

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 38, Issue 2, August 2007



Inside...

What would William Appleman Williams Say Now?
A Roundtable on Thomas Zeiler's
Ambassadors in Pinstripes
Sources for Nixon's Foreign Policy
Steven Fuchs on "Dumping the Dead Folks"

...and much more!

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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William Appleman Williams in the late 1940s. Courtesy William Appleman Williams Papers, Oregon State University Libraries, Special Collections.

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The editors of *Passport* wish to acknowledge the generous support of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University--Newark, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

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A Roundtable on Thomas W. Zeiler's *Ambassadors in Pinstripes: The Spalding World Baseball Tour and the Birth of the American Empire*

Midori Yoshii, Michael L. Krenn, John Day Tully, and Thomas W. Zeiler

Review of Thomas W. Zeiler, *Ambassadors in Pinstripes: The Spalding World Baseball Tour and the Birth of the American Empire*

Midori Yoshii

In this fascinating tale of the world tour made by American baseball players in the late nineteenth century, Thomas Zeiler argues that the efforts by former Chicago White Stockings player and sporting goods tycoon Albert Spalding to promote baseball overseas symbolized the American aspiration to become a global power. In contrast to earlier studies that focus on more obvious and well-known political and military events such as the Spanish-American War, the acquisition of the Philippines, the annexation of Hawaii, and Theodore Roosevelt's dispatch of the Great White Fleet to circumnavigate the globe, Zeiler's book presents a stimulating perspective in its attempt to reveal the nature of U.S. imperialism through an analysis of popular culture—or, to use a more trendy term, soft power. The book discusses not only baseball's development into a business enterprise, but also the vibrant growth of Chicago and other industrial cities, the rise of labor disputes and social changes, the development of a railway system, the racial hierarchy, a change in gender conventions, and the effect of that change on sports. By including many intriguing subject areas in an excellent narrative, the author truly captures the ethos of American Exceptionalism during the

Gilded Age. I anticipate that this work will become a popular book for use in American history and international studies courses on many college campuses.

The story is chronologically organized. It follows the route of Spalding's tour, beginning with his business hub, Chicago, then moving westward within the continental United States (Denver, San Francisco), then on to Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and western Europe (Italy, France, and the British Isles) before finally returning to the East Coast. Readers learn that Spalding's desire to lead a world tour was rooted in the vitality of Gilded Age Chicago, the rising industrial metropolis that cradled American capitalism. Spalding, who owned both a sporting goods company and a baseball club, wanted to expand his business opportunities overseas and thus considered his tour a long-term investment.

As Zeiler follows the tour westward, he critiques the old Turner thesis about the American West and the closing of the frontier as a romantic notion and instead characterizes the region as a place where "a juggernaut of capitalists, government officials, and railroad barons manipulated" commerce and industry (41). Here, too, as in Chicago, American business was expanding energetically. The booming American West and Spalding's baseball enterprise in Chicago thus "symbolized the drive, energy, and materialism of the masses who preceded them in the nineteenth century" (41).

The energetic rise of the new nation was attended by aspirations to great-nation status but also by profound racial prejudice. The late nineteenth-century racial perspective is an important theme for Zeiler. In the chapter on Chicago, he links that perspective with the vitality of the city and the aggressive business spirit, citing the writer and adventurer Captain Willard Glazier: "Chicago is a great and a magnificent city, embodying more perfectly than any other in the world the possibilities of accomplishment of the Anglo-Saxon race, given its best conditions of freedom, independence, and intelligence" (7). But Zeiler also suggests a degree of continuity between the Gilded Age and the present. "Such race-laden sentiment of Anglo-Saxonism seems anachronistic today, but it expressed a positive faith in modernity integral to nineteenth-century globalization and, indeed, globalization in the late twentieth century" (7). One is reminded of such racial views in the post-9/11 debates over ethnic profiling and immigration, although racial attitudes today are perhaps expressed in a more subtle or sophisticated way. Such sensitivity seemed nonexistent among Spalding's touring participants. The presence of "Cap" Anson, widely known as an avid supporter of baseball's color barrier, was in itself evidence of a lack of racial sensitivity, as was the inclusion of the Chicago White Stockings' black "mascot," Clarence Duval, who had to entertain spectators with "plantation dancing."

The Gilded Age "attitude of

superiority of white America to people of color" (76) became more evident as Spalding's group continued on to visit Hawaii, Sri Lanka and Egypt. In a letter home, pitcher John Tener complained that local people "are nearly all darkies and after awhile, you get tired of looking at them and hearing their funny talk" (105). A similar view was expressed in Egypt, where in the athletes' eyes, "the people were either exotic inhabitants of a beautiful and historical land, or barbarians existing in backwardness" (106). In contrast, the ballplayers felt at home when visiting British Australia, where they shared "racial beliefs, cultural backgrounds, nationalistic longings, and affinities for sports" (88). They played cricket with the white Australians, which demonstrated "sport's effectiveness as a tool of imperial accord" (90). These testimonies convincingly prove the author's argument that "white attitudes toward race shaped globalization and imperial imaginations" (75).

However, Zeiler's further claim that "sports enhanced nationalism but also joined the Anglo-Saxons across the world into a band of brothers" (91) remains questionable, as the author later reveals that in England the British mocked baseball as a version of the children's game of rounders. Furthermore, he argues that "unlike the British colonials who talked of kinship, the Italians, French, and British thought of Americans as social climbers who occupied a rung of the ladder of civilization below the Europeans. Discrimination cut both ways" (110). But the nature and degree of discrimination toward "people of color" and toward Americans seem both different and disproportionate, even though the racial hierarchy of the time placed Americans below Europeans. However, the more important argument in the book is the connection between such racial views and nineteenth-century globalization. The author notes that:

both at home and abroad, the Spalding tourists had exhibited the traits of racial superiority in their thinking, words, and deeds. Whether encountering Chinese immigrants, Clarence Duval,

Hawaiians, or Hindus—or white British colonists held in high esteem—the tourists engaged in the late nineteenth century's hierarchy of race.... It was all a part of globalization, by which empires were built by the fittest competition—that is, by white men (110).

Zeiler also offers an interesting argument about the correlation between changing gender concepts and the rise of sports. He suggests that American white males who were sent to perform "feminine" office work during the Second Industrial Revolution felt compelled to emphasize manliness through sports, and "baseball, among such other sports as boxing, football, and hunting, filled a need for exhibiting masculinity." "Hordes of fertile immigrants" to the United States, who seemed poised to "supplant the effete Anglo-Saxon male," also contributed to the white American male's need to find ways to prove his manhood. Men therefore "turned to sports as an outlet, and afterward to war and empire-building, to express their gender concerns" (130). It was in this context that "cultivating manliness was foremost in Spalding's . . . vision of the world tour. He linked sports to social purpose and the U.S. presence in the world, and he designed his global project to exhibit American manliness" (131). However, European countries were not impressed with the manly American sport of baseball, and their lack of interest compelled Spalding to turn his eyes to the U.S. domestic audience to emphasize baseball as America's national sport. It was for this reason, Zeiler reminds us, that Spalding created the myth about baseball being a purely American sport, originating with Abner Doubleday in Cooperstown, having no connection to British rounders, and supposedly representing the American values of democracy and upward mobility.

While this myth appealed to the American domestic audience, Spalding's tour failed to achieve the same success abroad. Zeiler acknowledges that it did not make baseball a global sport and terms Spalding's attempt to introduce it to

the "advanced nations" of Europe and the British Commonwealth his "ultimate failure in promotion." Ironically, "baseball took hold in places that the tour had not reached, such as Japan and the Caribbean"—"nations of color rather than the white imperial outposts so lauded by the tourists" (188).

While Spalding's one-time tour did not spread the love of baseball, certain parts of the world where American influence reached certainly embraced the sport. But under what circumstances? Earlier in the book, the author equates American baseball's role abroad to sports' role in the British Empire: "Part of Britain's imperial strategy depended on acculturating colonial subjects, as well as the British middle class, to the 'games ethic' of fair play, order, and elite-led rule making. In essence, American baseball, like other sports, arrived abroad (in baseball's case, in Cuba and Japan) as a function of Victorian-era imperialism" (87). We need to question if this comparison between the British colonial experience and the area of U.S. cultural influence actually furthers our understanding of the American imperial experience. Did baseball really play such a role in acculturating Cubans and Japanese into an American mindset? The Philippines was once a U.S. territory, but baseball did not become a prominent sport there. Japan was occupied by the United States after World War II, but baseball had already been a passion for Japanese people for over half a century. What promoted baseball in areas where it is popular today?

If we are to understand how the sport spread in American-influenced areas, perhaps we need to pay attention to the receiving sides' experience with baseball and study the efforts of people who lived for a long while among the populace, rather than focus on a one-time promotion by tourists who just touched the surface of each society. In Japan's case, an American missionary and English professor, Horace Wilson, taught students the game at Tokyo Imperial University (then known as Kaisei School) in 1872.¹ We also need to examine how receiving sides adopt

American Foreign Relations Since 1600

A Guide to the Literature


3rd Ed., Thomas W. Zeiler, Editor

After five years of work, a distinguished group of editors has updated the bibliography of record for diplomatic historians, *American Foreign Relations Since 1600: A Guide to the Literature*. Known as the *SHAFR Guide*, the annotated bibliography supplements the prize-winning 2nd edition with the addition of nearly 2,000 entries. The new edition is available only in an electronic version, which facilitates searching for sources and authors. Electronic publishing also allows biannual updating, ensuring you'll always have access to the latest research.

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
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a foreign culture. This point is stressed by Warren I. Cohen in his book, *The Asian American Century*.² Cohen challenges the notion of cultural imperialism and discusses how the receiving sides selected and modified desired aspects of American cultural influence to fit them into their own cultures. Numerous books on the different styles of Japanese baseball prove this point.³

At the end of *Ambassadors in Pinstripes* Zeiler remarks that “the conceptualization of empire occurred years before its advent, and baseball played a role” (191). Spalding’s world tour symbolized rising American capitalism and views of racial hierarchy and promoted an expression of manliness associated with late nineteenth-century American social changes. But this expression of manliness did not work on the self-proclaimed sophisticates of Europe, and American racial views did not influence “people of color” as effectively as the British colonists did, at least through baseball. Perhaps the business side of baseball was most successful—the side in which the Americans championed themselves. Zeiler writes that “the world tour of 1888–1889 symbolized aspects of the early era of globalization. Among them was the triumph of big business in the U.S. economy” (190). While I was reading this book in Japan this winter, I saw a high school student in a Tokyo subway station carrying a gym bag with the brand name “Spalding.” Although the boy did not know who Spalding was, and he was using the bag for basketball, not baseball, the nineteenth-century sporting goods magnate’s dream seems to live on in the market overseas.

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Notes

1. The best study thus far on Japanese acceptance of baseball is: Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “For Love of the Game: Baseball in Early U.S.–Japan Encounters and the Rise of a Transnational Sporting Fraternity,” *Diplomatic History* 28 (November 2004): 637–662. Shimizu writes that Spalding donated baseballs and other equipment to Japanese teams to promote the sport (pp. 650ff).

2. Warren I. Cohen, *The Asian American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2002).

3. See for example, Robert Whiting, *Chrysanthemum and the Bat* (New York, 1977); Sadaharu Oh and David Falkner, *Sadaharu Oh: A Zen Way of Baseball* (New York, 1984); and Robert Whiting, *You Gotta Have Wa* (New York, 1989).

Thomas W. Zeiler, *Ambassadors in Pinstripes: The Spalding World Baseball Tour and the Birth of the American Empire*

Michael L. Krenn

In 1888–1889, baseball mogul Albert Spalding carried out what was, for its time, an audacious undertaking: sending two teams of American baseball players literally around the world. In the space of six months, the teams played exhibition games in New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii, Ceylon, Egypt, France, Italy, England, Scotland, and Ireland. The travails and triumphs of the arduous journey are covered with wit and verve in this brief and entertaining book. The exploits of the players, both on and off the field, are covered in some detail. Aside from the legendary “Cap” Anson, most of the names will resonate only with the most avid baseball fan, but Zeiler brings all of them to life (warts and all).

Had Zeiler done nothing more than resurrect this little-remembered nugget of Gilded Age history, the story would be of little interest to anyone beyond sports zealots and those scholars who might find the colorful characters and tales fodder for the next video or manuscript history of baseball. However, in less than two hundred pages the author accomplishes a great deal more. Using Spalding’s baseball tour as an interesting backdrop, Zeiler examines the growth of American industrial capitalism and the resultant outward surge of the nation’s economic (and cultural, racial, and political) power overseas. In short, he uses the story of the baseball tour as a vehicle for illuminating America’s rise to empire; or, as Zeiler prefers, the “process of globalization” (xii).

The author is careful to note, however, that he is not interested in writing another history of the late nineteenth-century American

empire, but instead wishes to focus on “the ideas and expressions behind the formation of empire.” Coming a decade before the Spanish-American War, Spalding’s baseball tour “gave a sense of the exceptionalism of the United States and the hope of elites of the future greatness, and, thus, imperial power, of the country” (xiii). As Zeiler freely admits, the globetrotting baseball players “might be viewed as quite odd representatives of budding imperial notions,” but he casts them as living examples of “globalization” — agents, if you will, of America’s growing claims to worldwide economic, political, and cultural power (ix).

Zeiler adopts a unique and effective approach to telling his story. While following a rough chronological organization, he uses each individual chapter as a means to describe an aspect of globalization. Chapter one looks at the simultaneous growth of Chicago as an entrepreneurial center and Albert Spalding’s steady climb to dominate both the sport of baseball (as cultural entertainment) and the business side of the sport (particularly sporting equipment). The following chapter introduces us to the impact of transportation on the process of globalization by taking us along on the long trek by railroad from Chicago to the baseball players’ point of departure for their overseas adventure, San Francisco. Chapter three focuses on the issue of race as it concerned the baseball tour. According to Zeiler, the players carried with them “notions of superiority”; indeed, he argues, they “traveled in the context of race, a context that shaped their views of and experiences with the nonwhite domestic and foreign cultures to which they were exposed” (75–76). However, in the next chapter Zeiler indicates that the players were abruptly disabused of their notions of superiority when they arrived in Europe. The English, French, and Italians, it turned out, were seasoned pros both in terms of exuding ideas of national greatness and building empires. As he wryly notes, “The Old World might teach the Americans a thing or two about culture, customs, and humility, and ultimately reveal the United States to be an empire in

waiting rather than a nation that had already come of age in the world arena" (121). As the final chapter demonstrates, however, the plucky Americans quickly shook off the cool reception from the Europeans. Upon their return to the United States they and their supporters proclaimed that the baseball tour was not a mere suggestion of what might be, but a clear announcement that the globalization of American culture and capitalism was complete and that the North American giant was ready to accept world leadership there and then.

For the remainder of this rather brief essay, I would like to focus on the questions raised by Zeiler's use of "globalization" as the central theme of his book, as well as the role of culture as an agent in that process. The term "globalization" has been growing in popularity during the past two or three decades and is used to describe any number of things. An internet search for "globalization" produces more than 1,650,000 sites, most of them dealing with definitions of the word. When I began this essay there were 41,836 books on Amazon.com that featured "globalization," including volumes that are basically "globalization for idiots" (the stamp of approval for college students). By the time this essay was completed there were 41,859 books. As one might imagine, this burgeoning mass of information results in a veritable cacophony of interpretations of what globalization is and what impact it has on the world and its people. These range from the rather benign descriptions offered up by the World Bank ("the growing integration of economies and societies around the world") and the International Monetary Fund ("an extension beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity – village markets, urban industries, or financial centers"), to studies that portray globalization as either the salvation of the underdeveloped world or as another mask for devastating capitalistic exploitation of many of the nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.¹

Zeiler's definition of this key term is in some ways a reflection of this ongoing, multi-faceted debate. It is somewhat indefinite. He notes that the process "hinged on modernization through industrialization" and further suggests that it is an immutable, nearly inevitable force – "a never-ending cycle of innovation, profit, sacrifice, and change" (xii). By the late 1800s it was already a centuries-old phenomenon, with technology, industrialization, capitalism, and increasingly efficient modes of transportation washing over national boundaries, linking developed, underdeveloped, and undeveloped nations together in transnational markets of goods, ideologies, and cultural manifestations. In American hands, the process took on a decidedly nationalistic tint; globalization became merely the precursor to "Americanization" on a global scale. Yet all of this leaves the specific parameters of globalization somewhat hazy and extremely malleable. Zeiler's constant reference to the term suggests that scholars, while perhaps disagreeing on the impacts of globalization, are in general agreement on its meaning. That, however, is hardly the case. As Imre Szeman notes, it has become a "ubiquitous term in a wide-range of academic and popular discourses" and is used to describe a dizzying array of circumstances. "For this very reason, globalization is a concept that is already in danger of becoming simply a short-lived buzzword of the age." Even the World Bank, after dedicating an entire study to an understanding of globalization, finally had to admit that "amazingly for such an extensively used term as globalization, **there does not appear to be any precise, widely agreed definition.** Indeed the breadth of meanings attached to it seems to be increasing rather than narrowing over time, taking on cultural, political and other connotations in addition to the economic."²

Zeiler himself, of course, is interested in increasing that "breadth of meaning" to include the cultural manifestations of globalization. In fact, this is one of the very valuable contributions of the book. Most historians of U.S. foreign relations

are by now well aware of the rapidly growing number of studies of "cultural diplomacy." Almost without fail, however, these works focus on the post-World War II period and the "culture wars" between the United States and the Soviet Union. These twentieth-century battles of national cultures, featuring opposing armies of ballet dancers, actors, singers, writers, and artists, have certainly widened the lens through which the Cold War is viewed and expanded our understanding of the nearly all-encompassing nature of that conflict. Zeiler takes us back to an earlier (and supposedly more innocent) time when thoughts of "cultural diplomacy" were, like the American empire, just taking shape. As he consistently reminds us, Spalding and his cohorts in the sporting industry saw the baseball tour as a way to spread American ideals of manliness, progress, and national superiority around the globe.

Despite the 1880s setting, however, Zeiler's study serves to illuminate some of the same crucial issues concerning cultural diplomacy that confront his colleagues working on later periods of U.S. diplomatic history. One is the relationship between governmental and non-governmental players in the carrying out of international presentations of American culture. On this subject Zeiler raises some interesting questions. In the Cold War historiography of cultural diplomacy, it is very often the government that seems to be the motivating agent. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that private actors – cultural organizations or groups or individuals involved in the arts – were mere puppets used by the government for its own propaganda purposes. In Zeiler's book, however, the government is almost completely absent from the picture. Aside from an extremely awkward meeting between the returning baseball tourists and President Benjamin Harrison, U.S. officials make only brief and rare appearances during the course of the study. There are a few diplomatic receptions here and there along the path of the baseball teams, but by and large it is the planning, initiative,

and financial support provided by Spalding and his associates that drive the endeavor. Of course, baseball players are hardly the Bolshoi Ballet or the touring company of "Porgy and Bess," but this does strongly suggest that non-governmental cultural agents were moving far ahead of the government. Further investigation of early attempts at cultural exchange are needed, but if private actors were indeed controlling cultural exchanges, then perhaps it partially explains the reluctance of later actors to cede an immense degree of control over such exchanges and their guarded wariness when approached by the U.S. government after World War II.

Of course, this all raises the question of whether efforts such as the baseball tour can fairly be called cultural diplomacy at all. With the government a negligible presence in the proceedings, one is forced to more carefully consider the motivations of private citizens such as Spalding. Yes, he liberally peppered his speeches and letters with chest-thumping pronouncements of U.S. supremacy and did his best to portray the tour as nothing less than an extension of American power and prestige to foreign lands. When all was said and done, however, the question remains: did patriotism or profit really drive Spalding? Was the tour merely an extended business junket, with Spalding's desire to spread baseball nothing more than an effort to create more demand for bats, balls, and gloves (all of which he produced)? Zeiler would argue that what appear to be Spalding's individual initiatives were, in fact, manifestations of the on-going process of globalization. Perhaps, but if not, then one of the main criticisms of studies of cultural diplomacy rears its ugly head: that the scholar simply reads too much into episodes that were merely entertaining diversions rather than important barometers of America's rise to power.

And, as with all studies of cultural diplomacy, the issue of impact on the foreign audience comes to the fore. If the baseball tour was explicitly designed to spread admiration and respect for – and perhaps mimicry of – American ideals, then one can only conclude from Zeiler's study

that it failed rather miserably. Citing the large crowds that viewed the often sloppily played games can be deceiving. Many in the audience were perhaps drawn by no greater forces than boredom, a desire for novel entertainments, or mere idle curiosity. Certainly nothing Zeiler describes suggests that the games had more than a momentary impact on the host nations. By and large, the European audiences seemed genuinely uninterested, offering little more than polite applause and smiles. As an agent of "globalization," therefore, did the baseball tour have an important or lasting impact on the nations visited? Of course, in a world where one of the highest-paid baseball players in history is Japanese, perhaps it all just took a few decades to sink in.

None of these questions or criticisms is meant to diminish the importance of this book. Indeed, it is a testament to Zeiler that he is able to pack so many significant issues and questions into a less-than-200-page study of a little-known event in the history of sports in the United States. By pushing the topics of globalization and cultural diplomacy back to the late nineteenth century, he is alerting us to the need for some critical rethinking about the means and ends of America's rise to empire.

Michael L. Krenn is I.G. Greer Distinguished Professor of History and Chair of the Department of History at Appalachian State University.

Notes

1. For the World Bank definition, see <http://www.worldbank.org/globalization>; for the IMF, go to <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II>. For a brief sampling of books that argue the pros and/or cons of globalization, see Daniel Cohen, *Globalization and Its Enemies* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Dani Rodrik, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997); Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*, 2d ed. (Baltimore, 2001); and Michel Chossudovsky, *The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order* (Pincourt, Quebec: Global Research, 2003).
2. Imre Szeman, "Globalization," in John Hawley, ed., *Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies* (Westport, CT, 2001), 209; for the World Bank report see <http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/documents/AssessingGlobalizationP1.pdf> (bold in original).

Thomas W. Zeiler, *Ambassadors in Pinstripes: The Spalding World Baseball Tour and the Birth of the American Empire*

John Day Tully

*"This is like déjà vu all over again."
– attributed to Yogi Berra*

Thomas Zeiler's book came out almost seven months after Mark Lamster's *Spalding's World Tour: The Epic Adventure that Took Baseball Around the Globe—And Made It America's Game*.¹ That book received notices in the *Boston Globe*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and *Newsweek* and became an Editors' Choice at the *New York Times Book Review*. We all hope that there are no other writers busily pounding away at a keyboard to weigh in on a topic that we have spent years researching and writing about, but Zeiler surely must have felt a victim of his publisher's timetable over last summer. He need not worry, though, because he has written a more nuanced, enlightening, and engaging work that will be used in American foreign relations and American history survey classrooms for years.

Zeiler lays out his argument in the introduction and conclusion in a way that is perfect for the undergraduate classroom, and in between he explains the economic, sporting, and cultural roots of Albert Spalding's idea before taking the reader through the details of the tour. The first chapter outlines Spalding's ideological and marketing goals in creating a traveling exhibition of his Chicago White Stockings and an all-American team to play across the country and around the world. After setting the scene, Zeiler chronicles the tour's initial reception in the American West.

Chapter three is most critical to argument. It explores how the "baseball tourists," as he describes Spalding and the two teams he took with him, "traveled in the context of race" as they played first in San Francisco and then in Australia, Ceylon, and Egypt (76). The professional baseball world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had unwritten rules about people of color, and the white players

on the tour were some of the most outspoken on the subject of blacks not playing on the same field as whites. Visits to San Francisco's Chinatown before they boarded the ship for Australia gave many of the players their first encounter with Chinese people, and it is not hard to imagine their reaction. Later on, one player noted how a light-skinned Polynesian had a "greater mental capacity" than other Pacific Islanders (85).

When the group reached Europe, Spalding's unrealistic hopes of creating a worldwide acceptance of baseball were dashed. Europeans were not interested in baseball, or worse, they ridiculed it. Upon his return to the United States, however, Spalding was feted at many celebratory dinners. Speaker after speaker, some certainly engaging in hyperbole, toasted the baseball tourists for championing American superiority to the world.

Zeiler concludes by arguing that the impact of the tour lay in its role in the "development of an American imperial identity, itself forged by U.S. overseas encounters through

the process of globalization" (190). Big business ascendancy, growing transportation and communication networks, a worldview that included racial hierarchies, and a growing nationalism at home all came together in Spalding's mission. Together, these elements helped create a "weighty national identity that promised a future of imperial eminence" (191). Zeiler does not argue that the tour created, formalized, or even significantly advanced American empire but rather that it reflected much of the early stages of the national identity and the tools of globalization that later allowed that empire to take hold.


