memo, Laird to Kissinger, 21 February 1969, box, 1007, Haig's Vietnam File, Vol. 1 (Jan.-March 1969), National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP); and Journal/Diary entry, October 17, 1969, Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman (JDHRH), NPMP. "Madman theory" and "principle" are from H. R. Haldeman, with Joseph DiMona, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), 82-83.

3. For background information on the telcons and their declassification, see the Web sites of the National Archives and Records Administration, "Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)," <http://nixon.archives.gov/find/textual/presidential/nsc/kissinger/telcons.html>; and the National Security Archive, "The Kissinger Telcons," <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/index.html>.

4. Burr and Kimball, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert," 115, 126-134.

5. This acronym refers to a graduated scale of Defense Readiness Conditions or military alert postures from defcon 4 or 5 (normal peacetime posture) to defcon 1 (deployed for attack).

6. Telcon, Laird, 11:40 a.m., October 6, 1969, box 2, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, NPMP. The transcriber, unfamiliar with the term defcon, typed "DevCon" instead.

7. Telcon, Laird, 12:40 p.m., October 10, 1969, HAK Telcons, NPMP. Regarding the submarine exercise, see Burr and Kimball, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert," 133.

8. Telcons, Laird, 12:05 p.m., October 13, 1969, and 5:35 p.m., October 14, 1969, HAK Telcons, NPMP.

9. Telcons, Dobrynin, 4:40 p.m., October 17, 1969; and Laird, 5:15 p.m., October 18, 1969, *ibid.*

10. Telcons, Rockefeller, 4:50 p.m., October 14, 1969, and 11:10 a.m., October 20, 1969; and Kraemer, 12:30 p.m., October 20, 1969, *ibid.*


11. Burr and Kimball, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert," 129, 141-142.

12. Telcon, Nixon, 8:20 p.m., October 20, 1969, HAK Telcons, NPMP.

13. Telcon, Rockefeller, 4:50 p.m., October 14, 1969, *ibid.*

14. Telcons, Laird, 6:23 p.m., October 21, 1969; and Laird, 8:25 a.m., October 22, 1969, *ibid.*

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History through Documents and Memory: A CWIHP Critical Oral History Conference of the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961

Lise Namikas

On 23-24 September 2004, scholars and former U.S. and Congolese officials gathered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to discuss the Congo crisis of 1960-61. The conference was one of a series of critical oral history workshops sponsored by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) under the direction of Christian F. Ostermann and co-sponsored by the Africa Program. The other workshops sponsored by the CWIHP, including the July 2004 conference on the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, have dealt with relatively recent events. This conference delved farther back in time and was the first to put the spotlight on the Cold War in Africa.

To help guide the conference discussion, former CWIHP scholar Sergey Mazov and I compiled a reader. It included documents gathered specifically for the conference from Russian, European, and U.S. archives, along with material recently declassified from U.S. and Belgian archives, several key articles on the crisis, and a comprehensive chronology. Conference participants also heard eyewitness testimony from veterans of the crisis, including Lawrence Devlin, former CIA station chief in the Congo; Thomas Kanza, former Lumumba confidante and ambassador to the United Nations; and Cleophas Kamitatu, the provincial president of a political party, Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA). With few people left to share personal accounts of events, this testimony added meaningfully to the historical record. Also attending were scholars from around the globe, including Sergey Mazov, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences scholar; Herbert Weiss, Wilson Center senior scholar and eyewitness to the events; Jean Omasombo, Congolese scholar and consultant on the Belgian

Parliamentary Commission's inquiry into Lumumba's assassination; Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Congolese expert and current director of the U.N. Development Programme's Oslo Governance Center; Amerian foreign policy expert and author of one of the first books on the Congo crisis Stephen Weissman; and U.N. expert and member of the U.N. Intellectual History Project Tatiana Carayannis. Representatives from the National Security Archive at George Washington University also attended.

There were several important revelations at the conference, some of the most significant relating to the events of September 1960. Lumumba's dismissal on 5 September has long been controversial. From the memoirs of Belgian ambassador Jean van den Bosch, published in 1986, we know that the Congolese president, Joseph Kasavubu, began talking with Belgian advisors about revoking Patrice Lumumba's premiership as early as July 1960. It is also known that Kasavubu talked with the UN's temporary representative in the Congo, Andrew Cordier, who suggested that he was not averse to Kasavubu's proposed action. Cleophas Kamitatu explained that Lumumba was told of Kasavubu's impending move at least a week before his actual dismissal. Lumumba then met with Kasavubu and tried to work things out, but on 5 September he was suddenly dismissed. Cordier immediately closed the airport at Leopoldville and shut off access to the radio, abruptly styming Lumumba's attempts to rally support.

Historians suspect U.S. complicity in these events, but there has been little conclusive evidence. It has long been known that U.S. ambassador Clare Timberlake and Cordier were cooperating, but Timberlake's actions in the days before the coup are a mystery. Lawrence Devlin

recalled that Timberlake met with Kasavubu shortly before the dismissal. Timberlake told Kasavubu that he too favored revoking Lumumba, but he felt that Kasavubu had ignored him. Timberlake also met with Cordier before the coup, but the contents of their discussion remain unknown. Pushed by the Belgians and assured of indirect U.S. and UN support, Kasavubu acted. Documents translated by the CWIHP revealed that the Soviet Union was also working behind the scenes to urge other African states, including Ghana, to put their troops serving under the UN operation in the Congo at the disposition of the government of the Congo or create a joint command to aid Lumumba. But before the leaders of these states could meet to discuss either option, dramatic events intervened.

On 14 September 1960 Congolese Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu launched his first coup (the second would take place in late 1965). Again, current documentary evidence does not shed much light on the U.S. role. But in a blow-by-blow account of the decisive hours before and after the coup, Devlin recalled how, under pressure, he agreed that the U.S. government would recognize Mobutu's government. The relationship between Devlin and Mobutu has long raised suspicions, but Devlin confirmed that he met with Mobutu only twice before 14 September 1960. These meetings nevertheless convinced him that Mobutu had leadership qualities. On the night of his first coup, Mobutu told Devlin that if the United States would guarantee recognition of his new government then the coup would go forward. Not unaware of the risks involved, Devlin demurred. Impatiently, Mobutu asked again what the U.S. position would be. Devlin recounted how he went out on a limb

and guaranteed U.S. government support.

Kamitatu surmised that the guarantee of U.S. support might explain why Mobutu felt confident enough to dismiss both Lumumba and Kasavubu. He said that he and others had been aware only of plans to remove Lumumba. Had the coup failed (and Timberlake thought it might because he believed that Mobutu was yielding to pressure to allow Lumumba to return), the U.S. position in the Congo could have been jeopardized. As it was, the coup did not fail, but it was not an overwhelming success. Washington in effect undermined Mobutu by insisting on the "de-neutralization" of Kasavubu to safeguard both the UN and the U.S. position in the Congo. The conference discussion also provided new details about the money that Mobutu used to pay his soldiers at the end of September, thereby sealing their loyalty and ensuring that the coup would not fail for lack of military support.

There were other revelations at the conference, particularly about Lumumba's relations with Kasavubu and the West, which had begun to deteriorate long before September. The circumstances surrounding the granting of Congolese independence generated much discussion, as did the relationship between Lumumba and Kasavubu. The two leaders were longtime rivals, and Thomas Kanza recalled that after a secret agreement with Abako, the powerful political organization led by Kasavubu, Lumumba had little choice but to support Kasavubu as president. The discussions also corrected the long-held belief that Lumumba was furiously writing his inflammatory independence-day speech during Kasavubu's speech. In fact, Kanza explained, Lumumba wrote the speech (with the assistance of his European advisors, as Jean Omasombo noted) in the days before independence. It reflected his growing anger with Belgian attempts to deny him the position of prime minister. Along with the many other revelations from the Belgian Parliamentary Commission's inquiry, this disclosure suggests that the relationship between Belgium and

Lumumba was more strained than previously assumed and should be reassessed.

The Congolese participants in the conference also explained the significance of the misunderstandings that colored Congolese foreign relations. Thomas Kanza shed light on the importance of the fiasco involving Edgar Detwiler, a shady American businessman who proposed to develop and manage Congolese mineral resources. Detwiler was introduced to Lumumba by the son of Belgian Minister without Portfolio W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch. In Lumumba's mind Detwiler's connection to Van der Meersch confirmed his credibility, and a contract was signed. The Congolese Parliament confirmed the deal, although they later revoked their approval. Even though he had been warned about Detwiler by Ambassador Timberlake, Guinean and Ghanaian representatives at the United Nations Diallo Telli and Alex Quaison-Sackey, and even concerned U.S. citizens in the Congo like the young Herbert Weiss, Lumumba was still surprised when he discovered that he had not signed a legitimate contract.

In light of the Belgian Parliamentary Commission's extensive investigation into Lumumba's death, the conference did not spend a lot of time on the assassination. But it became clear that Lumumba's supporters feared the worst as the deposed prime minister remained under house arrest and then became a prisoner. Kanza revealed that in September he had fruitless discussions with Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, whom he called a "showman," and more serious discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on the general topic of how to save Lumumba. Kanza learned, with disappointment, that the Soviet Union was apparently in no position to help directly. So he appealed to President-elect John F. Kennedy through Eleanor Roosevelt. It was Kanza's recollection that an informal deal was struck with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and President-elect Kennedy guaranteeing that Lumumba should remain in Leopoldville at

least until Kennedy took office and then be brought to Parliament. Kanza also recalled that he asked Kennedy (again via Roosevelt) to intervene to protect Lumumba after he became a prisoner, but Kennedy responded that the handling of prisoners was the UN's responsibility. Lumumba was transferred out of Thysville prison on the night of 16 January 1961 by Mobutu's men, who carefully skirted UN guards, and was assassinated the next day in Katanga.

Documents obtained for the conference from both Russian and German archives offered new details about the Soviet role in the crisis. Evidence from the former East German archives suggests that the Soviet Union supported giving aid to rebel leader Antoine Gizenga, formerly Lumumba's deputy prime minister, who had established a rival government in Stanleyville in December 1960. However, the Soviets did not want to take the international risks involved in delivering him that aid. A memorandum of a meeting between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt confirmed that the Soviet Union wanted to send diplomats and military advisors to Stanleyville, but Nasser suggested rather dramatically that the only way to get them into the Congo was by parachute. On another occasion, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky told Pierre Mulele, Gizenga's representative in Cairo, that Soviet planes were ready to fly to the Congo, but he feared that UN forces would shoot them down. Documents also established that early in 1961 Moscow decided to send \$500,000 to Gizenga in Stanleyville, but Lawrence Devlin said that when he heard that the first \$250,000 was to be shipped via courier through Sudan, he sent a U.S. operative to distract the courier and snatch his suitcase.

The discussions revealed important details about the Lovanium conference of September 1961, called to form a new government for the Congo. The United States and the UN feared that Gizenga would be elected prime minister. As Kamitatu related, the nationalist bloc wanted Gizenga to take the job, but Gizenga refused,

fearing a trap. The nationalists then agreed that the “moderate” Cyrille Adoula would be the “least evil” choice. Although they disliked him, they believed he could help re-unify the Congo. Adoula agreed to work with the bloc and, escorted by UN representative Robert Gardiner to Kamitatu’s residence, worked through the night with other nationalists to form a new government. At the last minute Gizenga surprised everyone by accepting the post of vice prime minister. However, after a short visit to Leopoldville he returned to


Stanleyville, leaving his intentions open to suspicion. Gizenga’s mistrust of Adoula ran deep, in part because he was aware of Adoula’s secret connections, brought to light by the CWIHP conference, with the Binza group, a pro-Western band of Mobutu supporters. Adoula’s ties with this group were not widely known, but in light of them, his former relations with the AFL-CIO appear less significant. In the end Adoula’s premiership would depend heavily on the nationalist bloc. By December of 1962 Adoula, under great pressure

from the nationalists, had called on the UN to use force to end the secession of Katanga province. U Thant felt he had few options and, tired of the whole affair, obliged, giving Kennedy little choice but to go along or see the UN withdraw from the Congo altogether.

If there was a single message to take away from the conference it is that the course of events in the Congo was at least as strongly influenced by events on the ground as by decisions emanating from Washington or Moscow. The conference confirmed that Lumumba had little Western support and that many people had a share in plans first to depose him and then to assassinate him, although how those plans were coordinated remains unclear. Washington seemed to keep its distance from unfolding events, with the result that its hand was sometimes forced at the last minute, while Khrushchev tended to be very cautious and was reluctant to act without the Afro-Asian states. The conference also highlighted the role the Congolese people played in the crisis but did not exaggerate their influence. Clearly, a general misunderstanding among the Congolese, Americans, Soviets and Belgians underlay the tragic events of 1960 and 1961—events that still haunt the civil-war-wracked Congo today.

Lise Namiskas is an adjunct instructor in the history department at the University of New Orleans-Tulane. The author wishes to thank Herbert Weiss and Sergey Mazov for their observations and comments on this draft.

The Cold War International History Project plans to post documents and a transcription of its conference on their website, along with several interpretive articles relating to the documents. An earlier version of this paper appeared on the CWIHP website at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=102105.



