

# The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations



## NEWSLETTER

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# The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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**MEETINGS:** The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the AHA in January.

**PRIZES:** The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

**PUBLICATIONS:** The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

## LBJ, CHINA, AND THE BOMB: NEW ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE

by  
Shane Maddock  
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During research for my dissertation, "The Nth Country Conundrum: The American and Soviet Quest for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970," I obtained under the mandatory review process the document dated December 14, 1964 which is printed below (The original can be found in "China" folder, Committee File, National Security File, Box 5, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas). This paper further illuminates Gordon Chang's argument in his 1990 book, *Friends and Enemies*, that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations seriously considered preemptive military action against Chinese nuclear facilities. The U.S. government found a military option so enticing that it did not abandon these plans even after China's first nuclear test in October 1964. As well, despite McGeorge Bundy's claims to the contrary in his 1988 book, *Danger and Survival*, these plans did go beyond mere thoughts and entered the realm of specifics. This U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency paper, which was generated for and reviewed by Roswell Gilpatric's Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, demonstrates that the U.S. government made several studies of the means to destroy China's nuclear capability, including unilateral U.S. action, cooperation with the Soviet Union, and an attack by a third party under U.S. sponsorship. The specific proxy power, or powers, suggested in the report remains unclear because government censors struck these details out of the declassified version of the report. But apparently the country, or countries, had such strong ties to the United States that

American involvement would have surely been transparent. Beyond its implications for U.S.-Chinese relations and American nonproliferation policy, this document also reveals yet another instance during the Cold War when the existence and possible use of nuclear weapons could have provoked a major world conflict.

[The following document was stamped TOP SECRET and SANITIZED, with accompanying names and codes.]

This document consists of 7 pages.

Number 3 of 22 copies, Series A

### DESTRUCTION OF CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

The bases for direct action against Chinese Communist nuclear facilities were explored in April 1964 in a paper by Robert Johnson of the Department of State Policy Planning Council,<sup>1</sup> which paper it was apparently decided should form the basis for any subsequent consideration of the subject.<sup>2</sup>

The paper considers four methods of destruction and draws the following conclusions regarding them:

1. Overt non-nuclear air attack (presumably U.S.). "Relatively heavy" (not further qualified) non-nuclear air attack would be required to destroy fissionable material production facilities to the degree that essentially complete rebuilding would be required. A question is raised as to how effective a job could be done with various alternative levels of attack.

2. [Sentence deleted] The paper also makes the point that any attempt to more than formally disassociate the U.S. from involvement would be transparent.

<sup>1</sup>"The bases for Direct Action Against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities" by Robert Johnson, dtd 14 April 1964.

<sup>2</sup>The paper purports to represent the broad consensus of the views of representatives of State, CIA, DOD and ACDA.

3. Covert ground attack with agents in China. This is judged not feasible because of lack of assets.

4. Air drop of [word(s) deleted] sabotage teams. It is concluded that a 100-man team could possibly overwhelm security forces at a Chinese nuclear facility and damage the facility, though it is noted that really thorough destruction would be difficult. The possibility is reported to have been receiving serious analysis at the time of the Johnson report.

Destruction using nuclear weapons delivered by missile, air, or sabotage team is not discussed. The following other observations are made in the report:

1. There is considerable uncertainty regarding the location of critical facilities. [Soviet cooperation might help in this — my observation, GWR.]

2. Soviet cooperation or acquiescence would be improbable, the degree of improbability depending on the circumstances of the attack; i.e., whether or not ostensibly in response to aggressiveness in Southeast Asia, etc.

3. Insofar as destruction of fissionable material facilities is concerned, the effects are not likely to last more than four or five years. For a longer term effect it would be necessary to destroy research facilities and personnel.

4. There would be substantial political costs associated with an overt, or discovered clandestine, destruction effort.

a. The political difficulties would be particularly great in the absence of clear provocation such as Chinese brandishing of nuclear weapons or intervention in Southeast Asia.

b. Something of a case for destruction could be made on non-proliferation grounds.

c. Our efforts to de-emphasize the significance of a Chinese nuclear capability would increase the difficulties in trying to make destruction politically acceptable.

d. Destruction would be more acceptable, particularly the non-proliferation case would be stronger, if there were being implemented at the same time other measures affecting nuclear capabilities, such as an agreed cut-off in fissionable materials production.

The major conclusion of the paper is to the following effect:

“It is evident...that the significance of a [Chicom nuclear] capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs of high military risks.”

This conclusion appears to be based on the observations summarized above regarding technical feasibility, impermanence of effect, and political difficulty, and, very importantly, on arguments to the effect that the near and medium term consequences in Asia of a Chinese nuclear capability will be small, and that direct threat to the U.S. will be very small.

With respect to this last argument the paper makes a major point of the *relative* difference that exists, and is likely to exist for a long time, in U.S. and Chinese industrial and military, and particularly nuclear strength. It is argued that for China to have either an effective preemptive capability or a credible retaliatory capability against all possible hostile powers would require her to become a major industrial power; and it is argued that even that would not entirely suffice since Class A power status is a relative matter and the U.S. will continue to have much greater relative strength.

It would seem that this line of argument misses a major feature of the nuclear age: that a *relatively* small investment in offensive capability can make possible destruction of very great resources, and that it is all but inevitable that the time will come when *relatively* weak powers will be able to inflict very great and totally unacceptable damage on much stronger ones if they acquire nuclear capabilities modest by our and Soviet standards.<sup>3</sup> The paper does not seem to consider adequately that in some respects we will be far more vulnerable than China for a long time; at least we are likely to be more concerned about, say, the loss of our two or three largest cities than would be China with respect to her's. Finally, as regards the China-U.S. confrontation, the paper appears not to weigh very heavily the question of the effect that a limited Chinese nuclear capability might have in inhibiting us from using nuclear weapons in tactical operations in Asia.<sup>4</sup>

While the Johnson paper recognizes that a case for action against the Chinese nuclear capabilities could be made in part on non-proliferation grounds, in evaluation of the desirability of direct action it appears to give no weight whatever to the contribution destruction of such capabilities

<sup>3</sup>In the case of China that time is likely to be more than ten years off (which is unfortunately as far as most of the estimates look).

<sup>4</sup>Supporting papers argue, and somewhat convincingly that this factor should be heavily discounted, in part because for political reasons we probably have less freedom of action now to use such weapons than is perhaps commonly believed.

might make in inhibiting other countries from going ahead with nuclear programs.

On balance the Johnson paper seems to underestimate the medium, and particularly the long term (> 10 years), effects that attainment of nuclear capabilities by China might have on the U.S.-Chinese confrontation; and to give inadequate weight to the near term anti-proliferation effects of destroying Chinese nuclear capabilities. In the light of reactions to the Chinese nuclear test (which of course occurred after the paper and supporting documents<sup>5</sup> were written) it would appear that the political effects of the attainment of Chinese nuclear capabilities may also have been underestimated.

If it is judged that the Johnson paper may be deficient in these respects, further consideration of direct action against Chinese nuclear facilities, or at least consideration of exploration of that possibility with the Soviet Union, may be warranted.

ACDA/D:GWRathjens:ssk

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<sup>5</sup>NIE 4-63, "Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems," dtd 28 June 1963, and "A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability, Draft Staff Study," by R.H. Johnson, Dept of State Policy Planning Council, dtd 17 June 1963.

## POWER AND PEACE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

by  
Frederick W. Marks III

Curious as it may seem, two of the most suggestively consistent patterns in American diplomatic history have yet to be chronicled. The first of these consists in a practically one-to-one correspondence between periods of military preparedness on the one hand, and periods of peace and diplomatic achievement on the other. Conversely, America's wars have nearly always coincided with periods of military retrenchment or relative weakness marked by opposition on the part of the executive to defense spending. As a corollary, whenever military men have occupied the White House — whether generals, majors, or colonels — we have had peace; whereas intellectuals, or those who relied most conspicuously on intellectuals for advice and counsel, are generally the ones who have taken us to war.

Such was the case from the very outset. George Washington, after increasing the size of the army sevenfold and inaugurating an ambitious program of capital ship construction, brought peace to the American frontier, opened Spanish-occupied New Orleans to the American export trade, obtained the release of pirate-held hostages, and made the Mediterranean safe for American shipping.<sup>1</sup> Following the

<sup>1</sup>Washington's position was clear: "There is a rank due to the United States among nations," he wrote, "which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all

War of 1812 and the burning of the nation's capital, the principle of a standing army was accepted for the first time and American strength was maintained well above the prewar level.<sup>2</sup> James Monroe's naval expenditures during the years 1817-19 averaged almost twice the figure for 1810-12, and this too proved to be a time of unparalleled diplomatic success, nothing less than America's golden age of diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> Eighty years later, Theodore Roosevelt raised

times ready for war" (quoted by Edward McNall Burns, *The American Idea of Mission*, 248). See also Frederick W. Marks III, *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution* (1973), 207-19.

<sup>2</sup>In 1815, the navy established its first overseas squadron (in the Mediterranean). President Monroe, capitalizing on the spirit of preparedness, saw to it that the militia was reorganized, West Point expanded under the able leadership of Sylvanus Thayer, Atlantic seaboard fortifications built, and the navy bolstered. In 1816, Congress authorized the building of nine battleships with 74 canon, along with 12 frigates. It was the first time Congress had ever committed itself to the construction of a fleet of capital ships comparable to those of the European powers. Monroe's naval expenditures during the period 1817-19 averaged \$3.7 million annually. See Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (1946), 87-91, 94, 97; R. Ernest Dupuy, *The Compact History of the United States Army* (1961), 73; Canadian Historical Association Booklet #1, file 1415-40, RG 25, Department of External Affairs, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

<sup>3</sup>Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, framer of the Monroe Doctrine, is on record as having said that "an efficient commerce and a growing navy, these are the pillars of my peace." Few words could have been more telling. Monroe's achievements included the establishment of America's first claim to Pacific Ocean frontage, the acquisition of the Floridas (present-day Florida, along with the southern portion of adjacent Gulf states), the fabulous Mesabi iron ore ranges of northern Michigan and Minnesota, and some long-coveted fishing privileges off the coast of Newfoundland. The Great Lakes were demilitarized, and Great Britain, hitherto public enemy number one, extended a surprisingly cordial hand.

the standing of the United States Navy from a rank of #5 in the world to #2, second only to that of the Royal Navy; and like Washington and Monroe, TR compiled an enviable peace record laced with useful mediation and crowned with the Nobel Peace Prize.

Vaulting from the early 1900s to mid-century, we find President Eisenhower spending three times as much as his predecessors on peacetime defense after winding down hostilities in Korea. By the same token, Ike played a key role in pacifying French Indochina, albeit temporarily, and by 1954, the world was at peace for the first time in a generation with journalists marveling at a totally unexpected thaw in the Cold War.<sup>4</sup> Ronald Reagan, third among the presidents to engage in rapid escalation of peacetime defense spending, was instrumental in ending a war between Iran and Iraq while signing the first agreement in history to reduce nuclear stockpiles.<sup>5</sup> As Moscow prepared to evacuate its troops from

See John D. Hicks and George E. Mowry, *A Short History of American Democracy* (1956), 182; Marie B. Hecht, *John Quincy Adams* (1972), 272 (for JQA quote); Samuel Eliot Morison, "Old Bruin" Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1967), 85.

