

Vol. 33 No. 4

SHAFR
Newsletter

*The Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations*

Founded in 1967

Chartered in 1972

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Institutional Subscription Rates for *Diplomatic History*, Vol 32, 2001 are \$75 for Institutions in North America and \$90 for institutions in the rest of the world. Make checks payable to Blackwell Publishers or use MasterCard, Visa, or American Express. Mail orders, payments, and address changes to SHAFR Membership coordinator, Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148 or call 1-800-835-6770. For those wishing only to receive the *Newsletter* the cost is \$15 paid to the *Newsletter's* office.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the society is held in the summer. The society also meets with the AHA in January.

PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed thorough the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly newsletter and a journal, *Diplomatic History*.

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ISSN0740-6160

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“A FOOTNOTE ON HIROSHIMA AND ATOMIC MORALITY:
CONANT, NIEBUHR, AND AN ‘EMOTIONAL’
CLERGYMAN, 1945-46”

by

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One of the most prominent, if private, debates about the morality of using the atomic bomb occurred in an exchange of letters in March 1946 between the era's most prominent educator and most prominent theologian: James B. Conant — President of Harvard University and, as an official of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and then as a member of the Interim Committee, a key figure in the decisions to build and use the atomic bomb in World War II — and Reinhold Niebuhr, then a professor at Columbia University. Conant, who as a member of the Interim Committee had endorsed the bomb's use (and was recorded in the minutes of its May 31 meeting as suggesting the criteria of using the weapon on “a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses”¹), was upset on the morning of March 6, 1946, by a report on the front page of *The New York Times* that listed Niebuhr among the signatories of a draft declaration by the Federal Council of Churches calling the use of the bomb “morally indefensible.”² An admirer of Niebuhr who had vainly tried to lure him to Cambridge, Conant had been especially disturbed to read of the theologian's position because, like many liberals who had supported intervention in World War II, he had

¹Interim Committee minutes, 31 May 1945, reprinted in Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1975), pp. 295-304.

²See “Japan Atom Bombing Condemned in Federal Church Report” and “Report of Protestant Church Leaders on Atomic Warfare,” *New York Times*, 6 March 1946; for the ultimate report, see Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, Commission on the Relation of the Church to the War in light of the Christian Faith, *Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith* (New York, 1946).

often cited Niebuhr's writings on the permissibility of using immoral means to achieve moral ends to defend U.S. participation in the conflict against Nazi Germany. In an unusually impassioned (for him) letter, Conant sharply defended the atomic bombings as being no more immoral than strategic incendiary bombings of cities (noting that "I was as deeply involved in the one method of destruction as the other, so at least" on that point he could be impartial) or many other violent actions committed by the United States in the process of winning the war. Moreover, with fears an eventual conflict with Russia increasing, Conant worried that disavowing the bomb's use on Japan implicitly meant forswearing such weapons for the future, and unilaterally disarming — "a logical and defensible position, but to my mind unrealistic." While Niebuhr robustly defended the desirability of acknowledging some "expression of guilt" regarding the bomb's use — "I thought it important from the Christian standpoint to admit the moral ambiguity of all righteous people in history, who are, despite the good they do, involved in antecedent and in marginal guilt" — Conant's protests clearly had some impact, since the theologian subsequently acted to tone down the Council's statement on the bomb.³

While some have wondered whether Conant's letter represented, as he frankly acknowledged to Niebuhr, "a highly personal reaction by one who has a guilty conscience," the exchange can also be seen as a highly symbolic conversation reflecting the efforts of leading American liberals, who had favored the war (and would likewise support the Cold War) and opposed isolationism, to grapple with the problems of ends vs. means in the atomic age, and the integration of nuclear weapons into America's moral as well as military arsenal as it headed into the postwar era of global leadership and possibly renewed conflict. The exchange has been recounted in several

³See James B. Conant to Reinhold Niebuhr, 6 March 1946, and Niebuhr to Conant, 12 March 1946, both in box 3, Conant file, Niebuhr Papers, Library of Congress; and, for Niebuhr's effort to tone down the report's criticism of the atomic bomb decision, Niebuhr to Robert L. Calhoun, 13 March 1946, box 5, Niebuhr Papers, LC.

works, including Richard Fox's biography of Niebuhr and my own work on Conant.⁴

What is presented here for the first time, however, is an antecedent exchange between Conant and a far less prominent religious figure, which sheds light not only on the intensity of his reaction to Niebuhr's statement but on his own rationale for using the atomic bomb in the first place. In a handwritten postscript to his March 6 letter to Niebuhr, Conant alluded to having received a few months earlier "a very emotional letter from a clergyman denouncing me for my part in the atomic bomb development." In response, Conant had urged him to read Niebuhr's *Children of Light and Children of Darkness*, which stoutly defended the morality of going to war to defend civilized values. Now, Conant told Niebuhr, "I can't reconcile this book with your signature on the document in question."

Though Conant had alluded only vaguely to the clergyman at issue, I had discovered the final letter in the exchange to which he referred to Niebuhr in time to include it in my book. In it, on December 13, 1945, the Rev. Bradford Young of Grace Church in Manchester, New Hampshire thanked Conant for his "patient answer to my somewhat excited letter." Rev. Young acknowledged that he "largely followed" the reasoning in Niebuhr's *Children of Darkness and Children of Light*, and that the "A-bombing was no worse in its effects than the obliteration bombing." However, clearly alluding to previous correspondence, Rev. Young reacted negatively to what he described as Conant's argument that it had been necessary to drop the bomb on Japanese cities in order to alert world public opinion to the danger of future atomic war so that measures could be taken to put the weapon under international control. Considering the human cost to the inhabitants of Hiroshima

⁴Richard Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), pp. 224-225, and James G. Hershberg, *James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 282-285.⁴

and Nagasaki, Young had written, this was a calculation that “only God” could make. “What bothered me,” he added, was to see you preparing and participating in such a Godlike decision with *apparently* no sense of presumption, no fear and trembling, no feeling of tragic involvement in a horrible deed.⁵ Unfortunately, at the time I was finishing *James B. Conant* (the early ‘90s), I had been unable to locate Young’s original “somewhat excited letter,” nor Conant’s response.

However, during a later visit to Cambridge, I returned to the Harvard Archives — where, under the University’s stringent 50-year secrecy rule, the papers for 1945–46 did not open up completely until the summer of 1996 — and found the rest of the exchange. The exchange had been prompted by a presentation Conant gave on December 3, 1945, to the Harvard Club of Manchester, New Hampshire. One member of the audience was Rev. Young, an Episcopalian minister (and Harvard graduate) active in social causes and described by one family member as a “Norman Thomas-style socialist” (though not a formal party member) and a “very serious pacifist.”⁶ During his talk, Conant showed photographs of the destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “As the pictures told their terrible story,” Young wrote Conant the next day, “I felt that all of us there were war criminals reenacting a scene strangely like that when Goering et al. were compelled to view the pictures of the barbarities of Buchenwald.” Like the Germans, Young went on, Americans had “closed their eyes to what we had done or what was done in our name,” “not daring to speak or even think of the scores of thousands of our brother humans who perished by our hand. Or we said, as cruel people have often justified their savagery, it shortened the war.” If there were no good reason why “the bomb could not have been demonstrated to the Japanese as persuasively

⁵Rev. Bradford Young to James B. Conant, 13 December 1945, box 273, “Atomic Bomb, 1945–46” folder, James B. Conant Presidential Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA.

⁶Telephone interview with Marilyn B. Young (Rev. Young’s daughter-in-law), 8 March 2001.

yet as harmlessly” as it had been to Conant in New Mexico, then “the crime you helped us all commit was of the same stupendous order of the bomb.” Perhaps Conant’s well-known calm demeanor perhaps further infuriated Young, for he added: “If you have a conscience about that crime, you concealed it wonderfully well. If you have none, it’s monstrous.” Though described by a family member as having a “rational clerical” rather than an emotional manner, a clearly outraged Young signed off “With hopes for your repentance and all the world’s.”⁷

In his response, dated December 7, Conant did indeed recommend consulting Niebuhr’s text, stressed as he did elsewhere the inextricable linkage between the acceptance of the ethics of strategic bombing of cities and the use of the atom bomb,⁸ and described his

⁷Rev. Bradford Young to James B. Conant, 4 December 1945, box 293, “X-Y-Z” correspondence folder, Conant Presidential Papers, Harvard University Archives; “rational clerical” is from Marilyn Young telephone interview, 8 March 2001.