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Albania's Cold War Archives

Christian F. Ostermann

Albania was isolated from the rest of the world throughout much of the Cold War. It is a mere footnote in most Cold War accounts, and the role it played during that period has remained shrouded in mystery to its citizens and the outside world alike. Yet this tiny and remote Balkan country found itself at or near center stage during crucial Cold War confrontations. In 1948, Albania emerged as a central issue in the politics of the Stalin-Tito split that shook the Communist world. A little over five years later, the regime of Communist dictator Enver Hoxha became the target of a major attempt at rollback by British and U.S. intelligence agencies, which tried in vain to topple the regime by infiltrating agents into the country by sea and air. After its break with Moscow in the late 1950s, Albania entered into a close alliance with China. Hoxha also maintained unusually warm relations with North Korea in succeeding decades. For Cold War historians, Albania thus offers an important archival vantage point from which to examine areas well beyond the Balkans. Albanian archives promise significant insights for the study of the Sino-Soviet relationship and the evolution of the foreign policy of North Korea and other nations.

Established in 2001, the Albanian Cold War Studies Center (ACWSC) has been at the forefront of efforts to promote access to records in the Central State Archive and Foreign Ministry Archive in Tirana. Under the direction of Dr. Ana Lalaj, the center has been cooperating closely with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) to further the declassification, translation and publication of documents on three subjects: (1) Albanian-Yugoslav relations; (2) Albania and the Warsaw Pact; and (3) Albanian relations with China and North Korea. Working

under difficult conditions, Lalaj and other scholars have made significant inroads into the archives. Visiting Washington on a Fulbright fellowship earlier this year, Lalaj presented first findings on "Albania and the Warsaw Pact" at a meeting held at the Library of Congress. Dr. Hamit Kaba, another member of the center, helped advance the close relationship between the CWIHP and like-minded scholars at the ACWSC by serving as the most recent CWIHP Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The ACWSC and the CWIHP are also planning a series of publications of translated documents from the archives.

At the invitation of the Albanian Cold War Studies Center (ACWSC), I visited Tirana for discussions with Albanian scholars, archivists, and government officials in early November 2004. Sponsored by Dr. Lalaj, the trip was designed to foster cooperation between the CWIHP and Albanian archivists and scholars. I was joined in Tirana by Jim Hershberg, associate professor of history at George Washington University and a member of the George Washington University Cold War Group, a CWIHP partner. In the course of a few intense days, we met with Albanian Deputy Prime Minister Namik Dokle; Roland Bimo, secretary general of the Albanian Foreign Ministry; Shyqyri Dekavelli, director of the National Security Authority at the Albanian Council of Ministers; Prof. Shaban Sinani, director general of the Central State Archive of Albania, as well as Albanian archivists, scholars and university students interested in Cold War research and archival openness. With the help of our partners, we were able to look at tantalizing samples of records on the Soviet Union and China, including memoranda of conversations, many of which remain formally classified. We were also able to review finding

aids for the Albanian Labor party's relations with the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s and request more than a thousand pages of materials (including copies of records of conversation with such figures as Mao Zedong, Nikita Khrushchev, and Zhou Enlai) to be submitted for declassification review.

Since 1991, an increasing number of documents from the Communist party and foreign ministry files have become available. A succession of archival laws, the most recent of which was the 2003 archival law (Law No. 9154, 11 June 2003), established a general directorate of archives, strengthened the authority of individual archive directors, and reinforced certain aspects of the right of access. Under the energetic leadership of Pranvera Dibra, the director of the Foreign Ministry Archive, foreign policy records have been catalogued and declassified through 1951, and a team of archivists and former diplomats is working hard to make available the next tranche of documents through 1955. Under the direction of Prof. Sinani, who has written an article on archival access entitled "Open Archives for an Open Society" (2003), the Central State Archive (address: Rruga "Jordan Misja", Tirana, phone number: ++355-42-279 59; fax number: ++355-42-279 59; email: dpa@sanx.net or dpa@albarchive.gov.al), has also begun to provide access to its riches, including the records of the Albanian Labor (Communist) party. This move was at least in part a response to the considerable and continuing media interest in the communist period, claims to the contrary by some archivists notwithstanding. The archive has addressed critical preservation problems, which is no small feat given the constant problems with electricity and other basic infrastructure that continue to beset


this country, and we were impressed with the expertise of the archivists, who went out of their way to allow glimpses at the archive's most secret vaults and make our time in Tirana as productive as possible. All the senior officials we spoke to—including the vice premier, the foreign ministry director general and the head of the declassification commission—seemed supportive of a faster opening of archives about the communist period and of cooperation with Cold War scholars.

Such support is vital given the difficulties Albanian (and international) Cold War researchers continue to face in this country. Historians have complained that implementation of the postcommunist archival laws has been undercut by a 1999 law on state secrets (Law No. 8457, 11 February 1999). Archivists and researchers alike are uncertain about the status of documents. We were told by an archivist at the Central State Archive that in some cases the same material could be opened according to one law (on archives) yet kept classified according to another (on state secrets), and the stricter law usually prevailed. The declassification of important records is progressing slowly, hampered in part by shortages of staff and other resources, but also by the practice of reviewing files item-by-item, even those fifty years old and older. Unlike other former communist countries, Albania does not yet differentiate between Communist party records (declassified up to the end of the Communist party in most other countries) and government/state records (often declassified in bulk under a 25- to 30-year rule). Even the finding aids for the Communist party files (including Enver Hoxha's records) at the Central State Archive are still classified. Unless they have special clearances, scholars interested in researching the documents are dependent on the advice of the archivists. Officially, decisions on declassification are made by a declassification commission that meets a few times a year, but it is not completely clear what the actual role and influence of this commission is. Compounding the challenge for researchers and

archivists is the declassification system itself. Documents are not marked declassified even after they have been released; instead, the status of each document is captured in a bibliography that is not publicly available. Albanian researchers also voiced concerns over the high price of copies and the prohibition on copying entire files, with decisions on the number of photocopies from each file left to the archival authorities on a case-by-case basis.

To promote archival openness, encourage further research in the largely untapped Albanian archives, and highlight the Albanian dimension to the larger Cold War narrative, the Albanian Cold War Studies Center and CWIHP plan to sponsor an international conference on Albania and the Cold War within the next twelve to fourteen months. We are eager to hear from interested researchers and experts who would like to become involved in the project and in turn might be willing to contribute items on Albania's role in the Cold War from Albanian and other sources and archives. For further information, visit the CWIHP website at <http://cwihip.si.edu> or contact Dr. Ana Lalaj (alalaj@albmail.com) or the CWIHP at coldwar1@si.edu.

Christian Ostermann is Director of the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.




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When Irish Archivists are Smiling: Doing Research in Ireland

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

We all know Ireland, the Emerald Isle, as the home of St. Patrick and the leprechauns, and the point of origin for the refugees who thronged to the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in the nineteenth century. But the nation has also played a significant role in world affairs that is sometimes overlooked. Ireland initiated the unraveling of the British Empire, since it was the first nation to establish its political independence from the United Kingdom in the twentieth century. As a result, Dublin is the site of several archives that might prove pertinent to the research agendas of individuals who belong to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

At times U.S. foreign policymakers have had good reason to focus on Ireland. There was, of course, the massive wave of immigrants in the nineteenth century. They changed the face of American cities and filled the ranks of Union regiments in the U.S. Civil War. In the twentieth century, Ireland drew even more attention with the Easter Rising of 1916, when nationalists, tired of decades of British reluctance to grant the Irish home rule, rebelled in an effort to acquire independence. The Irish in America were a major source of funding for the Irish Volunteers, the uniformed rebels who seized various strategic sites in Dublin during the rebellion. In fact, the proclamation that rebel leaders read to the crowds gathered in front of the General Post Office made reference to Ireland's "exiled children in America." The rising failed, but public opinion in Irish America limited British reprisals: they executed the leaders of the rebellion but eventually granted amnesty to the rank and file. Afterwards the legendary Michael Collins had the Volunteers take off their uniforms and

fight guerilla style in the Anglo-Irish War. Irish-Americans continued to be a major source of revenue for the rebels.

After twenty-six of the thirty-two counties formed the new Irish Free State, the new government established diplomatic missions abroad. The first was in London; the second was in Washington, D.C. The Irish Free State was quite active in the League of Nations and in world affairs generally during the interwar period in an effort to establish an identity separate from that of the United Kingdom. During the Second World War Ireland remained neutral, much to the consternation of many officials in Washington and the Irish-American community. There was a good deal of effort in both London and Washington to get the Dublin government to change its mind, but Ireland stuck to this policy during the war and the Cold War that followed and as a result found itself isolated diplomatically during the middle of the twentieth century. The Irish did contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, but "the Troubles" that exploded in the six counties of Northern Ireland in the late 1960s showed that Ireland needed some help of its own. Americans were again involved in funding rebel activities. The Irish Republican Army received a good deal of support from sources inside the United States. President Clinton helped broker a peace settlement in 1998, but the campaigns of violence in Ulster have continued into the twenty-first century.

There are a number of topics that a SHAFR member could pursue in Irish archives, and there are three major institutions that a historian studying world affairs will want to visit: the National Archives, the National Library of Ireland, and the papers of Eamon de Valera at University

College, Dublin. The National Archives are located in a nondescript office building on Bishop Street in the city center south of the Liffey River. The archives are open Monday through Friday from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. Researchers sign in at the front desk and then store their personal belongings in lockers on the first floor. First-time visitors must get a reader's card, but it will take only about ten minutes to fill out the required forms. Once inside, researchers can take notes with pencils and/or laptop computers and can make five copies at a cost of twenty-five cents a page by buying a card for €1.25 that runs the photocopy machine. If more than five pages are need, the staff will copy them at a cost of €1.19 per page and will mail the copied items to the researcher.

The website for the archives is at <http://nationalarchives.ie>, and it is a good idea to visit it before traveling to Dublin. The website lists the rules for usage, gives opening and closing hours, provides directions to the archives, and, most important of all, has online finding aids. Documents are released thirty years after the fact. Researchers will have to search each individual batch of releases. The computer searches for words in folder titles, which requires knowing how bureaucrats labeled items. There are also paper finding aids in the reading rooms that are organized by department and then by year of public release. Members of SHAFR will most likely be interested in the files of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and the Taoiseach (prime minister). (One indication of how much the United States mattered to Ireland is the separate sub-file for the Washington embassy in the Foreign Affairs Department records. No other embassy is listed in such a fashion.) Historians doing research at this institution should be forewarned that the finding aids are severely flawed

tools. Often the filing numbers listed are incorrect, and sometimes the finding aids are misleading, since folder titles often do not correspond with those on the actual containers. There is no clear pattern of organization to collections, making it necessary to go slowly through the entire paper finding aid page by page.

In general, the National Archives building is a good place to work. Professional archivists are available to answer your questions. There are no fetch times, so individuals can submit requests at any time, and delivery usually entails a wait of no more than twenty minutes. There is no limit to the number of items that a researcher can request in a day. There is one major qualification to this good service. When it comes time for the staff to take their breaks, they take them, even if the result is that no one is available to process requests.

The National Library of Ireland has several component parts spread out over Dublin, but the main building is on Kildare Street near the city center. The website is at <http://www.nli.ie>. The main reading room is on Kildare Street near the city center, and its hours of operation are Monday through Wednesday, 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.; Thursday and Friday, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.; and Saturday, 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

The library's most important holdings in the realm of political and diplomatic history are its collection of parliamentary documents. In the last 250 years, Ireland has had three different legislative assemblies. Until 1801, Ireland had its own bicameral legislature, and the library has an impressive collection of the statutes and debate journals that this body produced. After 1801, Ireland sent its politicians to London to sit in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. This library has an almost complete set of the records of its proceedings (Hansard). The third Irish Parliament was installed after the Anglo-Irish War. The library has a complete set of the papers and records of the debates of the Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann, which are also available online at <http://oireachtas-debates.gov.ie>. The library also has copies of the numerous reports and studies that the Irish government

has published. Ireland is a member of the European Union and several other international organizations, and the National Library has good holdings on the publications of these various transnational governmental organizations. Many are stored off-site, however. As a result, researchers must make requests twenty-four hours in advance. Most documents, but not all, are listed in the online catalogue available through the website. Some documents will require the use of paper finding aids.

The Department of Manuscripts is in a separate facility located at 2-3 Kildare Street. The hours of operation are Monday through Wednesday, 10 a.m. to 8:30 p.m.; Thursday and Friday, 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.; and Saturday, 10 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. SHAFR members will be interested in the political papers that document many of the Irish independence movements since the eighteenth century. Many of the individual nationalists leading these causes had strong ties to the United States. The holdings are particularly strong for the 1916-1923 period.

Doing photo research concurrently with manuscript collections investigations is a good way to save a lot of publication-related problems. The National Photographic Archive is part of the National Library but is located in Meeting House Square, Temple Bar. This archive is open Monday through Friday 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., but access is by appointment. The online catalogue allows researchers to do a lot of work before arriving at the library. Copies of photos can be ordered in either black and white or color. Researchers can order slides or copies ranging from 8" x 10" to 24" x 20". Prices range from €12.70 to €38.10 depending on size and color. A full price list is available on the library's web site.

The papers of Eamon de Valera are housed at University College, Dublin. De Valera was a major figure in Irish history during the twentieth century. The last of the battalion commanders to surrender during the Easter Rising, he was elected to a seat in Parliament after his release from prison, but the nationalist political party, Sinn Féin, which won a majority of Irish

Parliament seats in 1919, boycotted Westminster, assembled in Dublin, and declared Ireland independent. De Valera was elected president of this new assembly during the Anglo-Irish War, yet he actually spent most of the war touring the United States to raise funds. Born in Manhattan, he was always mindful of public opinion in America.