<sup>4</sup>For thaw reportage, see Krock memorandum, April 7, 1960, box 1, book 2, Arthur Krock Papers, Princeton University. Liberal reform swept Eastern Europe, bibles poured into Russia, extensive programs of Soviet-American cultural exchange were set in train, and Nikita Khrushchev sat with his opposite number around the fireplace at Camp David.

<sup>5</sup>Reagan's rapid escalation is reminiscent of similar action under Washington and the first Roosevelt (as opposed to Monroe and Eisenhower, who inherited a level of defense spending keyed to war and maintained it at levels that were highly unusual for peacetime). Congress, under strong executive prodding and often by razor-thin margins, voted funds for Reagan's MX missile, the B-1 bomber, the Strategic Defense

Afghanistan and surrogate forces operating in Angola and Cambodia made similar plans, Kremlin spokesmen announced unilateral cuts in the size of their army, along with a pullback of twenty-five percent of their tank forces from Eastern Europe. Dissidents were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in record numbers; religious leaders began coming into their own after sixty years underground; and Soviet jamming of the Voice of America ceased, almost as if by magic.<sup>6</sup>

To sum up, I count five great ages of peace coupled with diplomatic breakthroughs beginning with Washington and ending with Reagan, and all five were accompanied by an unusually high degree of preparedness.

On the reverse side of the coin, we see Thomas Jefferson reducing an army of 4,000 to 3,000 and scrapping, selling, or dry-docking five out of seven capital ships before sustaining

Initiative, and a 600-ship navy. Along the way, it agreed to the extension of U.S. military power overseas through the sale of forty F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan and the transfer of some highly sophisticated AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In the face of Moscow's biggest peace offensive since the Berlin crises of the early 1960s, he installed Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe. This triggered a Soviet walkout from Geneva, but the long-range results were good. Because Reagan requested a \$10 billion increase in defense spending, as compared with a House target of only \$4 billion, a compromise was struck along the lines of what happened at the time of TR.

<sup>6</sup>It is interesting to note that the first Roosevelt achieved a similar détente when, on the aftermath of the World Cruise of the Great White Fleet, a bellicose Tokyo slashed its defense budget and carried out its side of the celebrated Gentlemen's Agreement (Frederick W. Marks, III, *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt*, 1979, 57-58, 179-80). Anglo-American tension was also greatly eased as a result of understandings reached on Alaska and the Caribbean.

a series of insults to the flag.<sup>7</sup> American citizens were held to ransom by the Barbary pirates and Jefferson found himself embroiled in an ugly four-year war which he simply could not win. Four hundred Americans died in combat before he realized he would have to pay annual tribute to guarantee the security of overseas shipping plus additional sums to ransom hundreds of captives.<sup>8</sup> Passing over the War of 1812, which caught the nation woefully unprepared, we need to focus on James K. Polk, who stated in his first annual message that a standing army was “contrary to the genius of our free institutions.”<sup>9</sup> In December 1845, with diplomatic crises brewing on two fronts, Polk sent naval estimates to Congress roughly two thirds the size of those submitted by President Tyler the previous year, and Congress was blandly assured that there would be no need for additional men under arms until the country was actually attacked.<sup>10</sup> Needless to say, war broke out later that year, and naval supplies were in such

<sup>7</sup>Jefferson halted construction on John Adams’ 6 ships of the line, opting instead for “defensive” gunboats, twenty-five of which were voted in 1805, fifty more in 1806, and 188 in 1807. He also reduced the number of captains on the active list from 28 to 9 and reduced naval pay: “We are running navigation mad,” he fumed, and “commerce and navy mad, which is worst of all” (quoted in Fletcher Pratt, *A Compact History of the United States Navy* (1962), 64). See also Sprout and Sprout, *American Naval Power on Jefferson*.

<sup>8</sup>Jefferson’s son-in-law summed up the philosophy that informed American foreign policy in the years before 1812: “If there is any principle which ought to be hooted at in a republican government,” it is the principle “that to preserve peace we ought to be prepared for war” (quoted in Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Civilian and the Military*, 1972, 48).

<sup>9</sup>Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians* (1968), 150.

<sup>10</sup>Sprout and Sprout, *American Naval Power*, 129; Ekirch, *Civilian*, 82.

disarray that it took 30 days to furnish Commodore Conner's flagship with a three-month supply of biscuit.<sup>11</sup> The army, for its part, was so feeble that the mere assembling of a token contingent at Corpus Christi drained off three quarters of the regulars, and even this proved insufficient to repulse a Mexican invasion. With Mexican leaders supremely confident, Polk had maneuvered himself and his adversaries into the worst of all possible scenarios for success at the diplomatic bargaining table.<sup>12</sup>

Seventy years later, Woodrow Wilson spoke against preparedness, in particular a series of measures proposed by Senator Lodge. After a year and a half in office, he began to speak ambivalently but still refused to take many measures of a practical nature to prepare for hostilities, telling his secretary of war after Germany had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in defiance of a presidential ultimatum, to give "no basis...for opinion abroad that we are mobilizing."<sup>13</sup> Ominously, German authorities regarded America's potential to affect the outcome of a European set-to as virtually nil.<sup>14</sup> And they were not far wrong. Wilson's expeditionary force, obliged initially to rely on French rifles and artillery, along with British ships and French aircraft, took a full year to make its presence felt in any appreciable way, with the result that few American lives were lost relative to the total, and Wilson's voice in the peace settlement was

<sup>11</sup>Pratt, *United States Navy*, 114-15.

<sup>12</sup>Dupuy, *Army*, 92; Ekirch, *Civilian*, 81-82.

<sup>13</sup>Wilson quoted by Ernest R. May, "America's Benevolent Neutrality" in Warren Cohen, ed., *Intervention, 1917* (1966), 106.

<sup>14</sup>Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, *The Lusitania Disaster* (1975), 335.

muffled.<sup>15</sup> Overall, Wilson made one of the worst peace records in American history, sending armed forces into Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Western Europe, and Soviet Russia. More Americans were killed in Mexico alone under Wilson than during the entire course of the Spanish-American War.<sup>16</sup>

To complete the picture, one need only recall Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. FDR began by cutting defense expenditures, already minuscule under Hoover. He then rejected the call of nearly all his advisers, political as well as military, for a defense initiative commensurate with the magnitude of mounting threats to world peace.<sup>17</sup>

Truman, after chopping the defense budget to barest bones against the advice of his military experts, invited a North Korean attack on the South by pulling out all 50,000 American troops and limiting Seoul to “defensive capability” — meaning light weapons (no tanks, bombers, or bombardment vessels to match a North Korean force twice as powerful and twice as large). From 1945 to 1951, America had no ballistic missile program worthy of the name. Research ceased altogether in 1948 with Truman refusing to

<sup>15</sup>Secretary of War Baker was perfectly in tune with Wilson when he remarked after Washington entered the conflict: “I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not, like our adversary, ready for it...” (Hermann Hagedorn, ed., *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, XIX, 13).

<sup>16</sup>See Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy* (1966), 318, 320; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (1967), 178, 181-83.

<sup>17</sup>See Frederick W. Marks III, *Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt* (1988), 61, 149-50, 278-79.

spend money already appropriated by Congress.<sup>18</sup> Congress was anxious to support German rearmament and establish American bases on Spanish soil. Truman was not. And once again, the country went to war (in Korea), as well as to the brink of war over crises in Berlin, Trieste, Iran, and Greece.<sup>19</sup>

Jimmy Carter, though not a war president, merits reference in this connection because once more, we see in a presidential record the coincidence of anti-preparedness sentiment with failure on the diplomatic front. Incremental rises in defense spending from 1977 to 1980 did not reflect the scope of Soviet defense spending or the extent of Kremlin adventurism. Even modest increases, as called for by Congress, ran into stiff opposition from the White House. Carter slashed Ford's budget proposals on arms by \$57 billion and thwarted the popular desire to build another nuclear carrier. In an era of burgeoning Soviet capability, he retired a good many ships, blocked arms sales to Latin America, and canceled or delayed production of the B-1 bomber, neutron bomb, MX missile, Trident missile sub, and Cruise missile. There were

<sup>18</sup>For the U.S. missile program, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (1968), 206-208; Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (1961), 172, 401. Massive demobilization, it should be added, ran counter to public opinion. Polls for the period 1945-56 showed Americans strongly in favor of universal military conscription (Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, 1967, 273).

<sup>19</sup>On German rearmament and Spanish bases, see Harold D. Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (1963), 703. Truman demilitarized the National Security Council on August 10, 1949, eliminating the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force unless specially called (John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, 1950, 236).

substantial reductions in CIA personnel as well.<sup>20</sup> Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, along with a dramatic extension of Russian influence in the horn of Africa, South Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America, especially Nicaragua, not to mention the infamous Iranian hostage crisis; American pride was smarting so badly that it may well have cost Jimmy Carter reelection. Aside from relinquishing American claims in Panama, contributing to an Arab-Israeli peace pact, winning an Olympic hockey victory over highly favored Russia, and holding down defense spending, Carter had little to show.

One notes that Carter was a product of the Naval Academy. How could he behave so unmilitarily? It is a good question, and in the process of answering it, we are brought full circle to the second of the two patterns mentioned earlier: namely, the record of so-called "military" presidents as compared with those who were either stereotypically intellectual or surrounded by academic luminaries. The list of military men, or those with notable military experience who served as chief executive, begins with Washington and ends with Eisenhower. In between, we have Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Pierce,

<sup>20</sup>Carter merely accelerated a strategic retreat begun by Republicans. He campaigned against a putatively bloated defense budget and promised to cut defense by \$5 to \$7 billion. Although Congress would not endorse such a plan in its entirety, Carter did succeed in canceling or delaying production of one new weapons system after another during a period when the Soviets were expanding and refining their own arsenal (Norman Podheretz, *The Present Danger*, 41-43). For CIA morale and personnel reductions, see Gordon Hoxie, ed., *The Presidency and National Security Policy* (1984), xxxiii. See also Jean Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorship and Double-Standards* (1982), 23, 35, 52 (to a lesser extent, all of ch. 1). On arms sales to Latin American countries, see Kirkpatrick, 62. See also *New York Times*, June 2, 1980, A17; *The Wanderer* [St. Paul, MN], June 12, 1980 (George Will editorial).

Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and the second Harrison. James Monroe was an army major (and former secretary of war) while Theodore Roosevelt needs no introduction. Suffice it to say that not a single one of these individuals led the nation to war despite numerous opportunities.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup>James Monroe was a lieutenant in command of troops under Washington when the Continentals mounted their attack on the Hessians at Trenton. Pierce, a brigadier general in the Mexican War, injured himself by falling from a horse in the only battle in which he was closely involved (Cunliffe, *Soldiers*, 66, 110). Hayes and Garfield, along with Benjamin Harrison, were Civil War generals. The first of the Harrisons, William Henry, was also the first president to die in office — after only a month in office. Old Hickory, hero of the battles of New Orleans and Horseshoe Bend, guided the nation through eight years of peace, wringing major concessions from England and France while at the same time squelching South Carolina's bid to secede. Many Whigs scorned him as a rough rider type with a record of abrupt, violent, and even illegal action. He was also criticized for high-handed action along the Florida border. Clay, who accused him of lacking any appreciation for the civilian point of view, jibed that "killing two thousand five hundred Englishmen at New Orleans" did not qualify him for the "complicated" duties of the White House. Others predicted that he would involve the nation in war "having once tasted of the pleasure of absolute command" (Ekirch, *Civilian*, 75). Grant, known to the South as "the butcher," was not squeamish about the number of lives sacrificed in battle. Yet he not only compiled a record of untrammelled peace during his eight years as president but also championed peaceful methods of dealing with the Indians and opposed a popular plan to bring the Bureau of Indian Affairs under military control (see Ekirch).

