

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

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WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY*

By

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Most of us, I am sure, have in recent years experienced as much, or more, change and turmoil within academic life as have scholars of earlier generations in a lifetime. This ferment swirling around us may lead many of us, even as supposedly aloof and objective scholars, to take change in our world of the intellect almost for granted. We now accept, virtually as a matter of course, the rearranging of curricula, the creation of new areas of study, and the establishment of new fields and subfields within older disciplines such as history.

This ready acceptance of change is something new in academic life. As David Reisman has pointed out, in the past those who wished to inaugurate a special field had to be equipped not only with vision, but also with a surplus of courage and energy.[1] They had to round up supporters and overcome the resistence of colleagues who had vested interests in established fields they did not wish to see threatened, or who, for reasons rooted in plain conservatism, opposed change. Today, opponents of innovation must be frustrated indeed. Change in academic life now explodes out of social pressures few of us can resist and none of us can ignore.[2]

Our own special field, American diplomatic history, I feel, has lagged in its response to swiftly moving social change. I think we can understand why it has by analyzing its nature, by touching upon its history, and by assessing some of its striking shortcomings as well as its accomplishments, as I propose to do in this paper.

Our field, unlike black studies for example, did not explode upon academic life; it evolved. Those who pioneered the history of American foreign relations encountered the usual problems of being resisted, criticized, and often ignored. A number of these scholars, the first professional practitioners in the field, are still alive, attesting to the youth of our sub-discipline.

Even though academicians such as Albert Bushnell Hart and Carl Russell Fish had published surveys of American diplomatic history earlier, and amateur scholars such as Henry Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan, had written noteworthy histories dealing with foreign relations, the field as a distinct one can trace its origins only to the period of the First

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World War. The Spanish-American War stimulated an interest in the history of America's foreign relations in a few leading universities, but before 1914 the field had no individual identity.[3] Well into the nineteen thirties, even though foreign policy provided the core for much of the American history being written, there were few historians of foreign relations in our universities. The first scholarly texts in the field, written by John H. Latane and Louis M. Sears, came out in 1927, but the more substantial books by Samuel F. Bemis and Thomas A. Bailey did not appear until 1936 and 1940. Despite the quality of these surveys, their importance and their readability, academic and popular interest in American diplomatic history did not really pick up until the end of another great war. The solid growth in the field, with courses in the subject taught in most of the nation's colleges and universities, did not come until the nineteen fifties. In the history of American diplomatic history, therefore, the two world wars serve as bench marks, reminding us that in those times of stress and conflict Americans interested themselves as never before in their country's place in the affairs of the world and how it got there.

Out of the First World War the interest in American diplomacy came first through a related discipline, European diplomatic history. In the United States, especially among intellectuals, that war stimulated a concern over the international politics of Europe. "Our thoughts and feelings," one of them recalled, "were conditioned by the European war of 1914 which had become a World War . . . . We were concerned with controversies over the causes of war and the results of the peace . . . ."[4]

Feelings such as these made European diplomatic history popular in the universities; it attracted fine scholars and entered the mainstream of American historiography. The war and the intervention of the United States also made Americans aware of an aspect of their history that they had usually overlooked, America's stake in the politics of Europe and her old tradition of involvement in them. This awareness did not die; from it emerged diplomatic history as a recognized subdivision of America's national history.

After the war the interest of professional historians and of others in the international politics of Europe remained strong. In the nineteen twenties, despite isolationist feelings evident among many intellectuals, American participation in the making of the peace and in the creation of the League of Nations stimulated anew the concern with European diplomacy. It also led to the growth of numerous courses in international relations, many of them legalistic and centered on the League of Nations, but all of them important to the development of diplomatic history. This activity in the universities in related areas kept alive the interest in the diplomatic history of the United States. In these years, though, the outstanding works of American historians were in the field of European, not American diplomacy.

American scholars explored the coming of the war and the making of the peace, providing the analysis and knowledge that gave their people a meaningful grasp of Europe's international politics and of America's place in them. The works of these academicians gained for American

historians their first recognition, as a group, as the equal of Europe's scholars. Within the next decade a number of prominent American scholars were making original contributions to the general field of European diplomacy. In the twenties and thirties diplomatic history reigned as the most prominent, if not the most importnat, European history being written in America.

This impressive writing in European diplomatic history, along with the work of some of the disciples of the frontier historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, shaped the early development of the history of American foreign relations.[5] Turner's followers, who approached the subject internally, being concerned mainly with the various pressures that influenced the making of foreign policy, spread their influence through their writings and through the teaching posts they held in major universities. Most of the scholars who did the best work in American diplomatic history, essentially the deepest and soundest research, were those who were interested primarily in the history of Europe. Others interested mainly in Asia, Latin America, or in the British Empire also produced meritorious histories on America's foreign relations.

Most specialists in American history still avoided diplomacy as an area of concentration, or viewed it more narrowly than did colleagues in other fields. In the thirties many of those who wrote about foreign policy concentrated on the American aspects of policymaking and its consequences. A few were perceptively critical, but others concerned themselves more with the shortcomings and mistakes of policy, more with bitter attacks on policymakers, than with broad treatments of foreign affairs in an international setting. American diplomatic history, as a result, gained the reputation in academic circles of being written and taught in an intellectual vacuum. From the beginning this antinomy between narrowness of execution and broadness of subject has been a marked characteristic of the history of American diplomacy.

Another outstanding characteristic of the field is its deep and inevitable involvement with official policies. Like all diplomatic historians, those who would tell the story of America's foreign relations must acquire a mastery of public documents, must understand official phraseology and government bureaucracy, and must show a concern for official policies, especially for the men who made them and carried them out. This concern, whether or not justificable, has given diplomatic historians another reputation among their colleagues, that of being defenders of official policies.