De Valera appointed the delegation that negotiated the peace settlement bringing an end to the Anglo-Irish War and creating the Irish Free State. Although he was opposed to certain terms in the treaty—namely, its failure to create an Irish Republic and its division of Northern Ireland from the rest of the island—and he supported the losing side in the Irish Civil War that followed the ratification of the treaty, de Valera became Taoiseach in 1932, a position he would hold for sixteen consecutive years and then reclaim two more times before serving two terms as president of the Republic. During the interwar period, Ireland pursued an almost bipartisan foreign policy in the sense that all Irish officials, regardless of their domestic politics, supported efforts to establish a foreign policy for Ireland that was independent of that of the United Kingdom. During this period, de Valera served as president of both the League of Nations council and assembly.

Needless to say, the de Valera papers can be quite useful for studying certain periods in U.S.–Irish diplomatic history. The campus where they are located is a short driving distance from the city center. A number of bus routes terminate on campus or have stops in front of the main entrance. The Archives Department of the university library is open Monday to Thursday, 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. The reading room is quite small, so appointments are required, and it is best to contact the staff at least a week in advance of one's visit. (While I was there a researcher who wanted to visit later that week was turned away). The Archives Department has two useful web pages for researchers. The first is on planning a visit and is at <http://www.ucd.ie/archives/html/planningyourvisit.htm>. This

page contains all sorts of information, including the numbers of the buses that reach campus, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and maps of campus. The second page of interest is on the de Valera papers, and is at <http://www.ucd.ie/archives/html/collections/devalera-eamon.htm>.

The de Valera papers are an exceptionally well organized collection. The three-volume finding aid is quite detailed and easy to use. Since de Valera played such a large role in Irish history, his papers are used quite regularly. To minimize the wear on the documents, the archives staff made microfilm copies of the collection, which is what a researcher will see rather than the originals. As a result, little time passes between placing a request and receiving the film. The staff did not make copies of certain items in this collection, like photographs. If researchers need to look at such material, they must put a request in at least a day in advance. Researchers can take notes in pencil or on a laptop computer. It is possible to make photocopies from the microfilm, but at €1 per page the document had better be exceptionally important.

Transportation

Dublin has become a major weekend destination for many Europeans. As a result, travel to Ireland is exceptionally cheap. Low-fare airlines are quite popular in Europe, which also helps. Travelers from the United Kingdom can get round-trip tickets for less than €20, if they are willing to fly at odd hours. Individuals traveling from North America are going to pay more, but they should still be able to find tickets for between €300 and €400.

Buses are the best form of transportation to Dublin from the airport and within the city itself. The Aircoach runs regularly from the city center to the airport and has a pickup point in front of University College, Dublin. The service is fast and more regular than the train. The Aircoach costs €6 and has a website at <http://www.aircoach.ie/>. Dublin has an adequate internal bus network that runs on a regular basis and goes to almost every part of the

city. The only catch is that the buses take coins and give no change. The web site for Dublin Bus is at <http://www.dublinbus.ie>. The bus service becomes exceptionally expensive after midnight and much less frequent. Taxis are also quite plentiful.

Currency Conversion

Ireland uses the euro of the European Union. The Bureaus de Change at the airport basically offer the same rate as major outlets in Dublin itself, so one might as well convert cash at the airport. An ATM is a better bet, though, for people whose banks charge no fee for using a foreign machine.

Travel Guides

Anyone traveling to Ireland should have a travel guide for getting the most out of the country. The best guide to Dublin and Ireland is *Lonely Planet*; placing a close but clear second is *Let's Go*. No other publishers come close to producing a volume as useful as these two. Each contains far more information than could be presented here.

Housing

While Dublin's designation as a major party destination for the rest of Europe has made airline tickets quite cheap, it has made housing costs outrageous. Not only are prices high, but rooms are hard to come by during the travel season (March through October).

One of the better-located hostels in Dublin is Ashfield House at 19/20 D'Olier Street. This hostel offers dorm-style or en suite rooms and is located near a train station, bus stops for routes that go to University College, Dublin, an Airbus stop, and many of the more interesting parts of the city center. The lobby has computers with Internet access. The web site is at <http://www.ashfieldhouse.ie/>. Rates range from €13 to €57.

Another hostel worth considering is Kinlay House at 2-12 Lord Edward Street (telephone: +353

1 679 6644). Its website is at <http://www.kinlayhouse.ie>. Rates range from €19 to €50. The prices for rooms are modest by Dublin standards and include a small breakfast. The environment is lively. The only drawback is the communal showers.

If one is planning on doing a good deal of research at University College, Dublin, one should consider the Montrose Hotel, which is across the street from the campus on Stillorgan Road. The hotel is a full-service establishment with a bell staff, restaurant, and currency conversion service that offers a decent exchange rate. The hotel is also across the street from an Aircoach stop. Since it is away from the center of the city, it is less expensive than others.

A livelier lodge is the Arlington Hotel at 23-25 Bachelors Walk, O'Connell Bridge (telephone: +353 1 804 9100). Its website is at <http://www.arlington.ie/>. This 116-room hotel is on the northern banks of the Liffey and houses the Knightsbridge Bar, one of the biggest pubs in the city. Irish jig dancers are a regular evening feature and are worth seeing in and of themselves, and there is a good selection of traditional Irish meals. The website gives rates, ranging from €129 to €246.

Eating and Dining

At University College, Dublin, there are several eating options on campus within a short walk of the Archives Department. Nine One One is a small sandwich shop in the library-student union complex. It offers blended fruit drinks and custom-made sandwiches, each for under €5. There is a counter where you can eat, but there are better places to eat outside.

The news kiosk in the student union is the cheapest option on campus. Sandwiches are roughly €3 and drinks go for between €1 and €3. The Café in the student union offers a limited fare of sandwiches and chips. The price range is slightly higher than that at the news kiosk.

Researchers at the National Archives have many more options when it comes to eating. There are no dining facilities at the Archives, but it is located in the center of the city and

there are many options in a number of different price ranges all within a walk of less than 10 minutes on Kevin Street or Wexford Street. One of the best is Café Sora at 6-11 Lower Kevin Street. Its website is at <http://www.cafesora.com>. This café is a nice little coffee shop with pastries and custom-made sandwiches. Meals are roughly €5. Another restaurant worth visiting is Eddie Rockets on Wexford Street (telephone: +353 1 475 2324). Its website is at <http://www.eddierockets.ie>. This eatery is part of a national chain of 1950s-style U.S. hamburger joints. The burgers are tasty and cost between €5 and €6. A meal with fries and a soft drink will be about €11. The website lists the menu.

There are also a number of good places to eat that will give you a good feel for the city. Among them are:

Gallagher's Boxy House at 20 Temple Bar (telephone: +353 1 677 9723, website <http://www.boxyhouse.ie>). A boxy is a traditional Irish potato pancake that is wrapped around marinated lamb and beef. The desserts are exceptional, and main courses cost between €12 and €20. Live traditional Irish folk music adds ambiance without being overpowering. The menu even explains where to buy CDs of the music. The website provides a map and a menu and accepts online reservations, which is helpful, since the place fills up quickly during regular eating hours. Highly recommended.

Captain America's at 44 Grafton St. (telephone: +353 1 671 5266; website <http://www.captainamericas.com>; hours: seven days a week, 12 p.m. to 12 a.m.). For slightly overpriced American food try this Marvel-comics-meets-Hard-Rock-Café eatery. Movie and film memorabilia signed by the likes of Mel Gibson, Eric Clapton, and U2 adorn the wall alongside Marvel comic book covers. Murals of a World War II-era Captain America doing battle with the Red Skull add to the atmosphere. The fare is burgers, chicken, and pasta of average quality, with main meals costing around €10. The website includes a map and a menu.

Thunder Road Café on Fleet Street in Temple Bar. (Telephone: 353 1

679 4057, website <http://www.thunderroadcafe.com>). Inspired by a Bruce Springsteen song and a Robert Mitchum film, this restaurant attempts to be the Hard Rock Café of biker bars. Menu items are roughly €15, but lack something in taste. The website includes a menu and hours of operation and accepts online reservations.

Pubs

Oliver St. John Gogarty at 58/59 Fleet Street (telephone: +353 1 671 1822, website <http://www.olivergogartys.com/>). Many travel guides list this pub as one of the more plastic tourist traps in Temple Bar. That said, it is a venue for a good deal of entertaining music that draws large crowds of tourists and Dubliners during the weekends. It also serves pub and restaurant fare on its three floors

O'Shea's Merchant at 12 Lower Bridge Street (telephone: +353 1 679 3797). The only thing Irish about this pub is the name. The multinational staff offers up high-quality food in heaping portions, but it is not for the diner interested in the tradition of the Irish. The live music is good, but is just as likely to be John Denver-style country as Irish folk.

Attractions of Interest


The building at 2 College Green that once housed the Irish Parliament is now the home of the Bank of Ireland, but it still holds the chambers of the House of Lords. When the Act of Union of 1800 merged Ireland into the United Kingdom, the Irish Parliament Building became unnecessary. When the British government sold the structure to the bank, it included a stipulation that the building be altered to remove any indication that it had ever contained a national legislature. The financiers met only half of this requirement, and as a result the chambers of the House of Lords remain intact and open for tours. Telephone: +353 1 671 1488. Hours of operation: Wednesday through Monday. Tours at 10:30 a.m., 11:30 a.m., and 1:45 p.m. Admission is free.

Three buildings that were important during the Irish fight for independence are worth visiting: the General Post Office, Fourcourts, and the Custom House. The General Post Office was the headquarters of the rebels during the Easter Rising of 1916. The building remains a working post office and still bears the scars of artillery and rifle fire from ninety years ago. Fourcourts was—and still is—a center that housed the judiciary, but the Irish Free State Army shelled it during the Irish Civil War when the rebels of the Irish Republican Army occupied the complex. Most of the damage has been repaired. The Custom House was the site of battles in both the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War. This building has also been repaired. All three are on the north side of the Liffey River and are within easy walking distance of each other.

Another worthwhile destination is Kilmainham Gaol Museum on Inchicore Road in Kilmainham (telephone: +353 1 453 5984). Built by the British to house Irish political prisoners, the jail is now a museum that uses penal practices to examine Irish social and political history. The tour goes into the cell areas and culminates in the courtyard where the British executed the leaders of the Easter Rising of 1916. Ticket prices start at €4.40. There are special discount packages for families. Hours of operation: 9:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., seven days a week.

Hopefully this information will help historians have a productive and enjoyable experience in Dublin. For more suggestions about what to see and do in the city, pick up a free copy of *Events of the Week* or visit its website at <http://www.dublinevents.com>. This weekly publication lists events, functions, and festivals, along with many other things worth seeing in the greater Dublin area.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is Visiting Associate Professor at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base.



March 31, 2005

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Survey

Dear Colleagues,

Last June SHAFR president Mark Stoler appointed a Task Force on Teaching, as you have probably read in previous issues of *Passport*. At the SHAFR Council meeting at the AHA in San Francisco in January, the task force was converted into a committee.

Among our group's tasks is to conduct a survey of those SHAFR members who teach undergraduates, in order to identify what courses are being taught, and how. We hope to draw a picture of our subject, identify both standard and non-standard practices, and perhaps suggest future directions for consideration. Survey responses will also provide the committee with specific suggestions about various teaching-related initiatives that SHAFR might pursue.

Confidentiality will be maintained. The surveys are the property of, and will remain under the control of, the SHAFR business office. With its assistance, the committee will compile the results, analyze them, and provide a report to the membership.

We very much hope that you will take a few minutes of your time to participate in the survey. A web version, which lends itself to more efficient data collection, is available at www.shafr.org. But if you would prefer to fill out a paper version of the questionnaire and mail it to the SHAFR business office, a copy is available in this edition of *Passport*.

Thank you very much for your assistance, as we seek to promote the teaching of the history of American foreign relations.


For the Committee,


Mark T. Gilderhus, Chair


Teaching Committee Members:

Carol Adams, *Ottawa University*
Catherine Forslund, *Rockford College*
Mark Gilderhus, *Texas Christian University*
Mitchell Lerner, *Ohio State University*

John McNay, *University of Cincinnati*
Richard Werking, *U.S. Naval Academy*
Thomas Zeiler, *University of Colorado*



SHAFR Survey of Teaching Spring 2005



Conducted by the SHAFR Teaching Committee

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. An easy-to-use web version is available at www.shafr.org. The paper version is provided here for those who would prefer to use this format; instructions for mailing it in may be found at the end of the questionnaire.

I. Faculty and Institution Information

A. SHAFR Status: Member Non-Member

B. Please provide the year that you began teaching at the college level: _____

C. Your highest degree, and in what discipline:

Ph.D. Master's Other doctorate Other (please specify):

In History? Yes No If "No", in which discipline?

D. Does your institution consider you to be employed full-time or part-time during the current academic term? Full-time Part-time

E. Your sex: Male Female

F. Type of college or university where you teach:

Associate's (2-yr) Baccalaureate Master's Degree

Doctoral/Research Other (please specify):

G. Length of your school's term: Semester Quarter Other (please specify):

H. Comments/Clarifications?

II. Courses and Course Composition

What **undergraduate** courses do you currently teach at least once every 2-3 years, whose focus is to a significant degree (approximately half or more) the **history of U.S. foreign relations**? For each course, please give a descriptive title, including an indication of **years covered** (e.g., "U.S. Foreign Relations, 1895 to Present"; "The Foreign Policy of the Truman Administration"; "The U.S. Since 1945"; etc.), and also answer the five questions about the course in the boxes below its title.