It should be noted in addition that two leading generals of the 1920s, Tasker H. Bliss and John J. Pershing, were early exponents of disarmament. George C. Marshall and Alexander Haig, the only generals ever to serve as secretary of state, had perfect peace records, with Marshall winning the Nobel Prize. What, one wonders, do such facts have to say about the standard conception of military men: "Professional soldiers do not want peace. War is their opportunity, fighting their only business" (Ekirch, *Civilian*, 116). Alexis de Tocqueville reinforced the

Amazing as it may seem, most of our war presidents smelled of the lamp. Jefferson, who fought the Barbary kings, was the “sage of Monticello” and father of the University of Virginia. Madison, of 1812 fame, took a degree from Princeton and remained on campus to do postgraduate work, a sort of prototype Woodrow Wilson School grad student.<sup>22</sup> James Polk, of Mexican War, fame turns out to have been a prize-winning student at the University of North Carolina at a time when college degrees were the rough equivalent of today’s Ph.D. Polk’s father and grandfather wrote books. William McKinley attended college and taught school before going into law. Here was a “little” intellectual who, appropriately enough, fought a splendid “little” war. Woodrow Wilson, who led us into a full fledged war, had been president of Princeton, having taught there for many years. Franklin Roosevelt, next on the list, graduated from Harvard and established the first presidential “brains trust.” Moley, Tugwell, Berle, Hornbeck, Rosenman, Lovett, and Perkins — all were campus figures and all had a hand in setting the compass of New Deal policy.

stereotype when he linked peace with democracy and democracy with civilian control of the armed forces. The only agents likely to propel the nation toward war, he believed, would be military professionals whose advancement depended on hostilities — the average man would have too little to gain and too much to lose.

<sup>22</sup>John Adams was on the intellectual side too, though not to the same degree as Jefferson. Expertise in comparative constitutional law and wide reading in history and philosophy complemented a record of success at the bar. He was also a hard-bitten critic of human nature. Perhaps the man who fought a “quasi-war” with France (1798-99) is best remembered as a “quasi-intellectual.” As for his highly educated and brilliant son, John Quincy Adams, the latter was too skeptical of the benefits of education to be classed with Jefferson, Wilson, or FDR’s “brains trust.”

Passing over Truman, we come to John F. Kennedy, who sent the first American combat troops into Vietnam, launched a surrogate invasion of Cuba, and brought the nation as close to World War III as it has ever been. JFK was sickly as a youth, bookish to the point of reading 1200 words a minute, and fairly set at one point on becoming a writer. After attending the London School of Economics, Princeton (for 6 weeks), and Harvard, he published his undergraduate thesis, *Why England Slept*. As president, he emulated FDR's brains trust by choosing a Rhodes scholar to head the State Department (Dean Rusk). His defense secretary had been an instructor at Harvard (Robert McNamara), as was the case with his special assistant for national security affairs (McGeorge Bundy). An MIT professor ran State Department policy planning (Walt Rostow), and the intellectuals' favorite general, a well known critic of Ike's doctrine of massive retaliation (Maxwell Taylor), became Kennedy's military adviser and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of JFK's first 200 appointments, 18% were drawn from the intellectual community, as compared with a figure of only 6% for Eisenhower. It is also interesting that while Kennedy did not cut defense spending, he did abolish the Operations Coordinating Board (designed by Eisenhower to amplify the voice of the military in government planning), just as he rejected the military's "all or nothing" approach to American involvement in Vietnam.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup>Henry Cabot Lodge, *As It Was* (1976), 208; Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (1965 paperback), 338. Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington concluded on the basis of what he could observe that the more education the American public has, the less likely it is to vote for defense spending (Huntington, *The Common Defense*, 1961, p. 248). Clearly, this holds for American presidents as well. The chief executives who led the nation to war were without exception civilians. They were all well above average intellectually, and all were disinclined to heed the voice of the

Some may wonder at this point whether the patterns we have noted thus far are particular to the United States or whether they cut across national boundaries and time periods. I hesitate to say for certain; but from the general shape of the evidence, our situation as Americans would appear to be far from unique. One finds in Jewish history, for example, nine centuries before Christ, as outlined in the *Book of Chronicles*, two kings especially noted for defense spending: Asa, who ruled 41 years, and his son Jehosaphat, who ruled 25. Together they fortified their border towns, secured them with powerful garrisons, stepped up troop training, and fielded an army numbering close to a million. Asa had one military encounter, which proved to be a walk-over. So successful was he, in fact, that he never had to fight again. As for Jehosaphat, he did not have to sacrifice the life of a single soldier on the field of battle.<sup>24</sup>

Alexander the Great may not have gone to the Ivy League, but he went one-on-one with a tutor by the name of Aristotle. Extraordinarily solicitous of artists and authors, Alexander made a point of bringing them along on his campaigns. According to one story, his men were sacking Thebes when their master sent word that one home was to be spared, that of the poet Pindar. In more recent times, Benito Mussolini prided himself on his talents as an editor, writer, linguist, and playwright. And it was of course he, a civilian, rather than

military when it came to the issue of preparedness. George Bush, I would submit, conducted a police action in the Persian Gulf. But if such action qualifies in the mind of some as a war, then it was a "pint-sized" war pitting David against Goliath; and Yale-educated Bush was a "pint-sized" intellectual.

<sup>24</sup> 2 *Chronicles* 17:1-2, 12-19; 20 (entire).

the Italian military, who opted for an invasion of Ethiopia.<sup>25</sup> Adolf Hitler, another civilian, was, like Mussolini, a creative artist, in this case a painter. As noted in *Wind over Sand*, my volume on FDR, the most bellicose decisions leading up to World War II in both Germany and Japan were taken by civilians. Axis military officials were usually on the side of conservatism and compromise.<sup>26</sup> In Spain, a professional

<sup>25</sup>On Ethiopia, see Marks, *Wind over Sand*, 384 n. 52.

<sup>26</sup>As late as November 1941, Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and the U.S. Joint Army-Navy Board expressed support for a modus vivendi. See German Embassy (in Washington) to German Foreign Ministry, December 1, 1939 ("The General Staff [of the U.S.] is still working against war sentiment...in contrast to...the impulsive policy of Roosevelt — often based on an over-estimation of American power"), quoted in *Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War* (published by the German Foreign Office — the Auswärtiges Amt — in 1940), series D. vol. 8, 470. See also Lester Brune, "Considerations of Force in Cordell Hull's Diplomacy, July 26 to November 26, 1941," *Diplomatic History* 2 (Fall 1978): 401; Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (1966), 258, 300-301. Under Truman, the Joint Chiefs opposed the use of force in Berlin, as well as later on (under Ike) in Lebanon and at Dienbienphu. In Korea, when the South first came under attack, MacArthur had to be prodded into action by civilians. For Vietnam, see Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, April 1, 1954, box 5, NSC series, Ann Whitman File, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; for Lebanon, see Margaret M. Bodron, "U.S. Intervention in Lebanon — 1958," *Military Review* 56 (February 1976): 72. Earlier in the century, Admiral Dewey, victor of the Battle of Manila Bay, favored conciliation in dealing with insurgent Philippine leader Aguinaldo (he was overruled by the administration).

All of which bears out the conclusion of political scientist Alan Betts: "Civilian officials generally have been more willing to use force than their military counterparts." See Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, (1977), 4 as cited in John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" *Diplomatic History*

soldier by the name of Francisco Franco kept his people at peace throughout the war.

Going back to 1776, how many English generals advised George III to use force against the American colonies? Cornwallis? Howe? Burgoyne? Clinton? The answer is no, no, no, and again no.<sup>27</sup>

My final point relates to a situation in American historiography, one that seems to me every bit as curious as anything we have observed thus far: namely, the near total neglect by members of our profession of the patterns outlined above. Robert Divine's presidential address to SHAFR in 1976 listed economic factors, cultural factors, and ethnic factors as possible causes of war, but never military ones. Power and the balance of power were not viewed as having much of a bearing on war and peace. Instead, Divine spoke of "inevitability."<sup>28</sup> When Thomas Bailey published a critique of Divine's address in the *SHAFR Newsletter*, he too bypassed the power factor, claiming that America entered various wars willy nilly at the bidding of "lady luck."<sup>29</sup> As evidence, he pointed out that Americans had been sucked into

Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983): 185.

<sup>27</sup>On 1776 and English generals, see Sir Robert Cecil to Paul Emrys Evans, May 29, 1957, #58241, Emrys Evans Papers, British Library, London.

<sup>28</sup>Robert A. Divine, "War, Peace, and Political Parties in Twentieth Century America," *SHAFR Newsletter* (March 1977): 2.

<sup>29</sup>Thomas A. Bailey, "War-Bent Democrats?" *SHAFR Newsletter* (September 1978): 25-28.

all nine world wars since 1688 regardless of which party happened to be in the White House. What he failed to mention is that there was more than one president during the Napoleonic Wars. There were four, and two of the four — the ones who advocated preparedness — kept us out of formal hostilities.

Bailey also seems to have overlooked the possibility of *averting* world war. All one has to do is compare the record of Theodore Roosevelt with that of Wilson or FDR in this respect, and what one finds is as different as night and day. The circumstances were, to be sure, different. But the principal difference would seem to lie less in external circumstance than in the fact that Wilson and FDR, unlike TR, viewed power as an agent of provocation rather than a deterrent.<sup>30</sup>

Henry Kissinger has lamented America's failure to think more in terms of power, while Dexter Perkins, one of our own, stated that we have been "reluctant" as a people "to give to force the place which we must concede it occupies."<sup>31</sup> George Kennan put in characteristically inimitable prose when

<sup>30</sup>For FDR's views on preparedness, see Marks, *Wind over Sand*, 279. For weaknesses in the standard argument that FDR faced more difficulties than his cousin did on the diplomatic front (re: depression, isolationism, unprecedented Axis threat, failure of the League, and so forth), see Marks, *Velvet on Iron*, 3, 5-10, 55-56; Marks, *Wind over Sand*, 18-21, 61, 112-13, 151-52, 278-79, 400-401 n. 41; Robert Lansing, *The War Memoirs of Robert Lansing* (1970), 19-20; William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (1980), 131; Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (1963), 395; Huntington, *Common Defense*, 249.

