


Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 38, Issue 3, December 2007



Inside...

A Roundtable on Mark Moyar's *Triumph Forsaken*
Book Publishing Tips for the Uninitiated
Doing Research in South Africa
The A-Bomb and *American Prometheus*
An Introduction to the Center for History and New Media

...and much more!

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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Thoughts from SHAFR President Thomas A. Schwartz

As I was thinking about writing my first message to SHAFR members as President, I came across a story that captured my own feelings about being elected to this distinguished position. It's in the recently published journals of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and it dates back to September 1953. Schlesinger was attending a meeting of Democratic Party leaders, and he recorded how Adlai Stevenson was protesting his own lack of qualifications for the presidency, and how former President Harry Truman cut him off and said, "If a knucklehead like me can be a successful President, I guess you can do it alright." With all due respect to my friend Arnie Offner, I find it hard not to like Truman, and this quote endeared him to me even more. When I look at the forty or so SHAFR presidents preceding me, especially my immediate predecessor Richard Immerman, I feel a lot like Truman must have felt. I am humbled to follow in the footsteps of scholars like Richard, and I do hope I "can do it alright."

First, a brief note of thanks. Richard is turning over to me a very well-organized and well-run SHAFR, which also benefits from the extraordinary talents of Peter Hahn, who helps all of us avoid mistakes. It is also reassuring to know that Frank Costigliola is the incoming Vice-President and a person who has already played such an active role in SHAFR that his knowledge of the issues and questions will help keep me on course this year.

There are really three things I'd like to focus my attention on as SHAFR President. The first is to continue our efforts to support and encourage graduate students in the field. Unfortunately I am writing this short essay at the last minute and while on the road, in a Comfort Inn outside of Durham. (My daughter plays on a club soccer team, one of those baby-boomer innovations specifically designed to torture us in ways our parents would never have dreamed of.) Consequently I won't try to list all the new initiatives that SHAFR has or is planning to begin to promote graduate study in our field. I simply want to emphasize that given the relative financial health of SHAFR as a scholarly organization, we should seize upon this opportunity to promote the study of the history of the interaction of the United States with the world, a topic which this post-9/11 generation is already sensitive to, and quite responsive to, fully recognizing its enduring importance.



The second area is the internationalization of the organization, something which past presidents, including one of our most distinguished leaders, Michael Hogan, have also promoted. There are already a number of ideas on this question on the table, and it played a role as well in the discussion of whether to change the timing of our annual conference. While that particular question remains unresolved, I want to encourage more ideas on this subject, including such questions as promoting the study of foreign languages for multiarchival research, and increasing the number of scholars from outside the U.S. who are SHAFR members.

The third area is somewhat amorphous, and I confess that I'm not quite sure where I want to go with it. Recently we held a conference at

Vanderbilt to mark the inauguration of our new Max Kade Center for German and European Studies. One of the speakers was Ambassador John Kornblum, who served as Ambassador to Germany during the Clinton years, and now works in the international private sector. From that vantage point, he remarked on how little any of the candidates for President, from either political party, had to say about the integration of the world economy, and specifically the trans-Atlantic economy, and the challenges that poses to political governance and alliance cooperation. Kornblum was struck by this absence of discussion of the forces and trends that are changing our lives. His observation led me to this thought and hope. What I would like to encourage is for SHAFR, as both an organization and for its individual members, to think of our responsibility in trying to explain this world, how we got here and where we may be going, to both the American public and whatever world audience might listen. It does seem to me that so many of the public challenges that the United States faces are connected to its position and role within the world community, and that an organization like SHAFR should also play a role in furthering the intelligent discussion of those questions, not to promote a particular political agenda, but to further genuine understanding and a recognition of the choices we face.

Thomas Alan Schwartz is professor of history at Vanderbilt University.

A Roundtable on Mark Moyar's *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*

Edward Miller, David Kaiser, David L. Anderson, Scott Laderman, and Mark Moyar

Revisionism with a Vengeance: A Review of Mark Moyar's *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*

Edward Miller

Scholarship on the Vietnam War has long been afflicted by polarized thinking, and Mark Moyar's new book is not going to change that. In the decades-old debate between "orthodox" and "revisionist" scholars, Moyar positions himself squarely in the latter camp. Indeed, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965* is quite possibly the most ambitious work of Vietnam War revisionism ever published. From preface to conclusion, Moyar is both determined and pugnacious in challenging the claims put forward by his orthodox counterparts. This volume will provoke spirited responses from scholars on both sides for years to come.

The scope of Moyar's interpretive ambition is reflected in his merging of two revisionist arguments that had previously been advanced separately. On the one hand, Moyar endorses the views of Gunter Lewy and Michael Lind, both of whom have stridently insisted that the domino theory was valid and that the United States could and should have held the line in South Vietnam. However, where Lewy and Lind located America's fatal strategic mistakes mostly in the post-1965 era, Moyar dates the first major U.S. error to 1963, when the Kennedy administration backed the ouster of Ngo Dinh Diem, founding

president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Moyar is drawing on the brand of revisionism expressed in the writings of the CIA's William Colby, Ellen Hammer, and others; even the title of *Triumph Forsaken* seems a deliberate echo of Colby's 1989 memoir *Lost Victory*.¹ Moyar describes Diem as "a very wise and effective leader" (xiv), and he fully agrees with Colby that as the RVN president was on his way to victory over the Vietnamese communists in 1963 when short-sighted American officials schemed to remove him from power. Because Moyar's claims about Diem are crucially important to the validity of his larger argument about America's lost chance for victory in Vietnam, I have chosen to focus this review on assessing those claims. In my opinion, Moyar's interpretation of Diem is one of the most interesting and historiographically significant aspects of *Triumph Forsaken*. However, I do not find this interpretation to be very persuasive.

Like many other historians who have written about Diem (including me), Moyar argues that the Vietnamese leader achieved a number of unexpected successes during the first years of his rule. However, Moyar disagrees with those scholars who argue that Diem's tactics and strategies were counterproductive in the long run. For example, Moyar notes that RVN security forces came close to wiping out the Communist party's organizational apparatus in South Vietnam during the late 1950s. Yet he rejects the view that the harshly repressive measures used by Diem's

police and military served to alienate the rural population from the Saigon government. Moyar acknowledges that the NLF insurgency turned the tables on Diem in 1960 and 1961 and scored impressive battlefield gains against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). However, this two-year period was the only time during Diem's tenure that "he fared poorly in the struggle for the villages" (124). By 1962, Moyar asserts, Diem had righted the ship and reclaimed the initiative in the countryside, thanks in part to a massive new infusion of U.S. military aid.

Having portrayed Diem as hugely successful and wildly popular in South Vietnam, Moyar blames his downfall on ignorant U.S. journalists and officials who had mistakenly concluded that Diem was losing the war and on malevolent South Vietnamese leaders who saw Diem as a threat to their personal ambitions. Moyar is especially critical of the monks who led the 1963 anti-Diem Buddhist protest movement. He depicts the bonze Tri Quang and other "militant Buddhists" as cynical liars who manufactured specious claims of religious persecution and who were covertly working for the communists (212-218). Thus, in Moyar's telling, Diem was undone not by his own shortcomings, but by the treason of his allies and subjects.

Moyar's admiring depiction of Diem can be seen as a reaction against the simplistic caricatures that have long dominated historical writing about the RVN president. Orthodox historians have typically depicted

Diem either as an American puppet or as a hopelessly backwards exponent of "tradition" who was predestined to fail. Moyar is commendably skeptical of such interpretations. Unfortunately, however, he undermines his own attempt to provide a persuasive alternative view by frequently flying to the opposite interpretive extreme. This is especially apparent in his analysis of the military situation in South Vietnam, in his assessment of Diem's popularity, and in his questionable use of certain historical sources. The lionized portrayal of Diem that emerges in *Triumph Forsaken* is just as distorted as the negative caricatures that the book aims to refute.

Moyar's assessment of Diem's military efforts against the communist-led insurgency illustrates his propensity for turning keen historical insights into exaggerated and unsustainable conclusions. While other historians may have been too quick to dismiss the gains made by the South Vietnamese army between 1962 and 1963, Moyar himself is far too eager to minimize or dismiss evidence of communist military progress in this period. His downplaying of communist gains is especially apparent in his treatment of data showing an increased number of insurgent attacks in the Mekong Delta during the summer of 1963. Moyar suggests that these attacks were strategically insignificant because they were concentrated in just four provinces (247). The geographically focused nature of these strikes is certainly an interesting finding. However, since the four provinces in question had a combined population of over 2.2 million people—comprising 40 percent of the population of the delta and 18 percent of South Vietnam's total population—the communist advances there were more significant than Moyar lets on.² Moyar also neglects to mention that because of tactical withdrawals by government forces, communist forces in some provinces were able to increase the amount of territory under their control without mounting numerous attacks.³ Diem might not have been on the verge of losing the Vietnam War in 1963, but it does not

follow from this that he was on the verge of winning.

In one case, Moyar's desire to depict Diem as militarily dominant leads him to transform an ARVN defeat into a victory. In the famous battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, Viet Cong fighters inflicted heavy casualties on a much larger ARVN force and shot down five U.S. helicopters. Although historians have long debated the reasons for the U.S.-RVN defeat, none has questioned the fact of the defeat—none except Moyar, who describes the battle as "a defeat for the Viet Cong in a strategic sense." This breathtaking claim is based on rather unconventional military logic:

At the beginning of 1963, the government's regular forces outnumbered the Viet Cong's regulars by approximately ten to one, yet the ratio of government to Viet Cong casualties at Ap Bac was no higher than two to one, so the Viet Cong lost a much higher [pro]portion of their total armed strength (194).

Even if Moyar's staggeringly high estimate of the enemy casualty rate during the battle (100 or more casualties out of 300-odd total fighters) is correct, his argument here rests on a misunderstanding of NLF strategic objectives. Communist commanders chose to fight at Ap Bac in order to demonstrate their ability to use a medium-sized military formation to maul a numerically and technologically superior enemy force. Ap Bac was therefore a tactical *and* a strategic victory for the insurgents.

Moyar also makes erroneous claims about Diem's nation-building programs. For example, he incorrectly portrays Diem as conducting a sustained campaign of land reform, and he asserts that this campaign "seriously interfered" with the communists' efforts to win peasant support (72-73). Moyar derives this claim from the translated version of a 1962 NLF document. But the relevant portion of the document actually refers to "the U.S.-Diem policy of land expropriation," not to land redistribution. Another passage in the document makes it clear that South

Vietnamese officials were undertaking this expropriation not to establish more equitable patterns of land ownership, but to increase their own wealth and power at the expense of the insurgents.⁴

Moyar's assertions notwithstanding, Diem never made more than desultory attempts to carry out land reform in South Vietnam.⁵ Diem was not indifferent to the plight of poor peasants; however, he preferred to pursue rural reconstruction by redistributing people rather than by redistributing land. Strangely, Moyar makes no reference to Diem's program of "Land Development" (*Dinh Dien*), which relocated nearly a quarter of a million poor peasants from crowded lowland areas to new settlements in the central highlands and elsewhere. Like the later Strategic Hamlet Program, the Land Development Program also reflected Diem's communitarian convictions and the abstruse "Personalist" philosophy of development espoused by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. If Moyar wanted to make the case for the effectiveness of Diem's nation-building programs, he ought to have focused on the most important of those programs, not on land reform.

Moyar's already shaky analysis of the situation in the South Vietnamese countryside is further weakened by his invocation of an outdated and condescending understanding of the peasants who lived there. Moyar depicts Vietnamese farmers as caught in a sort of time warp: "The basic outlook of the peasant had changed little since the early centuries of Vietnamese history. . . . He venerated the bones of his ancestors, served his parents dutifully, and hoped that his children would remain to till his land after he was gone." Such peasants, Moyar asserts, "looked at the power of the opposing forces when deciding which side held the mandate of heaven, and they almost invariably threw their support to the strongest" (92-93). It is only by falling back on this Orientalist notion of "power-minded villagers" (153) that Moyar is able to explain his otherwise contradictory claim that peasant support for Diem rose at the same time that his rule became

more authoritarian and the behavior of RVN officials became more arbitrary and onerous. Moyar thus ironically affirms one of the claims made by anti-Diem authors about his "traditional" qualities: "Diem governed in an authoritarian way because he considered Western style democracy inappropriate for a country that was fractious and dominated by an authoritarian culture" (xiv).

Moyar's superficial understanding of Vietnamese political history and political culture is also revealed in his explanation of the origins of the 1963 Buddhist protest movement. Moyar believes that Vietnam was "a nation where Buddhist monks rarely engaged in political activities." He therefore concludes that the 1963 movement was an aberration, and that Tri Quang and the other leaders of the movement must have been communist operatives (217-18). In fact, Moyar is mistaken: Vietnamese Buddhist monks have frequently engaged in political activities, and the 1963 movement is best understood as part of the long-running "revival" of Vietnamese Buddhism that began during the 1920s. This revival eventually became linked to a distinctive form of Buddhist nationalism and to the promotion of Buddhism as the key to Vietnam's national destiny.⁶ Moyar does not cite any reliable evidence showing that Tri Quang or any other leader of the 1963 movement was a communist, because no such evidence exists. There is, however, extensive evidence that these monks had embraced the Buddhist revival and the nationalism associated with it. There is also substantial evidence that suggests that the brand of Buddhist nationalism they endorsed was incompatible with communism. For example, a 1951 Viet Minh secret intelligence report specifically identified Tri Quang and other reform-minded monks as "reactionaries" whose goals were antithetical to those of the party.⁷ It seems that communist leaders were cognizant of the ideological differences that separated them from the Buddhist leadership, even if Moyar is not.

As the above examples suggest, there are many points in *Triumph Forsaken* at which Moyar's interpretation of particular documents

is open to criticism. Yet these interpretive problems are not the most troubling aspect of Moyar's use of sources. In a few cases, Moyar does not merely misinterpret sources; he actually misrepresents their textual content. On pages 165-66, Moyar writes about a July 1962 meeting between Diem and General Paul Harkins, the top U.S. military adviser in South Vietnam. For Moyar, Harkins is an admirable figure because he was one of Diem's staunchest American supporters and because he advised Diem "with enough tact and confidence to keep Diem's ear and respect." However, in his zeal to show the warm rapport that he says existed between the two men, Moyar exercises what might be generously described as poetic license. He relates what purports to be a verbatim account of the dialogue between Harkins and Diem, as indicated in his use of quotation marks to indicate what each said to the other. But the sole document that Moyar cites for this exchange is an American memorandum of conversation which does not contain anything that can be construed as a verbatim record of the meeting. Instead, the memcon is a detailed paraphrasing of the key points made by the participants. The resulting differences between Moyar's rendering and his source are striking. For example, Moyar relates part of the meeting as follows:

Diem admitted to Harkins, "I am concerned over the number of senior officers who have reached the height of their potential and who lack the education and initiative required in higher grades."

"Such men should be eliminated," said Harkins.

"The situation was inherited from the French, who were too easy and made colonels and lieutenant colonels who had no real capability or trainings," Diem explained.

"One of the difficulties in identifying incompetent officers lies in the fact that my generals do not want to recommend the separation of officers who are old friends." Despite the problems involved, Diem said, "I am considering the

thought of elimination."

The relevant portion of the memorandum reads as follows:

[Diem] then added that he was concerned over the number of senior officers who have reached the height of their potential and who lack the education and initiative required in higher grades. In response to General Harkins' remark that such men should be eliminated, the President commented that the situation had been inherited from the French, who were too easy and had made colonels and lieutenant colonels who had no real capability or training. He was considering the thought of elimination. General Harkins suggested that there might be an examination given and that those who failed to qualify would be eliminated. President Diem commented that one of the difficulties in identifying incompetent officers lies in the fact that his Generals do not want to recommend separation of officers who are old friends.⁸

Moyar might argue that the text of the memorandum still supports his interpretive claim about Harkins's ability to "coach" and advise Diem. But such an argument does not excuse the fact that Moyar has reconstructed a historical event in a way that dramatically embellishes the available record of that event. That Moyar repeats this practice elsewhere in the book—for example, in his account of a 1963 meeting between Diem and Robert McNamara on page 254—raises worrisome questions about whether and how frequently he plays fast and loose with his sources.

Triumph Forsaken is a bold and ambitious book that reflects the author's determination to challenge some long-held beliefs about the Vietnam War. Especially in the case of Ngo Dinh Diem, such an overhaul of the conventional wisdom is long overdue. Unfortunately, however, Moyar drains the persuasive power out of many of his arguments by making key interpretive and factual mistakes. As a result, the

SHAFR Activities at the Annual Meeting of the Organization for American Historians

March 2008

New York, New York

Reception (cash bar)

Friday, March 28

5:30-7:30 pm

Graduate Student Breakfast

Saturday, March 29

7:30-9:30 am

SHAFR will sponsor this event for all graduate student attendees.

Luncheon

Saturday, March 29

11:30 am-1:15 pm

Max Paul Friedman (American University) will deliver the 2008 Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture, "Anti-Americanism and U.S. Foreign Relations."

SHAFR will also announce the winners of the 2008 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize, Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize, Myrna Bernath Fellowship, Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize, Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize, Michael J. Hogan Fellowship, W. Stull Holt Fellowship, and Samuel Flaggs Bemis Research Grants.

Tickets to the luncheon must be purchased in advance from the OAH. Details will appear in OAH registration materials.

representation of Diem that he offers is as simplistic and caricatured as the ones he proposes to replace. This book ensures that the orthodox-revisionist debate will continue, but it does much less than it might have to change the terms of that debate.

Edward Miller is assistant professor of History at Dartmouth College.

Notes:

1. William Colby, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989); Ellen Hammer, *A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1987).
2. Provincial population statistics are available in CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand: Zone of Conflict in Southeast Asia," 14 March 1961, Folder 78, Box 05, Central Intelligence Agency Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX (hereafter Vietnam Archive).
3. For example, government forces conceded large parts of Binh Duong province to the communists during the summer and fall of 1963. See Philip Catton, *Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam* (Lawrence, KS, 2002), chap. 7, especially pp. 180-182.

4. See "Assessment of the Status of the Revolution in Vietnam," 25 September 1962, Folder 2, Box 1, Douglas Pike Collection, Vietnam Archive. The "seriously interfered" quote appears on p. 26; the other referenced passage is on p. 22.
5. Diem's government did expropriate some land, but less than half of it was ever redistributed to farmers, and less than ten percent of peasant families in South Vietnam benefited from the program.
6. Nguyễn Thê Anh, "L'engagement politique du Bouddhisme au Sud Viêt-Nam dans les années 1960," in *Bouddhismes et Sociétés Asiatiques: Clergés, sociétés et pouvoirs*, eds. Alain Forest et al. (Paris, 1990), 111-124.
7. Translated document No. 8602/2-R, "Traduction d'un document V.M. récupéré à BA-TRINH (KE-SACH) le 21 Septembre 1951," 11 October 1951, Box 10 H 4202, Archives de la Service Historique de l'Armée de la Terre, Vincennes, France.
8. Memorandum for the Record, 31 July 1963, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. III, Vietnam 1962 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 244.

Moyar Talk

David Kaiser

Mark Moyar's new book, *Triumph Forsaken*, is provocative and flamboyant and bound to attract a fair amount of attention. Its argument is not original. William Colby, Richard Nixon, Harry Summers, and Walt Rostow have all made similar arguments about the Diem regime, alternative military strategies, and the international context of the war. However, no one has ever presented this argument in such extreme terms. The author also makes frequent claims that he is essentially the first historian to grasp the truth of the matter, and in numerous footnotes he asserts that other historians (this reviewer among them) have misinterpreted the record.

Triumph Forsaken suffers from an enormous and crippling problem: its

use of sources. Moyar makes the case for many of his most critical points only by ignoring important, well-known primary sources. At times, indeed, his assertions contradict the sources cited. A close examination of his footnotes and of the sources he did and did not consult yields truly shocking results. It would take many, many pages to treat those results fully, and I shall focus on three key issues, all relating to the course of the war and the political crisis in South Vietnam in 1963. That is probably the most critical period for his argument, since he claims that Ngo Dinh Diem was actually winning the war at that time and that a few deeply misguided Americans such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan managed to persuade key decision-makers otherwise, bring about Diem's overthrow, and, by implication, lose the war. I shall look closely at the Battle of Ap Bac; the condition of the strategic hamlet program and the course of the war in summer-fall 1963; and the issue of the motivations behind the Buddhist revolt.

Moyar's argument depends upon discrediting all the major contemporary critics of the war — among them John Paul Vann, David Halberstam, and John Mendenhall. For example, he argues that the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963 was not the defeat that Vann thought it was. Within days of the battle, he writes, "many of the other American military advisers present at the battle" recognized that Vann "had greatly exaggerated both the South Vietnamese mistakes and the significance of the battle" (196). But of those other Americans he cites just one, Col. Daniel Boone Porter, and his quotes come from an oral history interview that Porter gave at least ten years later. Porter, he says, "recalled later that most of the advisers were pleased that the South Vietnamese had engaged the large Viet Cong force . . . and believed that the South Vietnamese officers had done their best in the difficult task of integrating infantry, armor, artillery, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, airborne, and militia units — something they had never attempted before."

The problem is that Porter also

expressed himself in writing at the time, and what he said has been reported by David Toczek in his excellent little book on Ap Bac, which is the kind of focused, capable treatment that unfortunately does not become the subject of roundtables on the Web. Toczek, whose book Moyar mentions only to register his disagreement with it, uses contemporary documents to tell a very different story. "Of the 15 ARVN weaknesses [Porter] noted in his endorsement of Vann's report," Toczek writes,

14 were related to functions of command. Echoing Vann's remarks, Porter condemned the "failure of the Corps, Division, Regimental and Sector commanders to go to the battlefield to direct, supervise and observe the actions of subordinate commanders and participating units." . . . Porter also cited the "failure of commanders at all echelons to act decisively to control and direct their available firepower, and to employ the principles of fire and maneuver to assault or outflank enemy positions." Porter prefaced his comments by noting that the weaknesses occurred "in the bulk of other operations in the old III Corps as well as in the new IV Corps."

Another adviser who was present, Major Macslarrow, complained that his ARVN unit had refused for seven hours to attack. Captain Ziegler, the ARVN 7th Division's G-3 adviser, called the battle "a real disgrace."¹ In other words, the contemporary evidence shows that the other American advisers agreed with Vann's analysis. Mark Moyar has no contemporary evidence to back up the opposite contention.

More important is Moyar's treatment of the course of the war in the second half of 1963, with particular reference to the strategic hamlet program and a new round of Viet Cong attacks upon it. Moyar addresses this issue specifically in note 15 on page 462. Trying to defend the program, he acknowledges a huge increase in Viet Cong attacks in September but claims that they were restricted to four provinces in the

Delta. Then he asserts that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research exaggerated the geographical scope of the problem in a famous report from October 1963, and he accuses me, Fred Logevall, John Newman, Neil Sheehan and many others of being taken in by that report in our books. It is dangerous to assume that you know how other historians work. As I made quite clear in *American Tragedy*, my analysis of the program was based upon a careful analysis of the weekly headway reports of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (available at the JFK Library), from which I tallied attacks in all four corps areas of the country. My results showed that in the late summer of 1963 attacks were substantially increasing not only all over the Delta but *in every corps area*.² Despite some variations from month to month, the secular trend of Viet Cong activity during the second half of 1963 was unmistakably upward. Nor does Moyar mention that in December, a Defense Intelligence Agency report (reprinted in *Foreign Relations of the United States*) confirmed all of State's conclusions about declining military trends during 1963.

In his attempt to argue that the hamlet program was going well, Moyar tries tortuously to get around the testimony of Rufus Phillips of the U.S. Agency for International Development before President Kennedy and the NSC on September 10. The war, Phillips said, "was going well in the first, second and third corps but it was emphatically not going well in the fourth corps, the Delta region. The strategic hamlets are being chewed to pieces by the Viet Cong. Fifty hamlets have been overrun recently." In an effort to downplay this evaluation, Moyar writes that "[Phillips] wrote later that the fifty strategic hamlets he mentioned to Kennedy were all in one province, Long An." But here is the full quote from the piece Phillips wrote many years later, recreating what he said back in 1963:

The First, Second and Third Corps are okay, but the war effort in the Fourth Corps, the Delta area south of Saigon, is going to pieces. The

Strategic Hamlet program there is collapsing. I was just in Long An Province, where within the past week the Viet Cong destroyed fifty strategic hamlets, forcing the inhabitants to cut the barbed wire defenses and take [to] the roofs of their houses.

Long An, in short, was just an example of a bigger problem, not the only place where Phillips was identifying a problem.³ And as I have already noted, things kept getting worse during the rest of September — not only in the Delta but all over the country.

In a further attempt to downgrade the significance of certain provinces where he admits Viet Cong attacks were increasing — An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Ba Xuyen and Kien Tuong — Moyar refers to these areas as “sparsely populated provinces” (248). That characterization is inaccurate. Ba Xuyen had 600,000 inhabitants. Moyar restates the same argument in an even more extreme and incorrect form on page 283.

Many Americans and many South Vietnamese gave up on the Diem government because the war and the strategic hamlet program were in fact going very badly in the second half of 1963, and this book argues the contrary only by doing serious violence to the data. In this connection I would also like to mention Moyar’s handling of statements by an impartial observer, the Australian major Ted Serong. Serong is quoted only once, briefly, about the Diem period, to suggest that he thought things were going well, and Moyar takes me to task in a footnote for, as he claims, misstating Serong’s overall point of view (454, n.9). Without quoting it, he simply states that Serong’s March 1963 report said that Diem was winning the war. I, on the other hand, quoted Serong’s extensive comments on the disastrous weaknesses of the strategic hamlet program and the Diem government’s policies towards the Montagnards, which Serong characterized as genocidal. Moyar completely ignored an earlier Serong report on the war effort, which even he, apparently, could not put a positive spin on.⁴

In his discussion of the 1963 Buddhist crisis, Moyar argues that the Buddhists had few if any real grievances; that they had political rather than religious goals (one view that I share); that many educated Vietnamese did not sympathize with them at all; that they were communist-influenced; and that the leading Bonze, Thich Tri Quang, was probably a communist. Almost none of this is actually supported by sources. Thus, for instance, Moyar writes that “even among the educated elite, a large number understood and supported Diem’s actions during the Buddhist disturbances” (216). A footnote refers to two labor leaders, Tran Quoc Buu and Dam Sy Hien, who displayed “full approval of Diem’s policies towards the Buddhists” and in July 1963 called the Buddhist monks “uninformed and unsophisticated.” That turns out to be an incomplete account of Tran Quoc Buu’s views: two months later, he was quoted as follows by State: “Tran Quoc Buu, head of the largest labor organization in Vietnam, claims that his followers believe that Nhu [Diem’s younger brother] must go. He fears that should Nhu emerge victorious from the present crisis, worse blunders will ensue, permitting an eventual Communist takeover.”⁵ The accompanying footnote is also interesting; it states that “most historians have similarly concluded that the Buddhist protesters were upstanding citizens motivated only by dissatisfaction with the government’s alleged religious intolerance.” Moyar then refers the reader to a long list of books, including those by William Duiker, George Kahin, Stanley Karnow, Robert Schulzinger, and myself. I defy anyone to find anything in *American Tragedy* that remotely supports that statement.

Moyar discusses Thich Tri Quang’s role in the crisis, citing a variety of sources, and concludes that “the sum of the evidence strongly suggests that Tri Quang was a Communist operative” (217-18). That statement follows two paragraphs stating that Tri Quang “served with the Viet Minh,” that his sermons argued Buddhism and communism were compatible, and that several of his collaborators accused him of being a communist.

But Moyar’s most detailed source is a CIA paper dated 28 August 1964, entitled “An Analysis of Thich Tri Quang’s Possible Communist Affiliations, Personality and Goals.” That paper did include various accusations and rumors that Tri Quang was a communist, as well as his own admission that he was briefly involved in a Viet Minh organization during the anti-French war, but Moyar does not quote its summary:

A summary of information available as of 27 August 1964 on whether Thich Tri Quang is a Communist leads to the conclusion that, although there are positive indications, they lack supporting evidence which would make them credible. *The assessment is, therefore, that Tri Quang is not a Communist* [italics added — underlining in original]. An evaluation of Tri Quang’s personality and an estimate of his goals discloses that Tri Quang is a supremely confident and ambitious man, who probably wants to establish a Buddhist theocracy in South Vietnam, with himself playing the double role of religious leader and political eminence in a government which has overcome or subdued the Viet Cong, but which might well have neutralism as its ultimate goal.

Continuing in the same vein, Moyar also quotes Robert Topmiller’s 2000 study of the Buddhist peace movement to support the idea that “the sum of the evidence” suggests Tri Quang was a communist. Here is what we find there: “Thich Quang Lien, an important Buddhist leader in his own right, told the author that he thought Thich Tri Quang was a Communist, *until he was placed under house arrest by the Communists in 1975. He remains under house arrest today.*”⁶ Moyar mentions a press report that Tri Quang was imprisoned; he neglects to say that the report also said Tri Quang was tortured and crippled during his imprisonment.

Moyar’s technique here is quite similar to what Douglas Feith and his office did in the run-up to the Iraq War to try to prove a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. Like

them, he has picked a few morsels out of a mass of evidence—morsels that seem to support the claims he wants to make—and ignored the much greater contrary evidence that other observers—in this case, Saigon CIA officers in 1964—wisely gave greater weight to. When I made this point publicly during a panel devoted to Moyar's book in a recent conference at Williams College, he defended the practice of using only one fact favorable to one's argument from a document filled with contrary facts—a practice which I myself cannot regard as scholarly. (He also said that he did not expect me to like his book because I was one of the authors he had "discredited." Allow me to state for the record that I feel my arguments remain fully intact, and that my dislike for his book is based upon the problems I am identifying here.)

I could not help feeling at a number of points that the author takes a positive delight in making statements so contrary to known facts as to be simply astonishing. For example, he cites Dean Rusk, of all people, to argue that George Ball was not really a determined opponent of escalation in Vietnam, but simply a "devil's advocate" (406). That quote refers to June of 1965. It boggles the mind that the author does not even mention the highly secret memorandum of October 5, 1964, in which Ball made an extraordinarily prescient argument against escalation—an argument so sensitive and controversial at that moment that Ball typed it himself, made only five copies (two for himself and one each for Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk), and never even put it into an official file. (Ball published it in *The Atlantic* in 1972.) This is rather like claiming that Ronald Reagan was never terribly hostile to communism by citing remarks he made during his second term and ignoring the earlier speech in which he described the Soviets as "the focus of evil in the modern world."