As scholars, historians should have no loyalty to any government's policies; they should function as analysts, interpreters of policy, and when necessary as perceptive critics. Their loyalty should be to unbiased scholarship. Such loyalty can be, and often is, the source of a universalizing quality that runs through academic life at its best. It can lift historians out of their personal attachments to home, province, country, and even to a particular university. Yet when American diplomatic history was emerging as a discipline of its own, its practitioners acted moreas crusading patriots than as objective scholars. They were prisoners of the stifling nationalism of their times.[6]

While American historiography has long had running through it a strong nationalist strain, nationalism had never before been so prominent in academic life as during the First World War. During that conflict the government set the precedent of enlisting historians and other scholars from the social sciences in the national cause. The historians joined eagerly. The historian as citizen needed "no spur from the state to make him willing and eager to do all in his power to help his country's cause."[7] Historians first gave their talents to the flag in April 1917 through the National Board for Historical Service, a voluntary organization headed by Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University. That board worked to place the nation's professional historians at the disposal of the government and "to utilize historical scholarship for patriotic and educational ends." It also cooperated with propagandist George Creel's Committee on Public Information, "the American substitute for censorship during the war."[8] One of the historians who worked for Creel, Carl Becker, in 1920 recalled his wartime feelings saying, "We were only professors, but the world was still young, and we wanted to do something to beat the Hun and make the world safe for democracy."[9]

Several of the nation's most prominent historians, such as Shotwell, Charles H. Haskins, Sidney B. Fay, and Charles Seymour served on The Inquiry, an organization of academicians brought together by President Woodrow Wilson, himself a scholar, to prepare the government's program for peace. Others worked in other capacities for the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.[10] The National Board for Historical Service gained an almost official status through its regular cooperation with The Inquiry.

Activities such as these, that called for unqualified loyalty from all participants, placed in question the objectivity of the histories that the involved scholars wrote or might write about the war. There could be and frequently was, critics maintained, a conflict of interest between an historian's service to the state and his loyalty to the principles of his discipline.[11] Since that time American historians have been concerned about their colleagues who served the state and then defended its policies; they have been particularly sensitive to the charge that those involved in the making of policy became court historians who wrote official histories.[12]

A quarter of a century later, during and after the Second World War, the problem of court history took on for American diplomatic historians greater dimensions than ever before.[13] Historians found employment in various branches of government, particularly in the Department of State and in the armed forces. Some functioned as advisers to policymakers, some as propagandists, a few as compilers of the documentary record of American diplomacy, and others as writers of official histories.[14] Many of these scholars, according to their lights, felt they performed as objective historians. Yet quite a number of them later became defensive about their work for pay in the government.

After the war a number of the men who had been a part of the decision-making establishment not only wrote memoirs but also composed histories or collaborated with professional historians who did the writing and necessary research.[15] While several of these histories criticized some aspects of

government policy not one of them, to the best of my knowledge, questioned the basic premises of the government's war program. All, in one way or another, defended the official policy. In a sense as Herbert Feis, a man who has himself written diplomatic history as an insider, says, the men who served the nation and then gave the people their version of the wartime policies became "not only the actors or agents of history but also its creators."[16]

Although earlier presidents left posterity with their versions of the history of their administrations, Franklin D. Roosevelt started something that has since placed presidents right in the center of the game of making history conform to official doctrine, or to the views of the men who made it. Since his time every president has set up an official library of his own to preserve the papers of his administration. In these libraries, financed by friends and admirers and then given to the government in return for payment of operation and maintenance, they have housed records, various other documents, and even preliminary accounts by members of their official families as to what happened in their administrations. Although the government administered the libraries, the donors controlled access to the documents the archives contained.

From these libraries those former presidents who lived beyond their terms, and those who served them, could, as Lyndon B. Johnson and several of his former close associates are doing in Austin, Texas, prepare the interpretive histories defending their policies.[17] They could present their views and explain their foreign policies a generation or two before scholars not in any way connected with their administrations could examine and use the records. In this way, as Benedetto Croce might say, they could through their own unchallenged interpretation of documents in the light of their own interests create a past as they saw it or desired it.[18] This problem affects the diplomatic historian more than any other because since the Second World War the most important and the most controversial decisions in each administration have usually been in the area of foreign policy.

With their libraries and with their friends within the administration who write the histories of their foreign policies presidents do not have to wait for posterity to judge them. Each can plan his own monument and try to preserve an honored place, whether or not deserved, in the nation's history. With much running in his favor, he can perhaps, with the aid of professional historians, close whatever gaps in credibility may have bedeviled his administration and hope that posterity will read history as he would like it read.

Historians and the public can be grateful for the memoirs of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the histories of the John F. Kennedy foreign policies as written by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Theodore Sorenson, and Roger Hilsman. These accounts offer material and insights that most scholars can get in no other way. All are based on public records and also on documents presently closed to other researchers. Yet they do represent history by an elite group of insiders, even a kind of cozy, closed, official history. The historians who are not on the inside have to wait thirty years or more to study and judge the record for themselves.[19]

As it is now the outsiders, in writing their own accounts of the postwar years, have to borrow from the insiders, from the interpretive, selective, and often defensive accounts of the decisionmakers. In such borrowings the researchers, almost inevitably, take and repeat favorable interpretations as well as preselected facts.

I believe that this close connection between government and historians, a legacy from the formative years, it is one of the things wrong with the history of American diplomacy. It causes critics to question the objectivity of all diplomatic history.[20]

Now the field is no longer in the hands of amateur historians, retired diplomats, or those who approach it through the study of Europe, Asia, or Latin America. It has attained a distinctive character of its own with a large body of professional historians usually trained specifically for the field in the nation's major universities, and even in foreign countries such as Canada and England. With the founding of this society in April 1967 we can assume that the field came of age. It now has its own professional organization, one that has had a remarkably rapid growth in the past three years, its own small journal, a Newsletter, its own outlook, and its own principles.[21] As professionals, as objective scholars in a mature discipline, we should now take time to analyze and assess its weaknesses and do what we can to eliminate them.

Critics from within the field as well as those without, focusing on the formal aspects of foreign relations, have often condemned American diplomatic history for being dull and narrow. Its practitioners have too often stayed on the surface of events, digesting official correspondence without probing deeply into motivation, cause, and effect. They have shunned the challenge of large problems while lavishing extreme care on minute ones, or on trivial characters and episodes. They have at times been more polemical and concerned with minor issues than they have been creative. They have lacked originality in method and brilliance in conception, and at the same time have shown qualities that inhibited the creative imagination. Without deviating from their defensive nationalism, or perhaps unaware of it, they have been overly concerned with the frequently sterile demands of scientific history, making themselves more factual and less theoretical, but not necessarily more objective, than scholars in other fields of history.[22]

If history is to be distinguished from chronicles or mere annals, it should contain some kind of theorizing and quite a bit of interpretation. A sound theory or interpretation simply offers the reader a general concept giving unity and a causal relation to a multitude of facts which otherwise may confuse more than they enlighten. Even if they do not confuse, facts without theory may not interest many readers other than antiquarians. We historians of American diplomacy should go beyond our usually cautious, partial interpretations and construct theories of our own.[23]

More than have others, we American diplomatic historians have in our writings reflected the doings, ideas, and views of those on top, of the

establishment, or of a narrow governing elite insulated from the less fortunate masses.[24] We have paid little attention to the underdog and have been intolerant of minorities and minority views, especially when those views conflicted with those of the establishment. We have, directly and indirectly, expressed contempt for ordinary, inarticulate, common men. In virtually all instances we have assumed American superiority, being more critical of America's enemies than of America and her policymakers. We have also assumed unrealistically that American policies, such as the Open Door in Asia, have been the crucial ones in the shaping of history. We have based our histories on the premise that foreign policy involved mainly the solution of immediate problems for the advantage of Americans regardless of the cost to others.