<sup>31</sup>Henry Kissinger, "Reflections," *Foreign Affairs* 35 (October 1956): 41; Dexter Perkins, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy* (1968), 116.

he remarked that Americans suffer from the “dream of a conflictless world.”<sup>32</sup> Listen also to Elting Morison, formerly of MIT, who stated that for an historian “to produce the life of a soldier” was “to lose a professional reputation.”<sup>33</sup>

Such blindness (or bias, if you will) manifests itself in numerous ways. There is, for instance, a tendency in certain quarters to doubt the word of power players like TR and Ike when they claim to have delivered ultimatums to their opposite numbers overseas even if this would have been the logical thing for them to do at the time given their *modus operandi*. Or, to take another case, how many times have historians ignored or distorted the importance of defense build-ups? Nine of ten books that touch on Truman and Eisenhower leave one with the mistaken impression that Harry S increased military spending while Dwight D. cut back.<sup>34</sup> Truman did indeed increase such spending, but only in time of war. Eisenhower did make cuts, but only on the *aftermath* of war. What counts is the comparative level of defense spending *in peacetime* on an annual basis, and here Ike outstrips his predecessor 3 to 1 from the start. Like Eisenhower, James

<sup>32</sup>George Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (1966), 23. Robert E. Osgood, another authority on American policy-making, wrote in 1953 that Americans have been prone to “overestimate the role of ideals and underestimate the role of national power and self-interest.” See Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations*, 1965, 10.

<sup>33</sup>Elting Morison, *Admiral Sims* (1942), vii. Undoubtedly this is less true today than it was in 1942. But the point stands.

<sup>34</sup>For a recent example of this approach, see Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (1987), 180.

Monroe cut back, but he still outspent his predecessor, James Madison, by 2 to 1 if one compares the period 1817-19 with 1810-12.

How often do we read that FDR increased the defense budget and built up the navy? Indeed he did. But it is his refusal to do more that looms so large. Defense spending under FDR represented a grudging concession to public opinion and congressional pressure. Roosevelt went along kicking and screaming. The nation's military output between 1935 and 1941 was absurdly small viewed against a backdrop of billowing war clouds in both Europe and the Far East.<sup>35</sup> Such circumstances were just as menacing as any that obtained during TR's first term. Yet the second Roosevelt reacted entirely differently. Madison, Wilson, FDR, and Truman — all four were alike in that they lagged behind public opinion on the issue of preparedness and went to war.<sup>36</sup>

Telltale signs of the American illness abound. Samuel Flaggs Bemis, for years the dean of American diplomatic historians, asserted that "in the achievement of the Manifest Destiny of continental expansion, the European powers were loosened of their titles by the peaceful process of diplomacy unaccompanied by any threats of force — there was no force with which to threaten!"<sup>37</sup> I wonder if Professor Bemis, for whom I have the utmost respect, was aware of the case of Louisiana when he wrote as he did. The Louisiana Purchase is almost always portrayed as something of a windfall

<sup>35</sup>For conventional wisdom on FDR and the navy in recent historiography, see *ibid.*, 145.

<sup>36</sup>For Truman, see Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report*, 172.

<sup>37</sup>Bemis, *Latin American Policy* (1967), 385.

involving Spanish intrigue, weather, yellow fever, the whim of a dictator, bathtubs, European power politics, and the astuteness of American diplomats. Power elements on the American side, if introduced at all, are generally reduced to the fact that Jefferson threatened France with an Anglo-American alliance.

But there is more to the story than this. Jefferson put the army and navy on a war footing. Troops were concentrated at various points. Atlantic coastal forts were readied for war. Men and guns were rushed to the Canadian border. Senators and representatives were asked to help raise militia volunteers, and the president was informed that he could have 5,000 sharpshooters at Fort Adams on a few days notice. Jefferson looked the other way when American merchants shipped guns and ammunition to Haitian rebels, and Secretary of State Madison instructed his envoy in Paris to say that 200,000 militia were combat ready should they be needed to remove further obstructions to Gulf-bound commerce.<sup>38</sup> Thomas Jefferson was no mean player in the game of power politics. Anyone capable of bribing France to apply pressure on Spain to sell West Florida was capable of much else as well.

Could it not be that there is a certain power blindness in the tendency of some writers to discount age-old concerns for national security? Albert K. Weinberg based an entire book, *Manifest Destiny*, on the premise that America's yearning for security during the nineteenth century was highly exaggerated, if not ludicrous.<sup>39</sup> Where, one would like to know, is the

<sup>38</sup>Thomas J. Fleming outlined Jefferson's military buildup in considerable detail in *American Legion Magazine* (December 1971).

<sup>39</sup>See, for example, *Manifest Destiny* (1963), 21.

evidence? Another influential work, William Appleman Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rests in large part on still another unproven assumption, namely that great nations need not compete. Williams does not seem to recognize any instance when a country such as ours must either seek to dominate or be dominated. Exponents of this school hold that Americans should pull back their horns and worry less about prestige.<sup>40</sup> Is this not another typically home-grown product? Haven't all of our most successful statesmen from Washington to Monroe, from TR to Ike, and down to Reagan, been highly competitive in outlook and acutely sensitive to issues of national honor?

Who would know from perusing certain texts that it took more than patience, the avoidance of ultimata, and public reference to the Monroe Doctrine to dislodge France from Mexico in 1867?<sup>41</sup> Entire books have been written on America's relationship with China in the years 1941-49 with little, if any

<sup>40</sup>Chapter 7 of *The Tragedy* is entitled "The Impotence of Nuclear Supremacy," and one of its basic themes is that one cannot win friends overseas by threatening them, implying that there is a more or less perfect correspondence between friendship among nations and friendship between individuals. Even Sprout and Sprout, in *American Naval Power*, are silent on Adams' deployment of ships to the Caribbean (as well as on the probable effect of such a move on Paris). Stephen G. Kurtz, who does furnish the relevant information (in his *Presidency of John Adams*, 1957) is an exception to the rule.

<sup>41</sup>See, for example, Hicks and Mowry, *A Short History of American Democracy* (1956), 370; and Dexter Perkins, *Foreign Policy and the American Spirit* (1972), 202, 224. For the use of force as a major element in Seward's diplomatic scheme, see P.H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs* (2 vols., 1888), II, 208, 210, 213-15, 217; Henry Davies, *General Sheridan* (1895), 258.

attention paid to the latter's enormous and all-consuming military effort.<sup>42</sup> Likewise in the case of U.S. naval action in the Far East before 1898. For years, historians supposed that TR's famous war order to Dewey was motivated by imperialism when, in fact, it makes perfectly good sense on purely military grounds.<sup>43</sup> Lastly, the Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (1928) is generally applauded as a high-minded retreat from imperialism. But is there not another side to this story as well? Is it not true that imperialism is driven by needs, real or imagined, and that when such needs disappear, so too does the behavior predicated upon them? Would Mr. Clark's statement not make more sense in the context of greatly waning threats from London and Berlin?

One could go on at greater length along similar lines. Suffice it to say, however, that on the basis of the most elemental facts, power and peace are not antithetical. On the contrary, they are symbiotic. And the failure of historians to entertain this idea more broadly and to develop it more fully suggests a sizable opening for additional analysis, research, and writing.

<sup>42</sup>Herbert Feis, for one, in his scholarly *China Tangle*, made absolutely no mention of the number of troops fielded by China or Japan. Neither was there any reference to Chinese casualty rates, or to the number and location of major battles, or the percentage of Lend-Lease going to Chiang Kai-shek, all key factors beyond any reasonable doubt. See review by Paul Sih of Chin-tung Liang, *General Stilwell in China, 1942-1944*, in *Modern Age* (Winter 1973): 100-103.

<sup>43</sup>Grenville and Young, *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy* (1966) was unusual for being right on the mark in this regard.

## RECENTLY RELEASED FILES FROM BRITISH INTELLIGENCE RECORDS, 1943-1945.

by  
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During the past two years a large archive of the intelligence files passed daily in the war years, 1940-1945, to Britain's then Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has been made available for inspection in the Public Record Office at Kew in London. Bearing the master-reference "HW" they comprise 3,785 files in all. Files covering the period September 27, 1940 to December 31, 1943 were released in November, 1993; additional files for 1944 through July, 1945 were released on May 20, 1994.

These documents, consulted by F. H. Hinsley in preparing his official study, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (3 vols., New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979-1984), but not otherwise available until now, appeared without much fanfare in the United States and do not seem to have much impact as yet upon historical scholarship. It may be that many diplomatic historians are unaware of their existence or availability, or indeed of the valuable insight they seem to offer both into international relationships during World War II, and also into significant events and perceptions that contributed to the origins of the Cold War.

The material was released with a brief historical introduction which can be quickly summarized. It explains the evolution of the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) which was founded by the British Government in 1919 and instructed "to study the methods cypher communications used by foreign

powers and advise on the security of British codes and cyphers". From this purely investigative function the GCCS developed into an intelligence gathering organization, first under the Admiralty and then under Foreign Office auspices before achieving a more independent status under the control of a Director who came to be known as "C". World War II led to a great expansion in demand for cypher and signals intelligence, especially from the armed services, which led to Churchill (who was Minister of Defence as well as Prime Minister) receiving daily and sometimes more frequent summaries of selected material. These daily summaries usually had three main elements:

1. Items relating to enemy ground and air forces in Europe deriving from high grade cyphers such as ENIGMA.
2. Naval headlines, invariably a summary of German, Italian and Spanish activity.
3. "BJ" reports, being selected translations of intercepted diplomatic telegrams.

It is this third class of reports that will be of greatest interest to diplomatic historians. I have not yet examined fully the materials in the first release and will confine my very brief comments to the 1944-1945 files.

The range and identity of the traffic intercepted is limited. There are, for example, no interceptions from American sources, though there are in the collection a few general intelligence reports from Washington D.C. Churchill advised President Roosevelt in 1940 that British experts had cracked certain American codes and gave undertakings not to exploit such opportunities. Nor is there, so far as I am aware, any material emanating directly from Soviet sources, though there are messages here from some foreign embassies in Moscow.

There is, however, an abundance of intercepted Axis traffic here, particularly high level German messages to and from Ribbentrop personally and to and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. There are also many Japanese messages to and from Tokyo, mostly having to do with the war in Europe where the Japanese had many representatives. Churchill was thus able to follow on a daily basis the rising anxieties of the enemy powers in the latter stages of the war, as well as their various diplomatic and political strategies as they cast about for ways to avoid defeat. An agreement with the Soviet Union was seen in Berlin and Tokyo as the most attractive possibility. The persistent Japanese effort to persuade the occasionally enthusiastic but increasingly fatalistic Nazi leadership to try and make peace with the Soviets, helps us understand Churchill's care not to offend Stalin in late 1944 and early 1945.

Most of the non-enemy material comprises intercepted messages to and from a variety of European capitals, notably Ankara, Madrid, Lisbon and, after their liberation, Paris, Rome, Athens and Sofia. There are occasional reports involving the war with Japan emanating from Tokyo, Nanking, Chungking and other centers but the focus is overwhelmingly upon the European theaters. Most of the messages are between Foreign Ministers or ministries and their diplomatic representatives. The British were also able to intercept communications from the London offices of certain foreign governments, and Churchill quite often received material from Polish, French, and Turkish sources in the British capital.

All these interceptions naturally reflect the preoccupations of the governments involved. The Germans sought with increasing desperation to maintain a strong propaganda front emphasizing their will to resist and the dreadful alternative of

a communized Europe. The Japanese, perhaps the best and most objective observers, gave a coldly realistic portrait of fascist Europe that Churchill clearly valued. They consistently encouraged the idea of a German-Soviet peace. The Turks, whom the British watched with particular concern for geopolitical reasons, were always worried about Soviet expansionism in their area. The French messages are notable for the chronic suspicion with which British and American actions were regarded.

