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DEAN RUSK'S REVELATION: NEW BRITISH EVIDENCE ON THE CORDIER PLOY

by

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Former officials and scholars alike had gathered in March 1987 at Hawk's Cay, a Florida resort, to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis by reexamining that dramatic episode. Fresh insights and even new specific information would, it was anticipated, emerge from the discussion. That hope was more than fulfilled when McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to President John F. Kennedy, presented to the conference participants a message which former Secretary of State Dean Rusk had sent to Missile Crisis scholar, James G. Blight. The text of the Rusk letter which Bundy read out stated that there was:

> a postscript which only I can furnish. It was clear to me that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, proposing the removal of both the [American] Jupiters [in Turkey] and the missiles in Cuba. Mr. Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after further signal from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr. Cordier has never seen the

> light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and I were the only ones who knew of this particular step.

Bundy went on to explain that Cordier was asked to stand by with this contingency plan on the night of October 27. "It's interesting to note," the former National Security Adviser added, "that this proposal wasn't going through the U.S. Mission. Cordier was a friend of U Thant's as well as of Dean Rusk's. The intention was to make it sound like a UN proposal, not an American one."[1]

As the organizers of conference later put it, the reactions to what soon became known as Rusk's revelation were "swift and powerful [at Hawk's Cay]. In the corridors and at meals, the scholars expressed shock and amazement at what they regarded as a piece of news worthy of front-page coverage." Many of those officials who had actually been through the Missile Crisis urged that Rusk's new information be treated circumspectly. Robert McNamara argued that ultimately Kennedy would not have authorized a public trade of the nuclear weapons in Cuba for America's Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The political costs of doing so, the former Secretary of Defense maintained, would have been inordinate. "People would have interpreted this as caving in — rightly or wrongly, but this is the way a lot of people, including a lot of Congressmen and our allies, would have interpreted such a trade." In the end, this consideration would have prevented JFK from carrying out the Cordier plan. Rusk himself felt that his revelation was "not all that much of a big deal. It

[1]James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux/Hill and Wang, 1989), 83-84.

was simply an option that would have been available to President Kennedy, had he wanted to use it." And no one, Rusk asserted, could know whether JFK would have actually selected that alternative. McGeorge Bundy concurred, stressing that there was an obvious difference between a definite policy and a contingency plan.[2]

Despite these caveats from those who actually participated in the October 1962 confrontation, students of the crisis soon attached great importance to Rusk's letter. According to many, it fundamentally changed our understanding of the denouement of the Missile Crisis. Scholars have always wondered how Kennedy would have reacted had Khrushchev not decided on October 28 to accept his October 27 proposals — namely, that the Soviets withdraw the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a public commitment from the United States not to invade Cuba and a private promise to remove the Jupiters from Turkey. Would Kennedy have launched a military attack on Cuba? Would he have extended the blockade, as McNamara contends, to perhaps cover petroleum, oil, and lubricants so as to bring the Cuban economy to a standstill?[3] Or would he have opted for a diplomatic approach, such as a public quid pro quo involving the mutual withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and Turkey?

Various scholars, in their understandable zeal to incorporate new findings into their interpretation of the Missile Crisis, have claimed that Rusk's revelation provides an answer to the hypothetical question of what Kennedy's next step would have been had the crisis not ended on October 28. He would, it is

[2]Ibid., 114, 190.

[3]Ibid., 190.

now often argued, have almost certainly chosen diplomacy over war. Marc Trachtenberg, a participant at Hawk's Cay, stated, "I've changed my mind as a result of what's been said here." "I really did think," he continued, "until a few days ago, that an [American] invasion of Cuba was imminent at the end of October. But now — if only because of the new information from Rusk — this issue seems much less clear-cut." J. Anthony Lukas, in an August 1987 *New York Times Magazine* article, felt Rusk's letter to be a "genuinely important revelation" that indicates "the dangers of nuclear war during the crisis were somewhat slimmer than most analysts — not to mention most Americans — have believed." This view has also found its way in to the scholarly literature on the Missile Crisis. James Blight, in *The Shattered Crystal Ball*, his 1990 monograph on the October 1962 nuclear confrontation, wrote that Rusk's information showed that war was something which "President Kennedy, by October 27, simply would not permit."[4]

A document recently released in the Public Record Office in Kew, England, revises not only this interpretation of Rusk's revelation, but also the details of the revelation itself. This evidence is in the form of a top secret telegram sent by Sir Patrick H. Dean, the Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations, to the British Foreign Office. The telegram states:

[4]Ibid., 109; J. Anthony Lukas, "Class Reunion: Kennedy's Men Relive the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The New York Times Magazine* (August 30, 1987): 58, 61; James G. Blight, *The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 115.

I have heard from a most reliable source that Cordier (lately United Nations Under-Secretary) has been in touch with top level persons in the United States Government about U Thant's statement on Cuba. Cordier says that if a United Nations Commission could be introduced to keep a watch on Russian bases in Cuba under satisfactory guarantees, the United States might be prepared to consider allowing a similar United Nations Commission to look at some bases elsewhere, e.g. the United States bases in Turkey. If a satisfactory arrangement about Cuba could be reached they would be prepared for the United Nations Commission to go to other places but not to all the other American missile and other bases around the world.

2. Adlai Stevenson dropped a hint to this effect to me last night. If these ideas are being seriously considered, the biggest problem may be how to decide how many United States bases should be brought under the surveillance of the United Nations Commission.

This telegram was sent at 5.48 p.m. on October 25, 1962, and not, it must be emphasized, on October 27.[5]

Patrick Dean's telegram plainly refers to the Cordier ploy unveiled by Rusk at Hawk's Cay. Its specificity, such as the clear references to Cordier and U Thant, makes it far too much of a coincidence to be otherwise. There are, however, two conspicuous differences between the Cordier plan revealed by Rusk and the one described by Ambassador Dean. First,

[5]Telegram from P. Dean to Foreign Office, October 25, 1962, Foreign Office 371/162387, Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, England.

whereas Rusk recalled that Kennedy hatched the plan on October 27, at the very peak of the Missile Crisis, the British telegram demonstrates that it was in fact on October 25 — or possibly even earlier. Twenty-five years after the fact, the former Secretary of State had simply misremembered the date. The second difference is that Rusk said the deal which Cordier would prompt U Thant to offer in public consisted of the reciprocal removal of the Jupiters in Turkey and the missiles in Cuba. According to Dean's source, however, the arrangement involved sending United Nations commissions to the Soviet bases (presumably this meant the missile sites) in Cuba and perhaps to American bases in Turkey. Another possible discrepancy is that the Rusk letter in 1987 made no mention of Stevenson, whereas the Dean telegram implies that America's UN Ambassador may have been involved in or at least cognizant of the Cordier ploy. Of course, it is conceivable that Rusk remembered the terms of the deal correctly, and that Dean's source was misinformed. But given the failure of Rusk's memory on the temporal issue, it would be no surprise to learn that his recollection of the actual details of the Cordier ploy was imprecise as well. It also makes sense to place greater faith in a document from 1962 than in a twenty-five year old memory. Moreover, the precision of Dean's source on the personnel involved — Cordier and U Thant — means that it would be reasonable to assume that he or she was also accurate about the details of the plan.

Dean's telegram clearly renders all previous interpretations of Rusk's revelation obsolete, not because of any lack of dexterity on the part of Missile Crisis historians, but simply because the accepted understanding of the nature and timing of the Cordier ploy was erroneous. Most obviously, Kennedy did not put into motion a plan at the height of the crisis on the evening of October 27 which, if implemented, would have

involved a public trade of the Jupiters in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba. His plan called instead for the establishment of a UN observer team in Cuba in return for which the United States "might be prepared" to permit a similar UN commission in a country with American bases such as Turkey, and possibly elsewhere.[6] Perhaps the goal behind this maneuver was to develop an option which would reduce the chances of a sudden Soviet attack on Turkey, and which would also make an American assault on Cuba problematic. Any air strike on or invasion of those countries would be far more difficult to carry out with UN officials present. Hence, Kennedy probably thought this strategy would decrease the likelihood that the Missile Crisis would lead to war — and in this way, the October 25 Cordier ploy was commendable.

Nevertheless, JFK did not consider trading away the Jupiters as part of a public quid pro quo, as Rusk stated in 1987. And even if the Cordier ploy had been implemented it would not have defused the confrontation over Cuba. For American policy-makers, including the President, the removal of the missiles from the Caribbean island was the sine qua non of any settlement; and so a situation where those missiles continued to be present in Cuba, even if they were being observed by a UN commission, was still intolerable. Officials in Washington would no doubt have felt that the weapons on the island still needed to be removed. In addition to all this, the Cordier ploy had no real chance of being accepted by the Soviets or Cubans. Khrushchev would almost certainly have rejected a plan which stipulated that UN observers be dispatched to Cuba in exchange for which other UN personnel only *might* be sent to Turkey. And Castro, ever conscious of

[6]Ibid.

the need to guard his country against external interference, would certainly have prevented any UN inspection of his island, as he in fact did after the Missile Crisis when he prevented UN officials from coming to Cuba to monitor the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.

What the Cordier ploy actually represented, then, was a policy option which involved a far less generous American concession than Rusk had suggested at Hawk's Cay, which would not have ended the Missile Crisis even if it had been carried out, and which was totally impractical anyway. The very fact that Kennedy did not authorize Cordier to carry out the plan during the next three days — that is between the day on which Dean sent his telegram to the Foreign Office and October 28, the day the Missile Crisis was suddenly defused — indicates that by the time the crisis ended JFK may have given up on the Cordier plan as an unworkable modus vivendi.

The overall significance of this British documentation is that it discredits the information which emerged in 1987 — and the new interpretation which this has produced. Rusk's evidence indicated that at the very least Kennedy was more interested in pursuing a diplomatic approach in order to end the Missile Crisis than had previously been apparent, and, therefore, that the crisis was considerably less dangerous than previously assumed. If war seemed imminent, JFK probably would have arranged a public withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey and Cuba. Because Rusk's revelation misrepresented the Cordier ploy, these arguments are unpersuasive. So unless further documentation emerges to prove that Kennedy initiated two Cordier ploys, one around October 25 and a revised version two days later, the conclusion is clear: If Khrushchev had rejected the terms of settlement offered by JFK on October 27, the President was just as liable to have responded by

launching a military attack on Cuba as we had always suspected. Consequently, the Cuban Missile Crisis was as dangerous and as likely to have resulted in a superpower war as we had always feared. This is not to denigrate the herculean labors of James Blight, David Welch, and Bruce Allyn, who together have organized the series of conferences on the Missile Crisis which began at Hawk's Cay. On the contrary, it is testimony to the utility of these forums that they have stimulated the research which leads to what is hopefully an ever more precise, nuanced understanding of the most dangerous episode in the nuclear era.