While such elitism and self-satisfying patriotism have generally held sway, they have not been uncontested. In the past two decades the writing and teaching on the history of American foreign relations has gone through a partial democratization in a movement that has come from below. Young historians, some from backgrounds that would exclude them from commitment to a distant and at times hostile establishment, and others of the New Left that are openly radical in their stance, have challenged traditional values and old leadership within the field. More recently, concern, and even disgust, over America's role in the Vietnam War has caused some of us, especially myself, to take a more critical look than before at the whole of our diplomatic history. The general public, too, a public better educated, more knowledgeable, skeptical, and critical about foreign policy and its historical roots than ever before, has questioned the conservative, even placid establishment view, of the nation's past. So we American diplomatic historians of this generation, even if we so desired, cannot take for granted in our students and readers the patriotic complacency of the past.

The literature of American diplomatic history, I believe, has contributed heavily to that old complacency. Too often, when dealing with foreign adversaries, professional historians, as well as the untrained amateurs, have been condescending, and even racist, in their attitudes. Many have been uncritical believers in the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon, of Protestantism, and of their own way of life.[25] They explained America's foreign relations as a series of triumphs over lesser peoples. Without themselves having carefully studied other societies they were convinced that American government and institutions were better than anything else anywhere else; more than others they perpetuated the myth of American righteousness.[26] It makes no sense for a scholar to be arrogantly defensive about his own country, to be fundamentally uncritical of it, and to be condescending and less than analytical about other cultures, the sources of adversary policies. Such defensiveness is not only unrealistic, it is also wrong and unnecessary, and it distorts history.[27]

The record of American diplomacy shows another distortion in its heavy emphasis on Anglo-American relations. The writings of several of the most distinguished of our diplomatic historians reflect an Anglophile spirit. Anglo-American relations have always been, and still are, important and their study should be encouraged. But too often students and

even advanced scholars study them not for their own sake but for peripheral reasons. American historians generally suffer from a language gap, being incapable of using foreign languages because they were never trained in them beyond the minimum necessary to pass Ph.D. examinations. They find no language gap when they study relations with England; Englishmen and Americans share a similar culture and even think along the same lines. Moreover, historians find documents in Anglo-American relations easier to get to and to understand than those in other areas of international history.

This reliance on sources in the English language has been an important factor in making the history of American foreign relations ethnocentric and one dimensional. Since many of the documents historians of foreign relations use come from government sources, and these historians, like political scientists, are often in line for government favors, they have great difficulty in avoiding the passions of nationalism. To outsiders, and to other colleagues, they have appeared as little better than apologists for government policy, no matter how bad. Like leaders in government, American diplomatic historians have been critical of those who dissented from established policy, or who challenged the status quo.[28] When these flag waving historians criticized, they mainly attacked American policies that did not triumph, regardless of the virtues of the other side.

If diplomatic historians would approach the use of official sources with considerable wariness, if they would be less eager in their pursuit of favors and prestige from the leaders of government, they probably would find themselves less often considered biased defenders of the establishment; American diplomatic history would less often be considered an expression of nationalism. This wariness, when coupled with a broad cultural awareness, would make their histories less artificial and more representative of the deeper currents of society. It would permit diplomatic historians when analyzing international conflict, to present the loser's position and point of view, regardless of how unpopular, without the stigma of disloyalty to their own country.

Historians could more easily avoid such stigma if they did not compromise themselves by avidly seeking recognition and reward from the establishment in the form of government posts, sometimes on the policymaking level. Such connections between the scholar and the establishment tie him to official policy, to an exclusive client who rewards loyalty above intellectual honesty, and makes his histories not only uncritical but also suspect. If an historian has to lie and deceive to carry out government policy, and this becomes known, it is only logical for his colleagues to suspect that he might do the same thing while functioning as a scholar. Historians who covet official honors cannot easily criticize the men who bestow them.

Unlike other academicians we diplomatic historians have as the heart of our discipline the analysis and explanation of government policy. For this we need the objectivity of being outsiders and the detachment of distance. We should not compromise ourselves with situations capable of

generating conflicts of interest between the demands of our government and of our profession.[29]

I do not suggest that as diplomatic historians we should shun government posts, but unlike political scientists and others, we should not concern ourselves ideologically or economically with the immediately practical.[30] Diplomatic historians ordinarily do not devote their professional talent to analyzing old policies so that an elite of policymakers can devise new ones which may or may not work. The task of the American diplomatic historian, whether dealing with very recent policy or with that of earlier eras, is to analyze, explain, and criticize objectively whenever appropriate, and to transmit his findings and ideas to all who will listen, read, and think.[31] This kind of commitment requires a catholicity in outlook, a cosmopolitanism in living, and a sophistication in scholarship that we American diplomatic historians are just now acquiring.

The history of American foreign relations has now become one of the more complex fields in historical scholarship and its practice more demanding than ever before. It has profited from Bemis's stress on multi-archival research, from Bailey's concern with public opinion, and from other techniques that most of us now take virtually for granted.[32] But we must go beyond the pioneering works of these scholars.

As a number of the pioneer scholars have themselves urged, we diplomatic historians should shift our emphasis. We should consider the history of American foreign relations much more a part of international history than of national history.[33] As Dexter Perkins wrote a quarter of a century ago, "Diplomatic history needs to be told against a larger and wider background than that of foreign policy alone or the diplomacy of a single nation."[34]

Although few of us today view our diplomatic history solely from the perspective of Washington, that advice is still sound. I would add that diplomatic history needs an internationalism of spirit as well as of research, an appreciation of the finer qualities of other cultures, and a tolerance of the foibles of other peoples as well as of our own.[35] Even in the works of the most prominent of the pioneer scholars we cannot easily find such appreciation. Instead we can see remnants of an old isolationism, a distrust of Europe, an aversion for foreigners, and an ethnocentrism that should have no place in works of objective scholarship.