The general character of the collection, which is a fascinating mixture of high policy and diplomatic chatter, is overwhelmingly right-wing, as one would expect of Europe in this period. From the neutral capitals (Madrid, Lisbon, Ankara, Bern etc.) we see a rising anxiety over, and some sympathy for, Germany's predicament, as well as a pervasive sense that the European future belonged to the Soviets who were being encouraged by a weak appeasing Anglo-American diplomacy. The great preoccupation is with Europe's immediate future. There is diminishing faith in Britain as rallying point against the Soviet and communist threat, and hardly any expectation of a significant American postwar role in Europe.

It will be interesting to see how historians work these materials into their studies of the still confused transition from World War to Cold War. They clearly offer a further dimension to our understanding of Churchill's actions and policies (though he made few notations on the daily sheets), and of British diplomacy generally. They may usefully be consulted together with such other recent British offerings as the Special Operations Executive (SOE) files which were released to the Public Record Office for public examination early in 1995. These bear the master reference "HS" and

contain much interesting political background relating to SOE operations during the war.

## THE PENDING REFORM OF THE FOIA: A RESEARCHER'S REPORT

by  
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As members of SHAFR know, scholars conducting research in contemporary diplomatic history often require access to relevant intelligence data. Yet governments schooled in Cold War intrigue resist sharing such information with their publics. Perhaps my own experience may be helpful to others confronting this dilemma. I hope that a legislative proposal which I have drafted will lead to the accessibility of important, hitherto concealed records. This bill (H.R. 1281), which I describe below, is slowly making its way through the Congressional labyrinth. If passed, Congressional oversight will be essential to its implementation. Here is the background to this legislation.

For the past nine years I have been researching the elusive career of the Austrian diplomat Dr. Kurt Josef Waldheim. Basically, I have been trying to answer two questions. First, what was the nature of Waldheim's activities while serving in the Wehrmacht between 1939 and 1945? In 1988, when I published *Waldheim: The Missing Years*, I concluded that the

<sup>1</sup>Herzstein is the author of *Waldheim: The Missing Years*.

Austrian president had facilitated the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but was not himself a “war criminal.” The second question has been more difficult to answer.

How could someone so prominent as Dr. Waldheim — an ambitious diplomat in a country occupied by four great powers; foreign minister in a city at the center of Cold War intrigue; head of a world organization in the media capital of the planet — bury his wartime past?

In an op-ed piece I wrote for the *New York Times* back in 1986, I suggested that the concealment of Waldheim’s exploits in the Balkans during World War II could not have been the work of one man, acting alone. I asked, “Did [Waldheim] now put his skills to work for the West, with the understanding that war crimes allegations would be allowed to drift into oblivion?” Thanks to the imperfect but indispensable Freedom of Information Act, complemented by interviews with former American officials, I have since 1990 obtained information that points toward a remarkably close collaboration between Waldheim and the United States government. Not too long ago, Waldheim boasted to an acquaintance, “I have always served the West.” If so, the U.S. repaid the favor, many times over.

Early in 1948, persons representing the Department of State received information — forwarded to the United Nations War Crimes Commission — implicating Waldheim in alleged war crimes. I believe that this Yugoslav case was a political fabrication, and have proven that in my book, but more important is this central truth: State Department files showed that Kurt Waldheim had served in the Balkans, in bloody campaigns of reprisal and extermination. Secondly, from its inception, the CIA was in possession of an OSS-transmitted

document, dated 1945, showing that Kurt Waldheim had served on the staff of the High Command of Army Group E, in the Balkans. Other information suggests that the CIA's predecessor organization was well aware of Lt. Waldheim's knowledge of anti-partisan warfare in that region.

Subsequently, another U.S. agency, either by design or through incompetence, altered Waldheim's wartime biography. In 1952 the State Department noted that Waldheim received his law degree from the University of Vienna in 1940, married in 1944, and entered the reborn Austrian Foreign Service in November, 1945. What else was he doing during the war? According to the State Department, Waldheim was working in the legal system, assisting judges and the like. In other words, we are asked to believe that the American officials handling this document found it reasonable that a healthy young Austrian had never served in the German armed forces. But there is an added delight here, one which would please any bureaucrat, especially one so vain and ambitious as Kurt Waldheim. The information in question was supplied by the Personnel Office of the Austrian Foreign Ministry. At that time the head of this agency was none other than the 33-year old Kurt Waldheim.

The State Department's recording clerk in Washington added an interesting comment: Waldheim had little contact with American diplomatic personnel, but more information would be forthcoming. This proved to be a false prophecy. The internal biographical information distributed in subsequent years to interested parties in the government continued to omit any reference to Waldheim's wartime service. He could thus evade the implications of his wartime record, until cornered by the work of the World Jewish Congress and other entities in 1986.

State Department clerks would from time to time update the 1952 resume by adding to Kurt Waldheim's growing list of achievements. Later, when memories of the war had grown dimmer, Waldheim freely acknowledged his service in the Wehrmacht during the early stages of the Russian campaign. But the State Department, which had access to its own file on Waldheim's Balkan service, remained silent. The incomplete biography went forward to Ambassador George Bush, when he voted to make Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1971. In 1972, the CIA did a superficial job of investigating rumors about the new Secretary-General's alleged National Socialist ties.

Mr. Bush later became Director of Central Intelligence and CIA chief. At that time (1976), the United States solidly supported Waldheim's bid for a second term. On May 6, 1987 I wrote Mr. Bush, whom I had met in 1985 upon the occasion of his visit to my university. I asked the Vice-President about his knowledge of "Mr. Waldheim's wartime service when the U.S. strongly supported his candidacy [for Secretary-General]." I also wondered whether Mr. Bush, as D.C.I., had looked into CIA materials on Waldheim. The Vice-President referred me to Donald Gregg, his assistant for national security affairs, and to C. Boyden Gray, his legal counsel. Writing to me on June 12, Mr. Gregg noted that he had been in contact with CIA in regard to my request. Gregg then repeated the Agency's reasons for refusing to provide copies of the desired documents. "I can understand your disappointment that information potentially valuable to your scholarly work is unavailable because of national security concerns," added Mr. Gregg. He then bid me farewell, wishing me "every success as you continue your work." On July 14, Counsellor Gray indicated that he too was unable to help. Like his colleague, he too wished me good fortune. Clearly, a protective curtain had descended over Mr.

Waldheim. Yet official American reticence about Waldheim's war is far less remarkable than another aspect of his biography.

Kurt Waldheim, according to the State Department, understood American thinking, and was especially "receptive to our way of approaching problems," more so than anyone else in the Foreign Ministry. Later, Waldheim's service apparently improved, for one cable, released to me in 1990, observes that "[Waldheim] has proven most cooperative and helpful in promoting U.S. interests." Other phrases fell into the same mold: "cooperative and receptive to U.S. interests," and "has an understanding of American thinking and foreign policy objectives," which by 1970 has been upgraded to "an excellent understanding of American thinking and foreign policy objectives." By 1974, when U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim was campaigning for a second term, the State Department described him as "a good friend of the United States," and as man who "was cooperative in promoting U.S. interests." After more research and a number of useful interviews, it became apparent that these euphemisms pointed to a confidential relationship, not just with the State Department, but with the Central Intelligence Agency.

My attempt to obtain documentation from the CIA met with a blanket refusal between 1986 and 1994. Now, things have begun to change, though at a glacial pace. Here are some of the salient facts. They are relevant to work of other historians researching American foreign policy during the Cold War.

Under Title VII, Section 701 (b) of the CIA Information Act (passed by the Congress in 1984, see 50 U.S.C. 431, "Protection of Operational Files of the Central Intelligence Agency"), "operational files" of the Agency may be exempted from the Freedom of Information Act. The much used and

abused Executive Order 12356 enables the CIA to shield these materials from disclosure.

The CIA defines these materials as files which “document the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations of intelligence or security liaison arrangements or information exchanges with foreign governments or their intelligence or security services,” and as “files of the Office of Security which document investigations conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources...” The researcher can appeal a particular denial, and I repeatedly did so. One may then file suit in a U.S. District Court, but besides incurring great expenses, such a challenge would probably be futile. Not even a court may order the CIA “to review the content of any exempted operational file or files...”

A typical response to one of my requests was dated October 21, 1986. The CIA's Information and Privacy Coordinator rejected my latest demand for information. “One document,” added Mr. Lee S. Strickland, “was located [pursuant to my request], release of which was denied in toto.” In response to subsequent requests for further documents, the CIA would neither confirm nor deny their existence. The Agency, using the current law, had determined that disclosure might:

Damage the national security; lead to the release of information about sources and methods used in intelligence work; provide information about foreign governments; expose foreign intelligence materials produced by nations with whom the United States enjoys an “equivalent protection” relationship.

This language is so broad enough to shield almost anything from public scrutiny. Yet further concealment only whets the researcher's appetite, for the order's language fits the

Waldheim case perfectly. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. enjoyed a close relationship with various Austrian intelligence and foreign policy agencies.

After eight years of delay and denial, the situation may be changing for the better. President Waldheim's retirement in 1992, combined with the advent of a new U.S. administration in 1993, has moved things along. A series of articles about my dilemma, by columnist A.M. Rosenthal in the *New York Times*, helped matters. The CIA has begun to disgorge some of its vast documentation on Kurt Waldheim.

Like the State Department, the CIA agreed that Waldheim understood American "foreign policy objectives," and had been useful in furthering American interests. More striking still is the Agency's statement that Waldheim was "particularly effective in confidentially working out Austrian formulations acceptable to the United States" in questions concerning Vietnam, the Middle east, and Europe. It is apparent from these confidential statements that Kurt Waldheim served U.S. foreign policy interests. This is not surprising. Waldheim owed his early career to Karl Gruber, an informant for the U.S. Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps' 430th Detachment, and to Fritz Molden, who worked for the CIA's predecessor organization, the Office of Strategic Services. But how do we know whether the CIA was copying the State Department's biography, or the other way around?

Kurt Waldheim was a Foreign Ministry official and a diplomat, so the State Department would ordinarily have been the agency most concerned with his resume. Surprisingly, however, the CIA's information on Waldheim was far more complete; that of State was sketchy at best. It seems probable that State was summarizing information provided Washington by the CIA's station chief in Vienna, and by the Agency's

confidential biographers in Langley, Virginia. Because of the Agency's "operational interest" in Waldheim, State received what it needed to know, and nothing more. This explains why State's post-1952 biographies contained no information about Waldheim's exploits with the Twelfth Army and Army Group E in 1942-1945.

Kurt Waldheim denied any connection with American intelligence when I asked him about this matter eight years ago. In fact, he was being less than forthright. Placed in sensitive centers of Cold War intrigue, Waldheim informed American contacts about difficult diplomatic negotiations, and provided them with information about Austrian personnel stationed in places like Moscow. Senior American diplomats at the United Nations assumed that Waldheim was working for the CIA, that he was cooperative and a good source of information. On one occasion, Waldheim unwillingly undertook a dangerous mission, one that nearly cost him his life. CIA was particularly concerned about the vast and potentially embarrassing trove of intelligence data stored in the embassy's safes in Tehran, Iran. Pressured by the United States, the Secretary-General, who was campaigning for a third term, flew to Tehran, in a vain attempt to secure the release of the American hostages. Soon after the Tehran fiasco faded from the headlines, the CIA reciprocated and rescued the Secretary-General. Its efforts proved to be more successful than Kurt Waldheim's.