EISENHOWER, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND THE PERILS OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: A REPLY TO SPAULDING

by

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I hope the editor and readers of the *Newsletter* will forgive my returning to the subject of Eisenhower's export control policy for a final comment on the disagreements between Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., and myself.[1] Since our controversy

[1]The initial contributions are Tor Egil Førland, "'Selling Firearms to the Indians': Eisenhower's Export Control Policy, 1953-54," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Spring 1991): 221-44; and Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "A Gradual and Moderate Relaxation: Eisenhower and the Revision of American Export Control Policy, 1953-1955," *Diplomatic History* 17

concerns methodology in diplomatic history as much as the rather arcane subject of export control policy, my persistence may perhaps be excused.

Two substantive issues are at stake. First there is President Eisenhower's role in the process leading to the reduction of CoCom's export control lists in summer 1954. Spaulding sees Ike as more important to the contraction than I do. Closely related to this is the second point of disagreement, namely Britain's contribution to the cutback. How far was the British idea of replacing CoCom's three export control lists with one "short list" independent of the "new look" in U.S. embargo policy? And how wise is it to regard the negotiations from fall 1953 to summer 1954 as a tug of war between the United States on the one hand and Great Britain and other European countries on the other?

Which methodological issue is at stake is itself a bone of contention. I have argued that Professor Spaulding's lack of consulting relevant foreign (in this context: British) archives, which alas has ample precedents in U.S. diplomatic history but which I had thought was on the wane, leads him to flawed conclusions regarding Britain's role.[2] Spaulding considers the

(Spring 1993): 223-49. For the debate, see Førland, "Eisenhower, Export Controls, and the Parochialism of Historians of American Foreign Relations," *The SHAFR Newsletter* 24, no. 4 (December 1993): 4-17; and Spaulding, "Eisenhower and Export Controls Revisited: A Reply to Førland," *Newsletter* 25, no. 1 (March 1994): 9-17.

[2]Judged by his reaction to my earlier *Newsletter* article, Professor Spaulding may find the word "flawed" offensive and disparaging (cf. Spaulding, "Reply," footnote 3 p. 11). In the academic tradition to which I belong such judgments are an acceptable part of the discourse as long as they are supported by arguments. Whether they stick with the addressee or rebound on their author depends on the strength or the arguments.

cause of our disagreement not different approaches but differences in "concepts and skills that are basic to the historian's craft": "chronology, causation, cogency of argument, and framing the proper questions." He suggests that "if there is a larger methodological issue here" it is "archival fetishism."[3]

The proof of the value of particular methodological approaches and skills can only lie in the pudding of their application to specific historical problems. Fortunately Professor Spaulding's analysis of the relation between the Eisenhower administration's new embargo policy and the evolution of the British short-list approach provides an excellent example of the perils of writing diplomatic history based exclusively the *Foreign Relations of the United States.* (I am not saying it cannot or should never be done: sometimes no other sources are available. What I am saying is that it requires much caution and a clear conception of the limitations of the evidence — skills that I advance for inclusion in Professor Spaulding's catalogue.)

Since export controls are a little known topic and knowledge of the major steps in the revision process is necessary to assess the actual controversy, I shall repeat the basics. In the spring of 1953 President Eisenhower initiated a review of U.S. export control policy. On 31 July this led to the adoption of a new embargo policy paper, NSC 152/2, which was relayed to diplomatic missions on 21 August. It recommended that export controls should be put "on a narrower and more flexible basis by tightening the criteria [for inclusion in the export control lists] so as to concentrate on commodities and services which contribute significantly to the war potential of

[3]Quotes from Spaulding, "Reply," 16.

the Soviet bloc." As a general rule the lists should not be extended; instead emphasis should be on effective implementation and enforcement of controls.[4] When the U.S. Embassy in London asked permission to immediately and informally reveal to the Foreign Office the "substance" of the new policy, Washington concurred on 1 September.[5] The formal transmission to Britain of the new administration's embargo policy took place when the British Embassy in Washington was handed an *Aide-Mémoire* on 6 October.[6] In November U.S. export control diplomats went to London to explain their "new look" in embargo policy to Britain.[7]

Now to the British scene. On 2 September Whitehall's Economic Steering Committee, consisting of top officials from several departments, came up with the idea that Britain ought to compose a "short list" of very important items, the export of which was to be strictly prohibited. At an appropriate moment this list should be suggested to the Americans as an alternative to CoCom's three long lists of items. (There was one containing embargoed items, another consisting of items that could be exported in limited quantities, and a third comprising goods that were exported freely but for which export figures had to be reported to CoCom.) Ministers endorsed the short-list concept "in principle" on 12 October,

[4]NSC 152/2, 31 July 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54* 1:1009-14 (hereafter: *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

[5]Ibid., 1014-15.

[6]Aide-Mémoire, handed over on 6 October 1953, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, Washington, DC, 460.509/10-653 (hereafter RG 59 with filing information).

[7]The bilaterals were held in two sessions: 3-6 and 20-21 November. There are summaries in *FRUS, 1952-54* 1:1039-49 and 1061-62.

leaving for later consideration the detailed composition of the list and the timing of its presentation to the United States.[8] In the second session of the bilaterals in November the Americans were presented with the concept of a short list and an outline of what kind of items Britain thought the list ought to comprise.[9] There followed months of bilateral, trilateral (with France), and multilateral negotiations on the appropriate design of an embargo policy for "the long haul." Finally a set of three slimmer CoCom lists was adopted in July 1954.

Then to the issues disputed by Professor Spaulding and myself. Pointing out that the British short-list idea was conceived by the Economic Steering Committee one day after the State Department had allowed its London Embassy to inform the Foreign Office of the substance of the administration's new embargo policy, Spaulding speculates that perhaps "Aldrich's notification of a change in U.S. policy" may have some kind of parental relationship to the short-list idea. He asks me to "help clarify this problem by establishing more precisely" the chronology. Such clarification, however, although "interesting," would "not be important to this debate" since "by itself, the simple idea of drafting a desired British short list proves nothing, regardless of when the idea was hatched." The "crucial point" is that ministerial blessing of the short-list concept came only on 12 October:

[8]For references, see Førland, "Parochialism," 14.

[9]Despatch 1855 London Embassy to State Department, 23 Nov. 1953, Record Group 469: Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD, Mission to France, box 206, folder "Trade: East-West, Nov. 1-Dec. 31, 1953."

> six weeks after Aldrich's initial disclosure and nearly a week after State Department representatives had fully described to members of the British embassy in Washington the 'shift in emphasis [in U.S. export control policy] resulting from [a] recent high level review.' In short, Cabinet approval for the drafting of a British short list came well after the British had been informed of a new direction of U.S. export control policy.... Equally significant, the British certainly did not communicate any plans for a severe reduction of embargo lists until months after the Americans had announced that the United States had decided on a fundamental revision of U.S. export control policy.[10]

Professor Spaulding's thesis certainly satisfies his standards regarding chronology, causation, and cogency of argument. But it fails on two other criteria. It is not supported by the evidence but undermined by records — foreign and domestic — that Spaulding has ignored, perhaps out of fear of archival fetishism. And it reveals a deficient understanding of how export control policy (and other policies) was formed in the Eisenhower administration.

First the deficiency in evidence. There is no record, in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*) or anywhere else, showing that Aldrich disclosed the substance of NSC

[10]Spaulding, "Reply," 13-14; see also idem, "'Gradual and Moderate Relaxation,'" 239. I apologize for quoting at such length, but this is a critical point. Besides, my earlier attempts to summarize Professor Spaulding's arguments have failed to meet their author's approval. Cf. "Reply," footnote 3 p. 11.

152/2 to the Foreign Office.[11] *FRUS* has printed the 31 August telegram in which the London Embassy asks for permission to reveal the new policy, and in a footnote has referred to the State Department's concurrence one day later. What is not printed or referred to in *FRUS* but can be found in the State Department files of the National Archives is another telegram from the London Embassy, sent on 3 September. Here the embassy explains that new talks with the Foreign Office has calmed its fear of a flood of British proposals for reduction of controls during the upcoming review of items for quantitative control. Therefore the "Embassy feels that [the] urgency in informing [the] United Kingdom [of the] substance [of the] NSC economic defense policy has somewhat diminished insofar as we hoped to forestall such moves."[12] Not until 6 October, when handed the US *Aide-Mémoire*, was Britain informed of the new U.S.

[11]A minor point is that Aldrich himself would very seldom handle matters of export control: they were too unimportant. Looking at export control records in archives — in the United States, Britain or anywhere — one realizes that export control was a low-to-medium level subject. Spaulding has probably been deceived by the *FRUS* editors' practice of referring to the formal sender and receiver of telegrams and despatches (i.e. ambassadors and the [acting] secretary of state) while ignoring the real authors. This convention, which unfortunately is reproduced by journals such as *Diplomatic History*, conveys the impression that a disproportionate part of decision-making is conducted by top-level people. For more on this point, see Tor Egil Førland, *Cold Economic Warfare: The Creation and Prime of CoCom, 1948-54* (forthcoming), ch. 19.

[12]Tel. 955 London Embassy to State Department, 3 Sept. 1953, RG 59, 460.509/9-353. Later in the same message is the intriguing information that "incidentally, some Foreign Office statements indicated possible awareness [of] some aspects [of the] NSC policy." The sources of this awareness, and to which aspects it pertained, is an open question. There is little point in speculating on this, however, since, as will be shown, the new U.S. policy was not the decisive factor behind Britain's drive for decontrol.

export control policy.[13] The probability that the officials from the economic ministries who put forward the short-list idea on 2 September knew there was a new direction in U.S. policy, is very small indeed. The short-list concept originated independently of Eisenhower.

To Spaulding the origin of the short list is "not important." To him the "crucial point" is its approval by ministers on 12 October — after the U.S. *Aide-Mémoire* had been received (although not "nearly six weeks after Aldrich's initial disclosure," since the London Embassy disclosed nothing) — and its communication to the Americans on 20 November. Surely the sequence of events shows that Britain's decision to propose a short list, the exact contents of which was not finally specified until March 1954 but whose outline was communicated in November, was caused by Whitehall's knowledge of the "fundamental revision of U.S. export control policy?" No, it does not — because of a factor that lies at the very heart of diplomatic history: perceptions.