In my opinion this book, because of its misuse of sources, cannot be regarded as a serious historical contribution. I must add, however, that I was also very unimpressed by the author's military analyses and his counterfactual speculation, both of

which, again, pointedly ignore facts that have been well established by others. He argues quite breathtakingly that the Mekong Delta, where most South Vietnamese lived, was not a critical area in the war in 1962-3. He says that it would not have been difficult for the United States to have blockaded the Ho Chi Minh Trail, even though John Prados in *The Blood Road* documented the conclusion of American military planners that the United States simply could not provide logistical support for large forces in that remote region. And he argues that the United States should have been ready, willing, and able to invade North Vietnam in 1965, even though, as I showed in *American Tragedy*, there is not the slightest evidence that the United States could have built up forces in South Vietnam any faster than it did. Westmoreland himself said repeatedly that he would not really be able to take the offensive even within South Vietnam until 1967 or so.

Moyar is hardly the first historian to misuse evidence on a large scale. Others have survived severe criticism from their peers. In the 1970s Robert James Maddox made some devastating points about evidence in the works of Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, and William Appleman Williams, but those New Left historians remained influential. In the same decade, after Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman published *Time on the Cross*, Herbert Gutman and others showed that they had taken extraordinary liberties with their data, but that criticism did not prevent Fogel from securing an appointment at Harvard or winning a Nobel Prize. *Triumph Forsaken* will have a following because it tells a certain segment of our body politic—a very important one at the moment—what they want to hear: that the Vietnam War was lost by the stupidity and/or treachery of a few Americans, mostly liberals, who turned victory into defeat. The same accusation was leveled against the Americans who "lost" China, and eventually it will be leveled against those who "lost" Iraq. But for the reasons I have indicated, I do not think that *Triumph Forsaken* has actually added to the sum of our historical

knowledge of the Vietnam War.

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Notes:

1. David M. Toczek, *The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam* (Westport, CT, 2001), 118-19, 27-8.
2. See David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), 220-1, 259-60.
3. Rufus Phillips, "Before We Lost in South Vietnam," Harvey Neese and John O'Donnell, eds., *Prelude to Tragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965* (Annapolis, 2001), 50.
4. Kaiser, *American Tragedy*, 190-2, 162-4.
5. *FRUS*, 1961-3, IV, no. 110.
6. Robert Topmiller, *The Lotus Unleashed* (Lexington, KY, 2000), 156.

Comments on Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*

David L. Anderson

Mark Moyar has offered a bold and extensively documented defense of what historiographers of the Vietnam War have termed the "revisionist thesis." Indeed, the closing sentence of his volume is one of the most succinct statements of this thesis I have seen: it characterizes the conflict as "a wise war fought under foolish restraints." The majority of historians of the Vietnam War, usually termed "orthodox" because they represent the mainstream, would not choose the adjective "wise" to describe the origins and course of the American intervention into the politics and society of Vietnam. Indeed, they would consider such a characterization of the American experience in Vietnam as dangerous to the process of understanding the role of the United States in world affairs. I count myself among the orthodox.

In his preface, Moyar challenges my characterization of the revisionist historians as analysts who demonstrate "uncritical acceptance" of the Cold War consensus, which lay at the foundation of the containment strategy from the time of the Truman administration through that of Richard Nixon (although Nixon compromised with the communist Vietnamese in the

end). Moyar contends that revisionists like himself also demonstrate the kind of "reasoned analysis" that I attribute to most orthodox historians.¹ Moyar's own reasoned analysis begins with the premise that South Vietnam was a place of vital strategic interest to the United States because the domino theory was, in his view, correct. He cites as evidence that the domino concept was accepted by the "elites" of Southeast Asia (382). He also presents data that he thinks show that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was making tremendous progress under Diem, whom the American press dubbed "the miracle man of South East Asia" in 1957, and he terms the U.S.-abetted coup against Diem in 1963 a foreign policy disaster for the United States. With Diem dead, President Johnson ultimately had no other strategic choice than to attempt to sustain the RVN. Moreover, Moyar claims that the war could have been taken directly into North Vietnam without risk of retaliation from China, Hanoi's backer, but that Johnson foolishly limited the U.S. effort. That decision compounded the mistake of

withdrawing backing from Diem, and the result was a "forsaken triumph."

Moyar has amassed a great deal of evidence to support his thesis. It is not possible to analyze all of that evidence in a brief commentary, but its meaning and significance is open to question. For example, Moyar argues that the strategic hamlet system was working until Diem's death. His contention is based in part upon interviews he did with Rufus Phillips, the chief U.S. advisor to the strategic hamlet program.² Phillips was a brave and patriotic official, as was his former boss at the Saigon Military Mission, Major General Edward Lansdale. I spoke briefly with Phillips, whom Moyar identifies as a protégé of Lansdale, at the SHAFR conference in Austin and was struck by his openness, but I have never had the pleasure of interviewing him. I did interview Lansdale at some length at his home in Virginia. Personally I found Lansdale to be a marvelous story teller but a less than reliable historical source. Phillips may be a better source than Lansdale, but there is considerable testimony from

other observers about the flaws in the strategic hamlet program.

Moyar suggests that many of the scholars who have written about Vietnam are wrong, but it is difficult to comprehend how so many scholars could be so wrong on so many details about the war – Diem's successes, strategic hamlets, the Buddhists, China's intentions, and more. Moyar concludes, for example, that the Buddhist revolt in 1963 was almost certainly communist-led and communist-inspired. Yet Robert Topmiller's research, based upon hundreds of interviews in Vietnam, indicates that although the Buddhist peace activists in 1963 were not "typical" Buddhists, there is no evidence that they were communists. In fact, he contends that they were about as far removed politically and theologically from the communists as it was possible to be.³ Moyar is also fairly confident that if Washington had invaded North Vietnam in 1964, the Chinese would not have responded, because they were too afraid of American power to risk war with the United States. What might

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have happened cannot be known definitively, but a number of Chinese authors, such as Yinhong Shi, Xiangen Wang and others, have demonstrated the high strategic value Beijing placed on Hanoi's ability to withstand U.S. pressure.⁴ It is doubtful that Johnson or any U.S. president would have rolled the iron dice and invaded the north with so much uncertainty about what the United States might face.

Even without checking his footnotes, I find Moyar's reaffirmation of the domino theory troubling. William Duiker, one of the most respected American scholars of Vietnamese communism, has noted how Cold War thinking about Indochina gained momentum over time. Duiker cites Patrick Hatcher's argument in *The Suicide of an Elite* that the United States moved away from George Kennan's prudent application of containment in the 1950s to maximizing the stakes in Vietnam during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. It was not wrong to include Southeast Asia in the containment strategy, but it was wrong to make South Vietnam the keystone in the arch, as Kennedy termed it. Washington reaped what it sowed. The "never again school" or the "go all out school" — of which Moyar is one of the most recent adherents — is wrong, Duiker contends. The United States can help others, but the key to effective foreign policy is for the United States to keep the means and ends in balance. That balance was never achieved in Vietnam. Vietnam was never a vital interest for the United States, never worth going all out for. But at what point did the United States go too far? When did Washington get on the slippery slope? Was it under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson? Vietnam was not of crucial importance to the United States, and there was no prospect for victory at reasonable cost; hence there was no rationale for the introduction of U.S. combat troops.

Neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy ever set clear limits for U.S. intervention, and thus Saigon never assumed responsibility for itself. Without that responsibility there were no conditions for successful containment. It was all right to give

Diem aid as long as he appeared to make reasonable use of it, but it was an error to tie U.S. credibility to Diem's long-term survival. Vietnam was not a noble effort (to paraphrase Ronald Reagan). It was commendable to try to stop communism. That is what I thought I was doing when I served in Vietnam in the U.S. Army, but American policy was marred by ignorance, shortsightedness, hubris, and self-righteousness. It is important for a great power not to lose a sense of proportion in foreign affairs. The Vietnam War was a civil war with regional implications, not a struggle for the global balance of power.⁵

In a January 1962 memorandum to Robert McNamara on "The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland," the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the "communist insurgency or aggression" in Southeast Asia as "part of a major campaign to extend communist control beyond the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and overseas to both island and continental areas in the Free World, through a most natural and comparatively soft outlet, the Southeast Asian Peninsula. It is, in fact, a planned phase in the communist timetable for world domination."⁶ In February 1965, Connecticut Senator Thomas J. Dodd compared the danger that Hanoi posed to the United States to that of Nazi Germany. In both cases the United States faced "an incorrigible aggressor, fanatically committed to the destruction of the free world." "If we fail to draw the line in Vietnam," Dodd warned, "we will find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle."⁷ This vision of falling dominoes made no allowance for the power of nationalism or the historic abilities of individual states to resist domination by ambitious neighbors. Exactly who was it that, after it had conquered South Vietnam, was going to spread its power across Asia and the Pacific to threaten the European nations and the United States at their own borders? Would defeating Hanoi bring peace and stability to Asia? Inspired and empowered by Vietnamese nationalism, Hanoi had the capacity to be victorious in Vietnam and to

unite the country, but it had neither the power nor the intent to expand or conquer other territories, including Seattle. The domino theory does not stand up to reasoned analysis.

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Notes:

1. David L. Anderson, "One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 30 (January 2006): 3-4.
2. See, for example, Phillips's own report of Prime Minister Nguyen Ngoc Tho's complaints in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. 4, *Vietnam August-December 1963* (Washington, DC, 1991), 596-99.
3. Robert Topmiller, *The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964-1966* (Lexington, KY, 2002).
4. Yinhong Shi, *Meiguo zai Yuenan de ganshe he zhanzheng, 1954-1968* [American intervention and war in Vietnam, 1954-1968] (Beijing, 1993), and Xiangen Wang, *Zhongguo mimi da fabing: Yuan Yue kang Mei shilu* [China secretly dispatched many troops: The real record of supporting Vietnam to resist America] (Jinan, 1992).
5. William J. Duiker, *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina* (Stanford, CA, 1994), 380-83.
6. U.S. Department of Defense, *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, The Senator Gravel ed. (Boston, 1971), 2:664.
7. Thomas J. Dodd, speech in the Senate, February 23, 1965, *Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 1st sess., Part 3: 3350.

The Perils of Vietnam War "Revisionism"

Scott Laderman

Mark Moyar has undertaken a momentous task. Displeased with the extant literature on the Vietnam conflict, Moyar wished to correct what he saw as the inaccuracies of previous accounts that considered the United States "wrong to go to war in Vietnam" (xii), situating his work instead among those that consider the intervention to have been a "noble but improperly executed enterprise" (xi). The first of two planned volumes, *Triumph Forsaken* admirably distinguishes itself

from many other syntheses of the war in its pursuit of a broad international focus. It is clear, moreover, that Moyar has done extensive research in both primary and secondary sources. That is to be commended. But *Triumph Forsaken* is a deeply flawed book. It is not flawed because it challenges much of the “orthodox school” of Vietnam War scholarship, as Moyar calls the bulk of the post-1975 literature (xi). Challenges to the received wisdom are in fact healthy and should generally be encouraged. Yet when the end product is a study as tendentious, unpersuasive, and selective in its use of evidence as *Triumph Forsaken*, it reflects poorly on the entire “revisionist school” project (xi).

Although peppered with a number of new interpretive insights, Moyar’s largest arguments are not especially original. Ho Chi Minh and his comrades were dedicated agents of international Communism. Ngo Dinh Diem has been misunderstood. The American press contributed to American defeat. The domino theory was correct. And so on. Most of these positions were advanced by the war’s proponents decades ago, and they were rehashed in various permutations after the American withdrawal by authors ranging from Guenter Lewy and Robert F. Turner to Peter Braestrup and Michael Lind.¹ The novelty of Moyar’s contribution is its broad narrative scope and, crucially, the scholarly garb that over eighty pages of endnotes lend it. In the end, however, *Triumph Forsaken* is no more convincing than its predecessors.

Consider Moyar’s treatment of Ho. Dismissing his nationalism as qualified—Ho was “a nationalist in the sense that he had a special affection for Vietnam’s people and favored Vietnamese unification and independence”—Moyar suggests that Ho was, above all else, a willing tool of the Soviets and Chinese, “firmly adher[ing] to the Leninist principle that Communist nations should subordinate their interests to those of the international Communist movement” (9). Moyar thus sees in Ho’s professions of global solidarity not Vietnam’s placement at the forefront of a vast wave of anti-colonialism and revolutionary

nationalism, but rather machinations in pursuit of collapsing dominoes. The Vietnamese revolutionaries’ gestures towards the Soviets and Chinese are thus viewed invariably as genuine and nefarious while their gestures towards the United States are dismissed as insincere and duplicitous.² It is apparently inconceivable to Moyar that Ho could simultaneously be both a nationalist and a communist, or that he or his comrades could be shrewd individuals willing to make pragmatic accommodations in pursuit of larger national objectives.

Ngo Dinh Diem, on the other hand, was a “very wise and effective leader” (xiv). Moyar is not the first historian to claim that Diem was not an American puppet—and this argument, while by no means original, is one of *Triumph Forsaken*’s strongest—but Moyar goes much further than other scholars by positing not only his independent-mindedness but also his general effectiveness. There may be areas in which this point is true, but Moyar overreaches. It strains credulity, for example, to characterize Diem’s early land reform program as a “significant achievement” (72). The argument that Moyar unfolds on this issue is not compelling. His conclusion contravenes nearly all others, including the far more detailed treatment by one of Moyar’s sources, Philip Catton, who found Diem’s record to be “dismal” on this account.³ Indeed, given that, as Moyar notes, Diem’s program would have entailed breaking up only holdings larger than 100 hectares, while 44 percent of the peasantry in the Mekong Delta remained landless, the case presented in *Triumph Forsaken* would seem to warrant the opposite conclusion (73).

As for the widespread repression by the Diem government, it is true, Moyar concedes, that Diem was authoritarian, but whereas Ho’s heavy-handedness was a contemptible illustration of the communist threat, for Diem it was an asset. This was because “Vietnamese culture” was “imbued with authoritarianism” (36). Indeed, Vietnam was, as a whole, an “authoritarian country” (43). Moyar fails to cite any credible evidence for this view, and when he does attempt to marshal sources in his favor, they

are invariably self-serving: U.S. officials or Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu (36; 428, n.11 and n.13). Moyar dismisses those Vietnamese who did not subscribe to these cultural norms as a “very small urban elite” that was “severed philosophically from the rest of Vietnamese society” and “resented Diem for taking away privileges or possessions” bestowed on them by the French (37). This “intellectual class,” which was driven, it seems, by little more than scorn for the threat to its class station, lacked “inherent worth,” he writes (37). Real Vietnamese, according to Moyar, were not interested in “ideas,” “democracy,” or “civil liberties,” and “liberal governance” was clearly “unsuitab[le]” for such people (37, 40). The masses cared only for power, craving a “strong and charismatic leader” who, while treating them “justly,” would “protect them” and “shield them from subversives” (37). They were, in essence, unthinking automatons, accepting “the judgment of the elites without question or complaint”; describing peasants recruited by the revolutionaries, Moyar says they were just “given weapons and ordered to attack” (71, 73). These simpletons “accepted and expected one-man rule as part of the natural order of the world,” while the “best officials . . . operated as kindly despots, treating the people as their children” (75, 94). Such reductionism, which echoes much too closely the racist suppositions of American policymakers in earlier decades, is not useful.⁴ If Moyar’s contention is broadly accurate, then why, to cite one obvious example, did Diem employ democratic discourses in the October 1955 referendum in an effort to appeal to these same Vietnamese masses?⁵

Moyar’s argument is also internally inconsistent. He renders his judgments about “Vietnamese culture” in an effort to demonstrate how the Vietnamese differed from Americans, a difference that he uses to criticize U.S. officials’ concerns with Diem’s authoritarianism (concerns that, incidentally, Moyar greatly overstates in ascribing them to these officials’ democratic principles). Yet Moyar does not hesitate to note elsewhere how Americans responded positively

to first the threat and then the reality of the U.S. bombing of Vietnam (314, 330), which was a clear demonstration of power, even if Moyer thinks the United States should have hit the Vietnamese harder, nor does he address how Americans respected the anti-communist leaders who promised most effectively to protect them from the alleged subversives imperiling the country. Furthermore, his numerous references to the importance to the Vietnamese of “prestige” and “losing face” (43, 81, 231, 236, 239-40, 279-80, 316, 346) sound quite similar to well-explored U.S. concerns about “credibility.” Assuming one is willing to speak in broad terms about national political cultures, the Vietnamese, in other words, turn out to seem, at least in this respect, not so very different from Americans.

Like a number of reviewers, I examined some of the sources cited by Moyer in *Triumph Forsaken* to assess his use of primary and secondary materials. A full examination would have required far more time and space than I had at my disposal, so my analysis was necessarily limited. But the findings of other reviewers had already raised serious questions. James McAllister, for example, shows how the only documentary evidence Moyer cites for his claim that some “high-ranking” U.S. officials were concluding in 1964 that “Tri Quang himself was a Communist” (317) says nothing of the sort.⁶ Gareth Porter, commenting on Moyer’s explication of the domino theory’s validity, accuses the author of “violat[ing] the basic norms of scholarship” by, among other things, alleging that the Malay communist insurgency “never really stopped” when, according to Porter, the allegation is “contradicted flatly by the very source [Moyer] cites.”⁷ Edwin Moïse, addressing the alleged attack during the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 4, 1964, expresses his annoyance with “the way Moyer carefully [sic] selects from my own book only those facts that support” *Triumph Forsaken*’s argument that the available contemporaneous evidence “strongly supported the reality of the attack,” a point Moïse disputes and says is “very strongly contradicted” elsewhere in his same book.⁸ And

William Stueck, commenting on Moyer’s claims regarding the battle at Dien Bien Phu and the 1954 Geneva conference, writes that while Moyer cites for “some specifics” what are arguably the leading sources on Vietnamese relations with China and the Soviet Union, he “ignores other details” in these sources that weaken his position “as well as these authors’ conclusions.”⁹

My own brief examination only further reinforces the concerns expressed above. To cite one easily confirmable example, Moyer writes that “[i]n Vietnamese Communist parlance, the label ‘reactionary’ was applied to anyone who was not a Communist. Many more ‘reactionaries’ would suffer death during the remainder of 1946, bringing the toll of civilians killed by the Communists during the period of Communist rule into the tens of thousands” (19). Moyer then provides an endnote in which he adds that “[i]ntra-Vietnamese killings, which the Communists perpetrated in greater numbers than everyone else combined, came to a total of as high as 50,000 in this period, according to recent estimates” (425, n. 42). In support Moyer cites Shawn McHale’s *Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam*. Yet McHale does not write that “the Communists” killed “tens of thousands,” nor does he write that they perpetrated killings “in greater numbers than everyone else combined.” In fact, he does not mention “the Communists” at all; his discursion is, rather, about the Viet Minh (a “front organization led by the communists”) and its opponents “assassinating each other.” Moreover, McHale is careful to “underline” that the “Viet Minh was not ... responsible for all of the deaths, as other nationalist and religious groups contributed to the carnage,” for which he cites an estimate by François Guillemot (5,000 to 50,000 killed) and adds his own belief that “at least ten thousand were killed in intra-Vietnamese violence,” though the death toll was “probably much higher.”¹⁰ At no point does McHale seek to apportion the level of responsibility of the various groups.

As is true of a number of damning statements in Moyer’s book, the claims noted above thus lack a citation to evidentiary support—something especially important in a work that seeks to challenge nearly the entire corpus of Vietnam War scholarship. The point is not that Moyer is wrong; he may very well be correct. But in a book that consistently attempts to portray the Viet Minh in the most negative possible light, this lack of substantiation for his empirical claims only exacerbates the concerns raised by Moyer’s problematical use of evidence elsewhere.

In other instances Moyer levels charges that require far more support than he provides. Take, for example, the case of the northern land reform executions of the mid-1950s. That record is crucial to Moyer’s assertion that the revolutionaries were responsible for the most reprehensible atrocities against noncombatants “in recent memory” (62), which in turn helps to justify his full-throated defense of the Diem regime. It would seem necessary, after all, to establish some rational or moral basis for his support of Diem other than rank anti-Communism. Moyer writes that according to “a former Communist land reform cadre who is the most well-informed and trustworthy source on the subject,” approximately 32,000 people lost their lives “over the course of [the land reform campaign’s] five phases” (62). Who is this apparently unimpeachable source? What makes him or her so “well-informed and trustworthy”? What is the basis for his or her enumeration? Moyer does not say. Without providing any clarifying information, his endnote simply cites a November 1973 dispatch—that is, a document drafted nearly two decades after the land reform campaign ended—from the United States Embassy in Saigon to the State Department. But the significance of this example lies not merely in the failure to provide important supporting details. The example also conveys how Moyer casually—and unpersuasively—dismisses the leading scholarship on the issue.

The same endnote in which Moyer cites the November 1973 dispatch relates Bernard Fall’s earlier estimate

of 50,000 land reform executions, adding that Fall “was conducting research in Vietnam during this period,” a statement presumably meant to suggest, without actually saying so, that Fall’s figure is more credible than the one other published source Moyar addresses in the endnote. That other source is the one generally considered most reliable by Vietnam specialists: Edwin Moïse’s *Land Reform in China and North Vietnam*. Moïse, in his 1983 study, estimated that the total number of executions during the land reform “was probably on the rough order of 5,000 and almost certainly between 3,000 and 15,000.”¹¹ More recently he has written that “probably fewer than 8,000 landlords and would-be opponents of the regime were put to death.”¹² While the executions were horribly brutal whatever the actual figure, Moïse’s conclusions nevertheless represent an estimate that, even at its highest, was still less than half of the unnamed source relied upon by Moyar. If Moïse’s estimate was accurate, the number of executions would represent only one-fifth to one-quarter of what Moyar asserts. But a number higher than Moïse’s would be necessary if Moyar wished to represent Hanoi as, judging only by the body count, more ruthless and contemptible than Saigon. Other scholars, after all, had concluded that, to cite William Turley, the “number of politically motivated executions in the South during the 1950s probably exceeded the number in the North.”¹³ Alexander Kendrick offers an estimate for the South of “as many as 75,000 persons.”¹⁴

Moyar thus dismisses Moïse’s work on the executions in a single sentence. Fall, who covers the issue in less than a page and explains his estimate of approximately 50,000 people killed by citing simply “the best-educated guesses” — whose guesses and on what basis they were made Fall does not say — is not directly challenged by Moyar.¹⁵ But not so Moïse, who devotes seven full pages to his treatment of the land reform atrocities.¹⁶ “Moïse contended that some of Fall’s evidence was unreliable,” writes Moyar, “but his alternative approach of extrapolating

from incomplete data provided by the Communists rested on the dubious assumption that the Communists would show accurate figures to outsiders.” And that’s it. To be sure, it is certainly possible that Moïse is incorrect. Yet Moyar’s characterization of his methodology is misleading, and it is certainly the case that an author wishing to overturn the operative consensus on an historical issue will need to offer a far more effective critique than *Triumph Forsaken* does.

The example appears typical of Moyar’s style. Favorable evidence is marshaled in framing *Triumph Forsaken*’s arguments while inconvenient evidence is ignored, downplayed, or dismissed. It is of course necessary for scholars in evaluating sources to make subjective decisions about which evidence seems credible and which evidence does not. But given how often Moyar uses seemingly incriminating details from sources authored by leading specialists while concomitantly overlooking the many other details that lend these specialists’ works a nuance largely absent from *Triumph Forsaken*, readers would be well advised not to pick up Moyar’s tome in isolation. While undoubtedly the book will continue to find an enthusiastic popular audience among Iraq war proponents and other champions of a militaristic foreign policy, scholarly assessments of *Triumph Forsaken* will rest largely, I suspect, on how well its sourcing (or, in many important cases, lack of sourcing) ultimately holds up under close examination. For Moyar, the early indications cannot seem encouraging.

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Notes:

1. Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford, 1978); Robert F. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1975); Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*, Volumes I and II (Boulder, CO, 1977); and Michael Lind, *Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict* (New York, 1999).
2. While according to Moyar, American leaders

were capable of “merely telling [people] what they wanted to hear” (277), the same was evidently not true of the leaders of the Vietnamese revolution.

3. Philip E. Catton, *Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam* (Lawrence, KS, 2002), 54.
4. See, for example, Seth Jacobs, *America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957* (Durham, NC, 2004).
5. Jessica M. Chapman, “Staging Democracy: South Vietnam’s 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao Dai,” *Diplomatic History* 30:4 (September 2006): 671-703.
6. James McAllister, “H-Diplo Roundtable on *Triumph Forsaken*,” H-Diplo, July 8, 2007. Accessed at <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0707&week=b&msg=TKMIKxoGMu/mowAf/Phdcw&user=&pw=>. Moyar’s response to McAllister was disingenuous. Moyar wrote that the CIA document in question “says what I stated that it said, that there were ‘objective and well-informed U.S. official observers’ who believed Tri Quang to be a Communist.” Mark Moyar, “H-Diplo Roundtable on *Triumph Forsaken*,” H-Diplo, July 10, 2007. Accessed at <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0707&week=b&msg=FW7eyTFLws5HphU9ZBH0qQ&user=&pw=>. Yet this elided McAllister’s criticism and misrepresented what Moyar originally claimed. Moyar did not write in *Triumph Forsaken* that U.S. “official observers” believed this of Tri Quang; rather, he wrote that some “high-ranking” U.S. officials believed it, which is quite different.
7. Gareth Porter, “Did South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem Get a Bad Rap, and Were the Dominos Really Ready to Fall?” *Vietnam* 20:1 (June 2007): 60.
8. Edwin Moïse, *A Glance at Moyar’s Book*, Comment No. 99133, History News Network, October 8, 2006, accessed at <http://hnn.us/readcomment.php?id=99133&bheaders=1#99133>. The book in question is Edwin E. Moïse, *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, 1996).
9. William Stueck, “*Triumph Forsaken* Roundtable Review,” H-Diplo, July 2, 2007, 24, accessed at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/TriumphForsaken-Roundtable.pdf>.
10. Shawn Frederick McHale, *Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam* (Honolulu, 2004), 35-6, 193.
11. Edwin E. Moïse, *Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level* (Chapel Hill, 1983), 222. See also Edwin E. Moïse, “Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam,” *Pacific Affairs* 49:1 (Spring 1976): 70-92.
12. Edwin E. Moïse, “Land Reform,” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History* (Oxford, 2000), 219.
13. William S. Turley, *The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954-1975* (Boulder, CO, 1986), 18.
14. Alexander Kendrick, *The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945-1974* (Boston, 1974), 112.
15. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A*

A Call to Arms

Mark Moyar

This roundtable has turned out to be a battle rather than a discussion. When I originally agreed to participate in the roundtable, I did so with the understanding that the composition of the group would be balanced. All four of the individuals who wrote commentaries, however, had expressed disdain for me or like-minded historians before the roundtable was organized. One is on the record as saying that people who interpret the Vietnam War as I do argue only on emotion, not reason;¹ a second launched into a hysterical tirade about me at a conference at Williams College earlier this year;² the third is so far to the left that he attacks historians for accepting massively documented facts such as the Communists' slaughter of thousands of civilians at Hue in 1968³ or the American antiwar movement's hostility to Vietnam veterans;⁴ and the fourth assailed many of my book's main arguments in a journal article last year.⁵

Three of four of the commentators employ the same approach: they attack the book on a few points, ignore the rest, and then issue sweeping verdicts. Two of them allege that the book contains little of historical significance, in stark and suspicious contrast to the many other scholars, including some who disagree strongly with certain of the book's points, who have concluded that it contains numerous new findings on such subjects as the media, counterinsurgency, conventional military operations, American policy, South Vietnamese politics, North Vietnamese plans and capabilities, the influence of Vietnam on Indonesia, and international support for the war.

When assaulting *Triumph Forsaken*, the four commentators frequently misstate my views, and they present poor or no substantiation for their counter-arguments. The greatest

number of flaws can be found in the critique by David Kaiser. It comes as no surprise that Kaiser does not care for *Triumph Forsaken*, since it contradicts most of what he wrote in his book *American Tragedy* and mentions several instances where Kaiser misrepresented sources, although it did not use those instances to issue blanket condemnations (*Triumph Forsaken*, 454, 462, 466; subsequent citations from the book appear in parentheses with page numbers only). But the viciousness of Kaiser's attacks is unusual, since senior historians do not normally explode at junior scholars who teach at little-known colleges. That should be especially true of established historians who consider themselves leaders in the field. (In *American Tragedy*, Kaiser likened himself to Thucydides and proclaimed, "I have provided by far the most thorough and best-documented account yet of the American decision to go to war and added a great deal to our understanding of the South Vietnamese role in the war and of Viet Cong tactics."⁶)

With respect to the battle of Ap Bac, Kaiser claims that I present no evidence from 1963 showing that U.S. advisers believed John Paul Vann had exaggerated South Vietnamese mistakes. His assertion is disproved on the very page he references, where two contemporaneous sources, Roger Hilsman and Andrew P. O'Meara, explicitly corroborated my point (196). Another contemporaneous source is cited in the footnotes (452n31). Kaiser also gives the mistaken impression that I believe most Americans were completely satisfied with South Vietnamese performance at Ap Bac. In reality, I note that General Paul Harkins and his boss, Admiral Harry Felt, were both disappointed by South Vietnamese performance during the battle, and that Harkins urged the South Vietnamese to relieve two of the commanders (203).

Kaiser maintains that Viet Cong attacks were increasing in the late summer of 1963. In his book, Kaiser went even further, claiming that in July 1963 the Viet Cong began "their biggest offensive of the entire war."⁷ The statistics presented in *Triumph*

Forsaken, statistics that Kaiser ignores, show that Viet Cong attacks actually fell slightly from June to July 1963, going from 410 to 407. They decreased further to 368 in August. They then increased to 503 in September, before falling back to 369 in October. The monthly average for July to October is 412, almost identical to the June figure (462n15).

Kaiser contends that a Defense Intelligence Agency report "confirmed all of State's conclusions about declining military trends during 1963." This report actually contained far fewer figures than the State Department report and did not repeat State's assertion that the Viet Cong accelerated their attacks in mid-1963. In addition, the report's conclusions encompassed not merely the summer and early fall but also November 1963, a month in which political upheaval wrecked the South Vietnamese war effort.⁸

Kaiser's argument that the overrunning of fifty strategic hamlets represented Communist progress across the whole Mekong Delta is unsustainable. On September 10, 1963, Rufus Phillips told President Kennedy that fifty hamlets had been overrun recently in the Mekong Delta. Phillips later revealed that fifty hamlets had been overrun in Long An at this time. (248-49) At the September 10 meeting, therefore, his principal evidence for problems in the Mekong Delta was the overrunning of 50 hamlets in Long An. In a written report dated September 1, 1963, Phillips himself stated that Long An was one of only two Mekong Delta provinces experiencing major reverses in the strategic hamlet program during this period.⁹ Phillips clearly did not believe that the war effort was deteriorating throughout the delta.