⁸Conant on several occasions drew a connection between military utility and morality in defending the use of the atomic bomb. Interestingly, new evidence suggests he also did so in opposing the hydrogen bomb four years later, as a member of the Oppenheimer-chaired General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. Evidence had previously emerged that at the key GAC session in late October 1949, Conant opposed the bomb “on moral grounds” (according to a passage in AEC chairman David E. Lillienthal’s diaries that he omitted from the published version), although later, during the 1954 AEC Oppenheimer security hearings, he stated that he had opposed development of the weapon “as strongly as anybody on a combination of political and strategic and highly technical considerations.” (Hershberg, *James B. Conant*, chap. 24.) During a visit to the Harvard University Archives in January 2001, I located a Conant letter in which he elaborated some of the moral considerations involved in his position on the H-bomb. Responding to Caltech physicist Robert F. Bacher (who had sent him a copy of a speech he had given on the hydrogen bomb controversy), Conant stated: “As to criticisms and comments, I think my only one might be that I think the so-called moral issue is a little more tied in to the military issues than you indicate. However, this is a very difficult matter to handle. I think that I should say something like this: that if one raises the question as to whether the hydrogen bomb is as important a military asset as has sometimes been said, then one can come to another consideration. The existence of weapons is always subject to the possibility of their being put to uses that no one intended. History is full of such examples. It has been alleged that the hydrogen bomb, if can be produced, would show people how to produce a weapon which would devastate the entire world. While this is probably a vast overstatement, nevertheless, it seems to be conceded that under certain conditions it might be possible to spread vast havoc over areas which were not intended for military destruction. In short, all of us would sleep

own rationale for using the weapon as two-fold: “first, because it was a valuable supplement to the strategic bombing then in progress and which I hoped would end the war without an invasion; and second, because I felt certain that unless this bomb was demonstrated in combat there was very little chance of arousing public opinion to a point where they would take sufficiently drastic action to control it in the future.”⁹ That Conant gave equal prominence to this postwar rationale as well as to wartime military imperatives (which would become the orthodox or traditional defense for the bomb’s use) is significant, for it reflected that strong sense of fear animating him as well as many of the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project (including Oppenheimer) of a postwar nuclear arms race and eventual nuclear World War III. The simple argument that it was needed to defeat Japan and avoid an invasion was not enough, in other words, if the consequence would be to trigger a postwar nuclear arms race among the former Allies, i.e., between the US and the Soviet Union. Some atomic scientists, particularly among those at the Met Lab in Chicago, believed that dropping the bomb without warning on Japanese cities would be most likely to cause such a disastrous competition — and they propounded their views in the summer of 1945 in the Franck Report, which was submitted to the Interim Committee but never

better nights if we know either that the bomb wouldn’t work or that no one knew how to make it. That being the case, one has to balance the existence of such a weapon, which seems to be on the negative side from a moral point of view, with the gains from a military point of view, which would be on the positive side. If it be true, as you maintain, that the positive might not be very large, then it is conceivable that some negative values which almost anybody would admit would tip the balance in a decision. Mind you, I don’t say even in this letter that this is my view, for I have kept very quiet except in documents marked TOP SECRET as to what I think on the whole subject. However, I suggest that the so-called moral argument is really entwined to a larger extent than you indicate with the military and scientific arguments which you bring out so well.” Conant to Bacher, 12 April 1950, “Bac-Barb 1949-50” correspondence file, box 361, Conant Presidential Papers, Harvard University Archives.

⁹James B. Conant to Rev. Bradford Young, 7 December 1945, box 293, “X-Y-Z” correspondence folder, Conant Presidential Papers, Harvard University Archives. The only other place where, to my knowledge, Conant described his reasons for supporting the use of the bomb in similar terms was in a September 23, 1946, letter to Harvey H. Bundy. See Hershberg, *James B. Conant*, p. 293.

reached Truman's Desk. (The text has been published in various places, most conveniently as an appendix to the most recent paperback edition of Martin J. Sherwin's *A World Destroyed*.) However, Oppenheimer and other leading atomic scientists (including Fermi, Lawrence, and Arthur Compton) dissented, finding no plausible alternative to use of the bomb on Japanese cities without prior warning — and so reported as the Scientific Panel to the Interim Committee. And, as physicists interviewed in the documentary "The Day After Trinity" recall, Oppenheimer explicitly argued to scientists at Los Alamos that the bomb's use in this fashion represented the *best* chance to convince the world to accept international control after the war.

Conant, too, I believe, came to this position, although the minutes of the Interim Committee do not record him as specifically making this argument (not entirely surprisingly, since even if he did make such a case the only known discussion over whether or not to use the bomb at all came during an informal lunchtime conversation). While at least one commentator has questioned whether Conant really held this position,¹⁰ this new letter to Young provides an additional, albeit *post hoc*, piece of evidence to suggest that he genuinely did. However, it remains unclear whether in his heart of hearts Conant sincerely believed that using the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the best course to follow to head off a nuclear arms race leading to a nuclear World War II — as early as May 1944 he had privately feared that humanity's only alternatives were a "race between nations and in the next war destruction of civilization, or a scheme to remove atomic energy from the field of conflict" — or whether he was rationalizing to himself his participation in, and support for, a decision and action he now viewed as inevitable and politically impossible to oppose; or, for that matter, whether Conant really knew himself.

¹⁰Louis Menand, "The Quiet American," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XLI, No. 13 (July 14, 1994), pp. 16-21, esp. p. 17.

APPENDICES

Document 1

Grace Church
Manchester, N.H.

Dec. 4, 1945

Dr. James B. Conant
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Conant:

I listened to your address last night at the Harvard Club and watched the pictures of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with great interest. As the pictures told their terrible story, I felt that all of us there were war criminals reenacting a scene strangely like that when Goering et al. were compelled to view the pictures of the barbarities of Buchenwald. Like them we closed our eyes to what we had done or what was done in our name. But we did it by not daring to speak or even think of the scores of thousands of our brother humans who perished by our hand. Or we said, as cruel people have often justified their savagery, It shortened the war.

Have you heard any good reason why the bomb could not have been demonstrated to the Japanese as persuasively yet as harmlessly as it was demonstrated to you in New Mexico? If there was none, the crime you helped us all commit was of the same stupendous order as the bomb.

If you have a conscience about that crime, you concealed it wonderfully well. If you have none, it's monstrous.

With hopes for your repentance and all the world's
Faithfully yours, [signed] Bradford Young

[Source: James B. Conant Presidential Papers, Box 293, "X-Y-Z" correspondence folder.]

Document 2

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

Office of the President
December 7, 1945

The Reverend Bradford Young
Grace Church
Manchester, New Hampshire

Dear Mr. Young:

I am wondering if you have read the little book by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr entitled, I believe, "Children of Light and Children of Darkness"? If not, I suggest you do, as I think it bears very directly on the problem you presented in your letter to me.

As I said at the Harvard Club the other night, I feel the chances of our getting through the next decade or two without any destruction of our industrial civilization depend to what extent men of good will can think clearly about the difficult problems which are present; and surely clear thinking depends on accurate analysis of the premises of one's thinking. The applies to the past quite as much as to laying plans for the future.

I feel the premises of your argument are erroneous. The destruction caused by the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan was neither different in kind nor in extent to the damage done by high explosives and incendiaries on a vastly greater scale in both Japan and Germany. This fact does not seem to be appreciated by the American people, perhaps because a censorship on war news never gave a true picture of the devastation that was being rained on German and Japanese cities by our Air Corps. For example, Tokyo was destroyed over a vastly greater area by the two thousand plane raids carrying incendiaries than were Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The decision as to the ethics of destroying civilian structures and killing civilians in connection with the air war was made when we started our strategic bombing of Germany and Japan, not when the

two atomic bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The significance of the atomic bomb from a purely military point of view is not the destruction which was caused, which was the equivalent of the explosion of twenty thousand tons of T.N.T., but the fact that one plane--not a thousand planes--could carry this load. Unless this fact is understood clearly, we shall go all wrong in our thinking about the future.

I was in favor of using the atomic bomb as it was used (though I am sure my opinion carried no weight and was perhaps not even known to the President) for two reasons: first, because it was a valuable supplement to the strategic bombing then in progress and which I hoped would end the war without an invasion; and second, because I felt certain that unless this bomb was demonstrated in combat there was very little chance of arousing public opinion to a point where they would take sufficiently drastic action to control it in the future. Nothing has happened since August 6 to change my views.

Very sincerely yours, [signed] James B. Conant

[Source: James B. Conant Presidential Papers, Box 293, "X-Y-Z" correspondence folder.]

Document 3

Grace Church Manchester, N.H.
Dec. 13, 1945

Dr. James B. Conant
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Conant:

Thank you for your patient answer to my somewhat excited letter. I've read Dr. Niebuhr's *Children of Darkness* and the *Children of*

Light and largely follow his reasoning. I also admit that the A-bombing was no worse in its effects than the obliteration bombing.

What was different was the possibility of a demonstration of the power of the A-bomb sufficiently convincing to make unnecessary its use against human targets. Just the gesture of trying to arrange such a demonstration at a time when Japan was ready to quit anyway would in my judgment have done more for the remnants of human decency than any other act. The decision to destroy two cities as the best way to arouse public opinion to control the A-bomb in the future must be based on so many uncertainties that only God could make it.

What bothered me was to see you preparing and participating in such a Godlike decision with apparently no sense of presumption, no fear and trembling, no feeling of tragic involvement in a horrible deed.

With kind personal regards, [signed] Bradford Young

[Source: "Atomic Bomb, 1945-46" folder, Box 273, Conant Presidential Papers, Pusey Archives, Harvard University.]

Document 4

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

Office of the President
March 6, 1946

Professor Reinhold Niebuhr
3041 Broadway New York, N.Y.

Dear Professor Niebuhr:

At the risk of having this letter considered a highly personal reaction by one who has a guilty conscience I am writing you

frankly about the report which you signed and which appeared in this morning's papers. I refer to the report of the Committee of the Federal Council of Churches dealing with the atomic bomb. It seems to me that your Committee does not take into account sufficiently the relation of the use of the atomic bomb to strategic or area bombing. It is true that you have a paragraph looking in that direction but it is to my mind quite insufficient. If the American people are to be deeply penitent for the use of the atomic bomb, why should they not be equally penitent for the destruction of Tokyo in the thousand plane raid using the M69 incendiary which occurred a few months earlier? (I may say that I was as deeply involved in one method of destruction as the other, so at least on these two points I can look at the matter impartially.) If we are to be penitent for this destruction of Japanese cities by incendiaries and high explosives, we should have to carry over this point of view to the whole method of warfare used against the axis powers. To my mind your two paragraphs which attempt to do this are not adequate and still leave the atomic bomb paragraph out of proportion.

But more important that this question is the strange feeling that I have that by taking this stand the leaders of the Protestant churches are cutting themselves off from a vast body of American opinion. I think a poll of opinion of citizens with high standards of moral responsibility and upright conduct would show only a small percentage taking the point of view presented in your document. I think a very large majority would follow the line of argument which is implied in my criticism, namely, that the atomic bomb was, from the point of view of its use in the last war, part and parcel of the total operation of that war.