As theoretically unbiased historians we should not continue to measure other nations, other societies, other peoples by the norms of our own society. If we think and write as nationalists we imply that our society is superior to others. Under this assumption other cultures will always appear drab, backward, and less appealing than our own. We should study other cultures, often on a comparative basis, and try to appreciate them on their own terms.[36] In that way we can understand not only the outward actions in their foreign policies but also the deeper, inner motivations.

If we can be less concerned than we have been with the formal aspects of diplomacy and official policy, with what ambassadors, foreign secretaries, and heads of governments have announced and said to each other, then we may be able to analyze, with a new awareness, cultural forces and their effect on relations between peoples. We should be able to understand why peoples stick to and defend their own unique traits, their own distinctive social systems, and their own historical traditions. We may, at times, even be able to bridge the chasm in ideas and institutions between the United States and foreign countries. To do so we would have to overcome the notion that the analysis of treaties and diplomatic correspondence gives us the deepest understanding of relations between peoples, and to devote special preparation and extra effort to the cultural dimension, studying peculiar national differences in values, traditions, and institutions.

Differing cultural attitudes, we know, can cause peoples to view the same situations and the same policies differently. To explain American foreign relations in true historical perspective we ourselves have to understand the cultural traditions of other countries, their internal politics, their social milieu, and how these things shaped their foreign policies and affected their reaction to our policies. In this way we could acquire more than a surface understanding of how a culturally distant people, such as the Chinese, viewed us or how a culturally closer people, such as the Italians, felt about us, and why they saw us as they did. Only with the study of social, political, and economic sources, as well as diplomatic ones, can we penetrate beyond the surface of cultural images and become familiar with the interaction of foreign societies and peoples.

All this requires the diplomatic historian to become something of a new breed of scholar, one who understands and embraces inter-cultural relations, who knows something about comparative history, and who thinks of foreign relations in the broadest of terms. While grounded in American attitudes and policy, his work should, whenever appropriate, reflect cross-cultural influences.[37] It should tell something of the attitudes, feelings, views, and problems of the disadvantaged classes as well as of the governing elites, of all countries involved, when he is discussing foreign policy and its impact.

As a teacher the diplomatic historian should encourage his graduate students to widen their horizons, to move beyond the more popular areas, such as Anglo-American relations, or places of immediate crisis, and into the more esoteric areas, such as America's relations with the countries of south Asia. He should also guide students into the study of relations with the smaller, lesser known countries throughout the world. In this way diplomatic historians could help close the gap in culture and understanding of the peoples and policies in Asia and elsewhere. Since many academicians as well as ordinary Americans have special difficulty understanding non-European cultures, we should encourage our students to specialize more than they have in Asian, Middle Eastern, and other non-Western studies, as well as in American diplomatic history.[38]

Wherever possible we ourselves should and should urge our students to make greater use of the social sciences than we have in the past.[39] At the very least the social sciences can make the historian self-conscious and more effective in his use of theory, technique, and methodology. Social science techniques would keep him from taking cultural differences and the vagaries of human nature for granted.

For example, diplomatic historians, like others, have more often than not assumed that men in crises act rationally, and have explained human behavior in rational terms. They have too often ignored the problems of emotional and irrational behavior, a recurring human phenomenon of considerable concern to psychologists. The policies of the totalitarian leaders of the nineteen thirties, policies that eventually involved the United States in its greatest war, did not fit rational patterns, though some historians have made them seem rational. Nor has the anti-communist hysteria in the United States in the fifties and the divisive Asian embroilments of the sixties conformed to rational principles. Since we know that people in their political and economic behavior frequently act irrationally, often even choosing leaders and supporting policies that clearly run against their own interests, we should learn more about ourselves, about man's basic nature, a problem of special concern to social scientists.

If we diplomatic historians could understand how and why human behavior is both rational and irrational we could more effectively explain the self-righteous nationalism, the racial, ethnic, and religious bigotry of Americans as well as their glories, their humaneness, their generosity, and their often warm civilized behavior in a fluid society. If those of us who write diplomatic history can examine the shortcomings of our own professional past and do something about them, then perhaps the people who read our histories can learn enough from the mistakes of their national past to do something to prevent war and senseless organized strife, and improve our present and future. Our task is simpler than society's. As diplomatic historians we have only to recognize the changes that have come to our field, fit in with its growing sophistication, and in effect accept our own maturity.[40]

FOOTNOTES

[1]See David Reisman, Constraint and Variety in American Education (New York: Doubleday Anchor Edition, 1958), p. 107.

[2]For a critical commentary on the "revolutionary" changes in the teaching of history, at least in British universities, see G. R. Elton, "Second Thoughts on History at the Universities," History, LIV (Feb. 1969), 60-67.

[3]On this point see James B. Angell, "The Inadequate Recognition of Diplomatists by Historians," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893 (Washington, 1894), pp. 15-23, which deplores the neglect of diplomatic history. The author calls for someone to write "a full and connected history of American diplomacy." For the influence of Harvard and Archibald Cary Coolidge on diplomatic history at this time, see Dexter Perkins, Yield of the Years: An Autobiography (Boston, 1969), pp. 26-30, 117-119.

[4]Francis Herrick, "The Profession of History," Pacific Historical Review, XXXI (Feb. 1962), 5.

[5]Earlier, Turner's ideas on the frontier had "marked the beginning of a process of broadening the fields of history." See William B. Hesseltine and Louis Kaplan, "Doctors of Philosophy in History: A Statistical Study," American Historical Review, XLVII (July 1942), 767. William A. Williams, in "The Frontier Theme and American Foreign Policy," Pacific Historical Review, XXIV (Nov. 1955), 383-84, stresses that "Turner's thesis played an important role in the history of American foreign relations." For Turner's interest in diplomatic history see Wilbur R. Jacobs, The Historical World of Frederick Jackson Turner, with Selections from His Correspondence (New Haven, Conn., 1968), pp. 58-59.

[6]For a perceptive general analysis of nationalism and the writing of history, see David M. Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," The American Historical Review, LXVII (July 1962), 924-938. See also Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Interpreters and Interpretations, 2nd. ed., Publication No. 20, Service Center for Teachers of History (Wash., 1963), and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Nationalism and History," The Journal of Negro History, LIV (Jan. 1969), 19-31, which analyzes some aspects of the effect of nationalism on the writing of history.

[7]William T. Hutchinson, "The American Historian in Wartime," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIV (Sept. 1942), 2.

[8]James T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1937), p. 78n. See also Shotwell, "The National Board for Historical Service," History Teacher's Magazine, VIII (June, 1917), 199.

