

# The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations



## ***NEWSLETTER***

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# *The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations*

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**MEETINGS:** The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the AHA in January.

**PRIZES:** The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

**PUBLICATIONS:** The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

[The following essay is by the winner of the W. Stull Holt Scholarship for 1998-1999. This is the latest in the series wherein the *Newsletter* publishes a summary of the research experience.

— editor]

“HANDS ON PRESIDENCY” OR “PASSIONLESS  
PRESIDENCY”? JIMMY CARTER AND RATIFICATION OF  
THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

by

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The eve of the transfer of control of the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama may be an appropriate moment to reassess a key event in the presidency of Jimmy Carter. The ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 has frequently been cited as one of Carter's most important achievements. Recently, his much-maligned political reputation has been partially “rehabilitated.” Carter's ambitious and often successful agenda in international affairs since he left office has provided the impetus for this reevaluation.<sup>1</sup> Although historian Burton Kaufman insisted as recently as 1993 that the Carter presidency had failed largely because of the president's inadequate political leadership, some recent scholarship has been characterized by “Carter revisionism.” Douglas Brinkley, David Skidmore, Robert A. Strong, and others have asserted that Carter showed more political savvy in office than Kaufman and a generation of Carter's critics had allowed. Revisionists invariably cite the ratification of the canal treaties as one of Carter's great accomplishments, and Skidmore actually

<sup>1</sup>Douglas Brinkley, *The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter's Journey beyond the White House* (New York, 1998); Mark Rozell, “Carter Rehabilitated: What Caused the Thirty-Ninth President's Press Transformation?” in *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years*, ed. Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994.

argues that the president “performed brilliantly in guiding the treaties toward Senate passage against long odds” and achieved “a daring political feat.”<sup>2</sup>

It is significant, however, that Skidmore’s account is not based upon archival evidence. The paper trail in the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia, suggests alternative interpretations. In almost every facet of the Carter administration’s handling of the controversy over ratification, errors in political judgment compounded existing formidable obstacles. Carter displayed the kind of uncertain leadership which critics complained characterized much of his presidency.

The canal treaties faced substantial opposition from a public skeptical of compromise agreements with other nations, and a well-organized conservative grass-roots campaign reinforced Americans’ misgivings.<sup>3</sup> Assuming that the lukewarm support for the treaties

<sup>2</sup>Burton Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.* (Lawrence, Kan., 1993). David Skidmore, “Foreign Policy Interest Groups and Presidential Power: Jimmy Carter and the Battle Over Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 22 (Summer, 1993): pp. 477-97, quotations on pp. 486 and 490. Carter revisionist works include Brinkley, *Ibid.*, and “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The “Hands On” Legacy of Our Thirty-Ninth President,” *Diplomatic History* 20 (Fall, 1996): 505-29; Jerel A. Rosati, “Jimmy Carter: A Man Before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of the First Post-Cold War Presidency,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 22 (Summer, 1993): 459-76, and *The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Policy* (Columbia, S.C., 1987); Robert A. Strong, “Jimmy Carter and the Panama Canal Treaties,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 21 (Spring, 1991): 269-85; Skidmore, *op cit.*, and *Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform* (Nashville, 1996).

<sup>3</sup>Leading studies of the struggle for ratification are: William Jordan, *Panama Odyssey* (Austin, 1984); J. Michael Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill., 1986); George Moffett, *The Limits of Victory: Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties* (Ithaca, 1985); Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York, 1982), pp. 152-85; Skidmore, “Foreign Policy,” and Strong, *op cit.*

in the Senate was solely due to negative public opinion polls, the White House invested high hopes in its public relations campaign. The Carter White House was slow to prepare its own campaign to influence public opinion to support ratification, and devised a wholly unrealistic strategy for doing so. When it became apparent that this strategy had failed to move the public, the White House was forced to scramble. Carter fell back upon frantic logrolling, which in Skidmore's romantic depiction is presented as the president's "virtuoso performance" of shrewd political wheeling and dealing in the tradition of FDR and LBJ.<sup>4</sup> It was never Carter's intention to seek ratification in this way, however, and his handling of the realpolitik was not without flaws.

The U.S. and Panama announced their agreement on the treaties on August 12, 1977, after months of intensive negotiations.<sup>5</sup> Right-wing opponents had been cultivating public antipathy to the transfer of the canal for years, as each administration since 1964 had conducted negotiations for an agreement with Panama. Although Carter knew he was entering a political maelstrom when he gave the negotiations high priority at the outset of his term, advanced planning for a public relations campaign only began in the summer of 1977. The American Conservative Union and other conservative groups quickly coordinated their massive grass-roots effort against the treaties. By the autumn of 1977, some senators were receiving four thousand anti-treaty letters a week, and public opinion polls showed a substantial majority of Americans opposed the treaties.<sup>6</sup>

Analysts in the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs alerted the White House to polling data which suggested powerful public opposition to a new agreement with Panama, though the Bureau's analysts believed this sentiment was "susceptible to change" because

<sup>4</sup>Skidmore, "Foreign Policy," p. 478.

<sup>5</sup>For the text of the treaties, see Jorden, pp. 701-704.

<sup>6</sup>Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics*, pp. 114-115.

the public opposed a new treaty “*in the absence* of countervailing arguments.”<sup>7</sup> By explaining the matter to the people, the president and other treaty supporters could ease the political pressure on senators who would otherwise be inclined to vote for ratification. On the eve of Carter’s meeting with Panamanian negotiators at the end of July, White House aide Joseph Aragon suggested to the president’s chief aide, Hamilton Jordan, that the White House needed to make “an all-out crash effort” to reverse public opposition. Jordan concurred, and advised the president that, if he could “educate” the public by “explain[ing] complex issues,” Carter could effectively counter the anti-treaty propaganda, obtain Senate approval, and even win broad support for his entire foreign policy agenda.<sup>8</sup>

Jordan and his staff sought to stimulate expressions of public support for the treaties in a number of “target states” where senators were undecided on the issue. This White House list of target states fluctuated over time, reflecting the frequent changes in the Senate vote count estimates offered by the White House and State Department congressional liaison staffs. The White House invited “opinion leaders” from these states to attend elaborate, well-organized briefings on the issue. Influential politicians, state and local officials, state legislators, early Carter supporters, and leaders of civic, labor, religious, and other groups were to learn “the facts” about the treaties from leading administration officials, including the president himself. These opinion leaders would, the White House hoped, return to their states to launch effective grass roots campaigns in support of ratification, which would swing the balance

<sup>7</sup>Jill A. Schuker to Joseph Aragon, June 17, 1977, Box 36, 6-7/77 Panama Canal Treaty, Chief of Staff’s Office, Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter cited as JCL).