In 1980, a suspicious Congressman, Rep. Stephen Solarz of New York, asked Waldheim about allegations charging him with concealed Nazi ties. In its letter to Solarz, the CIA subsequently allayed the Congressman's suspicions. When I inquired about this matter about seven years later, the Agency noted that its biographical data on Mr. Waldheim were based upon "open source materials." When I asked about the

identity of those sources, I learned from David D. Gries, Director of Congressional Affairs for the CIA, that “we are not able to identify open source materials the researcher may have used to prepare his 1980 response [to Solarz].” This alone was bizarre; even more tantalizing was the fact that the CIA’s 1980 report to Solarz, which cleared Waldheim, contained inaccurate information which to my knowledge did not then or now exist in “open source materials.” The CIA had collaborated with Waldheim in the production of parallel alibis. Waldheim was safe for almost six more years.

If the United States could secure Waldheim’s cooperation, was he not equally beholden to other great powers, such as the Soviet Union? At present, there is not one iota of public evidence to support an affirmative answer to this question. Everything points in another direction.

In the summer of 1980 Waldheim, a candidate for a third term as Secretary-General, bragged to a CIA informant that he had the Western powers “in his pocket,” but was “less certain of the support of the Soviet Union and China...” This is no wonder, when one heeds the testimony of Arkady N. Shevchenko, a high-ranking Soviet Foreign Ministry official assigned to the U.N. Secretariat. A close associate of Waldheim, Shevchenko also worked with the CIA, which managed his defection to the United States. In a memoir published after Waldheim left the U.N. (*Breaking with Moscow, 1985*), Shevchenko described how the Secretary-General worked to prevent Soviet/KGB penetration of his office. Further, Shevchenko reports that his boss, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, along with leaders like Leonid Brezhnev, disdained Waldheim. In fact, the Soviets backed Waldheim during his first (1971) campaign only because they feared the advent of another unpredictable activist — like the late Dag Hammarskjöld. In 1976, the Russians accepted

Waldheim for a second term, but only because no more acceptable (and viable) candidate had emerged.

Waldheim, Arkady Shevchenko continues, was in constant, confidential contact with American foreign policy officials, be they Henry Kissinger or U.S. personnel posted to the U.N. According a memorandum prepared for the Politburo, the Soviet Foreign Ministry concluded that Waldheim was "flirting with the Americans" (an understatement). True, Waldheim's five-year plan for the Secretariat enabled the Soviets to increase the number of their nationals serving in professional posts. Waldheim embraced this strategy because he needed Soviet support for his re-election campaign, but more importantly, he did so without incurring American wrath.

In 1981, Waldheim's famous luck took a turn for the worse. The Secretary-General, who yearned for a Nobel Peace Prize, was doggedly campaigning for a third term. In order to secure this unprecedented honor, Waldheim needed the support of the majority of the Security Council. This he could secure, but Waldheim could not be recommended to the General Assembly for a third term if a permanent member of the Council vetoed his candidacy. The Chinese wanted him out, however, for they demanded his replacement by a person from the Third World. Finally, the Russians also turned against the incumbent. After supporting Waldheim on the first ballot (October 13, 1981), the Russians abstained, as did their German Democratic Republic. Britain and France deserted him at the same time.

On the second ballot, which destroyed Waldheim's chances, only four powers remained loyal to him: The United States, the Philippines, Spain, and Japan. This information, provided by the mission of a power friendly to the United States,

completely contradicts the wild rumors regarding a Soviet connection.

Certain facts have become clear. The State Department and the CIA helped to fabricate and disseminate the false biography that enable Kurt Waldheim to deceive the world and lead the United Nations. In return, Waldheim provided the U.S. with sensitive information, undertook one dangerous mission, and kept the Americans informed about attempted Soviet penetration of the Secretariat.

The documentary record is far from complete, however. In 1994, therefore, I suggested that a reform of the CIA Freedom of Information Act would be in order. After reading one of A.M. Rosenthal's articles on the Waldheim affair, Rep. Carolyn Maloney contacted me. The Congresswoman, who represents New York's 14th District, is now the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology. H.R. 1281, which awaits hearings in the House, is her legislation, and now enjoys the support of twelve co-sponsors. This proposed amendment to the 1947 National Security Act, called the "War Crimes Disclosure Act," would apply to anyone liable to exclusion from the U.S. under the "Holtzman Amendment." In other words, the legislation concerns individuals whose wartime activities on behalf of Nazi Germany or its allies earned him/her a place on the "Watch List" of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. According to H.R. 1281, researchers could no longer be denied access to documentation concerning such persons. Sources and methods and agents would be protected, but the government would now need to show why other information about that subject should not be released.

This shift of the burden from the researcher to the government will show that the Freedom of Information is no longer a

casualty of the defunct Cold War. Indeed, the "Waldheim" bill may serve as a model, leading to the release of many other sources for the diplomatic history of the postwar period.

I hope that the pending reform of the CIA Information Act will pass in this session of Congress, and that Congressional monitors will thereafter oversee the enforcement of this amendment. Historians concerned with American diplomacy and U.S. intelligence operations (they often overlap) during World War II and the Cold War will benefit, as will the public interest. And historical memory will no longer fall victim to misused concepts of national security.

## THE NANKING ARCHIVES

by

Xiansheng Tian

OKLAHOMA STATE

Researchers studying the history of Nationalist China (1911-1949), including those who are interested in its foreign relations, now have a great place to explore in China. The Nanjing (Nanking) Archives in Nanjing, Jiangsu province is the place they many locate some of the most useful material for their studies.

Nanjing (Nanking) is the former capital city of Nationalist China and one of the ancient capital cities of the country. The Nanjing Archives was established in February 1951, after the Communist government had taken control over the whole country and expropriated the documents left by various departments of the Nationalist government. The new archives took over the old buildings and most of the holdings of the

Commission for the Study of History of the Nationalist Party and also took control over the files from the Archives of National History. In the early 1950s, the Nanking Archives also began to collect archival material the Nationalist government had left in Guangzhou (Canton), Chongqing (Chungking), and other places across the country. In 1962, the Archives got its formal name, the Second Historical Archives of China, although most people still prefer to call it Nanking Archives. Today, the Nanking Archives is one of the largest and the most authoritative sources for studies on Nationalist China.

All together, the Nanking Archives holds 897 whole files containing about 1,600,000 volumes of documents from different governments from 1912 to 1949.<sup>2</sup> The files are classified into four major sections, which cover different periods in the history of Nationalist China:

1. The Nationalist governments during different periods (1912-1949), including Nanjing Provisional Government, the Southern Revolutionary Governments in Guangzhou and Wuhan, and the Nationalist Government (Chongqing and Nanjing) until 1949;
2. The Beiyang (warlord) governments (Beijing, or Peking);
3. The Japanese/puppet government (Wuhan); and
4. Special (private) collections.

The 1911 Revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty and the new Republic of China

<sup>2</sup>The Archives supplied the numbers of files mentioned as of the end of 1994. Persons interested in the documents can contact the Archives' administration (address provided at the end of the article). One may also ask for the archives' *Brief Guide*, although this guide is already eight years old and out of date. A new guide is said to be in the process of preparation.

established its first Provisional Government in Nanjing on the New Year's Day of 1912. Although this government existed for a very short time and many of its documents vanished during the later warlord years, the Archives still hold more than one hundred volumes of very valuable documents from this period, including many documents commented upon and signed by Dr. Sun. In 1917, Dr. Sun set up his new military government in Guangzhou where he held the First National Congress of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or Kuomintang). After his death in 1925, the Nationalist leaders carried on his wish of uniting the country and started the Northern Expedition against the warlords in the north. During the same year, the Nationalist government moved its capital from Guangzhou to Wuhan. Many government documents from this period found their way into the Nanking Archives, including those concerning the relations with England and Japan, the two major powers that China had to deal with at the time.

After Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-kai) negotiated with Sun Yat-sen and forced the Qing emperor to abdicate in early 1912, he became the second Provisional President of the republic. However, his ambition to become another emperor made him one of the most hated men in China. His imperial dream soon vaporized in the face of numerous uprisings throughout the country. Following his death in 1916, China slipped into the so-called "Warlord Period" when warlords competed for power in Beijing and across the country. From 1912 to 1928 wars and chaos overrun the country and government changed hands frequently. However, many government documents were well preserved at the time. Unfortunately, many of these documents were damaged or lost during later years due to natural or human causes. Still, there are fifty-two whole files (about 60,000 volumes) in the Archives today. One may find many documents dealing with China's efforts to rewrite

the unequal treaties it had made with the powers. Documents concerning Japan's infamous "Twenty-one Demands" are also available.

The Nationalists finally established their central government in Nanjing in 1927. Until forced out of mainland China in 1949 by the Communists, the Central Government had accumulated a large number of documents. Except a fraction that the Nationalist government took to Taiwan in 1949, the Nanking Archives today holds more than 585 whole files containing more than 1,300,000 volumes of archival material. They cover the Nationalist Party organs and their activities, as well as the central government's various departments. Besides, researchers can find documents from different institutions concerning China's finance, economy, banking, natural resources, industry, commerce, culture, and education. In almost all these files researchers may find material about China's efforts to change its humiliating status with the western powers and to establish new relations with other countries. Documents concerning relations between China and the United States sometimes occupy a large part in the files belonging to many government offices and other organizations. Most of these documents are in good condition.

Documents belonging to the Wuhan puppet government under Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei) also make up one part of the Archives' collections. Many of these documents focus on the relations between the puppet government and Japan. After Japan's surrender in 1945, these documents suffered some damages and losses. Some were even mixed with the documents of the Nationalist government. The Archives has tried hard to restore these files. Today, the Archives holds seventy-four whole files (about 70,000 volumes) of these documents.

The Archives also has some private collections that used to belong to well-known persons who played very important roles in China's history. Diaries and other personal documents of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), Feng Yuxiang (Feng Yu-hsiang), Kong Xiangxi (H. H. Kung), Sun Ke, and dozens of others formed this special section, although some of these collections are very fragmentary.

According to the *Brief Guide* provided by the Archives, users can start their researches by consulting the Archives' directories designed in accordance with the four sections mentioned above. However, there are exceptions: some files still use their old file numbers assigned to them by different governments during different periods. Since the late 1980s, the Archives has been working on a new system of document classification, which will make things easier for the current cards (catalog) research and future computerized research. Due to the lack of funds, something very commonplace in China for nonprofit institutions today, computerization of the Archives so far remains in the future.

Due to China's "Open Door" policy in general, accessibility to the Archives' files today is much better than in the 1980s when the Archives first "opened" to the public. However, researchers may still find they are not satisfied from time to time in their studies. Some documents, such as those "concerning the national interests," along with most of the private collections and part of the judiciary files, are still not available, according to the *Brief Guide*. Also, researchers have to supply a formal "letter of introduction" from the institution to which they belong, such as a letter from university administration or government offices, when they are applying for any research at the Archives. They also need to make clear in their research applications the range and purpose of their projects. With all these ready, one can

expect a very brief paperwork session and quickly start his research. The archival staff is generally helpful, and cameras and copy machines are available too, although they are not self-service and fees will be charged. All researchers are told to follow the copyright laws in China and no one can take any document out of the Archives' reading rooms or make any copy by himself.