The British did not perceive the Eisenhower administration's new embargo policy in the way Professor Spaulding takes for granted. On 10 October, having read the U.S. *Aide-Mémoire* and discussed it with the U.S. London Embassy, the Foreign Office concluded that "it is pretty certain that the Americans are not contemplating any very radical reduction in the lists." It assumed the effect of the U.S. policy revision to be only "removing some of the present minor irritants in the operation of the existing system coupled probably with some fairly small

[13]Tels. Polto 380 U.S. Special Representative's Office in Paris (USRO) to State Department, 11 Sept. 1953, and 1519 State Department to London Embassy, 24 Sept. 1953, RG 59, 460.509/9-1153 and 460.509/9-2353.

trimming of the lists and/or increase in quotas."[14] This was what British ministers thought Eisenhower's new embargo policy meant when on 12 October they gave the green light to drafting a short list. Whitehall's impression of U.S. policy had not changed when the Cabinet on 17 November decided to present the Americans with an outline of Britain's short list: the embodiment of the "radical change" that the British sought. The officials told ministers that the United States "will be more ready to agree to some reduction in the lists but the reduction is unlikely to be substantial."[15]

The British, then, decided to push forward with their proposal for radical decontrol despite their perception that Eisenhower's new embargo look carried little promise. This never enters Professor Spaulding's picture, for two reasons. One is that he has not been to British archives and is unwilling to revise his analysis in light of the evidence of British perceptions presented in my *Newsletter* article of last December.[16] The other relates to an aspect of our disagreement that Spaulding ignores although it is critical to our assessment of Eisenhower, namely that in many ways Whitehall perceived the new U.S. embargo policy more accurately than he himself does.

We are entering the area of Professor Spaulding's deficient understanding of the decision making of the Eisenhower administration. What was presented to Britain was not *Eisenhower's* embargo policy but the Eisenhower

[14]Minute by Crawford, 10 Oct. 1953, FO 371/105867/M 345/45, General Records of the Foreign Office, Public Record Office (PRO), London.

[15]Cabinet Paper C(53)319, 14 Nov. 1953, CAB 129/64, PRO; for the minutes of the meeting, see Cabinet Conclusions CC67(53), 17 November 1953, CAB 128/26, PRO.

[16]Førland, "Parochialism," 15.

administration's embargo policy — which was much less radical than the president had intended. For reasons other than archophobia, since the evidence is overwhelmingly present in *FRUS*, Spaulding equates the policy preferred by Eisenhower with the one conducted by his administration. But they were miles apart. Since this was the main point of my 1991 *Diplomatic History* article I need not repeat details or evidence here but will only summarize my conclusion: by refusing to spend political capital on export control infighting with Cabinet members, the export control bureaucracy, and the Republican Right in Congress, Eisenhower found his new embargo policy emasculated. The president wanted to "pare this strategic list down to its fundamentals."[17] After his administration had nibbled away at Ike's new embargo policy and presented it to the British, the message was that the United States was only contemplating minor reductions in the export control lists. This led the Foreign Office to conclude — and subsequent developments confirmed this view — that "there will be a wide gap between it [the U.S. new look] and any list that is likely to result from the 'short list' idea."[18] Which is why the British, led by a much more ruthless political infighter than Ike, namely Winston Churchill, chose to submit to the Americans their short list to press for an embargo that conformed to the wishes of Britain *and* President Eisenhower — but not those of his administration.

In his first article Professor Spaulding, referring to Britain's short list, writes that "the thinking behind this proposal to institute more effective controls on a much shorter list was in

[17]Memorandum of discussion at 205th NSC meeting, 1 July 1954, *FRUS, 1952-54* 1:1103-7.

[18]Draft Memorandum by the Foreign Office for the Mutual Aid Committee, MAC(53)248, [10] November 1953, FO 371/105868/M 345/52, PRO.

accord with the policy change the Eisenhower administration had already undertaken."[19] No, it did not. First a minor correction: more effective controls had no place in Britain's short-list concept; they were only — and grudgingly on part of the Board of Trade — accepted as a *quid* for the *quo* of American acceptance of major cuts in the export control lists. More important, the thinking behind Britain's short list corresponded quite well with Eisenhower's thinking, but it was not in accord with his administration's policy. This is illustrated by the fate of the memorandum Mutual Security Director Harold Stassen sent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in December 1953, in which Stassen suggested that a study be undertaken of the possibility of resuming trade with the Soviet bloc (including China) "in everything except the direct military and highly strategic mandatory items of the Battle Act [U.S. export control law]." Spaulding uses Dulles's reply to Stassen that the suggestion was similar to Britain's short-list proposal as evidence for his assertion of accord between British and U.S. thinking. What eludes Spaulding is that when Dulles points up the similarities between Stassen's suggestion and the British approach and tells the mutual security director that his proposal deserves "very careful consideration," the secretary of state is not only ditching the idea but is also explaining why it would never reach the NSC Planning Board as intended by Stassen.[20] There existed an "obvious divergence" between U.S. and British policy, which in December 1953 led the State Department to express its "profound concern" in a note to the

[19]Spaulding, "'Gradual and Moderate Relaxation,'" 241.

[20]Spaulding, "'Gradual and Moderate Relaxation,'" footnote 60 p. 214; for further information on Stassen's rapture (he never proposed anything similar) see Førland, "'Selling Firearms to the Indians,'" footnote 25 p. 231.

Foreign Office. This divergence is the reason why it took several months of difficult negotiations before a compromise was reached.[21]

Two related points remain. The first is Professor Spaulding's assertion and re-assertion that "Eisenhower initiated a policy revision without relying on explicit British support."[22] The second is his claim that asking to what degree the eventual list reductions were due to U.S. or British policy is framing the wrong question.[23]

Making a point out of the lack of *explicit* British support for Eisenhower's policy revision initiative is placing intra-alliance export control relations upside down. CoCom had been established on a U.S. initiative. Every month of CoCom history had seen tugs of economic warfare between the United States, who wanted to expand lists and tighten controls, and European countries wanting less comprehensive lists and resisting elaborate control measures. Everybody knew that the moment the United States signalled it was ready to accept decontrol, the European would be more than willing to suggest cuts in the CoCom lists. The only reason why the Europeans waited for a signal from across the Atlantic instead of taking the initiative and submitting proposals for a less severe

[21]Quotes from note from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Government of the United Kingdom, 3 Dec. 1953, *FRUS, 1952-54* 1:1062-64. Interestingly Spaulding quotes these self-same phrases in the same paragraph where he insists that the thinking behind Britain's short list and the embargo policy of the Eisenhower administration were in accordance.

[22]Spaulding, "'Gradual and Moderate Relaxation,'" 246; repeated in "Reply," 15.

[23]Spaulding, "Reply," 15: "what the French would call *une question mal posée*."

embargo was their awareness that the U.S. would block such proposals.[24] As Professor Spaulding himself has demonstrated, the motivating force behind Eisenhower's embargo revision was just his awareness that the U.S. insistence on comprehensive export controls strained West European economies and soured intra-alliance relations. In the president's opinion this negative effect was greater than any effect the embargo had on Soviet bloc war potential.[25] What Eisenhower rightly can be credited for — and I believe Spaulding and I agree on this (!) — is that Ike, with a firm understanding of priorities, clearer than anyone else saw the need to reduce tension within CoCom by reducing the export control lists.

According to Professor Spaulding I frame the wrong questions because I continue "to work in an explanatory dichotomy of the United States versus Britain." Asking whose contributions were most important to the eventual list reduction "no longer makes very much sense after September 1953 when the U.S. invited British participation in discussing a new export control policy aimed at reducing the International Lists."[26] I confess astonishment at this statement. I need not expend readers' patience by arguing against it, however, since the evidence produced above provide ample proof that the U.S. vs. U.K. dichotomy is crucial to understanding what was going on from summer 1953 to summer 1954. (Of course seeing the list revision process as a tug of war between the United States and Britain does not give the whole picture: there were also conflicting views within the two countries. France and other

[24]Readers seeking evidence for this interpretation are referred to Førland, *Cold Economic Warfare.*

[25]Spaulding, "'Gradual and Moderate Relaxation,'" 236-37.

[26]Spaulding, "Reply," 15.

countries played a role, too.) Those inclined to think otherwise are advised to read five pages that abound with examples of the controversy between the two leading CoCom countries, namely pp. 240-45 of Professor Spaulding's *Diplomatic History* article. Or they could visit an archive — in either country.

One final remark. When I wrote that Professor Spaulding had pronounced Eisenhower God and was preaching a gospel of dubious value, it never struck me that he would take these phrases literally.[27] If my choice of metaphor has offended his religious feelings I ask him to forgive my lack of sensitivity. Yet it still seems to me that he has awarded Eisenhower a more prominent position in the pantheon of U.S. presidents than the evidence relating to export controls can support. As such, his belief in Ike's achievements is an act of faith.

HISTORY THROUGH A BEARD - OR BEARDING THE LION? NEW NAVAL INTELLIGENCE RECORDS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

by

Warren Kimball (Rutgers)

Through the intervention of a number of individuals, the National Archives has accessed a large (about 2,000 cubic ft.) collection of Naval Security Group Command (NSG) records

[27]See Spaulding, "Reply," footnote 3 p. 11.

dating through 1946. These include records relating to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The Naval Security Group is the Navy's signals intelligence component and was, in 1941, tasked among other things with intercepting Japanese communications. Although the bulk of these records focusses on Japan and the Pacific War, there are records relating to German and Italian communications. Simply put, this should be a gold mine for Second World War historians, particularly those working in intelligence and military history. Perhaps more important, this collection is apparently the last cache of "Pearl Harbor conspiracy" materials in the United States. Research in these documents should settle most if not all of the questions raised in the past and recently about the degree of knowledge that British and American leaders had regarding Japanese plans. Some finding aids are available.

As things stand now, only FOIA requests will gain access to any of the documents. However, there is some sentiment in the White House to issue a blanket declassification for all World War II records. I would recommend that anyone interested in gaining access to these records not only file FOIA requests, but write to Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor, and ask/insist/demand that all Second World War records be opened to the public immediately and without further review.

A summary description and listing of the NSG files follows:

1. Commander Naval Security Group Library (420 cu. ft.)
   general correspondence on cryptography, historical matters, etc.
2. Inactive Stations Library (200 cu. ft.)
   a variety of organizational records, but including intelligence reports and estimates, captured German and Japanese records, and various histories.