[9]Quoted in Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago, 1967), p. 16.

[10]For a detailed account of how the government used academicians in the war and in the peacemaking, see Lawrence L. Gelfand, The Inquiry American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven, 1963), and James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919 (Princeton, 1939). See also John Higham, Leonard Krieger, and Felix Gilbert, History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), pp. 269-271.

[11]For a critical analysis of historians who used their talents to write propaganda and in other ways to serve the government professionally, see C. Hartley Grattan, "The Historians Cut Loose," American Mercury, XI (Aug. 1927), 414-430.

[12]See, for example, Howard K. Beale, "The Professional Historian: His Theory and His Practice," Pacific Historical Review, XXII (Aug. 1953), 239, 244-45.

[13]For a bitter attack on "court" historians and upon diplomatic history as an "instrument and adjunct of official propaganda," see the essay by Harry Elmer Barnes, "Revisionism and the Historical Blackout," in Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho, 1953), pp. 1-78.

[14]For the role of the historical "expert" in government, see Richard Humphrey, "The 'Official' Scholar: A Survey of Certain Research in American Foreign Policy," in Norton Downs, ed., Essays in Honor of Conyers Read (Chicago, 1953), p. 31.

[15]During the war professional historians, while committed to the establishment, did not penetrate the inner circle of decisionmakers, according to Herbert Feis, "Some Notes on Historical Record-keeping, the Role of Historians, and the Influence of Historical Memories During the Era of the Second World War," in Francis L. Loewenheim, ed., ed., The Historian and the Diplomat: The Role of History and Historians in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1967), p. 106.

[16]Herbert Feis, "The President's Making of History," The Atlantic Monthly, CCXXIV (Sept. 1969), 64.

[17]See The New York Times, Nov. 9, 1969, 60:4-8, for Johnson's efforts to set the record of his administration straight.

[18]On this point, see Jack W. Meiland, Scepticism and Historical Knowledge (New York, 1965), pp. 13-38.

[19]For a discussion of the problems in making diplomatic documents widely available, see William M. Franklin, "The Future of the 'Foreign Relations' Series," Department of State Bulletin, LXI (Sept. 5, 1969), 247-251, and The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1969, 15:4-6.

[20] For a perceptive defense of the historian's involvement in government and policymaking, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Historian and History," Foreign Affairs, XLI (April 1963), 491-497.

[21] For the tendency of professional historians to organize along the lines of their own discipline, see W. Stull Holt, "Historical Scholarship," in Merle Curti, ed., American Scholarship in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 88-89.

[22] The young historians of the New Left have attempted broad interpretations, but their works, while healthy in their challenge of traditional attitudes, have not yet given us a truly sophisticated general analysis. As Erwin Unger has pointed out in "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," American Historical Review, LXXII (July 1967), 1248, much of the earlier New Left diplomatic history had, with inward contradictions, tried to rehabilitate isolationism.

[23] Dexter Perkins, in The American Approach to Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 114-129, offers a "Cyclical Theory of American Foreign Policy." He is one of the few diplomatic historians who has been broadly speculative.

[24] Richard Rovere, in "Notes on the Establishment in America," American Scholar, XXX (Autumn, 1961), 489-495, places the makers of foreign policy high in the establishment hierarchy. "The directors of the Council on Foreign Relations," he wrote, ". . . make up a sort of Presidium for that part of the Estabishment that seeks to control our destiny as a nation." The Council, with its conservative membership of bankers and industrialists, and various policymakers, such as Henry A. Kissinger, have long been cozy.

[25] The historian, like these, may tend consciously or unconsciously "to glorify the actions of the group to which he belongs, and of which, for the moment, he is the spokesman." See Frederick J. Teggart, Theory and Processes of History (Berkeley, California, 1960; paperback edition), p. 28.

[26] For a variation on this theme, see Thomas A. Bailey, "The Mythmakers of American History," The Journal of American History, LV (June 1968), 20, and C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," The American Historical Review, LXVI (Oct. 1960), 7-8 where he criticized "the national myth that America is an innocent nation in a wicked world . . . ."

[27] Soviet historians have made a point of this defensiveness, showing that Americans condemned others for fighting aggressive wars and seizing the land of neighbors, but excused or justified American seizures through various euphemisms. See N. N. Bolkhovitinov, trans. by Marin Pundeff, "The Study of United States History in the Soviet Union," The American Historical Review, LXXIV (April 1969), 1235.

[28]See for example Samuel F. Bemis, "First Gun of a Revisionist Historiography for the Second World War," Journal of Modern History, XIX (March 1947), 55-61 and Dexter Perkins, "American Wars and Critical Historians," Yale Review, XL (Summer 1951), 682-695.

[29]Such conflict is not so apparent in other more practical disciplines. There is, for example, nothing wrong and much that is commendable in economists and others giving their talents to government; nor is it bad even for historians of foreign policy if the historians realize that in committing themselves they become partisans in the shaping of policies. For the utilitarian role of professors in government and politics see Richard S. Kirkendall, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Service Intellectual," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (Dec. 1962), 456-471.

[30]Louis Morton, in "The Historian and the Study of War," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVII (March 1962), 610, points out that professors usually discourage their students from going into government employment, but this attitude applies mainly because of the stifling restrictions government posts at the lower levels impose on creative minds that promising students often have.

[31]In broader but related terms Samuel Eliot Morison, a scholar who has written military histories while employed by the Navy, maintains that "the historian's professional duty is primarily to illuminate the past for his hearers or readers; only secondarily and derivatively should he be concerned with influencing the future." See "Faith of a Historian," The American Historical Review, LVI (Jan. 1951), 264. For a perceptive discussion of how the diplomatic historian may influence policy, or prepare models for future decisions, see Ernest R. May, "The Relevance of Diplomatic History to the Practice of International Relations," and "A Comment by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr." Harvard Alumni Bulletin, LXVII (Nov. 27, 1965), 208-212.

[32]For the contributions of these scholars see Samuel F. Bemis, American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty and Other Essays (New Haven, Conn., 1962) and Alexander DeConde and Armin Rappaport, eds., Essays Diplomatic and Undiplomatic of Thomas A. Bailey (New York, 1969), particularly the biographical introduction.

[33]Ernest R. May, in his essay "Emergence to World Power," in John Higham, ed., The Reconstruction of American History (New York: Torchbook ed., 1962), 180, points out "how odd and improbable a field of study is the diplomatic history of one country."