<sup>8</sup>Joseph Aragon to Hamilton Jordan and Landon Butler, July 28, 1977, Box 36, 6-7/77 Panama Canal Treaty; Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, ca. June, 1977; Jordan to Carter, “Consultation with the Congress on Foreign Policy Initiatives,” ca. June, 1977; “Work Plan – Panama Canal,” June 28, 1977, Box 34, Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo 6/77, Chief of Staff’s Office, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter, JCL).

in favor of the treaties in state public opinion polls and generate pro-treaty mail and phone calls to the undecided senators. This show of public support would "help them [undecided senators] create a political atmosphere in their state that will allow them to vote for the treaty," Jordan assured the president.<sup>9</sup>

The White House state briefings, as well as a number of similar events staged for national civic and professional groups such as the Jaycees, generally produced positive press coverage and proved persuasive for many who attended. The president almost invariably came across as personable and well versed on the issue, and he exhorted his guests to help him "educate and to lead" Americans to support the treaties.<sup>10</sup> The White House collected and was impressed by statistical evidence of the success of its efforts. By mid-December 1977, Carter, his top Cabinet secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had conducted briefings with "over 1000 opinion leaders from 25 states," according to Jordan, and Carter had personally participated in "37 scheduled meetings" on the treaty issue, which took up to 27 hours of his time, not including a number of unscheduled meetings and phone calls with cabinet members, the National Security Council, and congressional leaders in which the subject might have come up, nor Carter's "private work time."<sup>11</sup>

Not all of this time was devoted to developing and implementing strategy for ratification, however. Much of it was spent on diplomatic issues including the protocol for the treaty-signing ceremony and General Omar Torrijos' visit to Washington in October, 1977. Moreover, Carter's time was even more heavily

<sup>9</sup> Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, August 21, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaty, 8/77 [1], Chief of Staff's Office, JCL.

<sup>10</sup> Transcripts of Jimmy Carter's briefings, no date, Box 8, Panama Canal Treaty, 1/16/78- 1/23/79, CF, O/A 616, Speechwriters-Fallows, JCL.

weighted toward wrangling with Congress over his stalled energy legislation and coping with the political fallout resulting from the debilitating controversy over allegedly improper conduct by Carter's friend and Budget Director, Bert Lance. The many private meetings and phone calls Carter held with senators may have been crucial to the ratification effort, but they were concealed from the public eye, and did not give a cumulative public impression of presidential activism or leadership. Such efforts were not a means for swaying public opinion, and could have no more than an incremental effect on treaty support in the Senate.

The administration's public outreach effort was ambitious in scope but produced no substantial increase in constituent mail to senators, much to the frustration of White House staffers overseeing the activities of the ineffectual semi-official advocacy group, the Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties (COACT).<sup>12</sup> New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici damned the White House efforts with tellingly faint praise when he informed the congressional liaison staff that although their cultivation of public support in his state was "paying great dividends," he would not be able to support the treaties. The liaison staffers who reported this statement to the White House did not comment on how such evidence raised questions about their assumption of a causal connection between stimulating public support and converting senators.<sup>13</sup>

However many individual endorsements the administration won from business leaders, interest groups, or "opinion leaders" in "target states," there was never any real chance that these could be marshaled to substantially influence senators. The administration's

<sup>12</sup> Douglas Bennet, Robert Beckel, Robert Thomson to Hamilton Jordan and Frank Moore, December 1, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaties, 1977, CF, O/A 413 [3], Chief of Staff's Office, JCL; Skidmore, *Reversing Course*, p. 120, and "Foreign Policy," p. 485.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Thomson and Robert Beckel to Frank Moore, December 12, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaties, 1977, CF, O/A 413 [3], Chief of Staff's Office, JCL.

dispassionate emphasis on letting the facts speak, or rather, letting opinion leaders speak about the facts, was no match for the well-financed, well-organized, fully committed right-wing grass roots campaign. Neither COACT nor informal networks of "opinion leaders" within "target states" could generate the volume of mail or public protests produced by the American Conservative Union and other right-wing groups. Skidmore rightly depicted public support for the treaties as weak, but the archival evidence suggests that the Carter White House had itself to blame for investing so much time and high hopes in an outreach effort that never had the potential for success. It was with reluctance and dismay that the White House acknowledged, in early 1978, the need to abandon its public outreach effort.

Carter still hoped to turn public opinion around, however, with a nationally televised "fireside chat" on the treaties. The president postponed the delivery of his speech several times during the autumn and winter of 1977-78, before finally choosing February 1, 1978. Carter, who had "never had much luck with speechwriters," as White House speechwriter Hendrick Hertzberg observed, granted his speechwriting staff minimal access to him, thus complicating their tasks. Speechwriter Jerry Doolittle lamented that the writing process "was never the same twice in a row, and never really anything less than chaotic."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Hendrick Hertzberg (including Christopher Matthews, Achsah Nesmith, Gordon Stewart), Miller Center Interviews, Carter Presidency Project, Vol. VIII, December 3-4, 1981, JCL, p. 1; Carol Gelderman, *All the President's Men: The Bully Pulpit and the Creation of the Virtual Presidency* (New York, 1997), p. 129; James Fallows, Exit Interview, JCL; Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency, II" *The Atlantic Monthly* 243 (June, 1979), p. 79; Jerry Doolittle, Exit Interview, JCL. On the "fireside chat" on the canal treaties, see Gelderman, pp. 131-32; Ronald A. Sudol, "The Rhetoric of Strategic Retreat: Carter and the Panama Canal Debates," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65 (1979): 379-91; Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith, "Narrative Conflict and the Panama Canal Treaties," in *The White House Speaks: Presidential Leadership as Persuasion* (1994), pp. 103-32.

Given their isolation from the president, it should not be a surprise that the speechwriters' initial drafts for the address were ineffectual. The president hesitated to set a date for the address, and allowed a debate over its timing to consume the White House for months, despite strongly worded advice from James Fallows, Hamilton Jordan, and Hodding Carter of the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs, that such a speech should come sooner rather than later. "We're leaving all the public argumentation to the other side," Fallows lamented, "and by letting their crazy charges go unanswered for the moment we suggest that we don't have any ourselves." Jordan warned that, "if we don't define the issues and the discussion of the treaty, they will be defined for us in the [congressional] committee hearings and by opponents of the treaty." Such a development would harden public opposition, which would "be politically devastating."<sup>15</sup>

The administration's effort to alter public opinion was so ineffectual that Moore reported the "unbelievable" news that "many Senators and Senate staff think you are doing nothing to sell the Treaties and are backing off the issue." Moore added to the president's hesitancy, however, noting that while many in Congress wanted a presidential address soon, Speaker Tip O'Neill wanted to keep the issue on the backburner until after the passage of energy legislation. Carter finally decided that the address would have to wait until 1978, since there was "no news hook" on the issue by December.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> James Fallows to Hamilton Jordan, September 14, 1977, Box 17, 2/1/78 Fireside Chat No. 4 (Panama Canal), File No.1 [3], Speechwriters' Chronological File; Hodding Carter III to Hamilton Jordan, September 19, 1977, Box 119, Panama Canal Background Information, 7/13/77- 11/29/77, CF, O/A, 86, and Jordan to Jimmy Carter, September 19, 1977, Box 36, 9/77 Panama Canal Treaty, Chief of Staff's Office, JCL.