If you would like to provide information about more than three courses, please use the last page of this survey as well.

Requested numbers and proportions are, of course, intended to be approximate.

	For Course #1	For Course #2	For Course #3
1. Please provide your descriptive title for each course.			
2. "Distance Education" course?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Typical class size?	fewer than 18 students <input type="checkbox"/> 18-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-50 <input type="checkbox"/> 51-80 <input type="checkbox"/> more than 80 <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 18 students <input type="checkbox"/> 18-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-50 <input type="checkbox"/> 51-80 <input type="checkbox"/> more than 80 <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 18 students <input type="checkbox"/> 18-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-50 <input type="checkbox"/> 51-80 <input type="checkbox"/> more than 80 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. With teaching assistant(s)?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Typical enrollment by major?	History majors only <input type="checkbox"/> History majors and others <input type="checkbox"/> No History majors <input type="checkbox"/>	History majors only <input type="checkbox"/> History majors and others <input type="checkbox"/> No History majors <input type="checkbox"/>	History majors only <input type="checkbox"/> History majors and others <input type="checkbox"/> No History majors <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Typical enrollment by level of students?	chiefly freshmen or sophomores <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly sophs or juniors <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly juniors or seniors <input type="checkbox"/> other (please specify):	chiefly freshmen or sophomores <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly sophs or juniors <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly juniors or seniors <input type="checkbox"/> other (please specify):	chiefly freshmen or sophomores <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly sophs or juniors <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly juniors or seniors <input type="checkbox"/> other (please specify):

7. Comments/Clarifications?

III. How Courses Are Taught. In sections A - C below, please describe each course as you have most recently taught it.

A. Required Materials

1. Which principal "textbook," if any, do you use covering all or most of the pertinent timeframe? (e.g., Paterson, Clifford, & Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History*; Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*)

For Course #1 – as above	For Course #2 – as above	For Course #3 – as above

2. What **other principal readings** do you require that you consider especially important or interesting, including both secondary and primary sources – books, document collections, etc.? (e.g., Michael Hunt, *Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy*; Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-54*) Please identify at least one, with a maximum of five, for each course.

For Course #1 – as above	<u>For Course #2 – as above</u>	For Course #3 – as above

3. What principal **viewing/listening** materials, if any, do you use in class or outside of class? (e.g., PBS's *Crucible of Empire*, audio excerpts from Kennedy-Nixon debates, LBJ tapes).

For Course #1 – as above	<u>For Course #2 – as above</u>	For Course #3 – as above

4. In addition to any you may have identified above in A2, if there are **primary sources** that you have found especially effective in any of your courses – either individual documents or document collections – please identify them here:

B. Types of Assignments Given. These might vary significantly by size and composition of the course, e.g. a senior research seminar with a dozen students vs. a class of 100 with separate discussion sections led by a T.A. or yourself. Hence, for each assignment category please connect the appropriate choice to the particular course you have identified above.

	For Course #1— as above	For Course #2— as above	For Course #3— as above
1. Research papers? (i.e., students going beyond specified readings ; if none please skip to #2.) Choose as many types as you require for this course in a term.	10 or more pages each, including primary sources <input type="checkbox"/>	10 or more pages each, including primary sources <input type="checkbox"/>	10 or more pages each, including primary sources <input type="checkbox"/>
	10 or more pages each, secondary sources only <input type="checkbox"/>	10 or more pages each, secondary sources only <input type="checkbox"/>	10 or more pages each, secondary sources only <input type="checkbox"/>
	fewer than 10 pages each, including primary sources <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 10 pages each, including primary sources <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 10 pages each, including primary sources <input type="checkbox"/>
	fewer than 10 pages each, secondary sources only <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 10 pages each, secondary sources only <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 10 pages each, secondary sources only <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Book reviews?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Article reviews?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Other writing assignments, from specified readings? (if none, please go to #5, below)	more than 10 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>	more than 10 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>	more than 10 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>
	5-10 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>	5-10 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>	5-10 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>
	fewer than 5 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 5 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 5 pages each <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Required to use electronic resources, e.g. JSTOR articles?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Required to examine/critique specialized web sites?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
7. In-class student presentations?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
8. Group projects?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

9. Do you use “how-to” books such as Marius, or Gilderhus, or Strunk & White for any classes?

Yes, required Yes, recommended No If yes, which one(s)?

10. Do you use course-management software or "courseware" (e.g., Blackboard or WebCT) for any classes?

Yes No If "Yes", for what purposes? -- Please indicate all that apply:

To post syllabi

To send students email

To post assignments

To use as electronic discussion venue

To receive student assignments Other (please specify):

11. Comments/Clarifications?

C. Use of In-Class Time

On average, over the course of the whole term, approximately what percentage of class time is spent on the following? Please supply the percentages in the spaces provided:

	Course #1	Course #2	Course #3
1. Professor's lecture	____%	____%	____%
2. Class discussion, led by you or a teaching assistant	____%	____%	____%
3. Small group activities	____%	____%	____%
4. Student presentations	____%	____%	____%
5. Viewing or listening to audiovisuals	____%	____%	____%
6. Testing or other evaluation	____%	____%	____%
7. Other (please specify):	____%	____%	____%
	____%	____%	____%
	____%	____%	____%

8. Comments/Clarifications?

D. Other/General

1. What **topics, themes, or interpretive frameworks** most interest your students **currently**? (e.g., World War II, gender, NGOs, personalities of leaders, military, economics, etc.?)
2. Are there **new topics, themes, or interpretive frameworks** that you expect to introduce into one or more of your courses in the next year or two?
3. Are there **new** required reading or viewing **materials** that you expect to introduce into one or more of your courses in the next year or two?
4. Are there **new assignments**?
5. Are there **new in-class teaching methods**?
6. If applicable to your situation, in a few words please describe how the advent of **electronic resources** (e.g., full-text journal articles, primary sources, other websites, etc.) has affected your teaching or how your students learn.
7. If you require your students to use these electronic resources, which ones do you consider most important?
8. Are there other materials you would like to see available online, or more easily accessible online than at present? (e.g. all of the FRUS series, certain collections of photographs, etc.)

9. Do you have **explicit learning objectives** for your students? Yes No

If yes, do you share them with your students? Yes No

10. In what ways is your teaching evaluated other than the traditional end-of-semester student evaluations? (e.g., mid-term student evaluations, "one-minute papers", peer visits to classes, etc.)

11. With enough time and resources, what would you **like to do differently**, if anything, in terms of topics/themes/frameworks, materials, assignments, in-class activities, evaluation, or other?

IV. SHAFR and Teaching

The SHAFR Teaching Committee is considering recommending to the SHAFR Council a number of initiatives to promote and support teaching, such as a regular column in *Passport*, workshops or programs at annual meetings, and other similar steps. A "Syllabus Initiative" has begun and is accepting contributions; you are encouraged to contribute at <http://www.shafr.org/syllabusinitiative.htm>.

What topics would you most like to see addressed by these activities (e.g., use of particular documents or types of documents, especially worthwhile audiovisual products, bibliographic instruction combining the traditional with the modern electronic library, innovative assignments or in-class activities, etc.), and in what venues?

If we may contact you about any of your answers, please provide your name and email address; otherwise your answers will remain anonymous. In all cases, confidentiality will be protected.

Name: _____ Email address: _____

Thank you very much for participating in this survey. If you choose to use this paper version instead of the web version, please return it no later than May 31, 2005 in an envelope addressed to: Teaching Survey, SHAFR, Department of History, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 W. 17th Ave., Columbus, OH 43210.


Supplement

II. CONTINUED from p. 2: Courses and Course Composition, Additional Courses. Please use if you would like to provide information about more courses than the three permitted on page 2.


	For Course #4	For Course #5	For Course #6
1. Please provide your descriptive title for each course.			
2. "Distance Education" course?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Typical class size?	fewer than 18 students <input type="checkbox"/> 18-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-50 <input type="checkbox"/> 51-80 <input type="checkbox"/> more than 80 <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 18 students <input type="checkbox"/> 18-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-50 <input type="checkbox"/> 51-80 <input type="checkbox"/> more than 80 <input type="checkbox"/>	fewer than 18 students <input type="checkbox"/> 18-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-50 <input type="checkbox"/> 51-80 <input type="checkbox"/> more than 80 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. With teaching assistant(s)?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Typical enrollment by major?	History majors only <input type="checkbox"/> History majors and others <input type="checkbox"/> No History majors <input type="checkbox"/>	History majors only <input type="checkbox"/> History majors and others <input type="checkbox"/> No History majors <input type="checkbox"/>	History majors only <input type="checkbox"/> History majors and others <input type="checkbox"/> No History majors <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Typical enrollment by level of students?	chiefly freshmen or sophomores <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly sophs or juniors <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly juniors or seniors <input type="checkbox"/> other (please specify): <input type="checkbox"/>	chiefly freshmen or sophomores <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly sophs or juniors <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly juniors or seniors <input type="checkbox"/> other (please specify): <input type="checkbox"/>	chiefly freshmen or sophomores <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly sophs or juniors <input type="checkbox"/> chiefly juniors or seniors <input type="checkbox"/> other (please specify): <input type="checkbox"/>

If you would like to provide the same information about these additional courses that you provided on pages 3-6, please photocopy the relevant portions of those pages and include these extra pages with your returned survey.

Thank You!



SHAFR Council Meeting



*January 7, 2005, 12:15 PM, Westin Hotel,
Seattle Washington*

Present: David Anderson (Presiding), Frank Costigliola, Jeffrey Engel, Brian Etheridge, Peter Hahn, Christopher Jespersen, Scott Laderman, Mitchell Lerner, James Matray, Anna Nelson, Robert Robinson, Robert Schulzinger, Katherine Sibley, Phyllis Soybel, Mark Stoler, Richard Werking, George White, Randall Woods

Business Items

1. Proposal to centralize web-sites and finances of SHAFR annual meetings

Referring to written information circulated in advance of the meeting, Peter Hahn suggested two motions to reform SHAFR annual meetings procedures. The first reform would centralize the website on www.shafr.org rather than pay to have a new site designed at the host institution every year. The second motion proposed to centralize the finances for the annual meetings in the Business Office. This step would include collecting registration and dorm room fees (but not hotel charges). Such a system would create an increased workload for the Business Office, but would have the advantage of making SHAFR more independent of the host universities. Nelson expressed support for the motions. Anderson also expressed support, calling the changes straightforward and common-sensical. Anderson stated that no formal motion was necessary. Hahn requested that Council specifically approve the concept of using Paypal.com to collect credit card payments. Nelson made a motion giving Hahn the ability to use Paypal.com and to take other actions related to the efficient organization and planning of the annual meetings. Council unanimously approved this motion.

2. Proposal to create a permanent Teaching Committee

Richard Werking urged that the temporary teaching task force be established as a permanent committee. He pointed out that a teaching committee would have a significant amount of work to do; for example it could spearhead the creation of an online database of text and images related to teaching diplomatic history. Jespersen added that a teaching committee could reach out to members of SHAFR who teach at the high school level. Discussion ensued regarding whether such a committee should be established by an amendment to the bylaws, by presidential order, or by the approval of Council. It was decided that Council would vote, and a motion to create a permanent Teaching Committee was approved unanimously.

3. Proposal to administer teaching survey on-line

On behalf of teaching task force Chair Mark Gilderhus, Richard Werking discussed a draft teaching survey composed by the task force, explaining that its purpose was to discover what content and courses are taught by members of SHAFR and what methods they use. The survey would also ask what teachers would like to do differently and how SHAFR could best help

teachers reach their goals. Werking added that it would be better to have a web-based survey. The task force asked Council to authorize spending money to hire a graduate assistant to get the web survey up and running. Hahn mentioned that there would be some expenses associated with postage, photocopying, and other miscellaneous items. Werking wondered whether the survey should be anonymous. Stoler commented that the timing for conducting such a survey was good. He pointed out that Mark Gilderhus, Mitch Lerner, and Mark Stoler had all written recent columns in *Passport* regarding teaching, and that the survey should be conducted while members' attention was focused on the subject. Sibley pointed out that the survey is long, and asked what could be done to encourage people to fill it out. Anderson said that the only incentive to fill out the survey is the desire to help. In addition, SHAFR will naturally share the results with those interested. Hahn suggested a one-time honorarium for the proposed graduate assistant rather than an hourly wage. This honorarium might be about \$1,000. Council unanimously approved the expenditure of such funds.

4. Guide sales and marketing

Referring to a written report circulated in advance of the meeting, Peter Hahn reported that ABC-CLIO had signed a contract with SHAFR earlier this morning for the electronic version of the Guide. This deal would guarantee \$5,000 a year for three years in royalties. Another agreement with ABC-CLIO, also signed today, absolved SHAFR of the obligation to purchase a minimum of 600 copies of the printed Guide. The issue for Council is how to price the remaining copies of the printed version of the Guide that SHAFR has available for its members. To date, SHAFR has lost about \$9,000 on the Guide. Since SHAFR does not produce the Guide for profit, but rather as a resource for its members, this fact should not necessarily effect Council's decision. Costigliola suggested cutting the price to \$50 because its usefulness is fading with time, particularly as the updated online version will be available in early 2006. Matray suggested reducing the price still further for students. Sibley moved that \$50 should be the new price for regular members and \$30 the new price for student members. Council passed this motion unanimously. Costigliola asked how ABC-CLIO would know who has the paper copy, since buying the paper copy gives owners the automatic right to access the electronic version. Hahn responded that he was unsure of the precise method, but that ABC-CLIO kept shipping records for all SHAFR orders.