[34]Dexter Perkins, "The State Department Speaks," Journal of Modern History, XVI (June 1944), 135. See also the similar plea of Raymond J. Sontag, "On the Study of Diplomatic History," Pacific Historical Review, XV (June 1946), 209-210.

[35]Perhaps "as long as men live within national boundaries, their environment will shape their prejudices." I hope not, or I hope that at least their environments will improve. See Ray A. Billington and others, The Historian's Contribution to Anglo-American Misunderstanding (New York, 1966), p. 2.

[36]There is now an awakening to the importance of comparative history among historians, with a journal, Comparative Studies in Society and History (Cambridge University Press), devoted to this approach. But I have not detected any noteworthy concern among American diplomatic historians, scholars who would have much to gain from this approach. C. Vann Woodward has recently edited a series of brief essays illustrating The Comparative Approach to American History (New York, 1968). Two of the essays, by Robin Winks and Ernest May, deal in general terms with aspects of American foreign policy. As Carl N. Degler points out in "The American Past: An Unsuspected Obstacle in Foreign Affairs," The American Scholar, XXII (Spring 1963), 192-209, we should also recognize the uniqueness of our history and not attempt to use it as a model for understanding the contemporary world.

[37]For a plea on this theme see Donald R. McCoy, "Underdeveloped Sources of Understanding in American History," The Journal of American History, LIV (Sept. 1967), 256-259.

[38]For a plea along these lines and a thoughtful explanation of why we need the multicultural approach to American diplomatic history, see John K. Fairbank, "Assignment for the 70's," American Historical Review, LXXXIV (Feb. 1969), 861-879. The "assignment" he urges upon diplomatic historians is the study of American-East Asian relations. See also AHA Newsletter, VIII (Oct. 1969), 21-25, which stresses the need for dual skills in American diplomatic historians.

[39]The reluctance of historians to use the concepts of social science, when appropriate, continues despite the pleas for such use by William L. Langer in "The Next Assignment," The American Historical Review, LXIII (Jan. 1958), 283-304, and H. Stuart Hughes in "The Historian and the Social Scientist," The American Historical Review, LXVI (Oct. 1960), 20-46.

[40]I think, as did John D. Hicks in his essay "What's Right with the History Profession," Pacific Historical Review, XXV (May 1956), iii, that "We need all the honest criticism we can get and even if it seems overdone we ought to profit from it."

FOREIGN RELATIONS RESEARCH

IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Research in the National Archives for historians of American foreign relations and their graduate students is usually a pleasant experience if they are adequately prepared. It is not necessary to write in advance, but general letters of inquiry from scholars explaining their research projects are helpful. Depending on the topic, our replies can often save a researcher from making a needless and expensive trip to Washington.

Some researchers do not know, for example, that records of the State Department are generally open for research through 1941, but closed after 1945, and that access to records dated 1942-45 (the "restricted period") is determined by the Historical Office of the Department of State on the basis of a formal application. The Central Search Room and the Microfilm Reading Room are open from 8:45 a.m. to 9:50 p.m. Monday through Friday, and 8:45 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Saturdays, but finding aids, reference specialists, and records of the "restricted period" are available only from 8:45 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday. Some typewriters are available, but a researcher can bring his own and leave it in the building overnight. Reproductions can be provided at five cents per page for microfilm or ten cents for electrostat copies; there is usually no objection if a researcher wishes to use his own reproduction equipment if such use will not harm the records or disrupt reference activities. After inquiry, researchers may learn that copies of the records they wish to examine are available for sale at a nominal price as a microfilm publication of the National Archives. Although we prefer to sell microfilm, we can provide the names of libraries which have already purchased particular microcopies, and it may be more convenient to use the microfilm there or attempt to borrow it on interlibrary loan. In addition, our reference staff can provide answers to letters asking specific questions or estimate the cost of reproducing specific documents or files.

The experienced scholar usually mines the available published sources and secondary works before tackling the mass of documents in the National Archives. The footnotes and bibliographies of other scholars provide clues to the most useful files; the various editions of the Digest of International Law by Wharton, Moore, Hackworth, and Whiteman, are not used as often as they could be. Many documents have already been published in the Foreign Relations series or in other documentary publications; besides checking the citations, on some topics it is advisable to make a calendar--there is no other way of knowing whether or not a document from the files has been previously published. The little brochure, "Major Publications of the Department of State: An Annotated Bibliography," is another useful reference tool.

The most important body of records for the historian of American foreign relations is the central file of the Department of State, part of Record Group 59. For the period through 1906, there are three major groupings--diplomatic, consular, and miscellaneous correspondence. Within each grouping are letters received by the Department (such as Consular Despatches), and copies of letters sent (such as Notes to Foreign Legations

and Embassies); these letters are thereunder arranged by country or consular post where possible, and thereunder chronologically. Registers are helpful in finding the dates of relevant documents. Almost all of these records are available as microfilm publications, as described in the periodic List of National Archives Microfilm Publications.

Beginning in 1906 the central file records are filed by subject. The subject file for the 1906-10 period is the Numerical File, containing 25,892 separate cases. A microfilm publication of the Numerical File is currently being prepared. To find subject files relating to a given topic, the researcher must use record cards listing each document in each case, and index cards to correspondents and subjects.

The central file records for the 1910-44 period are filed according to a predetermined decimal system of subject classification. For example, decimal file 841.857L97/1-180 relates to the sinking of the Lusitania; the first digit is for class 8, Internal Affairs of States; 41 is the country number assigned to Great Britain; 857 for "Navigation of Merchant Vessels, Disabled, wrecked, and stranded vessels, Collisions and salvage, Repairs"; during World War I this file became so large it had to be further broken down, so L97 is for the Lusitania; numbers after the slant mark (/) indicate the number of the individual document in the file, in this instance a total of 180. Another example is 767.8315/5. Class 7 is for political relations between states, 67 is the number for Turkey, 83 is the number for Egypt, and 15 is for boundary controversies between two states; decimal file 767.8315/5 is therefore the fifth document filed on the topic of boundary controversies between Turkey and Egypt. The lower country number always precedes the higher country number in class 7. Thus, documents relating to Japanese (94) extraterritorial rights (3) in China (93) are in decimal file 793.942. Class 3 (Protection of Interests), class 5 (International Conferences), and class 6 (Commercial Relations) also contain many files of interest to diplomatic historians.