It is important to note what Zeiler declares the book is not about. He is careful to alert the reader that in spite of the ambitious subtitle he is not arguing that Spalding's effort could be "linearly connected to the eventual American empire" (ix). He instead extends the arguments in Emily Rosenberg's classic, *Spreading the American Dream*, into the more immediate post-Civil

War years, with Spalding's tour of 1888-1889 cast as an expression of the nascent nationalism that grew into empire a little more than a decade later. He argues that the baseball tourists "exposed the foundations of America's rising international power in the 1880s" (xi). According to Zeiler, it was modernization's development of industrialization and industrialization's development of globalization resources that, combined with the United States' growing desire to expand, created the opportunity for Americans to project themselves onto the world stage as never before. Zeiler places the Spalding tour in the mix of the "cultural agents who built a national identity, through private means, by forging a self-image of a future imperialist power" (xii).


Good sports histories—those that go beyond the isolated details of games and players—can serve as inviting opportunities for undergraduates to explore the wider issues of culture, politics, class, gender, power, race, and identity. Zeiler's book opens up most of these and therefore adds a




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
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compelling story to the historiography of sport as history and as a window into American culture. Instructors will be able to elicit some good discussions about racial hierarchies and attitudes based on the Spalding group's conversations about the local populations they encountered and on Clarence Duvall, an African American whom Spalding brought along to serve as the team's "mascot." The players often made him dance a "plantation jig" for them and the local dignitaries. Duvall's role, and the casualness with which the players accepted it, should help students begin to understand post-Civil War race relations. The myriad ways in which globalization manifested itself through the travels of the Spalding group would also be an avenue into discussions about industrial production, transportation, and national identity issues. In addition, because Zeiler tackles so many of these types of topics and makes such clear arguments about them, the book can be an effective means of introducing survey students to this period of American history and to the deeper issue of the nature of historical inquiry.

Despite Zeiler's successes, there are two problems with the book. First, Zeiler's effort to incorporate the details of several of the games into the wider narrative often falls flat. Perhaps his goal is to remind the reader that the teams played games amidst all of this travel, but too often the descriptions of who pitched how many innings, who stole second, and who hit a home run are awkward and break the flow of the narrative. Second, the reader is left with the impression that an editor or an early manuscript reviewer urged Zeiler to link specific activities of the group to his wider theses about the impact the Spalding tour had on the development of globalization and the beginnings of American Empire. For instance, before the tour began, Spalding secured a visit for the Chicago players with President Grover Cleveland. Zeiler writes that a few weeks later, during a game in Omaha, the fans were focused on the upcoming election between Cleveland and Benjamin Harrison. The fans' interest in the election does

not mean, though, that "the baseball tour and the election, already linked by the White Stockings' visit with Cleveland, became more intertwined with national and international affairs" (49).

The only real gap in the book is the absence of any real engagement with non-Europeans' attitudes and reactions to the baseball tourists. Perhaps it was a lack of sources, but apart from some local newspaper accounts, Zeiler does not present any material that gives the reader a sense of how the people of Australia, Ceylon, and Egypt reacted to this strange game and the men who played it. In chapter four, Zeiler makes a point of exposing and analyzing the European response to the tour, but he does not do so in the preceding chapter to any large degree. It would have been interesting to learn if the targets of the players' racial observations were aware of them.

On another note, some readers may be struck by the parallels between Spalding's venture and the efforts of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), founded in Ireland in 1884, first to defend and then to export Irish culture. The GAA began as an overt attempt to protect Irish sports and culture from the threat of English encroachment. Soon after, Irish nationalists, specifically the Irish Republican Brotherhood, took control of the GAA, and Gaelic football and hurling became the basis of the GAA's efforts to create a new Irish identity. With the worldwide growth of spectator sports in the early years of the century, GAA events began to draw huge crowds. At the same time, the Irish Republican Brotherhood transformed the GAA into a distinctly nationalist, although not revolutionary, organization by excluding anyone who played or watched "imported games," meaning English soccer.

In 1888, forty-eight athletes from the GAA toured the United States. This tour, later called "the American invasion," visited major cities along the East Coast, including New York and Boston. Like Spalding's adventure, the tour did not make money, but it did lay the groundwork for the creation of Gaelic sports clubs

in many major cities with significant Irish and Irish-American populations. These sports clubs were very popular until the decline of Irish immigration in the 1930s, but Americans still play Gaelic sports under the auspices of the New York and North American Gaelic Athletic Associations, two groups that trace their creation to the 1888 "invasion."

A closer look at the GAA tour offers insights into Zeiler's broader arguments about the impact of Spalding's tour. Both the GAA effort and the baseball tourist adventure were designed, at least in part, to enhance the sponsoring country's reputation and engender affection for it around the world. Both Spalding and the GAA hoped to turn a profit on their activities. There were other baseball tours inspired by Spalding's efforts, most notably to Japan; those trips led in turn to visits by Japanese teams to the United States. Similarly, the GAA continued for many years to foster Irish sports in America. The main difference between the American and Irish efforts is that the Americans were thinking of starting an empire, while the Irish were looking for help in liberating themselves from one. The parallel that most supports Zeiler's argument, however, is the attempt to use sports as a way to influence the world.

The Irish debate about the power of sports to project a national identity continues, along with the sense of chauvinism and misunderstanding that the baseball tourists exhibited more than a hundred years ago. In a December 2006 article in the *Roscommon (Ireland) Herald*, we learn from a GAA fan that Americans are "heavy and loud, both in large proportions." He declares that it would be ridiculous to spend any more GAA money promoting Irish sports around the world, for "no matter how much we admire the deep-rooted cultures of our sports, they will never outweigh the culture of another sport to the native fanbase [sic]."

The Japanese media's fascination with Boston Red Sox pitcher Daisuke Matsuzaka's arrival in the United States for spring training this year, however, is evidence that such cultural transference can happen, although

may be not with Gaelic football. One can imagine future dissertations examining sports exports in a comparative manner.

The baseball tourists made their way around the globe just as American military personnel would find themselves traversing the world over the next hundred-plus years, sometimes more than once, either fighting or preparing to fight. If it is true, as either Ambrose Bierce or Paul Rodriguez should receive credit for saying, that "war is God's way of teaching [Americans] geography," then the baseball tourists played the role of prophets, laying the groundwork for Americans to create an identity of exceptionalism that would soon be projected, for better or worse, beyond their shores.

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Notes

1. Mark Lamster, *Spalding's World Tour: The Epic Adventure that Took Baseball Around the Globe - And Made It America's Game* (New York, 2006).
2. For example, see Walter LaFeber, *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism* (New York, 1999). Historians of Irish America are anticipating Paul Darby and David Assan, *Emigrants at Play: Sport and the Irish Diaspora*

(New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 07).

3. See, for example, Michael Cronin, *Sport and Nationalism in Ireland: Gaelic Games, Soccer and Irish Identity since 1884* (Dublin, 1999).

4. Perhaps ironically, Irish nationalists and Irish Americans were strong opponents of the budding American Empire presaged by the Spalding tour. See David Doyle, *Irish America: Native Rights and National Empires, 1890-1901* (New York, 1976) and Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley, 2002).

5. "GAA Money Should Never Leave Our Shores," *Roscommon* (Ireland) *Herald*, 13 December 2006, <http://www.roscommonherald.ie/news/story.asp?j=5134> (accessed on 18 February 2007).

Response to reviews of *Ambassadors in Pinstripes*

Thomas W. Zeiler

Each morning, like millions of people around the world, I glance at newspaper headlines and then sit down with the sports page. To gloat over the latest Yankees loss, I even read the sports section of the *Sunday New York Times*, which goes to print before many of the previous night's games are completed. If I want more information, I turn to television and the Internet. The latter also provides me with access to my

fantasy baseball league, in which my managerial patience is tested by the mercurial performances of various Devil Rays and Phillies recruits. To top it all off, a trip down to Coors Field in Denver lets me see the real thing, or something akin to Major League Baseball. Even SHAFR members have jumped on the baseball bandwagon en masse when our annual conference coincides with a game.

The point is not that I am a sports addict — far from it, although certain close family members would disagree when compelled to listen to my lamentations about relief pitching — but that I am fairly typical of many fans. I faithfully follow certain sports, I love my teams (unless they lose), and I pay to witness top-performing athletes. I pay a lot. I do not collect memorabilia and was not remotely tempted by the offer of a genuine pair of Mickey Mantle's underwear for \$2,000 (no joke), although Pete Rose once sent me an autographed baseball with an inscribed request to pass his goddaughter in my class. I do save my ticket stubs in the belief that one day, the Hall of Fame will ask me to deposit them for posterity.

No, I do not spend hundreds of dollars on stuff or even on special

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
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cable television season coverage, but I am part of the global masses united by a love of sports. Music, food, sports and perhaps shopping are consumer activities that everyone in the world shares in a very basic way. We might interact about politics, fear terrorism across the planet, and engage in international business transactions. But these are not activities that elicit strong emotions in everyday life. We weep when we hear a song that brings up a memory; we savor meals that celebrate holidays and intimate family gatherings like citizens of all countries; and we rejoice or wallow in pity according to our team's performance. We pay a good deal for the pleasure of these emotions, which occur daily on a worldwide basis.

Exploring the costs and the attraction of sports, specifically baseball, was in part what prompted me to write this book, but intellectually, my primary motivation was to try to understand the global phenomenon of baseball and, with it, globalization itself and America's place in the process. Sports have become truly international events. Foreign players and consumers have permeated these once purely national endeavors, American football being a general exception. Even a peculiar game like baseball has been part of the revolution—indeed, at the forefront, along with basketball, soccer, and hockey—of the globalization of sports at the professional and college levels. Globalization, of course, is not new, but the inflow into the United States of foreign players at the rate we have witnessed over the past decade does signal a major transformation. There have always been non-American players in U.S. sports, but not to the degree there are today. In fact, much of baseball's (and basketball's) resurgence and popularity is due to the participation of foreign players, who bring along advertisers and fans from their home countries. All the more ironic that we must endure the singing of "America the Beautiful" along with "Take Me Out to the Ballgame" during the seventh-inning stretch. Those visa holders are much of the reason that baseball remains so beautiful and vibrant; we might also credit them by humming the anthems

of Japan, the Dominican Republic, and Canada along with our own.

In order to comprehend the transformation wrought by globalization, we historians are obligated to trace the roots of the international trends of the national pastime. Many fine histories of baseball (as well as of other sports and events such as the Olympics) already exist. Works by Alan Klein, George Gmelch, Michael Lewis, and Robert Whiting are among a multiplying number of studies that focus on baseball's non-American side. I chose to explore the first around-the-world baseball tour by major leaguers, although James Elfers has done the same for the Giants-White Sox trip of 1913-14. We await a full treatment of the so-called Babe Ruth tour to Japan of 1934, the most famous international trip of them all.

Still, what on earth could baseball have to do with diplomatic history? I believe sports are relevant to our study of foreign relations. Our field is fundamentally concerned with power, and our sports culture—driven by the media, boosted by advertising, bankrolled by moguls, and reflective of American society—has played a role in projecting American influence abroad. Surely sports are a form of cultural diplomacy, which is among the reasons two U.S. presidents met with the Spalding tourists. Diplomacy certainly does not rest on sporting events, yet there are a myriad of examples in which the two are tied together. Our perceptions of Cuba and Cuban relations with the United States resurface when Cuban ballplayers flee to America or when the two national teams encounter each other on the field. Major League Baseball "withdrew" the gift of baseball from Japan after Pearl Harbor. Members of the Spalding entourage encountered the diplomatic world when they sailed to Hawaii and met people lobbying for its annexation or when they docked in the Samoan Islands around the time of the conflict there with Germany and Britain. The mass appeal of sports like baseball provides the United States with another tool in its arsenal of hegemony, even if it is expressed as soft power.

Baseball, as our oldest organized

professional sport, also might tell us about the contours of empire. Indeed, I hoped to make a case that diplomatic history's oft-neglected dead zone of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was worthy of study because of the imperial ambitions expressed by many of its figures. Readers might recall that the Gilded Age was a formative period of empire, in which the old diplomacy of quiescence gave way to vigor and determination in foreign affairs in 1898. The Spalding trip, undertaken by transnational baseball tourists, signaled the impending dominance of the United States on the world stage before the country actually acquired such a standing.

Globalization and empire are linked, the former the handmaiden of the latter. In *Ambassadors in Pinstripes* I use a thematic approach to contextualize the world tour within the processes of globalization—business expansion and competition, cultural integration, race-based cohesion among Anglo-Saxons, communication and transportation, even the projection of American national values and greatness. In doing so, it was my intention to help readers grasp that empire arose through transnational cultural contacts as well as through government policies. Spalding, the imperial leader of the national pastime, went abroad in an effort to win the world over to his sport. The failure of that effort did not negate his intent to seek profits or to assert American values. The world baseball tour provided a window into empire-building through globalization, and let's face it, there are few more entertaining ways to engage such weighty topics as imperialism, race, gender, nationalism, and the New Western History than through a narrative based on sports.

I thank the three commentators for pointing out the themes of the project and especially for their quite generous critiques. They level some criticisms, and I wish they had read a draft or two so alterations could have been made before publication. Suffice it to say that this book is aimed at an undergraduate and graduate student audience and perhaps the general public. I have no illusions whatsoever about rivaling the great

Boutonesque writers on baseball, nor do I pretend to have expertise in diplomatic history specialties such as race, gender, and the like. I did hope to include major strands of the history of the times—nationalism and nation-building, corporate power, the frontier thesis and technology, notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority, and American exceptionalism, particularly in regard to Europe and the roots of rapprochement with Britain. Like these kind commentators, other readers might wish for more attention to certain themes. Fair enough.

Michael Krenn considered my use of the term globalization “hazy and extremely malleable.” Meanings of the term stretch to include something for everyone. Maybe we just know it when we see it, but a definition is required. More precisely, it is the integration of production and marketing on a global basis to create a single, unified world market for a service or product. In this case, the product was baseball, a business that Spalding dominated and marketed around the globe. The people who control baseball today have a similar goal: to have a single baseball market based in the United States, in the offices of Major League Baseball, and to keep it there by recruiting talent from home and abroad.

An expert on cultural diplomacy, Mike gives a nod to my dealing with the era around 1898, a period that the late Kinley Brauer once called the “Great American Desert.” I appreciate his comments. As Mike writes, during the Cold War, government drove cultural diplomacy, but after the Civil War this was not the case. That makes sense to me, for, as Robert Beisner and others have noted, the postbellum era still had the Old Diplomacy of patronage, with spotty commercial and diplomatic support abroad and a weak executive in the face of an assertive Congress. The American state was on the rise but was not yet the driving actor in diplomacy. There was no systematic policy to spread American culture, so private actors like Albert Spalding did indeed take up the initiative.

Do I read too much into the effort? Spelling out that Spalding had profit in mind as he ran his baseball empire

at home and, he hoped, abroad, was my goal. I hoped, though, not to make too much of the baseball tourists; as I argued early on, they were a manifestation of, but not a causative link to, empire. Their thinking and actions on the tour should be taken as representations rather than the end results of imperial dreams.

As for impact, we agree that Spalding’s tour fell far short of his desires. The results were, by and large, abysmal, as baseball had very little success in finding a footing overseas. Spalding even failed to corral the troublemaking labor organizer, Monte Ward, by hustling him abroad and away from the planning for a baseball strike. In the end, Ward left the tour early and set in motion the famous Brotherhood War of 1890, the sport’s first major labor disruption. Spalding got publicity, for his journalist acolytes worshipped him in their press accounts. But the seeds were planted for international baseball, especially in Australia, and globalization has sprouted from them as other tours meander through Asia and Latin America to this day. Globalization was a constant, oftentimes plodding process; empire came quickly. But both inexorably ground onward, resulting in American hegemony and leadership. And the multi-billion dollar sport of baseball dominates the markets (and imaginations) of many people the world over, as a representative of transnational cultural imperialism.

Midori Yoshii picked up on the gender element that I did not give enough attention to; my apologies to Kristin Hoganson and others. I was afraid of stereotyping by discussing notions of manliness in the section on the French leg of the trip. Spalding was very clear that American conceptions of gender served as a foundation of his tour and of baseball itself. He spoke consistently about the “manly” virtues of the sport and its best players and tied these to the American national character, which was supposedly vigorous, courageous and masculine. Of course, gender concerns persisted in baseball well after the tour, as attested to by the rise of the women’s professional league during World War II and its

demise, due largely to early Cold War pressures for “containment in the home” and to continuing debates over the abilities of women to play, officiate, or manage in games. Gender concerns emerged again with the issue of openly gay men participating in America’s manliest pastime, something neither Spalding nor (in all likelihood) the turn-of-the-century public would have abided.

Regarding sources, readers will note that the bulk of the book rests on periodicals, which is pretty standard for baseball history. Archival material is hard to come by. The National Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York, holds some diaries and letters, but overall, newspapers, magazines, and guides served as the foundation for the book. Travelogues helped, and for context I foraged into diplomatic cables to pick up cultural patterns in immigration, marriages, legal cases, etc. I should also mention that one can never fully satisfy the baseball aficionados. When members of the Society of American Baseball Researchers got hold of the book, they picked apart some fine points. White Stockings’ leader Cap Anson might have come 3 hits short of 3,000, for example. I appreciate that Midori and the other reviewers preferred to look at the larger picture—the context of American society, economics, and culture—rather than baseball trivia.

Midori’s questioning of my view that sports linked the Anglo-Saxons in brotherhood is valid; certainly the British did not take kindly to baseball. I really focused more, however, on Spalding’s ambitions and motivations in connecting with his imperial brethren than on the actual results. She is correct, though, that the Spalding tour did not succeed. Still, whatever disdain the British and its colonies had for baseball, they politely overcame their contempt for this child’s game with proclamations of kinship. The Spalding tourists thus spread goodwill as Americans as well as sportsmen. We can liken their role as cultural emissaries to that of the U.S. ping-pong team that preceded Richard Nixon to the People’s Republic of China.

In a sense, baseball created conditions for an informal empire.

Midori notes that the British injected a sporting ethic into their imperial domains, but I would argue that baseball also helped acculturate U.S. overseas territories to American ways and American administration. The British Empire's effort was more purposeful, but the American endeavor was influential nevertheless. Two decades before the Spalding tour, baseball certainly shaped the reception of American power in Cuba through acculturation, and in Mexico, as Alan Klein's *Baseball on the Border* demonstrates, the process of Americanization went on for over a century. In *Baseball without Borders: The International Pastime*, George Gmelch has compiled an array of essays that show baseball's spread in Asia, the Americas, the Pacific, and Europe—and American culture with it. Japan, Midori writes, was a different case, but undoubtedly, bilateral ties were made more intimate by baseball tours and other connections between the two countries, as Sayuri Shimizu-Guthrie has confirmed. In Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines (where baseball was introduced when American troops occupied the islands in 1898), the sport arrived through missionaries, soldiers, and teachers. The participation of so many different agents in the spread of baseball raises interesting questions about connections between sports and other institutions that call for further exploration.

That Midori saw the name "Spalding" on a gym bag in Tokyo attests to America's cultural reach, yet as she acknowledges, the boy carrying the bag likely had no idea what the name meant. How far we can take the impact of American sports is questionable, as we have all come across t-shirts emblazoned with the "New York Footballers" or some other such misnomer. Still, that the Spalding Corporation made the bag is in itself an indicator of Spalding's influence and, more than that, of the global desirability of American sports icons that Major League Baseball depends on and stimulates for its own profit.

John Tully mentions that Mark Lamster proved a competitor by publishing a book on the Spalding tour just months before mine came out. This is a potential nightmare for

any second-place finisher, although our field does not seem to tire of Nixon and Kissinger tomes! Lamster's is a fine book on the entertainment aspects of the Spalding tour. We met a few years back, and he hurried to finish. We had different audiences in mind, however, his being the generalist and the baseball crowd. As John implies, our books did not clash because my project was grounded in historical themes.

I also appreciate that John understands the book is intended for an undergraduate audience. It is designed to grip them initially with sports and then get them suckered into learning history. I take that approach in a course I teach at the University of Colorado called "America Through Baseball," which also got me to thinking about this book. Thus, *Ambassadors in Pinstripes* evolved not only from my research and writing on globalization and my interest in sports, but from teaching as well. Such ties between research and the classroom make deans proud.

Granted, the baseball-game aspect of the book is subsumed by discussion of broader historical trends. I did that on purpose, and for those readers desirous of more balls and strikes, Lamster's book is more appropriate. Frankly, much of the play on the tour was so bad that the kinds of dramatic moments typical of professional baseball games occurred only on rare occasions. Most observers criticized the games as boring or ineptly played. John's second criticism, that I explicitly linked the tour to the empire/globalization thesis, is true, but I did not do it at the behest of the publisher. Any perceived overstatements on this topic, such as he found, should thus be blamed on me.

John's analysis of the foreign reactions is dead on. I contacted archives overseas and visited some in Britain. I combed newspapers from all the countries visited, including those in Italian and French, and almost all, except for the British and Australian journals, issued not a peep about the tour, certainly to Spalding's dismay and to mine as well. I agree with John that gleaning more of the foreign response to race and other

elements of the tour was necessary. On a related subject, the Gaelic sports tours are fascinating, and I wish I had mentioned them, since some of them occurred at the same time as the Spalding trip, and like the Spalding trip, they showed that such tours can backfire on the sponsors, leading people to view Americans in a negative light.

That sports might be a window into the American experience at home has been a theme for historians for a generation or so. The more recent historiographical development, fed by the contemporary globalization of sports, is the examination of U.S. encounters at home and abroad with international players and teams. As with baseball, the globalization of basketball promises an enriching research agenda into how America projects its power overseas and how that power returns in the form of financial rewards and the importation of players that make games better and more profitable.

Long ago, Albert Spalding recognized the instinctive appeal of sports to people throughout the world. He was certainly a pioneer in the sports globalization process, but he was too early to garner the profits now pouring into Major League Baseball's coffers. Still, his initial effort paved the way for the World Baseball Classic 117 years after his tour and opened the door to the sensational play of foreign participants in America's national pastime. Indeed, these players have reinvigorated the sport. Spalding, then, was as prescient about the future as he was eager to fill the purse of his sport. He would have applauded as Major League Baseball, child of his National League, reaped the economic and cultural benefits of expansion, just as the United States did in the ensuing American century. Now, should I trade Nomar for Helton?

Thomas Zeiler is Chair and Professor of History at the University of Colorado.

What Would William Appleman Williams Say Now?

Thomas McCormick

The work of the late William Appleman Williams constitutes the most comprehensive and sophisticated critique of American foreign policy offered during the last half century. It continues to influence a host of present-day scholars and even to engage more orthodox academics who might have preferred to ignore it. His influence in the 1960s and 1970s, however, extended far beyond the academy. His classic, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, was virtually required reading for the New Left antiwar movement.

Williams's unique contribution was to give dissenters the opportunity to understand the Vietnam War not simply as a quagmire born of policy mistakes or of a moral blot on the nation's ledger, but as the logical consequence of empire. Indeed, he gave them a theory of American imperialism that argued that American elites, from George Washington to George W. Bush, could only envision a nation that was both prosperous and democratic if it had perpetual recourse to a growing empire. In the nineteenth century, that empire took the form of a frontier for settlers and capital (at the expense of Indian nations and the Mexican Republic). Following the closing of that continental frontier in the 1890s, America's expansion thereafter emphasized the overseas drive for an Open Door to the markets, raw materials and investment opportunities of the global economy. Informal economic dominance, less costly, was the preferred mode of that expansion, but colonies, protectorates, military bases, or covert coups were acceptable when Third World resistance or Great Power rivalry seemed to require them.

In the giddy triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War, the power of Williams's ideas seemed to wane. Bush I and Clinton centrists embraced and successfully promoted

the New Economy of high technology, a lean-and-mean free enterprise system, and a free-trade world of balanced budgets, stable exchange rates, and unfettered movement of capital. Empire now masqueraded as a benign "globalization" that would close the gap between rich and poor and lay the groundwork for the spread of democratic values and institutions. The utopian goal of remaking the world in America's image appeared within reach; the "end of history" seemed at hand. "Ultra-liberalism," as Jacques Chirac was to lament, had become "the new communism."

That zealous crusade ran aground long before the events of 9/11/01. It crashed on the shoals of the widespread backlash against globalization in the United States, the Third World's dissatisfaction with WTO trading arrangements, Japan's deflation after 1997, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the collapse of the American technology bubble in 1999 and the return of the United States and Europe to the flat economic growth patterns of the 1970s and 1980s. The "invisible hand" of the free market could no longer be counted on to create universal acceptance of American hegemony and its rules of the international game. What was required was a more "visible hand" — a more muscular, more military foreign policy that would impose the economic openness and political stability required by American economic and security interests. "Hard power" would replace "soft power" as America's modus operandi. Bill Clinton signaled this change in 1998, when he bombed Iraq and made regime change there his stated policy. And George W. Bush cemented the change with a vengeance, giving it a more unilateral twist by bypassing NATO rather than working through it as Clinton had attempted.