5. 2005 annual budget

Peter Hahn circulated a written report, stressing its confidentiality. He reported that he was in the process of putting all financial records for SHAFR on the *Quick Books* computer program. Hahn pointed out several specific items on the written report. He noted that \$20,000 was transferred from the endowment to the savings account in October in order to maintain liquidity in SHAFR operating accounts. Hahn elaborated several items on the Profit and Loss Summary. The subsidy from Blackwell represented a substantial increase over previous years, largely the result of the increased subscription prices to *Diplomatic History* for libraries. Given a generous subsidy from the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, *Passport* cost SHAFR some \$7,000 in 2004—a notable decrease in cost from previous years. The 2004 annual meeting in Austin experienced a sizeable financial loss, although modest funds are still expected to be repaid by the University of Texas at Austin. Much of the loss stemmed from complications in Texas that led to increased printing costs and meal expenses. Hahn reminded Council that the conference was a great success on academic and professional grounds, that the financial loss could be absorbed by SHAFR, and that the overall experience was appropriate for a non-profit society committed to advancing the public interest. Hahn explained the balance between actual costs for the electronic Guide against expected revenue under the new ABC-CLIO contract. Hahn noted that SHAFR experienced a

deficit in operating funds of some \$2,000 in 2004.

Hahn elaborated major features of the 2005 budget. He encouraged Council members to study the fine detail in the Profit and Loss supplementary pages and to ask any questions. He indicated he aimed for complete transparency in all financial matters. Hahn also presented a summary of the endowment growth in 2004 and of SHAFR's net worth on 31 December 2004.

Costigliola asked if SHAFR is spending enough from the endowment to justify its non-profit status. Hahn said this is an ongoing concern, and stressed that SHAFR must make clear through actions that it is more interested in public service than making money. Woods observed that SHAFR seems to be operating on safe grounds. Nelson stressed that Council should dedicate significant resources to its annual meeting. Sibley asked about a video that appeared in the line-item expenses. Lerner explained that a roundtable is forthcoming in *Passport* on the documentary *Fog of War*.

Council unanimously accepted the 2004 financial statement and the 2005 budget.

Reports

6. *Diplomatic History* Contract Committee

Randall Woods reported that the committee consists of himself (as chair), David Anderson, Peter Hahn (ex-officio), Robert Schulzinger, Mark Stoler, and Mary Ann Heiss. At Council's direction, the committee has begun the process of examining the *Diplomatic History* contract well ahead of deadline. Notice must be given in December 2006 if SHAFR plans not to renew with Blackwell after the 2007 volume year. The committee intends to present a recommendation to Council no later than June 2006.

The committee is meeting with a number of publishers during this AHA conference. Nelson asked if SHAFR is fairly happy with Blackwell, and the response was generally positive. Woods said the committee is taking into consideration not only finances but also quality in the publication of *Diplomatic History* and service such as maintenance of the membership list. He further added that the committee is trying to involve Editor-in-Chief Robert Schulzinger at every step of the process.

7. Electronic version of the Guide

Thomas Zeiler circulated a written report in advance. David Anderson reported that an updated electronic version would be available early in 2006. Stoler added that ABC-CLIO is seeking feedback from SHAFR about the best method for incorporating the new updates. ABC-CLIO had suggested that members encourage their libraries to purchase the electronic guide. SHAFR will receive a minimum annual royalty of \$5,000.

8. Roster & Research List

Brian Etheridge reported that several points have been considered in redesigning the roster, including: how to best publicize the reform of the roster; how to redesign the interface of the on-line version; and how best to create a paper roster. He and his contact at Blackwell have come up with a redesigned version of the roster. It might be useful to add a button on the existing website called Membership Services. One would need a user name and password from Blackwell to access these services. At this page, members could edit their roster information and access *Diplomatic History* online. The roster link as it now exists will display a read-only version of the roster. Advantages to the new system will be that the roster will now be updated more directly with Blackwell's membership information. The upgrade will be effective in May. In the interim,

the current roster must be cleared of outdated and duplicate entries. Etheridge asked Council to consider hiring two MA students at Louisiana Tech for this task. Council indicated its assent for the expenditure.

It was also pointed out that if SHAFR wants another paper roster it might have to spend additional money. Hahn suggested that Council consider this issue after the electronic version is up and running. Nelson asked how readily the paper version can be updated. Anderson said that he used to ask for updated information once a year. Etheridge added that his contact at Blackwell had mentioned the possibility of Blackwell assuming responsibility for redesigning the entire SHAFR website, but that no specific offer had yet been made.

9. *Passport*

Mitch Lerner reported that *Passport* had now been up and running at Ohio State for more than one calendar year. Carol Anderson of the University of Missouri will replace Deborah Kisatsky on the editorial board. At the moment, *Passport* costs roughly half what the previous newsletter used to cost SHAFR per year. This savings is largely due to the subsidy paid by the Mershon Center at Ohio State in FY 2003-4 and FY 2004-5. Lerner reported that he is in the process of reapplying for this subsidy for FY 2005-6, and noted that at some point the Mershon Center may discontinue or reduce its subsidy.

10. 2005 annual meeting

Christopher Jespersen reported that the 2005 program committee met yesterday, and that the program looks sound. The annual meeting will begin Thursday afternoon, June 23, and run through Saturday, June 25. All 48 panels proposed were accepted, due to their exceptional quality. The SHAFR president will speak Friday night, and a luncheon will be held on Saturday afternoon. All sessions will be held at the National Archives, but dinner and the luncheon will be offsite. The plenary session will be held on Thursday evening. Hahn brought up that Council authorized \$1,500 for graduate student travel to this conference, and that the program committee will decide how to distribute these funds. Hahn said there has been an additional \$500 gift to this fund from a senior colleague. Sara Wilson asked for advice on whether Council wanted to recruit media coverage and advertise the conference to the local community. Council approved both ideas. Nelson advised that a shuttle bus should run to the local metro station; Anderson suggested that the local arrangements committee consider the idea.

11. 2006 annual meeting

David Anderson reported that the 2006 annual meeting will be held Friday, June 23 to Sunday, June 25 at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, with Ted Wilson chairing local arrangements. The local arrangements committee is in place. Wilson will present a more complete report at the Council meeting in June. The 2006 conference will feature a Sunday evening plenary session, to which prominent public officials have been invited. Stoler apologized for the numerous communications he had sent related to this meeting during the previous summer. There were a number of issues to be addressed by Council. Stoler explained the difficulty of getting appropriate building reservations, necessitating the need to meet through Sunday evening. Matray asked if there was a concern about attendance since Lawrence is a little out of the way. Stoler replied that we believe the proximity of two presidential libraries will attract people to the conference. Nelson mentioned that the 2007 meeting will be back in the Washington D.C. area, and suggested Georgetown University. Stoler added that Ohio State, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have all expressed interest for 2008.

12. Endowment

James Matray reported that the endowment was in excellent condition. The two accounts both experienced growth of about 5 percent during the last six-month period. Matray mentioned that much of that growth came in the month of November. In ten years the endowment has increased 162 percent. Matray suggested the possibility of increasing money for awards to further SHAFR's public service goals. Woods suggested the possibility of establishing a minimum balance for the endowment, with anything beyond that being spendable. Matray suggested discussing this idea at the next Council meeting. Anderson suggested that such a fund could be designed as a percentage of earnings. Matray urged that SHAFR could make a real difference for graduate students with even a portion of the earnings on the endowment. Nelson suggested that money could also be allocated for first year assistant professors. Matray requested that Council members contact him with their thoughts on this issue and he agreed to compose, in consultation with Hahn, a specific plan for Council consideration.

13. Bernath Dissertation Grant

Phyllis Soybel reported that 19 of 27 proposals received were for both the Bernath Dissertation Grant and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship. She reported that the state of young scholarship is very good, leading to significant competition for the award. The committee chose to award the Bernath Dissertation Grant to Jessica Chapman of UC Santa Barbara, who works on South Vietnamese politics.

14. Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship

Phyllis Soybel reported that this fellowship went to S.R. Joey Long, a Ph.D. candidate stationed in Singapore, who researches U.S.-Singapore relations in the 1950s. Soybel stressed that there were a number of high quality candidates. One of the reasons there were so many applicants was that the fellowship was publicized on H-Diplo.

15. Link-Kuehl Prize

David Anderson reported for the committee that there was intense competition. The committee granted honorable mentions to books edited by Christian Ostermann and by Mary Giunta & J. Dane Hartgrove. The Link-Kuehl prize was awarded to Jeffrey Kimball for his collection on the Nixon papers.

Other Business

16. Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members

David Anderson expressed thanks to William Burr, Andrew Rotter, and Robert McMahon for their years of dedicated service to SHAFR.

17. Announcements and other business

David Anderson mentioned that he would probably be sending a letter to the CIA about declassification.

Council warmly approved the scheduling of this meeting over lunch rather than breakfast and directed Hahn to aim to schedule the January 2006 meeting at a similar time. Hahn also indicated

that Council would be asked in the near future to approve an off-site venue for the SHAFR luncheon during the 2006 AHA meeting

Council also directed that the Council meeting in June 2006 be scheduled over lunch rather than breakfast if the schedule permitted it.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/rr

Mershon Network of International Historians


Professor Carole Fink, in conjunction with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University, has established a network of historians of European International Relations. Located at www.mnih.org, and titled the Mershon Network of International Historians (MNIH), the website serves as an electronic bulletin board for posting current information. Its primary purpose is to promote collaborative work among scholars on specific subjects in international history, such as panels, conferences, and volumes as well as joint research projects. Our other goals include posting archival information, announcing meetings and publications, and disseminating news of graduate and postgraduate study programs. The success of this project will largely depend on its participants, who will help to create links among a community of scholars without an organizational base.

Membership will require no fee, and privacy will be assured. The electronic bulletin board will be run and monitored by the directors of the MNIH from The Ohio State University. In addition, all announcements, postings, and information will be placed on the website by the directors.

If you are interested in becoming a member of the MNIH, please contact Ursula Gurney at gurney.13@osu.edu. Once you become a member, you will be able to submit information to post such as: a) calls for conference papers, b) archival and fellowship information, and c) upcoming publications and conferences. In addition, you will be able to request names of members, or have the directors of the MNIH send information of other participants, working in specific fields, on specific topics, and in specific cities and universities.



The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Lloyd E. Ambrosius (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) has been named the Samuel Clark Waugh Distinguished Professor of International Relations.

H.W. Brands has joined the University of Texas as the Dickson, Allen, Anderson Centennial Professor of American History.

Mitchell Lerner (The Ohio State University--Newark) will hold the Mary Ball Washington Distinguished Fulbright Chair at University College-Dublin for the 2005-06 academic year.

Stephen G. Rabe (University of Texas at Dallas) will serve as the Bicentennial Chair in American Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland for the 2005-06 academic year.

Tom Schoonover has announced his retirement from the University of Louisiana--Lafayette.

Jerry K. Sweeney will leave the service of South Dakota State University on 31 May 2005. Dr. Sweeney, a life member, dates his association with SHAFR to that time when dues were established at \$3.00 a year.



2. Research Notes

New FRUS Volume

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969-1972*. This volume, part of the ongoing official documentary history of American foreign policy, presents the record of the policy of the first administration of President Richard Nixon towards the United Nations, including a variety of issues related to the membership, management, funding, and operation of the organization. President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, considered themselves realists who stressed the importance of national self-interest and major power relationships in international affairs. As a consequence, they were often skeptical of the value of the United Nations and were generally content to leave the day-to-day direction of United Nations affairs to the diplomats at the Department of State. However, they recognized that the United Nations was too important and too visible a world organization to be totally ignored. When the UN policy on Chinese representation in the organization intersected with Nixon's and Kissinger's primary objective of opening relations with the People's Republic of China, they became involved in the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. On such high-profile issues as the selection of a new UN Secretary General to succeed U Thant, they also took an active interest in the process that eventually resulted in the selection of Kurt Waldheim of Austria. These are the primary concerns of the White House that are reflected in the documentation presented in this volume. Other major issues also covered in the volume include: U.S. concern with the radical tone of the Committee of 24 on Decolonization and the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Committee; the desire by members to hold periodic Security Council meetings and other meetings outside of the UN forum in New York; the perennial problem of the U.S. share in funding the virtually bankrupt United Nations; the selection of UN officials below the Secretary General level; and a variety of other questions involved in specific issues, such as the expansion of UN headquarters, the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the UN, and the security of UN missions. Before he was elected President, George H. W. Bush served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from March 1971 through 1973. Many of the documents provide insight into his role in the Nixon Administration and his tenure as head of the U.S. mission.

The text of the volume and the summary are available on the Office of the Historian website (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/v>). Copies can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at

<http://bookstore.gpo.gov>.

For further information contact:

Edward Keefer

General Editor of the Foreign Relations

tel.: (202) 663-1131;

fax: (202) 663-1289;

e-mail: history@state.gov.



Bush Presidential Records to be Released

Approximately 9,700 pages of George H.W. Bush Presidential records that were previously withheld under the Presidential Records Act are now open for research. These records are no longer subject to the Presidential restrictive categories or any applicable Freedom of Information Act exemptions. This is the first segment of records that the National Archives and Records Administration is releasing. In accordance with Executive Order 13233, representatives of former President Bush and incumbent President Bush have chosen not to assert any constitutionally-based privilege. This opening consists of records from the White House Office of Records Management Subject Files and Staff Member Office Files.