<sup>16</sup>Weekly Legislative Report, Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, November 19, 1977, Box 67 Panama Canal, 1977-78, No. 2, CF, O/A, 88 [2], Press Office - Powell; Jody Powell and James Fallow to Jimmy Carter, November 30, 1977, Box 17, 2/1/78 Fireside Chat No. 4 (Panama Canal) File No.1 [3], Speechwriters

The interminable delay in setting a date for the speech apparently did not provide the White House with sufficient time to determine the content of its message. Though Fallows had written a draft for the fireside chat in August, 1977 a whole new round of speechwriting began when Carter agreed to Jordan's suggestion of January 24 to deliver the speech on February 1 or 2. Doolittle and Fallows wrote a new speech, which consisted largely of a series of answers to commonly voiced objections to the treaties. After drafts of this speech circulated in the White House, Carter made remarkable revisions to his copy of the fifth draft. The president expressed displeasure with the speech, which had a "completely different emphasis [and] language" than he desired. The "hands-on" president displayed his characteristically technocratic style of leadership by rewriting the entire speech by hand, though his version shared Doolittle and Fallows' pragmatic, dispassionate vein and insistence that the treaties were in the "national interest."<sup>17</sup>

Though Doolittle had suggested in August, 1977, that the president's speech should have a "calming" effect on the overheated emotional debate over the treaties, and should not be excessively burdened with factual details, Carter ended up delivering a long, detailed address.<sup>18</sup> His answers to objections ranged from the extremely concise to the verbose, and he included lengthy quotations from passages of the treaties. Not content to dispel the basic objections to the treaties, such as concerns over the loss of U.S. sovereignty over the canal zone, the U.S. right to use force to defend the canal, and the economic consequences of the agreement, Carter tried to cover a number of minor points, as well. The narrow focus on the national interest left no room for the president

Chronological File, JCL.

<sup>17</sup>Jimmy Carter to James Fallows, Box 71, Panama Canal Fireside Chat, 2/1/78, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, JCL.

<sup>18</sup>Jerry Doolittle to Hamilton Jordan, August 9, 1977, Box 118, Panama Canal [Binder]; Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, August 9, 1977, Box 36, 8/77 [2], Chief of Staff's Office, JCL.

to indicate the larger significance of the treaties, which might have informed Americans of their true value. A product of internal wrangling and ambiguity, the speech was cautious and stirred few in the television audience. The fireside chat was “a porridge of a speech,” to use Fallows’ characterization of many Carter addresses. Having allowed a number of advisors to tug the speech’s contents and style in a number of directions, Carter was left with a speech bereft of a clear organization or compelling argument. The media reacted to the speech with marked indifference, and CBS even refused to carry it live. As the *Detroit News* editors observed, “as a public relations gimmick to win new support for the treaties the speech was a dud.”

Though Carter had sought to pave the way for ratification by creating a politically favorable climate, the failure of his public relations efforts left him with the need to confront the power politics of the Senate, where many members were uncertain how they would vote on ratification. The White House had hoped for a hero to shepherd the treaties through the Senate; in August, 1977 Jordan suggested that the venerable but ill Hubert H. Humphrey “probably has one good fight left in him.”<sup>19</sup> While hoping for a *deus ex machina* in the Senate, Jordan and Carter also had expected the news media to carry their water, with “good press coverage” of the elaborate treaty-signing ceremony at the White House in September contributing to “political momentum” for the treaties. Carter lamented afterward that in the media’s coverage of that event, “the terms of the treaty were not put across as well as I would have liked.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, Aug 21, 1978, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaty, 8/77 [1], Chief of Staff’s Office; Robert Beckel to Landon Butler, Aug 8, 1977, Box 6, Congressional, George Moffett Collection, JCL.

<sup>20</sup>Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, no date, August 21, 1977, Box 36, 8/77 [2], Chief of Staff’s Office, JCL; Transcripts of Jimmy Carter’s briefings, no date, Box 8, Panama Canal Treaty, 1/16/78-1/23/79, CF, O/A, 616, Speechwriters-Fallows, JCL.

In the period after the signing of the treaties, the White House was not bracing for possible Senate rejection of the treaties, but rather for Senate approval of amendments and reservations which Panama would find unacceptable. The challenge, as one congressional liaison staffer remarked, was “to tread the line between disaster and a success that is least harmful for treaty supporters,” that is, to allow the Senate to make sufficient changes to the treaties to ensure ratification without provoking Panama.<sup>21</sup> The reality that the treaties were facing a daunting uphill struggle in the Senate began to sink in by December, as the White House congressional liaison staff’s vote count showed “perhaps 35 against or leaning against, many of whom will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to move,” and with pro-treaty senators in disarray.<sup>22</sup>

An indication of the reluctance of the White House to accept the reality of profound public opposition, however, was its response to polling data from Arizona showing the public opposed to the treaties by a four-to-one margin. Observing that Arizona’s junior senator, Dennis DeConcini, was “not anxious to commit political suicide” by supporting the treaties in such conditions, White House congressional liaison staffers considered conducting a new poll in Arizona, one with questions worded in such a way as to produce more favorable results. While this might have been a clever, useful if artificial political tool to help DeConcini vote his conscience, their assumption that the Arizona polls were malleable revealed an exercise in denial which undermined the White House’s ability to comprehend and deal with senators’ anxieties.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Robert Thomson to Jimmy Carter, September 26, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaty, 9/77, Chief of Staff’s Office, JCL.

<sup>22</sup>Douglas Bennet, Robert Beckel, Robert Thomson to Hamilton Jordan and Frank Moore, December 1, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaties, 1977, CF, O/A 413 [3], Chief of Staff’s Office, JCL.

<sup>23</sup>Bob Thomson and Bob Beckel to Frank Moore, December 12, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaties, 1977, CF, O/A 413 [3], Chief of Staff’s Office, JCL.

The White House Office of Congressional Liaison, headed by Frank Moore, a young Georgia businessman with scant Washington experience, had begun promoting ratification in the summer of 1977. This liaison effort began amidst the political wreckage of Carter's shattered honeymoon with Congress. The president's inability to set priorities in his legislative agenda, and his brusque indifference to the political needs of a number of congressmen of both parties, produced a score of criticisms on Capitol Hill. "Logistical failures," such as numerous unreturned phone calls, failure to notify members about grants, led to a situation so dire that Moore and his staff reported to the president that "perhaps a majority of Democrats" on the Hill "do not feel they share common goals with you or the Administration generally."<sup>24</sup>

One problem the liaison staff had in lobbying the Senate was a lack of coordination which sometimes led to senators and the media receiving conflicting information from the White House, which compromised the credibility of Carter's repeated reassurances that the treaties' implementation would not require substantial American expenditures. Carter complained in February that, in his conversations with senators, "I've found that we are being hurt by varying answers to Canal maintenance and operations cost questions." The National Security Council's Latin American expert Robert Pastor complained to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that the liaison staffs of the White House and State Department had "been very slack" about coordinating their legislative strategy. Moreover, he lamented, "there is a real problem with paper flow on the Canal issue since I don't see a lot of the memos that State, Ham [Jordan], or Frank Moore prepare for the President. I just don't know what information he has and what information he lacks." Such disorganization several months after the announcement of the treaties indicates the uncertainty with which the administration pursued its goal of ratification. The Neutrality Treaty - the first of two canal treaties, concerning the role of the

<sup>24</sup>Frank Moore, Dan Tate, and William Cable to Jimmy Carter, ca. 1977, Box 34, Congress/President, Chief of Staff's Office, JCL.