3. Active Stations Library (170 cu. ft.)
   same as above but for stations still active.
4. Radio Intelligence Publication Library (65 cu. ft.)
   publications relating to foreign codes and ciphers.
5. Radio Intelligence Summaries (42 cu. ft.)
   daily intelligence reports sent from Washington to fleet stations in the Pacific, including Japanese fleet position reports.
6. Naval Security Group Detachment Crane Library (105 cu. ft.)
   records collected by the NSG historian including official histories of Navy COMINT activities.
7. Translations of Intercepted Enemy Radio Traffic and Misc. WWII Documentation (1029 cu. ft.)
   largely the Japanese Orange translations (710 cu. ft.) and some German and Italian traffic.
8. Microfilm Collection (15,342 rolls of 16 mm. and 35 mm. microfilm)
   the bulk of this is pre-1946 material that includes raw intercepts, field station reports, and message traffic.

ARCHIVES II AND FOREIGN RELATIONS RESEARCH

by

Milton O. Gustafson
NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Thirty years ago when I journeyed to the National Archives in Washington to do research for my dissertation I stayed in the upstairs back bedroom suite of Mrs. Martha Snyder's home next to the Library of Congress for three weeks for $45! (she had a special fondness for aspiring diplomatic historians). At the National Archives I worked sometimes in the main

research room but mostly in 5E for diplomatic records and 13E for legislative records and 6E-3 for State Department records of the restricted-access period (my notes had to be reviewed by the State Department before I could use them).

Things changed over the years. Mrs. Snyder is gone and only the Harrington Hotel continues to provide low-cost rooms within walking distance. The restricted-access concept disappeared in 1971, and branch research rooms disappeared in the 1980's. More and more researchers had to shuttle to Suitland to do some of their research at the Washington National Records Center because there wasn't room for everything in the National Archives Building.

Change is continuing. Now there is a new National Archives Building at 8601 Adelphi Road in College Park, Maryland — known as Archives II — and that is where most historians of American foreign relations will be doing their research beginning in 1995.

The move of records to the new building began in November 1993 and will continue until October 1996. Each record group has a specific period when it will be closed for research and moved, a fact that might create problems for researchers who do not plan ahead. Suitland will no longer be an archives branch — the record groups that are now in Suitland will move either to Archives II at the same time as records are moving from the downtown building, or to the downtown building after space is cleared.

Some offices and some record groups have already moved to Archives II. The Richard Nixon presidential papers, John F. Kennedy assassination records, and the non-textual records (maps, still pictures, motion pictures, electronic records, and sound recordings) are already in Archives II and open for

research. Some clusters of record groups — Energy, Housing, Interior, and Transportation — have all been moved to Archives II. Most of the record groups for the Agriculture, Commerce, and Science clusters have been moved, and the rest are closed or moving. Record groups in the Executive Office of the President/Presidential Agencies, General Government, Justice/Law Enforcement, Labor, Science and Technology, Modern Army, and Treasury/Revenue/Finance clusters will all close and start to move before the end of 1994.

And record groups in the State/Foreign Relations cluster close and start to move in November 1994. For example, records in Record Group 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Exhibitions, will close on November 21, and open again in Archives II on January 11, 1995.

The main record group for State Department records is Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State. For the purposes of the move, that record group will be divided into three sections. The central file records dated through 1910 (almost all on microfilm and entries 1-197 in the inventory) will close on November 29, 1994 and open on January 12, 1995. The central file from 1910 to 1963, the Decimal File, the records that most researchers want to use, will close November 23, 1994, and open on March 15, 1995. The rest of the records in this record group, the non-central file records, the office files, and lot files, will close on January 23, 1995, and open on April 17, 1995. Exact dates, of course, are subject to change.

Some clusters of record groups will remain in the downtown Archives building: Legislative, Genealogical, Judicial Branch, American Indian, District of Columbia, Miscellaneous,

Maritime, Old Army, Old Navy, World War I, and the New Deal/Great Depression clusters.

For specific information on any record group researchers may call 202-501-5400, or they may call 202-501-5380 to ask to be placed on the mailing list for the "Archives II Researcher Bulletin." The telephone number for the Reference Branch in Archives II is 301-713-7250; the Suitland Reference Branch is 301-763-7410; and in the downtown Archives building the telephone numbers are 202-501-5385 for military agency reference and 202-501-5395 for civil agency reference. None of these lines is voice mail.

The mailing addresses are the reference office, plus 1) National Archives at College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001; or 2) Washington National Records Center, 4205 Suitland Road, Suitland, MD 20409; or 3) National Archives Building, Washington, DC 20408.

Both Archives II and the Archives Building downtown have the same hours for research: Monday and Wednesday, 8:45 a.m. to 5 p.m.; Tuesday, Thursday and Friday, 8:45 to 9; and Saturday, 8:45 to 4:45. The full-service cafeteria in Archives II, open only until 4 p.m., is much nicer than the snack bar in the National Archives basement.

The ideal way to get to Archives II is by automobile, and there is free parking in the parking garage. The Adelphi Road site is between Metzerott Road (to the north) and University Boulevard/Greenbelt Road (to the south), just inside the Beltway between the New Hampshire Avenue and Route 1 Exits.

Another option is to use Metrorail. The National Archives provides a free researcher shuttle bus Monday-Saturday

between the Prince George's Plaza station on the green line and the Archives II building, and the R3 Metrobus goes between the Greenbelt and Prince George's Plaza Metrorail stations with a stop at Archives II. Space permitting, researchers may also use the staff shuttle bus that runs on the hour from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Monday-Friday between the downtown Archives building and Archives II.

Finally, it is possible to walk to Archives II (less than one mile) from the hotel located in the University of Maryland's University College Administration Building at the corner of Adelphi Road and University Boulevard. SHAFR's summer conference in 1990 was in that building. The hotel's 108 rooms are primarily for conference attendees and for people affiliated with a college or university; call 301-985-7300 for more information.

On the German-Czech Frontier during the Munich Crisis: Excerpts from the Journal of Clarence E. Pickett

by

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Occasionally in the course of doing multi-archival research diplomatic historians come across intriguing perspectives on past events. Clarence E. Pickett's Journal was to my mind a view worth sharing with others interested in the events of the

Munich crisis. In the fall of 1938, Clarence E. Pickett, the Director of the American Friends Service Committee, in Europe to visit Quaker centers, met with foreign Friends, and investigated the possibility of rendering additional service to those already victimized by the Nazis. Pickett arrived in Germany just at the time Hitler chose to force the question of the return of the Sudetenland to the Third Reich.

In his comments on recently constructed German army barracks, Pickett's Quaker values, his love of planning, his admiration for a job well done, his respect for order and his belief in progress, surface. So does his willingness to undertake difficult assignments, like asking the Gestapo the location of particular prisoners and by helping German Jews persecuted by the Nazis.

When Pickett met with Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador, Wilson expressed his belief that the Czech crisis was a result of the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles — the work of the Carthaginian peace. Later Pickett heartily agrees with Wilson's analysis and partially with Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. To Pickett and to many others in the West appeasement means revision of the Treaty of Versailles. He emphatically states that the Czech problem should have been dealt with five years earlier.

Perhaps of greatest interest is the power of Pickett's narrative which details the events of the Munich settlement from a perceptive spiritual point-of-view. From the narrative also emerges the portrayal of two worlds on the brink of war; a very small, vulnerable Quaker world, in opposition to, but in the midst of a much larger Nazi world. His analysis of these events and his commitment to all aid possible is very realistic, as are his conclusions, but he pins his hope for the future on a general European moral awakening — a millenarian wish.

Finally as an American, Pickett is a symbol of hope in a sea of danger and uncertainty. To many Europeans encountered in the journal this fact seemingly places Pickett and the United States under special obligation. From the following excerpts readers can judge the issues for themselves.

CLARENCE E. PICKETT'S JOURNAL
September 13 to October 25

An apology is due any who may be interested in this record because the last lap has been so slow coming. I am writing on board the "Ille-de-France" bound for America, and this must be sent out after we arrive home. But events moved so fast after we re-entered Germany, and with such tragedy that we simply could not withdraw from events to write about them. We did, however, keep notes which will be always valuable.

On September 13 we left Vallekilde, Denmark, by automobile with Howard and Katherine Elkinton to drive back to Berlin. We spent the night at Kolding, Denmark, near the German border, and the next morning the papers had in bold headlines "Hitler sends Ultimatum to Benes." We had a very brief family conference as to whether war was very imminent and whether we should remain in a neutral country, but within ten minutes had decided that if war came, Americans would be in a position to be of use in Germany, whereas British and other aliens probably could not, so we had best go our regular way and only change our plans when forced to by events.

We crossed the border Wednesday morning, September 14, with almost no difficulty — no examination of luggage or papers — only passports. The drive to Berlin was over beautiful roads — almost all of the way lined with trees planted in Wilhelm's time and now a standing tribute to long-range planning for usefulness and beauty (often they are apple trees — very useful).

This part of Germany is rough land, not very good for farming until one gets near Berlin. Everywhere life went on quietly as usual except we saw large shipments of guns, tanks, etc. and passed three very large army barracks — new buildings of fine, permanent brick construction where there seemed to be intense activity.

We got to Berlin at ten o'clock at night, to find a call for Howard Elkinton from his British colleague, Roger Carter, asking to be called at once when we got in. Roger had become convinced that at least a plebiscite in Sudeten Czechoslovakia was imminent and this probably

meant hostilities so he felt, and he thought he ought to go home to confer with the London committee. We mildly cautioned hasty action, but felt his responsibility was primarily to London, so bade him a hearty farewell and hoped he might return soon.

When the train came in, it was packed with Americans and British chiefly, fleeing for fear of war. This contrast with a peaceful drive all day through Germany, closed a pretty full day.

We were in Berlin from Wednesday, September 14 to the following Monday, September 19. I will not chronicle each day but give a variety of experiences. Most of time there we went along quite normally. Only now and again did the imminent threat of impending war protrude. This was partly because of the Press. It always implied that Germany was set on peace, but was the worst possible press in that atrocity stories and attacks on Benes were almost constant first-page stuff. It could have hardly been worse.

We visited the American Ambassador, Hugh Wilson, who said he had simply had to do nothing for two weeks, because the German Foreign Office was absolutely day and night absorbed in the Czechoslovak question. He did not think there would be war, because the German claims were too nearly justified to make a good case for England and France to fight over the claims of Czechoslovakia. Though the German government was very courteous, he evidently felt greatly tried at times at the way foreign representatives are treated. We had an extremely satisfactory interview with him, and Howard Elkinton purposes to keep in close touch with him. He ended by asking if we could help him find out about the mother of an American boy now living in Brooklyn who was said to be in a Concentration Camp. This involved seeing the Secret Police, who said she was nowhere in their records, but promised to try to locate her for us and report.