The Bush Library has opened approximately 5.4 million pages of records from the Executive Office of the President. These materials were previously reviewed under the Presidential Records Act and the Freedom of Information Act.

The Bush Library is continuing to review previously withheld records for possible release, and currently estimates that such records will total approximately 57,000 pages. The Library will make these records available on an on-going basis, once notice has been given and a decision has been made by the Presidential representatives not to assert any constitutionally-based privilege.

For additional information, contact:

The Research Room

The George Bush Library

1000 George Bush Drive West

College Station, TX 77842-0410

For archival inquiries, call: 979-691-4041



The Velvet Revolution: Inaugural Volume of the New Václav Havel Library

Celebrating the 15th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, former Czech dissident turned-President Václav Havel has chosen a set of U.S. State Department cables--obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Washington, D.C.-based National Security Archive--for the first volume in the Václav Havel Library. The volume, entitled *Prague-Washington-Prague: Reports from the United States Embassy in Czechoslovakia, November-December 1989*, is edited by Vilém Precan, a distinguished Czech historian, and includes the documents in both English and Czech transcription. Several originals are posted on the National Security Archive website. The documents constitute the daily and at times virtually minute-by-minute reporting from the Embassy of what it termed the "quiet revolution" unfolding in the country. To read selected documents from the new volume, please see: <http://www.nsarchive.org>. For more information contact Thomas Blanton at the National Security Archive at 202-994-7000.



The CIA and Nazi War Criminals

The National Security Archive has posted the CIA's secret documentary history of the U.S. government's relationship with General Reinhard Gehlen, the German army's intelligence chief for the Eastern Front during World War II. At the end of the war, Gehlen established a close relationship with the U.S. and successfully maintained his intelligence network (it ultimately became the West German BND) even though he employed numerous former Nazis and known war criminals. The declassified "SECRET ReIGER" two-volume history was compiled by CIA historian Kevin Ruffner and presented in 1999 by CIA Deputy Director for Operations Jack Downing to the German intelligence service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*) in remembrance of "the new and close ties" formed during post-war Germany to mark the fiftieth year of CIA-West German cooperation. This history was declassified in 2002 as a result of the work of The Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial

Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG) and contains 97 key documents from various agencies.

The documentation unearthed by the IWG reveals extensive relationships between former Nazi war criminals and American intelligence organizations, including the CIA. For example, current records show that at least five associates of the notorious Nazi Adolf Eichmann worked for the CIA, 23 other Nazis were approached by the CIA for recruitment, and at least 100 officers within the Gehlen organization were former SD or Gestapo officers.

For more information, see: <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact Thomas Blanton at 202-994-7000.

The Case Against Pinochet



With the decision by Chilean judge Juan Guzman to indict Augusto Pinochet for ten crimes relating to Operation Condor, the National Security Archive has reposted a series of declassified U.S. documents relating to Condor's acts of international terrorism--including the September 1976 carbombing assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C. The documents record the progression of U.S. intelligence gathering on Condor and U.S. foreign policy actions.

For more information contact:

Peter Kornbluh - 202-994-7116 / pkorn@gwu.edu

John Dinges - 212-854-8774 / jdinges@aol.com

<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Professor Seeks Historic PDBs from Johnson Years; Challenges CIA Blanket Policy of Non-Release

University of California, Davis professor Larry Berman has filed suit against the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, seeking release of historic President's Daily Briefs given to President Johnson during the Vietnam War. Represented by the law firm of Davis Wright Tremaine and by the National Security Archive of George Washington University, Berman is challenging the CIA's "blanket policy" of refusing to release any PDBs, even historic or innocuous ones that risk no damage to national security.

The previously released Briefs, including a 1998 PDB to President Clinton and a 2001 PDB to President Bush on bin Ladin (which were published in the 9/11 Commission Report), are posted on the National Security Archive website, at <http://www.nsarchive.org/pdbnews>, together with the Archive's previous reporting on the PDB issue. The National Security Archive also posted the latest Johnson-era Daily Brief that was officially declassified by the CIA through the Johnson Library this month, contrary to CIA policy. The 29 May 1967 Top Secret document was in the form of a cable from the White House Situation Room to the communications facility on the LBJ ranch outside San Antonio, and did not carry the letterhead announcing "President's Daily Brief."

For more information, contact Professor Larry Berman at 202-974-6202, or Meredith Fuchs/Thomas Blanton at the National Security Archive at 202-994-7000

<http://www.nsarchive.org/>



Bush Administration's First Memo on Al-Qaeda Declassified

The National Security Archive has posted the widely-debated, but previously unavailable, January 25, 2001, memo from counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke to national security advisor Condoleezza Rice - the first terrorism strategy paper of the Bush administration. The document was central to debates in the 9/11 hearings over the Bush administration's policies and actions on terrorism before September 11, 2001. Clarke's memo requests an immediate meeting of the National Security Council's Principals Committee to discuss broad strategies for combating al-Qaeda by giving counterterrorism aid to the Northern Alliance and Uzbekistan, expanding the counterterrorism budget and responding to the *U.S.S. Cole* attack. Despite Clarke's request, there was no Principals Committee meeting on al-Qaeda until September 4, 2001.

Also attached to the original Clarke memo were two Clinton-era documents relating to al-Qaeda. The first, "Tab A December 2000 Paper: Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al-Qida: Status and Prospects," was released to the National Security Archive along with the Clarke memo. "Tab B, September 1998 Paper: Pol-Mil Plan for al-Qida," also known as the Delenda Plan, was attached to the original memo, but was not released to the Archive and

remains under request with the National Security Council.

For more information contact Barbara Elias at 202-994-7045 or see <http://www.nsarchive.org>.



National Archives Opens Additional JFK Assassination Materials

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is announcing the release of additional materials relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The records being released are documents recently re-reviewed and processed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) determined that certain records should be released incrementally on specific years. The CIA has chosen to re-review and process all records the Assassination Records Review Board voted to open through 2010. As a result, over 4000 documents that previously were partially redacted are now released in full. An equal number are released in part with fewer redactions than in previous versions. Newly released information ranges from one word to a paragraph or more per document.

All of the documents are filed in series previously transferred to NARA, including Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, the Segregated CIA files, the CIA Miscellaneous files and the Russ Holmes files, as well as documents with CIA equities from the records of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The documents have been interfiled in their appropriate location. Each of the record identification forms (RIFs) describing the newly released documents have been copied to provide researchers with a finding aid to the newly released documents.

The documents are located at the National Archives in College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD. http://www.archives.gov/facilities/md/archives_2.html



The Soviet Bloc and the Aftermath of the June 1967 War

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to announce the publication of CWIHP e-Dossier No. 13, "The Soviet Bloc and the Aftermath of the June 1967 War: Selected Documents from Polish and Romanian Archives," edited by James G. Hershberg. To read or download the introduction and documents (in English translation), go to the publications link on the CWIHP website <http://cwihp.si.edu> and click on the link for "CWIHP e-Dossiers."



Princeton Obtains Long-Secret Report on James Forrestal's death

The investigation into the death of the nation's first secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal, resulted in a lengthy report long kept from the public. Admiral M. D. Willcutts, the commanding officer of the National Naval Medical Center, convened the review board that looked into James Forrestal's death in 1949. Now, more than 55 years later, the Navy has released the report, which is available electronically through Princeton University's Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library Web site at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/>.

The Willcutts Report supplements documents included in the James V. Forrestal Papers held at the Mudd Library, which include Forrestal's diaries. The report, along with a guide to the holdings of Forrestal's papers, may be viewed at the Mudd Library's Web site. For more information about this collection, contact the Mudd Library at (609) 258-6345 or mudd@princeton.edu.



3. Announcements:

Historians Ask Congress to Suspend Nixon Transfer

Sixteen historians who were scheduled to speak at a now-cancelled conference at the Nixon Library and Birthplace in Yorba Linda, California, have asked Congress to suspend plans for the transfer of the Nixon tapes and files from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland to the Yorba Linda facility. The historians informed the members of the U.S. Senate and House committees on appropriations, governmental affairs, and government reform, that "The unprofessional

behavior of the Nixon Library leadership calls into question that institution's fitness to join the Presidential Library system. The Nixon Library evidently feels free to toss aside, at its own convenience, its commitments to Whittier College and to the conference participants. A similarly cavalier attitude toward the commitments that the Library has made to the National Archives and to the Congress, in order to gain public funding for the transfer, would seriously jeopardize public access to and long-term preservation of invaluable historical records."

The historians noted that current plans for the Nixon transfer, for which the Library is seeking \$3 million in public funding, do not include any "legally binding commitment by the Nixon estate or the Nixon Library and Birthplace for such a unified collection in the control of the National Archives and governed by public access laws." In addition, the historians recommended that "Congress should enact a statutory requirement for an independent review board at each of the existing and future Presidential Libraries."

The historians are also asking the professional associations to which they belong to join their recommendation to Congress. For more information, contact Nixon Historians at 202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu.



Call for Submissions: *Yale Journal of International Affairs*

Yale Journal of International Affairs is a new journal that encourages discussion of issues in international affairs by highlighting the research of professors, graduate students, and practitioners in the international affairs field. The inaugural edition will be published in May 2005. For its inaugural edition, YJIA is interested in policy and research articles covering international politics, security, economics, and diplomacy, as well as reviews of recent books on foreign policy topics. In addition, YJIA will pay special attention to publishing articles on specific regional topics, as well as global health and development.

All articles should follow *Chicago Manual of Style* guidelines. Articles should range between 3,000 to 5,000 words, and book reviews should run 1,000 to 2,000 words. Please send submissions to:

jonathan.baum@yale.edu or
Yale Journal of International Affairs
International Affairs Council
34 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520

For more information please contact puongfei.yeh@yale.edu



Call for Submissions: Iraq War Culture Review Essays

Bad Subjects is issuing an open call for review essays of 1500-3000 words dealing with the cultural landscape created by the Iraq War. We are interested in essays that examine cultural products (art, film/video, photography, writing, music, theater, dance, software) or public-sphere phenomena (protests, political events, media coverage, educational projects, public reports, law) that respond to the war and its social environment. This review essay series is especially concerned with addressing issues created by the ideologies of the American Empire and 'democratic imperialism'; permanent military mobilization and domestic security watches; diminution of civil liberties and human rights; religious triumphalism and its relations with state violence; and the deepening of economic inequalities and poverty under global capitalism. How are such issues reflected in Iraq War culture and challenged through cultural critique? The editors will be interested equally in essays that review resistant cultural or political responses to Iraq War culture.

This is currently an open-deadline call. Submit review essays as word attachments to:

Joe Lockard
Arizona State University
joe.lockard@asu.edu
<http://bad.eserver.org/>



Call for Submissions: The Age of Imperialism, 1800-1914

Contributors are wanted for an encyclopedia, *The Age of Imperialism, 1800-1914* to be published by Greenwood Publishing in 2007. Scholars are invited to contribute entries, varying in length from 150 to 4,000 words, on key themes, wars, treaties, places, ideas, inventions, and people involved in the imperial rivalries in Europe and beyond from the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of World War I. *The Age of Imperialism* will consist of two volumes organized around 1,000 A – Z entries totaling approximately 400,000 words. This round of contributions is to be complete by August 1, 2005. Modest remuneration is available for major contributors.

C.C. Hodge
Okanagan University College
255 Arts Building
North Kelowna Campus
Kelowna BC V1V 1V7
(250) 762-5445 ext.7321
(250) 470-6001
chodge@shaw.ca



Call for Submissions: Women in the American Civil War

Women in the American Civil War: An Encyclopedia

This two-volume encyclopedia will include articles on all aspects of the Civil War era. There will be entries on individuals, places, ideas, events, institutions, and general themes. Articles will vary in length from 500-3,500 words (depending on the significance of the topic). The volume will also include a number of ancillary features, including chronologies, bibliographies (primary and secondary sources), and original documents. The encyclopedia will be published by ABC-CLIO.

All contributors will receive full authorial credit and electronic access to the published volume. Significant contributions will be compensated with a modest cash honorarium and/or a hard copy of the encyclopedia set.

For more information and a list of available entries, please contact:

Lisa Tendrich Frank
Department of History
Florida Atlantic University
777 Glades Road
Boca Raton, FL 33431
lfrank@fau.edu



Call for Papers: The Peace History Society

The Peace History Society will hold its bi-annual conference November 3-5, 2005 at Winthrop University in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The program committee is soliciting papers and presentations from scholars, activists, and non-governmental organizations that deal with the theme: "Peace Activism and Scholarship: Historical Perspectives of Social, Economic, and Political Change." While the program committee welcomes all submissions on subjects related to peace history, it encourages submission of papers and full sessions that deal with the relationship between activism and scholarship in the achievement of social justice and peace.

Please send a one page abstract of your paper or presentation electronically to Professor E. Timothy Smith (esmith@mail.barry.edu) and Professor Ginger Williams (williamsv@winthrop.edu) by May 1, 2005. Full details of the conference and the Peace History Society can be found on the Peace History Website at <http://www.berry.edu/phs/>.

E. Timothy Smith, Ph.D.
Department of History and Political Science
Barry University
Miami Shores, FL 33161
305-899-3471



Gerald R. Ford Library Research Grant

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards grants of up to \$2000 each in support of research in the archival collections of the Gerald R. Ford Library, part of the system of presidential libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. The collections are especially rich on U.S. Government domestic policies, diplomacy, and national political affairs in the 1970s. A grant defrays the travel, lodging, meal, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the Library. Application deadlines are March 15 and September 15.