One more point before I close this letter. I am worried about where your line of argument takes us in regard to the future. Are we to scrap all our armament at once? That is a logical and defensible position, but to my mind unrealistic. If not, how should our military staff plan for the waging of war in the future? Are we to rule out strategic and area bombing by incendiaries or high explosives and are we to rule out the use of the atomic bomb, even in retaliation? If so, then most of the arguments some of us have been using against university military training rather fall on the

ground. If not, then is the atomic bomb sufficiently different in its effect from incendiaries and high explosives to rule that out?

Of course I don't have to tell you that I am a great believer in eliminating the atomic bomb as a potential weapon [handwritten insertion: "for a surprise attack"] through international control. But I recognize this may be very difficult. In that connection I am sending you some remarks I made on this subject last fall. My views are essentially unchanged, but most people think I am a wild optimist.

With all good wishes.

Very sincerely yours, [signed] James B. Conant

[handwritten:]

P.S. A short time ago I received a very emotional letter from a clergyman denouncing me for my part in the atomic bomb development. I advised him to read your excellent book "Children of Light and Children of Darkness". I can't reconcile this book with your signature on the document in question.

[Source: Reinhold Niebuhr Papers, Library of Congress, Correspondence, Box 3, Conant file; also (without postscript) in James B. Conant Presidential Papers, Pusey Archives, Harvard University.]

Document 5

March 12, 1946

President James B. Conant
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear President Conant:

Thank you very much for your letter. While there may be some differences between us on the atomic bomb, they are certainly not as wide as you assume from the partial report in the New York Times of our Federal Council document.

First of all, we were careful to insist that no absolute distinction could be drawn from this new level of destructiveness and the levels which a technical civilization had previously reached. We called attention to the fact that the report of the Army air forces on the strategic effects of obliteration bombing suggested that such bombing was on the whole ineffective.

In regard to the statement about the bomb itself, the emphasis of the majority of the Committee was not upon the use of the bomb but upon its use without warning. The position taken was that we would have been in a stronger moral position had we published the facts about this instrument of destruction, made a demonstration of its effects over Japan in a non-populated section, and threatened the use of the bomb if the Japanese did not surrender. This, I take it, was also the position of a considerable number of the physicists engaged on the project. While the New York Times' report, by omitting some paragraphs, did not make clear that the objection of most of us was to the surprise bombings, I find in rereading the report that even the full text does not make sufficiently clear what was the conviction of most of us - that the eventual use of the bomb for the shortening of the war would have been justified. I myself took the position that failing in achieving a Japanese surrender, the bomb would have had to be used to save the lives of thousands of American soldiers who would otherwise have perished on the beaches of Japan.

Your letter prompts me to write to the Chairman of the Committee and ask for a restatement of this paragraph before the document is published. As it now stands the shortened form of it, and even the more extensive text, subjects the majority of the Committee to justified criticisms such as you have made.

I should like to make an additional point about the expression of guilt. During the war I had a letter from a Captain of our Army

which landed in Normandy, in which he observes how the people rejoiced in their liberation and mourned over their destroyed homes, and added how much evil we must do in order to do good. This, I think, is a very succinct statement of the human situation. The pacifist always declares that we cannot do good if it involves the doing of evil, which is an impossibility. On the other hand, it seems to me there is too general a disposition to disavow guilt because on the whole we have done good - in this case defeated tyranny. I was ready to sign the report on the expression of guilt - particularly because I thought it important from the Christian standpoint to admit the moral ambiguity of all righteous people in history, who are, despite the good they do, involved in antecedent and in marginal guilt.

I greatly appreciate the report of your address on the atomic bomb in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, with which I am in complete agreement.

I am taking the liberty of sending you a blast of mine against the world government people, appearing in this week's issue *The Nation*, with which I think you will on the whole agree.

Yours cordially,

[signature]

Reinhold Niebuhr

[Source: Reinhold Niebuhr Papers, Library of Congress, Correspondence, Box 3, Conant file; also in James B. Conant Presidential Papers, Pusey Archives, Harvard University.]

Document 6

March 13, 1946

Dear Bob:

To judge from several letters I have received, it seems to me that the section of our report dealing with the irresponsible use of the bomb, is subject to misunderstanding, at least the misunderstanding of those of us who are not pacifists. We objected to the use of the bomb without warning, but could not have said that it should in no case have been used. When the report is ultimately published I should think that it might be well to make this distinction sharper. It certainly existed in the minds of the Committee, as you will remember from the discussion.

A brief note like this is inadequate to deal with the issue. I am writing only to call your attention to a problem which has come to me through the correspondence of various critics.

Sincerely yours,

Reinhold Niebuhr

Dr. Robert Calhoun

[Source: Reinhold Niebuhr Papers, Library of Congress, Correspondence, Box 5.]

Document 7

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

Office of the President
March 23, 1946

Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr
Union Theological Seminary
Broadway at 120th Street
New York 27, New York

Dear Dr. Niebuhr:

May I in this one letter make a belated acknowledgement of your two letters of March 6 and 12. I am sorry to have intruded upon you with so many communications and I thank you for your good letters in answer to both of my earlier notes. We are, of course, sorry that you can't be with us at Harvard next year for the James Lectures. I haven't heard yet whether it was possible to postpone your coming, but I certainly hope that one way or another before long you will be giving a series of lectures in the Harvard Yard.

Your letter about the Federal Council document relieves my mind considerably. I imagine we still are in disagreement, but not as completely so as I had feared.

In these days of uncertainty regarding the UNO [United Nations Organization] we must all have our fingers crossed and hold our breath, hoping that somehow or other we can get through the final perils. Somehow it seems to me the next six months may be quite crucial. If Russia should break away from the UNO or succeed in breaking it up, then we should have to reexamine a good many problems, it seems to me, but I continue to be an optimist until events prove my optimism to be sheer folly.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours, [signed] James B. Conant

[Source: Reinhold Niebuhr Papers, Library of Congress, Correspondence, Box 6; James B. Conant Presidential Papers, Pusey Archives, Harvard University.]

THE POWER TO PERSUADE: F.D.R.,
THE NEWSMAGAZINES AND GOING TO WAR 1939-1941

by
Michael G. Carew
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Professor Richard Hill in his *SHAFR NEWSLETTER* article of June 2002 has stimulated interest regarding American beliefs as seen in the American press related to the beginning of American intervention in World War II. This paper, an adaptation from my recent Ph. D. dissertation, concerns the media and its role in moving the American electorate towards a belligerent confrontation with the Axis, before Pearl Harbor. Its purpose is to amplify discussion by providing the context of the editorial content of the primary American news media of the period with an emphasis on *Time/Life Inc.*

On December 8, 1941 President Roosevelt asked the Congress for a declaration of war against Japan in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the day before. Little information was available as to the damage done by the Japanese attack, nor had there been much opportunity for public discussion or evaluation of the consequences of the attack. Yet the Congress gave virtually unanimous support for the declaration of war. The American press also was virtually unanimous in its support for war, so was the electorate as reflected in several contemporaneous public opinion polls. This political and

popular unanimity was unusual in the American experience. America's prior wars had not met with such enthusiasm; in fact strong political, press and electoral dissent had greeted similar presidential requests for war in 1846, 1861, 1898 and 1917.

Interestingly, barely thirty months prior, the political press and electoral views were strongly opposed to any American involvement in any war in Europe or Asia.¹ This change in political, press and electoral views came amidst a burgeoning world conflict of unprecedented scope and ferocity, which otherwise would seem to reinforce the anti-war views held by the political world, the press and the electorate. The transformation of American views toward engagement in a foreign war was rooted in the developing acceptance of the danger to the United States of the increasing successful military aggressions in Europe and Asia. The successful aggressors were Germany and Japan and their several allies, collectively the self proclaimed Axis.

The American political arena and the electorate perceived the threat to the United States from the rising danger of the Axis ascendancy, only gradually in the 1939-1941 period. The information that demonstrated the danger and the threat of the Axis ascendancy was brought to the electorate by the American news media, collectively the American press. The communication and presentation of the threat to the United States of Axis ascendancy occurred in a preexisting environment of the Roosevelt Administration's relations with the press. This preexisting press environment posed two major obstacles for the Roosevelt Administration. In the first instance, the publishers of a large majority of the American newspapers had become hostile to, and suspicious of the Roosevelt Administration. Secondly, the recollections of the First World War included an array of press manipulation, censorship and broad scale propaganda from both American and Allied sources directed at affecting United States electoral opinion. As a result, the Administration fully

¹Betty Gold, *Key Pitman The Tragedy of a Senate Insider*, Columbia U Press, N.Y. (1986) 241-251, 280-300.

appreciated that the presentation of the threat of Nazi German and Imperial Japanese led Axis ascendancy could not originate with the Roosevelt Administration. Such an administration-based presentation of the threat to the United States electorate would be viewed as mere "propaganda," reminiscent of the World War I deception.²

As a result of this concern, the communication and presentation of both the threat of the Axis ascendancy, and the responding Administration foreign and defense policy initiatives required an independent media channel. Through the persuasion of the Roosevelt Administration, and the sympathies of the national newsmagazines, this independent media channel, the national newsmagazines, led the communication and presentation of the threat to the United States. The communication and presentation of the threat and the responding foreign and defense policy initiatives were seen as objective and did not appear as Administration propaganda. While the bitter isolationist opposition to the Administration complained of the newsmagazines role as propagandists, their high credibility and the wide dominant audience of the four major newsmagazines, *LIFE*, *LOOK*, *NEWSWEEK* and *TIME*, assured the appreciation of the threat and the formation of a wide political consensus in support of the Administration's foreign and defense policy initiatives. In fact the newspaper media, which followed the lead of the newsmagazines, also slowly became advocates of both defense preparedness and ultimately belligerency toward the Axis.