We saw Mr. Geist, the American Consul General, who had certainly one long (and highly justified) tale of woe. The preceding Saturday 3000 people had applied for visas for America. He was simply deluged with people who had heartrendering tales of woe — Jews or non-aryans. They could get no work — were thrown out of their apartments — had property confiscated — lawyers had lost clients — doctors must all quit practice October first, etc. The large Consular office was swarmed with people when we were there, and that, he said, was a comparatively quiet day.

When it became known that an American Quaker was on hand, then hope of help came to people who *must* get out. Realizing the shortness of my stay and the need to do many things, I did my best to keep clear of

individual cases. But I did see eight or ten persons. One woman whose husband is now in New York, is a wealthy woman, but has her money "blocked" in the bank and cannot even draw living expenses from it. This poor woman, a cultured and refined person, non-Jew, married to a very fine, able Jewish man, was simply broken down by the experience.

Not all was completely discouraging regarding the Jew, however, Dr. G (a woman) came to talk about her school. She is 100% Jewish, and operates a private school for 600 Jewish children in Berlin, with Government knowledge and encouragement (but not finance). She is extremely able, and has got American money to establish a colony for 100 children and some parents in the United States. The educational authorities urge her *not* to leave Germany but to continue this service.

Two meetings of Friends one can never forget — Thursday night a public meeting was held for Friends and "friends of Friends." One hundred fifty persons crowded into the Center meeting room. I talked through an interpreter for nearly an hour, and one-half hour of questions followed.

How could they prevent war? How could they let Czechoslovakian people and Friends know they loved and did not suspect or hate them? If war came, do not forget them and their desire to continue their path of good will. How could they be actually helpful to Jews in need.

In the end they drafted a most touching message to Czechoslovakian Friends, which we carried in person and decided to, if possible, send one of their number to visit Czechoslovakian Friends (this finally could not be done as the Czechoslovak border closed to Germans almost at once.) I was impressed with the freedom which they showed in discussion and the bravery of their resolve to live lives of good will no matter what came.

Then Sunday meeting for Worship — about 60 strong (smaller, because some Friends were at Cassel Quarterly Meeting) can never be forgotten. Several spoke — young and older — all with profound concern for the spirit of their countrymen who sought conquest, and ardent prayer for their own guidance and purity of motive. Few American Meetings rise to higher understanding of true worship than they did. There has been almost unbelievable growth in stability and depth of this group in four years.

The Elkintons and Picketts spent Sunday evening at the home of the Hoffmans. They live in what was a Social Democratic community — newly built twelve years ago in suburban Berlin.

We took a little walk around it. As Mrs. Hoffman pointed out the various homes, she remarked, "This man committed suicide" — "This one was sent to a Concentration Camp — "This family moved to a country

cabin," etc. went the stories. In the life of this home went the tragedy and the hope of Germany.

We left Berlin on Monday evening, September 19, after consulting the American Express as to probabilities of getting into Prague. There seemed no reason to change our plans, and we wanted very much to see Czechoslovakian Friends. The first Chamberlain visit to Berchtesgaden had taken place, but there was almost no account of its results in German papers, and English papers were not to be had. The radio continued to boom out speeches, threatening Czechoslovakia, but also saying, "be quiet, no war will come."

We took a two hour extra period we found we had before train time, to go to the Berlin zoo — the best I have ever seen. Crowds of people were there, all very quiet, unexcited, and finding, no doubt, some relaxation in the very unconcern of the monkeys (the great attraction) and other animals.

We stopped over night at Breslau and stayed in a hotel near the station since we must leave for the border early next morning. All night (at least until two or three o'clock) soldiers marched by the hotel, and at six the next morning when we awoke, it was to hear and see cavalry marching by toward the border. Crowds of people were along the streets, but no enthusiasm. It was as though they said in dejection, "must we go through with a useless war again!!"

The border crossing was slow but uneventful. Nowhere was our luggage opened. Only our passports stamped! Every one was most courteous, and though border towns were highly guarded, the soldiers were most kind. We actually crossed the border in a Czechoslovak train — the only passengers, but an escort of about a dozen soldiers. As we neared the border, trainloads of Germans fleeing from Sudeten Czechoslovakia passed us. Mostly women and children, all carrying flags, and the children having evidently a great holiday. At all stations they were greeted (on the German side) by crowds who welcomed them. I presume now they are all back home and tilling the soil.

Czechoslovakia was a delightful country from 300 miles east of Prague to that city. We passed through farm country, where men, women and children were all out haying chiefly — some digging potatoes — trying to get the work done before all men were mobilized.

Prague we found dazed at what had so suddenly come upon them. Chamberlain had made his visit to Hitler, and the Czechs felt he had failed them. (Later they said "betrayed"). They fully expected war. Every family we saw (all Friends) had their three months' standard provision of groceries stored for siege. Those who could, had got hold of a cabin or

cottage outside the city, where families where to stay in possible safety from air raids. Though believing in peace, the little group of Friends had not been able to see the pacifist testimony as possible in this extremity, and so all of the men were accepting service — two had gone and the remainder expected call any time. Broadcasts hourly brought news of developments and caution to be quiet. All statements in press and over radio were temperate and fair but breathed deep concern. In this atmosphere we met with the little Quaker group — about a dozen, in a home Tuesday evening, September 20. After quite a period of silence I brought greetings sent by the International Conference at Vallekilde and of German Friends. I spoke as I had done in Berlin, of the Family of God, conception of life so prominent in early Christianity, and again an idea so greatly needed. There was a spirit of deep worship and prayer throughout. One Friend spoke of their sad disillusionment at being deserted by France and England, but said he believed in the love and concern of German Friends and English Friends even so. Almost no one was dry-eyed as the session closed.

As we closed the meeting and had a little food, the talk reverted to food supply, the latest radio comment — Chamberlain and how they could protect their children. One Friend was going to London with her two children next day, another sent a letter by us to her two children sent out two days before to Zurich.

The apartment we met in was beautifully located on a hill overlooking the lower city and, as we made our way downstairs from it, someone said, "Shall we ever be here again? This is a wonderful target."

We did not have time to meet many people in Prague, but next day we did visit the Social Welfare Department of the government and also Alice Masaryk, (daughter of the first president of Czechoslovakia) now president of the Czechoslovak Red Cross. It has been through the Social Welfare Department that our Sudeten child feeding has been conducted for two years. They were most cordial and had carefully prepared in curious English an address to me as the American secretary of the Cooperating Committee which had enabled them to feed Sudeten children. At the end, however, they lapsed into a shadow of fear — would there be any future to their work? — was an end of the Social Welfare Department, which they had built up with so great care in sight? "Well, you have cheered our sad hearts for a moment anyway by your visit, and we thank you" was the parting greeting.

Alice Masaryk partakes of the courageous and statesmanlike spirit of her father. She felt ominous but not hopeless. There was a certain gaiety

about her as she said to us as we left, "Shall we all be blown up in this strange world? Well, even so, I go on fighting for the health and pure mind of my people, let come what will?" She is a kind of Jane Addams person — and must be a tower of strength in these trying days.

We went on to Vienna Wednesday evening, September 21. As we waited for our train at the Station. Two train-loads of Germans (Social Democrats) and Czech refugees from Sudetenland came in. Old men and women, wives and children — hundreds of them, with a few articles packed on their backs; now and again a dog, a beautiful quilt, or whatever they most praised. There was no brass band to meet them. As they walked along the platform — peasants leaving their homes and for the first time being in the city, fearing they would never again see their homes — they almost all wept. It was movingly sad. I can even now hardly write about it calmly. It was so unnecessary and so brutal. They were led by guides to the great public stadium, where they were being provided at public expense with beds of a kind and food, awaiting transfer to a colony in the country or to some farm home near Prague, where farmers were willing to take them in.

The journey to Vienna was entirely uneventful. There was not the slightest trouble in crossing the border. A few German refugees from Czechoslovakia were on the train and were met at the Vienna station by a crowd of Brown Shirts, who gave them coffee and sandwiches.

In Vienna I went first to speak of the Quaker Center. Since 1920 we have been at 16 Singerstrasse — always hoping to emerge from being a relief organization, but never entirely emerging. When last I was there in 1934, we were feeding the victims of the February '34 revolution when the Nationalists conquered the Government from the Socialists. That was still continuing on a greatly reduced basis when, after long negotiations, the Schussnig Government granted permission to care for families of imprisoned Nazis. This came just before the Anschluss in March, 1938. Now when I return, I find the Center the one spot in Vienna where non-Aryan Jews can get any counsel and help in getting out of Germany. They have eight workers, each conducting at the rate of six or eight interviews every day except Saturday and Sunday. In some cases it is working out plans for immigration, in many it can only be encouragement and sympathy for those who must stay in. The drain on workers is almost unbearable. To know what *can* be done is impossible often because all countries are loathe to take in new people. The work is extremely well organized on a "case record" basis, and a large number of Jewish

volunteers add to the regular staff their efforts, so that altogether there are some thirteen or fourteen persons.

This load has continued since the Anschluss, and shows no sign of abatement. There are almost 100,000 non-Aryan people in Vienna and few of them eventually will be able to earn a living. Jewish shops of various kinds continue but have fewer and fewer customers.

Old Vienna with its love of music — its appreciation of the arts — its domination by the Catholic Church — its love of beautiful crafts — is fast going. Much of the old culture came to it through distinguished Jews now going or gone. It bears evidence of still further becoming an unimportant, provincial, commercial city, with little cultural contribution.

Four years ago, marching, uniforms, saluting, etc., was painfully evident in Berlin. Now that stage has largely gone in Berlin. But it is tremendously evident in Vienna. They are still dominated by the psychology of revolution — the New Day, etc. We heard repeated stories of most cruel treatment of Jews by hoodlums under Party guise. The official acts are bad enough — the unofficial ones are often worse.

Three nights while we were there were city wide black-outs. No visible lights of any kind were allowed. One of these nights we went to supper with one of the Friends and had to come home in complete darkness. No taxi could be found. We finally found a train but it moved very, very slowly and was terribly crowded.

All the while airplanes droned overhead to see how much could be discerned as an object of enemy airplanes in case of attack. We found later that though certain streets all night long troops and tanks were being rushed to the border of Czechoslovakia in case of war. It was no longer maneuvers. It was mobilization!