The decimal file was broken into segments, and currently only the segments for 1910-29, 1930-39, and 1940-44 are in the National Archives. Some of the more important files for the 1910-29 period are available as microfilm publications, and there are accompanying pamphlets available for some of these microcopies. The pamphlets provide a roll breakdown, with a general description of the subjects of the documents on each roll. The basic finding aids for the decimal file are purport books, lists of documents arranged by decimal file number. The purport books are always filmed before the documents on the decimal file microcopies. There are also index cards arranged by country and consular post, and a partial name card index.

Besides the central file records, there are other records of the State Department, both in Record Group 59 and other record groups, that may be of interest to the researcher. It may be wise to examine pertinent records of other federal agencies. The National Archives has reference specialists to assist the researcher in his use of all of these records. The Guide to Records in the National Archives (1948) is still the best overall finding aid, and it is currently being revised to reflect current holdings.

MILTON O. GUSTAFSON
National Archives

Descriptive Pamphlets of National Archives Microfilm Publications of Interest to Diplomatic Historians*

EUROPE

Microcopy Number	Title	Number of Rolls	Price of Microfilm
30	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to: Great Britain, 1797-1906.	200	$711
31	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to: Spain, 1792-1906.	134	531
39	Notes from the Russian Legation in the United States to the Department of State, 1809-1906.	12	65
50	Notes from the British Legation in the United States to the Department of State 1791-1906.	145	559
77	Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906:		
	Austria, 1837-1906.	4	14
	Balkan States, 1868-1906.	1	5
	Belgium, 1832-1906.	3	9
	Denmark, 1833-1906.	2	6
	France, 1829-1906.	11	35
	German States, 1835-1869.	1	3
	Germany, 1868-1906.	7	26
	Great Britain, 1829-1906.	22	71
	Netherlands and Luxembourg, 1888-1906	1	4
	Netherlands, 1833-1888.	2	5
	Papal States, 1848-1868.	1	1
	Portugal, 1833-1906.	2	7
	Russia, 1833-1906.	6	17
	Spain, 1883-1906.	10	34
	Sweden and Norway, 1834-1906.	2	5
	Two Sicilies, 1838-1861.	1	1

*Compiled by Peter M. Buzanski. This list is a continuation from the SHAFR NEWSLETTER, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 4-9. Since all of the material in the current list is from Record Group 59, the microfilm listing is by geographical area, rather than by Microcopy number. Scholars interested in materials for which no "Accompanying Pamphlets" currently exist should inquire directly to: Dr. Milton O. Gustafson, Specialist in United States Foreign Relations, General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C. 20408.

81	Despatches Received by the Department of State from the United States Consuls in: St. Petersburg, 1803-1906.	18	$ 92
202	Notes from the Italian Legation in the United States to the Department of State, 1861-1906.	18	82
316	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29 Relating to: Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union.	175	1
333	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29, Relating to: Political Relations Between the United States, Russia and the Soviet Union.	7	29
340	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29, Relating to: Political Relations between Russia and the Soviet Union and other states.	20	117
355	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29, Relating to: Political Relations between the United States and Germany	4	24
367	Records of the Department of State, Relating to: World War I and its Termination, 1914-29.	518	2
443	Records of the Department of State, 1801-1906: Italy, 1838-1906.	3	11
456	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Moscow, 1857-1906.	2	16
458	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Novorossisk, 1883-84	1	1
459	Odessa, 1831-1906	7	55
467	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Warsaw, 1871-1906.	3	18
481	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Archangel, 1811-1889	1	2
482	Batum, 1890-1906	1	7
483	Helsingfors (Helsinki), 1851-1906	1	2
484	Revel (Estonia), 1858-1870	1	4

486	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Vladivostok, 1898-1906.	1	5
580	Records of the Department of State, 1910-20, Relating to: Internal Affairs of Great Britain.	249	1
581	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29, Relating to: Political Relations between the United States and Great Britain.	15	75
625	Area File of the Naval Collection, 1775-1910.	46	132
675	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29: Internal Affairs of Belgium.	78	404
676	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29: Political Relations between the United States and Belgium.	1	4
677	Records of the Department of State, 1910-29: Political Relations between Belgium and other States.	4	20

FAR EAST

77	Diplomatic Instruction of the Department of State, 1801-1906.		
	China, 1843-1906	6	22
	Hawaii, 1848-1900	2	6
	Japan, 1855-1906	5	15
	Korea, 1883-1905	1	4
	Siam, 1882-1906	1	2
88	Records Relating to the United States Surveying Expedition to the North Pacific Ocean, 1852-1863.	27	62
92	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to China, 1843-1906.	131	613
101	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Canton, 1790-1906.	20	88
102	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Chefoo, 1863-1906.	9	47

105	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Foochow, 1849-1906.	10	$ 42
107	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Hankow, 1861-1906.	8	37
108	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Hong Kong, 1844-1906.	21	93
109	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Macao, 1849-1869.	2	7
112	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Shanghai, 1847-1906.	53	225
114	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Tientsin, 1868-1906.	8	40
115	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Newchwang, 1865-1906.	7	34
133	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906.	82	311
134	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to Korea, 1883-1905.	22	74
144	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in Honolulu, 1820-1903.	22	77
147	Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, 1804-1886.	124	758
163	Notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, 1858-1906.	9	23
167	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in Seoul, 1886-1906.	2	7

168	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in Bombay, 1838-1906	8	$ 25
172	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Ministers to Siam, 1882-1906.	9	32
173	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Sydney, 1836-1906.	18	50
180	Papers of Stephen C. Rowan, 1826-1890.	1	5
181	Annual Reports of the Governors of Guam, 1901-1941.	3	14
254	Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896-1901, with Associated Records of the United States War Department, 1900-1906.	643	5
316	Records of the Department of State, 1910-1929 Relating to: Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union.	5	29
339	Records of the Department of State, 1910-1929 Relating to: Political Relations Between the United States and China.	2	15
340	Records of the Department of State, 1910-1929 Relating to: Political Relations Between Russia and the Soviet Union and other States.	12	65
422	Records of the Department of State, 1910-1929, Relating to: Internal Affairs of Japan.	43	232
	Records of the Department of State, 1910-1929, Relating to:		
423	Political Relations Between the United States and Japan	9	51
424	Political Relations Between Japan and Other States	1	3
441	Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy to Commandants and Navy Agents, 1808-1865.	5	26

486	Despatches Received by the Department of State from United States Consuls in: Vladivostok, 1898-1906.	1	$ 5
625	Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, particularly Area 10. (Pacific Ocean West of Longtitude 180°, extended westward to include the Indian Ocean).	59	230
719	History of the Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, 1899-1903, and Documents Relating to the War Department Project for Publishing the History.	9	67

Letter from the Executive Secretary

May 1, 1970

Dear Colleagues:

This second issue of our Newsletter gives me an opportunity to bring you up to date on a number of items. As many of you may know I was unable to attend the sessions in Los Angeles, but I have received reports that the Reception was a huge success. I would appreciate your candid remarks on the concept of the Breakfast session if you attended it. I understand the discussion was most profitable, but there may be some question of attempting that kind of program in the future in that particular setting. I would also like to urge you to send your ideas for programs directly to Professor David Trask, Department of History, State University of New York, Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York.