The perception of the danger, or the threat to the United States, in the American political world, and electorate was formed in the presentation and interpretation of the wars in Europe and Asia from the beginning of 1939 through late 1941. That presentation and interpretation was made by the several components of the American news media. Generally, the newspapers were suspicious of the Administration, its relations with the press, and were

²Nicholas John Cull, *Selling War: British Propaganda Campaign Against American Neutrality in World War II*, Oxford U Press, (1995) 198-201.

overwhelmingly opposed to Roosevelt's third term candidacy in 1940. Newsreels, radio, and periodicals did not operate effectively in the realm of broad political issues. On the other hand, the newly popular newsmagazines offered the Administration a unique channel of communication to vital segments of political and electoral opinion.

On February 20, 1940 Mrs. Henry R. Luce boarded an Italian ocean liner and sailed to Naples and a Europe, which had been at war for almost six months. As a journalist she had persuaded her husband to allow her to cover and report what was then perceived as a "phony war." Her coverage of the war would be published in the several magazines of Mr. Luce's *TIME/LIFE* Inc. Familiar with Europe, Mrs. Luce planned to travel through the several warring countries, with ready access through *TIME/LIFE*'s influence to senior European politicians and resident American officials. She planned to compile her travels and reporting into a popular book, tentatively to be called *Europe in the Spring*.

Clare and Henry Luce had married four years earlier, after a tumultuous romance that had wrecked both their previous marriages. She had been the heir of the Boothe theatre family, and as Clare Boothe had won renown as a highly successful playwright and as the editor of *VOGUE* magazine. The Boothe family's theatrical notoriety, as well as the topics of Clare's plays and her own amorous reputation had lent an aroma of scandal to their romance and marriage. Their mutual interest in magazine publishing had blossomed in their marriage and led to their joint creation of the spectacularly successful *LIFE* magazine.³

Clare arrived in Rome on March 2, 1940 where she met with Count Ciano, Italy's foreign minister and son in law of Benito Mussolini. She subsequently had an audience with the Pope, and began to file her stories through the *TIME/LIFE* office in Paris. From Rome she

³Ralph G. Martin, *Henry and Clare: An Intimate Portrait of the Luces*, G. P. Putnam and Sons, (1991) 188-191.

proceeded to Paris and then to London where she met with the American Ambassador, Joseph P. Kennedy. Kennedy was in the final stages of his troubled embassy to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement government. Kennedy and his second son John Fitzgerald Kennedy had been forthcoming and helpful to the Luces during the European trips of 1938 and 1939. Their stark appraisal of the weakness of France and Britain compared to Germany's burgeoning strength emphasized to Clare the ominous dread of the coming 1940 spring military campaign.

That military campaign opened in early April with Hitler's bold stroke against the Scandinavian flank of the French and British allies. The German Wehrmacht quickly overran Denmark, and the British navy was out maneuvered and out fought by the Nazi Kriegsmarine in Norway. At this crashing end to the "phony war" Clare wired Henry in New York, pleading for him to join her in covering the war as "the curtain is going up." Henry had turned over executive management of *TIME/LIFE* Inc. to Roy Larsen, his deputy, allowing himself the freedom to more actively edit and cover the war. Now, responding to Clare's urgency, Henry promptly cast aside his schedule and sailed to Europe to join his anxious wife. In order to avoid the German U-Boats blockading Britain and France he sailed on the Italian liner *Rex*, which brought him to Naples at the end of April. The trans-Atlantic crossing gave Luce the opportunity to reformulate his view of the war and the role that his magazines could play in preparing the American electorate for what he saw as the unavoidable intervention of the United States in the spreading war. From Naples he traveled to Paris, to join Clare where they cancelled their appointments for the next day. From there they again visited with Ambassador Kennedy in London, spent a weekend with high priestess of appeasement, Lady Astor. Leaving roses, they then flew to Holland to visit with Queen Wilhelmina. Anticipating a Nazi German assault in Flanders they then moved closer to that front in Belgium arriving at the American Embassy in Brussels on Thursday night May 9.

On Friday morning they were awakened by the explosions of German bombs in front of the American embassy, as the Nazis launched their surprise offensive through neutral Belgium against the British and the French. Clare and Henry watched as the hotel opposite them was bombed into destruction, and frenzied civilians began to flee before the German rampage. Refugees streamed into Brussels as the German Luftwaffe strafed the roadways indiscriminately destroying military and civilian traffic. In response the British and French rushed their armored reserves into Belgium, and the Belgian army closed all civilian traffic into or out of that country. In the midst of this confusion and destruction came the portentous news that the Germans had also broken through the French defenses on the Belgian-French border at Sedan. To the North the Germans obliterated the city of Rotterdam in an overwhelming air bombardment that forced the Dutch to surrender to Germany after only four days of fighting.⁴ Together the Luces were witness to the destruction of civilian morale and the increasingly frenetic efforts of the Belgian government that presaged its collapse, which in turn led to the Belgian surrender sixteen days later. The meticulous and well drilled Nazi German war machine chewed through the ineffective defenses of the Belgians, British and French. The jumble of frantic fleeing civilians, advancing British and French tanks, mobilizing Belgian military units and the marauding German Luftwaffe brought home to both Clare and Henry the horrors of modern war.

Using their official passes as journalists, and all the influence at their command the Luces managed to escape through the collapsing front and fleeing refugees to return to Paris early the next week. Henry felt compelled to return to the United States in order to inform President Roosevelt of the catastrophic magnitude of the allied defeat, the urgency of American rearmament and the need to provide aid to the faltering allies. Clare felt, despite Henry's pleas for her return with him, that she would better serve the cause by

⁴Robert Edwin Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man Who Created the American Century*, Charles Scribner and Sons, 128-132.

continuing to cover the war from Paris. Luce extracted a promise from Clare that she would not remain more than two weeks and would return home to him by the end of the month.

While awaiting the Pan Am transatlantic clipper in Lisbon, Luce accepted an invitation for a national radio speech on May 26, in order to report the dire news from Europe to a national radio audience, and to warn of the catastrophic conditions resulting from the British and French defeats. A committee in favor of aiding the allies, headed by his friend the Kansas Republican newspaper publisher William Allen White, sponsored this speech and a second Luce speech scheduled for later in June. Henry, like Clare, was casting off the partisan politics of the 1940 presidential election year and seeking to provide support for the Roosevelt Administration's rearmament program. Luce also accepted the role of leadership among pro British Republicans to assure the nomination of a Republican candidate who would support massive aid to the embattled British. From this time forward the Administration's "preparedness" efforts would receive unwavering support from *TIME/LIFE* Inc.⁵

More importantly, Luce arranged for an appointment with President Roosevelt to personally report his observations and evaluation of the British and French prospects, and the implications for American defense. That meeting took place at the White House on June First as the British were in the last stages of the desperate evacuation of their defeated army from France at Dunkirk. As a major publisher, Henry Luce was familiar with the corridors of power in the Roosevelt Administration. His stated purpose in meeting with the President was to report on his observations of the events in Europe. Less directly, he wanted to proffer his support to Roosevelt for assertive Administration defense and foreign policy initiatives. While Luce was recognized as a "moderate" Republican, Roosevelt was cautious of the print media which had been overwhelmingly opposed to his New Deal Administration, and to his inchoate bid for

⁵Herzstein op. cit, 136-138.

a third term as President. Moreover, Mrs. Roosevelt in her newspaper columns and her radio programs had been highly critical of Clare's plays, and the scandal attending the Luce's marriage. Therefore in this first meeting concerning the "threat" to the United States, both Luce and Roosevelt had to treat with one and another warily yet purposefully. Luce's presentation confirmed Roosevelt's fears of the European debacle, and intrigued him in the prospect of Luce's support for his foreign and defense policies.⁶

Henry again met with the President later in June to report on his efforts to organize support for the Administration's foreign policy of aid to the now alone Britain. This support came in three areas. In the first area there was the evident support within the editorial and news presentation of the *TIME/LIFE* Inc. magazines for rearmament and aid to the faltering Britain. In a second arena Luce reported to the President his efforts to call together and organize support for the Roosevelt Administration's foreign and defense policy initiatives among prominent Republicans and publishers in what became known as the "Century Group," after their meetings at the Century Club in New York City. Finally, Luce explained to the President his determination to work as a Republican for the nomination of Wendell Willkie as the Republican presidential nominee, as Willkie, if elected would continue the Roosevelt foreign and defense policy initiatives in support of rearmament and aid to the Allies.

Clare and Henry had another meeting with President Roosevelt at the White House over dinner and a private screening of the new *March of TIME* film, *BY THE RAMPARTS WE WATCH* on Sunday July 24th. In the two months since their return from the European debacle Henry and Clare had been able to take the measure of the political requirements for a strong American military rearmament

⁶Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins An Intimate History*. (Harper Brothers, 1948), 6-168; Robert A. Divine, *The Reluctant Belligerent American Entry In World War II* (John Wiley and Sons, 1966) 86-90; Mark Lincoln Chadwin, *The Hawks of War* (1968) U of North Carolina Press, 1968), 32-78.

and interventionist foreign policies. The haunting recollections of the horrors of modern war, the chaotic collapse of the British and French defenses and the upheaval of balance of power in the world committed the Luces to preparedness and intervention. Roosevelt, perceiving the same threat to the American Republic, saw the potential of the *TIME/LIFE* Inc. organization to inform and persuade the American electorate to his Administration's foreign and defense policies. The specific issue that set this relationship that July Sunday evening was the proposal to transfer a large segment of the United States Navy to the desperate British. This unprecedented, and probably unconstitutional, transfer was accomplished six weeks later after perfervid advocacy in all the *TIME/LIFE* magazines had generated broad public support for the naval transfer.⁷

The next seventeen months would see the transformation of the American electorate from sullen opposition to any intervention in foreign wars to broad support for a determined military confrontation with the Nazi led Axis and Imperial Japan.