The Library strongly encourages advance inquiry by email, telephone, or letter about the scope and availability of historical materials on a given topic. Detailed search reports from our internal collection description database, PRESNET, are available upon request.

Helmi Raaska, Grants Coordinator
Gerald R. Ford Library
1000 Beal Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Phone: 734-205-0559
Fax: 734-205-0571
helmi.raaska@nara.gov
<http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov>



National Archives of Australia Offers Research Grants

The National Archives of Australia is seeking expressions of interest for its 2005 Frederick Watson Fellowship and its Margaret George Award, both of which are offered annually to individuals interested in conducting scholarly research using the National Archives collection. Successful applicants for the Frederick Watson Fellowship will have formal credentials with a postgraduate degree, or an established record of publication. They will also be very well established in their chosen profession. Scholars who are still establishing a profile in their chosen career should consider applying for the Margaret George Award. Successful applicants for the Margaret George Award will have academic credentials and will have completed a postgraduate degree as a minimum. Both the Fellowship and the Award can be granted to international applicants provided their research focus is the National Archives of Australia collection.

Applications close on 24 June 2005. For more information please contact:

Derina McLaughlin
Director, Accessibility Development
National Archives of Australia
Tel: (02) 6212 3986 or +61 2 6212 3986
Fax: (02) 6212 3699 or +61 2 6212 3699
derina.mclaughlin@naa.gov.au



U.S. Department of State - Historian/Technical Editor, Foreign Relations series

The Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, is seeking to identify qualified individuals who are interested in the technical editing of the official documentary series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, and conducting research for other special projects. Requirements include knowledge of U.S. foreign relations and diplomatic history, proven research skills, a willingness to work on a variety of geographic areas over time, and considerable experience in technical editing. Salary range is approximately \$43,000 or higher, depending on qualifications, plus health insurance. Candidates must be U.S. citizens and pass background security clearance checks. Funding is anticipated for a contract position for at least 1 year (with potential for extension) and would begin in the fall of 2005. All appointments must conform to the laws and regulations regarding service with the U.S. Government. Interested candidates should send a c.v. and a cover letter describing their qualifications by e-mail to Dr. David Herschler at herschlerdh@state.gov and Dr. Kristin Ahlberg at ahlbergkl@state.gov or fax to 202-663-1289, to the attention of the Selection Committee.

Contact Info:
Dr. David Herschler
U.S. Department of State
Washington DC 20522
202-663-1145
202-663-1289
herschlerdh@state.gov
<http://www.state.gov>



Colgate University - Post-Doctoral Fellowship in Peace and Conflict Studies

Colgate University's 30-year old, interdisciplinary Peace and Conflict Studies Program [P+C] seeks to appoint a one-year postdoctoral fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies. The P+C program focuses on reflexive and critical analysis of peace and conflict. We encourage applications from candidates whose own research addresses both the particular features of a regional/historical conflict, as well as the general intellectual frameworks developed to explain them. We welcome applications from any field in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The Colgate Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies will teach one course in the P+C program each semester, share his/her research work with the community, and actively contribute to P+C Programming. Applicants should have received their Ph.D.s no earlier than 2003; persons holding tenure-track appointments are not eligible to apply. Ph.D. candidates must have degree in hand by the time of appointment. This position carries an annual salary of \$36,000 with full benefits and some research or travel support; there is a possibility of renewal for a second year.

Please submit an application letter and supporting materials (CV, two recommendation letters, and sample of written work not to exceed 20 pages; cover letter should indicate what research or writing the candidate will be engaged in while at Colgate) as soon as possible to: Daniel Bertrand Monk, Director, Peace and Conflict Studies Program, Colgate University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346-9778. Review of applications will begin on March 30, 2005

Contact Info:
Search Committee, Post-Doctoral Fellowship Search
Peace and Conflict Studies Program
Colgate University
13 Oak Drive
Hamilton, NY 13346-9778
<http://www.colgate.edu>



Call for Papers: Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference

The Transatlantic Studies Association was launched in 2002 at a major conference in Dundee by Alan Dobson, Professor of Politics and Director of the Institute for Transatlantic, European, and American Studies (ITEAS). Its mission is to nurture multi/inter-disciplinary studies of the transatlantic region. It holds regular conferences, promotes research networks, encourages scholarly exchanges, and supports publications through the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. The annual conference of the Transatlantic Studies Association will take place on July 11-14, 2005, at the University of Nottingham, England. Details of registration and a call for papers can be obtained from our website at www.Nottingham.ac.uk/hrc/tsc or from the Conference Secretary, Peter Boyle, at peter.boyle@Nottingham.ac.uk The Transatlantic Studies Association deals with all aspects of relations between Europe and North America – political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, literary, environmental. Deadline for proposals is 31 May 2005.



Call for Papers: Interdisciplinary Conference on British and United States Imperialism in Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and the Middle East

Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, May 15-18, 2006

We invite paper and panel proposals on any aspect of British and/or American imperialism in Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and the Middle East (from the eighteenth century to the present day). Proposals from all disciplines are welcome, including: History; Politics; Economics; Language(s) and Literature; Media Studies; Law; Social Science; Gender Studies; Cultural Studies; Religious Studies; Geography; the Sciences. We particularly welcome contributions that

compare and/or contrast British and United States policies, practices, and legacies. Areas of interest include, but are not restricted to, issues of:

- * Formal and informal modes of imperialism and colonization
- * Environment and resource exploitation
- * War, genocide, and humanitarian intervention
- * Corporations and the movements of national and global capital
- * Mapping and borders
- * Labour and class relations
- * Public memory (archives, monuments, museums...)
- * Race, sex, and gender
- * Religion
- * Writing and narrative
- * Alliances, including political/cultural relations between Britain and the United States
- * Anti-colonial resistance, revolution, and insurgency

Please send 300-word abstracts to the following e-mail address by January 20, 2006.
empire@post.queensu.ca
<http://post.queensu.ca/~empire>



The Legacy of World War II: A 60 Year Perspective

Chestnut Hill College will host an interdisciplinary conference on "The Legacy of World War II: A 60 Year Perspective" on November 4-5, 2005. We seek proposals for panels and individual papers from professional scholars and graduate students on topics related to the conference theme. Deadline for proposals is May 1, 2005, and should be submitted to:

William T. Walker
Chestnut Hill College
9601 Germantown Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19118
Phone: 215-248-7130
Fax: 215-248-7019
wwalker@chc.edu



"Price of Freedom" Exhibit Opens at Smithsonian

On Veteran's Day, "The Price of Freedom: Americans at War," the National Museum of American History's (NMAH) new permanent exhibit, opened to the public. The 18,200 square-foot exhibit provides a compelling look at U.S. military conflicts and their impact on American society from the 1750s to the 21st century. Using historical objects and documents, video and audio presentations, interactive displays, and original artwork, the exhibition chronologically takes visitors through the story of how wars have shaped United States history and affected the lives of all Americans. According to Brent Glass, director of the museum, the goal of this new exhibit is to help visitors "experience the impact of war on citizen soldiers...as well as on their families and communities." This exhibit features more than 850 objects and covers 16 conflicts, with special emphasis on the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War II, and Vietnam. A small number of documents are included, as are a number of interactive "voices" stations where visitors can see short audio-visual displays with quotations from actual Americans, combatants and noncombatants alike, about their wartime experiences. The exhibit also features nine short videos produced and donated by the History Channel.

For more information on "The Price of Freedom" exhibit please visit <http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/militaryhistory>.



Call for Papers: The United States in the 1980s: The Reagan Years

The Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford, invites single paper and panel proposals for a three-day interdisciplinary conference examining the subject of the United States in the 1980s. The RAI welcomes proposals analyzing the historical, cultural, economic, legal, and social impact of the 1980s upon both U.S. and international culture. While focusing upon Reagan's America, the conference looks beyond the presidency and the administration to examine wider literary, social, cultural and economic phenomena.

Please send one page proposals with a brief CV to Ruth Parr at the address below by July 3, 2005.

Topics to be addressed might include one or more of the following themes:

- * America and the Defeat of the Evil Empire
- * 'Just Say No': Nancy Reagan's War on Drugs
- * Aggressive Nationalism in Foreign Policy: Lebanon/Grenada/Libya
- * Reaganomics
- * No More Vietnams: American Isolationist Policy
- * Sunbelt Conservatism and the Emergence of the New Right
- * Confidence and Optimism for a New Decade: Reagan and the Legacy of Carter
- * Star Wars – America's Space Programme and the Quest for Arms
- * Literary Innovations and Representations of the Decade
- * 1984, the Los Angeles Olympics and American Nationalism
- * Reagan and Thatcher: the Conservative Revolution
- * The Closing of the American Mind: Education Policy in the 1980s
- * Madonna, MTV, Rambo and Dallas: the Impact of Popular U.S. Culture
- * Ubiquitous Television: the Spread of VCR and Cable
- * 1989: The Global Implications of the United States as Lone Superpower

For more information, contact:

Ruth Parr
Assistant Director, Academic Programme
Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford
1A South Parks Road
Oxford OX1 3TG
United Kingdom
academic.programme@rai.ox.ac.uk
<http://www.rai.ox.ac.uk>



Institute for Advanced Study, School of Historical Studies Memberships

The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, School of Historical Studies Memberships 2006-2007 offers scholars a community where intellectual inquiry, research and writing is carried out in the best of circumstances. The Institute offers members libraries, offices, seminar and lecture rooms, subsidized housing, stipends and other services. Open to all fields of historical research, the School of Historical Studies' principal interests are history of Western, Near Eastern and Far Eastern civilizations, Greek and Roman civilization, history of Europe (medieval, early modern, and modern), the Islamic world, East Asian studies, history of art, music studies and modern international relations. Candidates of any nationality may apply for one or two terms. Residence in Princeton during term time is required. The only other obligation of members is to pursue their own research. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications are required. Information and application forms for this and other programs may be found on the School's web site, or contact the School of Historical Studies (web, mailing, and e-mail addresses are provided below). Deadline: 15 November 2005.

For more information contact:

Marian Zelazny, Administrative Officer
School of Historical Studies
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive,
Princeton, NJ 08540
mzelazny@ias.edu
<http://www.hs.ias.edu/>



2006-2007 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowships

Application materials for 2006-2007 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowships are now available on the NEH website at <http://www.neh.gov/grants/guidelines/fellowships.html>. The submission deadline is May 1, 2005. NEH Fellowships support advanced research in the humanities by faculty or staff members of colleges or universities, or of primary or secondary schools, or independent scholars or writers. Fellowships are for periods of six to twelve months. The maximum stipend is \$40,000. Those enrolled in degree programs are not eligible to apply.

Fellowships provide support for research and writing projects that can be completed during the tenure of the award or for work that is part of a longer endeavor. Recent NEH Fellowship recipients are listed at <http://www.neh.gov/news/recentawards.html>

Applicants apply by using a web-based application form. For more information, contact NEH Fellowships at:

Division of Research Programs, Rm. 318
National Endowment for the Humanities
1100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20506
(202) 606-8200
fellowships@neh.gov
<http://www.neh.gov/grants/guidelines/fellowships.html>



LBJ Presidential Library, Grants-in-Aid Research Program

A limited number of grants-in-aid for research at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library will be awarded by the LBJ Foundation semi-annually. The grant periods are October 1 through March 31, and April 1 through September 30. Grant applications for the period October through March must be received by July 31; recipients will be announced in October. Grant applications for the period April through September must be received by January 31; recipients will be announced in April. Funds are awarded for the sole purpose of helping to defray living, travel, and related expenses incurred while conducting research at the LBJ Library during the period for which the grant is awarded. Grants range from \$500 to \$2,000. Grant requests should be calculated on the basis of \$110 per diem. Airfare should be calculated on the most economical fare. Requests for car rental or secretarial/research assistance should not be included in the grant. The Grants Review Committee will consider funding photocopying costs up to a total of \$75. Funds awarded for grants-in-aid by the Grants Review Committee cannot be changed or increased after the recipient receives favorable notification of the specific amount awarded. Grants are not awarded retroactively for research already completed.

Applications are reviewed by a special Faculty Committee appointed by the President of the University of Texas at Austin at the request of the LBJ Foundation. Competition for grants-in-aid from the LBJ Foundation has been strong in recent years, and candidates should be prepared to have their applications compared with thoughtful and well-written proposals. Candidates should state clearly and precisely how the holdings of the LBJ Library will contribute to the completion of the project. Application forms can be found at: <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/grantapp.pdf>

Applications should be addressed to:
Executive Director
The Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation
2313 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705
512-478-7829, ext. 296



4. Upcoming SHAFR Award Deadlines:

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two calendar years. Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign

relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination. The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Deadline for submission of books published in 2004 and 2005 is December 1, 2005.



The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship is designed to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate student members of SHAFR. The fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of United States foreign relations.

Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a thesis or dissertation prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced), a statement explaining how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used, and a letter of recommendation from the graduate advisor. Hogan Fellowships are awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting. Recipients of the fellowship must report to the Committee how the fellowship was used. Nominations and supporting materials must be received by 15 April 2005. Submit materials to: W. Michael Weis, Department of History, Illinois Wesleyan University, P.O. Box 2900, Bloomington, IL 61702-2900.



The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The Holt Fellowship is designed to promote research by doctoral candidates writing dissertations in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations, and must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation.

Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation. Holt Fellowships are awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting. At the end of the fellowship year, recipients of the fellowship must report to the Committee how the fellowship was used. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

To be considered for the 2005 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 15 April 2005. Submit materials to: W. Michael Weis, Department of History, Illinois Wesleyan University, P.O. Box 2900, Bloomington, IL 61702-2900.