U.S. and Panama in keeping the canal open - was ratified in March. Moore warned other administration officials that, in the debate over the second treaty - the Panama Canal Treaty - opponents would seek "to get conflicting cost and income information from different agencies in order to discredit the Administration," hence all congressional requests for economic information should be sent to the White House liaison staff and replies coordinated from there. That such concerns were raised at such a late stage of the treaty fight reflects the sluggishness of the administration's attempts to seize control over its own political resources.<sup>25</sup>

The numerous White House briefings arranged for senators reflected Carter's attempt both to provide the Senate with sufficient consultation, and to melt their skepticism toward the treaties. Carter and his aides were supremely confident in the president's persuasive powers, especially in White House briefings with relatively small groups. This confidence was generally well placed, as the president impressed most visitors with his grasp of the issues and his geniality. What the White House failed to understand, however, was that these performances did not always translate into any real change of opinion among senators. For example, on December 1 the president met with one hundred aides and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. The meeting, which Jordan had recommended after informing the president of the growing congressional perception that Carter was not fully engaged in the treaty fight, received "rave reviews from the Hill," but did nothing to prevent the Armed Services Committee from publicizing a damaging report which forecast considerably

<sup>25</sup>Jimmy Carter to Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hamilton Jordan, and Frank Moore, February 7, 1978, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaty, 1978, Chief of Staff's Office; Robert Pastor to Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 8, 1978, and Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, March 9, 1978, Box 60-61, Panama, 11/77-3/78, National Security Affairs - Brzezinski Material - Country File; Frank Moore to Herky Harris, Gene Godley, Jack Stempler, and Terry Bracy, March 29, 1978, Box 39, Panama, 2/20/78-2/13/79, Office of Congressional Liaison, JCL.

higher economic costs to implement the treaties than the administration had admitted.<sup>26</sup>

The White House, as Skidmore and others have ably discussed, had to invest an enormous amount of time and effort wooing senators individually and by groups. The intensity of this effort increased after the Senate began its debate on the treaties in early 1978. However, the White House's efforts waxed and waned, depending in part upon the reading of the latest tea leaves from Capital Hill. On the eve of the president's "fireside chat," Moore warned against complacency. The cooperation of Senators Byrd and Baker had, he observed, not altered the fact that the treaties were still "9 votes short of the necessary 67, and any combination of 67 votes that we can see is very fragile."<sup>27</sup>

During the long, divisive Senate debate, the treaties became enmeshed in Senate votes on a series of arcane yet critical amendments and reservations. With no choice but to admit the failure of its politics of pedagogy, the White House fell back on a neo-Johnsonian politics of bargaining. No matter the energy Carter and his liaison staff put into it, however, Moore acknowledged in early March that "a strategy of dealing with undecided Senators one by one is not yielding results. The undecideds are reluctant to announce their intentions individually because of the great amount of press attention such a move would elicit." Moore's insight was long overdue, as was his recommendation to shift to a strategy of urging undecided senators to work together "to coalesce around a package of understandings and announce their intentions to support

<sup>26</sup>Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale, November 14, 1977, Box 36, Panama Canal Treaty, 10, 11, 12/77 [3]; "Meeting with Senate Aides on Panama Canal Treaties," November 30, 1977, Box 50, Panama Canal Treaties, 1977, CF, O/A 413 [3], Chief of Staff's Office; NSC Weekly Legislative Report, December 3, 1977, Box 1, NSC Weekly Legislative Reports, 10-12/77, National Security Affairs - Staff Material - Press and Congressional Relations, JCL.

<sup>27</sup>Frank Moore to Jimmy Carter, February 1, 1978, Box 50, Panama Canal Calls, CF, O/A 413, Chief of Staff's Office, JCL.

the Treaties contingent upon Senate approval of the understandings or something similar.” The White House had finally seen the limits inherent in the strategy of bilateral appeals to senators’ patriotism or loyalty to the president, one which had never been realistic, given Carter’s limited popularity and small base of support even within his own party. Meantime, while the White House began acknowledging and cooperating with small and fluctuating groups of undecided senators to arrange a compromise, Moore urged Carter to single out Montana Democrat Paul Hatfield for special attention. “You will have to make a direct personal appeal for his vote,” Moore informed the president, advice an FDR or LBJ would scarcely have needed.<sup>28</sup>

Somehow, during the interval between the ratification of the first treaty in March and the second treaty in April, the White House again slipped into complacency. Jordan warned that “we definitely need to recreate the sense of urgency that has been absent since the first vote.” Jordan’s comment makes it clear that the White House never established a steady, disciplined approach to the management of the ratification process, but rather lurched from crisis to crisis, completely dependent upon external stimulus — polls, news stories, vote counts — to prompt it to action. Frantic last-minute appeals to loyalty and Carter’s agreement to support various senators’ pet projects helped save the treaties. The adroit intervention of Idaho Democrat Frank Church, no close ally of the administration, was instrumental in assuaging Panamanian anxiety over the DeConcini reservation, in a dramatic instance of senators pulling chestnuts out of the fire for the White House. The details of the final reservations

<sup>28</sup>Frank Moore, Dan Tate, Bob Beckel, Bob Thomson to Jimmy Carter, March 6, 1978, Box 3, Panama Canal, 9/77-5/79, Plains File - President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, JCL.

to the treaties were hammered out by key senators like Church while the White House at last stepped aside.<sup>29</sup>

Carter revisionists contend that the Carter presidency has been underrated, and that the “hands-on” president displayed more than normal political skills. While these scholars may have the better of the argument on Carter’s humane, reformist motives, Carter revisionism’s attempt to explain the president’s setbacks largely in terms of structural factors runs afoul of archival evidence to the contrary. In a two-part article published in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1979, Fallows, then the former chief speechwriter, set forth a highly influential picture of a “Passionless Presidency.” The president, like his White House staff, Fallows argued, was characterized by seriousness, hard work, and a genuine commitment to honesty and integrity in government. However, they had an impoverished idea “of what power is and how it might be exercised.” Carter repeatedly ran into political difficulties of his own making, as he and his advisors were too complacent to learn to master their jobs. There was no growth in the office, as Carter provided his staff with no incentive to improve, allowing failure to go unpunished. Having no “passion to convert himself from a good man into an effective one, to learn how to do the job,” Carter was not fully committed to translating ideas into action, and was often content with a surface appearance of accomplishment.<sup>30</sup>

Fallows’ perspective both reflected and reinforced the prevailing opinion of perhaps a majority of Americans in 1979 and 1980, and helped ensure Carter’s electoral defeat. Carter revisionists have tended to dismiss this argument as exaggerated, perhaps viewing the

<sup>29</sup>Hamilton Jordan to Jimmy Carter, no date but ca. 1978, Box 50, Panama Canal Treaties, 1977, CF, O/A 413 [1], Chief of Staff’s Office, JCL; LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer, *Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church* (Pullman, Wash., 1994).

<sup>30</sup>James Fallows, “The Passionless Presidency, I and II,” *Atlantic Monthly* 243:5 (May and June, 1979), pp. 33-48, 75-81.

“passionless presidency” thesis as the work of a disgruntled former staffer. Fallows’ insights, however, seem to fit the evidence that indicates Carter’s failure to make the most of the powers of persuasion inherent in the presidency. Carter failed to exercise firm leadership of the ratification effort, allowing resources to be diverted to an ineffectual public outreach effort. He could not control internal White House debates over the appropriate timing of a televised address. A disorganized speech-writing process resulted in an ineffectual fireside chat. The president could not devise a workable strategy for persuading individual undecided senators, and gravely mishandling the DeConcini episode. The technocratic Carter could neither provide leadership of public opinion nor guide the treaties through the Senate with the deft political touch of an FDR or LBJ. Carter, Fallows observed, “thinks he ‘leads’ by choosing the correct policy; but he fails to project a vision larger than the problem he is tackling at the moment.”<sup>31</sup>

Skidmore concludes his study of the treaty fight with the suggestion that “interpreters of Carter’s foreign policies would do well to focus less on the President’s personal attributes and more on the structure of the political constraints within which Carter was compelled to operate.”<sup>32</sup> Structures, however, can only help to explain the presence of obstacles, not the failure to achieve political objectives. If the archival materials available on the president’s performance in the canal treaty fight are any indication, the next wave of studies on Carter may take quite a different direction than that of Carter revisionism.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

<sup>32</sup> Skidmore, “Foreign Policy,” p. 493.

## REVISING EISENHOWER REVISIONISM?

by

Per F. I. Pharo

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As most revisionisms, Eisenhower revisionism has of late almost turned into conventional wisdom. In a 1997 *Diplomatic History* article on the “surprise attacks” conference of 1958, however, Jeremi Suri claims to be posing a challenge to Eisenhower revisionists by showing that Eisenhower was indecisive and unimaginative during the “surprise attack conference” of 1958: “The largely ignored documentary record of the conference sheds light on many of the Eisenhower administration’s shortcomings in the field of arms control.”<sup>1</sup>

Noting the asymmetry between Eisenhower’s desire for arms control and the achievements of his administration in that field, Suri ponders why “...the President failed to control the nuclear arms race he so dreaded?”<sup>2</sup> and points out that “... historians have found little evidence that Eisenhower prepared a concrete plan for arms limitations with any realistic chance of acquiring Soviet approval.”<sup>3</sup> His point regarding the surprise attack conference is that the Eisenhower administration was too obsessed with technological solutions to the problem of inspection, to the exclusion of more imaginative political proposals, and that the lack of presidential leadership reinforced that problem: “Eisenhower’s failure to

<sup>1</sup>Jeremy Suri, “America’s Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for ‘Eisenhower Revisionists’”, *Diplomatic History*, volume 21, number 3, summer 1997: 417-451, 421.

<sup>2</sup>Suri, “America’s Search...”, p. 419.

<sup>3</sup>Suri, “America’s Search...”, p. 419.

arbitrate the divisive debates within his administration and the alliance over the scope of arms control deliberations allowed Western activities to devolve to the lowest common ground — inspection proposals.”<sup>4</sup>

Suri’s argument is intriguing. I do believe, however, that his perspective is too narrow to sustain the broadness of his conclusions, and that it is his own, not Eisenhower’s, goals that Suri’s approach to the arms race would have realized. The unspoken assumptions of Suri’s argument are, first, that President Eisenhower *wanted* to be more compromising with the Soviets on arms control, and that the insistence upon inspection was mainly a bureaucratic construction to prevent progress towards arms control and disarmament; second, that the lack of progress in limiting the US-Soviet arms race was due to a failure of leadership.

These assumptions, however, are rather dubious. As to the first, the repeated attempts to increase the transparency of the Soviet Union, both through treaty proposals (“Open Skies”) and through espionage (U2), constitutes a running theme in Eisenhower’s presidency. As Eisenhower pointed out in his memoirs regarding the U2 overflights: “The importance of the effort at the time cannot be overemphasized. Our relative position in intelligence, compared to that of the Soviets, could scarcely have been worse. The Soviets enjoyed practically unimpeded access to information of a kind in which we were almost wholly lacking.”<sup>5</sup> Because Soviet society was so strictly controlled, and so little information escaped through ordinary channels, only elaborate inspection regimes could assure

<sup>4</sup>Suri, “America’s Search...”, p. 451.

<sup>5</sup>Eisenhower, *Waging Peace...*, p. 545. On Eisenhower’s general desire for intelligence on the Soviet Union, see also: Robert S. Hopkins III, “An Expanded Understanding of Eisenhower, American Policy and Overflights”, *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. II, April 1996, no. 2.

US decisionmakers — and public opinion — that treaties were being adhered to.

Eisenhower obviously was not blind to the fact that political initiatives would constitute an essential part of ending the arms race. However, transparency and verifiability was a *precondition* for the entire process, *both* to provide assurances against Soviet transgressions as to the treaty in question, *and* to provide a precedent for further — and more substantial — arms control and disarmament agreements. The corollary, of course, is that an insufficiently inspected treaty, whether against surprise attacks or nuclear testing, would be unacceptable *both* because it would imply a risk of Soviet transgressions *and* because it would set a dangerous precedent. This point illustrates why the other implication of Suri's argument is equally open to question. To postulate a leadership failure in Eisenhower's approach begs the real question: whether the US negotiating position in fact reflected his world view — a world view he shared with all his advisers. Basic to this world view was a distrust of the Soviet Union that made trust an unacceptable basis for agreement in matters of national security.

*All* the Eisenhower administration's more limited proposals in the direction of arms control were in a sense *test cases*: the issue was whether the Soviets would accept the degree of openness necessary for ending the arms race. As Eisenhower himself argued when commenting upon a watered-down version of the test ban treaty in 1959: "... we should still put a few inspection stations into Russia. Our real aim is to open up that country to some degree."<sup>6</sup> That was a sentiment he shared with all his advisers, which is why he did not settle internal disputes over "essential details", a trend that so bothers Suri. As Eisenhower saw it, US intra-administration disputes over technical details were secondary: what precluded agreement was the refusal of the Soviet leadership to open up their country to any kind of meaningful inspection. As the history of the

<sup>6</sup>Meeting of committee of principals with the President, 12.29.59, National Security Archives, Nuclear History Project, document nr 728, p. 3.

test ban negotiations in early 1960 shows, Eisenhower had no qualms about overruling the more hardline of his advisers *if and when* he thought an acceptable and meaningful agreement to be within reach.<sup>7</sup>

The “Surprise Attack conference” was a side-track, and a short-lasting one at that, the reasons for which Suri himself makes quite clear: the Soviets would not open their territory to inspection, and the Americans discovered that intimate Soviet knowledge of US nuclear weapons installations might not have been such a good idea after all.<sup>8</sup> What Suri neglects, however, is that when an *inspected* agreement was no longer seen as achievable, a “surprise attack”-treaty was no longer desirable; inspection was the *sine qua non* of all US arms control initiatives in the period. Thus, focus was shifted to areas where inspected agreements *could* hopefully be reached, first and foremost the test ban issue. As it turned out, the test ban negotiations, too, became entangled in disagreements over inspection.

Suri is thus probably right that the Eisenhower administration never prepared an arms control plan “with any realistic chance of acquiring Soviet approval.” The reason, however, was not lethargy and bureaucratic maneuvering, but a very real disagreement between US and Soviet decisionmakers regarding the degree of transparency required for arms control to be an option. For Eisenhower, arms control negotiations were not a search for agreement at any cost. Rather, they constituted a search for US-Soviet consensus on the principles necessary for substantial and lasting arms control and

<sup>7</sup>See Per F. I. Pharo, *Prudence or Paranoia? Why the Government of the United States of America Did Not Accept Soviet Proposals for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty during the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidencies 1958-1963*, unpublished ‘cand. Philol.’ thesis in history, University of Oslo, 1997; see also: Robert Divine, *Blowin’ on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debates 1954-1960*, New York 1978.