The Roosevelt Administration had set out in early 1939 to communicate and present its perception of the danger to the United States of a Nazi German ascendancy in Europe and Japanese assertions in East Asia. This presentation to the American electorate was pursued through the several news media channels. Yet only one of those media channels, the national newsmagazines possessed a broad national readership audience. By exploiting the presentation of its policies in the national newsmagazines, the Roosevelt Administration could reach a segment of the American electorate that was otherwise unsympathetic to the Administration's program or conduct. It thereby enlisted that electoral segment into the Administration's political coalition, and an effective political consensus was established for the development of American military capability, and the confrontation of the Nazi led Axis. Through

⁷W. A. Swanberg, *Luce and His Empire*, (Charles Scribner and Son, 1972) 172-178; Herzstein op. cit, 15, 132-148; Rare Books and Manuscript Library Columbia University - Swanberg Collection Box 18.

effective presentation of the threat to the United States and advocacy of the Administration's foreign and defense policy initiatives, the national newsmagazines, as exemplified by *Time* and *Life*, fulfilled the Administration's purpose.

THE RESIGNATION OF SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE

by
David F. Trask

In April 1980 the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, resigned his office. He found himself unable to support President Jimmy Carter's decision to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis by force. At the time I served as the chief of the Office of the Historian in the Department of State, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Hodding Carter III, for whom I had developed considerable respect. On the day of Vance's resignation, I attended a meeting that Mr. Carter called to make known the events of the day to his senior staff.

Immediately after this gathering I wrote a memorandum that summarized its substance. When I learned of Mr. Vance's recent death it occurred to me that I ought to share its contents with the SHAFR membership. The text follows with two appended documents, the Secretary's letter of resignation and the President's response.

The reference to "Bill Dyess" is to a Foreign Service officer, William Dyess, later Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and also an ambassador.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

This morning, April 28, just before Secretary Vance announced his resignation publicly, I received word to attend a meeting with Hodding Carter III at 2:00 p.m. There follows my recollection of what transpired in this gathering. Some twenty-five people were there. I take note of it because I doubt that many such meetings have taken place before in the Department of State.

Hodding's purpose was to provide a history of events, surrounding Mr. Vance's departure, and he did so in a quiet, utterly serious way. On most occasions he relieves situations with a certain banter or humor. Today he did not indulge in any, but spoke directly and clearly to the point.

Secretary Vance took a vacation around April 10, a long weekend in Florida. On April 11, the National Security Council held a meeting, and took the decision to try to release the hostages. Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher attended this meeting, and he thought that the Secretary had previously acquiesced in the decision to free the hostages in Tehran. Such was definitely not the case. Hodding did not say how Christopher had stood in the meeting.

When the Secretary learned of the decision, he opposed it, and did so on a good number of occasions as the matter passed through various stages after April 11. He had a good number of opportunities to talk to the President. His remonstrances ultimately led to a full-dress meeting of the National Security Council to review the decision, but he was the only one who opposed it. Sometime before April 21 he came to the conclusion that he would have to resign.

On April 21 he wrote to the President, resigning his office. A copy of this letter is appended. The President made a good number of efforts to get the Secretary to reconsider. Mr. Vance at one point considered the possibility of proposing that he be allowed to oppose the hostage matter publicly, but he soon realized that a Secretary of

State could not support everything but one decision of a major nature, and this solution went by the board. He might have gone public but Hodding argued that Secretary Vance would have deemed any such procedure treasonous. He was prepared to accept the necessity of resigning, but he was not prepared to torpedo the President's action. Hodding insisted that the two men remain friends, and parted as friends. Apparently, no acrimony accompanied the process. The Secretary has even volunteered to help the President in any possible way, presumably in the campaign or by undertaking special missions.

Hodding insisted that the resignation was not the culmination of accumulating grievances, although there had been prior problems. The Secretary resigned, Hodding said, because of the particular circumstances surrounding the decision to free the hostages by force. He acted on principle. He will be making a public record of all these matters in due course.

Hodding said that he thought the new secretary would be named very soon. He said flatly that it would not be Brzezinski. He thought Mr. Christopher had as good a chance as any, and he vouchsafed the view that "Chris" wanted the position. In connection with the role of the National Security Adviser, Hodding indicated how impossible the situation was — i.e., the existence of a policy person rather than an administrative type as the Adviser. He noted that Henry Kissinger had taken the same position. (obviously, although Hodding did not go further, he believes that the NSC is the villain in the piece. He said that Vance had not resigned because of being cut out of the NSC procedure but on the question of principle.)

Hodding indicated that no one was considering an early departure besides Vance. (He had made a survey of his colleagues and gotten this result.) He himself would remain for the moment, presumably through the "transition," but he did not believe that he would be here for any great length of time.

Bill Dyess asked whether certain things should not be kept quiet, but Hodding immediately said that we were free to convey the information he had covered along to our families and friends.

David F. Trask
The Historian, Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Monday, April 21

Dear Mr. President:

I have the greatest respect and admiration for you and it is with a heavy heart that I submit my resignation. It has been a privilege and a high honor to serve you and our nation. I look with pride and satisfaction at the many actions and new directions which have marked our foreign policy under your leadership. the Panama Canal Treaty, the Camp David Accords, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the strengthening of our military forces and our alliances, the negotiations of the SALT II Agreement, the Zimbabwe settlement, and the new thrust and direction given to our relations with the Third World are several of these major steps.

I know how deeply you have pondered your decision on Iran. I wish I could support you in it. But for the reasons we have discussed I cannot.

You would not be well served in the coming weeks and months by a Secretary of State who could not offer you the public backing you need on an issue and decision of such extraordinary importance — no matter how firm I remain in my support on other issues, as I do, or how loyal I am to you as our leader. Such a situation would be untenable and our relationship, which I value so highly, would constantly suffer.

I shall always be grateful to you for having had the opportunity to serve. I shall always have for you the deepest respect and affection, and you know you can count on my support for your continued leadership of our nation.

Respectfully yours,
Cy [Cyrus]

The White House
Washington

April 28, 1980

To Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,

I accept your resignation with regret, but with deep appreciation for your dedicated and effective service to me and our country.

As mentioned in your letter, we have had notable accomplishments under your leadership as Secretary of State. I share your pride in what has been achieved.

Because you could not support my decision regarding the rescue operation in Iran, you have made the correct decision to resign. I know this is a matter of principle with you, and I respect the reasons you have expressed to me.

You leave your post with the admiration and best wishes of a grateful nation. Our close friendship and partnership during challenging times have been a source of strength and reassurance to me.

I look forward to your continuing advice and counsel on matters of importance to the United States, our country, which you have served so well.

Your friend,
Jimmy Carter

[Wayne S. Knight (J. Sargeant Reynolds Community College, Richmond, Virginia) was trained as a diplomatic historian. He reports that for the past twenty-eight years he has often (!!!) taught survey courses in American History and Western Civilization. He suspects there may be other SHAFR members in the same or similar boat and that they might have a passing interest in how one cc. professor handles (or mishandles) these two 50-minute freshman level classes. Perhaps some dialogue will be generated.
- editor]

LECTURE #13 OF 42

I say "Good Morning," and write on the board my hook from our last class: "Why did the American rebels 'win' their independence from Great Britain?"

Heads down they copy my words. Then I ask: "Okay, one last time, why did I underline 'rebels'?" I explain again that many colonists were not rebels. "Back in my college days, my history professor said one-third were rebels, one-third were loyalists, and one-third were apathetic. Nowadays, however, most historians argue that 40 to 45 percent were rebels."

"So whichever percentage you choose it's clear that the rebels were a minority. Therefore you should never say 'the colonists' revolted against Britain instead you should say 'some colonists' or the 'American rebels' revolted against Britain."

I move to the broader question: "Why did the rebels 'win'? What I want is historical analysis, not Fourth of July rhetoric." After my warning I write on the board:

CLAUSEWITZ and WASHINGTON'S UNIQUE GENERALSHIP
"Let's use these two topics to try to fashion part of an answer to the question at hand: 'Why did the rebels win?'"

To push them toward thinking in Clausewitzian terms I try this tactic: "Look at our question. Notice my quotation marks around 'win.' Why did I do that?...The word 'win,' when applied to war and politics, has a more subtle meaning than when applied to sports. In most sports, if my team scores more points than your team, I win, you lose. But it's not that straightforward in war and politics."

I step to the board and print in capital letters, **WAR IS POLITICS BY VIOLENT MEANS**. As I write I tell them that “the axiom comes from the writings of Karl von Clausewitz, an early 19th century German military strategist. He taught that politics never stops. He taught that war is a violent way to achieve a political goal that could not be achieved in a non-violent way.”

(I’ve found Clausewitz difficult to teach. He goes against conventional wisdom. I suspect most people, consider war a discontinuation rather than a continuation of politics.)

Bringing things back to the American Revolution I ask pointedly: “What was the political goal of the British government? What was the political goal of the American rebels? Which political goal was more difficult to achieve?”

Simplifying, I say: “Britain had the more difficult task. The political goal of the British government was to regain control of its thirteen former colonies. However, for the British to achieve their political goal, that is, for the British to ‘win,’ they had to **CRUSH** George Washington’s army and reestablish loyal colonial governments. That would have been damned difficult,” I exclaim, “even for the mighty British Empire.”

“On the other hand, the political goal of the American rebels was to maintain their independence. To achieve that goal, they simply had to **HOLD OUT**.” I repeat: “All they had to do was **HOLD OUT**. They already had what they wanted. They had made the long journey from loyalty to the British Empire, to autonomy within Empire, to independence from the Empire.”

Then I explain: “As long as the British couldn’t crush Washington’s army, and as long as the British couldn’t prevent the Second Continental Congress from functioning as a National Government, the American rebels *were* independent. They had achieved their political goal. They had won, Therefore,” I conclude, “because their political goals were obviously so different, what constituted ‘winning’ for the American rebels was a far cry from what constituted ‘winning’ for the British government.”