Researchers from other countries (and even the Chinese nationals staying in other countries) may find things more complicated for them. According to the Archives' regulation, they have to present their research applications TWO MONTHS before the starting dates of their research projects. Along with the application, one must provide a current *c.v.*, a list of his/her research subject(s), the documents that he/she is going to read, and "the expenses in China,"<sup>3</sup> along with the formal "letter of introduction." The Archives administration's promise to give each application serious consideration and prompt response is not so reliable. Some applications may not be answered for unknown reasons. As they may experience in many other services in China, foreigners and overseas Chinese can expect to pay higher fees for the services they receive at the Archives.

Those who want to use their summer vacations to research in Nanjing should be reminded that it may not be a good idea to start your project during the summer. Nanjing is one of the "big ovens" in China and it is not unusual that the day time temperature reaches thirty-seven degrees Centigrade or higher (about one hundred degrees Fahrenheit). The Archives'

<sup>3</sup>My letter containing the question whether this "expense in China" means what currency to be used or whether public/private fund is involved got no answer or explanation from the Archives' administration.

reading rooms have air conditioners, but they are not effective. Also, the Archives may change the opening hours, sometimes only open a few hours a day, which will probably delay your project.

I recommend any interested persons contact the Archives prior to their trip to Nanjing, especially asking for the *Brief Guide*, which can help locate documents one wants to study. Doing so will definitely save time and reduce the possibility of frustration and disappointment. For more information about the Nanking Archives, contact:

The Second Historic Archives of China  
309 Zhong Shan East Road  
Nanjing, Jiangsu Province  
People's Republic of China

SHAFR COUNCIL MINUTES  
JANUARY 6, 1996  
ATLANTA MARRIOTT MARQUIS

The meeting opened at 7:35 a.m. with President Robert Dallek presiding. Council members present were Robert Dallek, Mark Gilderhus, Allan Spetter, Jonathan Utley, Warren Kimball, Bill Miscamble, and David Anderson. Others present were Anne Jones, Page Miller, Mike Hogan, Emily Rosenberg, Bill Brinker, Jim Matray, Chester Pach, Kinley Brauer, Bob Schulzinger, Ephraim Schulman, Milt Gustafson, and Marten Pereboom.

1. Mike Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History*, nominated H.W. Brands, Randall Woods, and William Burr for three-year terms on the Board of Editors of *Diplomatic History*. Council approved these appointments and passed a resolution of thanks to the retiring board members: James F. Goode, Gerald K. Haines, and Dennis Merrill. Hogan reported that the

Armin Rappaport Fund, which supports the professional work of the journal's editorial office, has reached \$12,000, much of that the royalties from the book *The End of the Cold War*. On behalf of the editorial board, Hogan requested that the Armin Rappaport Fund be renamed the Armin Rappaport-Lawrence Gelfand Fund in recognition of Professor Gelfand's instrumental role in the founding of *Diplomatic History*. Bill Miscamble moved and Jonathan Utley seconded that the name be changed. Council approved.

2. Page Miller reported on the activities of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History. The NCC's Washington Update is now posted on the H-List. The NCC is concerned that some agencies are resisting implementation of the current executive order on declassification, but Miller requested no action from SHAFR at this time. The NCC's costs are rising, and Miller asked Council to consider raising SHAFR's voluntary contribution to the NCC. Council took no action.

3. Allan Spetter announced that this year's recipient of the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant is Amy L.S. Staples of Ohio State University for work on her dissertation, "A Strange New Breed of Man: Constructing International Identity in the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization."

4. Marten Pereboom reported on behalf of Diane Kunz and the 1996 Program Committee. Fifty panels are being organized for the meeting in Boulder, Colorado, from June 21 to 24. There will be some panels organized by and designed for graduate students, a women's breakfast on Saturday, a graduate student breakfast on Sunday, luncheon speakers on Saturday and Sunday, and a plenary session on Friday night on the Bosnian war. One of the participants in the plenary session had requested an honorarium. It has not been SHAFR's practice to pay honoraria, but after discussion, Council authorized the committee to assure this speaker that all travel expenses would be met. Bob Schulzinger reported that planning for local arrangements for the conference is ahead of schedule and that programs should be sent to members in early March. There will also be conference information available on H-DIPLO.

5. Allan Spetter noted that the 1997 annual meeting is scheduled for June 19-22, 1997, at Georgetown University. David Painter is in charge of local arrangements. There was discussion of locating a site for the 1998

meeting. If possible, the site should be in the Washington, D.C., area and should be at a university rather than a hotel.

6. Anne Jones reported for Blackwell Publishers. *Diplomatic History* now has 807 institutional subscribers, and that is an 11 percent increase from 1994. *Diplomatic History* is one of Blackwell's top performers out of 160 journals worldwide. SHAFR's individual memberships are also increasing. As of December 15, 1995, there were 1855 members. The breakdown of memberships was 990 regular, 539 student, 188 retired/unemployed, and 138 life. Blackwell is publishing a new edition of the *SHAFR Roster and Research List*. David Anderson, editor of the *Roster*, added that it will be available in the spring. Jones also detailed Blackwell's numerous efforts to promote the journal and offered Blackwell's technical assistance if SHAFR should want it for creating a SHAFR home page.

7. Robert Dallek expressed concern about the disappearance of diplomatic history positions in university history departments. He cited specific examples of where retirement of some of our senior colleagues has led to the abolishing of their positions to make way for other fields. His own position at UCLA is a case in point, and reportedly so too is that of Bradford Perkins at Michigan. Dallek suggested that SHAFR communicate formally with history departments urging continuation of diplomatic history positions and the teaching of diplomatic history. Mark Gilderhus noted the connection between diplomatic history and world history, which is a growth field in our discipline. Many history departments profess to support globalization. Emily Rosenberg added that more diplomatic history sessions at the AHA and OAH meetings would increase the visibility of our field. Other discussion suggested greater participation in regional meetings, such as the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA and the Southern Historical Association. David Anderson moved and Jonathan Utley seconded the formation of a committee to promote visibility of diplomatic history with major historical organizations and with history departments. Discussion of the motion included possible topics the committee might consider: providing information to history departments about student and public interest in the field; organizing SHAFR sessions for the AHA, OAH, and other meetings; helping individual SHAFR members organize sessions; coordinating with centers and programs focusing on globalization and global history; and considering a SHAFR home page on the Internet. Council approved the motion.

8. Jonathan Utley reported for the Endowment Committee. The combined Bernath and general endowments now total about \$450,000 and are currently earning more than SHAFR is committed to spend from them. The committee requested Council's authority to expand the committee's task to function more like a finance committee. The committee would like to review the dues structure, plan for the possibility of large future expenses, examine various sources of income, and study trends in order to better advise Council on financial issues. Council approved this change.

9. Jim Matray announced that the Graebner Award Committee is seeking nominations for that award.

10. Spetter announced the results of the 1995 elections. Emily Rosenberg was elected Vice-President. H.W. Brands and Chester Pach were elected to Council. David Humphrey was elected to the Nominating Committee.

11. Upon the request of Warren Kimball, Council authorized that more than the currently specified maximum of \$500 per student could be allowed for the Minority Student Travel subsidy to the meeting in Boulder.

12. Bill Brinker reported that the cost of the *SHAFR Newsletter* has increased to about \$2500 per issue or \$10,000 per year. Tennessee Tech is currently paying \$6000 per year and SHAFR is paying the balance. The Finance Committee will continue to monitor this issue.

13. Allan Spetter updated Council on work of the Steering Committee for the *SHAFR Guide to American Foreign Relations*. SHAFR needs to begin serious discussions with ABC/Clio. The President, Vice-President, and Executive Secretary-Treasurer will set a schedule of target dates for this project and bring a report to Council at the June 1996 meeting in Boulder.

14. Proposals for agenda items for the June 1996 Council meeting included: (1) from Ephraim Schulman, that SHAFR take a formal position on freedom of discussion of the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan, and (2) from Warren Kimball, that Council discuss the OAH publication *Connections*.

The meeting ended at 9:05 a.m.

Submitted by David L. Anderson

## ANNOUNCEMENTS

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### Ferrell Prize Winner

A previous issue of the *Newsletter* failed to note the 1995 winner of the Robert Ferrell book prize. John L. Harper (Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University) was awarded the Ferrell Prize for *American Visions of Europe: Franklin Roosevelt, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson* (Cambridge, 1994).

### Center for the Study of the Presidency

The Center will be participating in several conferences and workshops next year in order to prepare a collection of essays for the incoming administration after the 1996 election. Please contact Joan Hoff as soon as possible at the Center's New York office if you are interested in presenting a paper for publication at one of these meetings on any of the following topics: crucial U.S. elections of the last two centuries, including the 1994 one, national security, economic policy, general or specific aspects of post-Cold War Policy, gridlock, campaign financing, congressional and White House relations, etc.

The address: Joan Hoff, Center for the Study of the Presidency, 208 East 75th Street, New York, NY 10021. E-mail: THE CSP@AOL.COM Tel: 212 249-1200 FAX: 212 628-9503

### SHAFR Travel Grants for Minority Students

SHAFR has allocated \$2,000 to fund the travel of minority graduate students to its 1996 June meeting. The maximum allowable grant is \$500. Native Americans, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans who are citizens or nationals of the United States and who are enrolled full time in an accredited graduate program in history are eligible to apply. A letter of application should be accompanied by a letter of nomination from a faculty adviser. The deadline for receiving applications is April 15, 1996. For more information contact Arnold H. Taylor, Department of History, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 20059. Tel. (202) 806-9330 Fax. (202) 806-4471

### Correction

The December *Newsletter* carried an incorrect zip code for the chairperson of the Holt Dissertation Fellowship. The correct address is:

David S. Foglesong, Visiting Scholar, Hoover Tower, Tenth Floor,  
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6010

### Military History Meeting

The Society for Military History will hold its 63rd Annual Meeting on 18-21 April 1996. The meeting, co-sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency, will be held at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel in Rosslyn, Virginia. The theme is "Intelligence and National Security in Peace, Crisis, and War." Contact: Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner, SMH Program Coordinator, P.O. Box 9402, Arlington, VA 22219.

### Social Science History Association Annual Convention October 10-13, 1996, New Orleans, LA

The Social Science History Association will hold its annual conference October 10-13, 1996, in New Orleans. The SSHA is the leading interdisciplinary association in the social sciences; its annual conference attracts historians, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, demographers, and geographers.

### Air Force Historical Research Agency Grants.

The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) announces research grants to encourage scholars to study the history of air power through the use of the USAF historical document collection at the Agency. Awards range from \$250 to \$2500. Proposed topics of research may include, but are not restricted to, Air Force history, military operations, education, training, organization, policy, activities, and institutions. Broader subjects suitable for a grant include military history, civil military relations, history of aeronautics or astronautics, relations among U.S. branches of service, military biographies, and international military relations. Applicants can request an application from the Commander, Air Force Historical Research

Agency, 600 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL. 36112-6424. The completed applications must be returned by 1 October 1996.