<sup>8</sup>Suri, “America’s Search...”, p. 446-449.

disarmament, namely those of transparency and verifiability. When that consensus could not be found, the only remaining option – for Eisenhower as for Truman before him and Kennedy and Johnson after him – was a continued dependence upon US nuclear superiority to keep the peace. The leadership “shortcomings in the field of arms control” that Suri claims to have detected, then, are illusory. If there were shortcomings in the Eisenhower administration’s arms control policies, they had to do with the nature of Eisenhower’s goals, not the nature of his leadership.

PHILIPPINE VIGNETTES:  
A NOTE ON PHILIPPINE PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS

by  
Milton W. Meyer

Most of my fun writing, a rare commodity today in the groves of academe, results from idle curiosity especially with relevance to Philippine affairs to which I am both personally and professionally committed. Born and raised in prewar Capiz (later Roxas City), I gravitate toward topics that embrace the archipelago generally and my hometown and province specifically. So in the course of a week or so stay in Manila in May, 1999, I tried to gather various strands of basic bibliographic research at various venues in the national capital. Desultory digs into presidential papers uncovered little on backwoods Capiz or anything substantial or blockbusting on the broader rubric of Philippine diplomatic affairs, the topic of my Stanford doctoral dissertation in 1959 and published by the University of Hawaii Press six years later.

I list the following presidential papers sequentially in chronological order of incumbency. At the National Library, the papers of

Manuel L. Quezon, first president of the Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1944 in office) miraculously survived the terrible devastation of World War II. Partly to ease their own research, early postwar American doctoral students helped to create a semblance of order to the Collection into classified categories. I did not delve into the Osmena papers, second Commonwealth president (1944-1946) and unsuccessful contender against Manuel Roxas for the office as first president of the (third) Philippine Republic, proclaimed on July 4, 1946. I was more interested in the writings of the first eight presidents of the Republic, Roxas through Fidel Ramos.

The papers of President Roxas (1946 — d.1948), are also in the National Library, Filipiniana Division, Rarebook and Manuscript Room. Librarians could not have been more helpful, especially after I identified my geographical origins. A series of librarians have laboriously compiled two valuable works. The first, a Register of his papers in the National Library, revised edition, 1995, has extended biographical information and more filed in fourteen subjects: Box 4 is General Miscellany (1916-1948); Box 16 is Domestic Affairs, with scant reference to Capiz. Librarian Feliciano Aldaba compiled additionally a second work, "Calendar of Manuel A. Roxas: Speeches, Statements and Messages" (1997) with a helpful index, which lists only one presidential Capiz entry (#253) of June 14, 1946, a two-line message for the *Capiz Weekly*.

In April, 1948, after Roxas dropped dead of a massive heart attack, ironically while speech-making on the American Clark Air Field base, Elpidio Quirino (1948-1953), his vice president and foreign minister, assumed presidential reins. Vicky, his daughter, donated papers to the Ayala Museum with its affiliated Filipino Heritage Library and neatly arranged presidential boxes. An index identifies the general contents of each box; it was a pleasure to work in the airconditioned, well-organized, comfortable, user-friendly milieu. (It helped that I enjoy the friendship of Ayala's director, Ms. Sonia Ner). In Box 45, there were at least three items relating to Capiz support of Quirino in his successful 1949 election against Jose P. Laurel, former president of the (second) Japanese-sponsored

Philippine Republic. In 1953, Quirino lost to his popular ex-Secretary of Defense, Roman Magsaysay, a man of the people.

The papers of Magsaysay (1953 — d.1957) are in a third location, housed on the bayfront Roxas (ex-Dewey) Boulevard, in archives associated with the Asia Library in the building of the Magsaysay Award Foundation, of which another friend, Carmencita (Carn) Abella, is the (fourth) CEO. It savors the sweet scent of money; the Rockefeller family was greatly drawn to the late president. After his death, it not only furnished funds to build the edifice and house appropriate collections, but it also provided funds to cover annual Magsaysay Awards (they had been \$25,000 apiece) to outstanding Asian personalities in five fields: public service; government service; community leadership; international understanding (ex-president Cory Aquino received this award last year); and journalism, literature & creative communication arts. Again, numerous boxes contain the eclectic collections, but what I found most useful was the “Presidential Diary of Ramon Magsaysay”; I (1954), II (1955), III (1956), and a 1957 epilogue, which were bound issues from the *Official Gazette* of the *Official Month in Review*. These entries revealed the pressing minutiae of official functions, but what I now found scary was when the president of the Philippine, tiring of these, periodically escaped for hours on end without trace of undisclosed locations.

In a succession reminiscent of the Roxas-Quirino administrations, Magsaysay, who died in a Cebu plane crash in early 1957, was succeeded by Carlos Garcia (1957-1961), his vice president, whose bulk of papers (some remain with family) are back in the Filipiniana Division of the National Library. A typed manuscript, as processed by Pat Nivera and others, is “Carlos P. Garcia: A Register of His Papers in the National Library,” with a most useful detailed chronology and diary of his life. Now the next presidents may be disposed of in short shrift. Papers of Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965) are with family; those of Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) are with the Marcos Foundation, wherever that is; those of Corazon

Aquino (1986-1992) are to be housed in her home province of Tarlac; and finally, those of Fidel Ramos, (1992-1998) are to be kept in a Manila-area collection.

Regrettably, there is little Philippine interest within the immediate families or in the public at large to preserve for posterity the presidential papers. People who should have interest list other priorities; people who have money elsewhere. The National Library, with its limited funds and expertise, endeavors "to do with what have" to preserve the legacy of at least two presidential administrations (Roxas and Garcia) but the best care is provided for another two (Quirino and Magsaysay) in private foundations. There has been talk about purchasing a string of lots along Roxas Boulevard to build other repositories for presidential papers but such a proposition remains a pipe dream.

## A NOTE ON FOOTNOTES

by

Robert H. Ferrell

INDIANA - EMERITUS

I do hope that readers of the *Newsletter* will not mind a short reminiscence concerning footnotes - this from a charter member of the Society. It was fifty years ago as I now write, in August, 1949, that the then Sterling Professor of History at Yale, the formidable Samuel Flagg Bemis, sent two of his graduate students, Lawrence S. Kaplan and me, to the Library of Congress where, as he may have said, "they all start," Kaplan to search out new material on Thomas Jefferson and France, myself to discover whether President Thomas Jefferson in 1807-08 was in league, as the Federalists said, with Napoleon Bonaparte. Kaplan's journey turned into part of his lifetime's dual study of not merely the Jefferson era but that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and he has produced a cornucopia of books and articles on these two subjects. My study

soon proved unprovable (and I later learned that Sam Bemis had sent other graduate students to the Library of Congress for the same goosechase). The only evidence I ever discovered of the league between Jefferson and Napoleon was a small letter sent from Boston to the president of the United States in which the writer, obviously a Boston Federalist, arranged a sort of early nineteenth-century comic valentine: as I opened the letter in the Jefferson papers, beyond the wax seal, the paper began to unfold, until it reached a foot and more in size; in large capitals the writer assumed his proof of Jefferson's perfidy and passed with celerity to his sentiment, which was "Go to hell, you bugger, go to hell." (Jefferson annotated the letter at the bottom: "Anonymous blackguard.")