Introducing my second topic, I say: “I’ve long thought that George Washington’s generalship during the War for Independence was indeed a

Unique Generalship. Why? Mainly because he lost every major battle but his American rebels won the war. Let me explain that more fully. In the first place, Washington lived a generation before Clausewitz. Moreover, Washington was first and foremost a civilian (a farmer, land speculator, and Virginia politician) and secondly a military man. So I think Washington's generalship was unique because, notwithstanding his predominantly civilian background, he intuitively understood certain concepts later advocated by Clausewitz. Washington understood the different political goals of the British and American rebels. Consequently, he knew that military stalemate equaled American victory and realized that his primary objective was to prevent the British from crushing his Continental Army."

I then offer another reason for Washington's Unique Generalship: "George Washington, in his heart of hearts, wanted to be a European-style general. He wanted to create a European-style American army and defeat the British in a conventional European-style battle. But he never accomplished that, suffering defeat time after time. Nor was Yorktown an exception. Yorktown wasn't a battle. It was a siege operation. Besides that, nearly half the troops were French and the French commander, General Rochambeau, who unlike Washington had conducted many sieges, provided the military expertise."

Now my main point: "Nevertheless, the French-American victory at Yorktown meant Washington had achieved his political goal. He was the Commanding Officer at Yorktown. His Continental Army had *not* been *crushed*. And soon thereafter the British government, calculating that its political goal was too costly to achieve, decided to grant the American rebels their Independence."

I continue: "And here's a third reason for Washington's Unique Generalship" saying something purposely provocative, something I'd wager my people hadn't heard about the Father of their Country. "As the War for Independence dragged on, some members of the Second Continental Congress worried that General Washington, who was held in high esteem by most of his officers and men, might become an 18th century Julius Caesar and use the Continental Army to overthrow the American experiment in republican government."

That's an overload. So I stop. I then take special pains to emphasize that Washington's basic orders came from the Second Continental Congress, which was, during most of the War for Independence, the Government of the United States. I say bluntly: "The Second Continental Congress outranked Washington. The Congress appointed Washington as Commanding General and could dismiss him.... Many members of the Second Continental Congress knew enough ancient Roman history to know that, some 1800 years before their own times, Julius Caesar, backed by Roman legions loyal to him, destroyed the Roman Republic and established a military dictatorship. In fact Julius Caesar is ancient history's most famous example of 'The Man on Horseback' — a term that historians, political scientists, and journalists often use. It refers to a charismatic military man, with a loyal army behind him, who, like Julius Caesar, or in the early 19th century Napoleon Bonaparte, overthrows a legitimate government and becomes a military dictator."

Returning to Washington: "When called to testify before the Second Continental Congress, Washington scoffed at fears he might become a 'Man on Horseback.' He defended his leadership of the Army, lobbied for more troops, guns, food, and better pay, and said emulating Julius Caesar never crossed his mind. In fact, to make his case, Washington also turned to ancient Roman history and compared himself to the mythical Cincinnatus."

I print CINCINNATUS on the board and say: "This misty legend comes from the earliest days of the Roman Republic, some 500 years before Christ, and depicts Cincinnatus as the exemplary citizen-farmer-soldier, a popular military leader, unquestionably devoted to the Republic. According to the legend, when the ancient Romans faced a military threat, they'd turn to their mighty warrior, Cincinnatus, who'd drop his plow, take up the sword, leave his beloved farm, and lead the Republic to victory. But, after defeating the enemy and saving the Republic, Cincinnatus would put away his sword, return to his humble farm, and take up the plow again. And that's what Washington successfully persuaded Congress he was going to do. He was, he argued, an 18th century Cincinnatus, who, after Independence had been won, would lay down the sword, ride back to his beloved Mount Vernon, and happily take up farming again. And, as we'll soon see, that's what Washington did do — that is, until another crisis arose that threatened the survival of American republicanism."

Then I sum up.

“Thus I call Washington’s generalship unique. He was a civilian, a wealthy farmer, land speculator, and Virginia politician, who temporarily became the Commanding General of the Continental Army of the new American Republic. He was, I would argue, fairly close to what he said he was: a Cincinnatus—like citizen soldier who persuaded the Second Continental Congress to trust him, who intuitively understood that wars are fought for political goals, and who, consequently, understood that to ‘win’ he had to hold out and not allow his Continental Army to be crushed.”


Next time we’ll discuss American Diplomacy in the War for Independence and finish our answer to the question: “Why did the American rebels ‘win,’” Meanwhile read about the Battle of Saratoga. Come to class prepared to explain why some historians argue that Saratoga is the most important battle in American history.”

After a long career teaching this is more or less how I’ve tried over the last few years to teach Washington’s contributions to the War for Independence in the 50-minute class in the American History survey course.

Lecture # 14 of 42

I start class with a reminder. “Remember that the Big Question under discussion is: Why did the American *rebels* ‘win’ their independence from Great Britain? Then I say: “Today we’re going to discuss the third part of our answer to that question, American Diplomacy and French Aid.”

I say: “You will recall that the American War for Independence, from 1775 to 1783, took place within the broader context of the 126 years of bitter rivalry between Britain and France for world supremacy — the so-called Second Hundred Years War.” I draw my 1775-1783 timeline, dividing it like this:



I ask: "What do covert and overt mean? Yes, covert means secret, or under the table. And overt means open, or above the table."

Therefore, "from 1775 to 1778, France secretly aided the American rebels. But, from 1778 to 1781, France openly aided them. That brings up two more questions: One, why did France aid the American rebels? Two, why did France change to overt aid in 1778?"

"Okay, let's flesh out that first question: Why did the French government, led by Louis XVI, an absolute monarch who despised republicans, send covert aid to the American rebels, many of whom, like Samuel Adams and Thomas Jefferson, were zealous republicans who despised monarchs? As we tackle that question keep in mind this trite but oftentimes helpful rule of thumb: Diplomacy, like politics, often makes for strange bedfellows.

This way of thinking can be used to explain why France helped the American rebels. The French desire for revenge against the British, who had humiliated them some 15 years beforehand in the French and Indian War, was stronger than their dislike of American republicanism. The French, therefore, supported the Americans rebels, hoping they'd win their independence and weaken the British Empire."

I tell my people: "Look at it this way. The only thing that matters in the lawless jungle-like world of international affairs is self-interest — hard-nosed, unemotional, calculated, self-interest. Accordingly, the French, following their self-interest, helped the American rebels against the British."

I ask two more rhetorical questions. "Why did France start with covert aid? Why not give the Americans overt aid when they first rebelled?" To answer: "Overt aid was like a slap in the face. The British would have immediately declared war against France, a war France wasn't ready for. Covert aid, however, was like a verbal jab. Britain might snarl at France but not declare war."

Now a brief narrative. "So from 1775 to 1778, France played it safe. Covertly, under the table, she supplied the American rebels with clothing, guns, ammunition, and cannon. In fact, some of the cannon used by Washington's artillery men had Louis XVI's monogram etched on their barrels. But, for the first three years, no French armies, and no French

fleets, helped the American rebels fight the British. And Britain did not declare war against France.”

“In other words, covert aid was France’s wait-and-see policy. Not wanting to risk being left alone fighting Britain, France was determined to avoid war until she had more evidence that the American rebels would stay the course. That’s why the American victory at the Battle of Saratoga was a turning point. And that’s why some historians consider Saratoga the most significant battle in U.S. history.”

“After Saratoga, France shifted to overt aid, signed a Treaty of Commerce, and, more importantly, a Treaty of Alliance with the United States. That meant France would open its ports to American trade, would send Admiral DeGrasse and a French fleet to American waters, and would send General Rochambeau and 7,000 professional soldiers to fight alongside George Washington’s Continental Army.”

“Where’s Saratoga?” I ask pointing to the map. I circle Saratoga and say: “It’s here, in upstate New York. Make sure you concentrate on the ‘ramifications’ of the Battle of Saratoga far more than on the little tale I’m about to tell.” Using the map to illustrate I say: “In late summer of 1777, the British general, John Burgoyne, often called ‘Gentleman Johnny’ because his mistress, and his fine chinaware as well, accompanied him on military campaigns, started out from Montreal with about 7,000 troops, heading south to Albany for a rendezvous with General William Howe, thought to be marching north from New York City.”

“But everything got all screwed up. After trudging through the mountains of northern New York, Burgoyne’s army arrived at Saratoga somewhat worse for wear. Meanwhile General Howe, who hadn’t gotten the word, was marching south toward Philadelphia not north to Albany.”

Pushing on, trying to be succinct: “At Saratoga, in October of 1777, a larger American force routed Burgoyne’s bedraggled army, confiscated its guns, ammunition, and cannon, and allowed it to retreat after ‘Gentleman Johnny’ pledged never to fight against the Americans again.”

Now, after Saratoga, I can teach American diplomacy. Today I start with the old-fashioned you’re-in-his-shoes tactic. “You’re Benjamin Franklin, the most distinguished American of the colonial era. You’re in Paris as the

American representative to the French government. And you've just received a dispatch describing the victory at Saratoga. What would you do? How would you try to exploit this turn of events?"

"Franklin went out to dinner with the British Ambassador to France — out to dinner in full public view at a popular Paris restaurant. Why in the world did he do that? What was he up to?"

"By dining so openly with the British Ambassador, Franklin was saying in effect to the French: 'Let's be realistic. After our great American victory at Saratoga, the British might offer us full autonomy within the Empire. That's a pretty good deal. And we might take it unless, of course, France offer us a better deal, specifically overt aid, a Treaty of Alliance, and a pledge to fight until Britain grants us our independence'."

Rhetorically I ask: "Was it Franklin's ploy that persuaded France to shift to overt aid and sign a Treaty of Alliance?"

My answer: "I don't know. But I do know that Saratoga prompted a major debate in the highest reaches of the French government between Louis XVI's finance minister, Turgot, and his foreign minister, Vergennes." I write TURGOT and VERGENNES on the board and say: "Here's my rendition of the arguments they used to try to get Louis XVI to accept their respective policies.

"First, Vergennes: 'Sire! We must act now. Saratoga proved that the Americans will fight. We must ignore their despicable republicanism and give them full military support, so that fighting side by side we can humble the high and mighty British'."

Then I say: "Here's how Turgot might have responded. 'Sire! I too detest the wild-eyed Americans, and I too want to humble the haughty British. But, Sire, your Royal Treasury is nearly empty. Another war with Britain might mean financial bankruptcy for your government and social unrest as well'."

"In the long term," I explain, "Turgot was right. French aid to the Americans helped bankrupt Louis XVI's government, which, in turn, helped to trigger the French Revolution — a watershed event that began in 1789 and brought on nearly twenty-five years of European wars. In the

short term, however, Vergennes was right. French overt aid, General Rochambeau's soldiers and Admiral DeGrasse's ships, particularly at the Battle of Yorktown, helped the Americans rebels win their independence, which did, temporarily at least, tarnish the power and prestige of the British Empire."

Now I try to squeeze in one more diplomatic concept. Pointing to my map of the United States circa 1783, I say: "Look at this! The United States began its existence as one of the largest countries in the world." I trace out the boundaries: "From the Florida-Georgia border north to the Great Lakes, from the Mississippi River east to the Atlantic Ocean, the British gave this enormous territory to the Americans during the postwar negotiations in Paris, a two year period that you'll notice I've labeled Diplomatic Maneuvering on our timeline."

"Did the Americans conquer this territory? No, of course not. It was a coldly calculated deal, offered by British diplomats, and quickly accepted by their equally shrewd and knowledgeable American counterparts. Here's the essence of the deal. In return for Britain giving up that vast territory, the United States blatantly violated its alliance with France and signed a separate peace treaty with Britain. The American diplomats in Paris, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and John Adams, keenly aware of America's self-interest, ignored their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance with France, and stabbed the French square in the back."

"And that's American Diplomacy of the War for Independence" [in a 50-minute class in the American History survey course].

ANNOUNCEMENTS

2004 OAH Call For Papers

The 2004 program will be organized around the theme of American Revolutions. The OAH expects the program to explore a wide variety of political, social, cultural, intellectual, economic, diplomatic, military, technological, and environmental

transformations in American history — as well as movements that sought and failed to bring about such transformations. We also expect the program to examine counterrevolutions and anti-radical backlash and to include sessions and papers that emphasize continuity, challenging the revolutionary character of particular moments, movements, or trends in American history. Finally, we welcome sessions to explore the relationship of the United States to various sorts of revolutions in the rest of the world, as well as those that examine revolutions in the interpretation of American history. Deadline for submissions is January 3, 2003.

Contact: OAH Annual Meeting, 112 North Bryan Avenue,
Bloomington, IN 47408-4199

Phone: 812-855-9853

Fax: 812-855-0696

E-mail: meetings@oah.org

Website: www.oah.org/meetings/2004

Berlin—Prague Seminar

The annual Bradley University Berlin—Prague Seminar will be held June 15-28, 2003. The seminar is intended for social and political scientists, historians, and others interested in the culture, society, economy, and politics of Central Europe. It includes formal discussions with German and Czech leaders from the realms of academia, business, and politics, as well as short trips to points of interest. All sessions are conducted in English or with a professional translator. The fee for both segments is \$1800, or either segment may be attended separately for \$700 (Prague) or \$1100 (Berlin). We can accommodate up to thirty individuals. Applications are due by February 5, 2003. For further information, please contact Professor John A. Williams, Department of History, Bradley University, Peoria, IL 61625, Tel: 309-677-3182, e-mail: johnw@bradley.edu. You will find more information and an application form at our website: www.bradley.edu/academics/las/his/Berlin.

2003 SHAFR Meeting

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) will hold its annual conference at George Washington University, Washington D.C. from June 6-8, 2003. Please submit panel proposals via e-mail or mail to: Professor David F. Schmitz, SHAFR Program Committee Chair, Department of history, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. E-mail address: schmitdf@whitman.edu.

To be fully considered proposals must arrive by Monday, December 16, 2002. Proposals should include: Session name, paper titles and abstracts, and a one-page vita for all participants. Preference will be given to proposals with full five-person panels: Chair and commentator, three panelists.

Fellowship/International Security Studies

The Mershon Center at the Ohio State University invites applications for a one-year residential postdoctoral fellowship during the 2003-2004 academic year. The center is especially interested in projects dealing with any aspect of the following broad themes: (1) military and diplomatic history, (2) political and economical decision-making as it pertains to foreign and defense policies in the United States or other countries, (3) the relationship between cultures and identity and international security, and (4) law and the institutional management of conflict, including the international management of environmental security. Mershon provides a \$32,000 stipend plus University benefits, an office, a computer, and an \$1,800 budget for travel and research expenses. Only Ph.D.s earned since June 30, 1997 are eligible. Applications will be reviewed starting January 15, 2003. For full consideration all materials should be submitted by that date. Download application from <http://www.mershon.ohio-state.edu>. The Mershon Center is an AA/EOE. Send application materials to Matthew Keith, Assistant Director, Attention: Postdoctoral Fellowship, The Mershon Center, 1501 Neil Ave., Columbus, OH 43201.

Visiting Scholar

The Mershon Center at The Ohio State University invites scholars to apply for a visiting scholar position. The center is open to visits of one to two months, a quarter or an entire academic year. The center is especially interested in projects dealing with any aspect of the following broad themes: (1) military and diplomatic history, (2) political and economic decision-making as it pertains to foreign and defense policies in the United States and other countries, (3) the relationships between culture and identity and international security, and (4) law and the institutional management of conflict, including the international management of environmental security. Compensation is negotiable and will depend on length of stay and rank. Mershon will provide an office, computer, and access to Ohio State library resources. Applications will be received starting January 15, 2003. For full consideration all materials should be submitted by that date. Download application from <http://www.mershon.ohio-state.edu>. The Mershon Center is an AA/EOE. Send application materials to Matthew Keith, Assistant Director, Attention: Visiting Scholar Fellowship, The Mershon Center, 1501 Neil Ave., Columbus, Ohio 43201.

Call For Papers

The UC Santa Barbara Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS) and the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW) announce a graduate student conference on the Cold War, to be held at the University of California, Santa Barbara, on May 2-4, 2003. The programs have held separate spring conferences for the past several years: this one will inaugurate a new, jointly sponsored conference to be held at each campus in alternating years. The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. Each paper will have a faculty discussant, and there will be a keynote address by a distinguished scholar in the field.

We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War. Proposals, including one-page abstract and a brief CV, should be e-mailed to conference coordinator John Sbardellati at sbardellati@umail.ucsb.edu by December 31, 2002. The conference chair is Professor Fred Logevall of UCSB.

We seek faculty members to serve as chairs and discussants. Those interested in serving in this capacity should contact John Sbardellati. For more information on the CCWS and GWCW, see respective websites: <http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/ccws/>

<http://ieres.org>

SHAFR Events at the AHA

The SHAFR reception/cash bar, designated for this year in honor of Allan B. Spetter for his years of service as Executive Secretary-Treasurer, will be held on Friday, January 3, 5:30-7:30 pm in Palmer House Hilton Parlor B.

The SHAFR luncheon, on Saturday, January 4 from 12:15-1:45, will feature General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) as keynote speaker. Tickets must be purchased in advance from SHAFR Business Office, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210. Cost is \$38. Make checks payable to SHAFR.

The SHAFR Council will meet on Saturday, January 4, at 7:30-9:00 am in Palmer House Hilton Parlor B.

Department of State Conference

On May 14-16, 2003, the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State will sponsor a conference on U.S. relations with Guatemala during the 1950s. The conference will coincide with the release of a special *Foreign Relations of the United States* retrospective volume on U.S. involvement in the 1954 overthrow of

younger and more established scholars to submit proposals for original papers dealing with a variety of topics relating to the relationship of the United States and Guatemala during this period, in addition to papers that link this topic with broader themes on U.S.-Latin American Relations.

Submit proposals, including title, abstract, curriculum, vitae, and contact information by January 1, 2003. Send to:

Douglas W. Trefzger, Conference Coordinator
Office of the Historian, 2401 E Street, NW, Room L-409
Washington, DC 20522

Phone: (202) 663-3529

Fax: (202) 663-1289

E-mail: TrefzgerDW@state.gov

PUBLICATIONS

Lloyd E. Ambrosius (Nebraska), *Wilsonianism, Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations*. Palgrave, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 1-4039-6008-9, \$75.00, Paper: ISBN 1-4039-6009-7, \$24.95.

Nigel J. Ashton (London School of Economics), *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence*. Palgrave, 2002. ISBN 0-333-71605-1, \$78.00.

Andrew J. Bacevich (Walpole, MA), *American Empire, The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Harvard, 2002. ISBN 0-674-00940-1, \$29.95.

Edward M. Bennett (emeritus-Washington State), *Separated by a Common Language: Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Anglo-American Relations, 1933-1939: The Roosevelt-Chamberlain Rivalry*. iUniverse, 2002. ISBN 0-595-22292-7, \$21.95.

H.W. Brands (Texas A&M), *The Reckless Decade, America in the 1890s*. Chicago, 2002. ISBN 0-226-07116-2, \$17.00.

Francis M. Carroll (St. John's-Manitoba), *Money for Ireland: Finance, Diplomacy, Politics, and the First Dáil Éireann Loans, 1919-1936*. Greenwood, 2002. ISBN 0-275-97710-2, \$64.95.

Nathan J. Citino (Colorado State), *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of US-Saudi Relations*. Indiana, 2002. ISBN 0-253-34095-0, \$39.95.

Warren I. Cohen (Maryland-Baltimore County), *The Asian American Century*. Harvard, 2002. ISBN 0-674-00765-4, \$22.95.

Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani (Virginia Commonwealth), *The First Cold War, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations*. Missouri, 2002. ISBN 0-8262-1388-x, \$42.50.