With American empire no longer

hiding behind the verbal veil of globalization, Williams's work has suddenly reacquired relevance not always evident in the decade since his death. Recognizing this, a number of his former students — and, in turn, their students — found themselves discussing and speculating about what William Appleman Williams would say now about the current state of affairs. That dialogue, and my effort to synthesize it, resulted in a paper given to the University of Wisconsin History Department and I am pleased to share it with SHAFR members.

Williams thought and wrote with the rigorous logic of a philosopher. A practitioner of the examined life, he sought to unearth and critique his own underlying assumptions and premises and, in turn, to offer them openly and explicitly to his students and readers to examine and to challenge. In that spirit, let me offer eight such propositions that I think Bill Williams might have advanced for our consideration today. Many suggest, as Yogi Berra put it, "it's déjà vu all over again."

First, Williams would posit that the current public debate over U.S. foreign policy is just another example of the historic tension and conflict between two variants of American exceptionalism — that is, the convictions of American uniqueness and superiority. Often at odds with each other, these two variants clashed most sharply in times of war — as they did in the so-called Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, the Vietnam War, and now the War on Terror.

One version of exceptionalism was the notion of using a pro-active, aggressive foreign policy, including force if need be, to promote the American way of life — first in the Western Hemisphere, later the globe. The second was the notion that America should make itself an even better role model that others

would be energized and encouraged to emulate. The flip side of that exemplar republicanism was John Quincy Adams' admonition that America should not "go off in search of Monsters to destroy, even in the name of freedom. She might become dictatress of the world, but she would no longer be mistress of her own spirit." America's version of the old Roman conundrum: can one be both an empire and a republic?

Second, Williams would contend that in the conflict between those two versions of exceptionalism, the proactive, aggressive variant has almost always won out. Over time, as he famously put it in the title of one of his books, empire became a "way of life" for American society. For starters, it provided the economic surplus necessary to maintain a high standard of living, even if that surplus was more unevenly distributed than in any other industrial society. Moreover, it provided a kind of psychic substitute for the lack of real community in a society whose only common identity was consumption. Empire offered the public the double thrill of physically dominating others while purporting to uplift and civilize them. And war, that frequent companion of empire, gave American society a chance to express and vent its own internal angst and anger against external, distant enemies. Bread and circuses!

Third, Williams would suggest that what Iraq has experienced and will experience at American hands is, in part, a replay of an old story a century ago. The Caribbean was then the prime focus of American economic and strategic interests – to protect American-owned oil fields around Tampico, Mexico, and safeguard the imminent Panama Canal shortcut to Asian markets. The solution was the transformation of the Caribbean islands and Central America into a series of American colonies like Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and protectorates like Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua.

The model for the Caribbean Basin was the Platt Amendment. It remains today, in its essentials, the historical model for Iraq. Like the Iraq War, the Spanish-American War

proclaimed itself a war of liberation against tyranny and ended with an American protectorate. The American army of occupation did leave after a number of years, but only after Cuba had codified its "special relationship" with the United States into its constitution and a ninety-nine-year treaty. While circumstances are dissimilar in some respects, Williams would have predicted an eventual Iraqi settlement along similar lines – permanent U.S. military bases (just like Guantanamo), an Open Door for U.S. participation in Iraq's banking system and oil enterprises, privatization of heretofore state-owned infrastructure, and creation of an essentially free trade tariff schedule and a low-tax system that allows the cheap and easy repatriation of profits from doing business in Iraq. As a corollary, I think Williams would have reminded us that the oft-touted rule of law – be it in Cuba, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Honduras, Mexico, or Iraq – historically has had little to do with democratic rights. Instead, it has always had far more to do with contract law, the sanctity of property rights and the protection of foreign investment.

Fourth, Williams would have stressed the centrality of oil in current foreign policy. He would not do so in a single-cause way; contrary to his critics, Williams was never a narrow economic determinist. But he still would have seen the oil issue as crucial – partly because of the economic value of the oil itself, but more largely because of the geopolitical clout over others made possible by control of oil. The struggle for oil is, of course, one that is a century old. But that struggle has, for several reasons, reached a new and critical phase.

Few new major fields have been discovered since the early 1970s, and predictions are that oil production will peak in the next five to ten years and decline sharply thereafter. More to the point, oil companies believe those dire predictions and have commenced a renewed search for new reserves. But Big Oil, however, has not been a prime mover pressuring the American State to act aggressively in its behalf. The giant multinationals, by and large, are

fairly content with their relationship to the Saudis and to OPEC and anxious that war not upset the stability of their arrangements. The push really comes from the independent oil companies like Occidental, Unocal, Murphy and Kerr-McGee and from the Texas-based oil service companies tied to them, like Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Bechtel. As their U.S. holdings decline, they have looked elsewhere and sought to influence U.S. foreign policy in ways not seen since the Eisenhower days and the oil depletion allowance. And they have found ready ears in this administration and its aggressive policies in Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia.

There is also an abiding fear that without its U.S. control of the oil market, OPEC may in the medium-term start pricing its oil in euros. Iraq had already done so – which was one of its great sins – but there is strong talk that OPEC will eventually follow. If that happens, Japan and China will have to start cashing in their massive dollar reserves for euros in order to meet their immense energy needs; that in turn would send the value of the dollar plummeting and bring the U.S. economy – highly vulnerable because of its fiscal and trade deficits – to its knees. Finally, control over oil provides the likeliest leverage for the United States to reassert its hegemony and geo-strategic dominance. This is not a new variable, but it is one that has never been as decisive as now. Western Europe, Japan, China and India are highly dependent on the Middle East for their energy needs. With the United States as the uncontested power in the region, those nations would have a far greater incentive to defer to American rules of the game on other matters of global concern. They would be far more inclined to accept American dominance rather than continuing to find ways to limit it.

Fifth, Williams would have characterized the current period not as the triumph of conservatism, but as the degradation of conservatism. To the annoyance of many liberals, many of Williams's heroes in American history were conservatives: for example, John Quincy Adams, Mark Hanna and Herbert Hoover. In his view, however, they were

conservatives who morally and intellectually tried to reconcile a privatized, market economy with the general welfare of the whole society, for none of them accepted the proposition that a laissez-faire marketplace automatically, naturally, almost mystically achieved the general welfare.

To that end, many of Williams's conservative heroes helped to produce an American version of corporatism – more informal and less institutionalized than Europe's, but corporatism nonetheless. And by the post-World War II era, they had put together a loose, collaborative structure of cooperation between the state, large business associations and the AFL-CIO that linked productivity, profits and wages in a lock-step relationship so that all proceeded together in tandem. Some refer to it as the Fordist bargain. That system never worked perfectly and even at its best never became a substitute for empire and expansionism. Ultimately it broke down altogether in the stagflation of the 1970s. But it nonetheless had represented an earnest effort to address the contradictions between the marketplace and the general welfare.

FREE LIST- SHARING FOR JOB ADVERTISEMENTS

SHAFR Council recently decided to provide SHAFR's e-mail and postal mailing lists, free of charge, to any academic department in the world that is running a job search in diplomatic or international history.

SHAFR members are encouraged to notify departmental or search committee chairs of this new program and to encourage them to make use of these mailing lists.

Questions can be addressed to Peter L. Hahn, SHAFR Executive Director, at shafr@osu.edu.

But neo-conservatism, as Williams had already pointed out in the Reagan years, had abandoned that admirable effort to square the circle. As a consequence, America's version of capitalism – with its so-called reforms of the labor market, the tax system and Social Security – has (in contrast to Europe's more Social Democratic version of capitalism) become truly "red in tooth and claw." As a consequence, too, the pell-mell drive to privatization has been in part responsible for the unprofessional, amateur-hour quality of much of postwar policy in Iraq: the subcontracting of many military functions to private security firms, the feast of blatantly corrupt contracts given out to favored business interests, and the powerful civilian positions in Iraq given to well-connected ideologues, many barely out of college, who inhabit the Green Zone in their shades, flak jackets and holstered pearl handles, wielding more power than any one that age should command. "Capitalism with the brakes off," as the writer Budd Schulberg put it.

It goes without saying that all this would have been a source of great dismay to Williams. In the long term, he always envisioned and worked for an American socialism both democratic and decentralized, for he believed America's size and its democratic tradition made it plausible. In the near term, however, he would have mourned the demise in America of anything resembling European-style social capitalism – capitalism with a more human face that would set some limits on the flexibility of capital to exploit its workers, exploit its consumers, and exploit its environment and might lessen the structural dependence of American free enterprise on an economic frontier abroad.

Sixth, Williams would have seen the current stress on preemptive empire and military solutions as a manifestation not of American omnipotence, but of American decline. In his view, empires at their zenith tend to prefer imperialism on the cheap – informal empires that eschew formal colonies and protectorates and use their economic

and ideological hegemony to exert their will. In the quarter-century after World War II such was largely the case with the United States. It exercised its hegemony primarily through multinational institutions like NATO and husbanded its massive military force chiefly as a weapon of last resort to defend that status quo, as it did in Korea and Vietnam.

Empires on the make and empires in decline, however, are not satisfied with the status quo and are more inclined to alter that status quo aggressively through force and formal protectorates (nation-building is the current euphemism). Such was the case with America's rise to world power in the early twentieth century when the nation put somewhat greater stress on the use of force and the creation of formal or semiformal empire as an adjunct to informal empire, conquering colonies in the Philippines and Puerto Rico and using Gunboat and Dollar Diplomacy to establish protectorates in the Caribbean basin. America was, after all, seeking to replace Great Britain as the dominant global power, while simultaneously fending off a parallel challenge from Germany. In Joseph Schumpeter's terms, the United States was engaged in a bit of creative destruction to alter the status quo to its advantage.

Similarly empires in decline are not satisfied with the status quo either and are inclined to change it by force and more formal means of control. Ironically, such was the case after America's apparent victory in the Cold War when it confronted a wave of centrifugal forces previously held in check by the Cold War – the forces of regionalism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, cultural traditionalism, religious militancy and anti-globalization. Moreover, the end of the Cold War also facilitated the emergence of two new power poles that were potential challengers to American dominance – a more integrated and more independent European Union and a more global and dynamic China. Hostile to this new global shape of things, the United States seeks to impose a new status quo more to its liking through preemptive wars and protectorate-building. Once more, a bit of creative

destruction – the first time round to become the dominant power, the second time round to hang on to that status by any and all means possible.

Finally, Williams, if he was so inclined, might say “I told you so.” The Cold War might end, but the American empire would not. After all, he always argued that the Cold War was, in part, just another chapter in that expansionist saga, and neither the first chapter nor the last. In all of them, the dynamics were the same – the same heady combination of economic lust and messianic exceptionalism. And in each of them, an external enemy was the essential prerequisite for making expansionism palatable and persuasive to American citizens and American allies – be that enemy an Indian nation or the Mexican Republic in North America or British hegemony in Latin America or the German threat in Europe or the global Soviet challenge. Williams would logically have concluded that the end of the Cold War would not change those dynamics of empire. The United States would still have the same drive for economic globalization and the same willingness to maintain a huge military budget (bigger than the rest of the G-8 countries combined). All that would be required was a new enemy. And the War on Terror provided it.

That is not to say that the war is

a phony war, for that would clearly not be true. But it was nonetheless a convenient opportunity to push an agenda at home and abroad that would have been difficult if not impossible without it. Dean Acheson once said that the Korean War “came along and saved us” – that is, it permitted Harry Truman to sell an NSC-68 foreign policy that otherwise would have been unacceptable to the American people and American allies. The War on Terror did something similar, though it worked better with the American people than with American allies.

One final observation. Ironically, much of what Williams said about empire and expansion is now accepted in intellectual and even political circles. When he first expounded his ideas in the 1960s, they were viewed as nothing short of criminal and subversive. He attracted the attention of the FBI, the House Un-American Activities Committee and its Wisconsin assembly counterpart. Moreover, fellow members of the historical profession ridiculed, reviled, and denounced him.

Now conservative political pundits and academics openly embrace the idea and the vocabulary of American Empire, as do some on the left who still find virtue in neo-Wilsonian interventionism. But Williams, I think,

would have found no validation in that embrace. He would have had little use for these Niall Ferguson or Peter Beinart look-alikes and wannabes, these apologists for “good” empire – be it a rationalized version of British Empire past or a fantasized version of American Empire present and future. Indeed, he might well have observed that of all the so-called good empires, perhaps none was quite so good as the British Empire in North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and yet the American Revolution dramatically demonstrated what Americans, at that point in time, thought of good empires.

Thomas McCormick is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Input for this piece also came from former Williams and Williams-influenced students: Gar Alperovitz, William Borden, Edward Crapol, Jeffrey Engel, Lloyd Gardner, Nathan Godfried, Patrick Hearden, Walter LaFeber, Takeshi Matsuda, Saul Landau, George Lipsitz, Thomas Lutze, Tyler Priest, and Yone Sugita.

Congratulations!

Congratulations to former SHAFR President Michael Hogan, who was recently named the 14th president of the University of Connecticut.

Recent SHAFR Awards

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The 2007 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize is awarded to **Paul A. Kramer's** *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (North Carolina). Kramer's study of race and empire in Philippine-American colonial encounters during the early twentieth century is impressive in both scope and theoretical sophistication. He complicates our understanding of race and racial ideology as it manifested itself in the global arena, showing the dynamic processes through which race became constantly re-configured in imperial encounters between metropole and colony. Kramer adds a new dimension to the historiography of race and foreign relations by showing that empire did not simply project western ideas of racism outward, but that through the process of empire-making race itself became reconfigured in the metropole. In addition, by drawing extensively on Spanish and Filipino sources, he is able to restore agency to the subjects of western imperialism. Employing these materials, Kramer argues against the notion that Americans simply transferred domestic racial ideologies onto the Philippines, suggesting American ideas about how to govern Filipinos reflected a complex mix of domestic and transnational factors. Breaking out of U.S.-centered analyses, he shows that the Philippines was not a blank slate on which Americans imposed their vision of racial hierarchy. Instead, Filipino nationalists traveling between Manila and Madrid before 1898 established ideologies of race and nation that U.S. policymakers needed to accommodate. The challenges of governing a diverse archipelago further transformed U.S. race thinking. Turning back to the United States, he also demonstrates how these colonial experiences influenced concepts of race in U.S. politics and culture, leading by the 1930s to a growing movement for decolonization. Kramer's supple and nuanced argument is transnational in scope, yet always keenly attuned to national variations and contexts. Provocative and deeply researched, *Blood of Government* makes a major contribution to the scholarship of U.S. imperialism.

--Mark Bradley

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Bernath Lecture Committee—Steve Rabe, Andy Fry, and Lisa Cobbs Hoffman—has selected **Max Paul Friedman** to be the Stuart L. Bernath Lecturer for 2008. Friedman received his Ph.D. in 2000 from the University of California, Berkeley, working under the direction of Diane Clemens. Professor Friedman, who is an associate professor of history at Florida State University, will begin teaching at American University in the fall of 2007. He has previously taught at the University of Cologne and the University of Colorado. Colleagues attest to his teaching skill, noting that students “flock to his courses on U.S. diplomacy and Latin America.” He is the author of numerous scholarly articles and of *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against Germans of Latin America in World War II* (2003), which won the Herbert Hoover Book Prize in U.S. History. Friedman is currently working on a book, which involves research in several countries, on the concept and practice of anti-Americanism in Western Europe and Latin America. --Stephen Rabe

Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize

Although most prize committees comment on the high quality of the scholarship they had to consider, and the difficulty of choosing among worthy candidates, the group of eligible articles for this year's Bernath Article Prize was both particularly large and particularly impressive. One member of the committee said that he would have been pleased to give the award to any of several different articles. We had a total of fifteen eligible articles published in *Diplomatic History* and an additional five were nominated after having been published elsewhere. I think we can anticipate many volumes of innovative and solid scholarship from this group of young scholars.

The article chosen in the end exemplifies both the newest and most exciting trends in our field of the history of foreign relations, and the traditional values that have shaped the field for decades. The winner, **Sarah Graham**, is a PhD student at Australian National University. Her article is titled “The (Real)Politics of Culture: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in UNESCO, 1946-1954,” published in the second issue of *Diplomatic History* for 2006. The committee members were uniformly impressed with Graham's ability to write a truly international history, in ways that help us better think through the trajectory of the early Cold War. She also deftly explored the ways in which cultural institutions and cultural politics were part and parcel of what we used to think of as the real politics (to build on the pun in her title) of the Cold War. She demonstrates persuasively how culture was used for political ends as well as how political concerns shaped cultural policies and institutions. Not incidentally, especially for a committee reading 20 articles in a short time span, her article is pleasingly written. --Anne Foster

Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant is awarded to **Blair D. Woodward** of the University of New Mexico. Blair's research project on Cuba and the United States since 1945 asks the question, how did two countries that were bound—in the words of Cuban historian Lou Pérez,—by “ties of singular intimacy,” come after 1959 to see one another as “natural” enemies? He believes this cannot be understood without considering the influence of popular culture, especially visual images—posters, billboards, films, comics, advertisements, and the like—that changed rapidly in their presentation of each country after the Cuban Revolution, producing on each side a “visual language of hostility.” His dissertation, “The Aesthetic of Enemy Making: Popular Culture in United States and Cuban Foreign Relations” is theoretically sophisticated in the realms of visual culture, the study of borderlands, and environmental studies, while being grounded in extensive archival work in both countries. Having already worked in Cuban archives and planning to return there in the future, Blair will use the Bernath funds for research at the Library of Congress and U.S. National Archives, examining political cartoons, Cuban revolutionary films, recruitment materials from the Peace Corps, U.S. Army training films, and diplomatic records. --Max Friedman

Myra F. Bernath Fellowship

Yale University's **Lisa Pinley Covert** was awarded the 2007 Myrna Bernath Fellowship during the SHAFR Luncheon at the OAH Convention in Minneapolis for *Defining a Place, Defining a Nation: San Miguel de Allende through Mexican and Foreign Eyes*. This dissertation, which interrogates the formation of national identity through a confluence of often-contradictory forces is original, innovative, and well-conceived. It has, the committee believed, the potential to provide an unmatched insight into the local and transnational forces that shape cultural and political identity. --Carol Anderson

Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

The Ferrell Book Prize rewards distinguished scholarship in the history of foreign relations. This year the prize goes to **Robert Beisner** for his superb book, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War*. This magisterial biography covers a wide range of issues and regions of the world while dealing intelligently with the role of the individual in the policy process. Deeply researched and gracefully written, it provides a judicious and timely interpretation of Acheson's diplomatic leadership. And it is a good read. --Susan Brewer

W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The winner of the W. Stull Holt Fellowship was **Ani Mukherji** of Brown University, a Ph.D. candidate in American Civilization. The Committee unanimously selected Mukherji's project, *Moscow's Community of Color: A Study of Anticolonial Thought and Practice in the Interwar Period*, for the Holt. He will study the community of African and Asian anticolonialist activists, Chinese exiles and American leftists that existed in Moscow during the 1920s and 1930s. He promises to excavate the the history of the Soviet Union in the struggle against colonialism in the period before WWII, while exploring Moscow's place as a center of "cosmopolitan anti-colonialist activism." --Robert Dean

Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The winner of the Betty Unterberger Prize for the Best Dissertation in U.S. Diplomatic History is **Jennifer Heckard** for her dissertation, *Crossroads of Empire: The 1817 Liberation and Occupation of Amelia Island, East Florida*. Heckard completed her dissertation at the University of Connecticut under the direction of Frank Costigliolo in 2007. The dissertation is well-written, makes excellent use of primary sources, and shows great familiarity with the secondary literature. Heckard did a sophisticated job of placing what could have been a small, narrow topic into the broader conceptual framework of early American expansion, engaging such topics as U.S. relations with Spain, republican ideology, Caribbean and South American History, pirates, smuggling, and the Atlantic slave trade. --Linda Qaimmaqami

Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship is awarded to **Sarah Manekin** of the University of Pennsylvania. Sarah has an unusually ambitious and important research project: Her dissertation, *Spreading the Empire of Free Education, 1865-1920*, focuses on a neglected aspect of early American empire-building, the role of education advocates and theorists both in promoting the spread of American power and in shaping the way new territories, colonies, and spheres of influence were administered. She follows two generations of education theorists who developed their ideas domestically in the Freedman's Bureau and in Native American schooling, then moved on to Hawaii, Alaska, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, where they instituted programs designed at home for groups deemed racially inferior and difficult to assimilate. Some of these educators then returned to the U.S. after their experience abroad to run urban schools with large immigrant populations. Tracing the circulation of people, ideas, and policies, Sarah links the domestic to the foreign and continental expansion to the overseas empire, and shows how education, a sphere usually considered private and local, helped shape the character of the American empire. She has an impressive source base, having already conducted research from Alaska to Virginia, and will use these funds to work in the records of the Bancroft Library, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Smithsonian, and elsewhere. --Max Paul Friedman

Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Holt-Hogan committee selected **Sara Berndt**, a Ph.D. candidate in Latin American History at George Washington University as this year's winner of the Michael J. Hogan Fellowship. She intends to use the award to study Spanish at the Proyecto Lingüístico Quetzalteco de Español, in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Ms. Berndt is undertaking a dissertation that will examine the culture of imperialism during the American occupation, 1898-1902, and its effects on both North Americans and Cubans. --Robert Dean

Dumping the Dead Folks: Teaching U.S. Foreign Relations*

Steven J. Fuchs

*The editors of *Passport* would like to thank the SHAFR Teaching Committee for soliciting the following essay.

The study of history is driven by questions. But how well do we convey this lesson to our undergraduate students? How do we, trained in the arts of questioning, analysis, and interpretation, transmit these skills plus our passion for inquiry to an undergraduate who views the study of history as no more than learning about “dead folks”? I have been wrestling with this question for some time, and it has been the subject of many discussions with colleagues at St. Joseph’s College.

For me, experimenting with new approaches to teaching is the intellectual equivalent of a vigorous Sunday morning run. Effective teaching and physical training both require a sound understanding of one’s objectives and the most effective way to attain them. I keep these two requirements in mind as I develop my courses. Given my teaching load and the number of students who take more than one course with me each semester,¹ I am very conscious of the dulling effects of repetition. Therefore, I alter my teaching methodology in each course to keep myself and my students intellectually energized. The nature of the reading and writing assignments as well as the manner in which I utilize them varies from course to course. By using a variety of materials and approaches I hope to give students a sampling of the many tools in a historian’s intellectual toolbox while serving as a model for my history majors, the vast majority of whom are preparing for careers in secondary education.

St. Joseph’s College requires all history majors to write a senior thesis, an article-length study on a historical question of their choosing. In preparation for this undertaking, they

are required to take a historiography course that serves as an introduction to the development of history as a field of inquiry and to those historians who have defined the discipline. They are also required to take a research methodology course in which they learn the nuts and bolts of conducting research while designing their own research proposal. The actual writing of the senior thesis is done the following semester. In recent years, guiding students through the senior thesis project has become more challenging. Students often find their search for a historically significant question frustrating. Because they have been reared since their primary school days on a “just the facts” approach to history, reading for historical questions and arguments rather than for content is a major intellectual hurdle for them.

U.S. Foreign Relations since 1920, which is a course I developed to meet both individual and departmental needs, is one of the required courses for history majors, so it must contain “the facts” that they are likely to encounter on the state-mandated teacher certification exams. Although I abhor the notion of teaching to a test, consistently poor results by our students on such exams could compromise the department’s accreditation. Assessment is a reality from which we cannot escape! Despite the restrictions imposed by testing, teaching the next generation of secondary education teachers provides an exciting opportunity to arm them with the ability to identify and formulate historical questions, to put questions and analysis rather than “dead folks” at the center of historical inquiry, to develop the writing and verbal skills to communicate and teach what they have learned, and, ultimately, to make history matter for their future students. I believe that a question-based approach can

improve the educational experience for students by transforming the classroom experience from a professor-centered one, in which students passively take notes or provide brief factual responses to questions, to a student-centered one, in which the professor guides students in a dynamic exchange of ideas.² This approach should give students a more profound understanding of history while helping them retain what they learn better than rote memorization of “facts.”