5. Recent Publications of Interest

Anderson, Irvine H. *Biblical Interpretation and Middle East Policy: The Promised Land, America, and Israel, 1917-2002*, University of Florida Press, \$39.95.

Arndt, Richard T. *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Potomac Books, \$45.00.

Aster, Sidney, ed. *Appeasement and All Souls: A Portrait with Documents, 1937-1939*, Cambridge University Press, \$75.00.

Ballantyne, Tony and Antoinette Burton. *Bodies In Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters In World History*, Duke University Press, \$89.95.

Barlow, Tani, Yukiko Hanawa, Thomas LaMarre, and Donald Lowe, eds. *Against Pre-emptive War*, Duke University Press, \$14.00.

- Best, Jacqueline. *The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance*, Cornell University Press, \$37.50.
- Bohning, Don. *The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965*, Potomac Books, \$29.95.
- Boyle, Peter G, ed. *Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957*, University of North Carolina Press, \$45.00.
- Byrne, Malcolm and Mastny, Vojtech. *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991*, Central European Press, \$75.00.
- Callahan, Michael D. *A Sacred Trust: The League of Nations and Africa, 1929-1946*, Sussex Academic Press, \$69.50.
- Cullinane, Michael. *Illustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*, Hawaii University Press, \$41.00.
- Cuordileone, Kyle. *Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War*, Routledge, \$24.95.
- Danchev, Alex. *Georges Braque: A Life*, Arcade Publishing, \$30.00.
- Doenecke, Justus D. and Mark A. Stoler. *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, 1933-1945*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, \$19.95.
- Dumbrell, John. *President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism*, Manchester University, 2004
- Edgar, Adrienne Lynn. *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan*, Princeton University Press, \$37.50.
- Fahlbusch, Michael, Ingo Haar, and Haar Fahlbusch, eds. *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1920-1945*, Berghahn Books, \$60.00.
- Fink, Carole. *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938*, Cambridge University Press, \$80.00.
- Finney, Patrick. *Palgrave Advances in International History*, Palgrave, \$24.95.
- Gardner, Lloyd and Ted Gittinger, eds. *The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964-1968*, Texas A&M University Press, \$40.00.
- Glantz, Mary E. *FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles over Foreign Policy*, Kansas University Press, \$34.95.
- Hahn, Peter L. *Crisis and Crossfire: The U.S. and the Middle East since 1945*, Potomac Books, \$45.00.
- Haimson, Leopold H. and David MacDonald. *Russia's Revolutionary Experience, 1905-1917: Two Essays*, Columbia University Press, \$39.50.
- Hill, Peter P. *Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815*, Potomac Books, \$29.95.
- Ismael, Tareq Y. *The Communist Movement in the Arab World*, Routledge, \$100.00.
- Jacobs, Seth. *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957*, Duke University Press, \$22.95.
- Jackson, Peter and Siegel, Jennifer, eds. *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence in International Society Since 1815*, Praeger, \$99.95.
- Judson, Pieter M., Marsha L. Rozenblit and Judson Rozenblit, eds. *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, Berghahn Books, \$75.00.
- Krenn, Michael L. *Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit*, University of North Carolina Press, \$39.95.
- Lankov, Andrei N. *Crisis In North Korea: The Failure Of De-Stalinization, 1956*, University of Hawaii Press, \$48.00.

- Lebovics, Herman. *Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age*, Duke University Press, \$29.95.
- Lerner, Mitchell, ed. *Looking Back at LBJ: White House Politics in a New Light*, University Press of Kansas, \$35.00.
- Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, Cornell University Press, \$35.00.
- Litvin, Alter and John Keep. *Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium*, Routledge, \$100.00.
- Melanson, Richard A. *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush*, M.E. Sharpe, \$85.95.
- Murphy, Gretchen. *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire*, Duke University Press, \$74.95.
- Preble, Christopher A. *John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap*, Northern Illinois University Press, \$32.00.
- Quigley, John. *The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective*, Duke University Press, \$22.95.
- Rosenberg, Victor. *Soviet-American Relations, 1953-1960: Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange During the Eisenhower Presidency*, McFarland, 2005, \$45.00.
- Small, Melvin. *At the Water's Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War*, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, \$26.00.
- Soybel, Phyllis L. *A Necessary Relationship: The Development of Anglo-American Cooperation in Naval Intelligence*, Praeger Publishers, \$84.95.
- Stein, Rebecca L. and Ted Swedenburg, eds. *Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture*, Duke University Press, \$24.95.
- Steinberg, David ed. *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics*, M.E. Sharpe, \$72.95.
- Wigg, Richard. *Churchill and Spain: The Survival of the Franco Regime, 1940-1945*, Routledge, \$132.00.
- Young, Elliot. *Catarino Garza's Revolution on the Texas-Mexico Border*, Duke University Press, \$23.95.

SHA FR NEEDS YOUR HELP

In the previous two issues of *Passport*, Mark Gilderhus and Mark Stoler have provided fair warning about a pending survey of SHA FR members. You need wait no longer, for that day has arrived. The time has come for all good men and women of SHA FR to come to the aid of their association and their colleagues by participating in the survey on teaching.

The Teaching Committee's questionnaire, available both in web and paper versions, is relatively lengthy, but no more so than is necessary to obtain good information about what courses we teach and how we teach them. So if you have not already done so via the web, please read Mark Gilderhus's letter on page 24 and respond affirmatively by sharing with your colleagues the benefit of your experience.

With appreciation,

David L. Anderson, President
Robert L. Beisner, Past President
Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director

Michael J. Hogan, Past President
Mark A. Stoler, Past President
Randall B. Woods, President-elect

In Memory:

Hermann-Josef Rupieper

(1942-2004)

About fifteen years ago, I was a Ph.D. candidate in the history department at the University of Virginia and a regular visitor at the German Historical Institute (GHI) in Washington, D.C. Determined to compose a thesis on the role of Jews in the reeducation of Germany after VE-Day, I was lucky to run into Hermann-Josef Rupieper at the GHI. Rupieper listened carefully to my ideas and became the first to provide the encouragement needed so desperately by every beginning researcher who is haunted by self-doubts. I did not know back then but would realize in the following years of our friendship that my experience encompassed in a nutshell what this scholar meant to countless students and colleagues: a prolific researcher and writer, a man of the archives whose curiosity proved to be incredibly broad, an intent listener, a restless organizer, and a fine friend.


Hermann-Josef Rupieper was born in Recklinghausen, Germany in 1942. Beginning his studies of history at the Free University of Berlin, he soon transferred to Stanford University where he caught the attention of Gordon Craig and wrote an English-language Ph.D. thesis on Weimar Germany, later published under the title *The Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922-1923: Politics and Economics* (Boston, 1979). In doing so, he paved the way for a generation of students who would come to the United States to seek degrees and, perhaps, careers in the English-speaking world. With his next manuscript, composed as assistant professor at the Free University, he turned to social history and investigated the lives of workers and employees at the Maschinenwerke Augsburg during the industrialization. He then received an offer from the University of Marburg, and, successively, from the Martin Luther University-Halle Wittenberg, where he went in 1993.

Rupieper experienced his appointment in Halle in a profoundly personal way. Witnessing the transition of post-communist East Germany, the withdrawal of the People's Police and the arrival of the Federal Army, he felt a deep need to investigate GDR history and, in a way, help East Germans to master their own past. His studies on the Friedliche Revolution 1989-90 (*The Peaceful Revolution of 1989-90*; Halle, 2000) and the events on June 17, 1953,

in Sachsen-Anhalt met widespread interest among his colleagues and the public. His works always underlined the necessity of multi-archival research and an analytical approach soundly based on sources and on evidence. Rupieper loved to correct "old truths" and to disseminate new archival findings among social groups outside of the academic world, such as professional associations, high school teachers, and even aspiring policemen. He was, as his colleague, Klaus Schwabe, recently mused, "somehow a German patriot."

American historians remember him best for his

numerous stints in the United States as well as his extensive work in the field of transatlantic relations after World War Two. In 1987 he was director of the GHI; in 1990-91 a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.; and in 2000-01 he taught at Vanderbilt University, occasionally even appearing on American television to comment on political events in the Federal Republic. Thanks to his initiative, numerous U.S. historians came to Halle to present papers and exchange their ideas with students and faculty. At the same time, he served as trust lecturer (Vertrauensdozent) for the Fulbright Commission. At least three of his publications, *Der besetzte Verbündete* (The Occupied Ally; Opladen 1991), *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie* (The



Origins of West-German Postwar Democracy; Opladen, 1993), and *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955* (ed. with Jeffrey M. Diefendorf and Axel Frohn; Cambridge, 1993) have become standard readings for students and scholars interested in German-American relations, High Commissioner John McCloy, cultural diplomacy, or the role of NGOs in international affairs. Sadly, his last project, a monograph dedicated to the era of Jimmy Carter--Helmut Schmidt, remains unfinished.

Hermann-Josef Rupieper died on Tuesday, August 31, 2004, during a vacation on the island of Crete. He is survived by his wife, Marion Rupieper-Pantenius.

Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

Congratulations!



*SHAFR would like to congratulate
the following prize
and fellowship winners*

**2005 Arthur S. Link-
Warren F. Kuehl Prize for
Documentary Editing**

Jeffrey P. Kimball

*The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the
Secret History of Nixon Era Strategy.*
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2004.

**2005 Lawrence Gelfand-
Armin Rappaport
Fellowship**


Joey S.R. Long
Cambridge University

**2005 Stuart L. Bernath
Dissertation Grant**

Jessica Chapman
University of California
at Santa Barbara

The Last Word

Mitchell Lerner



In 1952, Senator Joseph McCarthy proposed a bill placing restrictions on what college professors could teach, explaining that the measure was necessary because "Eighty percent or so of them [professors] are Democrats, liberals or socialists, or card-carrying Communists." Oh, wait a minute. That wasn't Joe McCarthy. That was Ohio state Senator Larry Mumper a few months ago, as he introduced Senate Bill 24 to the Ohio Legislature.

It should make no difference where one falls on the political spectrum to recognize the inherent dangers of allowing the state to place limitations on classroom discussion. And although academics throughout the country should be alarmed by these actions, diplomatic historians should be particularly worried. Is there another academic discipline that offers as many potential minefields as ours? Is there a way to teach twentieth-century American diplomacy without introducing ideas that challenge what students think about their country and their government? And equally as important, is there a realm of the academic world that the state would like to control as much as ours? I doubt that the current administration cares what my colleagues say when they teach Elizabethan poetry; I don't doubt that they do care about what is being said about the war in Iraq.

Space precludes a detailed examination of the provisions of SB 24, but a few points demonstrate its potential dangers. Title B demands that professors not assign grades based on students' "political, ideological, or religious beliefs." I imagine that we would all agree with this statement in theory, but its potential application is chilling. How can diplomatic historians in particular provide worthwhile instruction if we are forced to accept "political beliefs" as the basis for answers? By its very nature, our discipline deals with controversial issues of a political nature; how long, then, until a student from either side of the political aisle writes a terrible paper about a controversial topic and then causes an uproar by protesting his failing grade on the grounds that he is being punished for his political opinion? Think it can't happen? Try doing an internet search for Ahmad Al-Qloushi at Foothill College, and see what grade you would give the paper in question. And what should we read into a law protecting "ideological beliefs?" If a student supports Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb by arguing that it killed a lot of Asians, and in doing so strengthened the world's gene pool, must a teacher now consider that an acceptable answer? Can a paper championing slavery

on the grounds that African-Americans are inherently inferior be harshly graded? Aren't these beliefs, reprehensible as they are, part of the individual's personal ideology?

Title C forbids professors from "persistently introducing controversial matter into the classroom...that has no relation to their subject of study and that serves no legitimate pedagogical purpose." But who is to decide what is legitimate? Who is to decide what is controversial? Are politicians, regardless of their party or their

beliefs, the right people to evaluate what is appropriate instructional material? Senator Mumper has already defined two controversial issues: "religion and politics." How many subjects can be excluded from the classroom under these broad headings? Can I teach Vietnam? Middle East policy? Recently my class discussed Nick Cullather's book about Guatemala, which evolved into a debate about the current conflict in Iraq, as students wondered if there were any lessons to be drawn from the earlier case study. Would Title C ban such a conversation? One reasonably assumes that it would, since the class will not otherwise address post-1975 issues as part of its regular focus.

Title A demands that reading lists "shall respect all human knowledge...and provide students with dissenting sources and viewpoints." It does not stretch the bounds of interpretation to see in this clause a scenario in which the state decides what books can be assigned. Since we are required to provide "dissenting sources" must a professor who assigns Darwin also assign the Bible? If students read George Herring on Vietnam, must we also read Norman Podhoretz? Must a critical account of the Red Scare be "balanced" by Ann Coulter's defense of Joseph McCarthy?

Such reforms are not unique to Ohio. Twelve other states have similar proposals in various stages of the legislative process, and more are expected to emerge. After a recent battle in Colorado over a similar bill, university officials agreed to a "Memorandum of Understanding" that accepted some of its principles. SHAFR members in particular should be concerned about this emerging threat to the guaranteed free exchange of ideas, the ability to challenge conventionally accepted beliefs, and the power to be skeptical of those in authority. If, as Thomas Jefferson once said, "Information is the currency of democracy," it is incumbent upon our field and our organization to resist this attempt to place a government-sponsored ideological straightjacket on the very place where democracy is meant to flourish.