The above constituted a scholarly first run, and I pass to footnotes, which as my scholarship turned more serious have often been of concern, and in this regard let me say something about several forms that have caught attention over the many years. I see these forms often, and wish to protest them, and indeed would welcome agreement or defense from readers of the *Newsletter* in future issues.

A first footnote form that I do not admire is the placing of bibliographical references in the footnotes. One or two might have justification, if they are arcane, not well known books. Here, let me add quickly, I speak of books, not articles difficult to know about, assuredly not manuscript sources. Scholarly articles often appear in which the authors cite a dozen or more books, apparently evidence that they have seen this material. An article is, to my mind, necessarily a piece of new research, or a think-piece, not a place to ventilate one's knowledge of published books. It is, the article, a step forward in advancing knowledge, and if a piece of research would perhaps become a chapter in a book, the author of the article can list his books in a bibliography at the back.

A footnote on the above footnote. Sometimes one sees in an article an initial two footnotes. The first will list all the books in which whatever dreadful scholarly error the author of the article is about

to correct. The second will display the few books in which the authors, perhaps witlessly, escaped the error.

A second variety of footnote to which I take exception might be described as a bucket note. And let me say that surely some buckets, so to speak, have justification. Recently a graduate student from Ferdinand, Indiana, sent me the notes to his dissertation chapters and I saw at once that he had far too many. Making a rough measure of his word-processor copy, doublespaced, he had 250 words on a page. If they appeared in print they likely would translate to 400. Judging from his four notes per typescript page, in print he might find himself with seven note numbers and of course footnotes or notes shoved to the back of the book. To be sure, many publishers place notes at the back because even now, with extraordinarily complicated measurements possible because of tapes and computers, it is technically difficult to use footnotes. But using notes rather than footnotes, tossing the apparatus of sources to the back, is also a way for a publisher to get an overabundance of footnotes out of sight, perhaps almost losing them by not permitting page numbers at the tops of the rear-end note pages. But to return to the bucket notes. If a writer will carefully use a bucket, that is, several references seriatim in a single footnote (or note), all will be well and it will prove easily possible to cut notes in half. Which is what I advised the student from Ferdinand. I did caution him to be careful not to place an upraised number at the end of every paragraph, which would appear - and indeed would be - mechanical.

The above description of a bucket footnote as I now read it does justice to some buckets, but let me come to why I basically dislike most of them. The writers of many articles and books use buckets to hide their sources, or so I am tempted to say. If there are several sources in their lengthy footnotes the reader becomes bewildered as to what is the basic source - what pertains to the text material. The footnote is simply bewildering. Three, four, five basic sources? What one is the quickest way to the perhaps outrageous notion presented in the text? Surely it is the duty of an author to inform,

not to throw dirt in a reader's eye. Whoever told a writer he was writing a tract or otherwise some piece of ideology?

The bibliographical footnote. The bucket, with its usefulness and its sly persuasions. Then there is third variety of footnote that simply bewilders, and this is the citation of not merely sets of personal papers in, say, presidential or other libraries across the country but their archival collections, in all their detail, including box numbers and folder names. If the author of an article is quoting in the text, or if there is a quotation that does not fit the text but is collaterally important, it deserves this careful citation, indeed demands it. But if the author, and such is so often the case, is parading the fact that he has been to some library, such show-off citation in the footnotes is altogether out of order. Editors should force the removal of such nonsense. Unfortunately many editors are not themselves scholarly and other editors think they can employ copyeditors for manuscripts. The copyeditors often are college or university undergraduates who can hardly spell cat. Large New York publishing houses, indeed most of those I know, no longer police book manuscripts this way. Most of them have resorted to self-proclaimed non-house editors. The former secretary of one of my friends has edited - I write the word hesitatingly - a dozen or more books for Oxford University Press; she can spell cat, but any sense of what is extraneous footnoting would be beyond her ken. Now many journals have been removed from editing by the colleges or universities or learned societies that sponsor them, this supposedly because of efficiencies in publication, have their editing done in factories, and the factory workers are anonymous drones who, like the out-of-house book editors, lack all sense of what constitutes a proper footnote and would not wish to change a footnote morass even if they discovered it, for it would mess up their already word-processor taped copy.

A very few university presses still maintain the old tradition of placing first-class, that is, trained editors on books and periodicals they publish. The University of Missouri Press is one of them; they employ in-house editors who know over-footing when they see it,

and take it out. That press has a few outsiders, carefully vetted by the press director. The University Press of Kansas uses outsiders, but excellent ones. The University Press of Colorado does likewise.

I come lastly to the fourth variety of footnotes, to which I raise objection. This one might be described as the deceptive footnote. Its purpose is not to clarify but to fool the reader. Here there are three subtypes.

The perhaps least offensive of the subtypes is a footnote that shows what I could denominate "xerox research." At the present time the presidential libraries are not being used as much as they should be, the museums attached to them are now receiving tourists and researchers are not either coming to the libraries or, if they come, are genealogists or individuals curious about this or that. Such surely is a saddening situation - but let me pass to my point. Not merely are the archivists being inundated by citizens who send in silly requests for Harry S. Truman's birthday date, but many scholars who surely ought to know better, and I firmly believe do know better, are calling in their requests. In August, 1998, I came flatly up against such a request, and wish to relate it in detail below, for edification perhaps of the readers of the *Newsletter*. My point here is that even the calling in of a scholarly request by a scholar is all right if that scholar, preparing his footnotes afterward, declares openly not merely that he received the material from such and such a library but that it was sent him and that he, himself, did not go there. To give the impression of research in a library, physically being there, has become almost a common practice. I know a researcher who does that. He has not been in the Harry S. Truman Library since 1988, and has told me so. I was there at the time and saw him spend three days there, a totally inadequate time. In the footnotes to his scholarly articles this fact is not evident, and a reader of his footnotes would believe that he has been there often.

My case study in the danger of not visiting a library physically, calling for xeroxes that will make it possible to give evidence of research without doing it, occurred in August, 1988, when I visited

the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, and stayed for a week. From Bloomington, Indiana, this visit meant a long drive over the New York Turn-pike, and my arrival coincided with the county fair, which meant a room in the White House Motel next to a fair roustabout who was showing himself porno films with the sounds passing through the walls. It was not a pleasant experience. But I discovered that the authors of a book about the Kansas City political boss, Thomas J. Pendergast, had called in a xerox order for materials on Pendergast for the years 1938-39, and because they did not know any better and had failed to go to the library they did not - nor did the disgusted archivists, who sent them what they asked for - follow through to the end of the box run in the papers of Henry Worgenthau. There, in a box labeled "1942", after Pendergast had spent his year and a day at Leavenworth, was a book-length account of the boss's investigator. I was working on a book, *Truman and the Pendergast*, published in June, 1999. I published the 1942 manuscript as a twin to my own book. It had a 2,000 copy printing and in the first three months has sold half of it.