The reading assignments for U.S. Foreign Relations since 1920 have been selected to foster an active approach to learning that emphasizes history as an interpretative discipline. During the first half of the semester, the reading assignments are taken from *Diplomatic History*. Not only is *Diplomatic History* free, which sparks a positive reaction towards the course among students, but most students also find the articles more interesting than a textbook.³ Students approach a textbook’s factual content with near reverence or complete boredom—or both. The two reactions stem from the fundamental flaw of textbooks: they strip history of its contentiousness. The questions that motivate and often divide scholars are not clear to students. Here *Diplomatic History* offers another advantage. The authors lay out their historical questions and arguments in a way rarely seen in textbooks. They include cues that enable students—once they have been taught to identify them—to answer the questions that accompany each reading assignment. What is the primary question the author wants to answer? How does the author construct his or her argument? What primary sources and secondary sources did the author use to write the article? How have other historians approached the same or similar questions in the past?⁴

In order to evaluate students’ critical

reading skills and begin creating an educational environment based on questioning, I dedicate the first full day of class entirely to discussing Ross A. Kennedy's "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security," Thomas Knock's "From Peace to War: Progressive Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction," and Tony Smith's "A Workable Blueprint for a Broken World."⁵ I start with a fifteen-minute introduction, drawn largely from the articles, to frame the major questions that President Woodrow Wilson faced during World War I and in its immediate aftermath. Weaving the material covered in the reading assignment into the introduction provides students with a pedagogical lattice upon which their ideas can grow. The first day is always the toughest. Students want to discuss the content, which I encourage as a way of moving them from the familiar to

the uncertain. More than anything else, I want to set the stage for a semester-long pursuit of questions and themes, and now is not the time to stymie conversation. Once they have explored the subject, I redirect their attention by asking, "OK, but what is the question that the author is trying to answer?" I then proceed to guide them through each article, focusing on historiography, the manner in which the arguments are constructed, and the use of primary and secondary sources. Students are encouraged to evaluate and critique each author's work. By the end of the first class, students understand that I am more interested in the questions that generated the content than the content itself.

I have found that these three articles complement each other extremely well. Kennedy challenges students to think about how Wilson conceptualized the relationship between militarism, national security,

and democracy. Knock challenges them to examine the domestic political reasons behind Wilson's failure to secure Senate approval of the Treaty of Versailles and his beloved League of Nations. Finally, after recalling Wilson's short-term missteps and failures, Smith challenges students to consider Wilson's foreign policy objectives from a long-term perspective. Once students have analyzed the articles, then they discuss how they would link the arguments to get a more comprehensive view of Wilson's presidency. The last question, in many ways, is the most important. I ask students to develop a list of the analytical tools, in the form of major questions, which they can apply to their study of U.S. foreign relations in general. In recent years, these questions have led to a discussion of the war on terror and the war in Iraq.

Once we have gone through this process twice, students then write the

Diplomatic History

The Journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Published on behalf of the

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Frequency: Five times a year Current Volume: 31 / 2007

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first of four, two-page historiography papers. I advise them that they are likely to experience difficulty and frustration and that this result is quite normal. The first writing assignment is due no later than the third week of class so I can evaluate their writing skills and progress in making the transition from writing about content to writing historiographically. The first two writing assignments are based on one article each so that students can read them twice, and many of them opt to do so. I found that including more than one article per assignment only results in more of the same mistakes, because the students have to struggle so hard to overcome their urge to describe the article's content rather than to examine the questions. On the day the paper is due, I allow them to keep their papers during our forty-minute (or more) discussion so that they have their "notes" in front of them. The discussion progresses in the manner previously described. An important final step is to return papers the next time the class meets so the material is still fresh in their minds. One thing they will not find on their papers is a grade. Having judged by the looks on their faces when we discussed the article that the writing assignment had indeed proved arduous, I remind them that I am more concerned about the results of their fourth paper than I am their first. I ask them to review their papers and compare them with the notes they took during the discussion and with my written comments. Together, these should serve as a guide for writing the second paper. This approach is designed to take the emphasis off grades and assessment and place it where it belongs, on learning.⁶

The third and fourth historiography papers are more complicated. The third assignment has students write a paper on four articles from "The Future of World War II Studies: A Roundtable."⁷ Since many of my senior thesis students choose a topic on World War II, these articles provide a methodological model for how historians assess the state of their field. This assignment also makes students aware that they should be reading for content, for the questions that drive the content, and for the questions that

still need to be asked. Herein lies the genesis of future research proposals! The fourth assignment has students read Fredrick Logevall's "Bernath Lecture: A Critique of Containment" and Tony Smith's "A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War." Students often view the Cold War as a bilateral struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that was eventually won by the former. While there may be a great deal of truth to this, Logevall challenges students to assess the methods the United States used to fight the Cold War, while Smith challenges students to analyze how "junior members of the international system . . . played a key role in *expanding, intensifying, and prolonging* the struggle." Pairing these articles sparks questions about the design and implementation of U.S. foreign policy and the analytical tools historians use to evaluate it. Equally important, students no longer see other states as pawns on a U.S.-controlled chessboard.⁸

The reading assignments for the second half of the semester are comprised of a series of case studies. Why so much emphasis on case studies? In keeping with the methodological approach I have taken in U.S. Foreign Relations since 1920, they are organized around a historical question and offer students a more detailed factual background than most textbooks. Rather than continuing to focus on how historians have approached the study of history, I now move historical actors and debates onto the center stage. Students examine how people and nations have responded to complicated historical questions. To date, student response has been overwhelmingly positive. Most of the feedback I have received, some of which was solicited but most not, centers on their becoming invested in the material and its outcome rather than cruising through history as a casual observer, their welcoming the opportunity to exchange ideas with their peers, and their improved retention of the material. I believe that the key to achieving these benefits is creating a comfortable classroom environment that allows for

experimentation. Students' arguments invariably become more sophisticated as the discussion progresses. One cannot underestimate the importance of establishing a rapport with the students, knowing when to interject in the discussion and when to accept periods of silence, knowing which student to ask which question, and providing positive reinforcement.⁹

Having spent the first half of the semester being guided through secondary sources, students now apply the skills they have learned to case studies. The student is placed at the center of the learning experience. Though I conduct case studies in a variety of ways, let me start by describing my general approach. Before each case study, students are assigned a national identity or the role of a historical figure, or they are given a historical position to defend, depending on which is appropriate. They then read the case study and write a two-page paper supporting their assigned position. Building on the historiographical writing assignments, students must identify the main argument and all supporting arguments, and at the end of the paper they must include three questions to ask the other team(s). Having questions readily available keeps the discussion moving.

On the day the assignment is due, students discuss their paper with their team members for approximately twenty minutes. This gives them a chance to exchange ideas and answer any lingering questions they might have before engaging other teams or the entire class. Then, either I select two volunteers from each team to lead the discussion or we meet as a group. At no point are students required to stand alone before the class. Instead, I rotate discussion leaders every couple of minutes, which brings new information and arguments to the discussion and gives everyone a chance to participate. Throughout the process, I remind students that they are not expected to be able to answer every question. While I might appear to be letting them off the hook, my purpose is to involve as many students in the process at any given time. Rather than watching the debate, teammates are expected to join it

actively!

One of my favorite case studies is *A Madman's Appetite – Operation Menu: The Nixon Administration and the Secret Bombing in Cambodia*. The writing assignment and class discussion are organized around one of the central questions raised in the case study: should President Richard Nixon have authorized the bombings in Cambodia? Students spend the first twenty minutes analyzing details and sharpening their arguments for or against the bombing, depending on the position I assigned them. The two teams are then invited into the Oval Office for a meeting with Nixon, played by yours truly. At this stage I ignore Nixon's own views on the subject in favor of having him act as a neutral party seeking counsel. The meeting often begins with students struggling to define the terms of the debate or offering narrow versions of their team's arguments. Rather than succumb to the temptation to insert my voice into the debate, I give the students the chance to build on these initial arguments. One of two things generally happens. A teammate contributes additional facts or analysis that strengthens the argument, or the other team attacks the argument's weak points, thus evoking a more thoughtful reply. Once the two sides have presented and defended their positions, the teams are asked to consider which advisors and government departments were the strongest advocates of their position and why.¹⁰

In *Operation Menu* students confront a range of questions relating both to the material covered in the case and to U.S. foreign policy in general. The dynamic interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy – a theme that permeates the course – manifests itself in Nixon's attempt to gauge how the American public will react should it learn of the top-secret bombings in Cambodia. The case study also raises questions about how a president's personality and his advisors impact "foreign policy decision making." After analyzing Nixon's decision to bomb Cambodia, students explore exit strategies, war termination policies, and possible "alternative courses of action." Last, but certainly not least, students evaluate the long-term consequences of Nixon's decision for Vietnam, Cambodia, the United States and his own political future.¹¹

The last three class meetings are dedicated to *Nations: A Simulation Game in International Politics*. I have to thank one of my former colleagues for making me aware of this universally loved game. Students are divided into seven teams, each representing a nation from the fictitious continent of Lostralia. Each team has a clearly defined national identity and a set of national objectives, which, not surprisingly, stand in stark contrast to those of the other nations. Solutions are neither obvious nor easily obtained. The challenge is to achieve your national objectives without compromising your nation's identity. The World Council – me – ensures that

students do not violate the rules or act contrary to their national identity.¹²

I have not found another teaching device that reinforces as many of my course objectives as *Nations* does. *Nations* challenges students to identify the major issues and questions affecting their own nation and to place them in an international context. They must prioritize national objectives, develop a strategy for achieving them and constantly reevaluate it as negotiations and changing international conditions demand, and take into account the multifaceted nature of international problems. Having spent the first half of the semester examining how historians formulate questions and construct their arguments and the second half of the semester examining how historical actors have dealt with critical historical questions, students are now placed in the hot seat. The fate of their nation rests solely in their hands. What becomes apparent in our debriefing session is that the students and teams who best understand and negotiate the fault lines of domestic policy and international relations generally win the game. Analytical, communication, and negotiation skills figure prominently. After three days of *Nations*, the simplistic resolutions to international problems that students offered early in the semester disappear. Finally, at the end of the simulation I remind them of their role as historical actors. I ask them to reflect on how future historians would write the history of Lostralia in general and of their actions in particular.

This is the direction my U.S. Foreign Relations since 1920 course has taken in recent years. Having the class size capped at twenty students makes much of what I do easier, perhaps even possible. It affords me the time to help students who need assistance with their critical reading skills and with identifying questions and arguments, and it allows me to organize students efficiently without interrupting the class flow. It keeps students more engaged and gives them more opportunities to express their ideas. It also creates a more secure learning environment, because I know most of them already and they

Job Posting

Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government seeks candidates for a tenure-track assistant professorship in the history of international relations and/or the history of U.S. foreign policy. The School needs to bolster its traditional ability to educate students in historical reasoning, including the critical use of historical analogies, issue histories, and individual and institutional biographies. Period or geographical specialty is immaterial, but a successful candidate must be able to connect with students who aim for careers in policy analysis or public management. Applicants should send a curriculum vita, letters of recommendation, and papers and publications to Professor Ernest May, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. The deadline for receipt of applications is September 1, 2007. Qualified women and members of minority groups are specially urged to apply.

know most of their classmates.

If the many variables that comprise the educational experience aligned in the manner I intended, none of my students would ever think about history again as the study of "dead folks" or "just the facts." But of course, some students will continue to struggle. One student came up to me after the midterm and said, "Professor Fuchs, I just want to memorize stuff." That stung. However, I believe the majority of our students, whether they are future historians or teachers, will be able to assimilate the idea that history is an interpretative discipline driven by questions if they are given the opportunity and the means to do so.

Steven J. Fuchs is Assistant Professor of History at St. Joseph's College.

Notes

- 1 The teaching load at St. Joseph's College is four and four, though I often teach additional courses.
2. My intention is not to demean lectures as an educational tool; I use them in many of my courses and I can think of many professors I had during my undergraduate and graduate studies that mastered the art.
3. The library at St. Joseph's is a subscriber.
4. While monographs offer many of the same benefits as articles, most students find them inaccessible. I can also assign many more articles than monographs, thus allowing students to better develop their skills through

practice. While I believe wholeheartedly in incorporating primary sources into my courses, and Matt Loayza's article in the December 2006 issue of *Passport* offers an exciting way of doing so, I do not include them in U.S. Foreign Relations since 1920.

5. U.S. Foreign Relations meets twice a week for 85 minutes. Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 1-32; Thomas Knock, "From Peace to War: Progressive Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, sixth edition, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston, 2005), 48-57; and Tony Smith, "A Workable Blueprint for a Broken World," in *Major Problems*, 65-69.

6. A student once came to class visibly frustrated by the experience of having to write a paper and revise it several times. After letting him vent, I calmly responded, "So you're mad at me for making you think?" He just smiled. This semester the first writing assignment is on Jason M. Colby, "Banana Growing and Negro Management: Race, Labor, and Jim Crow Colonialism in Guatemala, 1884-1930," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 4 (April 2006): 165-196. The second writing assignment is on Barbara Keys, "Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Coca Cola: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 2 (April 2004): 165-196.

7. I change the selection each semester to reduce the possibility of plagiarism. For Spring 2007 I am using Warren F. Kimball, "The Incredible Shrinking War, Not Just the Origins of the Cold War," Loyd E. Lee, "We Have Just Begun to Write," Yukiko Koshiro, "Japan's World and World War II," and David Reynolds, "World War II and Modern Meanings," in *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2001).

8. Fredrick Logevall, "Bernath Lecture: A Critique of Containment," *Diplomatic History*

28, no. 4 (September 2004): 473-499; and Tony Smith, "A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 567-591.

9. My discussion of how case studies can be used as an instructional tool has benefited from conversations with my students and from Vicki L Golich, Mark Boyer, Patrice Franko, and Steve Lamy, *The ABCs of Case Teaching: Pew Case Studies in International Affairs* (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, GUIDS Pew Case Study Center, 2000). Available at <http://guids.org/> (accessed February 12, 2007).


10. Tara Baird and Lynn M. Kuzma, *Case 242: A Madman's Appetite - Operation Menu: The Nixon Administration and the Secret Bombing in Cambodia* (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, GUIDS Pew Case Study Center, 2001). Available at <http://guids.org/> (accessed February 12, 2007).

11. See Baird and Kuzma, *A Madman's Appetite*.
12. A student once volunteered to dress in camouflage as part of his ongoing espionage activities. What such an outfit would look like for a class that was held in the library remains unclear. See Michael Herzog and David Skidmore, *Case 169: Nations: A Simulation Game in International Politics* (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, GUIDS Pew Case Study Center, 1995). Available at <http://guids.org/> (accessed February 12, 2007).

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Key Sources for Nixon's Foreign Policy*

Edward C. Keefer

**The views expressed in this guide are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State.*

Presidential libraries are gold mines of documentation for foreign policy decisions and the conduct of foreign affairs, but the most extraordinary collection of presidential documents on foreign policy is the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, now at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland (Archives II), but soon to be moved to the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California. Nixon was a complex man, and his foreign policy records are as fascinating as he was, but what makes the Nixon documentary record different from other presidential libraries' collections is that it contains unique records that provide an entirely different level of information beyond the usual paper documentation. The materials have the standard minutes of the National Security Council (NSC) and NSC subgroup meetings, memoranda to the president, memoranda of conversations of the president with world leaders, records of the NSC staffers, telegrams, intelligence memoranda, and so on, which are the staple of all presidential libraries. However, they also have something else.

Obviously, the most famous collection of records in the Nixon materials are the White House tape recordings, a virtual "you are there" tool for understanding and assessing Nixon's first love, foreign policy. Nixon was not the first president to have an extensive taping system for posterity. John F. Kennedy taped 325 of his meetings, for a total of 248 hours of audio, and 275 of his telephone conversations, for a total of about 16 hours. Lyndon B. Johnson taped 9,300 of his telephone conversations, for a total of more than 400 hours, and after January 1968 he taped Cabinet meetings, for a total of more than

200 hours.¹ The difference was that Kennedy and Johnson had to switch the taping system on themselves and could pick their moments; Nixon's system was voice-activated and tied to the president's location. When Nixon entered either of his two offices it started, and when he left it shut off. As long as there was tape in the machines, the system captured everything, although the tape occasionally did run out.² Furthermore, Nixon taped more than 13 times the hours Kennedy taped and more 6 times the hours Johnson taped.

Over 2,000 of the 3,700 hours of Nixon tapes have now been released, and scholars patient enough to listen to key segments will find amazing insights into how Nixon and his principal foreign policy advisers – especially Special Assistant for National Security Henry Kissinger – developed strategies (linkage, triangular diplomacy, and realpolitik) to deal with the complex world of superpowers and emerging superpowers.³ The Nixon tapes are not so much a guide to the formulation of foreign policy under Nixon – that is best discerned through official NSC documents – but a window into Nixon's psyche and attitudes, his beliefs, hopes, prejudices, and fears. They provide a unique source for understanding what made the president tick – a source that historians have rarely enjoyed before. By listening to tapes a historian can be in the Oval Office or the Executive Office Building with the president and eavesdrop on his conversations with his major foreign policy advisers or foreign leaders. To historians this is documentary heaven – but it comes at a price.

The Nixon tapes are often raw, incoherent, rambling, and repetitive, and are of poor audio quality (which sometimes can be enhanced by audio software).⁴ They must be used with caution, because Nixon had a tendency

to exaggerate, vent, and posture. For example, he would announce that he wanted officials fired on the spot and rant about his intentions or his toughness as a leader. What Nixon says on one day in the heat of the moment is not in itself absolute proof of his intentions, just evidence of his state of mind at that particular time. Obviously, upon reflection a president can change his mind or moderate his attitudes. Multiple examples from the tapes, backed up by other documents, are the best way to discern Nixon's real motivations and reasoning. Still, the tapes provide absolutely fascinating insight into the Nixon administration's shadowy and secretive policy machinations.

Another collection of the "you are there" documents are the transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations from his tenure as the special assistant to the president for national security affairs and as secretary of state for both presidents Nixon and Ford. While the originals (housed at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers) are not yet available to the public, copies covering the Nixon administration – until August 8, 1974 – are declassified and open at Archives II. The Kissinger telephone transcripts for the Ford administration are in the Department of State's electronic reading room for the period when he was secretary of state (<http://foia.state.gov>). Kissinger's telephone conversations were either listened to by a secretary and transcribed on the spot, or taped and then transcribed. Apparently the tapes were either reused or did not survive, since only the transcripts remain. The telephone conversations are often cryptic, but they reveal much of what Kissinger was working on and what he was attempting to accomplish. Reading eight years' worth of transcripts provides valuable insight into his way of conducting business and his

personality. They show his well-known charm, his sense of humor, and sometimes his temper. By themselves the transcripts are a remarkable source; added to the Nixon tapes, they provide an extraordinary array of documentary evidence.

The third source that makes the Nixon Presidential Materials so multilayered is the Haldeman diaries. The diaries were originally handwritten, but after December 1970, Haldeman dictated his entries onto tapes. He published a selection of extracts in a book, H.R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York, 1994), and produced a much more extensive multimedia edition on CD. The multimedia edition has full diary entries and many more entries than the book, as well as additional information added by Haldeman. However, technology has moved so quickly that the CD-ROM, now out of print, runs only on older operating systems (i.e., Windows 98).

In whatever form they are used (book, CD, or original entries and tapes), the Haldeman diaries are an invaluable source. What makes Haldeman's observations so useful is that he did not have much experience in foreign policy, and because of his naiveté his views were basically unfiltered. In contrast to more seasoned U.S. officials, who would never admit that politics affected their actions, he was not reticent about acknowledging political motivations for foreign policy decisions both large and small. Haldeman was also extremely frank in his views of Nixon's foreign policy advisers, but his loyalty to the president made him uncritical of Nixon.

A fourth source, the Moorer Diary, is not part of the Nixon Presidential Materials, but rather part of Record Group 218, official files of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. Now at the National Archives, it is not yet available to the public. When it is released it will provide an extra insight into Nixon's relations with the military and the Department of Defense. Moorer's is not a diary in the classic sense, but rather a working account of his day, with documents he saw and records of telephone conversation

he had on that day attached. To circumvent Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who did not always see eye to eye with the president, Nixon increasingly used Moorer as his go-to man in the Pentagon. Their relationship became complicated when it was discovered that Moorer was involved in a Joint Chiefs of Staff spying operation on Nixon and Kissinger by Yeoman Charles Radford, who worked on detail to the NSC staff. Although the operation became public knowledge, Nixon, who had come to rely on Moorer, chose not to fire him or other high-ranking military men involved. The Moorer Diary presents an inside look at the very complex relationship among Moorer, Nixon and Kissinger, which essentially took place outside of normal channels and was overlaid with a certain amount of intrigue.⁵

In the more traditional paper files of the Nixon Presidential Materials the foremost source is the National Security Files. These files, maintained by the NSC staff, are the mother lode of paper documentation on foreign policy. While similar files exist in virtually all other presidential libraries, the Nixon National Security Files collection is remarkable because of its size (1350 boxes) and because Assistant for National Security Henry Kissinger maintained complete control over the flow of paper from the bureaucracy. All recommendations for action or information had to be first read, summarized and analyzed by one of Kissinger's NSC staffers. If a recommendation was deemed worthy of presidential consideration, it was then sent to the president under a substantial memorandum from Kissinger. Nothing went directly to the president from any department or agency relating to foreign policy without first being vetted by the NSC staff and, ultimately, Kissinger. That policy has since led former Department of State officers to claim that the NSC staff plagiarized their memoranda, but in theory the NSC was supposed to provide an analysis of the motivations of the sender and prevent State and other agencies from boxing the president into decisions that they wanted. The result is multilayered National Security Files, which provide the historian with not only the raw

material of policy decisions, but also a look at how the NSC staff and Kissinger controlled information and dominated the bureaucracy.

In addition, there are in the NSC Files a separate, extensive set of Kissinger Office Files (149 boxes) and two Alexander Haig Files, the Chronological File and the Special Files (totaling 67 boxes). The Haig Files are the most extensive collection of materials relating to a deputy to the assistant to the president for national security affairs in any presidential library. Haig's responsibility and influence grew in the Nixon administration, and his files reflect his importance. Other NSC aides' files are also valuable, especially the extensive Harold Saunders Files for the Middle East.

Another difference between the Nixon collection and earlier presidents' records is the president's and the NSC Staff's use of backchannel messages — telegrams that went directly to or from the president, Kissinger, or other White House staffers to an ambassador in the field without Secretary of State Rogers or anyone in the Department of State or Defense knowing about it. Other presidents used backchannel messages, but not as frequently and consistently as Nixon did. The backchannel section of the NSC Files, arranged by regional area and topics, is an important source. An even more significant backchannel collection is the confidential channel between Assistant to the President Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. The channel was established in early 1969 and continued throughout the Nixon presidency and into the Ford administration. It allowed Kissinger and Dobrynin to meet secretly either in the White House or at the Soviet embassy with virtually no one in the U.S. government beyond Kissinger and Nixon knowing. There is a fair amount of skulking around by Kissinger and Dobrynin to keep this supersensitive dialogue and negotiating tool secret from the rest of the U.S. bureaucracy (although the channel was more widely known in Moscow, causing Kissinger considerable heartburn). The memoranda of conversations, memoranda to the president, and memoranda for the record that make



SHAFR ANNUAL MEETING, 2008

CALL FOR PAPERS

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Annual Meeting
26-29 June 2008

Blackwell Inn and Conference Center at The Ohio State University,
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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for panels and individual papers at its annual conference, 26-29 June 2008, to be held at the Blackwell Inn and Conference Center on the Ohio State University Campus in Columbus, Ohio. Although proposals for individual papers will be considered, proposals for complete or nearly complete panels are encouraged and will receive preference. In order to receive full consideration, proposals should be submitted no later than 15 December 2007.

SHAFR President Thomas A. Schwartz will deliver his presidential address at the Saturday luncheon. Last year's program co-chairs Steve Rabe and Doug Little have also promised to debut their long-awaited retrospective recap of the SHAFR summer conference titled: "Dorm Rooms, Cafeterias, and Low-Rent Hotels We Have Known."

The Program Committee encourages panels and paper proposals from all areas of diplomatic history, foreign relations, and international studies. Panels can follow either of the following formats: (1) three or four papers, chair, and commentator or (2) a roundtable with a chair and participants. The committee also welcomes innovative formats, such as sessions that utilize pre-circulated papers, as well as those dealing with issues such as pedagogy and professionalization.

Electronic submissions are encouraged (as Word or WordPerfect attachments), but paper submissions will be accepted. Panel submissions should total no more than three pages and must include the following information: the name of each panelist as she/he would like it to appear on the program should the panel be accepted (please check the proper spelling of everyone's name); each participant's institutional affiliation and status (graduate student, assistant professor, lecturer, professor, etc.); the role of each panelist (presenter, chair, commentator, etc.); and contact information, including a working e-mail address and phone number for each participant. Each panel or roundtable should include a brief rationale, the title of each paper, and a short description of the work to be presented. Each panelist should include a brief bio. Please adhere to the limit of three pages. One member of each proposed session should be designated as the contact person.

This year the SHAFR Council will offer up to \$1,500 total in travel funds to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: (1) no award will exceed \$300 per student; (2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and (3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make the decision regarding all awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. (Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on accepting panels.) Requests must be accompanied by a letter from the graduate advisor confirming the unavailability of institutional funds to cover travel to the conference.

If you have questions about submitting a panel or would like some assistance in finding participants for a panel, please feel free to contact the members of the Program Committee, or post your panel ideas on such discussion groups as H-Diplo and others related to our field.