We were sorry to find one Friend who was in charge of Air Raid Precautions for the Vienna Government. He said he had spent two million marks on protection for public buildings alone. 500 million marks were to be spent in all Austria. While we talked with him in the dark, the telephone rang, and he was asked to go to the top of the building and watch an airplane that was coming — was it an enemy bomber? He turned white, left his wife and us behind and rushed to the roof. Later he returned to say it was only an inspection plane. But he firmly believed there were from 3000 to 6000 Russian planes just over the Czechoslovak border, only 25 kilometers away, and that they might come at any minute! I feel sure there was not one!

Altogether with this psychology of fear of attack, the paralysis of the Jewish population, the mobilization of troops — Vienna was an anxious place.

And yet on Sunday, 65 people came to worship at the Center, where 10 had come four years ago. Many of them were Jews, or part Jews, who have long been Christians, but who now, classed as Jews by the government, are cast off by the Catholic or Protestant churches, and find their only haven in our Meeting. As I spoke at that Meeting, I felt a strange yearning for words of truth and sincerity — words of comfort and courage — and wished more than ever that I could speak in German. But under those circumstances one's attitude perhaps speaks louder than anything else. At any rate in one sense I felt it was for such a day as this we had spent our eighteen years of labor in Vienna.

While we were here the second Chamberlain visit came off — but again no report of it in the German press. No one could, however, miss the general war preparations. So we held a solemn conclave as to Center strategy in case of war. We decided that we should go on until that stage came, then probably British workers should at once go as they would be interned as alien enemies; that American workers should continue as long as they could do anything worthwhile, since they would probably be needed more than ever.

I conferred with a prominent leader of the Protestant Church and came away feeling that this group had nothing to say whatever to the need of Austria. A leading Catholic came to say he was completely saddened by the failure of the Church in this crisis. All Catholic schools have been closed by the government. The Church bears no testimony regarding treatment of Jews. While he is deeply religious and will continue to be, no matter what happens — the Church is now of little significance, so he said.

On the other hand, one found here and there brave souls who were going straight ahead with their Jewish friendships and risking their own standing, if not their safety, in doing so. And among Jews also, frequently a rebirth of religious life much more promising than most organized religion one saw.

We left Vienna 7:30 Monday morning, September 26. As we drove away from the Center at least 150 people were lined up in a queue awaiting their number for interviews at the Center the following week. It would be 300 or 400 by 9:30 a.m. when the doors opened. We sighed but drove on, hoping we could do more by being elsewhere, but we left with heavy spirits.

At the train we were met by a woman, very prominent in pre-Anschluss days in peace work — a woman of wealth and culture whom we had already met. She pleaded that we warn all her friends not to write to her — to get all organizations which were sending her literature, to stop. She was threatened with arrest and must cut off every sign of connection with the outside world, and live a solitary life.

Along the Danube for 60 miles or more were heavily armed troops, pontoons at every bridge to throw across in case the bridge was blasted, and miles of tanks and guns, concealed only by a thin disguise of brush or canvas covers. We had carried out our itinerary almost entirely as planned in Philadelphia, but we only one day ahead of the closing of the Geneva border. But calmness and devotion to normal duty itself — in a fearful and nervous time — is perhaps a contribution.

Twice before I had gone through Innsbruck, in the very midst of the Alps, and wanted to stop, but had not. We got there at five o'clock in the evening and decided we would stop off and spend the night so as to drink in the beauty of the surroundings and to be able to see the rest of the journey by daylight.

That night came Hitler's famous speech. All over Innsbruck were loud speakers, so no one could fail to hear. Clusters of people formed around each loud speaker to listen. The bus drivers stopped their busses to hear. We moved slowly about from group to group to see what happened. Loud cheers interrupted the Fuhrer as he spoke in the Sports Platz in Berlin. Not a word, not a whisper came from the listeners in Innsbruck. And so it was all over Germany, so far as our experience went. There was great fear of war, terrible dread of it, but a willingness to endure anything rather than have it. Germany — the people — had little interest in the Czechoslovak problem and no slightest desire to fight over it.

During the day we were in Innsbruck general mobilization of all men between 19 and 42 was called for — and that was a very sobering reality to everyone.

Interviews, which I am not at liberty to write about here, convince me that had it not been for the stern resistance of the army to war now, the story in Czechoslovakia might have been different — and while one feels profoundly grateful to Chamberlain, one feels that much bluff could have been punctured by a more aggressive personality.

September 27 — We left Germany. We had thought the border might be difficult, but nothing could have been easier. No customs or even money examination was accorded us. Only the stamping of passports as routine gesture. We left both with regret and gratitude. But the pall of

war still hung over us. When we got into Switzerland, we heard about the third Chamberlain visit, but Hitler's speech colored our hope of its success.

All over Switzerland was a complete black-out, so we sat in near-darkness and had a delightful flow of soul, though all about was anxiety and fear. Basle looks out into both France and Germany — just across the Rhine — where the most heavily fortified French-German border of all is. France had ordered general mobilization the day before, and especially Basle was nervous.

Geneva, next day, was even more so. The American consul had issued letters urging all American citizens to leave.

A call had gone out for a general public meeting, at which I was to speak. I knew this and had consented but had remarked that morning that I did not see what I could say under the circumstances — political discussion was not profitable — only a meeting of members and others for worship. It was a profitable time, perhaps somewhat relieved in spirit by the announcement in the afternoon that the "big four" were to meet next day. Also the publication of President Roosevelt's letter lent a great deal of hope to the atmosphere.

During the night our [train] engine broke down and we sat for three hours. It was the very night when the settlement came, and I confess until I got out and found what was wrong, I wondered if we had been sidetracked to let troops pass. That might easily have been the alternative, for France was mobilizing at top speed.

We spent only a few hours in Paris between trains. I had promised to see Anne Morgan [Head of the American Friends of France and sister of J.P. Morgan] there about a committee on handcrafts on which we serve in New York. But she pumped us about what we saw in Germany the whole time. As we went to the boat train for London we were held up by a traffic jam. Daladier was coming back from Munich bringing Peace! Everywhere there was gaiety and relief from a long period of tension.

London had apparently been tensest of all. Hyde Park and other parks, once beautiful swards of green, were rows on rows of ditches designed to house people against air raids. For days all trains out of London had been packed with people who fled airplane bombs. All over England, families had been told how many London children they must take — 50,000 actually had already been taken away to reputed safety.

We came in just in time to see the outburst of praise of Chamberlain's peace, and to see people rather sheepishly coming back to their regular life in London. I am still nonplussed by England's panic of fears. It is

symptomatic, I believe, of her fear of failure of prestige. She does not feel as sure of herself as one has always expected England to feel.

Life was a dizzy round of conferences at Friends House, now besieged by refugees from Germany, relief problems in Spain, and the newly emerged relief area of Czechoslovakia. I only want now to venture into the realm of deductions coming out of our observations;

1. Europe is suffering from the lost generation. The war killed off the cream from which leadership should have come for this current generation. Everywhere one felt a low political morale — the next stage is likely to be revelation of large scale graft.

2. Chamberlain — a Birmingham business man — handled the Czechoslovak situation far too late, but better than if he had brought on war. He was timid and was bluffed by Hitler. There would probably *not* have been war if he had been much firmer. But the Czech problem *had* to be faced — should have been five years ago.

3. If Chamberlain had followed up his open door with insistence on consideration of the colony problem, disarmament, and freeing trade, he might even then have carried us far in the direction of peace. But he at once retreated. He ordered speeding up of rearmament — followed by a like order in France, and also in Germany. And now America trails the same fateful path.

4. Though Germany lost a generation, the loss of the war put her on her mettle, and France and England reclined in ease. Consequently, though she has ruthless leaders, she has strong, and in many ways very shrewd ones — and is capturing trade opportunities in Southeastern Europe, which will stabilize her shaky financial structure substantially.

5. While Germany has gained in strategy, her inner morale is not good. Her leaders are full of fear. New dissensions are likely to come. The most stable factor in the scene now is the *Army*, and it does not want war — wants quiet and industry.

6. In none of the major countries do the governments represent the people. Both Labor and Conservative Parties in England are far from the average man's desire for peace and industry. France almost has no government — only a shell. Germany certainly does not, as a people, want war, or conquest, or exploitation, or Jewish persecution.

A major internal reform within countries themselves is the first essential. It will come, but not very soon. People are too tired of tension — too exhausted with troubles. If such reforms can come without wide-scale violence, it will be well, but I do not look upon that as likely. Europe is

not surging with moral idealism — it is lax and sluggish. A great civilization is threatened, not primarily from attack, but from atrophy.

7. There are signs of hope. One Jewish Rabbi, one great musician and one poet in Germany are really prophetic souls. Following them eagerly are many people of lesser gifts.

In the little society of Friends in France at least six active business men let the government know in the latest mobilization that they would under no condition fight. They were religiously re-made men and must oppose all war. And they have a good many comrades. How many no one knows.

In England the Peace Pledge Union, which represents the thorough-going pacifists from all groups, is strong enough and vigorous enough to begin to carry some weight. There also seemed to be some increase in real life even in the organized church.

One must hasten to comment that these words are not written as comparing Europe unfavorably with us. What is coming now is that true and legitimate offspring of the World War. If it had not come, something would have gone wrong with truth and justice. And we must share in the consequences, though we lost far less in men and vitality than others, and our very detachment lays upon us a heavy responsibility.

8. What can be done, especially by the American Friends Service Committee? That is hard to discuss briefly. Relief is still important. We may feel penitent for our past in the vicious Versailles Treaty and War Settlement. But the Jews are the ones on whom now the burden for that war settlement falls the hardest. We can do no less than give every aid possible to help those who come to us to make a new and fruitful start. This is and will be our chief relief work for some time.

But the internal changes which come in Europe, need above all else nationals of right spirit and prophetic insight to lead in the rebirth from within. There are now in most European countries groups of Friends or "friends of Friends" who are a nucleus. They have grown decidedly in numbers and in caliber in the past four years. I believe our chief service is to use every means at our disposal to nourish these groups and individuals, who must find their own message and the form of its expression.

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE...

Tom Leonard (North Florida) sends the following regarding access to documents, FOIA, time lag and the like. -editor

December 15, 1940

RA - Mr. Daniels:
- Mrs. Bonsal:
PA/LD - Mr. Duggan:

In conversation with Dr. Samuel Flagg Bemis of Yale when he called at the office Friday December 13, I learned to my regret that the Department's action in withholding in May 1939 the notes he had taken in the Department was resulting in increasing embarrassment.