### **Siena College World War II Conference.**

Siena College will sponsor its annual international, multi-disciplinary conference on the Anniversary of World War II — but now on two levels. The foci for 1997 will be 1947, World War II — The Aftermath and 1937, World War II — Beginnings. In the first focus, papers dealing with the Holocaust, displaced persons, War Crimes Trials, Literary and Cinematic studies of the war, veterans affairs, the G.I. Bill and economic reconversion, as well as papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcome. In the second focus, papers on Fascism and Naziism, Ethiopia, Spain, Literature, Art, Film, Women's Studies and Jewish Studies dealing with the era. Obviously, the Sino-Japanese War will be particularly appropriate. In either focus, art, music, women's and minorities studies will be of interest. Other topics of relevance are also welcome. Deadline for submissions of proposals is December 1, 1996. Contact: Thomas O. Kelly II, Professor of History, Co-Director World War II Conference. (518) 783-2595 Fax (518) 783-4293.

### **CALL FOR PAPERS**

The Society for Military History will sponsor sessions at the following conferences: The Northern Great Plains History Conference; hosted by the University of Wisconsin — LaCrosse. 25-28 September 1996. And the Ohio Valley History Conference hosted at Bowling Green, Kentucky by Western Kentucky University. 17-19 October 1996. Proposals for papers or complete panels are welcome, as are the names of those willing to serve as chairs or commentators. The deadline for proposals is 1 April 1996. Please contact: Malcolm Muir, Jr., Department of History and Philosophy, Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, TN. 37044.

### **Stephan E. Ambrose American Biography Award**

The Eisenhower Center for American Studies is pleased to announce the inauguration of the annual Stephan Ambrose American Biography Award

for the best biography on an American historical figure published in the preceding year. The prize carries with it a cash award of \$1,500. To be considered for the prize, publishers should send a copy of the nominated book or books to Dr. Douglas Brinkley, Director, Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, 70148. The deadline for submission is June 1, 1996.

### **The Forrest C. Pogue Prize in World War II History**

The Eisenhower Center for American Studies recently inaugurated the annual Forrest C. Pogue Prize for the best book on the history of the U.S. Army published in the preceding year. The Pogue prize carries with it a cash award of \$1,500. To be considered for the prize, publishers should send a copy of the nominated book or books to Dr. Douglas Brinkley, Director, Eisenhower Center, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, 70148. The deadline for submissions is June 1, 1996.

### **Conference on Cuban Question, 1895-1898**

The Instituto de Historia de Cuba in Havana is sponsoring an international conference, December 4-6, 1996. on "Diplomacy around the Cuban Question, 1895-1898." Papers are invited for many aspects of this topic, including U.S. foreign relations in the period. For information and a brochure, contact Lic. Gustavo Placer Servers, Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Palacio de Aldama, Amistad #510 entre Reina y Estrella, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba. FAX 537 338254.

### **Ellis W. Hawley Prize**

The OAH recently announced the Ellis W. Hawley prize to be awarded annually for the best book or dissertation on the political economy, politics, or institutions of the United States, concerning its domestic or international affairs from the Civil War to the present. The prize winner will receive \$500 and a certificate at the OAH annual meeting. For information: Prize Committee Coordinator, OAH, 112 N. Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47408

## Obituary

Robert W. Sellen, professor of history at Georgia State University, died on November 23, 1995. Sellen was born in Topeka, Kansas, October 13, 1930. He graduated from Washburn University *summa cum laude*. He earned the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at the University of Chicago, where he was a Danforth Fellow and University Fellow. He taught at Baker University from 1958 to 1964 and chaired the Department of History and Political Science. In 1964 he moved to Georgia State University and was promoted to full professor in 1968. He was a visiting professor at New York University three times and lectured at the University of San Marcos and Villareal University in Peru. He co-edited two books and published sixty articles and 400 book reviews.

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## PUBLICATIONS

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Robert Accinelli (Toronto), *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950-1955*. North Carolina Press, 1996. ISBN 0-8078-2259-0, Cloth, \$39.95.

Stephen E. Ambrose (New Orleans), *Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West*. Simon & Schuster, 1996. ISBN 0-684-81107-3, \$30.00.

Terry H. Anderson (Texas A&M), *The Movement and the Sixties*. Oxford, 1996. Paperback edition. ISBN 0-19-510457-9, \$15.95.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis (Skandia Investment Management, Forest Hills, NY) and Frances T. Pudlo, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*. Yale, 1996. ISBN 0-300-06530-6, \$30.00.

Kenneth M. Coleman (North Carolina) and George C. Herring (Kentucky), eds., *Understanding the Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict, U.S. Policy, and Options for Peace*. Scholarly Resources, 1991. Cloth ISBN 0-8420-2382-8, \$40.00; paper ISBN 0-8420-2383-6, \$16.95.

Alonzo L. Hamby (Ohio), *Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman*. Oxford, 1995. ISBN 0-19-504546-7, \$35.00.

George Herring (Kentucky), *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975*. 3rd edition. McGraw Hill, 1996. ISBN 0-07-028393-1, \$ 13.75.

Walter L. Hixson (Akron), *Charles A. Lindbergh: Lone Eagle*. Harper Collins, 1995. Paper ISBN 0-673-99265-9, \$12.00.

Michael Hogan, ed. (Ohio State), *America in the World: The Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations since 1941*. Cambridge, 1996. Cloth ISBN 0-521-49680-2, \$54.95; Paper ISBN 0-521-49807-4, \$19.95.

Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina), *Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Yale, 1996. Cloth ISBN 0-300-06368-7, \$35.00. Paper ISBN 0-300-06597-3, \$14.00.

Howard Jones (Alabama), *Quest for Security: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations*. McGraw-Hill, 1995. ISBN 0-07-033077-8, (Volume I) \$20.75; ISBN 0-07-033078-6, (Volume II) \$24.00.

William R. Keylor (Boston), *The Twentieth Century World: An International History*. Oxford, 1996. Cloth ISBN 0-19-509769-6, \$49.95; Paper ISBN 0-19-509770-X, \$22.00.

Frank Kofsky (California State), *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948*. St. Martins, 1995. ISBN 0-312-12329-9, \$16.95.

Lester D. Langley and Thomas D. Schoonover (Southwestern Louisiana), *The Banana Men: American Mercenari*. University Press of Kentucky, 1996. ISBN 0-8131-0836-5, \$15.95.

Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut), *The Limits of Hegemony: The United States and the Cuban Revolution*, Latin American Studies Consortium of

*New England, Occasional Papers No. 5.* Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, University of Connecticut, U-161, 843 Bolton Road, Storrs, CT 06269-1161: January 1996. \$5.00

Bonnie F. Saunders (Springfield College), *The United States and Arab Nationalism: The Syrian Case, 1953-1960.* Praeger, 1996. ISBN 0-275-95426-9, \$49.95.

Jerry K. Sweeney (South Dakota State) ed., *A Handbook of American Military History.* Westview, 1996. ISBN 0-8133-8569-5, \$45.00.

William O. Walker III, ed. (Ohio Wesleyan), *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict.* Scholarly Resources, 1996. Cloth ISBN 0-8420-2422-0, \$40.00; paper ISBN 0-8420-2426-3, \$16.95.

Mark J. White (St. Andrews), *The Cuban Missile Crisis.* New York University Press, 1995. ISBN 0-333-63052-1, \$45.00.

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## PERSONALS

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Kathleen Burk has been appointed to a Chair in Modern and Contemporary History at University College London (University of London).

Yeong-Han Cheong (Queensland) has received a research grant from the Harry S. Truman Library.

Robert Dallek (Emeritus UCLA), most recently Harnsworth Professor, will be Professor of History at Boston University. Dallek has been elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

David Foglesong, chairperson of the Holt Dissertation Fellowship committee, has been incorrectly listed twice! (See note in ANNOUNCEMENTS.)

Joan Hoff has become president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. (See the notice of Center plans in ANNOUNCEMENTS.)

John T. McNay (Temple) has received a research grant from the Harry S. Truman Library.

Christian Ostermann (Washington, DC) has been awarded a dissertation fellowship by the Institute for the Study of World Politics.

Nick Sarantakes (USC) has received a research grant from the Johnson Presidential Library.

Charles S. Stefan (Gainesville) has received an award from *The New Press Literary Quarterly* for his essay "Albania: Reminiscences, Reflections, and Recent Developments." Stefan also presented a paper on FDR and Stalin at an LSU conference commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Roosevelt's death.

Ralph E. Weber (Marquette) has received a research grant from the Harry S. Truman Library and a research grant from the Gerald R. Ford Library.

Thomas W. Zeiler (Colorado) has received a research grant from the Gerald R. Ford Library.

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## CALENDAR

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1996

March 28-31

The 89th meeting of the OAH in Chicago.

April 1

Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.

May 1

Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.

June 21-24

SHAFR's 21th annual conference will meet at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Program chair - Diane Kunz; local arrangements chair - Bob Schulzinger.

August 1

Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

November 1

Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.

November 1-15

Annual election for SHAFR officers.

November 1

Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.

November 15

Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

November 15

Deadline for Myrna F. Bernath research fellowship proposals.

1997

January 1

Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02142.

January 4-7

The 111th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in New York.

January 15

Deadline for the 1996 Bernath article award.

February 1

Submissions due for Warren Kuehl Award.

February 1

Deadline for the 1996 Bernath book award.

February 1

Deadline, materials for March *Newsletter*.

February 1

Deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.

February 15

Deadline for the 1996 Bernath lecture prize.

March 1

Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.

April 17-20

The 90th meeting of the OAH will take place at the San Francisco Hilton.

Future OAH meetings will be in Indianapolis (Westin Hotel and Indiana Convention Center), April 2-5, 1998; and in Toronto (Sheraton Centre) in 1999.

SHAFR will meet at Georgetown University, June 19-22, 1997. David Painter will serve as local arrangements chair.

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## AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

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Details of the various awards, prizes, and funds are in the June and December *Newsletters*. Abbreviated notices are in the March and September issues.

### THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

#### The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Richard Immerman, History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. Books may be sent at any time during 1996, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1997.

#### The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners deliver a lecture, comparable in style and scope to the SHAFR presidential address, at the SHAFR meeting during the annual OAH conference. Nomination is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Send nominating letter and *curriculum vita* no later than 15 February 1997 to: Cecelia Stiles Cornell, History, Sangamon State, Springfield, IL 62794-9234.

### **The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize**

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. Current chairperson: Elizabeth Cobbs, History, U. of San Diego, San Diego, CA 92110.

### **The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant**

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Current chairperson: Bill Miscamble CSC, History, Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556.

Most recent recipient: Amy Staples (Ohio State U.)

### **The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize**

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 1996 and 1997 will be considered in 1997. Submission deadline is December 1, 1997. Publishers should send five (5) copies and a cover letter to: Anders Stephanson, Department of History, Columbia University, New York NY 10025.

### **The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships (Update)**

The society announces two Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships, 2,500 USD each, to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Anders Stephanson, Department of History, Columbia University, New York NY 10027. Deadline for applications is 15 November 1996.

## **THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP**

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Current chairperson: David Foglesong, Visiting Scholar, Hoover Tower, Tenth Floor, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6010.

## **THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD**

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history. Current Chairperson: James Matray, History, New Mexico State, Las Cruces, NM 88003.

## **THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD**

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture." Current chairperson: Melvin Small, History, Wayne State U., Detroit, MI 48202.

## **ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents

to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Current Chairperson: George Herring, History, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0027.

### THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT-LAWRENCE GELFAND FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History* and Larry Gelfand, former SHAFR president. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office.

### ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1996, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. Current chairperson: Doug Brinkley, History, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148.

Most recent winner: 1995 John L. Harper (Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins)