The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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MEMBERSHIP: Annual dues are $20.00 for regular members, $7.00 for students, and $9.00 for retired members. A life membership in SHAFR is $250.00. In the case of membership by husband and wife, dues for one of them shall be one-half of the regular price. Dues are payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. For those wishing only to receive the SHAFR *Newsletter* the cost is $10.00. Overseas members wishing to receive the *Newsletter* by air mail should remit an additional $10 per year to the *Newsletter's* editorial offices. Institutions wishing to receive *Diplomatic History* should contact Scholarly Resources.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in March or April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two others honor the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in each *Newsletter*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

SUMMARY OF THE 1990 ANNUAL MEETING

by
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The sixteenth annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations took place at the University of Maryland, College Park, on 1-4 August 1990. Two hundred and thirteen registrants attended twenty-three sessions. During the first morning of the meeting the participants learned of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

The meeting got off to an auspicious start on the evening of 1 August with a plenary session concerned with "The End of the Cold War? Meanings and Implications." Chaired by Michael H. Hunt of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the president of SHAFR, the panel discussion featured presentations by Alvin H. Bernstein, the director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, who stood in on short notice for Eric Edelman of the Department of Defense, John Lewis Gaddis of Ohio University, Walter LaFeber of Cornell University, and Geir Lundestad, the director of the Nobel Institute, Oslo. About two hundred and twenty-five people packed the house and heard a freewheeling and provocative discussion.

Bernstein assessed the implications for strategic thinking in the future. He noted that small arsenals will not necessarily cope successfully with smaller conflicts. Seeking to determine "an acceptable floor," he discussed dramatic changes in the military environment, notably the collapse of Soviet offensive capability, the proliferation of deadly chemical and biological weapons, and the technological revolution brought on by super

computers, precision guided systems, and stealth aircraft. His message underscored the need to plan carefully with appropriate regard for strategies and weapons.

Gaddis described his meetings with Soviet historians and the implications of *glasnost* for historical studies in the Soviet Union. He observed that Soviet historians are now gaining limited access to documentary materials in the archives and conceivably may acquire the means to write more accurately about the Soviet side in the Cold War. In an appraisal of Soviet historiography, Gaddis held that Soviet historians do not effect a monolith and do endorse differing interpretations. Intriguingly, he remarked upon the existence of a mirror-image effect by which Soviet thinking about the origins and development of the Cold War parallels the debate in the United States over orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist accounts. Candor is growing in the Soviet Union.

LaFeber unhappily at the last minute could not attend the SHAFR gathering, but he arranged for Michael Hunt to read a prepared statement which depicted the newly emerging world as reminiscent of the one which existed before 1939. By this assessment, the Cold War era was something of an aberration, dominated by the bipolar rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are now returning to the traditional realities of world history, characterized by regional tension, clashing nationalisms, vaulting technology, large debts and trade deficits, a strong Germany and Japan, and a disintegrating Soviet Union. In this dangerous new world, historians need to evaluate the implications with care, because they have great significance. For example, in the western hemisphere the change in conditions might encourage a reversion to the disastrous unilateralism of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. For LaFeber, a fundamental question centered upon the kind of responses we might expect from our own political culture.

Lundestad began with a warning about the dangers of

making predictions. No one, after all, anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Now that those things have occurred, he believes that the USSR will have to make significant adjustments, for example, new definitions of security and new ideological formulations. He cautioned against thinking that the end of the Cold War will mean an end to the use of violence in the conduct of international relations, for in all likelihood it will not. In assessing the long-term meaning for the United States, he saw a period of gradual decline in which the country would remain a great military power but with reduced political and economic capabilities, especially in relations with Germany and Japan. By way of reassurance, he told the audience nonetheless that the United States would remain Number One in the immediate future.

On the morning of Thursday, 2 August, the session on "Canadian-American Relations, 1783-1840, Origins of the Working Relationship," attracted a small but animated group which appreciated the attempts to link social history with foreign policy. The moderator, Professor Reginald C. Stuart of Mount Saint Vincent University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, noted the uneven awareness Canadians and Americans have of one another because of cultural similarities and disparities in size. The panel showed how Canadian-American relations evolved from the ground up, in the borderland region on either side of the boundary drawn by the Treaty of Paris of 1783.

Professor Jane Errington of the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, pointed out that anti-Americanism is often equated with patriotism in Canada. Yet most Canadians are ambivalent about the United States, admiring some, and rejecting other qualities found in Americans. She surveyed cross-border social, cultural, demographic, and economic themes between 1783 and 1830 to trace this ambivalence, and noted that ordinary folk were less fearful of

their Yankee cousins than members of the provincial elites, who had much to lose if serious political change occurred. The War of 1812 confirmed and projected this ambivalence, which became a source of tension within the Canadian identity as well as a theme in cross-border relations.

Dr. Roger Rosentretor of the Michigan Bureau of History could not attend the session, and Professor Stuart summarized his paper. Rosentretor examined the efforts of officials in Michigan to control filibustering into Upper Canada in the wake of the provincial rebellion of 1837-38. Local officials found themselves hamstrung to prevent incursions because of local sympathies for rebels, Michiganders' sense of mission to spread republican liberty, local political rivalry, and the division of powers under the Constitution. Rosentretor underscored the significance of the local context for understanding crises in Canadian-American relations.

As commentators, Professor Stuart and Professor Michael Cross of Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, amplified the main themes of the session. Stuart raised specific questions, but observed that both papers properly emphasized the significance of social/cultural history in a local context for the larger subject. Beyond that Canadian and American similarities often obscure the deeper differences between the two peoples, despite their common heritage and proximity.

Professor Cross reinforced these themes while demurring on specifics, and suggested that Canadians were even ambivalent about their ambivalences. Some wanted American political forms, but not unbridled capitalism; others wanted trade, but not republicanism. Perhaps we should not too readily accept American exceptionalism, he added. After all, America shares many qualities with Canada, both historically and currently. We are both North American countries.

A seminar on the subject ensued. Perhaps the major conclusion was the need to bridge the histories of society and foreign policy and that Canadian-American relations offer a superb case study for this important historiographical endeavor.

Betty M. Unterberger chaired the session on "The War, the Treaty, and the League." Regrettably this program suffered initially because one set of participants backed out without delivering a paper and another, also unable to attend, sent a paper ninety pages in length. Thanks to the heroic efforts of Lloyd Ambrosius, the commentator from the University of Nebraska, who agreed to cut it down and present it in shortened form, and the excellent paper by Russell Van Wyck of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the program was not only saved but turned out to be an exceedingly lively session with about fifty persons attending.

Van Wyck's paper on "German Agents and U.S. Neutrality: The German and American Records," offered another look at German agents in America and German attitudes toward United States neutrality. He sought successfully to establish the evidence we do have of German activities in the United States between August 1914 and April 1917; and to clarify the motivations for the unsubstantiated allegations in the United States documents and early secondary literature; and finally to identify that which must be regarded as speculation. He challenged the general view presented by other authorities that the German campaign of intrigue, espionage, and sabotage revealed the true attitude of German leaders toward the United States as an attitude of hostility and contempt.

The paper by Jonathan M. Nielson of Sonoma State University, so masterfully summarized by Professor Ambrosius, explored the government service and contributions of professional historians to American foreign policy during

the First World War — the role of the scholar as patriot and diplomat.

Both papers presented evidence that revealed German issues in a more favorable light. The commentary by Unterberger and Ambrosius set forth helpful suggestions for strengthening the papers, and a lively discussion ensued from the audience.

About fifty people attended the panel on de Gaulle and the United States, 1958-1969. The first paper, "De Gaulle, American Intellectuals and Algeria," presented by David L. Schalk of Vassar College, gave a summary description of the "honeymoon," the "state of grace" between the American press and General de Gaulle from 1958 to 1962 during the Algerian War. This interlude contrasted sharply with the tempestuous Franco-American relationship before and after. Never in recent American history, except perhaps for Churchill during the war, was a foreign statesman given such a positive evaluation of his policy. This phenomenon can be understood in three possible ways. De Gaulle could have modified his foreign policy to create a temporary alignment with the United States. Or the U.S. itself could have changed and produced a community of interest between the two nations. But more likely there was an element of truth in the laudatory terminology employed by the American journalists. They sincerely praised de Gaulle's democratic values and his political artistry.

"Charles de Gaulle and the French Withdrawal from NATO Integrated Command," presented by Samuel F. Wells, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, showed that well before de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 many French political and military leaders objected to U.S. policies for NATO and those calling for an elimination of colonialism, but that only de Gaulle had enough power, will, and vision to articulate and to implement a new policy. This policy unfolded from 1959 onwards and accelerated after the end of

the Algerian war. By the end of 1965, the stage was set for withdrawing from NATO. In evaluating the capacity for compromise on each side in order to produce a different outcome, Wells is pessimistic. De Gaulle was unwilling to compromise his demands. Among the American presidents, Eisenhower was the most prone to compromise and was encouraged by General Goodpaster. But in closing Wells supported the acerbic opinion of John Newhouse that "whatever the mistakes of American and British leaders...there never was a possibility of doing serious business with de Gaulle on reasonable terms."

"De Gaulle and the Atlantic Community" by Lawrence S. Kaplan, Kent State University, gave a nuanced and balanced view of Franco-American relationships during the de Gaulle era. For even during the "tempestuous period" de Gaulle policy was supported by prominent Americans, such as Walter Lippman, Mike Mansfield, and J. William Fulbright. But in 1966 the French decision to withdraw from NATO produced also sharp commentary in Congress mainly due to the dollar losses from the investment made in American bases in France. American anger appears also justified because de Gaulle took advantage of a rough balance in East-West relations to deal both with the West Germans and the Soviet Union in ways detrimental to NATO. But even if French withdrawal from NATO raised many issues, President Johnson was determined not to inflame an already difficult problem. Like his predecessors, he realized that de Gaulle was a force of nature which one worked around rather than pushed aside. In the end de Gaulle's policy even produced some good: it accelerated McNamara's reforms and gave a greater say to the smaller allies in NATO. The Alliance was strong enough to survive both de Gaulle's challenge and America's dominion.

In the commentary, Denise Artaud of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, stressed that the contrast between the "state of grace" depicted by Schalk and

the rather gloomy view that came out in Wells's and Kaplan's papers was only apparent. For even during the "honeymoon," there were several periods of tension between Paris and Washington due to the State Department's friendly attitude toward the Algerian provisory government, whereas during the worst phases of Franco-American crises there never was a unanimity of criticism against de Gaulle. Certainly it is necessary to wait until the French archives are opened to assess the respective responsibilities in the Franco-American crises, but from research work done recently in the British archives, it appears that during the Middle East crisis of 1958, London did its best to inflame an already bad situation, increasing de Gaulle's suspicions of the "wicked Anglo-Saxonsé." It will also be interesting to know more on the effects of the Algerian war. Was its end only a page that could be turned and therefore a possibility to embark on a new policy toward the Alliance? Or, because of acrimony due to friendly American attitudes toward the Algerian provisory government, was it a springboard to embark on a policy of confrontation with the U.S.?

Anton W. DePorte, New York University, put de Gaulle's decisions in a larger context. It may be an error to think that his policy was unfolding relentlessly until its execrable outcome: French withdrawal from NATO. The Missile Crisis was probably a turning point in 1962. If the result had been not a first phase of Detente, but a new surge of Cold War, de Gaulle might have been reluctant to embark on a course that could be detrimental to the Alliance. It is also necessary to remind that de Gaulle was strongly critical of the Vietnam war, and that was also an element in his decision to achieve greater independence from America. Furthermore, the Vietnam war facilitated his assumption of a "godfather role" in the Third World. Hence, his shattering speeches all over the world which infuriated many Americans.

The audience raised many questions, among which the

most interesting dealt with the effects of the Suez Crisis, the so-called "Directoire à Trois," and American and British refusal to give the French a major command in NATO.

On the afternoon of Thursday 2 August, a session entitled "'One World?': Concepts of Interdependence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1912-1954," chaired by Robert J. McMahon of the University of Florida, drew an audience of about thirty-five. John P. Rossi of the University of Arizona delivered the first paper. He examined the centrality of Woodrow Wilson in the creation of a "new paradigm" for American foreign relations. Professor Rossi argued that Wilson's new diplomacy rested upon the belief in an interdependent world. Despite its short-term failures, he suggested that Wilson's new diplomacy did create a major paradigm shift, changing radically and fundamentally the way that foreign policy has been made in the twentieth-century world.

In the second paper, Michael L. Krenn of Miami University postulated that U.S. policy toward Latin America during the 1945-1954 period was based on the idea that a genuine economic interdependence existed between the two areas. That concept suffered from a fatal flaw, however. Professor Krenn contended that the interdependence that American officials desired was based on the continuing production by Latin America of raw materials for U.S. industry and the continuing provision of markets for products. The resulting relationship, in fact, produced dependence rather than interdependence.

In the commentary, Howard Schonberg of the University of Maine praised both papers for laying an excellent foundation for the examination of dependence and interdependence in theory and in practice, from Wilson's era to our own. He raised a number of questions about Professor Rossi's notion of a fundamental paradigm shift, suggesting that it may have been a good deal less fundamental. The

methods of the old diplomacy, he noted, remained resilient after 1916. Burton I. Kaufman of Virginia Tech University (whose prepared comments were ready by Professor McMahon) also raised questions about Rossi's use of the paradigm shift concept and criticized him for failing to go beyond the work of N. Gordon Levin, Arno Mayer, and other scholars of Wilson. Both commentators focused on Professor Krenn's implicit use of dependency theory, an issue that was quickly joined by the audience. A spirited discussion took place that focused primarily on the relevance of dependency theory to explanations of U.S.-Latin American relations.

About thirty people attended the session entitled "The Summer of '41: Milestones on America's Road to War." The first paper, "The United States and the Occupation of Iceland, 1940-1941," by Theresa L. Kraus of the Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., stressed that Iceland was reluctant to have British troops on its soil, that the Icelanders believed that U.S. occupation would forestall a German invasions, that the U.S. military was unenthusiastic about a possible occupation, and that F.D.R. did not understand the problems inherent in military planning. Roosevelt dispersed scarce military resources, leaving areas unprotected that military planners thought vital. According to Kraus, the Iceland deployment "serves as an example of President Roosevelt's maneuvering to get the United States into the war."

The second paper was delivered by Theodore A. Wilson of the University of Kansas, currently a senior research professor at the Center of Military History. Entitled "A Fresh Look at the First Summit: FDR and the Diplomacy of Inadvertence" the paper noted that FDR never conceived of an American Expeditionary Force before Pearl Harbor; that he though that should the U.S. enter the war, only limited naval and air forces would be required; that the British found a huge American army counterproductive; and that even after the Argentia conference, the administration remained confused

about responsibilities and priorities.

The commentaries by the session chair Justus D. Doenecke of New College, University of South Florida, and Jonathan G. Utley, University of Tennessee, both questioned whether Kraus established her case that Iceland showed the president deliberately maneuvering into war. In response to Wilson, Utley called for greater research into lower bureaucratic levels. An animated question and discussion period followed.

An enthusiastic, standing-room-only crowd of more than eighty attended the panel of "Presidents and the Vietnam War." Melvin Small of Wayne State University served as chair and introduced David L. Anderson of the University of Indianapolis, who presented "Eisenhower and Vietnam: An Overview." Drawing on conclusions from a forthcoming monograph, Anderson showed that Vietnam was not a major issue for the Eisenhower administration except for the period 1954-56. Blinded by anti-communism and a lack of understanding of Vietnamese history and culture, Eisenhower and his colleagues erred in trying to impose Ngo Dinh Diem on the people of Vietnam. According to Anderson, at least in Southeast Asia, Eisenhower did not demonstrate the sort of foreign policy sophistication and wisdom that some historians recently have attributed to him.

In "Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnamese," Sandra C. Taylor of the University of Utah concentrated on the president's experiences with and perceptions of the peoples of Indochina. Quoting extensively from memoirs and speeches, Taylor demonstrated that Johnson had almost no understanding of Southeast Asia and that Eurocentrism and paternalism at best and racism at worst lay behind his simplistic views of the meaning of the Vietnam War.

Jeffrey Kimball of Miami University devoted his study to the Christmas 1972 bombing of North Vietnam with B-52s, its interpretation by historians, and what it has meant for the

historians' image of Richard Nixon and the war. Kimball explored the various motivations behind the bombing and brought to light documents from the Nixon Project that revealed the public relations emphasis placed by the administration upon the events during December-January, 1971-1973.

In the commentary, Small called attention to the common world view of all of the presidents who were involved with Vietnam and highlighted the importance of domestic politics in helping to explain why they remained so long in such a disastrous conflict. In a robust exchange with the panelists, the audience spent a good deal of time talking about options, especially those available to Eisenhower during the 1954-56 period. Several questions dealt with military tactics — invading the north and/or Cambodia and Laos and bombing heavier earlier — that might have produced victory for the United States.

About sixteen people attended the program on "United States Encounters with Non-European Nationalism. It consisted of two presentations. The chair, Kenton J. Clymer of the University of Texas, El Paso, read the paper by Hisham H. Ahmed of Florida International University, who was unable to attend. Entitled "American Foreign Policy and Palestinian Self-Determination,"it contended that the United States commitment amounted only to lip service in the case of Palestine. Centering on the Woodrow Wilson administration, Ahmed noted that the U.S. supported the Balfour Declaration (he claims that it was drafted by American Zionists) which promised a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Subsequently the U.S. ignored the wishes of a large majority of the Palestine peoples, leading ultimately to the creation of the state of Israel. At the same time, Ahmed noted that there were those who advised the administration that this policy was resented in the area and urged the adoption of the contrary policy. In this regard, Ahmed observed particularly the report of the

King-Crane Commission, sent by Wilson to the region in 1919, and the Congressional testimony of Yale University Professor Edward Bliss Reed in 1922.

Criticism of this paper centered on its lack of archival research and its overstatement of Zionist influence on the formations of American foreign policy. In his commentary, Professor Thomas Noer of Carthage College remarked that the sense of outrage apparent in Ahmed's paper is indicative of the importance that much of the Third World attaches to American policy pronouncements and the deep disappointment when policies are adopted that seem contrary to what has been said publicly.

Dr. Cary Fraser of the Social Science Research Foundation read a paper entitled "Anglo-American Relations and the Colonial Issue in 1942: The Case of the British Caribbean." It argued that the British made a number of concessions to American opinion in its governance of the British West Indies during World War II. The concessions resulted partly from genuine anti-colonial feelings in the United States, partly from the activities of the West Indian lobby in the United States and from civil rights organizations, and partly from the circumstances of World War II, which greatly weakened Great Britain. The fact that the West Indies were viewed as being in the United States' sphere of influence also accounted for the British willingness.

Both commentators commended Fraser for his careful use of American and British archival sources and for presenting a very convincing paper. Clymer noted the similarities between the British reaction to American concerns in the period of the great *rapprochement* at the turn of the century. He also noted the contrast between British willingness to make concessions in the western hemisphere but not in other areas of the world.

Some forty persons attended the program on "Denazification in Austria: Realistic or Misdirected?" chaired

by Wayne S. Cole of the University of Maryland. The three speakers and one commentator provided an informed, balanced, and thoughtful session. In his paper on "Allied Views of Naziism in Austria," Robert H. Keyserling of the University of Ottawa showed that during much of World War II the allies saw Austria as a victim of Nazi Germany and as largely anti-Nazi, though that sympathetic view faded in the closing months of the war. Donald R. Whitnah of the University of Northern Iowa in his paper on "American Treatment of Nazis in Land Salzburg" noted practical difficulties accounting for uneven and inconsistent American treatment of former Nazis in Land Salzburg. In his paper entitled "Repressed Guilt — Reluctant Atonement," Oliver R. Rathkolb of the Institute for Contemporary History in Vienna observed that while occupation authorities implemented denazification policies, they neglected more fundamental and traditional anti-democratic values in Austria and did little to inculcate positive democratic values. Robert R. Herzstein of the University of South Carolina provided both thoughtful comment on the three papers as well as findings from his own research on wartime activities of Kurt Waldheim. Questions and comments from the audience, including those from persons such as John Gimbel and Elmer Plischke, well informed on denazification in Germany, rounded out this thought-provoking session.

In the panel on "Issues in Latin American Relations," about twenty-five people heard papers by Gail Hansen, a Ph.D. student at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, and Kyle Longley, a Ph.D. student at the University of Kentucky. Hansen's paper, "Sumner Welles in Cuba and the Dominican Republic: A Case for 'Logical Continuity,'" argued that Welles and Enoch Crowder did much to fashion U.S. policy toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the 1920s. In so doing, Hansen claimed, they developed an ideological system, based upon North American culture and

institutions, that would serve as a model for U.S. policy in the Caribbean for many years. Whether the imposition of this hegemonic system served U.S. strategic interests was another question altogether, she reminded her audience.

Longley's paper, "United States-Costa Rican Relations during the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948: The Origins of the Containment Policy in Central America," suggested that Washington's interest in the Costa Rican revolution of 1948 marked the origins of a policy of containment in the Americas. The United States, Longley held, applied diplomatic pressures to obtain a favorable outcome in the revolution. He hypothesized that success in Costa Rica may have served as a precursor of later U.S. intervention in Guatemala and elsewhere in the region.

The commentators, Thomas Zoumaras of Northeast Missouri State University and William O. Walker III of Ohio Wesleyan University, who also chaired the session, praised the two papers for raising important issues. Hansen, they observed, was right to question the place of an "American" system in inter-American relations, although Zoumaras felt that greater definitional rigor would be helpful. Both commentators noted that Longley showed well how U.S. officials attempted to handle perceived threats to their interests from the Latin American Left, but they believed that his case for effective U.S. influence in Costa Rica would have been stronger if he had analyzed closely the domestic political scene. The audience then joined the discussion.

A special event on the evening of Thursday, 2 August, permitted interested persons to take part in a roundtable discussion of "China and the United States, 1989: Tiananmin Square." The participants consisted of Helen Chauncey of Georgetown University, the moderator, Steven MacKinnon of Arizona State University, and J. Kent Morrison of the University of Rhode Island.

On the morning of Friday, 3 August, about fifteen

people attended the session entitled "Anti-Interventionism at the 1928 Havana Conference: Two Case Studies." The two papers, based on archival research in Central America, Argentina, the United States, and Europe, sought to document the behind-the-scenes struggles involved in two challenges to U.S. domination of the 1928 Pan-American Conference at a critical moment in the Coolidge administration's campaign against Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua.

In his study, "José Gustavo Guerrero and the Politics of Inter-American Confrontation," Richard V. Salisbury of Western Kentucky University portrayed his protagonist as a conservative opponent of U.S. intervention who presented his case in Havana in spite of opposition from his government in San Salvador and the manipulations of U.S. diplomat Jefferson Caffery. David Sheinin of the University of Toronto presented a comparable case study in "Disarming the Anti-Interventionist Challenge: Charles Evans Hughes, Honorio Pueyrredón, and American Diplomacy of Control at the Sixth Pan-American Conference." Sheinin characterized Pueyrredón as a mercurial, politically ambitious type who made his attack on U.S. intervention and tariff policies, met with a sharp rebuttal from Charles Evans Hughes, received a reprimand from an embarrassed government in Buenos Aires, and then recanted his attack.

John Britton of Francis Marion College served both as commentator and chair (in the absence of Thomas M. Leonard, away on a Fulbright research grant). Britton suggested that Guerrero and Pueyrredón were, in part, testing political/ideological moods both at the Havana meeting and in their respective countries at a time when anti-Imperialism was becoming an important issue. Although both men gained much attention in Havana from other Latin American delegates and the international press, their statements did not bring the desired political advantage at home. In their responses, Sheinin and Salisbury disagreed on the importance

of these anti-imperialist outbursts. Salisbury saw Guerrero's statements as part of a significant, long-term trend of growing opposition to U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere, but Sheinin insisted that the important point was the continued U.S. domination of these conferences and hemispheric affairs, in spite of such protests.

Some fifty people attended a session that featured three students of Professor Ernest R. May of Harvard University presenting papers on aspects of American foreign and military policy in the thirties and forties. William Jongeward's subject was "Hollywood's Thirties: Reason for Appeasement." Jongeward noted that Hollywood produced almost no movies with any content on politics or foreign affairs during the Depression. He argued that the principal reason was self-censorship brought on by fear of losing foreign markets. Commentator Waldo Heinrichs of Temple University suggested that another and possibly stronger reason was the combination of isolationism and the audience's need for bright, cheerful, escapist films during hard times. Francis MacDonnell called his piece "The Search for a Second Zimmermann Telegram: Franklin Roosevelt, British Security Coordination, and the Latin-American Front." His theme was the attempt by FDR to create fear of a Nazi takeover in Latin America; one method was to use forged documents, created in collaboration with the British Security Council operating in New York. Heinrichs felt that the paper rather overstressed conspiracy and ignored other aspects of Roosevelt's policy of intervention. Timothy Naftali discussed "Allied Fears of Guerrilla Warfare and the Collapse of the Nazi Police State." He showed how and why Allied intelligence agencies at the end of the war fooled themselves and the high command into believing that there was a serious threat of guerrilla warfare from Nazis unwilling to accept defeat. The base supposedly would be in the Alps. Heinrichs wondered how many Allied troops were actually moved into the Alps as a result of these

false intelligence reports.

"Perspectives on the Recent Past" attracted about sixty people. In "Complaints, Self-Justifications, and a Bit of Analysis," Robert Schulzinger of the University of Colorado at Boulder provided a sweeping and helpful survey of what has been written about the foreign policy of the Nixon/Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. Emphasizing the centrality to the period of Raymond Garthoff's *Detente and Confrontation*, Schulzinger also devoted attention to outstanding memoirs like Henry Kissinger's two volumes, scholarly overviews like Gaddis Smith's *Morality, Reason, and Power*, and special studies like Robert Pastor's *Condemned to Repetition*. Focusing about 80% of his paper on work about the Nixon and Carter years, Schulzinger explained the way in which access to sources and concern with certain issues have resulted in those administrations being more studied. He also offered insightful remarks about the important roles of "inners and outers," journalists, and non-historians in generating a portrait of events. In the end he turned to the developing debate about American "decline" and speculated that we may see more of the grand "economic-social-cultural studies" in response to the contemporary revolution in international relations.

"Cats and Dogs: Jimmy Carter, Congress, and Foreign Affairs,: presented by Duane Tananbaum of Lehman College, CUNY, though equally stimulating, was a different kind of paper, more restricted in scope and more based upon original sources. Working primarily from the Hamilton Jordan, Jody Powell, and White House Central files in the Carter Library, Tananbaum described the development of an increasingly troubled relationship between president and Congress, concentrating especially on the way in which SALT II was affected. Some of the difficulties were beyond Carter's control, Tananbaum maintained, but he bears major responsibility for others. In particular, a condescending

attitude toward Congress, early and unilateral renunciation of the B-1 and neutron bomb, lack of consensus within his own administration, and willingness to consider making SALT II an executive agreement weakened Carter's hand in dealing with the Senate. Strenuous efforts by the administration during 1979 to build up public support and to mollify the Right and Left in Congress did little to reduce the block of forty or so senators who opposed such a treaty.

The audience and the critics reacted to the papers favorably. In his commentary, the chair, Keith L. Nelson of the University of California, Irvine, suggested that Schulzinger employ more explicit criteria regarding what he chose to include and asked for more discussion of books on strategic, military, and economic issues. With regard to Tananbaum's subject he wondered why, considering all the warning signs that had appeared, Carter had not considered negotiating a less comprehensive arms control treaty. The other critic, Mark Lytle of Bard College, offered trenchant and thoughtful observations about the challenges involved in doing contemporary history.

During the noon hour on Friday, 3 August, a formal luncheon took place at the conclusion of which the SHAFR membership heard an intriguing presentation by Stephen J. Randall of the University of Calgary entitled "A United Nations Observer: A Foot Soldier Reports from Nicaragua on the Election." Randall told an illuminating and vivid tale of his recent experiences in which he combined the roles of diplomatic historian and first-hand observer.