The Department on February 1, 1939, assured Dr. Bemis that his proposed history of the Latin American policy of the United States was regarded as worthwhile and as a project on which the Department would be pleased to extend fullest cooperation by giving access to its files since 1906. At that time the Departmental order on use of the files set no published limit to access. Dr. Bemis worked here several weeks taking notes on two subjects: the movement for codification of the law from 1906 to 1928, and the instructions given to the American delegation to the Inter-American Conference at Habana in 1928. The Department declined to release the notes because of the uncertainties of the developing international situation in May 1939.

We hear developing suspicion on the part of the faculties of universities that the Department had become secretive and evasive in keeping its word. The Department pursuant to a new order on use of the files, opening the files through 1918 (and in individual instances permitting, in unusual instances,

somewhat special access to limited papers), thereupon endeavored to go to the limit of liberality, within the terms of the order. The result of this was that a number of scholars have been able to do rather extensive research here and receive their notes. In turn, the result of that has been that at Yale Dr. Bemis has become subjected to some invidious criticism that something must "be wrong" with him since the Department denied him the use of his notes.

A further fact is that in the meantime Yale University has materially assisted the Department in compiling the Peace Conference records by permitting full access to the restricted papers of Colonel House deposited there. Dr. Bemis is also active in a patriotic educational effort to "build up" teaching of Latin American history and culture at Yale.

It is relevant to comment that the Department made its decision of May 1939 with reluctance and with some dissatisfaction, primarily based on the fact that we had originally extended a full welcome to Dr. Bemis to work in the files without restriction in advance as to papers dated 1928, and then in a period of less than three months, declined to allow Dr. Bemis to have the benefit of his time and work which he would have undertaken only with the full consent we had extended.

This matter has been embarrassing to those in touch with it for a year and a half.

Feeling that the criticism of the Department could possible be softened I have, over the week end, examined the notes taken by Dr. Bemis. Some, dated 1906 to 1918, inclusive, are subject to practically routine release under the order now operative. Other notes contain factual information to which no objection need be made. Probably all of them will be published by the Department in 1942 in the Department's *Foreign Relations* of 1927 and 1928. Since Dr. Bemis will probably not be able to publish his volume prior to the appearance of our official *Foreign Relations*, he will not

receive any advantage excepting that he will be able to *write* his chapters some months earlier. It is especially pertinent to remark, further, that under current editorial policy in the Department, "Instructions"to our delegates to international conferences are being published, with only such omissions as pertain to any document published by the Department; this policy is mow in force and the instructions to the Lausanne Conference are already being read by the public.

I have indicated on Dr. Bemis' notes the parts of documents, or the entire documents, which it seems advisable to have omitted, or used for background only without quotation or citation or attribution. Safeguarded by those indications, the Department will presumably run no serious risk in releasing the notes. Such action ought to do away with an unfortunate misconception of the position of the Department and of its integrity regarding the keeping of its promises.

I attach the type of letter which I think might be sent to Dr. Bemis.

RA:Notter:MLG

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Call for Papers

The Western Social Science Association calls for papers for its 37th annual meeting to be held at Oakland CA, April 26-29, 1995. Papers on practically any aspect of US diplomatic history will receive a sympathetic reception from the history section coordinator. Proposals should be sent by Dec. 2, 1994 to Benjamin D. Rhodes, Department of History,

University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Whitewater, WI 53190. Proposals should include an abstract of the presentation and a brief c.v. Moderators and discussants are also needed.

Symposium: MacArthur's Return to the Philippines

The MacArthur Memorial, in conjunction with Old Dominion University and the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, will conduct a symposium at the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, VA, October 20-22, 1994. Topics to be discussed include, among others, strategic decisions, FDR, King and MacArthur; MacArthur's Australian allies; life for Filipinos and Americans during the Japanese occupation; SWPA intelligence activities; guerrilla operations in the Philippines; the liberation of the Philippines; and the effects of MacArthur's return on Philippine and Japanese policy.

For information contact Dr. W. Preston Burton, Symposium Coordinator, MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, VA 23510; telephone (804) 441-2965 or FAX (804) 441-5389.

Call for Papers

"America's World; The World's America" is the title of the 1995 Fulbright Conference to be held at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, July 6-9, 1995. Call for proposals by March 1, 1995, on any aspect of American interaction with the rest of the world. Keynote speakers include John Lewis Gaddis and David Brion Davis. For information: Roberto Rabel, Dept. of History, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand; Fax: 064 (3) 479-8429. E-mail: Rrabel@gandqalf.otago.ac.nz.

Conference on Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the 21st Century

A conference on the changing roles of nongovernmental organizations, governments, and international organizations, with particular emphasis on the growing influence of NGOs in international affairs will be sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace on November 30-December 1, 1994 at the Omni Shoreham in Washington DC. For registration information: United States Institute of Peace, 1550 M Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: (202)429-3832. Internet managing_choas@usip.org.

News of Havana Conference

Thomas G. Paterson (Conn.) presented a paper on "U.S. Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Historiography on the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War," June 29, 1994 at the International Symposium on "1898: Naciones Emergentes y Transición Imperial," sponsored by the University of Havana and the Institute for History in Cuba.

Scholars interested in participating in the second conference with participation by American, Cuban, Philippine, Spanish, and Puerto Rican historians, should contact Paterson at Dept. of History, U. of Conn., Storrs CT 06269-2103. The conference will be held in December 1995 in Havana, Cuba. Spanish is desired but not required. Any aspect of late 19th century/early 20th century U.S. foreign relations is welcomed. The domestic or regional contexts of the period are also welcomed.

The 1994 Gilbert Chinard Prize

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Society for French Historical Studies and the Institut Français de Washington for distinguished scholarly books on the history of themes shared by France and North, Central and South America, published by Canadian or American authors. Historical studies in any area or period ar acceptable, including critical editions of significant source materials. The Gilbert Chinard Prize of $1,000 is awarded annually for a book, or manuscript in page-proof. The Institut Français de Washington funds the prize and a committee of the Society for French Historical Studies determines the winners. Deadline for the 1994 award is December 14, 1994, and three copies of each entry should be sent to: Professor Irwin M. Wall, Chair, Chinard Prize Committee, Department of History, 4110 Library South, University of California at Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521, (909) 787-5401 or 4314 (after September 1, 1994).

SHAFR Travel Grants for Minority Students

SHAFR has allocated $2,000 to fund the travel of minority graduate students to its 1995 June meeting. The maximum allowable grant is $500. Native Americans, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans who are citizens or nationals of the United States and who are enrolled full time in an accredited graduate program in history are eligible to apply. A letter of application should be accompanied by a letter of nomination from a faculty adviser. The deadline for receiving applications is March 31, 1995. For information contact Arnold H. Taylor, Department of History, Howard University, Washington DC 20059. Tel. 202 806-9330, FAX 202 806-4471

From the Nominating Committee

The SHAFR Nominating Committee (Geoff Smith: Queen's; Robert Schulzinger: Colorado; and Linda Killen: Radford) will solicit from the membership ideas about possible candidates for coming years. When you vote later this fall in the SHAFR elections, please include either your own interest in running for office, and/or ideas that you have of others who would be worthy office holders. Room for suggested names will appear on the bottom of the ballot.

The 1994 Commemorative Second Quebec Conference October 14-16, 1994

McGill University, the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library announce their sponsorship of an international conference to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Second Quebec Conference. The conference will examine the significance of the Allied meetings in Quebec from the British, American and Canadian perspectives, with a special emphasis on the Canadian contribution to the Second World War. Individuals interested in attending the conference should contact David B. Woolner, Department of History, McGill University, Stephen Leacock Building, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, P.Q. Canada H3A217, Telephone 514-398-3975, Fax 514-398-8365.

Report in next issue

This office has received recently a copy of "The Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation for the Period January 1993-June 1994." We will publish the full text in the December issue. -editor

CONFERENCE REPORT FROM EUROPE

The study of American foreign policy has, as we hoped, gone from strength to strength in the EAAS (European Association for American Studies). This year, in fact, there were three workshops devoted to that discipline. In addition to the one detailed below, there was another co-ordinated by Prof. Gunter Bischoff (Universities of Munich and New Orleans) on "The Cold War, Post-World War II American Foreign Policy, and American Historians: Between Isolationism and Internationalism" and a third co-ordinated by Dr. Daniela Rossi (Terza University of Rome) and Prof. Serge Ricard (University of Provence), "U.S. Isolationism and Internationalism in the First Half of the 20th Century."

European Association for American Studies Biennial Conference Workshop, Luxembourg, March 27, 28, 1994

Isolating America From the Vietnam War: Protest and Criticism in the United States and Europe

Organizer: Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
Deputy Organizer: Jacques Portes

The first of the two workshop sessions focussed on Europe *and* the Vietnam war. Sylvia Ellis (graduate student, University of Newcastle) examined the quandary of the Wilson government; Kim Salomon (associate professor, University of Lund) postulated a link between anti-Vietnam protest and the revitalization of the Swedish socialist movement; Jacques Portes (professor, University Charles de Gaulle at Lille) compared French and American war films, pointing to the insularity of the latter in the case of the Vietnam war. In the second session, European scholars spoke of their work *on* the Vietnam war. Bettina Hofmann (graduate student, Heidelberg

University; curator, Jewish music archives in Germany) spoke on Joan Didion's critique; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Reader, University of Edinburgh) described Old Left elements in labour's critique of the war; Fabian Hilfrich (graduate student, JFK Institute for North American Studies, Free University of Berlin) reviewed isolationism and exceptionalism as elements in the ideology of anti-war protest. Distinctions were made in the course of workshop discussion between European contributions drawing of European archives and languages, contributions offered from a distinctively European perspective, and "straight" scholarship by Europeans on this important topic in American diplomatic history. Overall, the workshop was critical of the isolationist spirit in American culture and historiography relating to the Vietnam war.

CALENDAR

1994	
November 1	Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
November 1-15	Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1	Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
November 15	Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
November 15	Deadline for M. Bernath Research Fellowship
1995	
January 1	Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
January 6-9	The 109th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Chicago. Deadline for proposals has passed.
January 15	Deadline for the 1994 Bernath article award.

February 1	Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
February 1	Deadline for the 1994 Bernath book award.
February 1	Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
February 1	Deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
February 15	Deadline for the 1995 Bernath lecture prize.
April 1	Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
March 30-April 2	The 88th meeting of the OAH will take place in Washington with headquarters at the Washington Hilton and Towers.
May 1	Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June 21-24	The 20th annual meeting of SHAFR will be held at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. Robert Love is chairing local arrangements.
August 1	Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

The OAH will meet at the Palmer House Hilton (Chicago), March 28-31, 1996. Program Co-chairs are Michael Hogan and Mary Kelly. Proposals must be submitted no later than January 15, 1995 to: 1996 Program Proposals, Organization of American Historians, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47408-4199.

In subsequent years the OAH will meet at the San Francisco Hilton, April 17-20, 1997, at Indianapolis, April 2-5, 1998, and Toronto in 1999.

The AHA will meet in Atlanta, January 5-8, 1996. The program chair is Renate Bridenthal, Graduate School - CUNY, 33 West 42nd St., New York, NY 10036-8099. The first deadline for proposals is October 28, 1994.

ABSTRACTS

Wayne S. Cole (Maryland - emeritus), "United States Isolationism in the 1990s?" *International Journal*, 48 (Winter 1992-93): 32-51.

Despite uneasiness that the United States might revert to its traditional isolationism, sufficient bases for that isolationism are no longer present. Since isolationism required only unilateralism and nonintervention in Europe, its revival would not prevent unilateral United States involvement in the Third World. Isolationism has been so completely discredited and internationalism so overwhelmingly endorsed by political leadership in both parties that a revival is unlikely. Despite the end of the cold war, military patterns make Americans unlikely to turn away from multilateral cooperation in world affairs. Most fundamental, the United States economy and its accompanying urban society very nearly mandate an active multilateral role in world affairs.

Justus D. Doenecke, "Rehearsal for Cold War: United States Anti-Interventionists and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, #3, Spring 1994, pp. 375-392. Here Doenecke notes the long-standing antipathy of most anti-interventionists towards the Soviets, culminating in their hope for isolation once war broke out over Poland in September 1939. When Germany invaded Russia in June 1941, they were more adamant than ever, predicting a rapid German victory and claiming that there was even less at stake in the conflict. For them, the Cold War proved a dilemma, for they were unable to make up their minds between policies of "liberation" or continued withdrawal.

Joseph M. Siracusa (U. of Queensland), "William Appleman Williams and the Case for An American Empire," a paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the Australian and New Zealand American Studies Assn., Melbourne, 30 June 1994. Born in Atlantic, Iowa, in 1921, educated at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and the University of Wisconsin, and a former president of the Organization of American Historians, Williams was the reluctant leader of the so-called "Wisconsin School of Diplomatic History." While at Madison, Williams laid the groundwork for a small but influential number of revisionist historians who came to maturity in the 1960s and 1970s; like their inspiration, they conceived a critique of United States external relations as a legitimate vehicle in urging, they hoped, the non-violent replacement of America's imperial or empire-minded expansionist political economy with a democratic socialism that was economically self-sufficient and politically free from international entanglements such as Viet-Nam.

The *Weltanschauung* of the great majority of Americans throughout their history, according to Williams, consisted of "having defined everything good in terms of a surplus of property [a belief which originally derived from an earlier abundance of, and relatively easy access to, Western lands], the problem ...[being] one of developing techniques for securing good things from a succession of new frontiers." From the beginning of the Republic the seemingly limitless frontier generally was regarded as the principal source of national strength, in that Americans believed "representative government, economic prosperity, and personal happiness...depend[ed] on expansion westward." This view of the world, however, contained seeds of its own weakness and ultimately its own destruction. In regarding the expansion of the frontier as a necessary function and absolute prerequisite both of democracy and capitalism, Americans

came to judge "a surplus of property as a substitute for thought about society." The pursuit of such an illusion resulted in the "Great Evasion."

PERSONALS

Sadao Asada (Doshisha) has received the Edward S. Miller History Prize for his "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927," *Naval War College Review* (Summer 1993).

Francis M. Carroll (St John's, Winnipeg) will be the John Adams Fellow at the Institute of United States Studies at the University of London. Professor Carroll is researching the 1816-1827 boundary commissions created by the Treaty of Ghent to explore and determine the Canadian-American boundary.

Robert Dallek (UCLA) has been elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Renate Strelau (Arlington, VA) is showing nine reproductions of spring 1994 drawings featuring Washington D.C.'s Francis Scott Key Bridge in a one-pperson exhibit at the Riggs Bank of Virginia, Rosslyn branch, from June 20-July 22, 1994.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Georgetown) has received a Wilson Center grant to research "America and the search for China's place in the world: The strategic, economic and cultural dimensions of Chinese-American interaction, 1953-66."

Grants from the Harry S. Truman Library Institute have been awarded to the following SHAFR members: Victoria C. Allison (SUNY), Antonio Fins (North Carolina), Hal Friedman (Michigan State), Wilson Miscamble (Notre Dame), William C. Remle Jr., (Bowling Green State), and Marshall Zeringue (Virginia).

The Lyndon B. Johnson Library has made awards to the following: Barbara A. Farnham (Columbia), Robert E. Herzstein (South Carolina), and Robert D. Johnson (Harvard).

Kennedy Library Research Grants have been awarded to Cary Fraser (Princeton Center of International Studies) and Zachery Karabell (Harvard).

BONERS

J. William Fulbright - Reagan's Secretary of State
- Secretary of State under Nixon
- General in charge of U.S. forces in Vietnam

Salvador Allende - CIA trained leader of the failed coup d'etat at the Bay of Pigs

- from Mark Stoler's recent exams

PUBLICATIONS

H. William Brands (Texas A&M), *The United States In the World: A History of American Foreign Policy*. Houghton Mifflin, 1994. Paper, ISBN vol. I, 0-395-62180-1, $23.16. vol II, 0-395-62181-X, $27.16.

Robert A. Divine (Texas) ed., *The Johnson Years, Volume III: LBJ at Home and Abroad*. Kansas, 1994. ISBN 0-7006-06556, $29.95.

Justus D. Doenecke (New College, U. of S. Florida), and John Wilz, *From Isolation to War, 1931-1941*. 2nd edition. Harlan Davidson, 1991. ISBN 0-88295-876-3, $

Richard W. Fanning (Bellevue, WA), *Peace & Disarmament: Naval Rivalry & Arms Control, 1922-1933*. University Press of Kentucky, 1995. ISBN, 0-8131-1878-6, $35.00.

Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana-emeritus), *Choosing Truman: The Democratic Convention of 1944*. University of Missouri Press, 1994. ISBN 0-8262-0948-3, $24.95

-----, *Harry S. Truman: A Life*. University of Missouri Press, 1994. ISBN 0-8262-0953-X, $29.95.

Peter Hoffer and William W. Stueck (Georgia), *Reading and Writing American History*. DC Heath, 1993. ISBN vol I, 0-669-24902-5, $12.00. ISBN vol II, 0-669-24903-3, $12.00.

Akira Iriye (Harvard), *The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945*, vol. II. Cambridge, 1993. ISBN 0-521-38206-8, $24.95.

Diane Kunz (Yale) ed., *Diplomacy in the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s*. Columbia, 1994. Paper, ISBN 0-231-08177-4, $15.50.

Walter LaFeber (Cornell), *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913*, vol. II. Cambridge, 1993. ISBN 0-521-38185-1, $24.95.

Lester D. Langley (Georgia) and Thomas D. Schoonover (Southwestern Louisiana), *The Banana Men: American Mercenaries & Entrepreneurs in Central America, 1880-1930.* University Press of Kentucky, 1994. ISBN 0-8131-1891-3, $29.95.

Robert W. Love, Jr. (Naval Academy) and John Major, eds. *The Year of D-Day: The 1944 Diary of Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay*. U. of Hull Press (England), 1994. ISBN 0-8595-8622-7, $25.00.

Robert W. Matson (Pittsburgh at Johnstown), *Neutrality and Navicerts: Britain, the United States and Economic Warfare, 1939-1940.* Garland, 1994. ISBN 0-8153-1651-8. $54.00.

Allan R. Millett (Ohio State) and Peter Maslowski (Nebraska-Lincoln), *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.* The Free Press, 1994. ISBN 0-02-921597-8. $22.95.

Wayne Morris (Lees-McRae College), *Stalin's Famine and Roosevelt's Recognition of Russia*. U. Press of Am., 1994. ISBN 0-8191-9379-8, $34.50.

Bradford Perkins (Michigan), *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*. Cambridge,1993. ISBN 0-521-38209-2 $24.95.

Melvin Small (Wayne State), *Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement*. Rutgers, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-8135-2106-8, $42.00; paper, ISBN 0-8135-2107-6. $15.00.

Theodore A. Wilson ed. (Kansas), *D-Day 1944*. University Press of Kansas, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-7006-0673-4, $45.00; paper, ISBN 0-7006-0674-2, $22.50.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

Full descriptions appear in the June and December *Newsletters*. The foreshortened descriptions below are highlighted to indicate changes and recent winners.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: **Emily Rosenberg, Department of History, Macalester College, St. Paul, MN 55105.** Books may be sent at any time during 1994, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1995.

Most recent winner: **Tim Borstelmann (Cornell), for *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War,* Oxford University Press**

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The lecture, to be delivered at the annual meetings of the Organization of American Historians, will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for research and teaching. Each lecturer will address not specifically his/her own research interests, but broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy. **Current committee chair is Charles Brower (West Point).**

Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt) will present the 1995 lecture.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.
Chairperson of the committee: Mary Ann Heiss, Kent State University, Kent OH 44242

Most Recent winner: **Frederick Logevall (Yale) for "The Swedish-American Conflict Over Vietnam," in Diplomatic History, Summer, 1993 (Vol. 17, No. 3).**

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. **Current chairperson : Peter Hahn (Ohio State).**

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of $2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies.

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships

The society announces two Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships, 2,500 USD each, to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a latter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Anders Stephanson, History Dept., Columbia University, New York NY 10027. Deadline for applications is 15 November 1994.

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project.

Most recent recipient: **Christian Ostermann**

The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history. **Current Chairperson: James Matray (New Mexico State).**

Most recent winner: **Wayne Cole (Maryland)**

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture." **Current chairperson: Thomas Knock (Southern Methodist).**

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. **Current Chairperson: Mary Guinta (National Archives).**

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1994, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is a senior book award; that is, for any book beyond the first monograph by the author. **Current chairperson: Ted Wilson (Kansas).**

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.
EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Box 5154, Cookeville, TN 38505 Tel. 615 372-3332, FAX 615 372-3898.
EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Nanci Long, Dana Mason, and Jason Reed.

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BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of many back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for $2.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is $3.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Papers and other submissions should be typed and the author's name and full address should be noted. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes. A paper submitted in WordPerfect is preferred. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* goes to the printer on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should arrive at least four weeks prior.

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