In early January President Leopold appointed Wayne Cole (University of Maryland), Jules Davids (Georgetown University), Richardson Dougall (Department of State Historical Office), and Forrest Pogue (George C. Marshall Library and Research Center), Chairman, to an Ad Hoc Committee to Restructure the Society. The Committee and the Executive Secretary met in early February to clarify the problem and to produce a draft of a new constitution. The Chairman circulated this and a number of other drafts. A final version, which was distributed to the Board, was then discussed at a second meeting on May 7. As soon as the Board approves a final version I will mail it to you for your approbation. I hope to accomplish this in time for implementation this Autumn.

On the next page you will find the text of the Holt Ad Hoc Committee on State Department Internships. This has recently been endorsed by both the AHA and OAH. I am awaiting word on endorsement by other scholarly societies. Our problem now centers on the question of funds. I saw Dr. Paul Ward, Executive Secretary of the AHA in Washington on May 8 on this point, but I would appreciate learning from anyone who can provide additional suggestions. At this critical time when money is in such short supply, we need to know who can contact what foundation on an informal, personal basis. If you could send me this information, I will attempt to eliminate duplications.

I would like to close with a reminder to check your mailbox during the summer for the new constitution. I will need your comments as soon after you receive it as possible, if we are to implement the changes in time for the Fall.

Joseph P. O'Grady

State Department Internship

The Ad Hoc State Department Internship Committee was composed of Richard Challener (Princeton), Robert Dallek (UCLA), Lawrence Gelfand (Iowa State), Henry Graff (Columbia), Gale McGee (United States Senate), Barbara Stevens (Connecticut) and W. Stull Holt (Washington), Chairman. The Internship has been endorsed by the Advisory Committee of the State Department, the Historical Office of the State Department, and the Councils of SHAFR, OAH and AHA. The Society is now seeking funds for this project. Please note the suggested format for seeking foundation support. If you have any suggestions along these lines, please send these directly to the Executive Secretary.

Internships in the Department of State offered by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Purpose

1. To give experience and understanding of the operations of the State Department to a few highly selected young scholars by actually working as interns in the Historical Office of the State Department.

Qualifications

1. Completion of the Ph. D. with a dissertation on some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Completion of all work for the Ph. D. except the dissertation on American foreign relations. In such cases there must be evidence of research ability including the use of documents as primary sources.

Application Procedures

1. Applications, limited to one person per year per institution, must be submitted by the faculty member who has directed or who is directing the dissertation. This constitutes the first screening. Applications for any year must be received by June first of the previous year.

2. Applications will then be screened by a committee of SHAFR and recommendations made to the Historical Office of the State Department not later than September 1.

3. The final screening will be made by the Historical Office and awards will be announced as early in the Spring as possible. The intervening period will also be used by the Department of State for security clearance.

Terms

1. The Fellowships are for a two-year period beginning June 1. Since that length of time is necessary to secure the objectives of the Fellowships, applicants must agree to this stipulation. If, for any reason, the Historical Office should wish to terminate the fellowship of an individual, the SHAFR will continue the stipend for the academic year.

2. The number of Fellowships at any one time will be limited to three.

3. The annual stipend will be $12,000 for a person with the Ph.D. degree and $10,000 for one without the degree.

Draft of a Statement to be Used When Applying for Funds from Foundations

We are seeking financial support in the amount of $218,550 for a project of real importance to historical scholarship and indirectly to the American public.

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations is composed of about 450 professors of History and Political Science. Its members do most of the writing and nearly all of the advanced teaching in the field of American foreign relations. Our project has received by a unanimous resolution the endorsement of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations of the Department of State, which is composed of representatives of the American Historical Association, the American Political Association and the American Society of International Law. The project has also been endorsed by the Historical Office of the Department of State which has promised full cooperation.

It is unnecessary to expand on the fact that the study of American foreign relations is, and will be, a field of utmost importance not only in terms of pure scholarship, but also in terms of national interest. If the United States is to have a wise and successful foreign policy, the public must have the knowledge and understanding derived from the best scholarship possible. During the past generation and including the present much of the best scholarly work has been done by man who had acquired an indepth and full understanding of the conduct of foreign relations by actually working in the State Department during and immediately after World War II. The names of Langer, Gleason, Feis, and Kennan are among the best examples. It has often been said that for an understanding of China one needs to have been there and to have experienced the dense

masses of people, the smells and the signts of extreme poverty. The same reasoning is valid in the case of students of American foreign relations. But the new generation of young scholars who will dominate the field in the coming years is not acquiring that understanding which can only be obtained by actual participation in the work of the State Department.

To make such participation possible we propose the establishment of a number of internships in the State Department for a trial period of four years. If the success we anticipate is realized, we hope that the government will assume responsibility for continuing the system.

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JOINT SESSION

PACIFIC COAST BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

AND

THE SOCIETY OF HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Portland, Oregon

September 4, 5, 6, 1970

EXTENDING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY INTO THE PACIFIC

Chairman: W. Stull Holt

"Merchants, Whalers, and Missionaries as Foreign Policy Makers in the Pacific"

Donald D. Johnson, University of Hawaii

"Vicarious Imperialism: American Encouragement of Japanese Expansionism, 1870-1880"

Sandra T. Caruthers, University of Utah

Comment: E. Berkeley Tompkins, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

W. Patrick Strauss, Oakland University

JOINT SESSION

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

AND

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Fall, 1970

Louisville, Kentucky

A SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN NEAR EAST POLICY:

MERCHANTS, MISSIONARIES, AND ZIONISTS

Chairman: Harry N. Howard (Tentative)

"The Merchant's Search: Admiral Mark L. Bristol, Open Door Diplomat and Merchant's Factor"

Thomas A. Bryson, West Georgia College

"The Missionaries, 1914-1923"

Joseph L. Grabill, Illinois State University

"The Zionists Search"

Leon E. Boothe, University of Mississippi

Comment: John DeNovo, University of Wisconsin, Madison