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up the accounts of this channel prepared by Kissinger himself, along with the notes that Dobrynin and Kissinger exchanged, are in the President's Trip Files of the NSC Files. In addition, in the Kissinger telephone conversations there is a specific sub-collection of conversations with Dobrynin, most of which relate to the confidential channel.⁶

Probably because he was a historian himself and aware of the importance of the historical record – and possibly because, as he himself confessed, he had a healthy ego – Kissinger insisted that the meetings he attended, be they with foreign leaders or meetings of the NSC sub-groups that he chaired, such as the Senior Review Committee, Washington Special Actions Group, the Verification Panel, or the Defense Policy Committee, all have virtually verbatim records. Pity the poor note-takers on Kissinger's staff. There are extensive meeting notes or memoranda of conversations, often 50 or 60 pages long, but usually at least 10 to 20 pages. The accounts of Kissinger's meetings are the most extensive of any assistant to the president for national security affairs.

When Henry Kissinger became secretary of state in September 1973, he held weekly staff meetings with the principal officers at State (mostly assistant secretaries or their equivalent, many of whom Kissinger brought from the NSC to State). Like most Kissinger records of meetings, these staff meetings accounts are virtual verbatim transcripts and provide a frank and revealing picture of how Kissinger interacted with his senior staff at State. He made little attempt to soften criticism, gloss over differences of opinion or personality, or hide his displeasure with his staff. These records have the ring of verisimilitude. They are not part of the Nixon Presidential Materials, but rather are a former Department of State lot file, now available at Archives II as Transcripts of Henry Kissinger Staff Meetings, Record Group 59, series designate A1(5177). These staff meetings extend throughout the Ford administration.⁷

This survey of the Nixon Presidential Materials and related documentation is based on a decade of research

done by the twenty-three historians responsible for research, selection, and annotation of the *Foreign Relations* series at the Department of State. Since Harry Truman's presidency, the *Foreign Relations* series has mined the presidential libraries. With each administration from Truman to Nixon, more and better records emerged from those libraries. Increasingly, *Foreign Relations* volumes rely on the records in the presidential library to the point where in many Nixon volumes the presidential documents printed or cited outnumber the Department of State records printed or cited. Currently the Department of State has released 17 *Foreign Relations* volumes (11 print and 6 electronic-only or e-volumes, the latter available only on the department website) of a projected 57 volumes (41 print and 16 e-volumes) for the Nixon and the Nixon-Ford administrations.⁸ This massive coverage of the Nixon-Ford era will present a full and comprehensive account of Nixon's and Ford's major foreign policy decisions and initiatives, but it will only present a small (albeit important) part of the total Nixon-Ford record.

The Nixon presidential holdings, notwithstanding their massive size, are not perfect. Occasionally meetings went unrecorded, but on the whole the documentation available on Richard Nixon's foreign policy is the most extensive and multilayered of any presidency. If there is no written record of a meeting, there may be a tape recording of it, if it was a meeting with the president that took place in the Oval Office, the Executive Office hideaway, or the Cabinet Room. Alternatively, it might be described in a telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, or mentioned in passing in the Haldeman diaries. The sheer size of the holdings and the complex nature of the Nixon foreign policy records present a challenge to those who must process and declassify these holdings, but the declassifiers and the staff of the Nixon Presidential Materials at Archives II have made commendable, even heroic, efforts in opening the records to the public. Their excellent job will no doubt be carried on by the staff of the Nixon Library at Yorba Linda. Scholars can look forward to spending many useful days

exploring, analyzing, and assessing this extraordinary record of a pivotal presidency during a crucial period of the Cold War.

Edward C. Keefer is General Editor of Foreign Relations of the United States series.

Notes

1. John Prados, *The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President* (New York and London, 2003) pp. 7-12.
2. Telephone call with John Powers, Nixon Presidential Materials, Archives II, College Park, MD, Feb. 28, 2007.
3. Obviously not all tapes concern foreign policy, but my estimate would be that about half concern or touch on foreign policy. Virtually all *Foreign Relations* volumes that document the Nixon administration after February 1971, when the taping system was installed, contain transcripts of Nixon tapes. The volume that has the most extensive collection so far is *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972*. This volume documents the sometimes rocky road to the Moscow Summit, culminating in Nixon's trip to the Moscow, the first visit of a U.S. president to the Soviet Union.
4. The Office of the Historian used Cool Edit and then Soft Soap software to improve the audio quality of the tapes.
5. For information on the Radford case, which includes key extracts from Nixon tapes, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Documents*, 164-166.
6. The Department of State, Office of the Historian, will be releasing in October 2007 a joint documentary publication with the Russian Government entitled, *U.S.-Soviet Relations in an Era of Détente, 1969-1972*. This volume will highlight the Kissinger-Dobrynin confidential channel by publishing side-by-side U.S. and Soviet original accounts of their meetings and related documents, as well as side-by-side accounts of meetings between other U.S. and Soviet leaders. The volume will culminate with key U.S. and Soviet documents on the Moscow Summit.
7. These staff meeting accounts are a staple of Nixon-Ford *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1973-1976. The first of these volumes to be published is *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976*, especially the chapter on Ethiopia. The volume is available only online at www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e6.
8. The 11 print volumes released so far are available for purchase at the Government Printing Office; order online at www.bookstore.gpo.gov. All 17 volumes (including the 6 e-volumes) are available for viewing or downloading free of charge on the Department of State website at www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/nixon. The remaining 30 print and 10 e-volumes for the Nixon-Ford administration will be released on the website. The print volumes will also be for sale at the Government Printing Office.

Testimony of Anna K. Nelson Before the Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, March 1, 2007

Author's note: A week before this testimony was given, I was called by a staff member of this subcommittee who asked me to participate on a panel because they needed an historian. The panel consisted of Tom Blanton of the National Security Archive, a representative of the Society of American Archivists, the lawyer from Public Citizen who had taken the issue to the courts, and Robert Dallek. It seems that Dallek, who was representing the AHA, was billed as a biographer rather than an historian.

There are several important points to remember when writing or reading testimony. There is rarely time to write great prose and for the most part, no time to read it. Oral testimony on panels is usually limited to five minutes per person. As a result, this does not represent the complete case against that Executive Order [EO 13233]. I had to pick two or three points and let the rest go. Finally, providing examples is a tricky business. It is important not to present a case for opening something that the Committee members would just as soon keep hidden. For that reason the examples are unremarkable, although I did tread lightly on Kissinger's toes.

This was a rare hearing in that the Chairman asked a great many questions of the panel. Somewhere behind him was a staff member who had done his work.

My name is Anna K. Nelson. I am the Distinguished Historian in Residence at American University in Washington, D.C. I have done research in five presidential libraries, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and in the Nixon Presidential Papers. I have also done extensive research in the National Archives in

Washington. I was a staff member of the Public Documents Commission, 1976-77 which was partly responsible for the passage of the Presidential Records Act. From 1994-1998 I was a presidential appointee to the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board.

Today I am representing the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, whose members are among the most active users of presidential libraries and government records.

It was no accident that Roosevelt established both the first presidential library and the Executive Office of the President. The proliferation of New Deal and World War II agencies moved the records of the President from a collection of personal letters such as those found in the Library of Congress to a unique set of government records.

It took about three decades for the Congress to respond to this increasingly dramatic change because presidents willingly donated their papers after leaving office. It was Richard Nixon's attempt to hide and control his records that finally brought into being the Presidential Records Act (PRA) in 1978.

The two most important provisions of the Act were, first, ensuring the protection of these records so that they could not be destroyed; second, to ensure that records of former presidents would be open to the public within a reasonable period of time. Equally important were the provisions that removed decisions of access from the heirs of the presidents to the Archivist of the United States.

In establishing a time for disclosure, Congress gave the president twelve

years before his records became available to the public. Other safeguards in the Act protected certain categories of records including National Security Records and deliberately excluded any diaries or private political papers. With these exemptions, Congress felt that it had duly protected each former president.

Unfortunately, former President Ronald Reagan and now President George W. Bush decided that records needed additional protection before becoming public. Reagan's Executive Order (EO12667) required the U.S. Archivist to notify both the former and incumbent president when in his judgment, records were about to be released that could be protected by executive privilege. Either could then invoke executive privilege if they found records they did not wish to open. The incumbent president was given 30 days to make his decision.

This revision of the PRA did not come to public notice until 12 years after the Reagan presidency, when the Bush administration took 9 months to make their decision on the Reagan records and continued to delay their release. Their solution to the problem was to issue EO 13233, which instituted more restrictions on release. Under this order, the past president has 90 days and the incumbent no limit of time to examine the documents to be released. Executive privilege has been further defined and provision made for the heirs or representatives of the former president to continue the process, presumably for years to come. Thus the EO overturns important access provisions the Congress deliberately provided in the PRA.

Defenders of the Bush EO note that except for an original delay, the Reagan records are being released. But that is entirely beside the point. Presidential records are now vast collections that have grown exponentially with each president. There are over 27 million pieces of paper in the Reagan library and over 64 million in the Clinton library (of which 12 million are classified). This veritable tsunami of paper must be processed and opened by understaffed libraries. It will take far more than 25 years for all the records to be released. In 2030, if the president is no longer alive should presidential families or executors of his estate make decisions about releasing government records – records illustrating public policy and paid for by the taxpayer? Should the incumbent president in 2030 have the authority to close or release the papers of a former president as expressed in a headline in the *Washington Post*, “Clinton Papers Release to be Bush’s Decision?”

Supporters of the EO argue that it is merely a procedural addition to the Presidential Records Act, but it negates important parts of that Act. While the purpose of the Act was to provide greater and rapid access, the EO encourages delay since the incumbent and past president are not bound by the time restrictions as they peruse documents. Finally,

broadening the definition of the president’s constitutional privileges and allowing their closure will remove most of the records of the confidential advice a president receives. In other words, it will have the potential to remove the core policy-making documents from the president’s collection.

The country is at war and major domestic issues loom ahead; why should the Congress and the public care whether a few thousand researchers have access to these records?¹ Perhaps for those very reasons we need reasonable access to the documents that have shaped our history.

We should think of the presidential papers as raw material for specialized books and articles [*I added verbally, like iron ore and coal*]. The ideas and conclusions gained by these few researchers are then refined and become subjects of influential books and articles and ultimately the textbooks that educate our students. Policy makers read these books and articles and are educated by the new insights gained through the original research in records.

Books on the Cuban Missile crisis based on presidential records have taught us about presidential decision making and the dangers of great power confrontations. When one collection of President Richard Nixon’s

records was promptly opened in the 1980’s we learned much more about the creation of the first agency entirely concerned with the environment. Even records over fifty years old can still be useful. Many books on the issues of the civil rights movement confronting President Dwight D. Eisenhower elucidate the inherent problems in that struggle. Unfortunately, delaying the release of records does not delay the memoirs and self-serving books that fill the gap. Kissinger records in the Nixon presidential papers often dispute Henry Kissinger’s two volume memoir. You need only contrast the books written before records are released with those written afterward, to see the importance of presidential records.

It is not difficult to discern that through this EO, President Bush can not only control access to his important policy making records but those of his father, as well as those records from the Reagan administration that might be of concern to members of his administration. But the problems with this EO go beyond the current president.

The United States is now a global power. The records produced by the White House have become more important to American history – indeed, World History – than ever before. Congress passed the Presidential Records Act so that the American people could learn about their recent past. Congress acted wisely. Executive Order 13233 should not be allowed to nullify that Act.

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Note:

1. There were 11,564 daily visits to research rooms in presidential libraries in 2006.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, School of Historical Studies, Princeton, NJ. Opportunities for Scholars 2008-2009. The Institute is an independent private institution founded in 1930 to create a community of scholars focused on intellectual inquiry, without the obligations and distractions associated with the teaching of undergraduates. The history of modern international relations is among the School’s principal interests, but the program is open to all fields of historical research. Scholars from around the world come to the Institute to pursue their own research. Those chosen are offered membership for a set period and a stipend. The Institute provides access to extensive resources including offices, libraries, subsidized restaurant and housing facilities, and some secretarial services. Candidates of any nationality may apply for a single term or a full academic year. Residence in Princeton during term time is required. The only other obligation of Members is to pursue their own research. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications are required. Information and application forms may be found on the School’s web site, www.hs.ias.edu, or contact the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Dr., Princeton, N.J. 08540 (E-mail address: mzelazny@ias.edu). Deadline: 15 November 2007.

Revisiting a Middle Eastern Crisis: Suez 50 Years On

Scott Lucas

I decided to attend last year's commemorations of the Suez crisis with some trepidation. A half-century after the event, I was certain that there would be no new documentary revelations to add to the sensational headlines of the crisis: the collusion between Britain, France, and Israel to attack Egypt, the American pressure upon the Eden government to cease fire before the Suez Canal was reoccupied, the possibility of Soviet "rockets" leading to a clash between Washington and Moscow.

In part, this trepidation arose because I am based in Britain rather than one of the other countries involved in the crisis. In Egypt, Suez can be held up as a high-water mark of Arab nationalism, while in Israel it can serve as confirmation not only of the young country's existence but of its emerging strength in the Middle East. In the United States, the crisis is remembered (if at all) as a sideshow in the Cold War. Even in France, potentially one of the greatest "losers" from the affair, Suez is a peripheral issue in the context of the setbacks of Indochina and Algeria and the possibility of national renewal through the Fifth Republic and the evolution of Europe. In British political culture, however, 1956 is a pivotal moment, marked every decade by an emotional wringing of political, journalistic, and even scholarly hands over the last imperial stand.

I have been pleasantly surprised, however, by how much re-interpretations of Suez can offer. The reflections below are drawn from five gatherings: a one-day colloquium at Queen Mary University in London in June; a two-day conference at the University of Hull in July, "Reassessing Suez: Fifty Years On"; a one-day seminar at the Royal United Services Institute in London in October, "The Suez Crisis Fifty Years

On"; a one-day seminar at University College London in November, "Suez Fifty Years On"; and a three-day conference at the Service Historique de la Défense in Paris in November, "The Western Powers and the Suez Crisis [Les Occidentaux et la crise de Suez]."

In particular, I was immediately impressed that presentations and discussion raised two essential points relevant not only to historical consideration but to contemporary issues in policymaking, operations, and political culture: 1) the necessity of addressing the tensions and even contradictions in political systems from London to Paris to Cairo; 2) the necessity of placing Suez in a regional context where issues are linked to but not dependent upon imperial or Cold War frameworks.

At an immediate level, these considerations still do not have a wide resonance in British discussions. There has been no major book to complement, let alone supersede, works such as Peter L. Hahn's *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956* (1991), Keith Kyle's *Suez* (1991), W. Scott Lucas's *Divided We Stand* (1991), and William Roger Louis and Roger Owen's *Suez 1956* (1989).¹ Instead, the country's attention to (some might say fixation upon) political biography has produced studies of Anthony Eden that add little to the studies offered by David Carlton and Robert Rhodes James twenty years ago.

The advance has come instead through presentations such as those of Sue Onslow, given at conferences in Hull, London, and Paris, on the role of Julian Amery – former intelligence officer, member of Parliament, and son-in-law of Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan – in the development and implementation of British policy. Onslow's findings, building upon published articles,

emphasize that London's intervention was not simply the product of Eden's fevered wishes or even a Cabinet decision. More important, the intersection of her analysis with that of others who are considering London's strategy, bureaucracy, and operations created a significant breakthrough in the study of the crisis. It is clear that the effort to overthrow Egypt's President Nasser was not the product of a coherent British approach to the Middle East, but the outcome of a fragmented system in which there were parallel foreign policies, one run by 10 Downing Street, one by the Foreign Office, and one by the intelligence service MI6.

Far from treating Suez as exceptional, this kind of approach, which explores the tensions and confusion within political systems, realigns examination of the crisis with a broader vision of the organizational and strategic challenges and difficulties for British foreign policy after 1945. This approach should not be limited to London. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Suez conference held by the Service Historique de la Défense (SHD) in Paris was to place French foreign policy under the same scholarly microscope.

By the end of three days of intensive discussion, the SHD's consideration of politico-military relations, initially framed to raise the profile of the Suez crisis in French academic and professional study, had opened up richer veins of discussion on the making of French foreign policy under the Fourth Republic. Provocative studies of individuals, such as François Lafon's reading of Prime Minister Guy Mollet, intersected with examinations of French military operations, like that of Philippe Vial. As in the British case, however, the conference did not reach a resolution

on politico-military decision-making. To the contrary, it offered re-interpretations, based on a collision of interests and procedures, of issues such as the role of French intelligence services not only in defining the threat of Nasser but in proposing operations against him, the role of government and non-government networks in supporting and developing an alliance with Israel, and the strategic tensions between policy in the Middle East and policy outside the region.

In these reconsiderations of national policymaking and operations, the Eisenhower administration continues to fare much better than its British and French counterparts. Whatever its strengths and weaknesses in other arenas, its response to Suez originated in a system designed to offer a measured, co-ordinated approach. If the U.S. government could have been accused of an intelligence failure in not anticipating the Israeli assault, Eisenhower reacted quickly and effectively (some would say ruthlessly) once Eden tipped his hand with the ill-constructed ultimatum to Egypt.

None of this was a revelation, however, as there was little new documentary evidence to add to the record regarding the United States. Instead, presentations on the American dimension of the crisis continued to beg the question of how to reconcile the Eisenhower administration's attempt to bring about a cease-fire, safeguarding Nasser against further Anglo-French-Israeli action, with its earlier program (implemented as late as 29 October 1956) to subvert and even overthrow the Egyptian president. Almost twenty years after it was first revealed, Operation OMEGA, designed to put pressure on Nasser not only through economic sanctions and the cut-off of High Aswan Dam funding but also through "grey" and "black" propaganda and the toppling of the government in Syria, is still largely overlooked by historians.

One consequence of this selective view of Washington's record is that a major assumption about the Eisenhower administration's approach to Suez – that it rested upon a broader, coherent strategy

that the administration had begun to forge in 1953 – remains unexamined. While it may be the case that the "tactical" line of 1956, determined by the collapse of the administration's attempts at an Arab-Israeli settlement, was implemented by the inter-agency system, it is not clear that the administration had a strategy beyond its immediate moves against Egypt. In this context, the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957, underexamined by historians (who tend to stop at the point of the cease-fire), is a reactive pronouncement rather than a considered approach to Arab nationalism.

The question about the coherence of American strategy in turn raises a broader and more significant question, suggested by the seminars of 2006, about the necessity of examining regional context and the role played by the Cold War to find the causes and the legacies of Suez. The title of the Paris conference, "The Western Powers and the Suez Crisis," points – perhaps inadvertently – both to further possibilities for research and to the limitations of scholarship on the crisis. There have been many studies of Anglo-American relations. The Anglo-French dimension, particularly in the military sphere, has not been overlooked, and there has been a good deal of work, based on the recollections of participants, on Franco-Israeli cooperation. The gatherings in the United Kingdom as well as France continue to focus on these bilateral relationships, albeit in the former case through papers based on national perspectives (e.g., Avi Shlaim on Israel, Christopher Goldsmith on France, Keith Kyle on Britain).

Yet amidst all this scholarly work, there was the spectre of an absent guest at these conferences: where, beyond Israel, was the regional? The Suez crisis turned not only upon the evolving relationship between the West and Egypt but also upon the policies and interests of Iraq, Syria (where there was a parallel Anglo-American effort to overthrow the government), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Indeed, had it not been for the possibility of an Israeli attack upon Jordan, there would have been no

French approach to Anthony Eden on 14 October 1956, no subsequent collusion, and no invasion of Egypt.

The standard scholarly line has been that the lack of open archives in Middle Eastern countries precludes a meaningful examination of events from the region's perspective as opposed to the perspective from London, Paris, or Washington. This was healthily disproved, however, in a series of papers given by Laura James of *The Economist*. Drawing upon documents and oral histories used in her recently published book on Nasser,² James offered studies of Nasser's decision-making and Egyptian political culture that paralleled and interacted with the best re-interpretations of British and French systems.

In discussing James's work and moving beyond Suez to the subsequent Anglo-Egyptian clash by proxy over Yemen, scholars still face a challenge: how do we incorporate not only the Arab-Israeli dimension but inter-Arab relations into the Suez interpretation? The answer will probably await analyses of Syria, building upon studies such as those by Patrick Seale and Douglas Little, that treat the country as more than an extra in the narrative; of Saudi Arabia, which was not just an oil-bearing pawn of the Western powers; of Iraq, caught between its ties with Britain and its attempt to lead the Arab world; or of the complex post-1945 creation that is Jordan. In the meantime, however, an acknowledgement that Suez was not simply a climactic scene in an imperial play or a local stage for the Cold War not only opens up the possibility of further interpretations but offers possible lessons for understanding contemporary post-imperial, post-Cold War events.

Perhaps the best illustration of the new approach to policymaking and analysis came in a paper that, on the surface, appeared to focus on an area far from the Suez Canal. At the conference in Hull, Jonathan Haslam offered a fundamental and provocative re-reading of the Soviet response to the Hungarian crisis, which was occurring at the same time as events in Egypt, while also providing a new perspective on Suez. According to

Haslam, the Politburo had decided by 31 October 1956 that Hungary had to be allowed to pursue its political and economic path of reform. Then, however, Khrushchev received word of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt in support of Israel. The Soviets erroneously concluded that the U.S. government must be acquiescing in, if not supporting, the intervention. Deciding that Moscow could not lose face and influence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East at the same time, the Politburo ordered Soviet forces to reoccupy Hungary. Thus, rather than the Cold War shaping events in the Middle East, regional developments reconfigured the Cold War thousands of miles away.

Similarly, last year's re-examinations of Suez may have both benefited from and contributed to thoughts on current conflicts in the Middle East. They did so not in the immediate comparisons, often stretched and superficial, between the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention of 1956 and the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq of 2003, but in more considered thoughts on the nature of strategy, policy, and operations. For example, the tensions and confusions in the British system between the Cabinet, the military, the Foreign Office, and the intelligence services – tensions that led to one of the worst-planned interventions in modern history – were replicated in the “sexing up” of intelligence to justify an invasion fifty years later. However, whereas in 1956 MI6 and its private allies designed and pursued a series of operations, laying the foundation of collusion, in the more recent case the intelligence services fulfilled a command from the prime minister's office to produce information justifying military action.

More importantly, the Middle East was no more to be “acted upon” in 2003 than it was at mid-century. Donald Rumsfeld's assertion at the first National Security Council meeting of the George W. Bush administration imposed the same logic, without any detailed consideration of the region, that lay behind Anthony Eden's reasoning that the removal of Nasser would “protect” pro-Western regimes elsewhere: “Imagine what the region

would look like without Saddam and with a regime that is aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about.”

At the end of the conference at Queen Mary University in London, the British historian Peter Hennessy commented, “What we need is a global history of Suez.” The “national” is still important in reinterpreting the crisis – that is, the divisions, conflicts, and confusion that arise within each national political system, not the seemingly coherent policy that issues from each government – but it is the connections among those individual frameworks that take us beyond the occidental perspective on Suez and continue to offer lessons well beyond any historical smoking gun.

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Notes:

1. Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in The Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 1991); Keith Kyle, *Suez* (New York, 1991); W. Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London, 1991); William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences* (New York, 1989).
2. Laura James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (London, 2006).

In the Next Issue of *Passport*...

A Roundtable on Mark Moyar's *Triumph Forsaken*

Robert Maddox on Martin Sherwin, Kai Bird, and the Atomic Bomb

The New Literature on Nixon and Kissinger

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Job Posting

20th-Century United States Foreign Relations. The history faculty of Eastern Connecticut State University invites applications for a tenure-track assistant professor position in 20th-century U.S. foreign relations, to begin August 2008. The successful applicant will teach freshman US history surveys and upper-level courses in US foreign relations to integrate American history broadly into a global context. A commitment to undergraduate teaching and mentoring at a small, public liberal arts university, a willingness to work with interdisciplinary programs, and evidence of scholarly potential required. Ph.D. in History required; ABD in History close to completion considered. Teaching experience preferred. The search committee will begin reviewing files November 1. Interested applicants should send a letter of application, curriculum vita, transcript and three letters of recommendation to Prof. Emil Pocock, Search Chair, Department of History, Eastern Connecticut State University, 83 Windham Street, Willimantic, CT 06226. Eastern is an AA/EOE.

General Hayden's Remarks at the 2007 SHAFR Conference

*Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency
Director Gen. Michael V. Hayden at the
Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations Conference
(as prepared for delivery)
June 21, 2007*

Thank you very much. As a lifelong student of history, I not only respect the work you do, I enjoy it. So I was especially pleased to accept the invitation to meet with this distinguished group.

Last month, I had the privilege to be the commencement speaker at my alma mater, Duquesne University. I told the Class of 2007 that the education I received there taught me at least three great truths, the first of which is "everything is connected to everything else."

That's the historian in me. What we do today inevitably has its roots in the past. And when you choose the Air Force and intelligence, you choose a profession in which history is a strong component.

Now, if you want to know the other great truths from Duquesne, you'll have to read the speech, and for that one, you won't even need a FOIA request. Today's topic is a different truth—CIA's social contract with the American people. More specifically,

how that contract guides CIA as we balance two crucial obligations: our need to protect information that helps us protect Americans and our need to inform the public—as best we can—about the work we do on their behalf.

Let me explain what I mean by the social contract. I talked about it when I was up for confirmation just over a year ago, and I've emphasized it inside and outside CIA ever since. It is a first principle for us—central to all we do.

As a secret organization serving an open and free society, CIA has been granted an enormous public trust. That's what secrecy is in a democracy. Not a grant of power, but a grant of trust. Each day, we have to earn that trust—as our democratic system demands—by acting as our fellow citizens expect us to: Skillfully, boldly, and always in keeping with the laws and values of our Republic. That's our social contract.

Here's an informal yardstick I use: If I could tell my brother back in Pittsburgh or my sister in Steubenville what CIA has done and why, would it make sense to them? Would they accept it as reasonable?

Of course, we cannot tell the American people everything we do to protect them without damaging our ability to protect them. When it comes to secret intelligence, public sovereignty and oversight reside in the Congress. But there is another window into our activities that's available to the 300 million Americans we serve. It can be found in the documents we release and the work that you and your colleagues do to place that material in a fair and accurate context. That's why declassification is so important to us.

The Agency officers who do that

work wrestle constantly with the twin imperatives of essential openness and essential secrecy. They carry a huge responsibility. Simply put, they must decide when a secret is no longer a secret.

You can imagine the tension involved in making that determination. We must balance our responsibility to the public, and to history, to explain our actions and their impact, with our obligation to protect sources, methods, and ongoing intelligence relationships. These are not simple, cut-and-dried issues. They spark vigorous internal debates that ultimately require informed, yet subjective, judgments. We have those debates and make those judgments knowing that mistakes can jeopardize American security, and, in some cases, place lives at risk. An intelligence organization that fails to protect those who work with it—foreign intel services and individuals—will eventually see sources dry up and cooperation diminish. So, as you can see, this is an existential question for us.

Despite these complexities, CIA recognizes the real benefits that flow from greater public understanding of our work and mission. That is not a boast: No other intelligence agency in the world rivals our record on declassification.

From the millions of pages of OSS documents released in the 1980s, to extensive documentation of America's early imagery satellites, the Cuban missile crisis, the U-2 program, and large collections of National Estimates on the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, CIA declassification has contributed greatly to the historical record. Just last year we added to that record with the declassification of volumes on the famous Berlin Tunnel operation and CIA's role in the rural pacification program in South Vietnam.



*Gen. Michael V. Hayden at the 2007
SHAFR Conference.*

These projects even have impact beyond our shores. The collection of China estimates, *Tracking the Dragon*, is on the shelves of a number of Chinese scholars, and the Yugoslavia collection is used in at least one graduate course in Serbia.

Our FOIA program is also very successful. In each of the last nine years, CIA has reduced its backlog—even as we receive about 3,000 new requests annually. This record is unsurpassed in the federal government, and we are making a concerted effort to close old cases, most of which are very complex and involve large numbers of documents.

In that context, we have completed our declassification review and are preparing to release most of the so-called “Family Jewels,” a very famous set of documents written over three decades ago, when Director Schlesinger asked employees to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with the Agency’s charter. Much of it has been in the press before, and most of it is unflattering, but it is CIA’s history. The documents provide a glimpse of a very different time and a very different Agency. When we release these declassified documents, we will put them on our public Web site, just as we have with many others, ensuring easy access.

Under the program that reviews records 25 or more years old, CIA has reviewed and released 31 million pages of previously classified records. One third of those can be full-text searched at the National Archives’ College Park facility using CREST, our records search tool.

Just last month, CIA made its latest delivery of declassified electronic records to the Archives—420,000 pages. These documents, like the nine previous deliveries, cover the full range of our work: Finished intelligence, operations reports from the 1940s and 50s, research and development files from the DS&T [Directorate of Science and Technology], and policy files and memos from the leadership level.

Keep in mind, we not only make these records available, we make them easily accessible, through CREST and our Web site. We are very proud of that and are actively

exploring ways to do more, including possible deployment of the CREST system to additional federal records depositories. To date, more than 650,000 pages have been printed from CREST, and the documents available through that user-friendly system are increasingly cited in academic publications.

And remember that nothing about intelligence and declassification happens without human intervention. We do not—we cannot—just kick these things out the door. We have to examine each and every page through the real-world security prism I mentioned. It takes time. It takes care. It takes talent.

Now, this may be a conference of historians, but all of us work in the present, so let me give you a sense of where we’re headed and what our declassification priorities are.

I should say right up front that resources for declassification programs are increasingly constrained. This is a function of the unprecedented demands placed on our core mission areas. There simply has never been greater demand from policymakers for quality intelligence—it is at the center of every national security challenge facing the United States today: terrorism, weapons proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, to name just a few. The ops tempo we have maintained since 9/11—and must continue to maintain—is unmatched in our Agency’s history.

The good news here is that we’re producing great stuff for future historians. The challenge today is that declassification is getting squeezed. We must use the money and manpower devoted to these efforts more smartly than ever. Certain things are required by law, but we want to do even more. Discretionary projects—like the release of more than 300 NIEs in partnership with the National Intelligence Council, and the declassification of hundreds of articles from *Studies in Intelligence*—give us the opportunity to present a more complete story, often with the expert help of CIA’s own historians.

So what are the Agency’s current declassification priorities beyond our FOIA and 25-year review obligations?

First, continuing support to the

State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. CIA understands the importance of this official documentary history. We know the value of conveying a complete and accurate picture of our nation’s foreign policy decisions. I’m actually one of the many who has used *FRUS*, and I can’t imagine writing my graduate thesis on the Marshall Plan without it. But again, this is about more than students and researchers. This is about telling the American people what we have done in their name.

As you know, the biggest challenge here for CIA is determining the extent to which covert actions can be declassified to present a full picture of foreign policy. On that front, we are working hard to draw a smaller circle around what must be kept secret. The bottom line: We strive to release as much as we can without endangering ongoing relationships with foreign partners.

A second priority is reviewing records awaiting release in the presidential libraries. Because we believe those records are relatively more valuable to those who write history, we want to devote relatively more resources to them in our 25-year program.

Thirdly, we plan to continue working with the NIC [National Intelligence Council], which is now part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to declassify collections of National Intelligence Estimates.

And fourth, we will continue to focus on discretionary releases of Cold War documents. We have in the pipeline a comprehensive collection of reporting and analysis of Warsaw Pact military programs, for example.

And, in collaboration with the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office, CIA later this year will release hundreds of pages on the development and deployment of the A-12 OXCART. The supersonic reconnaissance aircraft, which was developed with Lockheed as a successor to the U-2, flew missions over North Vietnam and North Korea in 1967-68. The intelligence it gathered helped save American lives by identifying missile sites that our pilots could then avoid. It also located the

USS *Pueblo*, a SIGINT collection ship that the North Koreans had seized. The release of the records will come in conjunction with our 60th anniversary celebration in September.

That's a few months down the road, though. Today, I want to tell you about another collection. Known inside CIA as the "CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers," it is a compilation of in-depth research and analysis on Soviet and Chinese internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations.

The collection is available to each of you today — 147 documents amounting to more than 11,000 pages of analysis done between 1953 and 1973.

What is unusual about this release is that the documents were not intended as finished intelligence products to inform policy. Rather, the authors aimed to create a broad base of knowledge on which analysts throughout the Intelligence Community could draw. In doing so, they relied heavily on consultations not only within the Directorate of Intelligence, but also with operations officers, the analytic division of the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (now known as the Open Source Center), and with a wide range of experts throughout academia.

The CAESAR and POLO papers, which studied the Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, respectively, helped prepare case officers working in the field against Communist targets. And many documents in the ESAU series were used essentially as working papers to inform analysts writing current intelligence on the same subject — formal DI assessments on Sino-Soviet relations that were delivered to policymakers.

The experts who put this collection together point out that many of the papers rely heavily on clandestine collection and other sensitive intelligence methods, information not usually available to researchers outside the Intelligence Community. The judgments in the papers are supported by a great deal of information from diverse sources. Finally, we believe the documents will be of interest to academics, and ultimately, to the public, because they reflect the views of seasoned

analysts who followed closely their special areas of research and whose views were shaped in the often-heated internal debates of the Cold War.

Before too long, the collection will be available on the CIA web site — in our FOIA Electronic Reading Room. But for now, this conference is the only place you can get it. So take a copy with you, and after you've had a chance to look at it, let us know what you think.

I mentioned earlier that CIA recognizes the very real benefits that flow from greater public understanding of our work. I want to expand on that, because it really is crucial to our success as an organization.

Greater openness does several things for us.

First, it helps the public, Congress, and the executive branch appreciate the courage and integrity of CIA officers. I've known the Agency over the years through my other assignments, but the last year has taught me a lot about the men and women who serve there. They are among the most dedicated, talented people I have ever had the good fortune of working with.

Also, releasing records that no longer need to be protected helps people understand the limits of our craft. Americans realize the vital importance of intelligence, especially since 9/11. That's a good thing. But it's equally important for people to understand the inherent uncertainties of intelligence work.

CIA officers deal in unknowns and unpredictables. The problems we face are complex and, more often than not, influenced by human behavior, which itself is complex and difficult to predict. We endeavor to reveal what others want to keep hidden, which adds another layer of difficulty to our mission. So even when we are at the top of our game, it's very, very rare that we can give certitude to policymakers.

Openness, particularly declassification of historical records, also exposes the public to one of the challenges CIA faces every day. Our Agency, and particularly our analysts, are at the nexus between the world as it is, and the world as we wish it to be.

Our job is to understand and explain the world as it is. The policymaker, though, has to make decisions or take action. We are expected to inform those decisions and actions by providing warning and signaling opportunity. That ties us closely to policymakers. They demand that we be relevant, and our craft demands that we be objective. Sitting in that nexus between reality and aspiration is never easy, and I think historical studies of foreign policy and the role of intelligence in shaping it, makes that point clear.

A final reason why declassification, when possible, is in CIA's interest: We want our history and our role in key decisions to be written accurately and fairly. Very often, we simply cannot correct misinformation in the press — history's first draft — without revealing information that would undermine ongoing intelligence operations. And, unfortunately, there seems to be an instinct among some in the media today to take a few pieces of information, which may or may not be accurate, and run with them to the darkest corner of the room.

With the passage of time, declassified historical records can give the full, accurate picture — the good and the bad, along with the necessary context. So eventually, the academic community and the public we ultimately serve together can arrive at informed judgments about CIA's work and effectiveness.

A few months after I arrived at CIA last year, I met with the Publications Review Board — a small, dedicated group that reviews books and other writings by current and former officers. I told them a few things that apply not only to their work, but also to information review and release more broadly. I said I expected CIA to build up a body of knowledge that is declassified, and to use decisions made in particular cases as precedent to guide future decisions.

I also told them that we need to draw hard lines to protect that which is truly secret, but warned that if we're drawing them on the margins, we're doing ourselves a disservice. I know it's a lot easier to say, "no" than to say, "let me think about that," but the latter is where we should be. The best

decisions, like the best intelligence, rarely come from the easiest road, especially on the toughest issues.

A few months after that meeting, CIA centralized all declassification review and release programs at the corporate level. We concluded that under the previous structure, where greater authority rested with the Directorates, decisions too often were opaque, inconsistent, and subject to lengthy, unproductive disputes. The new approach gives our Chief of

Information Management Services a stronger hand to ensure that adequate record searches are undertaken and appropriate decisions are made. We want decisions that are reasonable, timely, transparent, and credible.

I firmly believe this approach will improve CIA's standing with key partners inside and outside government, including people like you. It also will strengthen our ability to educate the public about our unique work and our vital contributions to

national security.

I hope you'll see good results from these steps. In our robust democracy, people want and deserve to know more about the government agencies they pay for and that exist to serve them, even the secret ones. We work for and serve the interests of the American people. When the protection of information is no longer required, we owe it to our fellow citizens to disclose that information.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. It's been a pleasure.

SHAFR WISHES TO THANK THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE FOR THEIR SERVICE RELATED TO THE 2007 CONFERENCE:

PROGRAM COMMITTEE:

Doug Little, *Clark University, Co-Chair*

Steve Rabe, *University of Texas at Dallas, Co-Chair*

Clea Bunch, *University of Arkansas at Little Rock*

David Engerman, *Brandeis University*

Katherine Sibley, *St. Joseph's University*

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE:

David Painter, *Georgetown University, Chair*

Kristin Ahlberg, *U.S. Department of State Historian's Office*

Hope Harrison, *George Washington University*

Sara Wilson, *Conference Coordinator*

In Memory: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. — historian, public intellectual, and presidential advisor — died in New York City on February 28, 2007. He was 89 years old.

Schlesinger left a mixed legacy as a scholar. His first major book, *The Age of Jackson* (1945), struggled to stand the test of time. It portrayed Andrew Jackson as the forerunner of 20th century American liberals — downplaying Jackson's racism and militaristic foreign policy, simplistically portraying his economic initiatives, and minimizing the reform sentiments of the opposition Whigs. On the other hand, Schlesinger's history of the age of Roosevelt (published in three volumes from 1957 through 1960) combined meticulous research with savvy insights. Our own era's preeminent expert on the New Deal, Columbia's Alan Brinkley, observed that Schlesinger "offered one of the earliest serious interpretations of the New Deal," and "was among the first scholars to argue that there was both a 'first' and a 'second' New Deal."

Schlesinger's writings on the Kennedys likewise were of varying quality. He received his second Pulitzer Prize (the first came for *Age of Jackson*) after writing *A Thousand Days*, his survey of the John Kennedy's presidency. Despite its encyclopedic nature, the book whitewashed Kennedy's personal life and offered an overly rosy interpretation of the president's policies, especially in the international arena. Schlesinger's National Book Award-winning *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (1978), on the other hand, remains the best single coverage of the late senator's life. The book sympathetically portrayed RFK as a leader who overcame his weaknesses and stood poised to keep the New Deal coalition together at the time of his assassination. Schlesinger compared his two subjects: "John Kennedy was a realist brilliantly disguised as a romantic, Robert Kennedy, a romantic stubbornly disguised as a realist."

Schlesinger was best known for his association with the Kennedys and his role in defining the tenets of American liberalism from the end of World War II through the mid-1970s. After serving in the Office of War Information and the OSS during World War II, Schlesinger helped found Americans for Democratic Action in 1947. The organization charted a middle course between what it perceived as a pro-Soviet leftism of Henry Wallace and the reactionary right-wing attitudes of senators such as Pat McCarran and later Joe McCarthy. Schlesinger summarized what would become the group's basic philosophy in *The Vital Center* (1949).

In the 1950s, Schlesinger — joined by his Harvard colleague John Kenneth Galbraith — worked on the two unsuccessful presidential campaigns of Adlai Stevenson. In 1960, describing himself as "nostalgically for Stevenson, ideologically for [Hubert] Humphrey, and realistically for Kennedy," he (and Galbraith) chose Kennedy. The duo played key roles in the campaign, smoothing the often contentious relationship between the Massachusetts senator and liberal intellectuals. After his victory, Kennedy responded by naming Galbraith ambassador to India and Schlesinger a special assistant to the President.

The position had no official portfolio; one aide wondered whether Kennedy had hired Schlesinger to write an official history of the administration. The president said no, but added, "Arthur will probably write his own, and it will be better for us if he's in the White House, seeing what goes on, instead of reading about it in *The New York Times* and *Time* magazine."

As events developed, Schlesinger played an important role as a speechwriter, cultural advisor, and policymaker, especially toward Latin America. The administration never spoke with one voice in defining the Alliance for Progress; hard-liners stressed counterinsurgency and containing the Cuban threat, while Schlesinger led a bloc that demanded the President make good on his promises of supporting democratic reform in the region. Schlesinger also distinguished himself as one of the few Kennedy advisors to oppose the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion.

Schlesinger's relationship with Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, was mutually frosty, and he resigned less than two months into Johnson's presidency. He went on to serve as an unofficial advisor to Robert Kennedy during his Senate tenure, and played a prominent role in RFK's 1968 presidential campaign. After Kennedy's assassination, Schlesinger never again had a formal political position.

After 1970, Schlesinger became best-known as a public intellectual, frequently appearing on talk shows, op-

ed pages, and the *New York Times* best-seller list. "I always combined academic life with what academics call 'the real world,'" he remarked in 1997. "Being a concerned citizen does not prevent one from being a good historian."

He produced two books exploring the dangers of excessive presidential power in foreign affairs. *The Imperial Presidency* (1973) attacked the abuses of executive authority that culminated in the Vietnam War – although Schlesinger was far less severe in his analysis of Roosevelt and Kennedy than in what he had to say about Johnson and Richard Nixon. His final book, *War and the American Presidency* (2004), returned to the issue in a searing critique of George W. Bush's policy in Iraq.

At the same time, Schlesinger confronted the excesses of the academic left. *The Disuniting of America* (1991) exposed the dangers of the "multicultural" movement that had obtained such strong support in the academy – and has only grown more intense in the years since Schlesinger's book appeared. The volume was attacked from unsurprising sources: Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr., for one, mocked Schlesinger for demanding "cultural white-face." But the book accurately anticipated the relentless assault within the discipline against the serious study of American public policy, foreign relations, and political ideology – other than through the analytic triumvirate of race, class, and gender.

Schlesinger was a professor for more than four decades. Although he never received a Ph.D., he joined the Harvard faculty in 1946 and was elevated to full professor in 1954. He gave up his Harvard post to remain in the Kennedy White House; after publishing *A Thousand Days*, he was named Albert Schweitzer professor of humanities at the City University of New York Graduate Center, where he taught until retiring in 1995. His longtime Graduate Center colleague, Jack Diggins, remembered Schlesinger as "both approachable and amiable" toward students, "willing to hear all points of view, convinced that history is 'an argument without end' and convinced that argument itself should be enjoyed as serious intellectual adventure."

In an essay published in the *American Historical Review*, Brinkley perceptively summarized "the multiple commitments" that shaped Schlesinger's life – "a belief in the value of history, a belief in its power to shape ideas and events, and a belief in his obligation to use his knowledge of the past to affect the present."

-- Robert David Johnson



SHAFR Council Meeting

Thursday, June 21, 2007

8:00-11:00 am

Franklin Room, Westfields Marriott

Chantilly, Virginia



Present: Kristin Ahlberg, David Anderson, Frank Costigliola, Craig Daigle, Peter Hahn, David Herschler, Richard Immerman (presiding), Mark Lawrence, Mitch Lerner, Doug Little, Fred Logevall, Robert McMahon, Anna Nelson, Meredith Oyen, Linda Qaimmaqami, Stephen Rabe, Chapin Rydingsward, Robert Schulzinger, Mark Stoler, Jeremi Suri, Sara Wilson, Thomas Zeiler

Business Items

1. Recap of motions passed by electronic ballots

Immerman reported for the record that since its last meeting Council had approved via e-mail the following motions:

- 1) Resolution recommending restoration of funding to National Archives to facilitate mandated reviews of State, CIA, DOD, and FBI records.
- 2) Resolutions reforming the criteria for works selected to receive the Link-Kuehl Prize
- 3) Increase in annual allocation to National Coalition for History from \$5,000 to \$6,000 for a period of three years.
- 4) Increase in annual allocation to *Diplomatic History* editorial office from \$14,500 to \$40,000.
- 5) Approval of Iraq book drive.

2. Vote on Report of Steering Committee

Immerman reported that the Steering Committee had been charged with conceptualizing programs and plans for expending anticipated new revenues in pursuit of SHAFR's academic and intellectual objectives. The Steering Committee recommended the following proposals:

- 1) The SHAFR Summer Institute
- 2) Dissertation Completion Fellowships
- 3) Distinguished Lecture Series
- 4) Travel for Council members
- 5) Increases to existing graduate student research fellowships
- 6) Lesson Plans
- 7) Webmaster

Discussion ensued. Logevall asked for clarification regarding the length of commitment of each proposal. Immerman stated that the assumption of the committee was that each proposal would last as long as the current contract. Hahn pointed out that committees would need to be appointed for each program.

Suri supported all of the proposals but expressed concern that the initiatives would result in Council members receiving a significant amount of money. Suri recommended the establishment of a parallel summer institute for graduate students. He also asserted that having a graduate student institute was more important than Council members' travel and the distinguished lecture series. Immerman noted that the SHAFR committee meets twice a year and that often home institutions only pay for one trip. Nelson stated that her institution provides travel funds only if the faculty member is presenting a paper. McMahon explained that subsidizing Council travel is meant to benefit the organization as a whole. He noted that when Council members miss meetings, financial burdens are often cited. He also pointed out that priority would be given to members who lack travel funds from their home institutions. Logevall stated that Council travel fund would be unlikely to upset rank and file SHAFR members. He also emphasized that travel subsidies for Council members was less important than a summer institute for graduate students.

Immerman explained that departments without diplomatic historians would be ideal hosts for the distinguished lecture series, potentially raising interest in the subfield. Logevall raised the possibility of following the OAH in not paying the distinguished lecturer. Stoler supported the distinguished lecturer program. He stressed that it would serve as a good advertisement for the discipline and strengthen the field's reputation and visibility. He also urged that the travel expenses of the lecturer be reimbursed.

Hahn and McMahon distributed a prospectus for the 2008 summer institute program. Hahn explained that the Steering Committee recommended Ohio State as the inaugural site to link the institute to the 2008 annual conference in Columbus. This linkage was made in hopes of promoting interest and attendance.

Stoler supported the initiative but asked for clarification with regard to the career stage of the 10-12 participants. Hahn

answered that most were expected to be assistant and associate professors from non-research institutions thus giving institutional support to scholars who may feel isolated from the larger diplomatic history community. The group might include non-specialists who wish to learn our field. McMahon emphasized that applicants would be required to explain how they would benefit from the summer program and that selections would be made accordingly. Stoler presented the West Point military history seminar as a potential model for the summer institute program.

Hahn explained that it would be possible to alternate between a faculty and graduate student summer institute every other year. He also expressed confidence that all of the current initiatives could be approved and that a graduate student summer institute could be introduced the following year as an additional and financially-viable initiative.

Lerner supported the graduate student summer institute and identified a similar program at Johns Hopkins as a potential model. Lerner also suggested that the SHAFR teaching committee should be involved with the teaching initiative. Logevall suggested that instead of having one faculty institute and one graduate student institute SHAFR could sponsor one large program including faculty and students.

Logevall directed discussion to the question of whether a mix of graduate students and faculty would be more beneficial than two segregated programs. Lerner stated that graduate students are often the most productive. Suri pointed out the benefits of small groups. Suri favored having two separate summer programs with the possibility of future integration and stated that he would be happy to run a graduate student institute in 2009 but that he would also be willing to defer.

Immerman asked Hahn and McMahon for their opinions regarding the composition of the 2008 summer institute program. Hahn stated that it might be helpful to welcome both faculty and graduate students applicants to insure an adequate number of applications. Hahn emphasized that an open application during the first year would also give the directors more options when making final decisions regarding the internal composition of the program. The directors would have full discretion over how to organize the program. It was suggested that they start advertising for faculty only and later solicit grad students if applications remained low in number. The first year would be a trial run and the results would be reported to Council for evaluation. Rabe supported the alternating model and thus the creation of a second summer institute in 2009. Immerman emphasized that funding increases could be made in future years.

Based on discussion, Immerman proposed the following amendments to the package.

- 1) Summer institute program: SHAFR will add an additional \$5,000 for administrative costs.
- 2) Distinguished lecture series: SHAFR will provide up to \$5,000 for travel expenses to be shared by host institutions. No stipends will be paid.
- 3) Travel for members will be offered only to those lacking sufficient travel funds from their home institutions.
- 4) Fellowships: total cost should read \$9,250.

Nelson moved to approve package as amended. Council approved the motion unanimously.

3. Motion to establish a Membership Committee and a Committee on Research and Access to Historical Diplomatic Documentation

Immerman moved that SHAFR establish a Membership Committee and a Committee on Research and Access to Historical Diplomatic Documentation. He said that these ideas emerged from discussions in the Steering Committee (noting that they exceeded the Steering Committee's mandate).

As a Steering Committee member, Herschler favored membership committee aimed at institutionalizing membership recruitment. He explained that such a committee would relieve Council from micromanaging the business of the organization relating directly to member concerns. The committee would also seek to enhance the availability of *Diplomatic History* and *Passport* by encouraging institutional subscriptions.

Herschler also recommended the establishment of a committee on research and access to diplomatic documentation. He stated that the continued issue of classification, increased use of electronic records systems, and the growing complexity of access issues make it imperative that SHAFR have an organizational voice in these matters.

Stoler explained that these proposals if passed would be reestablishing previous committees that had ceased to function. Immerman suggested that ex-committee members be contacted in order to determine why the previous committees dissolved. He also clarified that both committees would be composed of three members. One might be international (non-US) and one might be the SHAFR representative to the State Department committee on declassification. The motions passed unanimously.

4. Membership rates

Immerman explained that SHAFR will keep the membership dues as they are now.

Regular dues were raised 25 percent from \$40 to \$50 two years ago. In 2009, SHAFR will consider a new dues structure. It was recalled that in 2005, student dues were not increased.

5. Closure of Los Alamos Lab to historical researchers

Immerman reported on the privatization of Los Alamos National Laboratory and the related declassification controversy. Immerman stated that although officials have claimed that the Lab has not changed its declassification policy significant changes have been made. Prior to privatization, materials were available to researchers if they were unclassified whereas now any document not marked "Approved for Public Release" must be obtained through a FIOA request.

6. Honorable mention for FRUS series

Immerman moved to give special recognition to the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. Council passed the motion unanimously.

Reports

7. 2007 annual meeting

Rabe reported that the committee was proud of the 2007 program. A large number of high quality proposals were received this year and twenty-five percent of the participants were from abroad. Rabe expressed disappointment with the high number of withdrawals. Immerman recommended that wording could be put into future calls for papers to discourage withdrawals. Logevall suggested that the acceptance letters also have stronger language to discourage withdrawals. Little thanked Sara Wilson for her work as conference coordinator. He also explained that a large proportion of single paper proposals were rejected due to the high number of panel proposals. Wilson reported that the Westfields Marriott was great to work with and that registration was approximately 370, slightly higher than last year. Immerman proposed a motion to thank the Program Committee (Doug Little and Steve Rabe, co-chairs; Clea Bunch, David Engerman, and Katherine Sibley). Council approved the motion unanimously.

8. Ad Hoc Committee to Consider Changes to the Annual Meeting

Costigliola reported that ACCCAM is composed of David Anderson, William Stueck, Thomas Schwartz, Chris Jesperson, and himself. Costigliola explained the need to prioritize SHAFR's desire to minimize conference costs, to hold the conference in Washington DC every other year, and to accommodate non-American scholars who tend to have other obligations during the summer months. If SHAFR is moving toward an international framework, he pointed out that Council may want to consider holding the conference in the fall or spring semester. Stoler and Rabe highlighted the linkage between many critical issues such as timing, location, and accommodations. Stoler explained that holding the conference in the fall or spring would eliminate the dorm option and expressed his favor for holding the conference in June. Rabe pointed out that if the conference is not held in the summer, the desirability of Washington DC will decrease because most scholars plan research trips during the summer months. Schulzinger referenced complaints about the Westfields high cost, but strongly emphasized the high degree of convenience inherent in a one-site conference venue. For many people the convenience of a one-site venue is worth the extra money. Schulzinger also stressed that multiple site venues present considerable problems especially for those with access issues and urged that Council remain open to holding future conferences at the Westfields. Logevall reported that the committee sought to obtain a venue on the Metro but that such sites prove markedly more expensive. Anderson reported that University venues in DC are also very costly and that universities tend to avoid early commitments. Suri emphasized that the annual conference is SHAFR's keynote event and thus should be discussed in terms of outreach. He urged that the DC conferences be held on a Metro line even if it would require subsidizing the higher cost. He agreed that a self-contained venue is ideal but that being able to access the city is also important.

Logevall proposed a motion encouraging Immerman to book the 2009 conference in the DC area at a venue on a Metro line and with accommodations similar to the Westfields, it being understood that SHAFR may need to subsidize the higher cost. The Westfields would also work if no other suitable site were found. Council approved the motion unanimously.

9. 2008 annual meeting

Hahn reported that the 2008 SHAFR conference will be held in Columbus, Ohio from June 26 to 28. The Blackwell Inn will host the conference and dorm space will be available. Hahn noted that concentrating the entire conference at the Blackwell would limit the amount of space for book exhibits and curtail slightly the number of sessions. The second option is to move some or all of the panels and the exhibitors' space to a nearby classroom building. This second option would save considerable expense but also force attendees to walk to other buildings. Suri move to concentrate the conference at the Blackwell Inn while leaving open the possibility of obtaining classroom space if the number of panels makes overflow space necessary. Members indicated a strong consensus for this proposal.

10. Endowment

On behalf of Endowment Liaison Jim Matray, Hahn reported that the endowment experienced a rate of growth of approximately 5.7 percent in January-May 2007 and that the actual increase, when factoring in a \$35,000 withdrawal needed to cover Bemis fellowships this spring, was 2.8 percent.

11. Diplomatic History

Schulzinger stated that a 20-page annual report has been prepared and will be submitted to Council members in the near future. He discussed the recently published 40th anniversary edition and highlighted the new cover design. A special issue on the environment edited by Kurk Dorsey is one of several topical issues anticipated for the near future. Other special issues will include one on biography edited by Frank Costigliola and one on the end of the Cold War.

Immerman reported that back issues of *Diplomatic History* are online as negotiated in the Blackwell contract. Electronic issues must be accessed through the membership services link on shafr.org.

12. SHAFR Guide

Zeiler reported that the electronic version of the *Guide* will be ready in August and encouraged members to promote the *Guide* to their home institutions. He also assured Council that ABC-Clio will be promoting sales of the *Guide*.

13. Passport

Lerner reported that *Passport* had a fine year and that in 2006 it experienced higher revenues than costs. He noted that the Mershon Center at Ohio State had renewed its grant for next year but cautioned that this source of funding is not guaranteed in future years. Beginning in January 2008, the printing and mailing of *Passport* will be transferred from Ohio State to Blackwell. Lerner also reported that EBSCO had contacted *Passport* and expressed interest in publishing the newsletter electronically. Hahn asked if anyone would object to him negotiating a contract. He emphasized that any contract with EBSCO would be a non-exclusive agreement. Council unanimously supported Hahn in any negotiations he seeks to pursue.

14. Unterberger Prize Committee

Qaimmaqami reported that Jennifer Heckard will be awarded the Unterberger Prize. She also noted that submissions were down from 14 to 8. The decrease might be related to the prize's biannual status and Qaimmaqami suggested that the prize be advertised in the off year to encourage submissions.

Other Business

15. Motion to pass resolution on action by British Association of University Teachers

Immerman moved that Council approve the following resolution:

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) considers the decision of Britain's National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) to boycott Israeli higher education institutions deplorable. SHAFR is committed to the free exchange of ideas among academics without regard to the policies of their respective governments. We reject proposals that curtail the freedom of teachers and researchers to engage in work with academic colleagues, and we reaffirm the paramount importance of the freest possible international movement of scholars and ideas. SHAFR urges the NATFHE to reverse its position in the interest of academic freedom.

Immerman noted that Council passed a similar resolution in June 2005—one that approved the suspension of a boycott proposed by another British group. He composed the current resolution on the basis of the 2005 text. He further noted that Mel Leffler and Arnold Offner encouraged Council to pass the resolution. Council approved the resolution unanimously.

16. Resolution acknowledging Local Arrangements Committee.

Immerman moved that Council acknowledge and thank the 2007 Local Arrangements Committee (David Painter, Chair; Kristin Ahlberg, Hope Harrison; Sara Wilson, Conference Consultant). The resolution was approved unanimously.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn

Executive Director

PLH/cr



The Diplomatic Pouch

1. Personal and Professional Notes

Roger Dingman has retired from the University of Southern California after 36 years.

KC Johnson (Brooklyn College) has accepted a Fulbright Distinguished Chair in the Humanities at Tel Aviv University for the academic year 2007-08.

Kenneth Osgood (Florida Atlantic) has won the 2006 Herbert Hoover Book Award for *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (University Press of Kansas).

Robert Robinson was named Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Ohio University for the 2007-2008 academic year.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) received the Best Recall Article Award for 2006 from *Joint Forces Quarterly* for "The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet." He also received a Silver Pen Award from the Command and General Staff College for his article "President of the Historians: Theodore Roosevelt and the American Historical Association," published in *White House Studies* (Vol. 6, No.1, 2006).

Frank Schumacher (University of Erfurt) has accepted the position of Associate Professor of History at the University of Western Ontario.

James Siekmeier (State Department) has become Assistant Professor of History at West Virginia University.

Jeremi Suri (Wisconsin) has been promoted to Professor of History.

Dustin Walcher has accepted the position of Lecturer at the University of Dayton.




2. Research Notes

CWIHP Working Paper #55

The Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) has released CWIHP Working Paper No. 55, "Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal," by Guy Laron. Drawing on newly declassified Soviet and Czech archival material, Laron examines the origins of the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Ever since its announcement by the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, there has been a debate over both the reasons for Nasser's decision and the exact date he started negotiations for an arms deal with the Soviet Union. While Nasser claimed that the negotiations did not start until after the Israeli raid on Gaza in 27 February 1955, Israeli scholars have argued that Soviet-Egyptian negotiations began two years prior and were concluded two weeks before the Israeli raid. Soviet and Czech documents not only corroborate the Egyptian version of events but also widen the scope of discussion: they reveal that after the end of World War II, Egyptian governments had continually attempted to reach an arms deal with a major foreign power. In the early 1950s, as the West refused to sell weapons to Egypt, Nasser tried to appeal to the Soviet bloc, yet was rebuffed by Stalin. However, the documents show that the rise of Khrushchev changed Soviet policy towards the Middle East, including a newfound willingness to sell arms to Egypt.

The working paper and documentary appendix can be downloaded at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/WP55_Web_Final.pdf or from <http://cwihip.org>.



The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev

The National Security Archive has published the second installment of the diary of one of the key behind-the-scenes figures of the Gorbachev era--Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This document has been published in English for the first time on the Archive's Web site. This installment covers the year 1986, when the author became Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser. The diary reflects the admiration Chernyaev felt for Gorbachev and the spectacular plans for change, both internally and in foreign policy, which he brought with him. Chernyaev initially compared Gorbachev to Lenin, but also noted how ideology was losing its weight in the style and substance of real policy under the new General Secretary. 1986 was also a year of a most significant breakthrough in foreign policy when, on January 15, Gorbachev issued his Program for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons by the year 2000. It was also the year of Reykjavik, where Gorbachev and Reagan came close to agreeing to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

To read the diary, visit the Archive's Web site at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>. For more information contact Svetlana Savranskaya at 202-994-7000.

Documents Implicate Colombian Government In Chiquita Terror Scandal

New documents published by the National Security Archive shed light on revelations about the links between bananas and terror in Colombia and the Colombian government's own ties to the country's illegal paramilitary forces.

Recently, Chiquita, the international fruit corporation, admitted to funding a Colombian terrorist group and agreed to pay a \$25 million fine. The Justice Department indictment, filed March 13 in D.C. Federal Court, states that Chiquita gave more than \$1.7 million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC), an illegal right-wing anti-guerrilla group tied to many of the country's most notorious civilian massacres. The payments were made over seven years from 1997-2004. At least \$825,000 in payments came after the AUC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department in 2001.

Key documents from the Chiquita case, along with a collection of newly-available declassified documents, are posted on the Archive's Web site at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>.

For more information contact Michael Evans at 202-994-7029.



U.S. Opposed Taiwanese Bomb during 1970's

The unfolding controversies over the Iranian and Korean nuclear programs show the extreme difficulty of persuading a government to reverse its nuclear weapons program. Newly declassified documents on U.S.-Taiwan relations during the late 1970s, published for the first time by the National Security Archive, shed new light on the challenges of counter-proliferation diplomacy. Even a dependent ally such as Taiwan tried hard to resist U.S. pressures to abandon suspect nuclear activities and kept Washington guessing whether it had really done so.

To ensure that the Taiwanese actually shut down what appeared to be R&D for a nuclear capability, the Ford and Carter administrations continuously exerted pressure on Taiwanese leaders to stop scientists and the military from engaging in research with weapons implications. For three years in a row (1976-1978) the U.S. government secretly confronted Taipei over secret activities such as uranium enrichment work and attempts to purchase reprocessing technology that suggested an ambition to develop a weapons capability.

The declassified documents highlight three episodes:

* The summer of 1976 when U.S. concerns about Taiwanese interest in nuclear reprocessing triggered a U.S. demarche (protest) and a declaration by Taipei authorities that the regime would "henceforth not engage in any activities relating to reprocessing."

* From January through April 1977 when a nuclear inspection team and IAEA inspector detected suspicious activities at the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) that raised questions about the direction of Taiwanese nuclear research. This led the State Department to demand far-reaching changes, especially the "reorientation" of the research so that it was more relevant to producing power than weapons. In April, Premier Chiang acquiesced in a U.S. note demanding such changes.

* From August through September 1978 when a U.S. nuclear team monitoring the INER picked up worrisome signs that Taiwan had a secret uranium enrichment program. This led to a new demarche and a more authoritative statement by Chiang that his government "has no intention whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons or a nuclear device."

With the publication of these documents, the National Security Archive launches "The Nuclear Vault," a special section of the Archive's Web site devoted to documentation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy issues, largely during the Cold War. With bibliographies, photo galleries, links, new documents, and other features to be unveiled during the coming months, the Archive hopes to create a source that researchers, students, and interested citizens can turn to for information on one of the most critical issues of our day.

For more information contact William Burr at 202-994-7000.

<http://www.nsarchive.org/nukevault>.



The CIA's "Family Jewels" Released

The Central Intelligence Agency violated its charter for 25 years until revelations of illegal wiretapping, domestic surveillance, assassination plots, and human experimentation led to official investigations and reforms in the 1970s, according to declassified documents posted on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

The Agency has now declassified the full 693-page file amassed on CIA's illegal activities by order of then-CIA director James Schlesinger in 1973--the so-called "family jewels." Only a few dozen heavily-censored pages of this file have previously been declassified, although multiple Freedom of Information Act requests for the documents have been filed over the years. The entire report can be downloaded from the National Security Archive Web site at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>.

DCI Michael Hayden also announced the declassification of some 11,000 pages of the so-called CAESAR, POLO, and

ESAU papers--hard-target analyses of Soviet and Chinese leadership internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations from 1953-1973, a collection of intelligence on Warsaw Pact military programs, and hundreds of pages on the A-12 spy plane.

For more information contact Thomas Blanton at 202-994-7000, or visit the website at <http://www.nsarchive.org>.



Library of Congress Online Collection of Foreign Affairs Interviews

A new online collection of interviews with some of the most prominent diplomats of the 20th century is now available from the Library of Congress's American Memory Web site: <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/index.html>.

"Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training" <<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/>> presents a window into the lives of American diplomats. Transcripts of interviews with U.S. diplomatic personnel capture their experiences, motivations, critiques, personal analyses and private thoughts. These elements are crucial to understanding the full story of the creation of a structure of stable relationships that maintained world peace and protected U.S. interests and values.

Most of the interviews in the collection come from foreign service officers, but there are also some with political appointees and other officials. While some 1920s-, 1930s-, and World War II-era diplomacy is covered, most of the interviews involve post-World War II diplomacy, from the late 1940s to the 1990s.

This collection captures the post-World War II period in vivid terms and intimate detail, documenting the way U.S. diplomacy defended the United States and its interests in a challenging world. The narratives span the major diplomatic crises and issues that faced the United States during the second half of the 20th century and, as new interviews are added, will include developments in the 21st century. The 1,301 transcripts of oral history interviews were donated by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, a private, nonprofit organization. The collection includes extensive personal recollections from luminaries of American 20th century diplomatic history, including Alfred "Roy" Atherton (ambassador to Egypt), Zbigniew Brzezinski (national security adviser under President Carter), Frank Carlucci (ambassador to Portugal under Presidents Nixon and Ford; secretary of defense under President Reagan), Julia Child (spouse of foreign service officer Paul Cushing Child), Lawrence Eagleburger (secretary of state under President George H.W. Bush), Averell Harriman (ambassador to the Soviet Union and England under President Franklin Roosevelt), Jeane Kirkpatrick (ambassador to the United Nations), Winston Lord (played a critical role in opening relations with China under President Nixon), Clare Boothe Luce (ambassador to Italy under President Eisenhower), Douglas MacArthur II (nephew of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and ambassador to Japan, Belgium, Austria and Iran), Charles H. Percy (senator from Illinois), Rozanne Ridgway (ambassador to Finland and East Germany), Dean Rusk (secretary of state under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson), John S. Service (foreign service officer specializing in China before World War II), Cyrus Vance (secretary of state under President Carter) and Marion Post Wolcott (photographer, married to USAID official Lee Wolcott).

For further information please contact the Library's Manuscript Division at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/askalib/ask-mss2.html>.



Library of Congress Acquires Caspar Weinberger Papers

The Library of Congress has formally accepted a donation of the papers of former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The papers shed light on the policies of the Nixon, Ford and Reagan presidential administrations in which he served as secretary of health, education, and welfare (1973-1975) and secretary of defense (1981-1987). He also served as director of the Office of Management and Budget (1972-1973). Sections of the Weinberger Papers were subpoenaed by the special prosecutor during the Iran-Contra investigation.

Under a 1987 deposit agreement, the Weinberger Papers began arriving at the Library in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a final segment arriving in 2005. Ownership and control over access to the papers was retained by Caspar Weinberger during his lifetime. In November 2006, eight months after Weinberger's death on March 28, 2006, his wife gave the papers to the Library under an instrument of gift. Under this agreement, Mrs. Weinberger and her son and daughter control access to the papers during their lifetime, and requests from scholars to gain access to the papers are evaluated by the family upon request.



3. Announcements:

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Fellowships 2008-2009

The Woodrow Wilson Center awards approximately 20-25 residential fellowships annually in an international competition. Successful fellowship applicants submit outstanding proposals in a broad range of the social sciences and humanities on national and/or international issues. Topics and scholarship should relate to key public policy challenges or provide the historical and/or cultural framework to illuminate policy issues of contemporary importance. Fellows should be prepared to interact with policymakers in Washington and with Wilson Center staff who are working on similar topics.

Applications from any country are welcome. Men and women with outstanding capabilities and experience from a wide variety of backgrounds are eligible for appointment. For academic participants, eligibility is limited to the postdoctoral level. Academic candidates must demonstrate their scholarly development by publications beyond the Ph.D. dissertation. For other applicants, an equivalent level of professional achievement is expected. Applicants should have a very good command of spoken English, since the Center is designed to encourage the exchange of ideas among its Fellows.

In general, the Center tries to ensure that the stipend provided under the fellowship, together with the Fellow's other sources of funding (e.g., grants secured by the applicant and sabbatical allowances), approximate a Fellow's regular salary. Fellows are provided private offices, Windows-based computers, and research assistants. Professional librarians provide access to the Library of Congress, university and special libraries in the area, and other research facilities. The Center holds one round of competitive selection per year. Fellowship applications must be postmarked by October 1. Applicants are notified of the results of the selection process by March of the following year.

Woodrow Wilson Center
Scholar Selection and Services Office
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027
fellowships@wilsoncenter.org
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/fellowships>



Abe Fellowship Program

The Abe Fellowship is designed to encourage international multidisciplinary research on topics of pressing global concern. The program seeks to foster the development of a new generation of researchers who are interested in policy-relevant topics of long-range importance and who are willing to become key members of a bilateral and global research network built around such topics. Applications are welcome from scholars and non-academic research professionals. This competition is open to citizens of the United States and Japan as well as to nationals of other countries who can demonstrate strong and serious long-term affiliations with research communities in Japan or the United States. Applicants must hold a Ph.D. or the terminal degree in their field, or have attained an equivalent level of professional experience. Applications from researchers in professions other than academia are encouraged.

The deadline for submission of applications is September 1, 2007, 5:00 PM (EST). Applications must be submitted on-line at <http://soap.ssrc.org>.

For further information, please visit our website at <http://fellowships.ssrc.org/abe> or contact the program directly at abe@ssrc.org.

Abe Fellowship Program
Social Science Research Council
810 7th Avenue, 31st Floor
New York, NY 10019
Phone: (212) 377-2700 x423
Fax: (212) 377-2727



Institute for Advanced Study, School of Historical Studies, Princeton

The Institute is an independent private institution founded in 1930 to create a community of scholars focused on intellectual inquiry, without the obligations and distractions associated with the teaching of undergraduates. The history of modern international relations is among the School's principal interests, but the program is open to all fields of historical research. Scholars from around the world come to the Institute to pursue their own research. Those chosen are offered membership for a set period and a stipend. The Institute provides access to extensive resources including offices, libraries, subsidized restaurant and housing facilities, and some secretarial services. Candidates of any nationality may apply for a single term or a full academic year. Residence in Princeton during term time is required. The only other obligation of Members is to pursue their own research. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications are required. Information and application forms may be found on the School's web site, www.hs.ias.edu, or contact the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Dr., Princeton, N.J. 08540 (E-mail address: mzelazny@ias.edu). The deadline is November 15, 2007.

Marian Zelazny
Administrative Officer
School of Historical Studies
Institute for Advanced Study
Einstein Drive
Princeton, NJ 08540
Phone: (609) 734-8300
mzelazny@ias.edu

Radcliffe Institute Fellowships Available

The Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University awards approximately 45 fully funded fellowships each year. Radcliffe Institute fellowships are designed to support scholars, scientists, artists and writers of exceptional promise and demonstrated accomplishment, who wish to pursue work in academic and professional fields and in the creative arts. Applicants must have received their doctorate or appropriate terminal degree by December 2006 in the area of the proposed project. Radcliffe welcomes proposals from small groups of scholars who have research interests or projects in common. Please check the Web site for more information.

The stipend amount is \$70,000. Fellows receive office space and access to libraries and other resources of Harvard University. During the fellowship year, which extends from early September 2008 through June 30, 2009, residence in the Boston area is required as is participation in the Institute community. Fellows are expected to present their work-in-progress and to attend other fellows' events.

Radcliffe Institute Fellowship Program
Application Office
34 Concord Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone: (617) 496-1324
Fax: (617) 495-8136
fellowships@radcliffe.edu



Fellowships at the National Humanities Center, Durham NC

The National Humanities Center offers 40 residential fellowships for advanced study in the humanities during the academic year, September 2008 through May 2009. Applicants must hold doctorate or equivalent scholarly credentials. Young scholars as well as senior scholars are encouraged to apply, but they must have a record of publication, and recent Ph.D.s should be aware that the Center does not support the revision of a doctoral dissertation. In addition to scholars from all fields of the humanities, the Center accepts individuals from the natural and social sciences, the arts, the professions, and public life who are engaged in humanistic projects. The Center is also international and gladly accepts applications from scholars outside the United States.

Most of the Center's fellowships are unrestricted. Several, however, are designated for particular areas of research. These include environmental studies and history; English literature; art history or visual culture; French history, literature, or culture; Asian Studies; and theology. Fellowships up to \$60,000 are individually determined, the amount depending upon the needs of the Fellow and the Center's ability to meet them. The Center provides travel expenses for Fellows and their dependents to and from North Carolina. Located in the Research Triangle Park of North Carolina, near Chapel Hill, Durham, and Raleigh, the Center provides an environment for individual research and the exchange of ideas. Its building includes private studies for Fellows, conference rooms, a central commons for dining, lounges, reading areas, a reference library, and a Fellows' workroom. The Center's noted library service delivers books and research materials to Fellows, and support for information technology and editorial assistance are also provided. The Center locates housing for Fellows in the neighboring communities.

Applicants must submit the Center's form, supported by a curriculum vitae, a 1,000-word project proposal, and three letters of recommendation. You may request application material from Fellowship Program, National Humanities Center, Post Office Box 12256, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709-2256, or obtain the form and instructions from the Center's website, <http://www.nhc.rtp.nc.us>. Applications and letters of recommendation must be postmarked by October 15, 2007.

Fellowship Program
National Humanities Center
P.O. Box 12256
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
Phone: (919) 549-0661
nhc@ga.unc.edu



Visiting Scholars Program at the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma

The Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma seeks applicants for its Visiting Scholars Program, which provides financial assistance to researchers working at the Center's archives. Awards of \$500-\$1000 are normally granted as reimbursement for travel and lodging. The Center's holdings include the papers of many former members of Congress, such as Robert S. Kerr, Fred Harris, and Speaker Carl Albert of Oklahoma; Helen Gahagan Douglas and Jeffery Cohelan of California; Sidney Clarke of Kansas; and Neil Gallagher of New Jersey. Besides the history of Congress, congressional leadership, national and Oklahoma politics, and election campaigns, the collections also document government policy affecting agriculture, Native Americans, energy, foreign affairs, the environment, the economy, and other areas. The Center's collections are described on the World Wide Web at <http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/archives/> and in *A Guide to the Carl Albert Center Congressional Archives* (Norman, Okla.: The Carl Albert Center, 1995) by Judy Day, et al., available at many U. S. academic libraries.

The Visiting Scholars Program is open to any applicant. Emphasis is given to those pursuing postdoctoral research in history, political science, and other fields. Graduate students involved in research for publication, thesis, or dissertation are encouraged to apply. Interested undergraduates and lay researchers are also invited to apply. No standardized form

is needed for application. Instead, a series of documents should be sent to the Center, including: (1) a description of the research proposal in fewer than 1000 words; (2) a personal vita; (3) an explanation of how the Center's resources will assist the researcher; (4) a budget proposal; and (5) a letter of reference from an established scholar in the discipline attesting to the significance of the research. Applications are accepted at any time.

For more information, please contact:

Carolyn Hanneman
Carl Albert Center
630 Parrington Oval, Room 101
Norman, OK 73019
Phone: (405) 325-5835
Fax: (405) 325-6419
channeman@ou.edu
<http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/archives/>



CFP: Overcoming the Iron Curtain: Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945-89

June 12-14, 2008, Paris, France

The end of the Cold War and, in particular, the events of 1989-1991—from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the disintegration of the USSR—have been at the forefront of historical research for the past fifteen years, and are likely to continue to be the main focus of the historiography of the Cold War in the future. Among the reasons that explain the infatuation aroused by this period, the unpredictability of the events in question ranks high. There is indeed a consensus among historians that the unfolding of these events had hardly been foreseen by contemporaries, including key political actors who were mostly taken by surprise by the rapidity as well as the pacific character of the “revolutions” of 1989 and their sequel.

And yet the end of the Cold War had been a constant and recurrent theme throughout the Cold War itself. Ever since its inception, statesmen, diplomats, politicians, academics, and others reflected about ways of ending the East-West conflict and its consequences. To be sure, as the Cold War settled in, the East-West status quo increasingly came to be seen by most contemporaries as long lasting. Yet the situation was, arguably, never considered as irreversible in the long term: even at times when the established order appeared to have become all but perennial, the need to overcome it and the way to do so were more or less openly discussed. It is surprising, therefore, that recent historiography has not systematically sought to explore and investigate the visions of the end of the Cold War before the end of the Cold War, as we intend to do.

The objective of the conference is therefore to bring to the fore the reflections, programmes and strategies which, throughout the period, have aimed at calling into question the bipolar system and at replacing it by alternative logics, approaches or concepts. These visions may be associated with individuals, whatever their role or function (say, a Kennan, a de Gaulle, a Brandt, a Reagan or a Gorbachev); of organized groups (e.g. political parties like the French RPF in the late 1940's, or the German SPD and Eurocommunists in the 1970's); or of civil society (as witnessed for example by the posture of Soviet or East European dissidents in the 1980's). Alternatively, they may have been connected with certain processes (the European integration process, the CSCE) or certain events (e.g. the Euromissile crisis and the peace movement). Depending on the period and context, they may have constituted actual, thoroughly conceived programmes, more blurred, utopian aspirations aiming at the reconciliation between the two halves of divided Europe, or even simply the belief that the Cold War had already, in effect, come to an end (for instance after Stalin's death or at the height of détente).

We invite papers dealing with all aspects of the foregoing problematic over the whole period, and, in particular, focusing on visions of the end of the Cold War **expressed by prominent individuals (statesmen, politicians, diplomats etc.)**, by governments, or organizations, including political parties or emanating from the civil society (e.g. dissidents, intellectuals or religious groups). We would also welcome contributions covering visions of the end of the Cold War conveyed by specific processes (e.g. the EEC or the CSCE) or expressed at particular junctures, whether moments of crisis or times of détente. Finally, we would encourage more “methodological” submissions contributing to the elucidation of the subject in more general ways, whether in historic terms (e.g. reflections on the impact of visions of the end of the Cold War on its actual ending) or in theoretical terms (e.g. reflections on the notion of “anticipation” in international politics). The organizers would, of course, be happy to consider additional proposals that potential contributors believe would fit in the overall intellectual framework of the conference.

The deadline for proposals is September 15th, 2007. Proposals should include a title, a one page outline and a one page CV of the author with a list of major books and articles. Following the acceptance of the proposals (before the end of October), authors will receive editorial guidelines (e.g. format of the papers). In order for the papers to be available to conference participants beforehand, authors will be asked to submit their draft papers by June 1st, 2008.

The conference organizers intend to publish a selection of the papers as an edited volume. In order for the publication to proceed swiftly, the deadline for the submission of final drafts of the selected papers will be September 15th, 2008.

Proposals should be emailed or sent by regular mail to:

Prof. Marie-Pierre Rey
Université de Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne
Centre de recherches en histoire des Slaves
1 rue Victor Cousin
75005 Paris
France
Marie-Pierre.Rey@univ-paris1.fr



CFP: Peace Movements in the Cold War and Beyond: An International Conference

January 31-February 2, 2008, London, England

The Cold War Studies Centre (CWSC) of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), in association with the Centre for the Study of Global Governance of the LSE, and Free University of Amsterdam are pleased to announce their upcoming conference, "Peace Movements in the Cold War and Beyond", to be held on January 31 - February 2, 2008 at the LSE.

We welcome paper proposals from scholars as well as journalists and other specialists related to any discipline and working on projects involving research on peace movements, nuclear disarmament, and anti-nuclear movements during the Cold War and after. We also welcome papers from graduate students. Applicants will be considered to present their work on one of the following themes, although we will accept papers addressing other topics as well:

- Early Anti-Nuclear Movements, 1945-1960
- European Peace Movements in the 1980s
- The Vietnam anti-war Movement and its legacy in the 1970s
- The Impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the anti-nuclear movement
- The Church and Peace Movements
- Post Cold War Peace Movements (e.g. Iraq)
- Peace Movements and the German Question
- Peace Movements and Humanitarian Intervention
- The East-West Dialogue
- Women's Peace Movement
- Concepts of Peace
- The Role of Peace Research
- Peace Movements and Conscientious Objection

The Conference will host a series of panel and plenary sessions featuring these topics. Sessions will be chaired by prominent academics and scholars specializing in the field. Plenary sessions will also include notable public and political figures who can authoritatively discuss their experiences and the historical significance of peace movements during the Cold War and after.

Applicants must submit proposals no later than 1 September 2007 and decisions will be announced by 1 October 2007. Successful applicants will be invited to present their work during the Conference. Accommodation during the Conference will be provided by organisers. Only limited funding may be available for those whose academic institutions are unable to support their travel expenses.

For further information please see the following website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/peace_conference/Default.htm

Contact: Sabine Selchow and Andrea Mason, London School of Economics peaceconference2008@lse.ac.uk



CFP: 2008 Policy History Conference

May 29-June 1, 2008, St. Louis, MO

The Institute for Political History and the *Journal of Policy History* are hosting a Conference on Policy History at the Sheraton Clayton Plaza in St. Louis from May 29 to June 1, 2008. All topics concerning the history, development and implementation of public policy, American political development, and comparative historical analysis will be considered. Complete sessions are encouraged, but individual paper proposals are welcome. The deadline for proposals is December 3, 2007.

Proposals should include one (1) copy of the following materials:

- Panel/Paper Description and Contact Information Page (template is available on our website at <http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph/conf2008.htm>)
- A one (1) page summary of each paper
- A one (1) page C.V. of each panelist

Please send materials to:

Policy History Conference
Journal of Policy History
Saint Louis University
3800 Lindell Blvd.
P. O. Box 56907
St. Louis, MO 63156-0907
policyhistoryconference@gmail.com

Incomplete proposals and e-mailed submissions will not be considered. For questions concerning conference content or program information, please contact Edward Berkowitz at ber@gwu.edu or Robert C. Lieberman at rcl15@columbia.edu. Please direct general e-mail inquiries to Matthew C. Sherman, the conference coordinator, at policyhistoryconference@gmail.com.



CFP: 2008 Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History

April 17-20, 2008, Ogden, UT

The Society for Military History is pleased to announce its call for papers for the 75th Annual Meeting, hosted by Weber State University at the Ogden Eccles Convention Center in Ogden, Utah, April 17-20, 2008. The conference theme is "The Military and Frontiers," highlighting the military's role relating to geographic, technological, political, social, and other frontiers. Panel proposals must include a panel title, contact information for all panelists, a brief description of the purpose and theme of the panel, abstracts of each of the three papers (one paragraph each), and brief CVs for all panelists, including commentator and panel chair.

Proposals for individual papers are welcome and should include a brief abstract, brief CV, and contact information. Deadline for proposals is November 1, 2007. While the theme of the conference will provide a basic guide to determining the final program, the Program Committee will gladly consider proposals on other facets and perspectives of military history. Proposals may be submitted electronically to Dr. Nikolas Gardner at Nikolas.Gardner@maxwell.af.mil or by regular mail to Dr. Nikolas Gardner, Chair, SMH 2008 Program Committee, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112. Information concerning registration and lodging for the 2008 meeting can be found at: <http://www.weber.edu/History/WhatsHappening/SMH2008.html>. Please contact Dr. Bill Allison at wallison@weber.edu or 801-626-6710 for more details.

Prof. Bill Allison
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Weber State University
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Fax: (801) 626-7613
wallison@weber.edu
<http://www.weber.edu/History/WhatsHappening/SMH2008.html>



CFP: Gender And The Long Postwar: Reconsiderations of the United States and the Two Germanys, 1945-1989

May 30-31, 2008, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C.

Historians have long understood that wars can serve as a catalyst for change. In his recent book *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, Tony Judt, for example, argues that "World War II created the conditions for a new Europe." The possibilities for change during this period were, we contend, especially apparent in terms of gender relations. In Europe, the immediate aftermath of the war brought with it the need to confront massive death and destruction, continuing privations, dislocations, and, for women, the risk of rape. But at the same time, peace offered the prospect of new opportunities. Both communism and liberal democracy held out the promise of equality for women and well being for them and their families. Yet the demands of rebuilding nations and restoring social order took immediate precedence. The tensions between the political and economic needs of nations, the promises of new social orders, women's ongoing struggle for recognition, autonomy, and equality, and men's efforts to recast masculinity in the wake of unprecedented violence—these constitute the major themes of this conference.

Judt's study implies that conditions for creating "the new" were greater in Europe than in the United States. Was this in fact the case? From the perspective of gender, we would argue, the war opened up possibilities for women and men on both sides of the Atlantic. But the extent to which those possibilities were realized varied considerably across societies. This conference will bring together a group of scholars to explore why this was so. Comparing gender developments in the United States and the two Germanys during "the long postwar" will allow us to examine these variations and, in particular, to see how gender developments intersected and were affected by the trajectories of market democratic and communist regimes as well as the impact of idiosyncratic cultural continuities. By extending the investigation to 1989, we will be able to trace both continuities and change over a long expanse of gender relations, sorting out the impact of the war itself from other factors that came into play during the period.

Panels will be organized around the following themes:

- War, Memory and the (Re)construction of Gender
- Migration, Immigration and Changing Gender and Sexual Identity
- Education, Employment, Consumerism: New Roles for Women
- Social Citizenship and the Gendering of Welfare States
- Politics, Protest and Civil Society
- New Sexualities
- Gender, Postwar, and German and U.S. Historiography

The conference will be held in English and will focus on the discussion of pre-circulated papers of about 7,000 to 8,000 words (due by April 15, 2008).

Please send a one-page proposal, short CV, and list of relevant publications by e-mail to Bärbel Thomas of the GHI at B.Thomas@ghi-dc.org by October 1, 2007.

The cost of travel and accommodations will be covered by the sponsors.

For further information, please contact:

Sonya Michel: smichel@umd.edu
Karen Hagemann: hagemann@unc.edu
Corinna Unger: unger@ghi-dc.org



CFP: The Atomic Age; 2008 Film & History Conference: "Film & Science: Fictions, Documentaries, and Beyond."
October 30-November 2, 2008, Chicago, Illinois

After the creation of the atom bomb and its use against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II, nuclear arms, energy, and science were the subject of countless films across a wide range of genres, from *Godzilla* and *Dr. Strangelove* to *The China Syndrome*, *The Day After* and *24*. How did the movies respond to the atomic age? How did they represent nuclear science and scientists? Did Atomic Age films exaggerate or dismiss the dangers of nuclear weapons and energy? How did social or political events concerning atomic energy make their way into film? And, in turn, how did such films affect national policy or civic character? These are just a few questions to be addressed in this area, which investigates the impact of the nuclear age (1945 to the present) on society as portrayed through film and television. Presentations can, for example, feature analyses of individual films and/or TV programs from historical perspectives, surveys of documents related to the production of films, or investigations of nuclear history and culture as explored through film.

Genres could include films attempting to define atomic history, Hollywood blockbusters, TV programs or mini-series, science-fiction, propaganda, instructional films, documentaries, docudramas, newsreels and broadcast media, war films, national cinemas, music videos, avant-garde films, actualities, and direct cinema.

Paper topics might include atomic war, national security and secrecy, atomic espionage, ethics and morals, reel representations of atomic science and scientists, peaceful applications of nuclear power, atomic fantasies, nuclear dystopia, civil defense, myths, nuclear terrorism, government and institutions, the anti-nuclear movement, nuclear accidents and near-disasters, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in memory and post-memory, health, safety, environment, gender, ethnicity, race, class, etc.

Please send your 200-word proposal by November 1, 2007 to:

Christoph Laucht
Chair of the Atomic Age Area
School of Cultures, Languages and Area Studies
University of Liverpool
Chatham Street
Liverpool
L69 7ZR
United Kingdom
Phone: ++44(0)151-794-2404
c.laucht@liv.ac.uk

For more information, please visit: <http://www.filmandhistory.org>



CFP: University of Victoria Military Oral History Conference: "Between Memory and History"
February 21-23 2008, Victoria, British Columbia

The History Department is pleased to invite proposals for the University of Victoria Military Oral History Conference to be held in Victoria, BC on February 21-23, 2008. The intention of the conference is to bring together senior undergraduate and graduate students, academics, and veterans, working in a variety of fields in military history, in order to foster discussion in a multi-disciplinary environment. Papers addressing all facets of military history that rely heavily upon oral history will be considered. This includes, but is not limited to, the writing of popular military history, official history, operational history, military families and the home front, First Nations, Military Medicine, records management and archival preservation. Proposals are welcome from all scholars, but senior undergraduate and graduate students are especially encouraged to submit. We also encourage submissions from community scholars, independent scholars, archivists and librarians working in the field.

We encourage a broad interpretation of the conference theme from a variety of fields and backgrounds. Panel submissions will be considered. Subsidies for students, to offset some of the costs associated with travel to the conference, are available.

Please submit proposals to Dr. Shawn Cafferky, Department of History, University of Victoria, P.O. Box 3045, Victoria, B.C. V8W 3P4 or shawncaf@uvic.ca

For more information, contact Dr. David Zimmerman (250) 721-7399, dzimmerm@uvic.ca, or Dr. Shawn Cafferky (250) 721-7287, shawncaf@uvic.ca



CFP: The International Social Science Review

The International Social Science Review, the peer-reviewed journal of Pi Gamma Mu Honor Society in Social Sciences published semi-annually, invites submissions of manuscripts in history, political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, international relations, criminal justice, social work, psychology, social philosophy, history of education, and human/cultural geography. Articles must be based on original research, well-written, and not exceed thirty pages in length (including endnotes, double-spaced, and written in Times New Roman 12 font). Endnotes and style must conform with Kate Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* (7th ed.) and *Chicago Manual of Style* (15th ed.), respectively. Authors interested in publishing in the journal are asked to submit a 100-150 word abstract of their manuscript, three hard copies of the manuscript (e-mail attachments will not be accepted), contact information (phone number, mailing address, e-mail address), and an abbreviated c.v. to:

Dean Fafoutis
Editor, *International Social Science Review*,
Department of History
Salisbury University
1101 Camden Avenue
Salisbury, MD 21801



4. Letters to the Editor

May 10, 2007

I really liked the essay on Charles Campbell in my April 2007 *Passport*. Whoever wrote it did justice to the man, especially his remarkable teaching ability. I think I was his final Ph.D student at Claremont. I started in Japanese studies, but after one of Mr. Campbell's seminars (he always said to call him Charlie but none of us ever did), I was hooked into diplomatic history. He was a terrific mentor. Having been in the foreign service, he was pleased when I joined myself. In our correspondence over nearly three decades, he followed my postings (and our growing family) with true interest. He was a wonderful person and made a huge impact on my life.

Thanks so much for such a fine piece.

Best regards,

Bill Morgan
Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo



5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually. The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the Ph.D. whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2008 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2008. Nominations should be sent to Joseph A. (Andy) Fry, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Wright Hall, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455020, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5020 (e-mail: joseph.fry@unlv.edu).



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible. All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by

any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. To nominate an article published in 2007, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Seth Jacobs, Boston College, Boston College, History Department, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3859 (e-mail: seth.jacobs@bc.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2008.



The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of \$4,000 is intended to help doctoral candidates defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The grant is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required. Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Applicants for the Bernath Dissertation Grant will also be considered for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

The deadline for applications for the 2008 grant is November 15, 2007. Application materials should be sent to Andrew L. Johns, Department of History, Brigham Young University, andrew_johns@byu.edu.



The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two calendar years. Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominations for the 2008 prize is December 1, 2007. Submit required materials to SHAFR Myrna Bernath Committee, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210 (e-mail shafra@osu.edu).



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students. The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted. The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominations for the 2008 prize is December 1, 2007. The deadline for nominating books published in 2007 is December 15, 2007. Submit books to Kenton J. Clymer, Northern Illinois University, Department of History, Zulauf 715, DeKalb, IL 60115 (e-mail: kclymer@niu.edu).



The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required. Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Applicants for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will also be considered for the Bernath Dissertation Grant. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

The deadline for applications for the 2008 grant is November 15, 2007. Application materials should be sent to Andrew L. Johns, Department of History, Brigham Young University, andrew_johns@byu.edu.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

- Al Madfai, Madiha Rashid. *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, Cambridge University Press, \$52.00.
- Alvah, Donna. *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965*, New York University Press, \$42.00.
- Art, Robert. *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics*, Routledge, \$90.00.
- Bacevich, Andrew J., ed. *The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II*, Columbia University Press, \$75.00.
- Barrett, Roby C. *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy*, I.B. Taurus, \$95.00.
- Behrendt, Sven. *The Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo: Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed*, Routledge, \$135.00.
- Bothwell, Robert. *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*, University of British Columbia Press, \$85.00.
- Caprio, Mark. *Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society*, Routledge, \$135.00.
- Clinton, W. David. *The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations*, Louisiana State University Press, \$40.00.
- Clymer, Kenton. *Troubled Relations The United States and Cambodia Since 1870*, Northern Illinois University Press, \$25.00.
- Crawley, Andrew. *Somoza and Roosevelt: Good Neighbour Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1933-1945*, Oxford University Press, \$99.00.
- Cueto, Marcos. *Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico, 1955-1975*, John Hopkins University Press, \$45.00.
- Donelan, Michael. *Honor in Foreign Policy: A History and Discussion*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$69.95.
- Engel, Jeffrey A. *Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy*, Harvard University Press, \$35.00.
- Ginor, Isabella and Gideo Remez. *Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War*, Yale University Press, \$26.00.
- Irwin, Halfond. *Maurice Palologue: the Diplomat, the Writer, the Man and the Third French Republic*, University Press of America, \$29.95.
- Henderson, Timothy J. *A Glorious Defeat: Mexico and Its War with the United States*, Hill and Wang, \$25.00.
- Hoganson, Kristin L. *Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920*, University of North Carolina Press, \$24.95.
- Hughes, Gerald. *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949-1967*, Routledge, \$125.00.
- Kershaw, Ian. *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941*, Penguin Press, \$35.00.
- Laurienti, Jerry M. *The US Military and Human Rights Promotion: Lessons from Latin America*, Praeger Security International, \$44.95.
- Lorenz-Meyer, Martin. *Safehaven: The Allied Pursuit of Nazi Assets Abroad*, University of Missouri Press, \$49.95.
- Loth, Wilfried. *The Making of Détente: Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75*, Routledge, \$130.00.
- Macmillan, Margaret. *Nixon and Mao: The Week the Changed the World*, Random House, \$27.95.
- Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, \$29.95.
- Martini, Edwin. *Invisible Empires: The American War on Vietnam*, University of Massachusetts Press, \$24.95.
- Mauch, Peter, Yoneyuki Sugita, and John Van Sant. *Historical Dictionary of United States - Japan Relations*, The Scarecrow Press, \$99.00.
- McDonough, Frank. *Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$69.95.

- Mora, Frank O. and Jerry W. Cooney. *Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies*, University of Georgia Press, \$24.95.
- Nikolaev, Alexander. *International Negotiations: Theory, Practice, and the Connection with Domestic Politics*, Lexington Books, \$85.00.
- Nish, Ian. *Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862-1964*, University of Hawaii Press, \$90.00.
- Nygren, Bertil. *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries*, Routledge, \$145.00.
- Randolph, Stephen P. *Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive*, Harvard University Press, \$29.95.
- Rofe, J. Simon. *Franklin Roosevelt's Foreign Policy and the Welles Mission*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$69.95.
- Rosenberg, Mark. *The United States and Central America: Geopolitical Realities and Regional Fragility*, Routledge, \$29.95.
- Ruger, Jan. *The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire*, Cambridge University Press, \$95.00.
- Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, Cornell University Press, \$29.95.
- Sattar, Abdul. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Concise History*, Oxford University Press, \$24.95.
- Schmitz, David F. *The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941*, Potomac Books, \$19.95.
- Seekins, Donald M. *Burma and Japan Since 1940: From 'Co-prosperity' to 'Quiet Dialogue'*, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, \$67.00.
- Smith, Joseph. *United States and Latin America*, Routledge, \$25.95.
- Stassen, Glen H. and Lawrence S. Wittner, eds. *Peace Action: Past, Present, and Future*, Paradigm Publishers, \$16.95.
- Statler, Kathryn C. *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam*, University of Kentucky Press, \$45.00.
- Stone, Gary. *Elites for Peace: The Senate and the Vietnam War, 1964-1968*, University of Tennessee Press, \$37.00.
- Suh, Jae-Jung. *Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$75.00.
- Suri, Jeremi. *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*, Harvard University Press, \$27.95.
- Sutter, Robert. *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*, Rowman and Littlefield, \$79.00.
- Sylvan, David and Stephen Majeski. *US Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, Enemies and Empire*, Routledge, \$125.00.
- Tierney, Dominic. *FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that Divided America*, Duke University Press, \$74.95.
- Tomkinson, Ray. *Russia, America and the Islamic World*, Ashgate, \$99.95.
- Tucket, Robert W. *Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America's Neutrality, 1914-1917*, University of Virginia Press, \$39.50.
- Weiss, Thomas G. and Sam Daws. *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, Oxford University Press, \$150.00.
- Walsh, David. *The Military Balance in the Cold War: US Perceptions and Policy, 1976-1985*, Routledge, \$125.00.
- Xu, Guangqiu. *Congress and the U.S - China Relationship*, The University of Akron Press, \$59.95.
- Ziegner, Graham, ed. *British Diplomacy: British Foreign Secretaries Reflect*, Politico's Publishing, \$30.00.


The Last Word

Peter L. Hahn

The fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) this year truly deserves some reflection. *Diplomatic History* has led the way by gathering the recollections of sixteen of the Society's past presidents in its June 2007 issue. I enjoyed reading these accounts of the founding of SHAFR, its intellectual odyssey, and its remarkable growth in size and significance as an institution dedicated to promoting excellence in the study of the history of American foreign relations.

I was also deeply gratified by the SHAFR conference held in late June at the Marriott Westfields in Chantilly, Virginia. This conference marked a bold new move for SHAFR, in that we departed from our usual model of holding such meetings on university campuses and ventured into a commercial establishment for the first time. This departure from custom was experimental – and an ad hoc committee is currently examining the pros and cons of the actual experience and formulating recommendations about whether we should repeat this so-called “mini-OAH” model in future years. Nonetheless, I gained an intellectual lift from attending several excellent panels, hearing Richard Immerman's superb presidential address and General Michael Hayden's words of promise, and otherwise interacting with colleagues and friends from around the world. My only disappointment was the failure of Program Committee Co-Chairs Doug Little and Stephen Rabe to recount past SHAFR conferences in their much-heralded slide show, “Dorm Rooms, Cafeterias, and Low-Rent Hotels We Have Known” (but at least they pledged to come through at next year's conference!).

Anniversaries are good moments to reflect on the future as well as the past, and I am optimistic that SHAFR is situated on the cusp of a bright new era. At the recent conference, our Council unanimously approved a plan to invest some of the Society's



financial resources in new initiatives designed to enhance research and teaching in our field. For example, Council authorized the founding of the SHAFR Summer Institute, a new program that will bring together scholars and graduate students for a week of study and research under the direction of seasoned colleagues. We will also annually fund two Dissertation Completion Fellowships to free advanced graduate students from teaching or other work-related responsibilities so that they can complete their dissertations in timely manner. As further testament to its commitment to graduate student

achievement, Council also voted to double the funds allocated each year to the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant, the Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship, the Michael J. Hogan Fellowship, the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship, and the Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Fellowship.

Two other programs to be phased in are designed to increase SHAFR's outreach into the non-academic circles. The Society will appoint a coordinator who will solicit and distribute lesson plans, aiming for the goal of improving the teaching of topics in our field at the secondary school level. We will also name a Webmaster, who will develop the content on the SHAFR web-site and find ways to deliver that content to public officials, the media, and other interested parties. Investment in these initiatives will extend SHAFR's reach well beyond the ivory towers of academia.

Details on all of these new programs will be widely disseminated in the future. As we change and grow into a more vibrant and visible professional society, there is every reason to expect that we will better fulfill our mission to advance the study of the history of American foreign relations.