During the afternoon of Friday, 3 August, the session on "New Perspectives on Asian Issues," chaired by Joseph A. Fry of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, attracted about thirty persons. In the first paper, "Ideology and Influence: William R. Castle, Jr., and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933," Barney J. Rickman, III, a Ph.D. student at the University of Connecticut, argued that Undersecretary of State

Castle adopted an influential, pro-Japanese position during the Manchurian crisis. This policy preference derived from Castle's ideology emphasizing anti-communism and designating Japan as the only viable anti-communist power in East Asia. Since potential Soviet expansion in the region was a greater threat than Japanese aggression in China, Castle, sought to avoid war with the Japanese and to repair U.S.-Japanese relations as rapidly as possible. Castle's influence resulted from his friendship and good working relationship with President Hoover.

"March 9, 1945: The Catalyst for Change in American Foreign Policy Toward Vietnam," the paper by Judith Munro-Leighton, a Ph.D. student at the University of Kentucky, asserted that in the wake of the Japanese coup against French authorities in Vietnam on that day junior Europeanists in the State Department decisively influenced U.S. policy away from Franklin Roosevelt's anti-colonialism and toward support of the French. She concentrated upon James G. Dunn, H. Freeman Matthews, and Eugene Dooman and their manipulation of the State-War-Navy Coordination Committee. The shift in policy ignored established policy and the complexities of Asian revolutionary nationalism. Her presentation, as did Rickman's, fell squarely into the bureaucratic politics approach to interpreting policy formation.

In his commentary, Marc Gallicchio of Villanova University complimented the writing and arguments in both papers. They truly assessed older issues from new perspectives. Concerning Rickman's paper, he asked if Castle were really so influential and could ideology solely explain his response to the Manchurian crisis. Perhaps the limits of U.S. power were just as responsible. Gallicchio also questioned whether Munro-Leighton had attached too much importance to the actions of the junior Europeanists in the State Department. Did they really overturn FDR's policies, or had he already begun to move away from his staunch anti-colonialism in

Vietnam? Can one discern any further, immediate change with Truman?

The other commentator, Mark F. Wilkinson of Austin College praised Rickman's and Munro-Leighton's research and argumentation. He also asked for more attention to just how much influence Castle had; and he suggested that it would be helpful to know if Castle had outside business interests, where the paper fits into the historiography of bureaucratic politics, and the nature of Castle's association with Stanley Hornbeck. Wilkinson found Munro-Leighton's development of bureaucratic infighting her most important contribution. However, like Gallicchio, he thought she overestimated SWNCC's influence. Wilkinson also contended that FDR and U.S. policy were already moving away from an anti-colonial position prior to March 9. Questions from the audience then centered on historiographical issues and the primary contributions of the two papers.

About fifty people attended the roundtable discussion of Lester D. Langley's new book, *America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), intended as a general introduction to a projected series of about fifteen volumes considering the internal political, economic, cultural, and social aspects of relations between the United States and the other countries of the western hemisphere, including Canada. Langley's volume surveys and presents an interpretive framework for hemispheric relations from the colonial period to the present.

Roger R. Trask of the U.S. General Accounting Office served as moderator of the panel and as a discussant. Other scheduled discussants were John Finan of American University, Irwin F. Gellman of Newport Beach, California, Stephen G. Rabe of the University of Texas at Dallas, and Robert F. Smith of the University of Toledo. Neither Rabe nor Rinan could attend, although Finan sent along brief

comments. He welcomed Langley's contribution but questioned some of his generalizations, arguing that he did not make clear enough what was opinion and interpretation and what was documented experience.

Gellman's comments dealt mainly with alleged factual errors in the book and ignored the larger substance. Smith complimented Langley's work but questioned his approach, especially the distinction between "America" and the "United States." Trask praised Langley for providing a thoughtful analysis of hemispheric relationships within an interpretive framework grounded securely on the factual history of those relationships, an interpretation generally critical of the Latin American policy of the United States.

In his response Langley expanded about what he was trying to accomplish in the book and especially tried to explain the distinction between the United States and "America." As he put it in his book, "America lacks a government to articulate its foreign policies, a military to sustain them, and precise territorial jurisdiction, yet its cumulative impact on the Americas, especially in its enduring faith in human betterment and community, has been great." The ensuing exchange with the audience brought further discussion of the meaning of these terms. Other questions raised by the audience dealt with the real meaning of the Good Neighbor policy and the U.S. role in the Cuban revolutions of 1933 and 1959.

About fifty people attended the roundtable discussion of "Cold War Era Documents in the National Archives," chaired by Milton O. Gustafson, Chief of the Civil Reference Branch. Gustafson provided a brief history of access policies of the State Department and the changes in procedures that resulted from various Executive orders, amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and the drastic budget cut for the National Archives in 1981. During the 1980s, systematic review and declassification of the State Department records

was done by NARA staff paid through reimbursable agreements from the State Department. In talking about review of records in the National Archives Building, Judy Thorne of the National Archives noted that guidelines have become more restrictive; seven times more information dated after 1950 was withdrawn than 1949 and earlier. In addition, because there are no guidelines, there has been no systematic review of National Security Council records. Marvin Russell of the National Archives described systematic review of records in Suitland — Foreign Service post records, AID records, and HICOG records. David Humphrey of the Johnson Library noted the differences regarding systematic and mandatory review at presidential libraries, and discussed another problem — donor restrictions on some records like the Tom Johnson notes on Lyndon Johnson's Tuesday luncheons. The discussion was lively, and most of the participants stayed in the same room for the subsequent session on "Recent Developments in Freedom of Information Act and Declassification Review."

Seventy-five people attended a lively session on "Eisenhower Diplomacy." In the first paper, "The Real Hawk at Dienbienphu: Dulles or Eisenhower?" Frederick W. Marks III of Foreign Hills, New York, argued that the secretary of state kept the United States from going to war in support of the French in the spring of 1954. According to Marks, Dulles aimed at inducing the French to approve the European Defense Community as the price for American military intervention at Dienbienphu. He thus followed "a multifaceted strategy" that included "contain[ing] Eisenhower's enthusiasm for military involvement,...cag[ing] Congressional hawks," and pressuring the French. Marks concluded that his analysis challenged the prevailing consensus that viewed Eisenhower as the dominant figure in foreign policy making and as less hawkish than Dulles.

In his paper on "The United States, Lebanon, and the

Middle East During 1958," Michael B. Bishku of Kearney State College analyzed the only instance in which Eisenhower committed U.S. troops to combat during his presidency. Bishku maintained that Eisenhower and his advisers did not understand the complexities of Lebanese politics. The U.S. intervention was intended to contain Communist expansion in the Middle East, a threat that Bishku maintained was largely imaginary. The lack of casualties and the restoration of stability in Lebanon, Bishku concluded, arose more from luck than the effective use of force.

Martin M. Teasley of the Eisenhower Library evaluated Eisenhower's foreign policy more favorably than the other two presenters. In his paper, "Promoting a 'Proper Perspective' Abroad: Eisenhower Administration Concern with Domestic Civil Rights as an Overseas Image Problem," Teasley examined the Little Rock crisis of 1957 as a case study. He found that Eisenhower was indeed worried that racial conflict at home might damage the U.S. reputation abroad and that the president supported the efforts of the State Department and U.S.I.A. to present Little Rock as an exception to "the steady progress being made on civil rights in America."

The first commentator, William W. Stueck, Jr., of the University of Georgia, found little common ground among these disparate papers. He praised Teasley for a persuasive argument buttressed by substantial research in materials at the Eisenhower Library. Stueck wished, however, that Teasley's paper had provided more context for the discussion of Little Rock, and, in particular, whether the Suez Crisis accelerated U.S. efforts to promote "a proper perspective" in Middle Eastern nations. Stueck found that Bishku's analysis compelled further research, especially on the effects of Arab-Israeli tensions on Eisenhower's Middle Eastern policy.

Stueck concentrated his commentary on Marks' paper, as did the second commentator and session chair, Chester

Pach of the University of Kansas. Both Stueck and Pach praised Marks for multiarchival research and noted his penchant for provocative analysis that had produced vigorous discussion at several SHAFR sessions. Both also agreed that Marks had properly emphasized the importance of EDC to Dulles. Stueck, however, was skeptical of some of the conclusions and questioned whether Marks had not underestimated the strength of the Dulles-Eisenhower partnership in making foreign policy. Pach thought that Marks had exaggerated the differences between the president and the secretary of state and challenged the author's interpretation of Dulles' important meeting with congressional leaders on 3 April. In response to those comments and to several questions, Marks replied that the documents supported his view, not only of that meeting but also of Dulles' restraint and Eisenhower's hawkishness. The ensuing discussion revealed strong disagreements over the administration's handling of the Dienbienphu crisis, but fortunately the session — like the 1954 crisis — ended with hostile action only contemplated, not implemented.

An engaged audience of twelve persons attended the session on "The U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Finland." In a paper entitled "Loans and Legitimacy: The Soviet Union's Attempt to Gain American Recognition in the Early Twenties," Katherine A. S. Siegel, a Ph.D. Student at the University of California, Santa Barbara, argued among other points that Soviet emphasis on prestige and equality of treatment led Lenin's regime to miss at least one opportunity (1922) to improve economic contacts with the United States. While both commentators applauded her efforts, Dr. Christine White of the Hoover Institution suggested the need for more extensive research, and Dr. Rorin Morse Platt of the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, questioned her rather unquestioning acceptance of Soviet rhetoric in light of contemporaneous covert and propagandistic activities.

The presentation by Jussi Hahnimaki, a Ph.D. student at Boston University, "America and the Finnish Solution, 1945-1950," described Finland's successful attempt, despite a very complex internal situation, to accommodate Russia's need for security (through signature of a treaty of friendship) while at the same time preserving ties to American economic assistance. Although he argued that the United States took a much too simplistic view of events in Finland, Hahnimaki also made clear that the United States understood that in order to safeguard Finland against further Soviet pressures the United States needed to maintain as low a profile as possible. Since neither the commentators nor the audience knew much about the Finnish experience, Hahnimaki's paper promoted discussion of broad, comparative questions rather than detailed analysis of the specifics presented. Why was Stalin willing to go easy on Finland? What comparisons come to bear upon concurrent events in Yugoslavia? Does U.S. policy toward Czechoslovakia need re-evaluation in light of the "success" in Finland?

The panel discussion on "Recent Developments in Freedom of Information Act and Declassification Review — Prospects for the 1990s" drew an enthusiastic crowd of about fifty, a number of whom were prominent in the field of federal records management. The discussion demonstrated surprisingly uniform support for a greatly strengthened "thirty year rule" for automatic document declassification as one part of a package of reforms of the present system. This recommendation obtained support from historians, archivists, and access personnel.

Christopher Simpson of Mt. Ranier, Maryland, served as moderator. In his opening remarks, he contended that the historical profession should defend and extend its access to federal records, but should at the same time develop a fuller critique of the "supervised abundance" of federal records as a whole. The structural weaknesses of the system at the stage

of creation of a record, as well as during release of records, tends to disguise preconceptions built into the system. Tracking records relevant to contemporary issues such as the role of intelligence agencies or of private enterprises in foreign affairs is likely to continue to be problematic.

Anna Nelson of Tulane University and a member of SHAFR's Committee on Documentation presented a statistical review of federal declassification actions based on reports of the government's Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). Nelson found that the number of pages the government declassifies annually has declined by almost two-thirds over the past ten years, and that there has been a significant increase in the number of mandatory review cases pending at the end of each year. Even those figures present a rosier picture of government mandatory review practices than is in fact the case, due to ISOO's practice of double- and triple-counting certain types of review actions. The present system of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reviews and mandatory declassification reviews had been adopted at the National Archives and the Presidential Libraries during the mid-1970s as a stopgap measure while waiting for more systematic regulations, but the policy reforms have failed to arrive, leading to the present crisis in access to historical records.

Author and historian John Prados of Takoma Park, Maryland, offered a series of examples of what he contended were substantial, costly inefficiencies in the present system of declassification review and FOIA processing. He provided copies of "sanitized" documents where government reviewers had excised quite different sections of the same document at different times, with the deletion decisions varying according to the review standards and political atmosphere at the time of the review. Prados suggested that some form of automatic declassification similar to England's "thirty year rule" would be more efficient and cheaper to administer.

Rebecca Daugherty of the Freedom of Information Service Center concentrated on the impact of recent court decisions on the future availability of government records. She stressed that court decisions in the recent "Reporters Committee" and related cases have substantially limited the scope of material available under the FOIA, and that the negative impact of these decisions has already begun to show up. Government claims of protecting the privacy of individuals as a reason for withholding records have greatly expanded in the past year, and are today being used to withhold records that have been made available to historians. In a related matter, recent court decisions concerning copyright law had cut historians' legal authority to quote from unpublished personal papers. The "J. D. Salinger" and "L. Ron Hubbard" cases had provided public figures and even their estates with legal tools to block publication of historical accounts that quote from personal papers.

Steven Tilley of the National Security Council's FOI section reported on efforts by his organization over the past year to provide better service. The NSC FOI staff is now at nine. Many pending review cases have been completed, and new reviews are being handled more efficiently. New computer upgrades have been instituted. Of particular interest to historians, the NSC has begun a systematic program review for release of high level NSC policy papers (NSDDs, NSSMs, Presidential Directives, etc.). Policy papers from the Reagan Administration are presently being reviewed. A relatively quick review of similar documentation from the Kennedy years to the present is now scheduled to take place over the next 12 to 18 months.

The audience discussion was animated with much of it centered on the Prados proposal for a strengthened "thirty year rule." Many persons supported it but wondered how to coordinate it with other forms of records access — the FOIA, mandatory declassification review, etc. Others pointed out

weaknesses in the British rule and wondered whether historians should forsake the rights presently enjoyed under the FOIA.

On the morning of Saturday, 4 August, a session chaired by David F. Trask of Washington D.C. explored the subject of "Popular Culture and the Cold War." It featured a paper by Walter Hixson of the University of Akron on "Tom Clancy and the Cold War: Foreign Policy Implications of American Cultural Perceptions During the Reagan Years." In this provocative and imaginative presentation, Hixson developed a case depicting the various Tom Clancy novels as mechanisms through which the agencies of popular culture disseminated the main ingredients of the Reagan world view — high tech, enthusiastically pro-military, and profoundly anti-Soviet. Much as the president, the novelist portrayed the USSR as a genuinely "evil empire."

The two commentators, Frank A. Ninkovich of St. John's University and Michael S. Sherry of Northwestern University, neither of whom claimed any expertise in Clancy fiction, responded with interest and enthusiasm to the larger purpose — that is, to the investigation of links between foreign policy and popular culture. Each raised methodological concerns about the dangers of the enterprise in general and misgivings about Hixson's approach in particular. Tom Clancy of Huntington, Maryland, then took the floor in response to an invitation and in a prepared statement sought to rebut Hixson's claims, mainly by pointing to alleged errors of fact and misrepresentations in the paper. A somewhat charged discussion then took place between the historians and the novelists over the merits of the case. About sixty people attended.

Approximately fifteen people came to the session on "Naval Affairs and Diplomacy in the 1940s," chaired by Mark A. Stoler of the University of Vermont. In the first paper, "The Cocked Gun: American Diplomacy and the

French Navy During World War II," Professor Calvin W. Hines of Stephen F. Austin University examined U.S. efforts to keep the Vichy French fleet out of German hands, with emphasis on the crucial role played by Admiral Darlan. In the second paper, "The U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1946-1950," Dr. Michael A. Palmer of the Naval Historical Center traced and analyzed the postwar establishment of a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, part of his forthcoming, two-volume study of this issue from 1945-1988.

In thorough and spirited commentaries, Professors Randall B. Woods of the University of Arkansas and Kenneth J. Hagan (filling in on short notice for Alexander S. Cochrane, U.S. Center for Military History), generally agreed that these were, in Hagan's words, "fine and useful papers," but ones that needed a broadening of scope. Woods found Hines' paper, with its research in British, French, and U.S. sources, "a significant contribution to our knowledge of Allied wartime diplomacy." He wondered, however, if the emphasis on Admiral Darlan's critical role was sufficient to explain fully what happened, while Hagan noted the absence of detailed analysis of high Allied officials to match the extensive consideration of Darlan. Hagan noted a similar absence in Palmer's paper, particularly in regard to Forrestal, and suggested that much stronger emphasis should be placed on interservice rivalry and the possibility of conflict between national and naval policies. Woods suggested a clearer statement of the thesis, greater weight on the relationship between naval planning and the policy-making process, and a broadening of the research base as well as the historical context, beyond naval records and perceptions to include major studies of national security policy during these years. Lively audience reactions centered to an extent on the Palmer paper because of recent occurrences in the Persian Gulf.

With over fifty people in attendance, the session

entitled "New Light on the Chinese Communist Party's U.S. Policy" reported upon the gradual appearance of new source materials during the past decade, introducing the possibility of grasping more fully the policy debates and dilemmas of the Chinese Communist Party's leadership during and after World War II. The presenters perceived a need to reevaluate understanding of the bases of CCP foreign policy making and of the agenda developed by the party for its foreign policy.

In "The American Threat in North China, 1945," O. Arne Westad, a Ph.D. student at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, explored the various twists and turns by which change came about both in the CCP's image of U.S. foreign policy and the role of foreign policy in the CCP agenda. In "The Korean Crisis, 1950-51," Michael H. Hunt of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, analyzed the Chinese decision to intervene while employing the newly available materials which support the view that it came about as a defensive measure much influenced by the end of the Civil War and changing perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. The ensuing comments by Burton I. Kaufman of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also the session chair, and William W. Stueck, Jr., of the University of Georgia, raised incisive questions about specifics but concurred overall in the importance of the new Chinese materials and of the need to take them into account.

The SHAFR meeting came to an end as scheduled by noon on Saturday, 4 August. The membership owes special thanks to Wayne S. Cole of the University of Maryland, College Park, who had responsibility for local arrangements, and also to the members of the program committee for 1990, Sandra C. Taylor of the University of Utah, Thomas M. Leonard of the University of North Florida, and Mark A. Stoler of the University of Vermont. Very best regards to each of them. Thanks also to the session chairs who submitted summaries of the programs.

DUSTING OFF AN OLD DOCUMENT: COLBY'S 1920 RUSSIAN POLICY REVISITED

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Two coincidences recently prompted my re-examination of Bainbridge Colby's August 10, 1920, "Note on the Polish Situation" — a misnamed document which in point of fact set out United States policy toward Russia, not Poland.

The first of these coincidences was the barrage of news stories, in December 1990, about American credits to and European debates over providing economic assistance to the Soviet Union. All such efforts have been seen as ways to help ease Russia's faltering moves toward democracy. Seventy years after the fact, the Wilson administration's vision of a democratic Russia may be at hand. What should US policy under such circumstances be?

The second coincidence involved a passing reference in Frank Costigliola's *Awkward Dominion*[1] to the effect that the State Department's Norman Davis "claimed" to have written the 1920 policy statement. That line set off alarms in my admittedly cluttered memory banks. Had not John Spargo written that note?

Hating indecision of this kind, especially about a document which became the basis for an intractable official U.S. policy against recognition of the Bolshevik revolution, I dug through my pile of dissertation xeroxes and made two discoveries. Ronald Radosh had already made a stab at settling the matter

[1]Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 252.

of authorship and so had I![2]

In the process of resolving authorship, I also discovered that this seventy-year-old document has new and rather immediate "relevance." The note presupposed an imminent demise of the Bolshevik regime. Seventy years later, that demise is much more imminent than it ever was in 1920 and, amazingly, conditions inside Russia today are not that much different than they were in 1920. It might be interesting to look back on what, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, American officialdom surmised might happen at its end.

Neither "America" nor "officialdom" spoke with one voice — and thus the authorship of the "Polish note" reasserts itself as a subject worth exploring. Radosh asserted — and I confirmed — that some six and a half of the note's nine pages came, often word for word and paragraph for paragraph, from a memorandum written by John Spargo, a prowar Russophile socialist with great, if unofficial, influence in the Wilson administration. The documents also prove that Colby personally did the editing. Norman Davis' suggestions overlapped Spargo's draft in general outline but were too sketchy to provide the body of any official pronouncement.[3]

However, the original Spargo memorandum ran some 11 pages, only five and a half of which were used by Colby. (The discrepancy between this 5½ and the earlier reference to 6½ is a function of typesize and margins.) This raises two

[2]Ronald Radosh, "John Spargo and Wilson's Russian Policy, 1920," *Journal of American History* (December 1965), pp. 548-65. See also Linda Killen, *The Russian Bureau: A Case Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. 148.

[3]The Bainbridge Colby Papers are located in the Library of Congress. Box 3A includes Spargo's memorandum, and Colby's editing of the final version.

types of questions above and beyond the document's policy relevance to the 1990s. What did Colby leave out in his surgery on the Spargo original and why? More philosophically, did Colby, by the very process of picking and choosing from the Spargo manuscript, become the note's conceptual author even when the words remained Spargo's? In other words, did Colby's editing change the essence of Spargo's memorandum and transform it into Colby's own?

Where Colby left the draft unchanged he, Spargo, and the State Department were apparently in complete accord. Thus the secretary made no significant alterations in those paragraphs outlining America's friendship toward and faith in the Russian people, its assistance to Russia during the war, and its commitment to supporting any efforts by the Russian people "to reconstruct their national life upon the broad basis of popular self-government." The United States held the Bolsheviks, not "the people," responsible for Russia's withdrawal from the war and for the turmoil currently wracking that country. Until "the people" were able, democratically, to express their own political wishes (i.e., until the Bolsheviks were ousted), Russia's interests needed to be protected against internal or external abuse.

Colby also let stand Spargo's memorable indictment of the Bolsheviks. Unrepresentative of the Russian people, they had come to power by "force and cunning," stood for the "negation of every principle of honor and good faith" necessary for "harmonious and trustful relations," openly boasted of their disdain for agreements made or obligations contracted, and preached the revolutionary overthrow of other governments. The United States government could find no common ground with a regime which espoused concepts "so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense," and so committed to the destruction of its institutions. So far, Spargo's words mirrored Colby's, Davis' and even Woodrow Wilson's thoughts.

Some of Colby's editorial changes were both minor and insubstantial ("hers" becomes "its" in reference to Russia). One major amputation can also be ignored. To buttress the argument that promises and guarantees emanating from the Soviet regime could not be trusted, Spargo provided a detailed description of the Soviets going back on their promise to guarantee the safe arrival at and use by cooperatives and *not* the Red Army of supplies sent to those cooperatives from Great Britain. The example involved Soviet dealings with Britain, not America, and was thus perhaps not the proper subject for American comment. In any case, the point had already been made.

Some of Colby's changes were subtle but not without substance. Colby was even more anti-Bolshevik than Spargo. He labelled the regime an "inconsiderable minority of the people" (modifying Davis' reference to "murderous minority") and substituted "oppression" where Spargo had used "might" in describing its means of maintaining power. By eliminating Spargo's reference to Russia being "torn and distraught by civil war," Colby shifted the blame for that country's weakened status away from generic chaos and more squarely onto Bolshevik shoulders. When Spargo described Soviet behavior as something to which "we" could not subject ourselves, Colby replaced "we" with "enlightened governments." The secretary of state also substituted the ideologically more neutral "non-Bolshevik" for Spargo's "Bourgeois." Where Spargo stated as a matter of fact that the United States would provide reconstructive assistance when a representative Russian government emerged, Colby inserted a double qualification: the United States *might* supply aid but only "provided Russia has not taken itself wholly out of the pale...by the pillage and oppression of the Poles" — i.e., he would not guarantee assistance *and* he took the opportunity to warn Russia that its conduct toward Poland, by whatever kind of government, could affect US policy.

Beyond these relatively minor changes, Colby's final note varied from Spargo's draft in three major areas: additions (by Colby but in agreement with Davis' suggestions) directed at the allies; an omission (Spargo's discussion of trade relations); and a shift of emphasis (concerning Russia's territorial integrity).

Although the State Department had for some time recognized the need for a formal statement on Russia, the August 10 note was issued in immediate response to an Italian request for clarification of the United States' position vis-a-vis the on-going Russo-Polish war *and* possible efforts by the European powers to mediate first an armistice and then possibly a final solution to that and other "Russian" problems. Spargo's draft made no specific reference to the war or to possible actions by the great powers. Obviously the State Department had to rectify that omission to provide a rationale for issuing the note in the first place. Both Davis, in his memorandum, and Colby, in the final version, offered support and understanding for why Europe might desire resolution *but* firmly rejected U.S. participation in any such endeavor and actually tried to sidetrack European initiatives. The Americans feared that open discussions would lead to recognition, in one form or another, of the Soviet regime — something the United States refused to consider. The United States government did not think recognition of the Soviet regime "would promote, much less accomplish" a peaceful conclusion to European difficulties and was "averse to any dealing with" that regime "beyond the most narrow boundaries to which a discussion of an armistice can be confined." It was also afraid that calling an international conference would encourage dismemberment of Russia by outside fiat without approval or input from any legitimate Russian government — also something which the United States refused to sanction. Similarly, Colby argued that transgressions into Russia by foreign troops would also only make matters worse.

Always excepting Poland and Finland, the Americans agreed that Russia's territorial integrity should be preserved. However, they differed in their reasoning, in their response to the present situation, and perhaps in their expectations for the future.

Colby left in Spargo's expressions of faith in a democratic Russia's future role as a force for international order and justice. Operating on those assumptions, both agreed that Russia's (as opposed to the Bolsheviks') interests should be protected and any decisions affecting it "be held in abeyance." To do otherwise would be to take advantage of Russia's current disadvantage, weaken the future government and, in all probability, give aid and comfort to the Bolsheviks by fostering their "false, but effective, appeal to Russian nationalism." (This was Colby's wording; Davis had said that dismemberment would "crystallize the national spirit which is now bolstering Bolshevism.") Both Colby and Spargo rejected the Supreme Council's recognition of "the so-called republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan" and Colby even added a reference to the United States' "persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations."

What Colby left out, however, was a long discussion by Spargo on the evils of any "Balkanization" of Russia — defined as the "creation of petty and even artificial states" not for the legitimate purposes of self-determination but to further imperialist ambitions, as had been the historic case in the Balkans *per se*. Spargo blamed Germany and Austria-Hungary for "artificially creat[ing] and foster[ing] movements for separation and independence among the different nationalities of Russia" and argued that it would be a dire mistake for Russia's allies now to do the same. Such "petty imperialisms" repeatedly endangered the peace of the world and a carving up of Russia would, in the long run, do more harm than good. Convinced that the Bolsheviks were a temporary phenomenon and doubting the legitimacy of many

of the separatist movements, Spargo insisted that no "*cordon sanitaire*" (or tier of small, theoretically independent states carved out of and acting as a buffer against Russia) was necessary. Autonomy within the future Russia would, he argued, clearly be preferable — for all concerned — to a string of shaky and vulnerable governments. Such autonomy could undoubtedly be expected in that future Russia since "it is a part of the political and spiritual tradition of Russian democracy."[!]

In this excised section, Spargo had harsh words for the central powers, entente powers, and Bolsheviks alike. But, Russophile that he was, Spargo was convinced that things would work out if the European powers could be held off and when (not if) a democratic Russia asserted itself.

Colby was apparently unwilling to take the implied slap at the allies or to talk about imperialist manipulation of separatist movements. He may also have been loath to make reference to "Balkanization" since the battle over postwar borders among the successor states in the Balkans was, at that very moment, still threatening to erupt into "petty and artificial" wars. Thus, for Colby, the better policy was to avoid both history and blame. By eliminating the lecture on and recommendations about autonomy within a future Russia, he also left open the possibility of a Russian government voluntarily sanctioning its own partial dismemberment.

That section of Spargo's draft (some three pages) which was excised *in toto* concerned trade relations with Russia and the Bolsheviks. According to Spargo, America's "interests in Russia's trade regeneration transcend[ed] every selfish interest." The United States was not looking for control, or monopoly, or privilege. Nor did it want to exert "any power, political or economic, over the will of the people or any government they set up." But, until such a government appeared, Russia could expect little outside help, in whatever form. Although Spargo was convinced that a restored Russia

had a vital role to play in stabilizing both the world's and the United States' postwar economy, he could not bring himself to encourage trade with the Soviet regime — and since all trade with Russia was now going through that regime he recommended avoiding all economic contact.

This did not mean that Spargo approved any continued legal embargo against trade with Russia. In fact, he noted, the United States had removed wartime restrictions as no longer having any logical merits. On the other hand, it did warn citizens that trade would be at their own risk (Spargo might well have added "and on their own consciences"), with the US government offering no protection.

Spargo faced something of a dilemma. The Russian people were not to blame for the "evil purposes and deeds" of the Soviets but were in fact themselves victims thereof, "compelled to endure frightful wrongs." Russia needed outside services and supports; Europe and the United States needed food and raw materials. The Soviet regime wanted to establish commercial, credit, and technological links with the west. Thus the ingredients of trade were definitely there but not, according to Spargo, the ethics. Given Soviet control over the Russian economy, anybody trying to provide assistance to or restore economic contact with the Russian people became, as it were, "an agent" of the regime. In fact, buyers should realize that any so-called surpluses which the Soviets offered for export were desperately needed by the Russian people. The purchase of such goods would, therefore, make the buyers co-conspirators in "appreciably increas[ing]" the population's "misery and suffering" while buttressing the repugnant regime's position of power.

As Spargo saw it, a revival in Russia's export trade depended, even assuming adequate exportable commodities, upon the reorganization of transportation and productive agencies. This, in return, would require foreign funding (or credit) which, while easily forthcoming in a positive political

environment, was unlikely to be extended under the present form of government. Simply put, everyone (inside Russia and out) would benefit tremendously if the Russian people would only throw the Bolshevik scoundrels out.

The economic policies set forth by Spargo did, in fact, reflect existing U.S. policies toward the Soviet regime. This section was excised, presumably, not because anyone at the State Department disagreed but because this was not the proper occasion.

Did Colby alter the essence of Spargo's draft? Not when the Bolshevik regime was under discussion. Unfortunately for both gentlemen, Lenin and his followers proved much less impermanent than either expected — which made moot, on a policy level during their lifetimes, all references to what might happen once Russia sloughed off that aberration. Their anti-Bolshevik rhetoric slowly assumed the status of policy and remained in force for much longer than either had ever envisioned.

However, the note was drafted and issued on the premise that the Bolsheviks *would* be temporary. And thus what its authors expected to happen *after* the Bolsheviks is integral to arriving at "the essence" of what they wanted to say. As of the early 1990s, this "post-Bolshevik" view of Russia also the attraction of still being relevant.

Taken by itself, the Colby note *is* different from the Spargo draft. Courtesy of those sections added by the secretary, the final version is directed at the allies and it discouraged action. Everyone should stay away from things Russian until a post-Bolshevik government emerged. The note offered little of a concrete nature as to what could or should be expected — of the allies, of the United States, or even of Russia — thereafter. It is, therefore, a political (or "diplomatic") statement urging inaction, avoiding specific predictions or activist policies and taking, as it were, one day at a time.

Spargo was clearly writing with a Russian audience in mind.

His concerns were more economic than political, and his position was much more precise than was Colby's. Vis-a-vis a post-Bolshevik Russia, Spargo had clearcut expectations, one of which involved committing America to an active role therein. It would provide aid; it would expand trade; it would extend reconstructive credits; and it would champion Russia's territorial integrity.

Seventy years later the United States is finally having to deal with the reality of a "post-Bolshevik" Russia which, once again, finds itself in acute economic straits and faces territorial disintegration. All manner of things happened in between the beginning and the end of "Bolshevik" rule but, on some levels at least, both Russia and the United States are back where we started. The Italians might well oblige by once again asking for some clarification of the American position. Colby's, Spargo's, and Woodrow Wilson's "search for a democratic Russia"[4] may be coming to an end and the United States will have to decide what course it wishes to pursue long before anyone knows what "a democratic Russia" entails. The discussion of such a U.S. position, especially as presented in the full length Spargo manuscript, is, I am pleased to report, no longer moot. Nor, however, is the "correct" conclusion such a discussion should reach quite as blindly clear in today's world as it seemed to be in John Spargo's.

[4]While the concept of "Search for a Democratic Russia" was definitely not original to me, I did use the term as the title for my doctoral dissertation (Chapel Hill, 1975) and for "The Search for a Democratic Russia: Bakhmetev and the United States," *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1978.

Minutes of SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

11 April 1991
Galt House, Louisville
Kings Head Room
Gary Hess presiding

The meeting opened at 8 p.m. Council members present were George Herring, Gary Hess, Linda Killen, Robert McMahon, Robert Schulzinger and Allan Spetter. Others present were Kinley Brauer, William Brinker, Daniel Helmstadter, Joan Hoff-Wilson, Michael Hogan, William Kamman, Page Putnam Miller, Keith Olson, Kevin Simon, Geoffrey Smith and William Walker.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, brought Council up to date on pending legislation dealing with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) introduced the legislation in the House in late October, 1990. The legislation would give considerable review authority to the Advisory Committee of outside scholars, would put the series on a thirty year timetable, and introduces for the first time in legislation the principle of automatic declassfication after 30 years.

2. In response to a proposal by Kevin Simon, Education Director of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, Council voted unanimously to hold the 1992 SHAFR Conference at the Institute/Presidential Library and Vassar College in Poughkeepsie/Hyde Park, N.Y. on June 18-21.

3. President Hess reported for Mark Stoler, chair of the

Bernath Book Award committee. The committee selected *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* by Gordon H. Chang of Stanford for the 1991 award.

4. President Hess reported for Richard Immerman, chair of the Bernath Article Award committee. The committee selected "John Quincy Adams's 'Great Gun' and the Rhetoric of American Empire" (*Diplomatic History*, Winter, 1990) by William Earl Weeks of San Diego State for the 1991 award. Hess informed Council that he has asked the committee to work on revisions of the award provisions to broaden eligibility.

5. Keith Olson, chair of the Bernath Lecture committee, informed council that the committee had selected H.W. Brands of Texas A&M to give the 1992 lecture.

6. President Hess, reporting for Warren Kimball, chair of the committee which will present the first Arthur Link Prize for Historical Editing, reminded Council and the membership that the committee will consider publications for the years 1985-1991.

7. President Hess informed Council of two committee changes: Lawrence Kaplan has replaced Lester Langley on the Kuehl Prize committee; Anna Nelson, who decided to step down as chair of the Committee on Documentation, recommended that Melvin Leffler take over as chair; Leffler has accepted the position.

8. President Hess, who chairs the Finance Committee, brought Council up to date on the status of endowment accounts.

9. Michael Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History,* asked Council to provide direction on the handling of fees for reprinting material from the journal. The Council delegated authority to Hogan, with all fees to go to the new Rappaport Fund which is designated to help underwrite costs of the journal.

10. Daniel Helmstadter, president of Scholarly Resources, informed Council about efforts to publicize SHAFR and *Diplomatic History.*

11. Joan Hoff-Wilson, chair of the committee which will select the winner of the first Myrna Bernath Award, explained to Council that the award will be widely publicized. The committee believes that it might be possible to present the first award at the 1991 AHA Convention.

12. William Brinker, editor of the *Newsletter,* informed Council that budget problems at Tennessee Tech might make it necessary to request some money from SHAFR operating funds to underwrite costs of the *Newsletter.*

13. President Hess led Council in a discussion about the continuing lack of sessions in diplomatic history at the AHA and OAH conventions. The AHA has suggested that the problem is in the small number of papers or sessions submitted. It seems apparent that many possible sessions have been presented at the SHAFR summer conference instead.

14. President Hess informed Council that a three or four-person delegation would be meeting with Dr. Gerald Bernath in California to discuss his wishes as far as current and future funds provided to various endowment accounts.

The meeting adjourned at 10:15 p.m.

PUBLICATIONS

David L. Anderson (Univ. of Indianapolis), *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961.* Columbia Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-231-07374-7, $39.50

Peter G. Boyle (University of Nottingham), editor, *The Churchill-Eishenhower Correspondence, 1950-55.* University of North Carolina Press, 1990. ISBN 0-8078-1910-7, $24.95.

David L. DiLeo (San Clemente, CA), *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment.* Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991. Hardcover: ISBN 0-8078-1936-0, $37.50; paper: ISBN 0-8078-4297-4, $12.95

Joseph F. Harrington (Stoughton, MA) and Bruce J. Courtney (Framingham State College), *Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years of American-Romanian Relations, 1940-1920.* Columbia Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-88033-193-3.

Walter Hixson (Univ. of Akron), *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast.* Columbia Univ. Press, 1989. Now in paper: ISBN 0-231-06895-6, $14.50

Michael J. Hogan (Ohio State Univ.) and Thomas G. Paterson (Univ. of Connecticut), eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations.* Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991. Hardcover: ISBN 40383-9, $39.50; paper: ISBN 40736-2, $12.95

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers), *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman.* Princeton Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-6910-4787-1, $19.95

Bruce Kuklick (Univ. of Pennsylvania), *To Every Thing a Season: Shibe Park and Urban Philadelphia, 1909-1976.* Princeton Univ. Press, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-6910-4788-x, $19.95

Melvyn P. Leffler (Univ. of Virginia), *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-804-71924-1.