Next comes Kaiser's statement that *Triumph Forsaken* acknowledges that Viet Cong attacks were increasing in An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Ba Xuyen, and Kien Tuong provinces. The book contains no such statement. Kaiser criticizes my description of Ba Xuyen as sparsely populated, apparently basing his assertion on population figures in a 1961 document cited in Edward Miller's commentary. That document, however, has different provincial boundaries from those

existing in 1963—the Ba Xuyen province in the 1961 document was the second largest province in the Mekong Delta, with over 5,500 square miles—and hence Ba Xuyen in 1963 was considerably smaller. Nevertheless, even if one uses the 1961 figures, the population density in “Ba Xuyen” was less than half that of delta provinces to the north.

In focusing on attack statistics, Kaiser ignores the critical question of how well the government responded to those attacks. Kaiser merely claims that “the war and the strategic hamlet program were in fact going very badly in the second half of 1963,” without supporting evidence. *Triumph Forsaken*, on the other hand, sets forth a wealth of evidence that until November 1963 the strategic hamlet program and the rest of the South Vietnamese war effort were going well nationwide. Much of the information comes from Communist sources and from anti-Diem journalists admired by Kaiser, like David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan (206-11, 246-49, 256-58, 281-87).

When complaining about my discussion of Francis Serong’s March 1963 report, Kaiser omits critical contextual information. In his book, Kaiser describes the report as “a devastating survey of the war” that concluded that the strategic hamlet program “had counterproductive results” and that was written in “a considerably more severe tone” than an October 1962 report.¹⁰ In *Triumph Forsaken*, I note that Kaiser’s characterization of this document was far too negative; while Serong pointed out what he saw as significant problems, he also said that “we are winning this war” and described the strategic hamlet program as “presently successful.”¹¹

Kaiser next insinuates that my statement about Tran Quoc Buu’s support for Diem’s Buddhist policies is contradicted by Tran Quoc Buu’s subsequent (September 1963) negative comments about Ngo Dinh Nhu. But supporting Diem’s policies and disliking Nhu were not incompatible. At this time, some key South Vietnamese generals who opposed Nhu supported a hard line against the Buddhists. Contempt for Nhu among

South Vietnamese military officers and civilians, including I suspect Tran Quoc Buu, escalated in late August and September 1963 after the U.S. press and government wrongly denounced Nhu for masterminding the pagoda raids.

Although Kaiser claims that his book does not portray the Buddhist protesters as good citizens motivated only by dissatisfaction with governmental religious intolerance, his section on the subject depicts the Buddhists in just this manner.¹² Nowhere in *American Tragedy* will one find the evidence of Buddhist duplicity and political conniving cited in *Triumph Forsaken*, such as Buddhist unreceptivity to governmental acts of conciliation (213, 219-20); Communist infiltration of the Buddhist movement (217, 231); American observations that the Buddhists were using charges of religious oppression as a façade for pursuing political goals (219); or violent Buddhist protests aimed at disrupting the June 16 agreement between more moderate Buddhists and the government (222).

Kaiser complains that I used some facts from an August 1964 CIA report without quoting other parts of the document and goes on to mischaracterize the comments I made on this subject at Williams College. I addressed this issue at some length on H-Diplo already, and must refer readers to that forum because I have too much else to cover in the limited space granted for this roundtable.¹³ Here I will merely state that it is common practice for historians to accept as true certain facts in a document (in this case, facts about a monk’s life) without necessarily accepting as true the opinions expressed in the document (in this case, the speculation of CIA analysts about Tri Quang’s political persuasion).

Kaiser disputes my assertion that George Ball opposed escalation because of his appointment as devil’s advocate, but he fails to explain away the statements of Dean Rusk, who was Ball’s boss at the time. In Kaiser’s opinion, it “boggles the mind” that I did not mention Ball’s October 5, 1964 objection to escalation. He apparently forgot that H.R. McMaster previously

debunked this memo as evidence of Ball’s heartfelt opposition.¹⁴ Another reason to doubt Ball’s dovishness was his emphatic support in February 1965 for the bombing of North Vietnam.¹⁵

When contesting my statements about the military importance of the Mekong Delta, Kaiser provides no evidence or argument. He invokes John Prados’s thinly sourced *Blood Road* to claim that the United States could not have blocked the Ho Chi Minh Trail for logistical reasons, ignoring my detailed rebuttal of that argument (322-24, 481). I addressed the issue of the feasibility of invading North Vietnam on H-Diplo.¹⁶

Edward Miller repeatedly misstates the content of *Triumph Forsaken*. As described by Miller, the book acknowledges Communist advances in four Mekong Delta provinces during the summer of 1963, advances that Miller contends were more important than I let on because these provinces were heavily populated. What I actually state in *Triumph Forsaken* is that the Communists concentrated their attacks in four provinces but caused major damage in only two (247-48). I subsequently observe that even in those two provinces, the Communists did not inflict severe damage on the strategic hamlets until after Diem’s assassination (285). Miller gives the impression that I believe that Diem “was on the verge of winning” in 1963. I actually argue the following: “Had Diem lived, the Viet Cong could have kept the war going as long as they continued to receive new manpower from North Vietnam and maintained sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, but it is highly doubtful that the war would have reached the point where the United States needed to introduce several hundred thousand of its own troops to avert defeat, as it would under Diem’s successors” (286).

Miller takes me to task for not mentioning that the South Vietnamese government ceded large amounts of territory to the Communists in 1963 in Binh Duong and other provinces. But the Saigon government’s abandonment of some territory in Binh Duong, the result of unusually heavy enemy resistance and difficult terrain, ran contrary to trends in

most provinces. Nationwide, the South Vietnamese government was increasing its control of both population and territory in the summer and fall of 1963 (248, 283-85). Within Binh Duong, the withdrawal from certain areas did not prevent the Diem government from using the strategic hamlet program to expand its control over the province's population, which mattered more than territory. Although the strategic hamlet program encountered more difficulties in Binh Duong than in the other III Corps provinces, it was not in the same category as the worst delta provinces (247-48, 284-85). A September 1963 USOM report stated that in Binh Duong, the South Vietnamese were succeeding militarily, and "substantial gains are being made in the strategic hamlet program." It noted that of 205 strategic hamlets planned for Binh Duong, 108 had been completed and 50 were under construction. The strategic hamlets contained 209,944 people of the total provincial population of 302,655.¹⁷ A Viet Cong report on Binh Duong in the late summer of 1963 confirms that the South Vietnamese government was militarily and politically aggressive and was able to recruit most of the province's youths into its service, while the Viet Cong were enduring heavy losses and could not obtain any popular support in the strategic hamlets.¹⁸

Miller contends that I use "rather unconventional military logic" in making the "breathtaking claim" that although the Viet Cong succeeded tactically at Ap Bac and may have suffered fewer casualties than their enemies, they failed strategically because they lost a much larger fraction of their total armed forces. That logic is far from unconventional. Historians of the American Civil War commonly contend that although Union casualties outnumbered Confederate casualties in battles like Shiloh, Antietam, Murfreesboro, and Chancellorsville, these battles benefited the Union strategically because the smaller Confederate armed forces were losing a larger fraction of their total strength.¹⁹

According to Miller, the Communists' strategic objective at Ap

Bac was to maul a numerically and technologically superior force. That is a tactical objective. Their strategic objective was to destroy large numbers of government forces, for they viewed the South Vietnamese armed forces as the principal impediment to final victory (70-71, 300-01, 339-40, 359) and also hoped that heavy casualties would encourage dissension within the Saigon government (146, 161). Ap Bac could have provided a strategic benefit for the Viet Cong had it served as the blueprint for many subsequent Viet Cong victories, but in the ensuing ten months the Viet Cong usually suffered defeat when they assembled in large numbers as they had at Ap Bac (208-11, 246-48, 256-57).

Miller claims that a Communist acknowledgment of damage caused by "land expropriation" does not mean that Diem's land reform achieved substantial results. Miller's reasoning is not entirely clear, but he does say that a different passage in the document shows that the South Vietnamese undertook "land expropriation" not to provide more equitable land distribution but to increase their own power. The passage he cites actually says nothing of the kind; it merely lists land expropriation as one of many enemy initiatives that should be opposed.²⁰ Focusing on the political impact of expropriation without reference to the uses of the expropriated land is akin to focusing on the political impact of taxation without reference to government spending. What hurt the insurgents was not the expropriation of the land but the distribution of this land to farmers who had owned no land, for landowning farmers were poor targets for Viet Cong promises of land redistribution.

In Miller's estimation, Diem's land reform was "desultory." Before the start of Diem's land reform in 1956, nearly 80 percent of the peasants in the highly populous Mekong Delta owned no land.²¹ By 1960, only 44 percent of Delta peasants remained landless.²² How Miller considers this achievement unimpressive is beyond me. Would we consider it unimpressive if the number of Americans below the poverty line in a large and populous area went from 80

percent to 44 percent in four years?

Miller leads the reader to believe that I view Diem's land reform as an unalloyed success. In reality, I note that the program suffered from major problems, including an excessively high ownership limit and a lack of funding, and that it left a large number of peasants in the Mekong Delta without land (73). Miller then claims that I overlook Diem's relocation of peasants to the highlands, but in fact I discuss how and why Diem relocated these peasants, as well as their subsequent influence on the war in the highlands (72, 392).

In Miller's opinion, I invoke "an outdated and condescending understanding of the peasants." He offers no explanation to back up this accusation. His next bold denunciation, that I possess a "superficial understanding of Vietnamese political history and political culture," also lacks substantiation.

Miller's claim that Vietnam's Buddhist monks had frequently engaged in political activities is followed by no enumeration of such activities. According to Miller, I argue that "Tri Quang and the other leaders of the movement must have been communist operatives," but I actually argue that Hanoi's influence among top Buddhist leaders is not certain, although considerable evidence suggests that one of them, Tri Quang, was a Communist (217-18). Miller goes so far as to say that there is no reliable evidence that any leaders of the 1963 Buddhist movement were Communists. While there is no smoking gun, there is much evidence that gives cause to suspect Communist affiliation. The Hanoi government has acknowledged that it had agents in the Buddhist movement, without stating whether any of them occupied influential leadership positions (217, 231). A large amount of evidence on Tri Quang cannot be as easily dismissed as Miller suggests, such as the fact that Tri Quang advocated collaboration with the Communists during the 1963 crisis, or that in 1964 some of Tri Quang's followers turned against him and declared him to be a Communist (217-18). One of Tri Quang's lieutenants, Dr. Le

Khac Quyen, was widely believed to be a Communist because of his leadership of a People's Revolutionary Committee in 1964 (317).

Miller then asserts that I "misrepresent" the "textual content" of sources, which "dramatically embellishes the available record" and "raises worrisome questions about whether and how frequently he plays fast and loose with his sources." Miller seems to be asserting that I seriously misrepresent the meaning of sources, but when he gets down to specifics it turns out that he is discussing something of much less significance, which raises the question of why he used such ominous and inflammatory language. What he is discussing is merely the use of meeting notes as verbatim transcripts—a matter of style rather than content, upon which reasonable people sometimes disagree. Other historians have employed this same method without incurring this sort of denunciation. Richard Reeves, for example, uses it extensively in his highly acclaimed *President Kennedy*, which won best non-fiction book of the year awards from *Time Magazine* and PEN.

Scott Laderman contends that I present no evidence of an authoritarian political culture in Vietnam. Somehow he missed a great deal of that evidence in the pages of *Triumph Forsaken*. For instance, in the elections held in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam, almost everyone voted as the government told them to vote, and very few became upset when the government's preferred candidates won by overwhelming margins or when non-preferred candidates were allowed to win but relegated to meaningless offices (17, 54-55, 75-76). The Communists and Diem's nationalists both mobilized the peasantry effectively without holding democratic elections in the villages (71, 158). Most Vietnamese chose their political allegiance on the basis of the armed strength, prestige, and charisma of a political leader or group, rather than political ideology or political programs (16-18, 43-44, 52-55, 62-63, 80-81, 93-94, 136, 152-53, 160, 169, 209, 216, 232-33, 316).²³ In denouncing my portrayal of an authoritarian culture, the sole fact that Laderman invokes

is Diem's discussion of democracy in the October 1955 referendum. As I explain in the book, Diem paid lip service to democracy and took some superficially democratic actions merely to please the United States and the small South Vietnamese intellectual class (75).

Laderman goes on to claim that my interpretation of Vietnamese mass culture "echoes much too closely the racist suppositions of American policymakers in earlier decades." Laderman's unsubstantiated insinuation of racism is a poor and irresponsible substitute for dispassionate analysis. I never raise the issue of race in discussing Vietnamese political culture, nor do I say that authoritarian cultures are peculiar to Asia or other non-Western regions. Most Vietnamese agree with my description of Vietnamese political culture, which is one reason why my books are very popular among Vietnamese-Americans.

In Laderman's view, American support for the bombing of North Vietnam shows that Americans have the same respect for power as the Vietnamese. Using force against a foreign country is, however, quite different from using force within one's own. Americans, unlike the Vietnamese, have long disdained the use of force against political oppositionists within the United States. Laderman adds that Vietnamese concerns about prestige and face were similar to U.S. concerns about credibility. There are some important similarities, but also important differences. Certain events that caused a devastating loss of face in Vietnam, such as public protests against the government, would not have had the same impact in the United States (46, 62-63, 216, 230-32).

Laderman approvingly cites Gareth Porter's dispute of my claim that the Malayan Communist insurgency never stopped. But numerous accounts show that Commonwealth forces continued counterinsurgency operations against Malayan Communist guerrillas after the "Emergency" was officially declared over in July 1960.²⁴ Porter was also wrong when he alleged that one of my sources, Chin Peng's memoirs,

stated that the insurgency ended in 1960. Chin Peng actually stated that although the Malayan Communist Party had demobilized many guerrillas after July 1960, its guerrilla strength did not fall below 300 prior to the 1961 decision to accelerate the armed struggle.²⁵ The claims of Edwin Moïse and William Stueck cited by Laderman have already been rebutted elsewhere.²⁶

Laderman disputes my assertions that the Vietnamese Communists killed tens of thousands of people by the end of 1946 and killed more in 1945 and 1946 than all other Vietnamese groups combined. In his description of Shawn McHale's writings, Laderman neglects a key phrase of McHale's upon which I base my assertions: "tens of thousands of Vietnamese were killed."²⁷ The available sources on this subject, which I summarized on pages 17 to 19, make it clear that the Communists were the principal killers during 1945 and 1946. According to David Marr, the Communists killed several thousand "alleged enemies of the revolution" in late August and September 1945 alone.²⁸ François Guillemot notes that "revolutionary purification" took between 4,000 and 8,000 lives in Quang Ngai and that the Communists massacred significant numbers of Hoa Hao and Cao Dai believers.²⁹ And in 1946, the Communists killed large numbers of people in overrunning several provinces held by the Vietnam Nationalist Party (19).

Next on Laderman's list is my citation of a former Communist land reform cadre who said that the Communist land reform campaigns killed 32,000 people. According to Laderman, I do not give any explanation as to why this person should be trusted, but the fact that this person had been a land reform cadre, which I stated in the text, is a very good reason. Had this document been challenged in the years after Arthur Dommen first cited it in his 2001 book, then perhaps its validity would have been worthy of further explanation, but between 2001 and now, no one has challenged the document, or Dommen's manner of citation, which is very similar to mine.³⁰ Laderman

then states that he is not persuaded by my dismissal of Edwin Moïse's estimate of deaths in the Communist land reform campaigns. Rather than address the substance of my critique, Laderman merely contends that Moïse is more reliable because he spent seven pages making his case while I contradicted it in a single sentence. I remain convinced that one sentence suffices to call Moïse's calculations into doubt, for it takes but one sentence to state that his data came from a perennially untrustworthy and partisan source, the Hanoi government.

Laderman invokes William Turley and Alexander Kendrick to argue that the South Vietnamese government killed "as many as 75,000 persons" in the 1950s. He neglects to mention that Kendrick's book *The Wound Within* was Turley's only source, and that *The Wound Within* provides no source for the 75,000 figure. I would be suspicious of anything contained in *The Wound Within*, considering that it contains no footnotes and it espouses some of the most egregious fictions concocted by the antiwar movement, such as that the Hue Massacre was a myth and that My Lai was "a typical incident in the war."³¹ In *Triumph Forsaken*, by contrast, I cite a Communist complaint that the anti-Communist campaigns took 4,971 lives through January 1959, which may well be an overstatement given the Communists' track record on such matters (65).

In contrast to the other commentaries, David Anderson's piece is a model of civil discourse, eschewing ad hominem attacks and unsubstantiated blanket condemnations. The issues he discusses have been addressed above except for one crucial issue that the other commentators ignored—the strategic importance of South Vietnam. Anderson contends that the domino theory was invalid because the Vietnamese Communists were nationalists who did not have the intentions or capabilities to expand beyond Vietnam. But I believe that they had the intentions and, increasingly, the capabilities. Ho Chi Minh and his disciples fervently believed in Marxist-Leninist

internationalism and tried to promote revolution beyond Vietnam's borders (8-11, 25, 83, 359, 425n51). By the early 1960s, they already had large numbers of troops in Laos, and later in the war they would have a large military and political presence in Cambodia. In the late 1970s, they ran into trouble in Cambodia and could not get beyond it, but their failure was a result of Hanoi's falling out with China, which was a by-product of the Vietnam War. During 1965, Hanoi and Beijing were working in unison to spread Communism across Asia. Meeting in the spring of 1965, Ho Chi Minh and Mao discussed building roads to Thailand in order to fight future wars (362-63). Had the United States not prevented North Vietnam from overrunning South Vietnam in 1965, other U.S. allies in the region, such as Thailand and Japan, almost certainly would have switched allegiance to China without Chinese or North Vietnamese military action. Others, like Malaysia, probably would have fallen victim to Communist insurgency. Absent U.S. intervention in Vietnam, Indonesia's pro-Chinese government most likely would not have fallen to anti-Communist military officers as it did in late 1965. The United States thus would have lost many of its military bases and trading partners, with profoundly damaging long-term implications (376-91).

Considering that the most prominent scholars have been in confident agreement on the war's big issues, one might not expect that a single challenge to the orthodoxy would cause legions of academics to unsheathe their swords. If the historical profession maintained the atmosphere of free inquiry it purports to maintain, indeed, a challenge to popular ideas would be welcomed as a guardian against complacency and a stimulus to debate in place of mutual back-patting. Regrettably, as this exchange has confirmed, ideological conformism and poorly substantiated contempt for dissent prevail too often at today's institutions of higher learning.

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U.S. Marine Corps University.

Notes:

1. David L. Anderson, "One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 2006), 1-21.
2. David Kaiser, at the conference entitled "New Vietnam War Revisionism: Implications and Lessons," Williams College, March 2-3, 2007.
3. Scott Laderman, "'They Set About Revenging Themselves on the Population': The Hue Massacre in Travel Guide Books, and the Shaping of Historical Consciousness in Vietnam," http://just.nicepeople.free.fr/The_Hue_Massacre.htm.
4. Scott Laderman, "Recovering the Reality of 'Supporting Our Troops,'" *The Minnesota Daily*, March 14, 2003.
5. Edward Miller, "War Stories: The Taylor-Buzzanco Debate and How We Think about the Vietnam War," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, vol. 1, No. 1-2 (2006), 453-484.
6. David Kaiser, *American Tragedy* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 2, 7, 9.
7. *Ibid.*, 220.
8. Carroll to McNamara, 13 December 1963, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, vol. 4, 366.
9. USOM Rural Affairs, "Second Informal Appreciation of the Status of the Strategic Hamlet Program," 1 September 1963, JFKL, NSF, Box 204.
10. Kaiser, *American Tragedy*, 190-192.
11. Serong, "Strategic Review," 14 March 1963, MHI, Westmoreland Papers, box 28. Serong likewise said the war was being won in the October 1962 report mentioned by Kaiser.
12. Kaiser, *American Tragedy*, 213-226.
13. <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/TriumphForsaken-Moyar.pdf> and <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=0707&week=b&msg=FW7eyTFLws5HphU9ZBHqQ&user=&pw=>
14. H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York, 1997), 166-7.
15. Smith, NSC meeting notes, 6 February 1965, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. 2, 76; McCone, "White House Meeting on Vietnam," 6 February 1965, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. 2, 77; McCone, "Meeting of the National Security Council," 8 February 1965, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. 2, 88; Ball to Johnson, 13 February 1965, *FRUS*, 1964-1968, vol. 2, 113.
16. <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/TriumphForsaken-Moyar.pdf>.
17. USOM Rural Affairs, "Second Informal Appreciation of the Status of the Strategic Hamlet Program."
18. "Binh Duong Monthly Report," August 1963, Virtual Vietnam Archive, item 23119056001.
19. See, for instance, James M. McPherson, *Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War* (New York, 1996); Alan T. Nolan, *Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History* (Chapel Hill, 1991).
20. VCD 257, September 1962, TTU, Pike Collection, Unit 1, box 1.
21. Carlyle A. Thayer, *War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954-60* (Sydney, 1989), 119.
22. Roy L. Prosterman, "Land Reform in

Vietnam," *Current History*, December 1969, 327-32.

23. See also Mark Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam* (Lincoln, NE, 2007).

24. For instance, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Gray, *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950-1966* (St. Leonards, NSW, 1996); Christopher Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo, 1949-1966* (South Melbourne, Vic., 2003).

25. Chin Peng, *My Side of History* (Singapore, 2003), 435.

26. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=0707&week=b&msg=His1A0U%2bm1eSs3cy0auayw&use_r=&pw= and <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/TriumphForsaken-Moyar.pdf>.

27. Shawn McHale, *Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam* (Honolulu, 2004), 36.

28. David Marr, *Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power* (Berkeley, 1995), 519.

29. François Guillemot, "Au coeur de la fracture vietnamienne: L'élimination de l'opposition nationaliste et anticolonialiste dans le Nord du Vietnam (1945-1946)," in Christopher E. Goscha and Benoit De Tréglodé, eds., *Naissance d'un État-Parti: Le Viêt Nam depuis 1945* (Paris, 2003), 207-8.

30. Arthur J. Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and*

Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bloomington, 2001), 340.

31. Alexander Kendrick, *The Wound Within* (Boston, 1974), 249, 256.

Editor's Response

Mitchell Lerner

I have served as editor of *Passport* for more than four years, and have never felt it necessary to insert my own comments into a roundtable that we published. I hope to not have to do so again. However, the first paragraph of Mark Moyar's submission suggests that he was misled when he agreed to participate in the discussion of his book, since he was promised "balance" in the selection of commentators, a balance that he believes did not materialize. Such a charge, I think, merits a clarification from the editor.

The criterion involved in the process of choosing *Passport* reviewers is in fact remarkably simple: participants are selected because they have a recognized expertise in the book's topic. I believe that the job of the editor is not to try to ensure divergent responses; in fact, since I have no way of knowing how people will feel about a book until they send me their commentaries, I obviously cannot assume their conclusions in advance. Nor do I feel it is appropriate for me to consider the political leanings of potential reviewers before inviting them to participate since no member of SHAFR should have to answer to me or anyone else about their political beliefs as a requirement for publication in the organization newsletter. Instead, I look for people who have written widely on the topic and hence can evaluate the sources and place the book within a broader historical and political context. Any one interested in evaluating the expertise of these four reviewers need only to spend a few minutes on the internet to find their CVs; doing so will reveal an extensive collection of books, articles, chapters, and presentations on this topic. On this level, then, I stand by my selections for this roundtable.

In my view, historians of any political stripe or background can read a work, even one whose conclusions

they reject, and evaluate it objectively. When they do so, as I believe the authors here have done, they have demonstrated balance. The four commentaries here seem to analyze the work in question on its merits and only on its merits. An author can ask no more.

The first *Passport* roundtable saw three historians offer criticisms of John Gaddis' *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Many of their comments faulted the book for being too charitable towards President Bush's policies. Yet while the commentaries were tough they also struck me as thoughtful, substantive, and fair. And Gaddis's response was a model of professionalism, erudition, clarity, and wit. That debate should be held up as an example of how historians of different ideological stripes can disagree without questioning the underlying motivation of those who disagree with them. And it is a model that I hope to always follow in these roundtables.

FREE LIST-SHARING FOR JOB ADVERTISEMENTS

SHAFR Council recently decided to provide SHAFR's e-mail and postal mailing lists, free of charge, to any academic department in the world that is running a job search in diplomatic or international history.

SHAFR members are encouraged to notify departmental or search committee chairs of this new program and to encourage them to make use of these mailing lists.

Questions can be addressed to Peter L. Hahn, SHAFR Executive Director, at shafr@osu.edu.

The Atomic Bomb and *American Prometheus*: A Review and Response

Robert Maddox, Martin J. Sherwin, and Kai Bird

American Prometheus: Beating the Dead Horse of Hiroshima Revisionism

Robert Maddox

American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, by Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, has won the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Critics Circle Award and promises to garner even more honors. The book, its authors modestly proclaim, has been "exhaustively researched over twenty-five years." Comments such as "a great biography," "a magisterial page-turner," and "a triumph beautifully told," are but a few of the accolades heaped upon it.¹ What no one has pointed out is that a key portion of the book dealing with the months leading up to the use of atomic bombs against Japan and the immediate aftermath of the bombing ignores almost all recent scholarship on the subject and badly mangles what little documentary material is used.

Bird and Sherwin present the standard version of what has become known as Hiroshima revisionism. The Japanese had been trying to surrender as early as the spring of 1945, according to this view, and would have done so if only they had received assurance that they could retain their sacred emperor. President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes knew this through intercepted diplomatic messages but declined to make such a gesture because they wanted the war to continue until atomic bombs were ready for use. The main purpose of the weapons was not to defeat an already defeated Japan,

Bird and Sherwin claim, but rather to intimidate the Soviet Union with this new power. Atomic bombs did not shorten the war, therefore, but instead prolonged it.

Like other Hiroshima revisionists, Bird and Sherwin are unable to produce even a wisp of evidence that Japan was willing to surrender before the atomic bombs were dropped. They attempt to compensate for this inconvenient deficiency by using a bait-and-switch tactic invented by Gar Alperovitz during the 1960s: claim without any substantiation that the Japanese were trying to surrender, then cite as corroboration some document that indicated they were seeking "peace." Bird and Sherwin tell their readers that "military intelligence in Washington had intercepted and decoded messages from Japan indicating that the Japanese government understood the war was lost and was seeking acceptable surrender terms." They provide no evidence for this contention. On the next page they give us the text of one of these messages:

Finally, President Truman himself seemed to think that the Japanese were very close to capitulation. Writing in his private, handwritten diary on July 18, the president referred to a recently intercepted cable quoting the emperor to the Japanese envoy in Moscow as a "telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace." The cable said "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace."²

Yet the phrase "Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace" appears nowhere in the

intercepted cable traffic. It did appear in a book written by Robert J. C. Butow in 1954. Sherwin cites these words in his *A World Destroyed*, published in 1975, and apparently he liked them so much that he has used them for more than thirty years even though the messages themselves have long since been declassified and made available to the public.³ No matter. Even if the phrase had appeared in an intercepted message, the attempt to equate "peace" with "surrender" is mere semantic jugglery.

The reason Bird and Sherwin, along with other Hiroshima revisionists, have to resort to such hocus pocus is simple: the Japanese were not trying to surrender during the summer of 1945. A group that Robert P. Newman refers to as the "civilian elite," acting with the approval of the emperor but kept under close watch by the military hardliners, was trying to use the Soviet Union to broker a negotiated peace that would have preserved the imperial system (not just the emperor) and Japan's prewar empire intact. As a Japanese official told the Soviet ambassador in early July, "Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that, together with the Russian army, would make a force unequalled in the world."⁴ That any American official reading such a statement would interpret it to mean that Japan was trying to surrender is absurd.

The question of whether Japan would have capitulated if only Truman had extended a guarantee about the emperor was asked and answered in the negative by the Japanese themselves. On July 17, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo instructed Ambassador Naotake Sato

in Moscow to "please bear particularly in mind . . . that we are not asking [for] the Russians' mediation in anything like unconditional surrender." When Sato proposed the next day that Japan had no choice but to surrender unconditionally provided the emperor was retained, Togo replied, "we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever."⁵ The "early surrender" thesis, therefore, is no more than a hoax that has been perpetrated by Hiroshima revisionists for nearly sixty years.

Bird and Sherwin's account of the situation in Washington during these weeks is equally unreal. In their zeal to promote the myth that American officials knew the Japanese were trying to surrender, the authors make bizarre statements such as "nearly all the president's advisers believed the war would be over by that date [November 1, 1945]" without naming a single individual who held such a view.⁶ They also omit mention of developments that, if included, would show how baseless their contentions are. Alluding to a discussion Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy later claimed he had with Truman, for instance, they neglect to inform the reader that this talk came at the end of a meeting Truman had with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War on June 18. During this session, the JCS unanimously recommended that the first stage of an invasion of Japan be launched against the home island of Kyushu by November 1. When Truman's most trusted military adviser, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, stated that air power alone had been unable to defeat Germany and would not be "sufficient to put Japan out of the war," no one disagreed. Toward the end of the meeting Truman stated that "he had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other," but now he was "quite sure" the chiefs should proceed with the invasion plans. This is not the talk of men who knew the Japanese were tottering toward surrender.⁷

A corollary to the "early surrender" thesis is that Truman wanted to keep the Soviets from declaring war against the Japanese because he knew such a

move "surely" would cause them to capitulate before he could use atomic bombs. Of course he knew no such thing. Once again, Bird and Sherwin fail to produce any evidence for their accusation. In another form of bait-and-switch, they cite a remark Byrnes made nineteen years later about what he thought at the time as though this constituted proof of Truman's alleged scheme.⁸

The truth is that there is plenty of evidence to show that Truman actively sought a Soviet declaration of war throughout the summer of 1945 and was pleased when it came. On August 9 the *New York Times* published an article entitled "Russian Entry into War Revealed as Truman's Chief Aim in Berlin [Potsdam]." The reporter who wrote the article had accompanied the presidential party to and from the Potsdam Conference of late July/early August, and he said that Truman had repeatedly told newsmen en route to Potsdam that his main concern was to end the Pacific war "with the least loss of American lives" and that he believed Russian entry into the war "might save hundreds of thousands of Americans from injury or death." The reporter also noted that Truman must have elicited Stalin's promise to enter the war because "the results were evident in his demeanor on the way back." We know, too, that immediately after receiving that promise, Truman had jubilantly written to his wife, "I've gotten what I came for."⁹

Upon learning that the Soviets had declared war on August 8, Truman hastily called a press conference to announce the news. Several individuals who attended commented on how pleased he appeared to be, one noting that he "rocked with laughter" at the end of the session when reporters jammed the doorway in their haste to file their stories. The next day he told aides that he went to Potsdam "entirely for the purpose of making sure that Stalin would come in then [August 15] or earlier if possible." He also wrote a state Democratic party official who had complained about the newspaper headline "Truman Jubilant Over New Bomb" that if he read the paper again he would find that "the good feeling on my part

was over the fact Russia had entered into the war against Japan and not that we had invented a new engine of destruction."¹⁰

Bird and Sherwin revive another old revisionist chestnut in their version of how Truman informed the Soviets about the bomb at Potsdam. At the end of a plenary session on July 24, the president walked around the conference table to where Stalin was standing with his interpreter and said something to the effect that the United States had "a new weapon of unusual destructive force," to which Stalin replied that he was pleased and hoped the United States would make "good use of it against Japan." Truman's later account of this conversation is the only source available, so it is not certain precisely what words were used, let alone how they came out in translation. Bird and Sherwin profess to see Truman's words as a deliberate attempt to mislead Stalin so as to prevent him from declaring war before the bombs could be used. "Instead of an open and frank discussion of the nature of the weapon," they write, "Truman coyly confined himself to a cryptic reference."¹¹

As usual, the authors of *American Prometheus* provide nothing to support their allegation, relying instead on the words "coy" and "cryptic" to convey the notion of prior intent. Their version of Truman's behavior rests on several assumptions that are far-fetched, to say the least. The first assumption is that Truman, after having told those around him that he was going to inform Stalin about the bomb, decided at the last minute to resort to trickery without consulting anyone. The second is that Truman somehow knew beforehand that Stalin would fail to ask any questions, thereby ensuring that his opening remark would be the only words he spoke on the subject. Unless Truman had hitherto unrevealed psychic powers, this is patently ridiculous. Finally, there is the assumption that atomic weapons were like some sort of Martian death ray that Stalin could have known nothing about, other than what Truman told him. This, too, is nonsense. American officials not only knew that the Soviets had penetrated the American atomic

program, they believed Stalin had one of his own. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had advised Truman before the conference to tell Stalin that “we were busy with this thing working like the dickens and we knew he was busy with this thing working like the dickens.”¹² That Truman hoped to fool Stalin into thinking that the “new weapon of unusual destructive force” was nothing more than an improved incendiary bomb or artillery shell is impossible to credit.

Despite their claim that *American Prometheus* has been “exhaustively researched over twenty-five years,” Bird and Sherwin write as though caught in a time warp dating back to the 1970s. They completely ignore most of the articles and books published since that time that have totally discredited the “early surrender” thesis, and they dismiss the few they do mention (two books, one article) as simply having been written from a “different perspective.” The different perspective, apparently, is one that uses archival evidence rather than merely spinning out a series of unsupported allegations.

Edward J. Drea, for instance, shows that intercepts of Japanese messages between diplomats (MAGIC) told only part of the story. Decoded military communications (ULTRA) revealed to American officials that the Japanese were engaged in a buildup of “mind-boggling proportions” on southern Kyushu during the summer of 1945. “Countless decrypted messages from the high command in Tokyo,” Drea writes, “underlined Japanese determination to fight to the death against the invaders.” Japanese generals claimed to welcome an invasion, predicting that it would be thrown back into the sea or at the very least result in such a bloodbath that the United States would agree to a negotiated peace favorable to Japan. And they held effective power.¹³

Sadao Asada, in an article based largely on Japanese sources, stresses that the atomic bombs were important (one Japanese official referred to them as a “gift from heaven”) because they enabled moderates to help the hardliners save face by arguing that Japan had been defeated by superior science rather than by military

failure. Even so, the emperor had to personally intervene twice to override the militants after both bombs had been dropped and the Soviet Union had entered the war. The notion that they would have accepted similar terms before these cataclysmic events cannot be taken seriously. These and other scholarly sources are nowhere to be found in *American Prometheus*.¹⁴

The treatment of Oppenheimer, or “Oppie” as the authors like to call him, during these weeks is at least as faulty. Bird and Sherwin depict the scientist as deeply torn between satisfaction at having brought this enormous enterprise to completion and revulsion over its ultimate purpose. Although the authors deplore the use of the bombs, they defend Oppenheimer’s failure to oppose their use on the grounds that he had been lied to with regard to how close Japan was to surrender (he had not) and because “he had become convinced that the military use of the bomb in this war might eliminate all wars.”¹⁵ Bird and Sherwin neglect to mention several examples of Oppenheimer’s behavior during this period that scarcely fit their portrait of a tragic figure agonizing over the use of this new force.

On July 17, one day after the successful test of a plutonium device, Oppenheimer called Major General Leslie R. Groves, who headed the Manhattan Project, to say that he was “unconvinced that our present plans are right.” Oppenheimer and a number of other scientists at Los Alamos wanted to cannibalize the uranium bomb (which was untested) and distribute parts of it into several plutonium bombs. When Groves vetoed this proposal, Oppenheimer called him again to press his case, arguing that the procedure he recommended “increases the number [of bombs] we can get” out of the materials on hand and “reduces the unreliable feature we have discussed.” Groves overruled him again.¹⁶

A week after the atomic test, Oppenheimer confidently predicted that the only danger of radioactivity would be in the cloud produced by the explosion and on that part of the ground touched by the fireball. The latter threat would be virtually

nonexistent provided the bomb was detonated at a sufficient altitude, as planned. When, two days after Hiroshima, a Columbia University scientist who had worked on the Manhattan Project predicted that the long-range effects of radiation would be lethal to many of those who had survived the blast, Groves telephoned Oppenheimer for his response. “This is of course lunacy,” Oppenheimer replied, and he authorized publication of his statement that measurements taken after the test explosion indicated that “there would be no appreciable activity on the ground and what little there was would decay very rapidly.”¹⁷ Bird and Sherwin fail even to mention this colossal error, let alone explore the possibility that it contributed to Oppenheimer’s sense of guilt when subsequent reports from Japan indicated that the prediction he had scoffingly referred to as “lunacy” was entirely accurate.

On August 10, the day after a second bomb had been dropped, Truman said during a Cabinet meeting that he had given orders to stop atomic bombing of cities because “the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible.” On the bottom of a memorandum Groves had sent earlier in the day stating that a third bomb would be ready August 17 or 18, General Marshall wrote that it was “not to be released over Japan without express authority of the President.” The next day Groves called Oppenheimer in Los Alamos to tell him to “ease up on the pressure” to produce more components. A bellicose Oppenheimer replied that as far as he was concerned, “until there is an official announcement that the war is over it is still on.” Obviously, the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was not “too horrible” for him.¹⁸

American Prometheus may be a good read, but that part of it having to do with using the bombs against Japan is pure fiction. Bird and Sherwin claim that Truman was willing to kill hundreds of thousands of Japanese and to permit thousands of American servicemen and prisoners of war to die solely to gain diplomatic advantage over the Soviet Union. They provide no evidence whatever to support this

monstrous charge, relying instead on word games such as conflating “peace” with “surrender.” They also misrepresent Oppenheimer’s role during this period by omitting several examples of his aggressive support for using the weapons. The man who wanted to cannibalize one bomb to increase “the number we can get out of it” and who later balked at orders to “ease up on the pressure” to produce more of them bears little resemblance to the tormented “Prometheus” Bird and Sherwin present to their readers.

Robert Maddox is professor emeritus of history at Pennsylvania State University.

Notes

1. Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, *American Prometheus* (New York, 2005). All quotations in previous two sentences are from the *American Prometheus* website, accessed at www.americanprometheus.org.
2. *American Prometheus*, 301, 302.
3. Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan’s Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954), 130; Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York, 1975), 235.
4. “The MAGIC Documents, Summaries and Transcripts of the Top Secret Diplomatic Communications of Japan, 1938-1945.” Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1980. MAGIC summary No. 1195, July 3, 1945.
5. MAGIC summary No. 1210, July 17, 1945, MAGIC summary No. 1214, July 22, 1945.
6. *American Prometheus*, 301.
7. *American Prometheus*, 300. Minutes of the White House meeting can be found in Xerox 1567, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia.
8. *American Prometheus*, 301. The authors refer to an interview Byrnes had with a television executive “circa 1964.”
9. Ernest Vaccaro, *New York Times*, August 9, 1945; Harry to Bess Truman, July 18, 1945, in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959* (New York, 1983), 519.
10. “Rocked with laughter” is from Felix Belair, Jr., *New York Times*, August 9, 1945. See also Edward T. Folliard, *Washington Post*, August 9, 1945. Truman statement to his aides is from Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers* (Columbia, MO, 1991), 62. Truman letter is to Lew Wallace, August 9, 1945, item 5-F-15, Makoto Iokibe (ed.), “The Occupation of Japan: United States Planning Documents, 1945,” Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service, 1989.
11. Truman account is in his *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, NY, 1955), 416; *American Prometheus*, 314.
12. Stimson diary entry, July 3, 1945, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Yale University.
13. Edward J. Drea, *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (Lincoln, NE, 1998), 154.
14. Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic

- Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration,” *Pacific Historical Review* 67 (November, 1998), 477-512. Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill reached similar conclusions in their “Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock,” in Saki Dockrill (ed.) *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London, 1994). Other works that have contradicted the “early surrender” myth are Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Code Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* (New York, 1995); Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman: A Life* (Columbia, MO, 1994); Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun* (New York, 1985); Robert James Maddox, *Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later* (Columbia, MO, 1995); Stanley Weintraub, *The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II* (New York, 1995); and Robert P. Newman, *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* (East Lansing, MI, 1995).
15. *American Prometheus*, 299; for the claim that Oppenheimer had been misled, see pages 300 and 302.
 16. Leslie R. Groves diary entry July 19, 1945, Groves Papers, National Archives, Washington, DC; Groves teletype to Oppenheimer, July 19, 1945, Microfilm Roll 1, “Correspondence (Top Secret) of the Manhattan Engineering District, 1942-1946,” National Archives microfilm publication M1109, Washington, DC, 1980.
 17. The Oppenheimer prediction is in Stanley Goldberg, “Note on Barton Bernstein’s ‘Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History,’” *Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter* (September, 1993), 5-7; the “lunacy” comment is in Groves’ telephone conversation with Oppenheimer, August 8, 1945, Groves diary; the Oppenheimer press release is item 5-F-14 in Iokibe, “The Occupation of Japan.”
 18. The Truman comment is in Henry A. Wallace diary entry, August 10, 1945, reprinted in Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, *The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age* (New York, 1991), 245; the Marshall quotation is from Groves to Marshall, August 10, 1945, Box 1, Leslie R. Groves Collection, Marshall Library; the Oppenheimer/Groves exchange is in Groves diary entry, August 11, 1945, Groves Papers, National Archives.

A Response to Robert Maddox

Martin J. Sherwin and Kai Bird

Professor Robert Maddox has seized on *American Prometheus*, our biography of Robert Oppenheimer, as yet another opportunity to argue that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary to induce the Japanese to surrender in August 1945. We appreciate the publicity but respectfully disagree.

Offering a selective laundry list of known facts and interpretations that support his version of the situation in Japan in the summer of 1945,

Maddox complains that we—like Oppenheimer—are somehow missing the essential point.

To reinforce his argument he accuses us of being stuck in the 1970s and then exhumes his charge, first stated in his 1973 polemic, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War*, that “the attempt to equate [the Emperor’s offer of] ‘peace’ with ‘surrender’ is mere semantic jugglery.” We confess to finding this statement utterly bizarre. In the context of the war what, other than surrender, could suing for peace mean?

Maddox also dismisses a huge body of distinguished scholarship, asserting that “like other Hiroshima revisionists, Bird and Sherwin are unable to produce even a wisp of evidence that Japan was willing to surrender before the atomic bombs were dropped.” “Even a wisp of evidence?” Such an ignorant statement can hardly be taken seriously. Every serious historian of this subject recognizes that there is evidence on all sides of this debate and that the arguments between historians are related to the relative importance each assigns to the various facts.

Tadoshi Hasegawa’s *Racing the Enemy*, which is absent from Maddox’s footnotes, is relevant here. Hasegawa’s research into Soviet and Japanese archives is replete with massive new and important “wisps” of evidence about the causes of Japan’s surrender. It seems telling to us that his work is ignored.

More interesting—and more relevant to a discussion of *American Prometheus*—are the anecdotes Maddox offers about Oppenheimer’s recommendations for the military use of the atomic bombs. They are all well taken, and they all reinforce a central point of the chapters in *American Prometheus* (21-23) that cover the Los Alamos years: for a variety of reasons, Oppenheimer unambiguously promoted the use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities without warning. To most readers that point was clear, but we commend the additional evidence Maddox provides.

Oppenheimer was a complex personality, and while supporting the atomic bombings of Japanese cities, he also harbored concerns

about the consequences that might follow from those attacks. With a few exceptions, which we document, he kept these thoughts to himself in the apparent belief that there was no other responsible alternative. But this was a view that he began to regret, even before the Japanese officially surrendered.

In August 1945, Oppenheimer was a conflicted man. He had led the atomic scientists in their two wartime crusades. The first crusade was to beat the Germans in a presumed race to a nuclear weapon. The second crusade was the almost manic effort to complete the development of the atomic bomb before the war ended.

For Oppenheimer and his colleagues, the first crusade was morally unambiguous before, during, and after the war. But the second crusade—to have the bomb ready to use against the Japanese—became problematic for Oppenheimer (and others) in the postwar years.

What made it so problematic for Oppenheimer was that after the war he learned a variety of things he had not known before August 6, 1945. He learned that the invasion of Japan had not been imminent, but was scheduled for November 1. He learned that Japanese message traffic had been intercepted indicating Japan's recognition of its hopeless situation. He also learned that the Soviets had committed to enter the war no later than August 15 and, of course, had done so on August 8. He learned too about the devastation the bombs had caused and, while he had promoted and expected those awful results, he was nevertheless, emotionally disturbed by them.

With respect to the nuances of Oppenheimer's feelings and the dramatic changes he experienced in response to the atomic bombings, it does not matter what Maddox (or Sherwin and Bird for that matter) believe about the relationship between the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of the war. The question at issue in our biography was: how did Oppenheimer come to view the bombings?

Three months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed, Oppenheimer made clear his views

about the atomic bombings. Speaking in Philadelphia on November 16, 1945 to the members of the American Philosophical Society, he addressed the implications of the new weapon he had done so much to make possible.

His theme was the revolutionary implications of nuclear weapons, the perils they presented, and their inherent potential to bring an end to war. It was a theme that had been suggested to him late in 1944 at Los Alamos by Niels Bohr, the great Danish physicist, whom Oppenheimer had first met at Cambridge University in 1926. Oppenheimer revered Bohr, and even a casual reader of *American Prometheus* would understand the powerful influence that Bohr's deeply felt and oft expressed belief that scientists must contribute to a more peaceful world had on the former star pupil of the Ethical Culture School.

If Hiroshima and Nagasaki had contributed to that goal perhaps the deaths of 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese civilians could be justified. Oppenheimer certainly wanted to believe that, yet he chose to confess to his audience in all honesty that those atomic bombs had been used "against an enemy that was essentially defeated." This was a considered conclusion that he felt strongly enough to repeat in print seven months later, in June 1946, in an article published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

Was Oppenheimer suggesting that in the aftermath of the war he now thought an invasion of Japan would have been preferable to the atomic bombings? Of course not. On the contrary, he was making the point that Professor Maddox and other defenders of those bombings consistently obscure: that the war could have been ended in August 1945 if the Truman administration had been willing to clarify the postwar status of the emperor or wait for the Soviets to declare war on Japan.

Neither Oppenheimer nor any known historian has ever argued that the invasion option was preferable. The false dichotomy—atomic bombings or invasion—promoted by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in his 1947 *Harper's* article, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," was the historical fallacy that Oppenheimer

chose to preempt and challenge (unsuccessfully).

We believe that the weight of all of those "wisps" of evidence that historians have uncovered over the course of more than sixty years suggests that Oppenheimer was right and that Professor Maddox is wrong. The atomic bombings, like an invasion of Japan, were options, and not necessary ones, to induce Japan's surrender.

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Kai Bird is a contributing editor of The Nation.

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An Editor's Book Publishing Tips for the Uninitiated

Susan Ferber

Perhaps the most critical step in the professional lives of historians is publishing that first book, yet historians rarely talk about the publication process within their departments. The key to success is not an insider's secret. Getting published is something that can be learned—just like interviewing, applying for grants, and constructing a syllabus. For those who imagine the publishing world as the Land of Oz and picture editors as shadowy figures behind the curtain, what follows is meant to erect some guideposts that can help point the way to the Emerald City.

Research, Research, Research

Like learning the tricks of the trade for doing archival research, finding out about publishers is a matter of doing your homework, and homework, naturally, begins at home. Look at your bookshelves: the publishers' names on the spines of your books will orient you towards the presses that put out the books that have been most influential in your choice of topic and approach. Check out the copyright years for some of these books. Were they published in the last three years, or are they twenty years old? Presses are often consistent in publishing in parts of disciplines, but they can change direction for a variety of reasons, among them the inception or shutting down of a series and the hiring or departure of an editor with a particular set of interests. Try to identify presses that have published books similar to yours in recent years.

Publishers go to great lengths to promote their lists to academics, and would-be authors should take advantage of their efforts. Presses mail discipline catalogues, seasonal catalogues, and sale catalogues throughout the year, typically to anyone who has purchased a

book from them or signed up on a mailing list. More often than not, these catalogues can be found in the exhibit halls at scholarly meetings and discarded around departmental mailboxes. Many are also posted on publishers' websites, where you can view both a publisher's frontlist (new titles) and backlist (all titles more than a year old). Increasingly, marketers are using electronic marketing in lieu of or in addition to traditional paper mailings, and you can sign up on websites to receive periodic listings of new books in, say, American history. It is also useful to look at professional journals. The publishers' advertising in these journals can give you a snapshot of new titles, and the reviews will give you a critical perspective on new publications from a variety of presses over a period of a few years.

Publishers also show off their new titles to authors and potential authors at professional conferences. Historians have dozens of conferences annually (some disciplines have one or at most two), but you will find the largest array of presses at meetings of the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians. You can use these meetings—and the ads in the programs for them—to collect a great deal of material about a potential home for your first book. Because of exhibiting and staffing costs, which are especially high when meetings are held in exotic locations or have smaller attendances, not every press will sponsor its own table at every meeting, so don't forget to spend time looking at the combined book exhibit tables staffed by such companies as Scholar's Choice, Library of Social Science, and Associated Book Exhibit.

At these meetings, you may see acquisitions editors and, particularly at smaller conferences, find that they have time to chat informally. The major conferences are not usually the

best places for this; editors have often made appointments well in advance with authors they are working with and may have so many commitments that they can't field questions. You should, however, be able to pick up a business card for the appropriate acquisitions editor or ask those who are staffing the booth about the right person to contact. Some potential authors believe it is necessary to meet an editor before he/she will consider a project, but I give consideration to strong proposals regardless of whether I have encountered the author in person.

You may also learn about a series for which your work might be a good fit. Series are subsections of a publisher's list in the field, usually revolving around a theme or period, and are often recruited for by academics. Series editors may simply recommend new authors to acquisitions editors, perhaps after hearing conference papers or reading journal articles, or they may play a more hands-on role in developing manuscripts with authors. Series have mushroomed in the university press world, and you may discover new ones through flyers at conferences or direct contact with a series editor. Whether a series is necessary for your book or will add value to it is something you will need to determine. However, the press is still the publisher, and it retains the right to make an offer and determine the terms, not the series editors.

Don't forget about a critical method of gathering information: oral history. Ask your friends and colleagues about their publishing experiences. Your advisor may have published a first book twenty years ago, in a vastly different publishing world, or he/she may have been commissioned to write books recently, so don't neglect to ask people you know who have published first books in the past few years and some accomplished authors a cohort

or so ahead of you. The academics I know are all too happy to talk about the nitty-gritty of their publishing experiences and especially what went wrong. As you ask around, keep in mind that *no one* is 100 percent happy with a publisher and thinks the press did everything it could to promote his or her book. But through these conversations, you will pick up valuable information about what to expect and what questions to ask so that you may avoid some of the problems others have experienced.

There are no major drawbacks to educating yourself about world of publishing before the need to publish suddenly becomes a "front burner" issue. Doing so will help you make better choices as you are working on your dissertation and may get you started on thinking about future book projects. It will also mean that you are not flying blind or relying on urban legends when the time for dealing with presses arrives.

Making Contact: When and How

There is no single right answer to when it is best to begin contacting publishers. In general, though, I advise a period of seasoning for the dissertation. Step back, put it in a drawer, and don't look at it for a period of weeks or even months. You need time to gain critical distance from what you have just completed before you can envision taking it apart and jettisoning parts of what you have spent years working on. That advice does not, however, take into account other factors, like a job search, but hiring committees tend to be accepting of newly filed dissertations in a way that acquisitions editors typically are not.

Even though a lot of potential authors assure me that "my advisor told me to write my dissertation like a book," there is a difference between the two. At the most fundamental level, the dissertation is written to prove mastery of material to a small group of advisors who have nurtured your project from its inception and helped you through research and development. Book publishers assume you have achieved mastery of your material; they are looking for

your original contribution. Editors know that finishing up and filing a dissertation is sometimes (usually?) done in a rush, that there are things you meant to do, wanted to do, and simply ran out of time to do. Taking advice from your dissertation committee and applying it to your work is time well spent. It will no doubt make yours a stronger first book, so implement it, and don't wait to get the same advice during a publisher's review process.

While there is a great deal more to be said on the topic of revising a dissertation, you can carry out minimal revision on your own by looking critically at a few structural elements of your dissertation. Recasting the introduction is usually necessary. These openers often contain literature reviews and extremely chunky footnotes pointing out the lacunae in other works. This is the place to make sure that your own argument comes through clearly and compellingly; it is not the place to point out all the problems with other books. Does your introduction explain what the flow of your manuscript is and how the chapters fit together? Next, take a look at your table of contents. Are your chapter titles clear, or are they jargon-filled? Are your chapters of more or less even length? Are your footnotes/endnotes predominantly citations, or do you use them to work in additional information and to have conversations with the literature you could not work into the text? If the latter, work on cutting these down now.

This is also a good time to assess the length of your manuscript, if you haven't done so already. Use the word-count function of your word-processing program to figure out how long what you have written is (and don't forget the notes). While there is no "magic number," publishers look most favorably on books in the neighborhood of 100,000-110,000 words, which translates into a book of around 300 pages. That is not an arbitrary figure. Production costs are all predicated on length, and a much larger page count can make it difficult to price a book at the level a press thinks optimal for its market. More important, if a book has course

adoption potential, greater length may make its appearance on syllabi unlikely. (Think about the longest book you can assign to your students.) While there are reasons why some books must be long, more often than not dissertations are over-exampled and overwritten. Although it may be painful to cut back material you have spent years in the archives discovering, it is a sobering fact that publishers are attentive to book length and their publishing decisions will, to a degree, be linked to this factor. Of course, there are also dissertations that are thin and may benefit from having an expanded time frame or an additional chapter.

The bottom line is this: you want to put your best foot forward when you submit to publishers. There are no second chances for editors to take a first look at a project. If what they see is an unrevised dissertation that isn't ready for review, it is rare that they can or will invest in reviewing a project, even if they have chatted with you in the past and expressed interest in seeing your manuscript.

The proper way to approach a publisher is through a proposal. Even if you have 535 pristine pages ready to mail, resist that urge at all costs. Do not send your full manuscript unless an editor asks for it. A clearly written, well-argued proposal best enables an editor to determine whether your book is suitable for the publishing program he/she oversees and whether he/she wants to see more of your project. This is not the time or place to be overly informal. An introduction or excerpt from your manuscript with a brief note saying, "As promised, here it is!" is not a substitute for a proposal.

Not every good proposal is precisely the same, but here are some elements that good proposals include:

1. A cover letter. If you have letterhead stationery for your institution, use it. Address your letter to the editor by name (and if you are writing several letters at once, make sure the name matches the publisher). Make sure your contact information (including e-mail) is clear. Briefly state your qualifications. Give the title of your work and a succinct statement of your book's argument, and make the purpose of the letter

explicit. What you are asking editor to do? Be honest about the status of the manuscript. How complete is it? Describe the state of play – is yours a solo submission or a multiple query? If it is a multiple query, you must tell editors this. Not all presses will allow multiple submissions. Also, inform the editor if you have a subvention (money towards publication from an outside source) or if you have unique timetable requirements (i.e., your tenure clock is ticking very fast, or your book is about an event with an upcoming important anniversary).

2. A prospectus.

Overview: A prospectus should include a brief description of your book. It should be written in the style in which you intend to write the book, and it should explain the book's central argument and lay out its arc. What kind of contribution does the work make? Be more specific than "it makes a contribution to the literature" or "it brings two different strands of the literature together." Talk about what kind of contribution it will make to understanding the historical issues at hand and challenging or nuancing the established narratives of the field.

Annotated table of contents: Give chapter titles and explain what each one contains, including the argument each advances.

Sources: Briefly describe your sources. Say what kinds of archival documents, collections, libraries, oral histories, etc. you are drawing on, and highlight any that are particularly new.

Market: Discuss the intended audience for your book. Is it written primarily for scholars? If so, what discipline(s)? Professionals (if so, what fields)? Students (if so, what level)? General/trade readers? (This is rare for a revised dissertation.) If particular scholarly or professional organizations are target audiences, identify them. Be as specific and realistic as possible. Few books appeal to all of these markets, and if an author claims that his or her book is for everyone, it is often a sign to an editor that he/she is overreaching and will be unrealistic about the market throughout the publishing process. There is nothing wrong with identifying a particular subfield and saying that your book is a

monograph intended for specialists in this area.

Comparable/competitive books: List three or four books that might be comparable to or competitive with yours (include author, title, publisher, publication date) and briefly explain how your book is like or unlike these. It is exceedingly rare for there to be no book even remotely like yours. If you have trouble doing this, think about what book yours would likely be sitting with on a library bookshelf, or what books might take similar approaches but might not necessarily be on your precise topic.

Nuts and bolts: Finally, give the anticipated details of your finished book. Spell out the number of words your manuscript will have (always include text, notes, and bibliography), not the number of pages your dissertation has or what the font type and margins are. Give the number and type of illustrations you hope to include. Also, lay out your intended timetable. Be honest about whether it is ready for consideration or still needs work. If any part of the dissertation has been published in a different form, say so. This might mean that a version of Chapter 5 has appeared as a journal article. While editors tend not to want to publish books from which the key research has already been in print for a core audience, they know that articles are part of building a c.v. and are not apt to be troubled by a journal article or two. Having gotten through a refereed journal process is a sign that your research has already favorably attracted the attention of a number of specialists in the field.

Also include in your submission package:

3. Your curriculum vitae.

4. A sample chapter (optional). If an editor wants to read more, he/she will definitely ask for it.

I strongly advise sharing the draft of your proposal with some eagle-eyed friends or members of a writing group. They will likely catch your typos and pick up on places where you are not effectively conveying your ideas to someone who does not have the same specialty you do. Remember, editors are generalists, so you need to make yourself comprehensible to someone

who does not know the ins and outs of your topic. Editors are busy and see a lot of projects. You need to hook them fast with your proposal, so make sure that your cover letter and the overview in your prospectus are in tip-top shape.

When you are ready, my advice is to print all of these materials and send them through the mail. Using paper may sound old-fashioned, but no one minds getting proposals in hard copy. Just because you can send your project via e-mail attachment doesn't mean that all editors want to receive it that way. (Even within a press, editors vary on this policy, but many university press websites say that proposals sent via attachment are not acceptable.) Think about it this way: you are creating more work for the editor, since he/she has to print out your materials, expending time that could otherwise be spent reading and engaging with your proposal. You do not have to call or write to say that you are sending your proposal. Nor should you plan to hand-deliver these materials at a conference, where the chances of them getting misplaced are greater. (It is unlikely they are going to be read during the conference anyway, and they will just add more weight to your – and your prospective editor's – suitcase.)

You do not have to ask university press editors if you can submit your proposal. While commercial/trade presses generally do not accept materials for projects they have not requested or received via an agent, university presses and scholarly commercial publishers do read projects that come (in industry lingo) "across the transom."

What to Expect

How long before you hear back from a publisher? That depends on the press, the time of year, and an individual editor's workload, but a month to six weeks from receipt of project is reasonable. You may get a letter thanking you for submitting your project but declining to review it for the list. These letters are not typically custom-tailored for each project, and you should not expect or request feedback from an editor on

what you could do better in making a submission or improving your proposal. Rejection is a normal part of the submission process, and although this project may not be a match with this particular publisher, future works of yours might be, so it pays not to burn any bridges. Remember, editors are looking for the best fit with their lists, depending on what else is in production or under contract at a given time, and they have more viable projects cross their desks than they can possibly pursue.

If all goes well, you will hear back from at least one press expressing interest in your project and asking to see more. Depending on the press and the project, the editor might ask you to send a sample chapter or a full manuscript. Be open with the editor about what is ready for review or how long it might take you to prepare your manuscript to send. If planned revisions will take a matter of weeks

or a few months, the editor may advise doing this work before sending it. What he/she is looking for is a double-spaced manuscript (unbound), printed out single-sided, preferably with endnotes.

If you have submitted your proposal to multiple presses and gotten feedback from one that it would like to review your project formally, e-mail any other press you are keen on to check that your proposal was received and to let that editor know that another press is interested. A press may demand exclusive review, in which case you have to decide if this is the publisher under whose imprint you most want your book to appear, should things go smoothly in the review process. Assuming that the publishers allow multiple submissions, it will be up to you to decide if you want your manuscript to go through multiple sets of peer review. Consider your timetable (for

professional reasons, do you need to have a contract by a particular date?) and your decision-making process (do you make endless pro and con lists whenever you have to make choices?). Should two presses pursue review processes, you do need to inform them that you are doing this and to wait until both processes are complete before you accept an offer. Publishers are investing time and money in these reviews, and you need to give them the opportunity to come to a decision.

The review process is a vetting procedure by specialists, and it is part of the "value added" that makes a university press a university press. That isn't to say that commercial imprints don't carry weight with tenure committees, but the peer review process and a university press imprint are important to many hiring and tenuring committees. At most presses, the peer review process means that a manuscript goes to at least two readers and sometimes three if it is interdisciplinary or if an editor feels that different kinds of feedback might be helpful. This is a blind review process – you don't know who reviewers are unless they decide to reveal their identity – but it isn't double-blind, as journals can be, so the reviewers will know who you are. I ask authors if they would like to recommend potential readers (though I am not obligated to go with those people) and if there is anyone they would not want to have evaluate their manuscript for any reason (I don't always know about professional feuds).

The review process is not just a hoop to jump through to gain a contract. It is a rare opportunity to get in-depth feedback on your manuscript as a book-in-the-making from experts who have not previously been associated with your dissertation. Their comments may range from analysis of your argument to advice on structure, criticism of your prose style, and assessment of your contribution to the field. Even though presses pay readers in books or in cash, this kind of prepublication input is invaluable to writers at all stages of their careers. Later on, these anonymous readers might very well become part of your close intellectual cohort.

"We Keep The World on Top of America"

LIBERTAS: A NEW INITIATIVE IN THE DISCUSSION OF US FOREIGN POLICY

Libertas (<http://www.libertas.bham.ac.uk/>) is a website linking scholars, the media, and the general public in engagement with and interrogation of US foreign policy past, present, and future. We seek not only to study US policymaking but to explore its roots within the American culture from which it emanates.

In pursuit of this mission, we do not seek to be "pro-American" or "anti-American" but to examine American interaction with the rest of the global community. We wish to consider not only the production of US foreign policy but also the response to and negotiation of that foreign policy, and the American activities it produces, by other governments, groups, and individuals.

Libertas will feature cutting-edge, timely analysis with daily podcasts and briefings, weekly analyses, and a discussion board. This will be supported by the highest-quality academic research and publication from associates in the United Kingdom and throughout the world. Libertas is already working with partners in Dublin, New York, Los Angeles, Washington DC, Bologna, Beirut and Tehran and more links will be made in the near-future.

Libertas welcomes contributions from all in the media and in the academic community to ensure the liveliest and most productive exchanges in the discussion of US foreign policy and the world.

For more information, contact Bevan Sewell at bevan.sewell@hotmail.co.uk or Scott Lucas at w.s.lucas@bham.ac.uk.

I generally give reviewers six to eight weeks with a manuscript, but that can vary based on time of year and the length of the manuscript. While a timely review is important, getting the best reader possible is an equally high priority. Reviewers are asked to respond to a series of questions posed by the editor but can discard this structure and go way beyond the original questions in giving feedback.

When the reviews come back, the editor will decide how to proceed, based on a reading of the reports, his or her own assessment of the manuscript, and discussions with colleagues. When you receive these reports, they may at first seem overwhelming in length and depth. But remember: you want this kind of criticism now, while you can productively use it in revising your manuscript, not printed in a review after your book comes out.

What happens after the reviews come in may vary slightly depending on the press, and the editor should help guide you through this process. If you are unclear on what will happen next, ask. Sometimes the reviews are not strong enough for the publisher to continue at this point, but statistically that is not the common outcome. If your manuscript is not rejected, you should be asked to write a response to the reviews. It makes good sense to spend some time analyzing the reports for commonalities. Begin by thinking about the strengths pointed out in your project before reconsidering parts that have been critiqued. You need not agree with all the changes recommended for your manuscript, but you need to write a defense of your position in these instances and perhaps think of some ways to clarify your choices if you think a reviewer has misunderstood your intent. This written response to the reviews will become part of the package that an editor presents in-house about your project, but it is not shown to the reviewers.

Publishers' deliberations usually occur on two levels. There is generally an editorial board meeting involving editors, marketers, sales people, publicists, and rights staff, most of whom will have read a summary

of your work in advance. An editor will present your project, including the book budget the editor has constructed. Collectively the board will decide whether or not to offer a contract and what that offer will look like. How often the editorial board meets varies by press. In addition, a faculty board (known at some presses as delegates or syndics) reviews all projects at university presses. They are the body that approves the imprint of the university being stamped on every book that the press publishes.

If your project receives final approval, you will be offered a contract for your book. While space will not permit extensive discussion of the terms of a contract, there are key things you should look for: delivery date, length, number of illustrations, royalties, advance, and paperback terms. There may be some room for negotiation, but it is likely not vast. You should not expect to get rich off your first book, but you should expect to make money over time as your book sells. A first book does financially reward you in ways beyond book sales as well: it establishes your scholarly reputation, can be essential to getting a job, may get you a promotion, and is likely a key consideration for tenure.

In the event that you have been offered more than one contract, you'll most likely be making a decision based on a combination of contract specifics as well as intangibles. While the latter cannot be quantified, I cannot underestimate its importance. During the review process, you have likely learned a good deal about working with a specific editor, a relationship that is at least as important as the contractual agreement you sign for your book. This is going to be a working relationship lasting several years, and you want to be sure that you find someone who shares your vision of your project and will be supportive in helping you shape the best work of which you are capable.

There is a great deal more to publishing a first book than I have covered here. For more information, I strongly recommend William Germano's concise yet comprehensive *Getting It Published: A Guide for Scholars and Anyone Else Serious about Serious*

Books (Chicago, 2001). But I hope this essay will give you a better sense of direction as you take your first steps along the publishing path, and I hope it has helped unmask and expose the mysterious figures who are furiously and frantically pulling the levers, dials, and switches at the presses where you are most likely to publish your first book.

Susan Ferber is an Executive Editor for American and World History at Oxford University Press-USA.

Resources and Tools for Teaching the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: Introducing the Center for History and New Media

Thomas Scheinfeldt and Sharon Leon, Robert Shaffer, Carol Jackson Adams, Catherine Forslund, and Matt Loayza

Editor's Note: At the annual SHAFR conference last June in Chantilly, Virginia, the SHAFR Teaching Committee sponsored a session with the above title. The proximity of the Center for History and New Media, which is based at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, offered an opportunity for SHAFR members to learn about the resources and tools developed by the Center's staff of historians. Summarized below are the contents of the program given on Friday afternoon, June 22, which included presentations from two of the Center's historians, followed by commentaries from four members of the Teaching Committee. Committee chair Mark Gilderhus presided.

Like other teaching-related articles that have appeared in Passport, this one may also be found on the SHAFR website, under "Teaching Services."

Introduction to the Center for History and New Media

*Thomas Scheinfeldt,
and Sharon Leon*

Building upon work that he had done on the award-winning CD-ROM *Who Built America?*, Roy Rosenzweig founded the Center for History and New Media (CHNM) in 1994 during the short-lived "golden age" of CD-ROMs. In early 1995, CHNM launched its first website, very soon after the first widely available web browser – Mosaic – was released. Through the 1990s and early 2000s, CHNM remained a relatively small operation that took on one project at a time. The staff consisted of Rosenzweig, some associated teaching faculty, an occasional grant-funded

post-doc, a half-time webmaster, and a couple of research assistants. As late as the fall of 2000, CHNM had only two active projects and one full-time staff member. Starting in 2001 and 2002, however, CHNM grew very rapidly. The staff expanded dramatically to include both new research faculty and a growing number of full-time programmers, web developers, and researchers. By the spring of 2007, CHNM had more than forty full- and part-time people, or the equivalent of more than twenty-five full-time staff.

The Center is loosely organized in two divisions: Research Projects and Educational Projects. Hence, one core segment of CHNM's work deals with collecting historical sources that are "born digital," creating tools to help historians do their work and producing research on doing history in the digital age. This segment includes several series of essays (http://chnm.gmu.edu/search_results.php?query=essays) and also Roy Rosenzweig and Dan Cohen's 2006 book *Digital History: A Guide to Gathering, Preserving, and Presenting the Past on the Web* (<http://chnm.gmu.edu/digitalhistory/>). One of the Center's most recent projects is a series of biweekly podcasts via our "Digital Campus" program (<http://feeds.feedburner.com/digitalcampus?format=xml>), which discusses the latest news and trends. The subject of the inaugural podcast on March 6 was "Wikipedia: Friend or Foe?" The second core segment of the Center's work, which in numerical terms comprises the majority of projects, emphasizes the creation of resources and materials to aid in the teaching of history in secondary schools and at

the undergraduate level.

A sampling of projects and tools that might be of interest to teachers and practitioners of the history of American foreign relations includes the following:

Collecting and Archival Projects

ECHO: Exploring and Collecting History Online – Science, Technology and Industry (<http://echo.gmu.edu>): Since 2001 the ECHO project has used the Internet to collect and present the history of science, technology, and industry. ECHO hosts free workshops and offers free consultation services to assist other historical practitioners in launching their own websites. In addition, ECHO provides a centralized guide and portal of five thousand reviews for those seeking websites on the history of science and technology.

September 11 Digital Archive (<http://911digitalarchive.org>): This site uses electronic media to collect, preserve, and present the history of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania and the public responses to them. It has become the leading digital repository of material related to the events of 9/11 and includes more than 150,000 first-hand accounts, emails, images, and other digital materials. This site results from a collaboration with the American Social History Project at the City University of New York.

Hurricane Digital Memory Bank

(<http://hurricanearchive.org>): The Hurricane Digital Memory Bank uses electronic media to collect, preserve,

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*“War and Foreign Policy: America’s Conflicts
in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical Perspective”*

The 2008 SHAFR Summer Institute
at The Ohio State University

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will launch its first annual Summer Institute on June 21-25, 2008 at The Ohio State University, designed for college and university faculty and advanced graduate students. The Institute will pay each participant an honorarium of \$500.00 and cover expenses of travel and accommodations.

Peter L. Hahn and Robert J. McMahon will co-direct the inaugural Institute, titled “War and Foreign Policy: America’s Conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical Perspective.” Exploration of specific case studies of what have been, arguably, the two most controversial U.S. foreign policy crises of the past sixty years will allow for the examination of a host of broad issues germane to our subfield: decolonization; nationalism; the reasons for and efficacy of U.S. interventionism in the Third World; the historical roots of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the Middle East; decisions for and consequences of wars, for the United States, countries and regions affected, and the broader international system; and more.

All participants will be required to read a significant amount of relevant secondary literature, before and during the Institute. Substantial time will be devoted to discussion of that literature, broader historiographical contexts and controversies, and selected primary sources. Visiting faculty who have ongoing research projects related to the seminar’s focus will be mentored, as appropriate, by the host faculty. Those who are interested in beginning research on one of the seminar’s themes will be encouraged and guided by the host faculty in choice of topic, research design, and the like. All participants will be mentored on strategies for integrating the content of the Institute into courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

The deadline for applications is January 15, 2008. Applicants should submit a one-page letter detailing their interest and explaining how participation would benefit their careers. Submit materials (and pose any questions) to Robert J. McMahon at mcmahon.121@osu.edu. Decisions about acceptances will be distributed in February.

The Institute will run from Saturday, June 21 to Wednesday, June 25, 2008. It will immediately precede the 2008 SHAFR Annual Meeting, also at Ohio State University, on June 26-28. Institute participants will be invited and encouraged to remain at Ohio State for the Annual Meeting and thereby accentuate the intellectual and professional gains earned at the Institute.

and present the stories and digital record of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The project contributes to the ongoing effort by historians and archivists to preserve the record of these storms by collecting first-hand accounts, on-scene images, blog postings, and podcasts.

Papers of the War Department, 1784-1800 (coming soon at www.chnm.gmu.edu/news/archives/papers_of_the_war_dept.htm): Developed with a grant from the National Historic Publications and Records Commission, this innovative electronic archive will give researchers, teachers, and students access to more than fifty thousand documents from the first decade and a half of the War Department's history.

Digital Tools

Syllabus Finder (www.chnm.gmu.edu/tools/syllabi/): Find and compare syllabi from thousands of universities and colleges on any topic with a tool that searches 868,425 syllabi at CHNM and more than 500,000 syllabi via Google.

Survey Builder (www.chnm.gmu.edu/tools/surveys/): Survey Builder allows the easy creation and management of online surveys suitable for Internet-based oral history projects, course evaluations, and other endeavors that involve collecting feedback. The user need not know how to build a web page that has forms, set up a database to store entries, or do any of the other technical tasks that are normally required to produce interactivity on the Internet.

Zotero (<http://zotero.org>): Zotero is a free, easy-to-use, open-source research tool that runs in the Firefox web browser and helps scholars gather and organize, annotate, organize, and share the results of their research. It includes the best parts of older reference manager software (like EndNote)—the ability to store full reference information in author, title, and publication fields and to export that as formatted references—and the best parts of modern software such as del.icio.us or iTunes, like the ability to sort, tag, and search in advanced ways. Using its unique ability to

sense when you are viewing a book, article, or other resource on the web, Zotero will—on many major research sites—find and automatically save full reference information for you in the correct fields.

Educational Projects:

History Matters (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu>): This award-winning site offers a range of resources, including a thousand primary documents in text, image, and audio (Many Pasts, at <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/browse/manypasts/>). A search for the term “foreign relations” yielded forty-six hits; the first two of these were the digitized *Foreign Relations* series sites at the University of Wisconsin Library and the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian. The site also has an annotated guide to a thousand of the best U.S. history websites, including a large number of reviews from the *Journal of American History* (www.history.org at <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/browse/wwwhistory/>). Finally, the site offers multimedia guides to using various kinds of online primary sources, such as oral history and maps (Making Sense of Evidence at <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/browse/makesense/>). The “Scholars in Action” segments, which include audio clips, show how scholars puzzle out the meaning of various kinds of primary sources. Designed for teachers of U.S. history survey courses at high schools and colleges around the world, “History Matters” provides an excellent starting point for investigating American history online. This site results from a collaboration with the American Social History Project at the City University of New York.

Historical Thinking Matters (<http://historicalthinkingmatters.org>): A joint project from the Center for History and New Media and Sam Wineburg's History Education Group at the Stanford University School of Education, “Historical Thinking Matters” offers both students and teachers online materials that facilitate the development of the habits of mind that historians exhibit when they

engage in authentic investigations. Based on four central topics from the post-Civil War U.S. history curriculum, this project uses primary sources, guided questioning, and modeling of historical inquiry through think-alouds to help students develop a narrative response to an inquiry question. The site also provides a host of materials to support teachers in their work with students as they encourage the learning of historical thinking skills.

Thomas Scheinfeldt is Assistant Director of the Center for History and New Media at George Mason University. Sharon Leon is Assistant Director of Educational Projects.

The Center for History and New Media: Web-Based Primary Sources for Classes in U.S. Foreign Relations

Robert Shaffer

The resources available on the Center for History and New Media website (<http://chnm.gmu.edu/>) are so voluminous that it can take much browsing and a few hints and shortcuts to access those materials that are specifically relevant to the teaching of U.S. foreign relations. But the effort will be worthwhile, as professors will be able to locate primary sources that can be the basis of lectures, class discussions, short papers, or even full-fledged research papers by students. The CHNM website features not only its own material but searchable links to other high-quality history websites, although this article will survey only the documents available directly from the CHNM site.

It is cumbersome to explain search features of a website in a narrative format, but the main steps are relatively straightforward. From the main site, one should click on “Projects,” and then on “History Matters.” That brings the viewer to “The U.S. Survey Course on the Web,” which has its own URL (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu>). Two main resources will then be apparent: “Many Pasts,” a collection of just over a thousand digitized primary

sources, and “www.History,” an annotated guide to what the CHNM staff consider to be “the most useful websites for teaching U.S. history and social studies,” which also number over a thousand. This survey will cover only the “Many Pasts” section. (The third major resource that appears prominently on the “History Matters” homepage, “Making Sense of Evidence,” consists of historians explaining how to interpret a range of documents, but neither the examples nor the analyses pertain directly to foreign relations.)

As “Many Pasts” includes numerous sources that are not directly relevant to U.S. foreign relations, the key to locating relevant materials is in the next step. Clicking on “Many Pasts” and then the “full search” option will bring up a screen with a checklist of both chronological and topical categories, types of sources desired, and “History Matters” projects. Clicking only on “International Policy” and “Many Pasts” here brings up seventy-nine matching primary sources. (Having to click on “Many Pasts” again, after accessing the “full search” feature from that project, seems redundant, but one should get used to that quickly.) The seventy-nine sources are not arranged in chronological, topical, or alphabetical order, although written documents appear to precede images (photographs, drawings, and cartoons) and audio (songs, speeches, interviews).

Thus, professors looking for resources for classroom use will want to refine the search further by clicking on a chronological period, along with “International Policy” and “Many Pasts.” (Alternatively, one could do a keyword search, which works nicely for some topics, such as “Haiti,” but less well for, say, “Mexico,” as the latter also brings in any documents about New Mexico or Mexican-Americans.) So, clicking on “Revolution and the New Nation, 1754-1820s,” along with “International Policy” and “Many Pasts,” brings up five sources, including a defense of the French Revolution by Benjamin Franklin Bache (the founder’s grandson) from the 1790s and an 1817 account by a Connecticut sea captain

of his capture and enslavement by Barbary pirates. Each document has both a full bibliographic citation and a clear and substantive introduction that puts it in its historical context and gives a sense of its significance. One can easily see how such primary sources could become part of a course reading list and discussion, the basis for a student’s oral presentation, or a document-based writing assignment.

For several chronological periods the documents are sparse. Only one relevant source appears for the Civil War years: a political cartoon mocking Confederate efforts to gain British diplomatic recognition. But since many of the documents do not come from the standard selections available in many print collections, and since most were not created by the foreign policy-making elite, they can still be valuable to those who wish to integrate social history with diplomatic history. For example, the only document available on the Mexican War is a long first-hand account by a U.S. soldier of the confusion and casualties that marked the house-to-house fighting in Monterrey in 1846, while two of the few documents on the background to World War II describe the efforts in the late 1930s of Chinese-American workers to aid China in its struggle against Japanese aggression.

The greatest number of sources — forty-one — fall between the years 1890 and 1930, and these cover especially well the Spanish-American War, its aftermath in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, World War I, and U.S. intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Again, these sources are not listed in any particular order, so one must scroll through all forty-one to see all of those about the Mexican Revolution or the U.S. occupation of Haiti. Some of the sources include a hyperlink to others on the same topic.) Professors do not really need a website to access President Wilson’s war message or Senator LaFollette’s antiwar response — both included here — but depth can be added to standard assignments through consultation of additional sources with conflicting viewpoints, such as a March 1917 pro-war editorial from the *North American Review* and Randolph

Bourne’s fervent dissent.

The group of documents on the sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine* is particularly good, as it includes not only articles and editorials from Hearst and Pulitzer papers that helped push the United States to war, but also the normally neglected coverage from the *New York Times*, which advocated a much more restrained response to the explosion, along with excerpts from Admiral Hyman Rickover’s 1976 investigation of the incident. One could easily envision these documents as the basis of a class debate, group presentation, or written analysis.

That the momentum towards war after the sinking of the *Maine* was based on shaky “intelligence,” to say the least, raises a current issue in U.S. foreign relations for students’ consideration. Many of the other documents also raise continuing themes in U.S. policy and are based on sources that are even less likely to be available in other standard collections and that represent widely divergent viewpoints. For example, there is correspondence on the Mexican Revolution between Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing, an essay by radical journalist John Reed, and letters from Mexican leader Venustiano Carranza. In light of present-day rhetoric about U.S. actions abroad, students should find particularly intriguing Lansing’s advice to Wilson “that we should avoid the use of the word ‘Intervention’ and deny that any invasion of Mexico is for the sake of intervention” (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4949>). For a slightly later period, there is a nice set of conflicting documents on Mexico’s expropriation of the property of U.S. oil companies.

Similarly, students can contrast Secretary of State Frank Kellogg’s 1927 memorandum justifying the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua on the basis of a “Bolshevik threat” with the views of Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto Sandino, in a brief 1933 statement, and Colombian journalist Alfonso Moncayo, who placed Sandino in the tradition of Simon Bolivar. One might add that a “Google” search for “Sandino” would refer students not only to Wikipedia’s inevitable entry but to the bilingual website

SHAFR EVENTS AT THE 2008 AHA CONFERENCE

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SHAFR is planning two major events at the American Historical Association Conference in Washington, DC in January 2008.

Please plan to attend:

Reception (cash bar) on Friday, January 4, 5:30-7:30 pm, Omni Hotel, Congressional A

Luncheon on Saturday, January 5, 11:30 a.m.-1:30 p.m.

Please note that the luncheon will be held at Lebanese Taverna Restaurant, 2641 Connecticut Avenue NW, a short walk from the hotels. **Philip Zelikow** of the University of Virginia will deliver the keynote address: "For Want of Knowledge': Microhistory and Pivotal Public Choices." The Bernath Dissertation Grant and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will also be awarded.

Tickets (\$25) must be purchased in advance.

Mail a check (payable to SHAFR) by December 29, 2007 to SHAFR Business Office, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210. Inquiries may be directed to shafr@osu.edu.

SHAFR is also pleased to co-sponsor two sessions at the AHA conference:

Friday, January 4, 9:30-11:30 am: "Diplomatically Speaking: How Historians of American Foreign Relations Communicate with the American Public" (Marriott, Washington Room 1)

Saturday, January 5, 2:30-4:30 pm: "The United States, Great Britain, and the Middle East: Recent Developments in Historical Perspective" (Marriott, Washington Room 2)



(www.sandino.org), which has an abundance of documents and essays on this controversial figure. However, the three CHNM selections have the advantage of focus, brevity, multiple perspectives, and clearer contextualization.

One also finds on "Many Pasts" Rudyard Kipling's iconic and oft-discussed poem, "The White Man's Burden," juxtaposed with three less well-known contemporary sarcastic responses. One of these responses begins: "Take up the White Man's burden/Send forth your sturdy kin/And load them down with Bibles/And cannon-balls and gin" (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5477>). Having used the very same juxtaposition of texts in the pre-Internet age, I can attest that even students who normally shy away from poetry will be interested in the kind of textual analysis that can be done on these poems.

However, in some cases the documents are more one-sided, with a bias toward critical perspectives on U.S. policy. (The genesis of the collection of documents as a CD-ROM meant to accompany the left-leaning American Social History Project's *Who Built America?* textbooks explains the tilt.) For example, among the most recent documents included is an audio interview with an organizer against free-trade agreements. But many of these unchallenged documents will still be worthwhile for historians looking for material to engage students. The site also includes testimony from American soldiers in the Philippines about atrocities which they witnessed or perpetrated, drawn from an Anti-Imperialist League pamphlet of 1899 and reprinted in *The Anti-Imperialist Reader*, a 1984 collection edited by Philip Foner and Richard Winchester. In a 2006 review in this newsletter of Thomas Paterson and Dennis Merrill's *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, I lamented the elimination of such testimony from the latest edition of that collection, so this website nicely supplements what is available in that textbook. Moreover, one can see the value of the digitized documents, in that the original Anti-Imperialist League pamphlet and even *The Anti-Imperialist Reader* are not in

many college libraries.

In a similar vein, a set of four documents on the U.S. occupation of Haiti in the 1910s and 1920s are uniformly critical of U.S. conduct. But this failed exercise in "nation-building," which was marked by racism and brutality and stirred enormous resentment against the U.S. presence among the populace, deserves greater consideration in diplomatic history classes. Moreover, the voices represented in these documents—the NAACP, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Haiti's armed resistance, and former Haitian prisoners—help to expand the range of perspectives associated with U.S. diplomatic history.

Another document that I plan to add to the reading list of my classes in both U.S. foreign relations and U.S. immigration history is an editorial from an English-language Japanese newspaper in 1924, entitled "The Senate's Declaration of War." According to the editorial, the exclusion of Japanese from the United States in the Immigration Act of 1924 "has given a shock to the whole Japanese race such as has never before been felt and which will undoubtedly be remembered for a long time" (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5077>). This document demonstrates the connections between immigration issues and foreign relations, which deserve greater attention in our teaching and in our field as a whole, and it exposes students to an oft-neglected facet of Japanese resentment toward the United States that contributed to tensions in the 1930s and war in the 1940s. (Of course, I am not equating racism in U.S. immigration policy with the unannounced military attack by Japan at Pearl Harbor, nor would I suggest that immigration restrictions constituted the major reason for Japan's attack. Nevertheless, students should be encouraged to appreciate multiple causes of conflict and to analyze the wide-ranging repercussions of specific actions.)

Logistically, some of the photos, cartoons, poems, and brief documents can be projected on-screen in many classrooms to accompany lectures

and stimulate student responses, while lengthier documents could be assigned on a course syllabus, or, as appropriate, printed and distributed in class. Two technical considerations may pose problems, however. I was not able to access the audio components of documents (a World War I-era song, for example), despite using two different computers that had audio capabilities. Also, when documents are printed from the website, the distinction between the introduction and the document itself becomes unclear, which may confuse undergraduates as they analyze primary sources.

In addition, searching under "International Policy"—the most relevant topical category for our field—does not always provide access to all relevant documents. For example, a search under "Immigration and Ethnicity" for the years 1890-1930 brought up an attack by a U.S. clergyman on German atrocities in World War I, although this document had not appeared under "International Policy." Meanwhile, a search under "African Americans" for the period between 1754 and the 1820s yielded two brief documents from 1797 on the reaction of U.S. slaveowners to the Haitian revolution, an issue that is also relevant to U.S. foreign relations. Finally, the keying of some documents to chronological periods is not always clear. Interviews with Carl Oglesby, a leader of Students for a Democratic Society, and with Kent State massacre eyewitnesses come up under "Contemporary U.S., 1968-Present," but not "Postwar U.S., 1945-Early 1970s," despite the overlapping years and the fact that other documents on the Vietnam War appear in the "Postwar U.S." category.

Good professors will continue to find primary sources for classroom use in many places, from readers designed for student use to specialized published collections, their own archival and newspaper research, and specialized websites. But for well-chosen documents with clear introductions on a variety of topics and from a wide range of historical actors and perspectives, professors of U.S. foreign relations will do well to spend some time on the "Many

Pasts" section of the "History Matters" website.

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Never Hesitate to Explore, or How One Thing Led to Another

Carol Jackson Adams

The members of the SHAFR Teaching Committee charged with assessing the Center for History and New Media (CHNM) website shared their pleasant surprise at the gold mine of available documents, assignments, essays, and appropriate digital resources. I was familiar with "History Matters: The U.S. Survey on the Web" and had successfully used its syllabi for my own course development numerous times. For the conference panel presentation and subsequent article, I explored the "unknown" of other sites produced by the center, with immediate rewards.

My goal was to introduce other professors to the practical application of varied CHNM resources, particularly in areas beyond their own expertise. In small liberal arts universities such as my own, professors teach a broad range of history courses and often must search for new materials every term. In addition, as higher education institutions increasingly emphasize distance learning, professors must locate appropriate websites, develop worthwhile assignments, and design rigorous online courses, all while juggling countless other responsibilities. CHNM provides an academically sound solution to the questions of "Where and how do I begin?"

I approached the CHNM website thematically, searching the projects "History Matters" (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu>), and "World History Matters" (<http://worldhistorymatters.org>), that contains two resource centers: "World History Sources" and "Women in World History." Initially I looked for topics in Middle Eastern history, a subject in which non-history majors,

and often majors as well, have little or no background. Using documents from both these resource centers I developed the following unit, which addresses one small aspect of that void, develops the skill of analyzing primary documents, and emphasizes the impact of foreign relations on social and cultural history.

"World History Matters" is currently not as extensive as the resource bank for U.S. history, but it contains world history sites that I would never have found on my own. The section of "World History Sources" entitled "Unpacking Evidence" introduces different types of primary documents. My first goal was to locate accessible official documents that would be appropriate for a course in twentieth-century world history. Many of the resources developed by the center are interactive; the exercise under "You Be the Historian" is an excellent example. Students read four excerpts from the Mandate for Palestine, dated July 24, 1922, granting the British government control over that region and arguably contributing to future problems in Palestine. Several highlighted phrases are hyperlinked for additional information, maps, and definitions, including crucial terminology such as "Jewish National Home." Students can type and save notes directly on the webpage to compare their views with those in the "Historian's Commentary," which in this case is written by David Trask of Guilford Community College. He analyzes the consequences of the mandate for the Arab population then and in the future. Ideally, these materials would prompt students to wonder about life for the Arab population living under the British Mandate, while taking into consideration the implications of the term "Jewish National Home."

"Women in World History" offers additional primary documents such as oral histories and photographs. This curriculum resource center incorporates gender in numerous case studies that can be used in world history, western civilization, and foreign relations courses. Students find it more difficult to analyze primary sources other than documents and may need additional background

assignments in preparation. If so, "Making Sense of Evidence" on the "History Matters" site may be helpful. It includes insights into "Making Sense of Oral History" and "Making Sense of Photography" that teach students the correct questions to ask when utilizing these primary sources.

Such fundamental assignments increase the likelihood that students will understand the case study modules located in "Scholars Analyzing Evidence." I focused on oral history interviews with Sa'ida Jarallah, a Muslim woman who lived in Jerusalem under the British Mandate in the 1930s. Active in the Palestinian Women's Movement, Jarallah exemplifies the importance of education that exposed Muslim women and Christian women to each other and fostered better relations between them. The oral history interview, accompanied by photographs, poses questions that dispel students' stereotypes of Muslim women. The struggle to maintain traditional values despite exposure to Western styles of dress and leisure easily transcend time and provide a foundation for discussion about Muslim women today and their exposure to Western culture. Additional photographs of the city's Arab population bring to life the consequences of post-World War I policy decisions.

Further search on the "Women in World History" website under "Primary Sources" led me to a "Framing Essay" that explains the context of viewing primary sources in relationship to gender. The author, Nancy Wingfield, writes that "women have subscribed to many different political, social, cultural, or economic agendas, and these must be taken into consideration to understand women through primary sources." The gender differences presented in Wingfield's essay undoubtedly will foster critical thinking by students and are applicable to an array of courses, whether used to promote participation on discussion boards in an online format or to stimulate discussion in a traditional classroom.

Tackling the more familiar topics of imperialism and nationalism, I searched the "Digital Blackboard"

listing of web-based assignments under "History Matters." Paul A. Kramer's article, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910" published in the *Journal of American History* in March 2002 (Vol. 88, no. 4) analyzes the rationalization of empire based on Anglo-Saxon superiority. The author directs students to hyperlinked political cartoons, images, maps, and an advertisement from the Sears, Roebuck and Co. Consumers Guide for lecture material on the Spanish-Cuban-American War, the Philippine-American War, and the Anglo-Boer War. Students then must assess the depiction of race, war, and imperialism in contemporary popular culture. Although the essay and stimulating questions incorporate various primary sources, I found that personal accounts were lacking.

One of the most helpful sections of the "World History Matters" project is "Finding World History," which contains reviews of websites, *primary source archives, and teaching strategies* organized by regions and time periods. Searching the Pacific Basin Region led to the "Diary of George Percival Scriven: An American in Bohol, The Philippines, 1899-1901" (<http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/scriven>). The Duke University website supplemented the Scriven Collection with photographs from other collections related to the Philippines, several of which focus on the timely concepts of the importance of religion in the Filipino culture and the determination of insurgents. To explore the impact of the motion picture industry's portrayal of war, a search under "Finding World History" also uncovered "The Spanish-American War in Motion Pictures," including a section on the Philippine Revolution designed by the Library of Congress (<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/sawhtml/sawhome.html>). The featured framing essay under "Finding World History" is by Deborah Vess, professor of history and interdisciplinary studies at Georgia College and State University. Her essay shows how to evaluate online sources in world history and is useful to novices and experts alike.

These few examples illustrate the breadth of digital resources available that might go untapped without the guidance of the Center for History and New Media. As is often the case with any type of research, one discovery leads to another and another. Because of the sheer volume of quality materials, the search itself is time consuming, but I found that the reward is better, more creative course preparation.

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Using Low Tech to Teach High Tech: Confessions of an Involuntary Luddite

Catherine Forslund

I would really like to use much more technology in my teaching, but time constraints keep me from learning more about the technology that would be useful to my students. *Thus, I tend to shy away from discussing it or promoting it very much in the classroom, and that makes me seem much more of a Luddite than I am or want to be.* *History Matters: A Student Guide to U.S. History Online* by Alan Gevinson, Kelly Schrum and Roy Rosenzweig (Boston, 2005) is a great way to provide information to students that I do not feel competent to deliver. The authors, all involved with the History Matters website (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu>), offer this book as a "basis for using the web to create innovative and engaging assignments for the undergraduate survey of American history or even research seminars in history organized around online primary sources" (vi).

Despite what is commonly thought, given the electronic proclivities of their generation, many students do not really know as much about how to use the Internet as one would think. They often accept any website as an authority and know little about how to evaluate sites or the sources they contain. A book like this has much appeal as a way to show students the right way to use and evaluate the richness of sources that exist on the web today.

This text could be used in introductory history courses, including surveys, or in upper-level courses, including research seminars. *History Matters* has two primary parts, both of which are valuable for teaching. First is the introduction, which at twenty pages is of a length most students can be induced to read. It gives an excellent overview of basic primary/secondary source distinctions and how to evaluate and analyze history websites. This is an issue most students struggle with; some know the difference between primary and secondary sources when they come into history classes, but many do not. In addition, evaluating the validity and veracity of websites is something even well-trained historians can find daunting, so it is no wonder students fare little better in doing so.

On page 3, the authors provide a very useful comparative chart that lists primary vs. secondary sources. While this might seem an elementary exercise, their examples are quite subtle:

Primary: musical recording /
Secondary: blog about jazz

Primary: photograph / Secondary:
article on photo journalism in history journal

Primary: advertisement / Secondary:
Smithsonian article on '40s appliance ads

Primary: 1580 Portuguese map of America / Secondary: modern map of Portuguese colonies

These examples show distinctions that many students must recognize if they are to know what to do with source materials. In addition, the text gives a description of how secondary sources might utilize the same primary sources, showing the value and necessity of 1) using a multiplicity of primary sources and 2) presenting multiple sides of an argument to give a full picture. The text's example relates to the cause-and-effect relationship between advertising and consumer behavior. It walks students through different arguments on the

question and shows them how to use different specific sources to address it, such as sources that provide primary documents but little or no analysis or online exhibits that present mostly secondary material and a point of view.

Using another example—holocaust denial websites—the text segues into a discussion of how to evaluate websites. It provides pertinent questions for students to bring to their use of web sources and shows what to look for when reviewing a site. Who created the site and put together the materials for it? Who is the host or publisher? (A chart is included to explain domain name codes.) When was the site created? Are there recent updates? Does that matter?

Additional questions help determine a site's reliability and usefulness for student objectives. What is the purpose of the site? Is it presenting facts or opinions? Is there any bias or point of view? Is it trying to sell something? Who is its intended audience? It is particularly important to ask what kind of resources a site offers and then evaluate them by determining whether the primary sources are full-text or edited and whether they are well documented. The analysis of one specific item, the "link check" function for websites, is particularly illuminating; the authors show how to assess a site by looking at how many and what other sites provide links to the one being examined.

History Matters also provides information for analyzing primary sources that are found on the web. Of course, this information is useful for documents found in an archive as well. The various questions to ask of documents are presented clearly for students: the who, what, when, how, and why. By walking students through the process of analyzing primary documents, the text helps them understand how the process of history works and how historians do their work. It also illustrates the power of primary sources and their potential for manipulation.

A final, vital component of the introduction is its coverage of plagiarism. The authors give specific references to Internet sources and

formats for citing various sorts of online sources, but they also discuss the topic generally. (Clearly, as college faculty know, it cannot be mentioned too often.) Some steps are offered to help students avoid plagiarism. The *mantra* of avoidance is included—"always credit the source of direct quotations, paraphrased information, and other people's ideas"—along with some websites to help students with research, plagiarism, and documenting questions (19-20).

The second portion of the book, which is more than a hundred pages, is an annotated listing of 250 websites the authors believe represent the best materials for studying U.S. history. The authors make it very clear that they do not feel this is in any way a "definitive" list of history websites, but they reviewed over five thousand sites and selected those they felt best illustrated "the strengths of the Internet for learning about the past and the incredible range of resources and perspectives available," from historical engravings, maps, and newspapers to oral histories, audio and film clips, and photographs (21).

The sites are arranged in a number of categories, making it easy to focus on more specific topics of research. One large, general category includes thirty-six sites. The rest are divided into nine different chronological divisions—to 1763, 1754-1820s, 1801-1861, 1850-1877, 1870-1900, 1890-1930, 1929-1945, 1945-early 1970s, 1968-present. Like those in most college survey textbooks, these divisions are also topical, which accounts for the overlapping years.

Each site is annotated by the authors with a paragraph describing what is contained in the site. There are also icons indicating the type of sources it offers—textual, visual images, audio materials, or film/video materials—and whether the site charges a user fee (clearly indicated with a \$\$ symbol). In addition, many of the annotations include a last sentence briefly explaining its value to the researcher: "These materials demonstrate the value of archaeology for historical research" (45) or "This valuable website... emphasizes the complexity of conflicts persistent throughout twentieth-century American history"

(89). Some include comment on particular strengths or weaknesses of the site.

Following the website listings are several other useful items. First is an appendix titled "Using Search Engines Effectively," which provides "some tips on getting the most out of your Internet searching" (135). Second is the handy glossary of "common Internet terms," which might well teach students how much they do not know about the Internet. And last but most certainly not least are two indices: one of primary sources and the other a subject index. The first is divided into nineteen different categories of primary source materials and lists all the sites in the book that have film and video, for example, or photograph sources. The second allows searches by topic, such as Mark Twain, Vietnam War, or consumer culture.

All together, this text illustrates how to help make electronic history source materials available to our students. While students generally feel they are very net savvy, finding CIA records on the 1954 Guatemala coup is not the same as operating an Xbox. *History Matters*—using the old tech of print—makes the new-tech world of digitalized historical records accessible to students in a very informative way.

Catherine Forslund is associate professor of history at Rockford College.

The Center for History and New Media Website

Matt Loayza

When I began exploring the Center for History and New Media (CHNM) website, I was struck by the breadth and depth of its resources. The comprehensiveness of the site made me despair of providing a brief commentary that would be of any value to audiences interested in the CHNM's resources. Having concluded that the time constraints of a panel presentation would render a broad overview relatively worthless, I chose instead to approach the CHNM by gauging the extent to which the site could address a specific pedagogical

concern: better integrating visual primary sources into my lesson plans. Although this required an eclectic approach to the site, I reasoned that a more focused inquiry would be more helpful to historians who come to the CHNM with some idea, question, or concern in mind. So although the following review admittedly reflects my own pedagogical interests, goals, and concerns, I take this approach simply to present tangible examples of how the CHNM can benefit historians seeking to enhance their ability to use digital media in the classroom.

When Committee on Public Information Director George Creel exhorted American cartoonists in 1918 to draw cartoons that left viewers either "with something to think about" or a "strong emotion," he attested to the considerable persuasive powers of visual images such as political cartoons, photos, maps, and films. The allure of imagery is such that, while professional historians may be loath to admit it, popular movies such as *Forrest Gump* contribute significantly to the intellectual baggage that people draw upon in constructing the past. However lamentable, this reality also presents numerous opportunities, if not a crucial need, to impress upon students the importance of applying critical analysis to visual sources as well as written documents. Although this consideration has informed my various course assignments over the years, I have found that students—even those who have demonstrated great skill and enthusiasm in their scrutiny of narrative documents—examine visual sources less rigorously than they do written texts. Thus, as I searched the CHNM, my primary interest was less in finding specific historical images than in developing new strategies to incorporate visual documents into my lesson plans in a way that inspired critical thinking and class discussion as opposed to questions that simply generate "answers."¹

With these ideas in mind, I began to examine the various "Essays in History and New Media" (found in the resources section), a collection of thoughtful essays on issues related to teaching with digital media. Reviewing the selections under

the "Teaching Digital History" category soon led me to "Ways of Seeing: Evidence and Learning in the History Classroom." This essay, a collaborative effort, turned out to be a great find, as the authors all devoted considerable attention to the many pitfalls that can hinder effective use of historical visuals in the classroom. Having identified these obstacles, the contributors put forward a number of strategies to overcome them. Persons interested in developing interesting and productive assignments that include visual primary sources would do well to consider both David Jaffee's ideas on juxtaposing visual sources with traditional text-based sources and Joni Seager's excellent essay on maps in the "unpacking evidence" section of "World History Sources."²

Subsequent visits to the Center for History and New Media led me to the "History Matters" project's "Digital Blackboard" (DB) collection, a collection of ninety-eight (to date) web-based lesson plans that CHNM describes as offering "practical models" for introducing digital media into coursework. Although one can use the "History Matters" search engine to hunt down DB assignments by topic, time period, and the nature of document under examination, skimming the list of titles was an easier way to review the DB collection. Moreover, reviewing the titles led me to several projects that, while not listed under the search engine as international policy per se, were nevertheless of potential interest to scholars of U.S. foreign relations.

One particularly impressive Digital Blackboard project that showcases many of the exciting and innovative aspects of the CHNM is Nick Cullather's "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State." This project (one of several excellent contributions to the *Journal of American History's* "Teaching the Journal of American History" installments), is based upon his 2002 JAH article on how U.S. officials, from 1946 to 1979, devised a series of ambitious hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan's Helmand Valley to modernize the region and thereby showcase the virtues of American economic development strategies. Since the

teaching exercises in "Damming Afghanistan" draw heavily upon visual documents, I tested the exercises in early June in my summer class, and I got very positive results. The first two exercises in the lesson plan incorporate visual materials to help students comprehend how the meanings of terms such as modernity, progress, and development are constructed and contested. In the first exercise, students are asked to examine photographs of various landscapes and then rank them in the order of most to least developed and in the order of which landscapes would provide the most desirable place to live. By posing the questions in this manner, Cullather requires students to make subjective judgments that provide several opportunities for discussing the basic assumptions that students make about modernity as they compile their rankings. When I asked my students to explain their conclusions, they often asked me to put their respective landscapes back on the screen so they could refer to specific details. As the students scrutinized the photographs more closely, they began to discuss the concept of development and its implications for nation-building projects in the Cold War.

Subsequent exercises ask students to examine maps of Afghanistan and infer from these maps the assumptions and misconceptions of U.S. officials regarding the appropriateness of U.S. development planning to realities in Central Asia. The various lesson plans include many user-friendly components such as links to both online and PDF versions of the original article, worksheets, photographs, and maps. Instructors thus have the option to present the lesson materials online, as power point presentations, as photocopies, or in a combination of formats. Most valuable, in my view, are the author's suggestions on how best to encourage students to engage and analyze the materials and debate their ramifications, both in general and as applied to Afghanistan.³

While "Damming Afghanistan" is one of the few Digital Blackboard projects that pertain directly to U.S. foreign relations, others can be altered

or used in part to illustrate themes pertinent to U.S. foreign relations. For example, Sue Luftschien and David Jaffee's "George Washington: Images of History" uses paintings of the first president (including the Brumidi "Apotheosis" that graces the U.S. Capitol rotunda) to discuss how artists contribute to constructing historical memory. Although Luftschien and Jaffee's lesson plans do not specifically address foreign relations, let alone Washington's specific policies, the general thrust of the lesson plan could easily be tailored to a discussion of how Americans have conceptualized Washington and the presidency in general and the importance of both concepts to constructions of American nationalism in the days of the early republic. So while diplomatic historians may find that many DB exercises are not necessarily ready to use "out of the box," they do provide a useful foundation that can be modified to suit individual preferences and needs.⁴

The Center for History and New Media is an exciting and ambitious initiative that merits the attention of any historian interested in integrating digital media into his or her teaching. My examination of various features of the CHNM, particularly the Digital Blackboard projects, was time well spent, as the center provided a number of materials that more than satisfied the pedagogical concerns I sought to address. Moreover, the relative scarcity of diplomatic topics in the DB collection should alert SHAFR members to the great potential of future collaboration with CHNM, whether it is in Digital Blackboard projects, Essays in History and New Media, or the myriad other CHNM projects that are helping scholars get their students engaged in historical analysis.


Matthew Loayza is assistant professor of history at Minnesota State University, Mankato.

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
1. Committee on Public Information, Bureau of Cartoons, Bulletin No. 16, September 28, 1919, 1-2, in "Cartooning for Victory: World War I Instructions to Artists," *History Matters*, Center for History and New Media. <<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5052/>>.
2. Michael Coventry, Peter Felten, David Jaffee, Cecilia O'Leary, and Tracey Weis, with Susannah McGowan, "Ways of Seeing: Evidence and Learning in the History Classroom," *Journal of American History* Volume 92, Number 4 (March 2006): 1371-1402. <<http://chnm.gmu.edu/resources/essays/d/43/>>; Joni Seager, "Maps," World History Sources. <<http://chnm.gmu.edu/worldhistorysources/unpacking/mapsmain.html>>.
3. Nick Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State," *Teaching the JAH*, Sept. 2002 (Vol. 89, no. 2). http://www.indiana.edu/~jah/teaching/2002_09/.
4. Sue Luftschien and David Jaffee, "George Washington: Images of History." Learning to Look Faculty Development Program, The Graduate Center, CUNY. <<http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6876/>>.




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
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Researching in the Beloved County: Archives and Adventure in South Africa

Eric J. Morgan

It is no coincidence that the demise of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the Cold War occurred at nearly the same time. By the end of the 1980s, the government of South Africa faced insurmountable pressure for change from both internal and external forces. As the threat of global communism faded and the march toward democratic self-rule progressed across Eastern Europe, the South African government found itself with few friends and even fewer options for self-preservation other than to join the great wave of democracy and end apartheid's codified, racist system of segregation. The road to majority rule in South Africa would not be easy, but without the collapse of communism and the rise of a global anti-apartheid movement, it might have been prolonged even further.

The little-studied archival collections of South Africa can give scholars a fascinating glimpse into the histories of the Cold War and global race relations in the twentieth century. The study of U.S. relations with South Africa during the apartheid era serves as a unique window onto the Cold War and race relations, and the collections are literal treasure troves for students of American foreign relations who would like to explore these subjects through the prism of South African history. The starting point for research is the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, located in the basement of the stunning Union Buildings in Pretoria. Situated atop a massive hill overlooking all of South Africa's executive capital, the Union Buildings were constructed between 1910 and 1913 and are surrounded by luxurious terraced gardens and a sprawling public park. They house both the Department of Foreign Affairs

and the Office of the Presidency, with the Department of Foreign Affairs archives holding records from 1965 onward.¹ Older materials are housed at the National Archives, also located in Pretoria, where cabinet minutes as well as the papers of the Office of the Prime Minister prior to the administration of P.W. Botha in 1984 can also be found. The Department of Foreign Affairs collections are arranged chronologically by country or subject, with detailed finding aids available for all collections.

Of particular interest is the collection on South African relations with the United States. This massive collection—numbering hundreds of oversized folders packed to the brim—chronicles the ambivalence of the U.S. government towards South Africa and the issue of apartheid. Correspondence between the American and South African governments was abundant, and there were numerous communications between American citizens and the South African government. The Department of Foreign Affairs also kept a close watch on the development of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, at times comparing it in scope and potential to the anti-war movement of the 1960s and early 1970s.

Exploring the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs is a tremendously efficient way to examine various relationships between the governments and peoples of the United States and South Africa during the apartheid era, since the complete chronological collection is available in one location. It is interesting to observe in countless memoranda and position papers the importance that the South African government accorded moral and economic support

from the United States and the emphasis it placed on the communist threat in southern Africa. By the 1970s the United States was South Africa's most important trading partner, and the government was always concerned that the United States would at some point move away from supporting South Africa. The records of the Department of Foreign Affairs also provide a glimpse into the larger picture of decolonization in southern Africa, with numerous files including interesting perspectives, debates, and policy decisions on the contentious liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s in such places as Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Angola, and Mozambique.

Beyond the official policies and foreign relations of the South African government, the records of various South African liberation organizations provide a unique insight into not only the liberation movement, but also black African perceptions of the United States (which were rarely positive), the Cold War, and global race relations. For this perspective, the collections of the University of Fort Hare, located in Alice, are indispensable to researchers. The University of Fort Hare, a veritable proving ground for black African liberation leaders (notable students included Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Robert Sobukwe, Steve Biko, Robert Mugabe, and Charles Njonjo), houses the collected papers of the African National Congress (ANC) as well as the Pan Africanist Congress and several other liberation movements. The papers of the ANC are located in the basement of the Howard Pym Library, though plans are in development to relocate the collection to the National Heritage and Cultural Studies Centre (NAHECS),

also located on the Fort Hare campus. The ANC materials illustrate the complicated role of liberation organizations in lobbying the United States government and show the importance of solidarity between the American anti-apartheid movement and the exiled ANC and other liberation groups.

Other archival collections worth exploring include the UWC-Robben Island Mayibuye Archives at the University of the Western Cape outside of Cape Town, the collections of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, the Jack Simons papers at the University of Cape Town, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation collection in Johannesburg. The Mayibuye Archives house an impressive collection of newspaper clippings, videos, photographs, posters, and other visual materials, as well as a large collection of oral histories.

Researchers contemplating a visit to South Africa are urged to contact archives well in advance of their proposed visit. Communications in South Africa can be slow, and it is not uncommon for an e-mail message to go unanswered for several months. Some archives do have collections or finding aids listed on-line, but it is best to contact the archives by e-mail or telephone to see if the collections pertinent to one's research are available. South

African archives are, in general, fairly efficient, though they do not have the same kind of structure as American or Western European facilities. The hours for research vary at each archive, though they generally fell between 9 A.M. and 4 P.M. None of the archives I visited had scheduled pull times, and they were all very informal (one even included tea with the archivist at 10 A.M. every day). That informality allowed much more personal interaction with archivists. However, several archives have only one archivist, meaning research can be delayed by vacations or sick days. Thus it is imperative to contact archives well before a visit. Scholars should also be aware of numerous South African holidays, which will keep most offices closed for a day or more.


For English speakers, language barriers are rarely a problem during archival research in South Africa. But it must be noted that while English served as the main diplomatic language between the government of South Africa and other countries as well as within liberation organizations such as the African National Congress, Afrikaans—a mix of Dutch, German, French, and English—was used quite often within the government itself prior to the end of apartheid. Approximately fifty percent of the files I looked at in the Department of Foreign Affairs' "Countries: U.S.A."

collection were written exclusively in English, with another twenty-five percent in Afrikaans but with English translations. The remaining twenty-five percent were exclusively in Afrikaans. Mastery of Afrikaans is not necessary for archival research, but some documents will be useless without a rudimentary understanding of the language, or at least a good pocket Afrikaans dictionary at one's side. Those with some facility in German or Dutch will be able to get by.

South Africa has eleven official languages, including English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa, along with dozens of unofficial varieties, but nearly everyone has a basic comprehension of English. However, be prepared to speak slowly, as English is not the first language for much of the black population. (And if you are fair-haired and blue-eyed like me, don't be surprised if you are greeted in Afrikaans by white South Africans in Pretoria.) Even within the service industry, English is not always spoken or understood perfectly. Most people will be more than willing to speak with you in English, though, as long as you are patient and good-humored.

Some advice on getting to and around the country may be helpful. A citizen of the United States or a Commonwealth nation does not need a visa to enter South Africa for less than ninety days, though a valid passport is required. For trips longer than three months, a visa, costing around \$70, must be purchased from a South African embassy or consulate before entering the country. In the United States these offices are located in Washington, D.C., Chicago, New York City, and Los Angeles.

Getting to South Africa from the United States is neither a swift nor a cheap venture. South African Airways flies directly to South Africa from Washington, D.C., and New York City, with roundtrip tickets starting at approximately \$1500. Other airlines that make the long journey to South Africa from the U.S. include Delta and British Airways, and most have at least one layover in either London or West Africa. The initial cost of getting to South Africa is high, but




The Union Buildings, located in Pretoria, house the offices of both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency.

the cost of living there is remarkably low compared to the United States, Canada, or Western Europe. While I was in South Africa, the rand – the official currency – hovered just above 7 ZAR to 1 U.S. dollar, and between lodging, meals, and daily transportation costs, my spending averaged around \$40 per day.

Depending on one's standards of luxury and interest in being immersed in local culture, lodging can be very affordable. South Africa does not have the same kind of hotel and motel culture as the United States. Instead it offers a wide array of guesthouses and backpackers – South African terms for bed and breakfasts and hostels, respectively – which can be found nearly everywhere, from the largest cities to the smallest villages. Dorm beds in backpackers run as low as \$7 per night. Private en suite rooms in backpackers, the option I chose for most evenings, average \$25 per night. Backpackers are interesting places where one will meet travelers from all over the world, and most of the proprietors I encountered were tremendously warm, helpful in arranging activities, and always willing to discuss South African history and politics with me. Guesthouses, a nice lodging option for someone with a budget larger than a graduate student's, will run at least \$50 per night, with many upscale options moving towards \$100 per night, depending on the location and season. Well-known hotels such as the Holiday Inn are also available in the largest cities, but offer little in terms of local flavor. It is advisable to avoid visiting South Africa during the summer holidays in December and January, as lodging options book quickly and prices can as much as double in such vacation destinations as Port Elizabeth or Plettenberg Bay.

Traveling through South Africa is fairly straightforward, with numerous options available depending on one's monetary allowances and, most important, patience. Rental cars provide the most freedom and allow a researcher to get to some of the more remote locations in the country, but they cost around \$50 per day (less for standard transmission models). The bus system in South



Elephants and warthogs mingle at a waterhole in Addo Elephant National Park outside of Port Elizabeth.

Africa is very good, with options such as Greyhound, Translux, and Intercape offering consistent service and competitive prices. Expect to pay \$35 for a one-way ticket from Johannesburg to Cape Town, an eighteen-hour trek. Flying within South Africa is the fastest option of all, of course, but it is expensive. Recently, however, several small airline companies, including Mango and Kahlula, have emerged as competitors to the larger airlines and offer relatively inexpensive flights between major cities. Other options include minibus taxis, which offer a taste of the local and bizarre for more adventurous travelers, and trains, which are without any doubt the slowest – though certainly the most romantic – way to get around the country. I preferred to travel long distances by bus so that I could read and rest. I used taxicabs within cities and also walked quite a bit. South Africa is a large country and does not have a nationwide light-rail system, so traveling from city to city does take patience and planning. I do have one caveat: while South Africa can feel surprisingly like the United States or Western Europe within its large urban centers and cozy suburbs, this impression can be deceptive. Crime remains a serious problem, and the locals adjust their lives accordingly. Nearly all properties in South Africa are surrounded by huge walls topped

with barbed or electric wire, and criminal activity – from muggings to break-ins to car jackings – are legitimate concerns. It is important for visitors to South Africa to be aware of their surroundings and to remain vigilante, but not to ruin their experience by giving in to paranoia.

A visit to South Africa will give researchers a unique opportunity to see one of the world's most beautiful countries, and it is advisable to spend as much time as possible outside the archives to explore all the wonders of nature and culture that South Africa offers. No trip to South Africa – or to the African continent in general – would be complete without at least one safari. The wildlife of South Africa is truly extraordinary, and visitors will be able to observe lions, rhinos, elephants, leopards, hippopotami, crocodiles, buffalos, zebras, ostriches, and numerous antlered beasts at a number of national parks or private game reserves. Kruger National Park, located an hour east of Pretoria, is the largest and most popular park and well worth a visit. Other excellent facilities include Addo Elephant National Park outside of Port Elizabeth and Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park in KwaZulu Natal.

South Africa is a paradise for lovers of the outdoors, and adventure tourism is a compelling attraction for many visitors. Beyond overland safaris, other noteworthy outdoor

diversions include whale and dolphin watching, deep sea fishing, whitewater rafting, canoeing and kayaking, camping, hiking, horseback riding, and, my personal favorite, the world's highest bungee jump, at the Bloukrans Bridge near Storms River.

South Africa is also home to numerous museums, among the best being the Apartheid Museum in Gold Reef City, the Hector Pieterse Museum in Soweto, the Johannesburg Art Gallery, and the Maritime Museum in Cape Town. A trip through wine country, located in the beautiful area surrounding the college town of Stellenbosch outside of Cape Town, makes for a fun Saturday afternoon. The quality of South Africa's wines has improved exponentially over the past decade, with hundreds of wineries producing top-quality reds, whites, and dessert wines.

South African cuisine is extremely variable. Travelers will find everything from traditional food like pap (a filling porridge dish made from maize) and grilled meat, to the occasional braai (which is the equivalent of a barbecue, and a staple of South African social life), to the more standard fare served at seafood, Italian, Greek, and American steakhouse-style restaurants. Excluding the

omnipresent McDonald's, few American fast food restaurants have made their way to South Africa, though the country has its share of domestic fast food choices, including Steer's and Nando's. Unique fishes and meats are readily available, including delicious kudu and ostrich steaks. Visitors to South Africa will have little difficulty finding their favorite cuisine in the larger cities, though options in the countryside and townships can be limited.

It is crucial for scholars interested in the history of U.S. relations with South Africa or the liberation struggle to spend at least some of their time in the country interacting with local people. No matter what their race, most South Africans over the age of thirty-five felt the influence of apartheid, for good or ill, and the scars of the system remain in many areas and aspects of the country. I found that nearly all South Africans, black and white, were more than willing to talk with me about their experiences during apartheid, as well as the consequences of it today. As a result of the country's contentious history, South Africans are very political, and it was not uncommon to become involved in a political debate while at a pub or braai (in between arguments

over South Africa's showing in this past summer's cricket World Cup and worries over the upcoming soccer World Cup in 2010, hosted by South Africa). A visit to a township is also essential. Millions of South Africans continue to live in poverty in townships, and contributing some money to the local economy by purchasing crafts or dining at local restaurants is important and will introduce a visitor to some of the world's warmest people.

South Africa offers scholars of American foreign relations a wonderful opportunity to explore the histories of the Cold War and global race relations from a unique point of view. It is worth at least one trip in a lifetime to experience the history, culture, and natural wonders of a truly beloved country.

Eric J. Morgan is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Note

1. For an in-depth analysis of the structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs records, see Sue Onslow, "Research Report: Republic of South Africa Archives," *Cold War History* 5:3 (August 2005): 369-375.

Congratulations!

SHA FR ELECTION RESULTS

In the 2007 election, the membership of SHA FR elected the following persons to offices in the Society:

President: **Thomas A. Schwartz**
Vice President: **Frank Costigliola**
Council: **Kenneth Osgood**
Council: **Catherine Forslund**
Nominating Committee: **Brian Etheridge**

The View from Overseas

“Metaphor of the Moment”: Capturing the Anglo-American Relationship of Late 2007

J. Simon Rofo

The following essay is the inaugural piece in a new series that the editors of Passport hope to run in future issues. This series will provide one or more short pieces written by someone outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad that might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at passport@osu.edu.

On 28 October 2007, in the type of drizzle reserved for the greyest of British days, Scottish-born kicker Lawrence Tynes began a National Football League match between the New York Giants and Miami Dolphins. The significance of the match was not that Miami was heading for a record 0-8 start to the season, but that the regular-season match took place at London's Wembley stadium, filled with 85,000 people. And they were the lucky ones, as the stadium could have been filled many times over. Curiosity and the extensive London-based American Diaspora cannot account for all of this interest in a game which is played on such a small scale in the United Kingdom. On the same day, a leading Sunday newspaper led its sports section with a story suggesting that English Premier League (soccer) matches could be played in North America, while, to continue the sporting transactions, the centrepiece of American sport, the Super Bowl, could be played in London in the not too distant future. In short, in a globalised world, transatlantic cultural relations in sport are set fair to take their place alongside any other number of cultural affinities in film, literature, or art.

In mid-September the United Kingdom experienced its first “run” on a major bank since the year after the American Civil War ended. Northern Rock, the UK's fifth-largest lender, holding twenty-five billion pounds worth of savings, had people queuing overnight at its branches up and down the country to withdraw their funds. The crisis stemmed from the lack of liquidity in international money markets attributed to the American sub-prime mortgage market. Within days it had become the subject of heated debate from pub to Parliament. Next to the huge sums that are traded daily between London and Washington, and the vast network of interconnectedness that situates transnational businesses within an Anglo-American club, the economic fortunes of the two nations seem to be aligned. The tale of Wall Street sneezing and the City catching a cold would seem to stand. And so, the spotlight of Anglo-American relations rests, as it so often does, on the high politics of relations between the two governments. As is also so often the case, due to very different electoral systems and cycles, the trajectory of one

of the administrations is looking up and the other down. In the autumn of 2007, it is Gordon Brown, in the first months of a government he has spent many years conceptualising, who seems most able to shape Anglo-American relations despite the universally acknowledged power imbalance in the relationship. Brown has impetus to shape his own foreign policy while Bush appears trapped in his.

Gordon Brown visited Washington within a month of taking office at the end of July 2007. For some in London that was too long to keep President Bush *waiting* in order to maintain a relationship, commonly termed “special”; for others it was too soon to see a president discredited in the body politic by American-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, something this piece will return to momentarily. As Brown stood at a podium alongside President Bush, his famously dour demeanour and penchant for dark suits contrasted notably with his jeans-wearing predecessor. Yet in his management of the Bush meeting, as with his handling of the London and Glasgow terror plots and farming crises domestically, although marginally checked by the “non-election,” Brown has the appearance of a statesman addressing grave issues of state. His own conception of the Anglo-American relationship owes less to aspirations of a “special relationship,” be that mythical, functional, or just a “will o’ the wisp,” and more to a vision promulgated during the first part of the twentieth century: Atlanticism.¹ Prominent in its articulation was another Scott, Philip Kerr, perhaps better known as Lord Lothian. Lothian was ambassador to Washington for fourteen months that were crucial for the future of the United Kingdom, between August 1939 and his death in December 1940, and core to his conception of Atlanticist thought was an understanding that transatlantic accord could provide for wider Western security into the future. Lothian “argued the case for Anglo-American cooperation not from sentiment or from Britain’s needs, as many of his countrymen were wont to do, but from the standpoint of America’s own security.”² Within the confines of his time, this idea would serve Lothian well. In a speech to the University of Westminster on 25 October 2007, Brown outlined a vision for the future of Britain that coupled Western ideals of “freedom and liberty” with responsibilities to act in both the domestic and foreign field. In doing this and establishing a “liberty test” for his government’s conduct, Brown referenced leading figures in Anglo-American political philosophical thought and included an assessment from American revolutionary Patrick Henry that liberty was “the foundation of everything” in Britain. Brown went on to highlight the meeting of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt

on board the HMS *Prince of Wales* off Newfoundland in August 1941, not so much to indicate the apogee of understanding between Washington and London as to demonstrate to the rest of the world the rights Brown sees as vital in international relations. How far his conception of “rights” differs from Tony Blair’s propensity to frame British foreign policy within a “values” framework may be open to question, but it is Brown’s Atlanticist vision that will influence and shape high-level Anglo-American relations in the near future. As such it is not a priority for Brown to become “best buddies” with the resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., but to promulgate familiar rights and responsibilities with Washington that will enhance both nations and in doing so, the transatlantic relationship.

Of course the intellectual antecedents of a prime minister’s speech are a long way from the place the United States holds in the minds of many of those in the United Kingdom. The “popular mind” is multifarious of course. That British and American forces have fought – and died – alongside each other in Afghanistan and Iraq is cause for sadness: admiration for America is being squandered. With these military operations being termed “American-led,” it is now problematic for Britain to define its own policy in southern Iraq, or British efforts in Afghanistan, as part of NATO’s foray into Central Asia. Criticising Britain’s military commitments has been part of editorial anti-Americanism for such a long time now that the critics themselves are ripe for caricature. Further probing reveals not heartfelt anti-Americanism but anti-Bush sentiment; and as such hope for a post-Bush redemption after January 2009. What this means is that as the former prime minister chose to prioritise *access to* rather than particular *influence in* Washington he tied himself in British eyes to an increasingly discredited president. It meant Britain appeared wholly peripheral, and relations with Washington seemed, therefore, not something worth pursuing. In simple terms, where was the payback for British deaths in Basra, Helmand Province, or on the streets of London in July 2005?

Brown’s Atlanticism, which recognises mutual interests, rights and responsibilities as paramount, will aim to negate the predilections of a president who arouses vociferous feeling throughout large sections of British society. This feeling is diminished, though, by a widely held hope that the end of the Bush administration will provide an opportunity for the next president to shape his or her own appreciation of Anglo-American relations. In turn this feeling of hope is drawn largely from the memory of the British people of the role that the United States played in the post-war world of a type of benign leadership which appeared to take heed of other’s opinions. In this sense the British *zeitgeist* sees America’s role in the world as a lens through which they can reference Anglo-American relations. American interest in the Middle East peace process is one such area, alongside U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond this, the conduct of the administration with regard to issues such as immigration along its southern borders, and the wider process of American politics in election season, has a formative influence upon British opinion, and the hope vested in

the United States. In transatlantic relations, Britons do not expect unfettered influence within any new administration but to be considered because, as Brown would conceive it, mutual understanding means Britain and the United States are pursuing and securing their own, and at the same time each other’s, national interest. In this light, the element of American national interest that is conceived of as exceptionalism, tainted by the Bush administration’s unilateralist bent, has the potential in British eyes, as it has since the time of the Founders, to be a ‘shining’ example for a future president. Dr. Jeff Engel (Texas A&M), in the sister article to this that will appear in *Argentia* (the newsletter of the British International Studies Association’s U.S. Foreign Policy Group), opens by noting that whenever there is a change of leadership the opportunity exists for reappraisal of the Anglo-American relationship. As this author’s assessment here has endeavoured to capture a British view of the Anglo-American relationship in the *autumn* of 2007, looking to Gordon Brown’s conception of transatlantic relations, so the inauguration of 20 January 2009 will provide others with the opportunity to assess the validity of the relationship as a common appreciation of national interests on a multiplicity of levels, above and beyond the individual complexion of either government. Or, to return to the sporting context employed at the outset of this article, alongside consideration of contemporary politics whether there can be anything more to the words of one of the victorious New York Giants players after playing in London: “It was like being at home.”

J. Simon Rofe is Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London. He is also a co-editor of “Argentia,” the publication of the British International Studies Association’s new U.S. Foreign Policy Group, the aim of which is to provide scholars with an interest in U.S. foreign policy a platform on which to exchange and disseminate their work and views, and to encourage cooperation and collective spirit among the rich community of those studying both contemporary and historical understandings of U.S. foreign relations. BISA welcomes contributions from the members of SHAFR in furthering our work in this area.

Notes

1. Amid a plentiful and rich literature, and to develop a further understanding of Anglo-American relations, please see Alex Danchev’s *On Specialness* (Basingstoke, 1998); a number of David Reynolds’s works including “A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War,” *International Affairs* Vol. 62, No.1 Winter 1985/6, “Rethinking Anglo-American relations,” *International Affairs* Vol. 65, No.1 Winter 1988/9; Alan Dobson’s *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1995); Jerome B. Elie’s erudite article, “Many times doomed but still alive: An attempt to understand the continuity of the Special Relationship,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3 (2005), 65; and most recently both editions of John Dumbrell’s *A Special Relationship* (Basingstoke, 2001 and 2006).
2. David Reynolds, “Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939-1940,” *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol.73, Part 2 (1983), 5.

2008 SHAFR Annual Meeting: Program Update

Mary Ann Heiss

Amy Staples and I are pleased, on behalf of the SHAFR Program Committee, to provide this brief synopsis of some of the events planned for the 2008 annual meeting, to be held 25-29 June at the Blackwell Inn and Conference Center on the campus of Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio. The committee is diligently working to put together what we believe will be a varied and interesting slate of panels, and we hope all SHAFR members will make plans to join us in Columbus.

As is usually the case, the program will include an array of sessions that address the full range of the field's interests, topically, chronologically, and regionally. If the panel proposals that have arrived thus far are any indication, this year's program will be a strong one that offers something for all SHAFR members.

In addition to typical paper presentations and roundtables, we are also planning a variety of other events, which include but are not limited to the following:

- Doug Little and Steve Rabe will debut their much-anticipated multi-media extravaganza "Dorm Rooms, Cafeterias, and Low-Rent Hotels We Have Known" in an evening plenary devoted to SHAFR conferences past.
- SHAFR President Thomas A. Schwartz will deliver his presidential address, titled "'Winning an Election is Terribly Important, Henry': Thinking about Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Relations," at the Friday luncheon.
- Congressman Joe Sestak (D-PA) will speak at the Saturday luncheon about the national security challenges that the next presidential administration will likely face.
- Clea Bunch will speak about her experiences as a Western woman traveling in the Middle East at the Women in SHAFR Breakfast.
- A second breakfast is planned for graduate student attendees.
- To mark the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, Nick Sarantakes has organized a panel on the modern Olympic movement and its connection to U.S. foreign policy.
- The conference will officially conclude with a SHAFR-sponsored excursion to watch the Columbus Clippers (AAA-affiliate of the Washington Nationals) battle the Indianapolis Indians (AAA-affiliate of the Pittsburgh Pirates).

Although the 15 December deadline for proposals has now passed, the Program Committee might be able to accommodate additional proposals on a space-available

basis. The same holds true for graduate students who might be interested in applying for travel support. Anyone interested in either of these matters may contact me directly.

As enticing as the final program will be for conference attendees, there will be much more for attendees to do than simply attend sessions. Mitch Lerner, Jonathan Winkler, and the Local Arrangements Committee are hard at work putting together a list of local attractions, places of interest, etc. More information on what to do and see in Columbus may be found in Jonathan Winkler's piece in this issue of *Passport*.

Questions about the conference program may be directed to any member of the Program Committee:

Amy L. S. Staples, Middle Tennessee State University, astaples@mtsu.edu

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Elizabeth Kelly Gray, Towson University, egray@towson.edu

Chris Tudda, U.S. Department of State, ctudda@yahoo.com

Joseph Mocnik, Bowling Green State University, jmocnik@bgnet.bgsu.edu

2008 SHAFR Annual Meeting: Local Arrangements

Jonathan Reed Winkler

As the SHAFR membership should now be aware, the 2008 annual meeting will be held in Columbus, Ohio at the Blackwell Inn and Conference Center on the campus of the Ohio State University from 26 to 29 June, 2008. Program co-chairs Amy L.S. Staples (Middle Tennessee State University) and Mary Ann Heiss (Kent State University) are making excellent progress towards a splendid slate of panels and plenary sessions. Those of us on the Local Arrangements Committee and Program Committees trust that you will join us for what promises to be an excellent conference.

As an Ohioan, let me extend a warm invitation on behalf of the SHAFR Council, the Local Arrangements Committee and the Ohio State University to come to Columbus and the conference. There is much to see and do here, and the activities need not stop with the conclusion of the last panel.

Columbus, the Ohio State University and the Surrounding Environs

Columbus, Ohio has been the capital of the state since 1816. It is now the most populous city in the state, the 15th largest metropolitan area in the country, and has a greater metropolitan population of more than 1.6 million. A center for banking, insurance and retail firms, it is home to five Fortune 500 companies as well as countless colleges and universities. Despite this growing national presence, however, residents will still affectionately refer to the place as a cow town, in homage to a now-gone dairy farm well to the south of the city center. Fans of college football will know of it as the home of Woody Hayes and the Buckeyes. In the core area of the city, the university campus area, the Short North and Arena

Districts south of campus towards the downtown, and the German Village south of the downtown are all vibrant, filled with shopping, dining and entertainment opportunities.

One of the states formed from the Northwest Territory, Ohio was for a while center stage for diplomatic events. SHAFR members may recall that one of the British forts retained after the revolution was near present-day Toledo. General Anthony Wayne's campaigns against the Shawnee-Miami coalition in 1794-95 in northwestern Ohio led to the Treaty of Greenville which, together with Jay's Treaty, eliminated British influence in the territory that became the Buckeye State in 1803.

Freed of this diplomatic baggage, Ohio would go on to develop a powerful agricultural, industrial and educational capacity through the centuries. One element of this was the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College, founded with Morrill Act funds and opened to the public in September 1873. The site chosen for the campus was not to be in the city center but several miles to the rural north, apparently to discourage the students from frequenting bars. Five years later it changed its name to Ohio State University.

SHAFR 2008 will occur at the upscale Blackwell Inn and Conference Center, located on the northern end of the central university campus. It is adjacent to the famous "horseshoe" football stadium, and within a short walk of the main university quadrangle as well as the Olentangy River. Parking will be available on a valet basis at the Blackwell, and at the university's Tuttle Parking Garage, a public facility only two blocks away. All of the events for the conference, including the evening plenary and luncheons, will occur within the

Blackwell building and the adjacent, cojoined Pfahl Hall.

Ohio State, Columbus and central Ohio have many attractions for the discerning SHAFR attendee. While the main Thompson Library on campus will be closed for renovation, the bulk of the library's collections are available at a new, nearby satellite facility served by a shuttle bus from the central campus. The rare books and manuscripts collection papers that may be of interest to SHAFR members include those of John B. Cornell (who worked on Japanese culture and later codebreaking in World War II) and Donald B. Cooper (disease and medicine in Latin America). The university archives contain the Byrd Polar Research papers as well as the John Glenn papers. Both archival collections are available at this nearby facility but researchers who wish to use the collection are encouraged to contact the library directly. The university also has several art galleries, including the Huntington Archive of Buddhist and related art, the Snowden Galleries of the historic costume and textile collection, and the Wexner Center for the Arts. Columbus features a museum of art, numerous art galleries and, in the surrounding region, museums dedicated to science and industry, motorcycles and militaria.

Beyond Ohio State, SHAFR members should be aware of the extensive holdings of the Ohio Historical Society. Included among their manuscript collections are the papers, among others, of Arthur St. Clair, Joshua Reed Gidings, William T. Sherman, John M. Vorys, Return J. Meigs, Salmon P. Chase, James Garfield, John Sherman, William McKinley, William Howard Taft, Warren G. Harding, John Bricker and William B. Saxbe. There is even a set

of British consulate records for the United States from 1797 to 1818. The Historical Society is located three miles to the east of the campus.

Getting Here

Columbus is served by a major airport, Port Columbus International (airport code CMH). Twelve major airlines connect Columbus to 37 other airports with daily, non-stop flights. The airport is located on the eastern side of the city, approximately 12 miles away from Ohio State and an easy twenty minute highway drive to the Blackwell. All of the main rental car firms serve Port Columbus, and the facilities for picking up and dropping off are very easy. Both the Blackwell and the Holiday Inn offer shuttle bus service to the airport on a limited-seat basis. Those interested should contact the hotels directly.

Accommodations

Blocks of rooms for attendees have been held at the Blackwell Inn, the site of the conference, as well as at the Holiday Inn on the Lane and in dormitories on North Campus. Both the Holiday Inn and North Campus dormitories are within 2-3 minutes walking distance from the Blackwell. Conference rates for the Blackwell are either \$129 (single or double occupancy) or, for the loft rooms, \$179 (single or double occupancy). The Holiday Inn rates are \$99 (double occupancy). The dormitory rates (with full linen service) run from \$52 (single) to \$26 (double) to \$21 (multiple) with access to all the campus dining halls (credit cards accepted) and campus parking at low rates. There are also, within two miles, six additional national chain hotels whose rates reflect the distance from the campus. Conference attendees should know that there is no smoking inside commercial facilities in the state of Ohio, so all hotel rooms (and dorm rooms) will be non-smoking. For those driving, the Blackwell offers valet parking, and the university's Tuttle Parking Garage, a public facility, is only two blocks away. Both the Blackwell and Holiday Inn offer shuttle bus service to the airport.

Culinary Options

SHAFR 2008 scheduled events at the Blackwell include the plenary session the evening of Thursday, June 26, the Friday luncheon where SHAFR President Thomas A. Schwartz will deliver his presidential address; and the Saturday luncheon where Congressman Joe Sestak (D-PA) will speak. The Women in SHAFR and graduate student breakfasts will also occur. For lunch and dinner, the campus area and Columbus generally offers a wealth of dining opportunities. Within walking distance, along Lane Avenue and High Street near the Blackwell, are a number of restaurants ranging from fast food to Chinese and even Ethiopian. Those with car transportation can avail themselves of innumerable chain and local eating establishments that range from Eastern European to Thai, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, seafood, barbecue and so on, all within a short drive. High Street, Olentangy River Road, the Short North, Arena district and German Village all have many brewpubs, bars with live entertainment and restaurants. Those seeking very fine dining will find it at places such as the Refectory or Lindey's in German Village.

Area Attractions

There is much else to see and do in the greater metropolitan Columbus area than just breathe in the heady atmosphere of an academic conference. Columbus boasts its own museum of art, an extensive Metroparks system, the Franklin Park Conservatory, as well as various theater, music and arts venues. The Ohio Historical Society maintains, in addition to the archival materials mentioned above, a large historical museum and outdoor village. The Olentangy River is a very short distance from the conference site, offering those who wish to run or walk a chance to do so along an extensive river path. Those who are fans of baseball will be pleased to know that there will be a SHAFR excursion to a home game of the Columbus Clippers, the AAA-affiliate of the Washington Nationals, as they

take on the Indianapolis Indians. For fans of major league soccer, the Columbus Crew plays adjacent to the Ohio Historical Society facility, but their 2008 schedule will not be known until February.

Those interested in turning the SHAFR trip into a vacation will find many attractions in the surrounding areas of Ohio. For example, in Dayton, one hour to the west, is the National Museum of the United States Air Force, the finest collection of military aircraft in the world. Forty-five minutes to the southeast is the Hocking Hills region of Ohio, part of the Appalachian Mountain foothills and a noted vacation area filled with hiking, camping and other outdoor activities. Cincinnati (and the Ohio River) is two hours by car to the southeast, while Cleveland (and Lake Erie) is two hours to the north.

All in all, there is much to do in Columbus and central Ohio during next year's SHAFR 2008 conference. We look forward to seeing you there.

The 2008 SHAFR Local Arrangements Committee is:

Jonathan Reed Winkler, Assistant Professor of History, Wright State University, co-chair

Mitchell B. Lerner, Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University-Newark, co-chair

Robert J. McMahon, Mershon Distinguished Professor, Ohio State University

Chester J. Pach, Jr., Associate Professor, Ohio University

Walter Hixon, Professor and Interim Chair, University of Akron

Chapin Rydingsward, doctoral student, Ohio State University

Jonathan Reed Winkler is assistant professor of history at Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio.



The Diplomatic Pouch

1. Personal and Professional Notes

Kristin L. Ahlberg (Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State) has been elected to the American Historical Association's Professional Division, beginning in January 2008.

David Ekbladh (Columbia) has been selected as a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for 2007-08.

Cora Goldstein (California State-Long Beach) received the Mary Parker Follett Award from the American Political Science Association's Politics and History Section for her article published in *Diplomatic History* in November 2005, "Before the CIA: American Actions in the German Fine Arts (1946-1949)."

Andrew J. Kirkendall (Texas A&M University) received the Association of Former Students of Texas A&M University Distinguished Achievement Award for undergraduate teaching.

Paul Rubinson (Texas) has accepted a Pre-doctoral Fellowship in International Security Studies at Yale University.

Mary Sarotte has accepted the position of tenured associate professor in the interdisciplinary department of international relations at the University of Southern California. She was also selected for life membership in the Council on Foreign Relations.

Douglas Selvage (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) has received a two-year Collaborative Research Grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities for the translation and annotation of documents relating to the history of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1990.



2. Research Notes

Secrecy and U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance, 1958-1976

Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, while the U.S. government conducted its space reconnaissance program under a veil of absolute secrecy, officials debated whether information about the program (including the fact of its existence) should be disclosed to other elements of the government, public, allies, and even the Soviet Union, according to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and archival research and posted by the National Security Archive.

The documents show that some officials argued that even with a program as sensitive as satellite reconnaissance, greater openness, both within and outside the government, could help a variety of U.S. policy objectives. A certain degree of transparency, these officials believed, would legitimize space reconnaissance by removing the stigma of espionage, allow more extensive use of satellite imagery for both national security and civilian purposes, and preserve the credibility of the classification system. As the documents demonstrate, other officials raised objections, often citing the likely unfavorable reactions from the Soviet Union and other nations as well as operational security concerns.

Compiled by National Security Archive Senior Fellow Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, the documents include National Security Action Memoranda, national intelligence estimates, and other sensitive internal records produced by the White House, the CIA, the United States Intelligence Board, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Department of Defense, and the Air Force.

For more information, visit <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact Jeffrey Richelson at 202-994-7000.



Declassifying the "Fact of" Satellite Reconnaissance

The National Security Archive has published a collection of documents concerning U.S. policy with regard to acknowledging the "fact of" U.S. satellite reconnaissance operations--particularly satellite photoreconnaissance. It was 29 years ago that President Jimmy Carter, in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center, acknowledged that the U.S. was operating photoreconnaissance satellites. As the documents illustrate, the perceived need to persuade segments of the public that the U.S. would be able to monitor Soviet compliance with the strategic arms limitation agreements served as the catalyst for the acknowledgment. They also show that the Nixon administration had considered acknowledging U.S. satellite reconnaissance activities in 1972 as a means of providing reassurance that any Soviet cheating would be detected, but the idea was rejected by national security adviser Henry Kissinger.

The documents published include memos stating the positions of various individuals and institutions on the issue in both the Nixon and Carter administrations, assessments of the risks and benefits of declassification, an assessment of the reactions to President Carter's disclosure, and presidential directives from the Carter, Reagan, and Clinton administrations specifying the classification associated with the "fact of" different types of satellite reconnaissance.

For more information, visit <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact Jeffrey Richelson at 202-994-7000.



Declassified Documents and Key Participants Show the Importance of Phony Intelligence in the Origins of the Iraq War

CBS News' exposure of the Iraqi agent known as CURVEBALL has put a major aspect of the Bush administration's case for war against Iraq back under the spotlight. Rafid Ahmed Alwan's charges that Iraq possessed stockpiles of biological weapons and the mobile plants to produce them formed a critical part of the U.S. justification for the invasion in Spring 2003. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's globally televised briefing to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003 relied on CURVEBALL as the main source of intelligence on the biological issue.

The National Security Archive has posted the available public record on CURVEBALL's information derived from declassified sources and former officials' accounts. While most of the documentary record on the issue remains classified, the materials underscore the precarious nature of the intelligence gathering and analytical process, and point to the existence of doubts about CURVEBALL's authenticity before his charges were featured in the Bush administration's public claims about Iraq.

For more information, visit <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact John Prados at 202-994-7000.



U.S. State Department and Russian Foreign Ministry Publish Record of Dobrynin-Kissinger "Back Channel" Meetings, Based on First-time Access to Classified Soviet-Era Documents

Then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger colluded with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to keep the U.S. Secretary of State in the dark about ongoing secret discussions between the Soviets and the Nixon White House, according to newly released Soviet-era documents published by the Department of State.

In February 1972, with the Moscow summit approaching, Kissinger met with Dobrynin, who was scheduled to meet with Secretary of State William Rogers, to talk about what the Secretary knew and did not know about "the state of U.S.-Soviet relations." Commenting on the meeting in his memorandum of conversation forwarded to Moscow, Dobrynin observed that it was a "unique situation when the Special Assistant to the President secretly informs a foreign ambassador about what the Secretary of State knows and does not know." This memorandum appears for the first time in an extraordinary State Department collection of U.S. and Soviet documents on the Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings, produced through a U.S.-Russian cooperative effort, with selections posted on-line by the National Security Archive.

On October 22, 2007, the State Department's Office of the Historian released *Soviet-American Relations: the Detente Years, 1969-1972*, edited by David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selva. Over a thousand pages long with 380 documents and introductions by Dobrynin and Kissinger, this volume (initially released in CD form by the office of the historian) includes the most secret and sensitive U.S.-Soviet exchanges of the superpower detente, the so-called "back channel" Dobrynin-Kissinger meetings. Besides Kissinger's records of his meetings with Dobrynin, which had already been declassified, this volume includes translations of previously secret cables and memoranda of conversations reporting on Dobrynin's meetings with Kissinger as well as President Richard Nixon.

Soviet-American Relations: the Detente Years, 1969-1972 is not yet available in print form yet or on-line, but the Office of the Historian has released a special CD with the volume on it. To give interested readers a flavor of the material, the National Security Archive has published on its Web site some illuminating examples of the new documents.

For more information, visit <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact William Burr at 202-994-7000.



Pakistan: "The Taliban's Godfather"? Documents Detail Years of Pakistani Support for Taliban, Extremists

A collection of newly-declassified documents detail U.S. concern over Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban during the seven-year period leading up to 9-11. Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive at George Washington University, the documents reflect U.S. apprehension about Islamabad's longstanding provision of direct aid and military support to the Taliban, including the use of Pakistani troops to train and fight alongside the Taliban inside Afghanistan. The records represent the most complete and comprehensive collection of declassified documentation to date on Pakistan's aid programs to the Taliban, illustrating Islamabad's firm commitment to a Taliban victory in Afghanistan.

These new documents also support and inform the findings of a recently-released CIA intelligence estimate characterizing Pakistan's tribal areas as a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists, and provide new details about the close relationship

between Islamabad and the Taliban in the years prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Declassified State Department cables and U.S. intelligence reports describe the use of Taliban terrorist training areas in Afghanistan by Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir, as well as Pakistan's covert effort to supply Pashtun troops from its tribal regions to the Taliban cause in Afghanistan--effectively forging and reinforcing Pashtun bonds across the border and consolidating the Taliban's severe form of Islam throughout Pakistan's frontier region. Also published are documents linking Harakat ul-Ansar, a militant Kashmiri group funded directly by the government of Pakistan, to terrorist training camps shared by Osama bin Laden in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

For more information, visit <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact Barbara Elias at 202-994-7000 or belias@gwu.edu.



The Algerian Nuclear Problem, 1991

A collection of recently declassified NSC and State Department documents published by the National Security Archive sheds new light on Algerian-Chinese nuclear relations and Beijing's role in U.S. nonproliferation efforts during the George H.W. Bush administration. The discovery of a Chinese-supplied nuclear reactor project in Algeria stimulated a controversy over whether Algiers sought a weapons capability and the extent to which Beijing was abetting nuclear proliferation.

At a time when nuclear power is becoming more and more attractive to countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the 1991 Algerian case has new relevance. The 1991 controversy came to light against the background of intelligence leaks about the capabilities of Algeria's Es Salam reactor, leading the Bush administration to initiate a campaign of pressure on Algiers to support nonproliferation goals. Washington also encouraged Beijing to take responsibility by inducing Algiers to make nonproliferation assurances and to open the reactor site to international inspectors. The flap quieted when Algeria declared its willingness to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Under pressure from the international community, Algeria eventually signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but questions about its nuclear intentions linger and recent developments raise new questions. Amid recent talk about a "renaissance" in nuclear power, Algeria and other countries in the region have been discussing reactor deals with such suppliers as Russia and France. For some observers, the possibility of expanded nuclear power capabilities in North Africa and the Middle East, especially in light of the Iranian challenge, raises proliferation concerns. Years ago, a report by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein criticized Algeria for not being "open enough to allay widespread suspicions about its [nuclear] activities." How much the situation has changed remains to be seen.

For more information, visit <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact William Burr at 202-994-7000.



New Website for Nixon Audiotapes

At <http://www.nixontapes.org>, scholars can view transcripts of conversations from the Nixon tapes while listening to the audio of the conversation—either in mp3 or high quality flac format. There are approximately 150 pages of transcripts and respective audio files online, and regular additions are made to the site, with the priority being new tape releases. This is a scholarly website run by historians that is not affiliated with the U.S. government, the Nixon Presidential Library, or any other institution.

For further information, contact Luke Nichter at nixontapes@nixontapes.org.



Presidential Voice Library

The voices of American Presidents have been captured by audio pioneers since the early days of sound recording. The invention of Edison's phonograph ushered in a new era of "recorded" history, beginning with President Benjamin Harrison in the late nineteenth century to the present day Bush Administration. The Michigan State University's Vincent Voice Library is working to preserve over 100 years of historical spoken word recordings like those of the U.S. Presidents, and has placed many samples from its collection on-line. The Voice Library also contains a large holding of World War II actualities, featuring Nazi propaganda, war news from the major networks, and the speeches of Churchill, Stalin, and FDR. For a complete listing of the Library's holdings, please visit: <http://vvl.lib.msu.edu/findingaids.cfm?action=list&categoryid=3>.

For further information, contact John Shaw at: (517) 432-6123 x287.



Editorial Cartoon Collection at the Dirksen Congressional Center

The Dirksen Congressional Center is pleased to announce the completion of its Editorial Cartoon Collection project available at <http://www.congresslink.org/cartoons/index.htm>.

Editorial cartoonists loved Everett Dirksen, his position of influence as Minority Leader in the Senate (1959-69), his way with words, and, of course, his distinctive appearance. Over the years, Senator Dirksen's staff compiled a scrapbook containing more than 300 editorial cartoons. Topics covered include Vietnam, civil rights, Republican Party politics, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, reapportionment, Taft-Hartley 14(b), school prayer, Dirksen's recording career, Senate procedures, congressional pay, presidential appointments, and Dirksen's legacy. Naturally, cartoonists also used these topics to depict Dirksen's relationship with President Lyndon Johnson, with his Democratic colleagues in the Senate, and with the Supreme Court. In addition, cartoonists sent Dirksen between 50 and 60 original sketches on equally diverse topics.

For more information, contact:

Cindy Koepfel
The Dirksen Congressional Center
2815 Broadway
Pekin, IL 61554



3. Announcements:

Call for Participants: "War and Foreign Policy: America's Conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical Perspective" *2008 SHAFR Summer Institute, The Ohio State University, June 21-25, 2008*

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will launch its first annual Summer Institute at Ohio State University on June 21-25, 2008. The Institute is designed for college and university faculty and advanced graduate students. The Institute will pay each participant an honorarium of \$500.00 and cover expenses of travel and accommodations.

Peter L. Hahn and Robert J. McMahon will co-direct the inaugural Institute, titled "War and Foreign Policy: America's Conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical Perspective." Exploration of specific case studies of what have been, arguably, the two most controversial U.S. foreign policy crises of the past sixty years will allow for the examination of a host of broad issues germane to our subfield: decolonization; nationalism; the reasons for and efficacy of U.S. interventionism in the Third World; the historical roots of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the Middle East; decisions for and consequences of wars, for the United States, countries and regions affected, and the broader international system; and more.

All participants will be required to read a significant amount of relevant secondary literature, before and during the Institute. Substantial time will be devoted to discussion of that literature, broader historiographical contexts and controversies, and selected primary sources. Visiting faculty who have ongoing research projects related to the seminar's focus will be mentored, as appropriate, by the host faculty. Those who are interested in beginning research on one of the seminar's themes will be encouraged and guided by the host faculty in choice of topic, research design, and the like. All participants will be mentored on strategies for integrating the content of the Institute into courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

The Institute will run from Saturday, June 21 to Wednesday, June 25, 2008. It will immediately precede the 2008 SHAFR Annual Meeting, also at Ohio State University, on June 26-28. Institute participants will be invited and encouraged to remain at Ohio State for the Annual Meeting and thereby accentuate the intellectual and professional gains earned at the Institute.

The deadline for applications is January 15, 2008. Applicants should submit a one-page letter detailing their interest and explaining how participation would benefit their careers. Submit materials (and pose any questions) to Robert J. McMahon at mcmahon.121@osu.edu. Decisions about acceptances will be distributed in February.



Dissertation Fellowships: Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia

The 2008-2009 Miller Center Fellowship is a competitive program for individuals completing their dissertations on American politics, foreign policy and world politics, or the impact of global affairs on the United States. It provides up to eight \$20,000 grants to support one year of research and writing and pairs each fellow with a senior scholar as fellowship "mentor." Applicants must be either 1) a Ph.D. candidate who is expecting to complete his or her dissertation by the conclusion of the fellowship year; or 2) an independent scholar working on a book.

Residence is strongly encouraged but not required. Each fellow is expected to participate in conferences at the Miller Center in fall 2008 and May 2009. All applications must be postmarked by February 1, 2008; applicants will be notified of the selection committee's decision in April 2008. Send two copies of your application materials to Miller Center National Fellowship Program, Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2201 Old Ivy Rd, P.O. Box 400406, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4406.

Inquiries should be directed to Chi Lam, ckl2q@virginia.edu or 434-924-4694, or Anne Mulligan, acm8k@virginia.edu or 434-243-8726. For more information and to download the application visit <http://www.millercenter.org/academic/gage/fellowship>.



CFP: "Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and War in the Modern Age"

University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, United Kingdom, July 8-10, 2008

In the modern age, propaganda has become synonymous with warfare, the battle for hearts and minds occupying a central position within military and civilian planning. This conference intends to promote a broader, comparative approach to the themes of justifying war and the 'just war', drawing on social, political, military, cultural and economic studies from the Napoleonic Wars of the 19th Century through to the current war in Iraq. We would like to encourage interdisciplinarity, especially the cross-fertilization of history with the wider military and media communities. Scholars will have the opportunity to compare and contrast studies drawn from such diverse chronological, thematic, and methodological positions to test the inception and development of the concept of justifying war in the modern era. This will be the first major international conference of its kind to explore these issues and will identify further research synergies that can form the basis for future collaboration.

Topics may include, but are not limited to, the following:

- historical case studies of attempts by individuals, groups, and nations to justify conflict;
- the media representation of the early stages of war in single nation and comparative contexts;
- the relationship between justifying war, propaganda, and public opinion;
- the nature of propaganda and its ability to articulate war aims within democratic and authoritarian nations and between nations, religions, ethnicities, and cultures;
- military and civilian conceptions of war aims;
- the politics of justifying war and the construction of national policy, identity, and myth;
- theories of 'just war' and their translation into propaganda;
- the memory of war, memorialisation, and the concept of the 'just war'.

Proposals (no more than 300 words in length) should be submitted, with a short CV, to either Professor David Welch, School of History, Rutherford College, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NX, United Kingdom (D.A.Welch@kent.ac.uk), or to Dr Jo Fox, Department of History, Durham University, 43 North Bailey, Durham, DH1 3EX, United Kingdom (J.C.Fox@durham.ac.uk).



CFP: 2008 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War

University of California at Santa Barbara, April 4-5, 2008

The Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS) of the University of California at Santa Barbara, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW), and the Cold War Studies Centre (CWSC) of the London School of Economics and Political Science are pleased to announce their 2008 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at the University of California at Santa Barbara on April 4-5, 2008.

The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that make use of newly available primary sources. A two-page proposal and a brief academic C.V. (in Word or PDF format), should be submitted to <jchapman@history.ucsb.edu> by January 15, 2008 to be considered. Notification of acceptance will be made by February 5. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers (no longer than 25 pages) by March 21. The author of the strongest paper will be given an opportunity to publish his/her article in *Cold War History*. Further questions may be directed to the conference coordinator, Jessica Chapman, at the aforementioned e-mail address.

For more information, please visit <http://www.CWIHP.org>.



CFP: 2009 OAH Annual Meeting: "History Without Boundaries"

Seattle, WA, March 26-29, 2009

With the theme of "History Without Boundaries," the OAH program committee seeks an eclectic program that will highlight the use of history in research, education, the media, and public presentations. We seek proposals reflecting the broad chronological and subject diversity of American history, including race, gender, disabilities, political, diplomatic, and military studies, by those teaching at universities, community colleges, and secondary schools, public historians,

and independent scholars. We encourage sessions that emphasize oral history, museums, archives, and broadcast and electronic media. The deadline for submissions is February 15, 2008.

For more information, visit the OAH website at <http://www.oah.org/2009>, or contact:

Amy Stark
Organization of American Historians
112 North Bryan Avenue, PO Box 5457
Bloomington, Indiana 47407-5457
Phone: 812-855-9853
Fax: 812-855-0696
astark@oah.org



CFP: Vietnam War Symposium

Lubbock, TX, March 13-15, 2008

The Sixth Triennial Vietnam Symposium will take place on March 13-15, 2008, at the Holiday Inn Park Plaza in Lubbock, Texas. The Center has already begun preliminary planning and has issued a number of invitations for key speakers for the program. A key Vietnam-related anniversary in 2008 is the 40th anniversary of the Tet Offensive and all of the remarkable events that unfolded in 1968. This included a shift to more critical media coverage of the war, a progressive shift in American public opinion, President Johnson's decision not to seek reelection, the Presidential election of 1968 and the emergence of Richard Nixon, and more.

Our symposia are open for papers examining any aspect of the American involvement in Vietnam and we encourage anyone interested in presenting a paper to submit a one-page proposal to the Vietnam Center. This anniversary, however, suggests a range of topics that participants might wish to explore. As always, graduate students are highly encouraged to submit proposals. Those interested in presenting papers (either individual or as completed panels) should provide proposals as soon as possible. Please format proposals to resemble an abstract, include the author's name, title/affiliation, and contact information, along with proposed title, thesis/purpose, and main points. Please limit proposal length to a maximum of 500 words and submit them to:

Stephen Maxner, Ph.D.
Director
The Vietnam Archive
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, TX 79409-1041



CFP: Thirtieth Annual Mid-America Conference on History

Springfield, Missouri, September 25-27, 2008

The Thirtieth Annual Mid-America Conference on History will be held September 25-27, 2008 in Springfield, Missouri. Paper and session proposals on all fields and phases of history, including overview sessions and graduate student papers, will be considered. Proposals should include a paragraph about the content of each paper. The deadline for proposals is May 1, 2008. For more information, please visit <http://history.missouristate.edu>.

Further questions should be addressed to:

Worth Robert Miller
Department of History
Missouri State University
Springfield, MO 65897
BobMiller@MissouriState.edu



CFP: *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and Culture*

Routledge Press is pleased to announce the publication of a new journal, *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and Culture!* Featuring cross-disciplinary and cutting-edge scholarship from academics and public intellectuals, *The Sixties* is the only academic journal devoted to this most extraordinary, celebrated, and controversial decade. In addition to research essays and book reviews, *The Sixties* will include conversations, interviews, graphics, and considerations of the ways that the 1960s continues to define global politics and popular culture.

The journal takes "the long sixties" (1954-1975) as its broad focus, and will include transnational and comparative analyses. Articles should be no more than 8,000 words and free of specialized jargon, with Chicago referencing and limited endnotes. Please send submissions electronically to each of the following addresses: Jeremy@sixtiesjournal.com, michael@sixtiesjournal.com, and john@sixtiesjournal.com.

For more information, visit www.sixtiesjournal.com or www.informaworld.com/thesixties.



Berlin Seminar

Bradley University's annual Berlin Seminar will be held from June 22 through June 28, 2008. This program is intended for academics interested in the history and contemporary culture, society, economy, and politics of Germany and Europe. Centered at the European Academy in Berlin-Grunewald, activities include discussions with leaders from the realms of academia, culture, and politics. There will also be guided trips to points of historical and contemporary interest, including a day trip to Dresden.

All sessions are conducted in English or with a translator. The cost is \$1900, which includes room and board in Berlin, the seminar program, and trips during the week. Applications are due by January 15, 2008. For further details and an application form, please visit our website at www.bradley.edu/academics/las/his/Berlin or contact Dr. John A. Williams at johnw@bradley.edu or 309-677-3182.



John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Research Grants

The John F. Kennedy Library Foundation provides funds for the award of a number of research grants in the range of \$500 to \$2,500. The purpose of these grants is to help defray living, travel, and related costs incurred while doing research in the textual and non-textual holdings of the library. Scholars and students are invited to apply for these research grants.

Grant applications are evaluated on the basis of expected utilization of available holdings of the Library, the degree to which they address research needs in Kennedy period studies, and the qualifications of applicants. Preference is given to dissertation research by Ph.D. candidates working in newly opened or relatively unused collections, and to the work of recent Ph.D. recipients who are expanding or revising their dissertations for publication, but all proposals are welcome and will receive careful consideration.

Applications may be submitted at any time, but the postmark deadline is March 15 for spring grants and August 15 for fall grants. Applicants will be promptly notified of their project's eligibility. Awards are announced on April 20 and October 20. Applications received after one deadline will be held for consideration in the next cycle.

To obtain information about the Library's collections, each applicant who has not already conducted research at the library should contact a member of the research room staff at the address below or by phone (617- 514-1629) to explain the topic and request a copy of *Historical Materials in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library*. To apply, submit an application form accompanied by a brief proposal (three to four pages) in the form of a letter or memo describing the planned research, its significance, the intended audience, and expected outcome; two letters of recommendation from academic or other appropriate references; a sample of your writing (ca. ten pages); a project budget; and a vita. List the collections in the Kennedy Library and other institutions that you plan to use. Describe how the funds will be applied, other fellowships or grants that will support the project, and whether matching funds are available to you from your institution or elsewhere. Preference is given to projects not supported by large grants from other institutions. Describe your qualifications and similar research projects you have undertaken.

For further information and to apply, please contact:

Grant and Fellowship Coordinator
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum
Columbia Point
Boston, MA 02125
Phone: (617) 514-1624
Fax: 617-514-1625
kennedy.library@nara.gov



Gerald R. Ford Foundation Research Travel Grants Program

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards grants of up to \$2,000 each in support of research in the holdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library. A grant defrays travel, living, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the Ford Library. Overseas applicants are welcome to apply, but they will be responsible for the costs of travel between their home country and North America. The grants only cover travel within North America.

You may print an application form from the library web site at <http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/foundationgrants.asp>, or contact the Library to obtain one. Before you apply, please contact the Library for information about holdings related to your project. To apply, please mail the application form, a vita, and a two or three-page project proposal to the Library. Ask three professional references to send (mail, fax, or e-mail permitted) supporting letters of recommendation.

Awards are made twice yearly. Application deadlines (postmark deadlines) are MARCH 15 and SEPTEMBER 15. You may submit applications at any time, and those received too late for one round will automatically be considered in the next. The Grants Coordinator will notify grant recipients about six to eight weeks after the deadline. Grants must support research to be conducted after the awards are announced and will not be awarded retroactively for research already conducted. The Library staff presents the grant check when the recipient arrives to begin research.

Grant recipients must begin Ford Library research within one year of receiving an award notice, acknowledge Foundation

support in the resulting publication(s), and donate to the Library a copy of the publication(s).

For more information, contact:

Helmi Raaska
Grants Coordinator
Gerald R. Ford Library
1000 Beal Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Phone: (734) 205-0559
Fax: (734) 205-0571
E-mail: helmi.raaska@nara.gov



Norwegian Nobel Institute Research Fellowships 2009-2010: "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Past Experiences and Future Challenges."

The Norwegian Nobel Institute runs a small research program on issues related to peace and war. As part of that program the Institute awards a limited number of guest researcher fellowships. We are now announcing the fellowships for the spring terms 2009 and 2010. Scholars of any nationality in history, political science, and international law are invited to apply. Both Senior Fellowships for distinguished scholars with a substantial record of publication in her/his fields and General Fellowships for scholars in the earlier stages of their post-doctoral careers are available. To qualify for a Nobel Institute Research Fellowship, a Ph.D. is a minimum requirement. The program runs from February through June each year. Applications may be for 2, 3, 4 and 5 months in either 2009 or 2010.

The Senior Fellowship is NOK 20,000 plus free housing worth approximately NOK 15,000 per month. The General Fellowship is NOK 16,000 plus free housing worth approximately NOK 15,000 per month. The Institute also covers travel expenses (economy class), office equipment, and the purchase of specific research materials for the Nobel Institute Library. Fellows must be free to devote full time to study and writing and will be expected to spend most of their time at the Institute. Moreover, the Institute expects each fellow to take active part in our research seminars and to present at least one original seminar paper during his/her stay.

The research program in 2009 and 2010 will focus on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. The basic idea is to collect a group of 5-6 scholars with a strong interest in the history of nuclear proliferation and/or the current and likely future challenges to the non-proliferation regime to work on their individual topics under the same roof. The individual projects may look at the proliferation history of a particular country, or group of countries, or seek to identify more general, causal patterns. They may also explore legal aspects of the NPT; analyze the historical evidence, theoretical assumptions and political arguments that have been used to justify or criticize the present nuclear order; or suggest measures to be taken in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

We do not use any standardized application form. To apply, please send us your research project proposal together with a CV, a list of publications and two letters of recommendation. The project proposal should be brief (normally, 3-4 pages are enough) and outline first of all the main questions that you want to address, as well as the methods, theories, and empirical sources that you will use in addressing them. It should also contain a few words about the relevance and potential importance of your project for the scholarly debate in your field of research.

The application deadline is February 15, 2008.

For further information, please contact:

Dr. Olav Njølstad, Research Director
The Norwegian Nobel Institute
Henrik Ibsens gate 19
0255 Oslo
NORWAY

Telephone 47-22 12 93 30
Fax 47-22 12 93 10
on@nobel.no.



4. Letters to the Editor

September 28, 2007

Dear Editors:

I read *China Market*, Thomas McCormick's first book, back in 1972, when Martin Sklar assigned it in the first American history class I ever took in college, in my senior year. It was a revelation—it had a bigger impact on me than *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, a book that Carl Parrini recommended later that year, when I was a graduate student trying to figure

out how to exit the field of Russian history.

And that's saying a lot. William Appleman Williams was a fetish object at Northern Illinois University, where I earned — is that the right word? — three degrees and got the best education available in the 1970s. Most of the courses I took as a graduate student there were unruly arguments about what to do with Williams.

He actually showed up to give a lecture in 1976, a huge event in DeKalb, Illinois. We all went back to Carl's house afterward, and Bill drank us under the table — literally. One of us slept there under the coffee table. We were all writing or working for *In These Times* at that point in our lives, and we pressed him about the Civil War, Lincoln, the meaning of revolution (we all objected to his treatment of the South). You know the scene. He kept sipping bourbon, neat, while answering our increasingly incoherent questions and addressing our increasingly idiotic declamations.

Eight years later, Williams was a reader on my first (dissertation) book manuscript. His report was positive, but was deemed too short and too eccentric (Translation: "Livingston is starting important arguments, full speed ahead!"). The book was published, anyway, in 1986 (it is still, inexplicably, in print). And then in 1988, I somehow got a job at Rutgers, where Lloyd Gardner would be my colleague.

By that time, I felt that I had always been animated and accompanied by ideas Williams had posited but never bothered to flesh out (bless his heart, he was an essayist, like his nemesis, Richard Hofstadter). Now here I was in the company of a man who was present at the creation. It was surreal.

So Professor McCormick's impersonation of Williams is a real pleasure — another surreal moment in my ongoing, always productive but not altogether pleasant, encounter with a mind that tolerated no boundaries. Even so, I would like to offer three questions about this impersonation, which I will ask, analogously, as a ventriloquist who is channeling his own teachers, Parrini and Sklar.

First, is Empire such a uniform historical phenomenon as the later Williams, and as the retired McCormick, believe? Didn't the Open Door Policy enunciate an anti-colonial imperialism that made a huge difference in the conduct of international relations, and in the definition and defense of national sovereignty? Didn't Williams himself acknowledge this difference? If so, shouldn't we, as working historians, stop juxtaposing the Roman Empire and Cuba under the Platt Amendment and the Bush Doctrine as if they were equivalent political moments that need no interrogation and periodization?

That is, shouldn't we try on a hypothesis that acknowledges the discontinuities as well as the similarities in the articulation and the enactment of imperialism? It goes like this: the Bush Doctrine is a radical departure from the principles of 20th-century American US policy, which explicitly repudiated the notion of American exceptionalism and accordingly placed us on a historical continuum that linked us to all peoples and all countries.

Second, how did the post-imperialist imperative of the Open Door Policy get lost in translation? Professor McCormick writes as if foreign policy makers in the US have always wanted to preserve North America as the seat of empire, and as if Bush and Cheney are merely acting on an inherited tradition in thwarting China's rise to world power. But didn't the makers of 20th-century US foreign policy understand that their task was to design peaceful, multilateral modes of this inevitable transition? Didn't they know that the military restitution of imperial power was doomed — that the seat of empire would eventually move? Isn't the Bush Doctrine a brutish denial of their insights?

Third, how does the concept of corporatism help the argument one way or another? Is it just another way of assigning causative significance to a ruling class? And is it even helpful in view of the powerful liberal tradition in American politics, which presupposes both the supremacy of society over the state and the priority of the individual as against the state—as against the statism of European corporatism, both left and right, which demoted individualism?

Again, what a pleasure to read McCormick impersonating Williams. Made me feel at home in a world pretty much gone mad.

James Livingston
Rutgers University



October 13, 2007

To the Editor:

Thomas McCormick's consideration in the current issue of *Passport* (August 2007) of what William Appleman Williams might have to say about American imperialism today was apt and welcome. I was disappointed, however, that his brief observation that Williams "always envisioned and worked for an American socialism both democratic and decentralized" (p. 18) did not receive more explicit attention. Instead, much like Williams himself, McCormick focuses upon the conflict between American ideals and imperialism and the effort to limit the exploitive practices of capitalism. Unfortunately that unrelenting exploitation reflects something far more complex and systemic than "economic lust and messianic exceptionalism." (p. 19) If not, why then socialism? The increasingly voracious needs and wasteful and destructive demands of today's profit driven economy would, perhaps, have pushed Williams toward relating his anti-imperialism more directly to such issues as capital accumulation, imperative development, global warming, pollution, environmental destruction, wasteful consumption, income disparity, and the benefits of fundamental change in our economic system.

Otto H. Olsen
Professor Emeritus
Northern Illinois University
Gainseville, FL



October 8, 2007

Dear Professor Hahn,

In January 2007, the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations honored me with the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant to support research for my dissertation, "The Aesthetic of Enemy Making: United States and Cuban Foreign Relations through Popular Culture, 1945-2005." My dissertation argues that popular culture – advertising, billboards, comic books, films, political cartoons, posters, and television – produced a visual language of hostility between the United States and Cuba. The images produced in both countries were active agents of dialogue that worked in concert to define a view of the national self in opposition to an external adversary. While some historians have written about a fusion of national cultures as a protracted and multifaceted process that creates new hybrid forms, so too can the fission of the intimate bonds of nations create new ways of seeing the other as adversaries. My work seeks to expand our understanding of the popular myths that influenced the collective memory of the people of Cuba and the United States and helped to define the national identities of both nations.

With the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant I traveled to Washington, DC in July 2007 to carry out research at the Library of Congress and the National Archives. At the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, I conducted research in the extensive collection of U.S. political cartoons. Among the many documents that I was allowed to view and photograph were a wide array of cartoons related to the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These two events constituted the most direct confrontations between Cuba and the United States and thus spurred the production of images depicting the increasing anxiety each nation had towards the other. Of particular importance to my project were the many political cartoons drawn by Bill Mauldin for *Saint Louis Dispatch* and *Chicago Sun Times*. Through a series of pencil drawings, Mauldin was able to capture the national disposition surrounding the escalating tension between Cuba and the United States in the early 1960s. With the assistance of the Library of Congress research librarians, I was also able to view the collections of political cartoonists such as Edward Valtman, Tony Auth, and Herbert Block. Many of the artists' works identified the Castro government as a dangerous adversary to United States' control in the hemisphere. The cartoons also reflected a shift in U.S. popular opinion from embracing the Cuban exile community as political refugees to one of increasing aggravation with the Cuban community's extra-legal attempts to overthrow the Castro government. The more than two hundred digital photographs that I was permitted to take will allow me to continue to analyze these political cartoons throughout my writing process.

While in Washington, I also conducted research at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. One of the main collections I am examining for my dissertation is the Peace Corps' training presentations and recruitment materials. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. strategy regarding Cuba concentrated on halting the further spread of communism in the western hemisphere. Many of the training materials for the Peace Corps expounded on the dangers of Communism around the world and articulated the perceived threat posed by Castro's Cuba in Latin America. A Peace Corps training slide show entitled "Americans Abroad" is an excellent example of the way that anti-Communist rhetoric was presented through the 1980s. At the National Archive Motion Picture and Sound Division, I was able to screen documentary films from the early 1960s that represented Cuba as a looming threat to U.S. security. Films with melodramatic titles such as *Castro, Cuba, and Communism: Danger on our Doorstep* or *Hitler in Havana* sought to represent Castro and the Cuban Revolution as part of a pre-planned Soviet plot to dominate the hemisphere. The films' bombastic proclamations that the threat of Communism looming only "ninety miles from home," made armed conflict with Cuba imminent would have been very plausible to a Cold War American public during the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The films, photographs, and policy documents that I was able to collect at the archive will be essential to the writing of my dissertation. The research staff at the National Archives assisted in making my time highly productive and an enjoyable experience.

Before the Cuban Revolution, the ninety miles of ocean stretching between Cuba and the United States seemed easier to bridge culturally than the ninety meters of river that separated the United States and Mexico. After 1959, this current of cultural exchange became a moat of misunderstanding as revolutionary Cuba distanced itself from the U.S. and aligned with the Soviet Union. While Cuba and the United States avoided open war during the last half-century, conflict between these nations found expression in a variety of arenas – most saliently, in the arena of the aesthetic. My dissertation will explore this aesthetic and its importance to our understanding of U.S.-Cuban relations into the twenty-first century. The materials that I gathered in Washington, DC constitute an indispensable part of my project. Support from the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant has enabled me to carry out this critical phase of my dissertation research. I wish again to thank the grant committee and the members of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for affording me this opportunity.

Sincerely,

Blair Woodard
University of New Mexico



5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually. The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2008 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2008. Nominations should be sent to Joseph A. (Andy) Fry, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Wright Hall, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455020, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5020, joseph.fry@unlv.edu.



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee welcomes nominations for articles published in 2007. All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will automatically be considered; other nominations may be submitted by the author or by a member of SHAFR. Anyone wishing to nominate an article should send three copies of that article plus a letter explaining why it deserves consideration to Seth Jacobs, Department of History, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 (e-mail: jacobssd@bc.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2008.

The Bernath Prize, meant to acknowledge and promote distinguished research and writing by young scholars, is awarded annually to the author of an article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book. The article, which may deal with any topic in the history of U.S. foreign relations, must be among the author's first six published works. The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna Bernath Book Award are ineligible.



The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women. The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of \$5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their Ph.D.s. Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant must also arrange to have a letter of recommendation submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. The deadline for applications for the 2009 Fellowship is December 1, 2008. Send applications to Darlene Rivas, Pepperdine University, Darlene.Rivas@pepperdine.edu.



The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting.

The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2008. Submit materials to George Herring, Department of History, University of Kentucky, 1715 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY, 40506-0027 (gherrin@uky.edu).



The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*. The Hogan Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. It is announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a detailed plan for using the fellowship to achieve the purposes of the program (5-7 pages); a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's graduate adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2008 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2008. Submit materials to: Kristin Ahlberg, Hogan Committee Chair, AhlbergKL@state.gov.



The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The fellowship is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2008 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2008. Submit materials to Kristin Ahlberg, Holt Committee Chair, AhlbergKL@state.gov.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote research by doctoral candidates, by untenured faculty members, and by those within six years of the Ph.D. and working as professional historians. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations or post-doctoral research projects dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation or must hold the Ph.D. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Graduate students should apply for the Holt Fellowship, under the guidelines above, as applicants for that fellowship will be considered automatically for Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants. Untenured faculty members and recent Ph.D.s working as professional historians should submit applications modeled on the Holt Fellowship application, making clear their professional status, substituting a research prospectus for a dissertation prospectus, and arranging a letter of recommendation from any referee. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for 2008 awards, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2008. Submit materials to Kristin Ahlberg, Bemis Committee Chair, AhlbergKL@state.gov.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

- Anderson, David L. and John Ernst, eds. *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War*, University Press of Kentucky, \$35.00.
- Arbuthnott, Hugh, Terence Clark, and Richard Muir, eds. *British Embassies Around the Gulf, 1600-2000: Iran, Iraq, Oman and Kuwait*, University of Hawaii Press, \$90.00.
- Ashbee, Edward, Helene Balslev Clausen and Carl Pedersen, eds. *The Politics, Economics, and Culture of Mexican-US Migration: Both Sides of the Border*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$79.95.
- Bacevich, Andrew J, ed. *The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II*, Columbia University Press, \$75.00.
- Bell, Duncan. *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press, \$95.00.
- Bilgin, Mustafa. *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era*, Tauris Academic Studies, \$79.95.
- Borgwardt, Elizabeth. *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*, Belknap Press, \$22.95.
- Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne. *Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the Caribbean Community*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$79.95.
- Brazinsky, Gregg. *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Democracy*, The University of North Carolina Press, \$45.00.
- Cooper, Andrew F. *Celebrity Diplomacy*, Paradigm Publishers, \$18.95.
- Crawley, Andrew. *Somoza and Roosevelt: Good Neighbour Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1933-1945*, Oxford University Press, \$99.00
- Davidann, Jon Thares. *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$79.95.
- Davies, Thomas Richard. *The Possibilities of Transnational Activism: The Campaign for Disarmament Between The Two World Wars*, Brill, \$129.00.
- Ellison, James. *United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-1968*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$74.95.
- Fischer, Conan. *After the Versailles Treaty: Enforcement, Compliance, Contested Identities*, Routledge, \$125.00.
- Foglesong, David. *The American Mission and the 'Evil Empire': The Crusade for a 'Free Russia' since 1881*, Cambridge University Press, \$34.99.
- Gentile, Emilio. *The Italian Road to Totalitarianism*, Routledge, \$115.00.
- Gillard, David. *Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$69.95.
- Goodman, Michael. *Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb*, Stanford University Press, \$50.00.
- Greene, Benjamin. *Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1945-1963*, Stanford University Press, \$65.00.
- Guinn, Gilbert and G.H. Bennet. *British Naval Aviation in World War II: The US Navy and Anglo-American Relations*, Tauris Academic Studies, \$79.95.
- Hass, Mark. *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989*, Cornell University Press, \$19.95.
- Henriksen, Dag. *NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999*, Naval Institute Press, \$24.00.
- Henriksen, Thomas. *American Power after the Berlin Wall*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$74.95.
- Hotta, Eri. *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$79.95.
- Howard, Lise Morje. *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, Cambridge University Press, \$34.99.
- Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. *The Origins of the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$93.50.
- Kimball, Jeffrey. *The Vietnam War Files: The Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy*, Vietnamese Edition.
- Kirby, William, Robert Ross, and Gong Li. *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History*, Harvard University Press, \$24.95.
- Klitzing, Holger. *The Nemesis of Stability: Henry A. Kissinger's Ambivalent Relationship with Germany*, WVT, □45.50.
- Leffler, Melvyn. *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, Hill and Wang, \$35.00.
- Matsuda, Takeshi. *Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency*, Stanford University Press, \$60.00.
- Mazlish, Bruce, Nayan Chanda, and Kenneth Weisbrode. *The Paradox of a Global USA*, Stanford University Press, \$50.00.

- O'Sullivan, Christopher D. *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943*, Columbia University Press, \$49.50.
- Page, Caroline. *Propaganda and Foreign Policy in the 20th Century*, Routledge, \$110.00.
- Peacock, James L. *Grounded Globalism: How the U.S. South Embraces the World*, University of Georgia Press, \$26.95.
- Peake, Louis. *The United States in the Vietnam War, 1954-1975: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography*, Routledge, \$95.00.
- Reynolds, David, *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century*, Basic Books, \$35.00
- Richmond, Yale. *Deploying America's Soft Power: US Public Diplomacy during the Cold War*, Berghahn Books, \$29.95.
- Roper, Jon and Saki Dockrill, eds. *Over Thirty Years: The United States and the Legacy of the Vietnam War*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$69.95.
- Schmidt, Elizabeth. *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958*, Ohio University Press, \$26.95.
- Sharp, Paul and Geoffrey Wiseman. *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$80.00.
- Sheldon, Anderson. *Condemned to Repeat It: Lessons of History and the Making of U.S. Cold War Containment Policy*, Lexington Press, \$70.00.
- Skinner, Kiron, ed. *Turning Points in Ending the Cold War*, Hoover Institution Press, \$15.00.
- Smith, Timothy. *Britain and the Origin of the Vietnam War: UK Policy in Indo-China, 1943-1950*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$69.95.
- Sullivan, Michael J. III. *American Adventurism Abroad: Invasions, Interventions, and Regime Changes since World War II, Revised and Expanded Paperback Edition*, Blackwell Publishing, October 2007. \$29.95.
- Suri, Jeremi. *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*, Harvard University Press, \$18.95.
- Tannenwald, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge University Press, \$34.99.
- Tom, Lansford. *Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy Since the Cold War*, The Scarecrow Press, \$75.00.
- White, Christopher. *Creating a Third World: Mexico, Cuba, and the United States during the Castro Era*, University of New Mexico Press, \$24.95.
- Williams, Gary. *US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$84.95.
- Williams, Michael, ed. *Realism Reconsidered: Hans J. Morgenthau and International Relations*, Oxford University Press, \$34.95.
- Xenos, Nicolas. *Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy*, Routledge, \$125.00.
- Yilmaz, Suhnaz. *Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952*, Routledge, \$95.00.


The Last Word

Robert McMahon

In happy contrast to the current plight of the U.S. Government, SHAFR has found itself awash in budgetary surpluses over the past several years. A tribute to the excellent fiscal management of our leaders—and to the largesse of the Bernath family—our society's impressive balance sheet is not without its own set of problems. SHAFR's financial managers have advised us that we cannot keep accumulating healthy surpluses indefinitely without risking our society's tax-exempt status.

This dilemma has, ironically, created exactly the sort of problem that any self-respecting professional society would envy: we must find constructive and creative ways to spend some of our surplus dollars in a manner consistent with SHAFR's fundamental objectives and commitments. Accordingly, President Richard Immerman last year rejoined SHAFR Council members to put their collective heads together and come up with a series of possible new initiatives that could be launched with the aid of some of our accumulated surplus. That directive resulted in an impressive and wide-ranging set of proposals. Though no one came up with a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute or global warming, the summer council meeting in Northern Virginia crackled with fresh ideas: from new awards for various scholarly achievements to extra research and travel grants for graduate students; and from fresh means for further invigorating SHAFR's internationalization to new teaching, workshop, and lecturing programs.

One of the proposals, first brought before the council at its previous meeting, actually involved me, my colleague Peter Hahn, and The Ohio State University. A council member thought that it might be possible for SHAFR to use some its surplus revenue to support an annual summer workshop for college and university teachers. The idea was that this would be based loosely on the longstanding model of the acclaimed NEH summer workshops. Perhaps because of our fortunate position as one of the few U.S. universities to have several full-time diplomatic historians, and our long institutional links with SHAFR, Ohio State was the university that several council members thought might be the appropriate one to inaugurate the new summer program. The fact that this year's annual meeting was already scheduled to be held at Ohio State also made the location of the summer institute at Columbus logical.



For further information about the workshop, interested readers should see the note on page 34.

After considerable deliberation, Peter and I—with the council's approval—proposed that we would focus on the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, their origins, course, and consequences, and their role in modern U.S. foreign policy as the central themes. Given his expertise in U.S.-Middle Eastern relations and mine in U.S.-Southeast Asian relations, we thought that theme played to our own strengths as scholars and teachers. But, much more than that, the Iraq War, which this year

eclipsed World War II in length, continues to provide eerie parallels to the Vietnam conflict in terms of its unmistakably large impact on America's international power, position, and prestige that warrant systematic exploration.

The two conflicts seem destined to be linked together by scholars, pundits, military strategists, and politicians for a long time to come. "The Iraq War has reawakened memories of the Vietnam War, the most significant political experience of an entire American generation," observed Henry Kissinger in May 2007. "But this has not produced clarity about its lessons," he added. Indeed. It is our fondest hope that this summer's inaugural SHAFR Institute will stimulate the dozen or so scholars who will attend to explore the numerous connections—and divergences—between what will likely long be compared and contrasted as America's most unpopular and least productive wars. The seminar-style discussions that we envision should prove stimulating to instructors and participants alike—and, with luck, will inform our future teaching and, in many cases, scholarship as well.

We are buoyed by the more than two dozen applications that we have already received. Peter and I speak for the whole SHAFR Council, I think, in saying that we strongly hope that this summer will mark the start of a very worthwhile—and enduring—SHAFR institution. We are proud to be a part of it.

Robert McMahon is the Ralph D. Mershon Distinguished Professor of American History at the Ohio State University and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.