Daniel Ellsberg (Washington, D.C.). *Secrets, A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers*. Viking, 2002. ISBN 0-670-03030-9, \$29.95.

Michael P.E. Hoyt (Santa Fe, NM), *Captive of the Congo, A Consul's Return to the Heart of Darkness*. Naval Institute, 2000. ISBN 1-55750-323-0, \$34.95.

Akira Iriye (Harvard), *Global Community, The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. California, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-520-23127-9, \$29.95.

Howard Jones (Alabama), *Death of a Generation, How the Assassinations of Diem and Kennedy Prolonged the Vietnam War*. Oxford, 2002. ISBN 0-19-516098-3, \$35.00.

William R. Keylor (Boston U), *A World of Nations, The International Order since 1945*. Oxford, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-19-510601-6, \$55.00; Paper: ISBN 0-19-510602-4, \$32.95.

Klaus Larres (Queen's University-Belfast), *Churchill's Cold War, The Politics of Personal Diplomacy*. Yale, 2002. ISBN 0-300-09438-8, \$40.00.

Douglas Little (Clark), *American Orientalism, The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. North Carolina, 2002. ISBN 0-8078-2737-1, \$34.95.

Frederick W. Marks (Forest Hills, NY), *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt*. Print on demand book again available from University of Nebraska and from bookstores. ISBN 0-8032-8115-3, \$24.95.

John Allphin Moore, Jr. (California State Polytechnic) and Jerry Pubantz, *Encyclopedia of the United Nations*. Facts on File, 2002. ISBN 0-8160-4417-1, \$67.50.

Matthew J. Ouimet (Seattle, WA). *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*. North Carolina,. Cloth: ISBN 0-8078-2740-1, \$55.00, Paper: ISBN 0-8078-5411-5, \$21.95.

Ronald E. Powaski (Euclid, OH), *Return to Armageddon, the United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999*. Oxford, 2003. New in Paper. ISBN 0-19-516098-3, \$21.95.

John Prados (Takoma Park, MD), *America Confronts Terrorism, Understanding the Danger and How to Think About It*. Ivan R. Dee, 2002. ISBN 1-56663-444-x, \$28.95.

John Prados (Takoma Park, MD), *Lost Crusader, The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby*. Oxford, 2003. ISBN 0-19-512847-8, \$35.00.

David Reynolds (Christ's College, Cambridge), *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War*. Ivan R. Dee, 2002. Paper, ISBN 1-56663-389-3, \$14.95.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York City), *A Life in the 20th Century*. Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 0-618-21925-0, \$15.00.

Joseph Siracusa (Griffith U, Brisbane) and David Coleman, *Depression to Cold War: A History of America from Herbert Hoover to Ronald Reagan*. Greenwood, 2002. ISBN 0-275-97555-x, \$69.95.

Ronald H. Spector (George Washington), *At War at Sea, Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century*. Penguin, 2002. ISBN 0-14-024601-0, \$16.00.

William Stueck (Georgia), *Rethinking the Korean War, A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-691-08853-5, \$29.95.

C. Dale Walton (Hull, UK), *The Myth of the Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam*. Frank Cass, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-7146-5187-7, \$59.50, Paper: ISBN 0-7146-8191-1, \$24.50.

Marvin R. Zahniser (emeritus-Ohio State), *Then Came Disaster: France and America, 1918-1940*. Greenwood, 2002. ISBN 0-275-97716-1, \$64.95.

PERSONALS

Edward M Bennett (Washington State), whose recent publication is listed in the PUBLICATIONS section wrote, "...the *newsletter* article by Les Brune led me to explore electronic publishing and because iUniverse is affiliated with Barnes and Noble and Amazon books I chose that company and certainly have not been disappointed in the end product."

Andreas Daum (Center for European Studies, Harvard) has been appointed Professor of History at the University of Buffalo (SUNY). His book *John F. Kennedy and Berlin* will come out in 2003.

Wilton Fowler retired from the U. of Washington at the end of the spring 2002 semester.

Carol Gluck (Columbia) has been honored with the Fulbright Program 50th Anniversary Distinguished Scholar Award by Japan-United States Educational Commission, in recognition for her "scholarship of the highest order" and contributions to international understanding "in the true Fulbright Spirit."

Thomas Schoonover (Louisiana — Lafayette) was named the Sargrera Family/BORSF Professor of History for 2002—2005.

CORRECTED CALENDAR WE HOPE!!!

2003

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
- January 2-5 117th annual meeting of the AHA in Chicago.
- January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
- February 1 Deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- April 3-6 The 96th meeting of the OAH will take place at Cook Convention Center, Memphis.
- April 15 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 6-8 SHAFR's 29th annual conference will meet at George Washington U. David Schmitz is Program Chair, Peter Hill is Local Arrangements Chair.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the Sept. *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for Dec. *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

Proposals for the Boston, 2004 meeting must be postmarked no later than 15 January 2003 and sent to: 2004 Program Committee, OAH, 112 North Bryan Ave., Bloomington, IN 47408-4199

Sites for future AHA meetings are: Chicago, January 2-5, 2003; Washington, January 8-11, 2004; Seattle, Jan 6-9, 2005; Philadelphia, Jan 5-8, 2006; Atlanta, Jan 4-7, 2007; Washington, Jan 3-6, 2008; and New York City, Jan 2-5, 2009.

The 2003 SHAFR annual meeting will be held at George Washington University, June 19-21.

Sites for future OAH meetings are: Memphis, April 3-6, 2003; Boston, March 25-28, 2003; and San Francisco, March 31-April 1, 2005.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and

analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Katherine Sibley, Department of History, St. Josephs University, 5600 City Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19131-1395

Books may be sent at any time during 2002, but should not arrive later than February 1, 2003.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 2002 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 2003.

RECENT WINNERS:

1999 Eric Roorda

Kurk Dorsey

2000 Fred Logevall

Jessica Gienow-Hecht

2001 Gregory Mitrovich

Joseph Henning

2002 Mary Renda

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The winner of the 2002 competition will deliver a lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 2003. The Chairperson of the Committee is: William Walker, Department of History, Florida International University, University Park, Miami, FL 33199

RECENT WINNERS:

1997 Elizabeth Cobbs
1998 Peter Hahn
1999 Robert Buzzanco

2000 Odd Arne Westad
2001 Mary Ann Heiss
2002 Jussi Hanhimaki

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 2002. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 2003. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Walter Hixson, Department of History, University of Akron, 201 Olin Hall, Akron, OH 44325-1902. The award is given at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the OAH annual meeting.

RECENT WINNERS:

1996 David Fitzsimons
1997 Robert Vitalis
1998 Nancy Bernhard

1999 Robert Dean
Michael Latham
2000 Joseph Manzione
2001 Seth Jacobs

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications, in triplicate, must include:
 - (a) applicant's vita;
 - (b) a brief dissertation prospectus focusing on the significance of the thesis (2-4 pages will suffice);
 - (c) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value;
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately to the selection committee chair.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1,500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to: Terry Anderson, History, Texas A&M, College Station, TX 77843. The deadline for application is November 1, 2003.

RECENT WINNERS:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1998 Max Friedman | 2000 Joseph Henning |
| 1999 Elizabeth Kopelman Borgwardt | 2001 Hiroshi Kitamura |
| Deborah Kisatsky | Clea Bunch |

Georgetown Travel Grants

The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee also administers grants to be funded from the SHAFR Georgetown fund to support travel for research in the Washington area. The amounts are determined by the committee.

RECENT WINNERS:

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Brian C. Etheridge | Elisse Wright |
| Hiroshi Kitamura | |

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 2002 and 2003 will be considered in 2003. Submission deadline is November 15, 2003. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Catherine Forslund, Department of History, Rockford College, 5050 E. State Street, Rockford, IL 61108-2393

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1991 Diane Kunz and Betty Unterberger	2000 Cecilia Lynch
1996 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker	Jessica Gienow-Hecht
	2002 Linda McFarland

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Award

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Catherine Forslund, Department of History, Rockford College, 5050 E. State Street, Rockford, IL 61108-2393. Submission deadline is November 15, 2004.

RECENT WINNERS:

1997 Deborah Kisatsky	1999 Alexandra M. Friedrich
Mary Elise Savotte	2001 Mary Montgomery

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily

completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 2003, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 2003 to: Anne Foster, St. Anselm College, Box 1648, 100 St Anselm Drive, Manchester, NH 03102-1310. Holt Memorial Fellowships carry awards of \$2000, \$1500, and \$1000. Announcements of the recipients will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowships will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used. A version of the report of the first-place winner will subsequently be published in the *SHAFR Newsletter*.

RECENT WINNERS:

2000 (1st) Jason Parker
(2nd) Jeffrey Engells

2001 Mary Montgomery
2002 Eriz Manela
Daniel Michael

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 2004. Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Department of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588-0327. Phone: 403-472-2414, Fax: 402-472-8839, email: lambrosius@unl.edu

WINNERS:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| 1988 Alexander DeConde | 1998 Robert Ferrell |
| 1990 Richard W. Leopold | 2000 Robert Divine |
| 1992 Bradford Perkins | 2002 George Herring |
| 1994 Wayne Cole | |

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and that are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 2002 and 2003. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 2003. Current Chairperson: Mary Ann Heiss, History, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242-0001.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1993 Thomas Knock | 1999 Frances Early |
| 1995 Lawrence S. Wittner | 2001 Fredrik Logevall |

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Milton Gustafson, 2796 Shawn Court, Ft. Washington MD 20744-2566.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Justus Doenecke

2001 Warren Kimball

1996 John C.A. Stagg

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact: Peter Hahn, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, Columbus, OH 43210-1361.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 2002, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 2003.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Current chairperson: Roger Dingman, History, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0034.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1995 John L. Harper

1996 Norman Saul

1997 Robert Schulzinger

1998 Jeffrey Kimball

1999 Emily S. Rosenberg

2000 Mark Gallicchio

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.