Charles S. Maier (Harvard Univ.), ed., *The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent*. Marcus Wiener, 1991. Cloth: ISBN 1-55876-029-6, $38.95; paper: ISBN 1-55876-034-2, $18.95

Thomas J. Leonard (Univ. of North Florida), *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability*. Univ. of Georgia Press, 1991. Cloth: ISBN 0-8203-1320-3, $35.00; paper: ISBN 0-8203-1321-1, $15.00

Chester J. Pach, Jr. (Univ. of Kansas), *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8078-1943-3, $34.95

Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, revised ed. Univ. Press of Kansas, 1991. Cloth: ISBN 0-700-60436-7, $25.00; paper: ISBN 0-700-60437-5, $12.95

Rorin M. Platt (Univ. of Tennessee - Chattanooga), *Virginia in Foreign Affairs, 1933-1941*. Univ. Press of America, 1991. ISBN 0-8191-7803-9, $39.50

Robert D. Schulzinger (Univ. of Colorado—Boulder), *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*. Columbia Univ. Press, 1989. Now in paper: ISBN 0-231-06953-7, $13.95

Thomas Alan Schwartz (Vanderbilt), *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*. Harvard Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-674-03115-6, $29.95

Jonathan G. Utley (Univ. of Tennessee), *An American Battleship at Peace and War: The U.S.S. Tennessee*. Univ. Press of Kansas, 1991. $25.00

Theodore A. Wilson (Univ. of Kansas), *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941*, revised ed. Univ. Press of Kansas, 1991. Cloth: ISBN 0-700-60484-7, $35.00; paper: ISBN 0-700-60485-5, $14.95

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The 1991 Gilbert Chinard Prize

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Society for French Historical Studies and the Institute Francais de Washington for distinguished scholarly books or manuscripts in the history of relations betwen France and North, Central and South America published by Canadian or American authors during 1991. Historical studies in any area or period are acceptable, including critical editions of a significance source materials. The Gilbert Chinard Prize of $1,000 is awarded annually for a book or manuscript in page-proof. The Institute Francais de Washington funds the Prize and a committee of the Society for French Historical Studies determines the winners.

Deadline for the 1991 award is December 15, and four copies of each entrant should be sent to:

Professor David Schalk
Chairman, Chinard Prize Committee
Department of History
Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601

University of Connecticut Foreign Policy Seminar

Two meetings will occur in Fall, 1991. On October 18, Robert Hannigan (Suffolk University), "Race, Gender, and Social Class in the Ideology of American Foreign Policy, 1890s — World War I."

On December 6, Richard Melanson (Brown University), "'This Will Not Be Another Vietnam': The Persian Gulf War and Domestic U.S. Politics" (this seminar will meet at the University of Rhode Island).

For more information, contact Thomas G. Paterson, Department of History, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-2103.

CARE Papers

The Manuscripts Section of the New York Public Library announces that the papers of CARE, the international relief agency, at at the NYPL and are available to researchers.

CARE was founded in 1945 to provide emergency shipments of food to European countries after World War II, and remained active there until the mid-1950s. Documentation is especially extensive for CARE's presence in Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia. In the early 1950s, CARE gradually expanded its scope to include long-term assistance to developing countries in nutrition education, agriculture, school and housing construction, medicine, and transportation in more than sixty countries worldwide.

For more information, contact:

New York Public Library
Manuscripts Section, Room 324
5th Avenue and 42nd Street
New York, NY 10018

Atlantic Charter Conference

A conference on **The Atlantic Charter: Its Making and Its Consequences** will be held at Memorial University of Newfoundland on August 11-13, 1991, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Atlantic Charter. The conference is co-sponsored by Memorial University and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. For further information, contact:
Atlantic Charter Conference, Dept. of History, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St John's, Canada A1C 5S7, or call: John Sears at the Roosevelt Institute: (914) 229-8114.

Perspectives in Intelligence History Series

The Edinburgh University Press is establishing a forum for scholars who wish to write serious books on intelligence history -- the "missing dimension" in historians' understanding of foreign policy. The series will include histories of foreign intelligence in the major powers. The time-spans would be specified, relatively brief, modern and specified in the titles. In addition, there will be "perspectives" contributions, including histories of particular agencies. Some of the following titles are already under discussion; the others are given as illustrations:

French Foreign Intelligence, 1870-1985
Allan Pinkerton: A Scottish-American Secret Operative
The Informer in Irish History and Fiction
The History of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency
The American Spy in Fiction and Film

Contributors are invited to submit books of 60-90,000 words in length, and to be meticulous in their documentation. In all cases, they are strongly encouraged to organize their books in a chronological fashion, to offer a dominant interpretive theme, and to supply fresh perspectives in intelligence history.

Proposals will be gladly considered by the series editor, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Dept. of History, University of Edinburgh, William Robertson Bldg., 50 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, Scotland, U.K.

U.S.-Iraq War Bibliography

D.C. Heath and Company has recently published a bibliography entitled *America and the War with Iraq: A Bibliography for Instructors* edited by Patrick Reagan, Department of History, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN 38505.

PERSONALS

Tom Borstlemann has accepted a position as an Assistant Professor at Cornell University.

Kendrick Clements (University of South Carolina) has been awarded a Fulbright to spend 1991-92 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario.

Norman Graebner (University of Virginia) has been named a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Peter L. Hahn has accepted an appointment as assistant professor at Ohio State University.

Waldo H. Heinrichs has accepted a chaired position at the University of California—San Diego.

Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut) has received a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation

Fellowship for 1991-1992 for a study of "At War with Revolution: The United States and Castro's Cuba."

William Pickett (Rose-Hulman) was a 1989-90 Fulbright lecturer to
Japan, a professor for the University of Maryland military base program

in Korea, 1991, and a participant in the first study tour ever to be allowed into Vladivostok, USSR.

Andrew Rotter (Colgate University) has been awarded an ACLS Postdoctoral Research Fellowship.

Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia) witnessed the release of black nationalist leader Nelson Mandela from prison while on a study tour of South Africa in February 1990. Siracusa's account of the event on Australian national radio is available from the author.

Fulbright Awards 1990-1991

The following SHAFR members were awarded Fulbright teaching and research awards: Kenton J. Clymer (Texas at El Paso) Indonesia; Walter L. Hixon (Akron) Soviet Union; Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers-Newark) Australia; Thomas M. Leonard (North Florida) Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras; Henry E. Mattox (North Carolina-Chapel Hill) Nigeria; Allan R. Millet (Ohio State) South Korea; Keith L. Nelson (California at Irvine) Sweden; Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas) Ireland; Benjamin D. Rhodes (Wisconsin at Whitewater) Finland; Charles G. Steffen (Murray State) Argentina.

CALENDAR

1991	
August 1	Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
November 1	Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
November 1-15	Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1	Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
December 27-30	The 106th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago.
1992	
January 1	Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
January 15	Deadline for the 1991 Bernath article award.
January 15	Deadline for submissions for 1992 Summer SHAFR panels and proposals.
February 1	Deadline for the 1991 Bernath book award.
February 1	Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.

February 1	Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
March 1	Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
April 1	Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
April 2-5	The 85th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Chicago with headquarters at the Palmer House.
May 1	Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June 19-22	The 18th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and Vassar College.

The OAH will meet in Anaheim in 1993, in Atlanta in 1994 and Washington in 1995.

The AHA schedule for next year is:
December 27-30, 1992 -- Washington DC Sheraton and Omni Shoreham hotels.

There will be no December 1993 meeting! The next AHA meeting will be held January 6-9, 1994 at the San Francisco Hilton. (Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.)

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Mark Stoler, Dept. of History, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05401.

Books may be sent at any time during 1990, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1991.

The 1990 award of $2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians in 1991 in Louisville.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)

1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984 Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985 David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986 Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987 Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory)
James Edward Miller (Department of State)
1988 Michael Hogan (Ohio State)
1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas)
1990 Walter Hixson (Akron)
Anders Stephanson (Rutgers-Newark)
1991 Gordon H. Chang (Stanford)

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

ELIGIBILITY: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1991. Nominations should be sent to: Keith Olson, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

The award is $500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)
1990 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1991 H. W. Brands (Texas A&M)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article, or essay appearing in an edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1990. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1992 to the chairperson of the committee: Duane Tananbaum, Department of History, Lehman College, Bronx, NY 10468.

The 1991 award of $300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in Louisville.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)
1989 Robert J. McMahon (Florida)
1990 Lester Foltos (Seattle)
1991 William E. Weeks (San Diego State)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Prize

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
   (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
   (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,
   (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
   (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
   (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,

(c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,
(d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
(e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)

5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed $500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. The deadline is November 1, 1991.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1985 Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara)
1986 Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas)
Walter L. Hixson (Colorado)
1987 Janet M. Manson (Washington State)
Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington)
W. Michael Weis (Ohio State)
Michael Wala (Hamburg)
1988 Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford)
Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario)
1989 Thomas Zeiler (Massachusetts-Amherst)
Russel Van Wyk (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1990 David McFadden (UC-Berkeley)

The Myrna L. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of $2,500.00 to be offered every two years for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Details will be forthcoming.

The Myrna L. Bernath Research Fellowship

A $2,500.00 research fellowship awarded every two years for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student. Details will be forthcoming.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be $1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1991, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the disseration. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1991 to: William Stueck, Dept. of History, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1984 Louis Gomolak (University of Texas)
1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)
1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)
1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

(a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and

awards and honors received;

(b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;

(c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and

(d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Waldo Heinrichs, Dept. of History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)
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THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1989 and 1990. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1991. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee:

Robert Accinelli
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University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A1
Canada

Harold Josephson
UNCC St. - History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 28223

Lawrence Kaplan
Dept. of History
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44242

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

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ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) proudly announces the establishment of the Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing. The inaugural prize will be awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered thereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted promarily ot sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher.

PRIZE: $500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented.

For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee.

W. F. Kimball, Chair
19 Larsen Road
Somerset, NJ 08873
tel: 201-648-5410

G. C. Herring
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THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings form their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

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GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication should be typed, double-spaced; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

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