A second subtype of the deceptive footnote is the citing of manuscript materials as such rather than their already published accountings. It does little service to a reader to inform him that "See Ann Whitman File, box 24, folder entitled 'Ike's dictation, June 24, 1957,'" when no reader should have to travel to Abilene, Kansas. The quotation is available in my editing of *The Eisenhower Diaries* (1981). The published source must be the reference source, for a footnote is to inform a reader where to find material in the easiest way. It would be possible for a author using the original diary material in Abilene to cite to the Louis P. Galambos edition of Eisenhower's papers, the definitive edition. Galambos and his assistants corrected a few of my place names and personal names. But my edition is more readily available in public libraries.

The last subtype of a deceptive footnote requires little explanation, save to say that it will slip and slide around the point made in the text, in such a way as to seem to support it but not really do so.

And there is a sub-subtype of this footnote that consists of bringing in the material of other scholars without acknowledgement, as if one has seen it. I need not describe this excrescence.

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## LETTERS

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To the Editor:

Robert Buzzanco is to be applauded for devoting his Bernath lecture to calling for a renewal of New Left scholarship. I share his political commitment and many of his sentiments. The economic determinants in U.S. foreign policy are crucial, and they deserve more attention. Leftists and revisionists — inclusively and generously defined — should do more to challenge triumphalist interpretations of U.S. foreign policy. For that latter reason, however, Buzzanco seems unwise and undiscerning in lumping together the perspectives of Melvyn P. Leffler and of John L. Gaddis. Further, the confusion with which Buzzanco discusses the analysis of language suggests that those of us who are using this approach have perhaps been remiss in not making clear what we are trying to do and why.

Mel Leffler can certainly defend himself, but I would point out that it seems odd to link his analysis with that of John Gaddis when Leffler devoted most of the chapters in *Preponderance of Power* and his 1984 AHR essay to contrasting the Soviets' caution with the Truman administration's persistent pushing for advantage throughout most of the globe. Moreover, in his 1996 essay in *Foreign Affairs*, his April 1999 article in the AHR, in his remarks at the June 1999 SHAFR convention, and at a September 1999 conference at Yale on Stalin, Leffler consistently challenged the main arguments in *We Now Know*, namely, that new archival evidence supposedly demonstrates that Stalin's psychological state and revolutionary romanticism bear primary responsibility for the origins of the Cold War. I agree that Leffler is more critical of the Truman

administration in the text than in the conclusion of *Preponderance*, yet it is too much of a stretch to label him a “Leonard Zelig” (p. 581).

However unfair, the language “Zelig” constitutes a powerful rhetorical strategy: once attached, labels can be difficult to unstick. Language has consequences and power. In foreign policy as in other human activities, *how* something is expressed helps shape *what* is expressed. Although Buzzanco acknowledges that approaches using gender and language “do have some merit,” (p. 586), he shortchanges the utility of such approaches in his determination to differentiate sharply between a serious, politics-and-economics-oriented New Left and a supposedly lightweight, “trendy” preoccupation with “gender assumptions and choice of words” (p.596). Language is much more than a “choice of words.” That phrase suggests examining the trees rather than the forest. The forest is language, which is a system of meaning with which we think about and make sense of the world, including concepts of economic relations and of foreign policy. Whether the outflow of U.S. dollars in the 1960s that Buzzanco analyzes so ably should be understood primarily as “an intolerable deficit in our balance of payments,” (p. 595) or as the U.S. providing its consumers with inexpensive imports and its corporations with advantageous foreign investments, was a matter of political, economic, or cultural judgment, simultaneously justified through appropriate language. The language that people use, particularly when they want to be persuasive, is not a random assemblage of transparent, interchangeable words, but rather a culturally specific, often emotionally charged system that historians and other scholars can analyze to yield meaning. Language that explicitly or implicitly refers to gender and pathology can have particularly powerful effects because it endows socially constructed concepts and judgments with the authority of supposedly immutable, biological “facts”.

Buzzanco’s statement that individuals are more “likely to agree on policies when their material interests intersect than when they

happen to be the same gender”(p.587) missed the point that “gender” as most scholars use it today refers not to a person’s biological sexual identity but rather to the behaviors and characteristics that societal customs attach to that biological identity. Gender thereby becomes a category of thinking with which people organize and make sense of things, including, sometimes, foreign policy. Buzzanco argues that analysis of policymakers’ language or “concepts of gender may be interesting, but it offers a mere insight into their overall world view” (p.605). But how can policymakers express their world view except through language? Why denigrate the possible insights? Sometimes analysis of language is helpful in constructing historical meaning, sometimes not, but it has always seemed to me that more meaning and multiple insights made for richer history. Buzzanco’s argument that “gender assumptions and choice of words are principally a good starting point for analysis rather than conclusive in their own right”(p.576) also missed the mark. Rather than a starting or an ending point, reading for gendered language and for other tropes of language is a tool that historians can use as they read documents at any stage of their analysis. As for such approaches not being “conclusive in their own right,” whoever claimed that they were? And is any other mode of analysis so conclusive?

Buzzanco argues that the articles on foreign affairs recently published in the JAH recently “are a far cry from the New Left of the 1960s” (p.585). But whose New Left? Certainly a cultural critique of the dominant society was part of the New Left. More specifically, feminism and an awareness of the gender bases and biases of society — analyzing the ideology of gender (as well as of class and racial) oppression — were central parts of that diffuse movement. And as Buzzanco sure knows from his books on the Vietnam war, the New Left understood that opposing that conflict required challenging the U.S. government’s justifying rhetoric of “communist aggression”, “democratic South Vietnam”, “pacification”, “Vietnamization” and “lack of will.” Scholars on the left need to be particularly careful not to succumb to the anxious notion that dangerous others, whether they be postmodernists,

purveyors of new approaches, social historians, or “the girls,” are “taking over” and they will dominate everything if they are at all present.

I certainly agree with Buzzanco that historians of foreign relations need to pay more attention to what Walter Lippmann called the “manufacturing of consent” (p.606). Indeed the study of language is often most useful in tracing the rhetorical strategies that opinion makers (with varying degrees of intentionality) use — that is, the emotional and conceptual “buttons” they push — in order to shape and to restrict debate. It is puzzling, therefore, that Buzzanco assumes that somehow one can differentiate sharply between the “thought and language” of the political and opinion leaders analyzed by Kristin Hoganson in *Fighting for American Manhood* and the “material interests” of these same people. How can those leaders of 1898, or we in our time, understand material interests except as mediated through thought and language? And, as Hoganson shows, gendered language shaped, though it did not determine, how those material interests were conceptualized. Similarly, the point of my 1999 AHA conference paper on George F. Kennan’s lecture tour across the U.S. was not that language is separate from material and class interests (it is not separate), but rather that Kennan’s linkage of containment with masculinity, maturity, and astuteness — and his linkage of opposition to containment with femininity, immaturity and inanity — made it more difficult for anyone, including Kennan, to see the problems with containment. Particularly poignant, in view of Kennan’s later campaign for nuclear disarmament, was the way his own categories facilitated his dismissal in 1946 of the warnings of atomic scientists about an arms race: “Politically, these people are as innocent as six year old maidens” (p.587). Buzzanco reproduces this quotation from Kennan while missing, it appears, the point about how language can shape perceptions of political choice.

Buzzanco’s underestimation of the power of language is particularly puzzling because he himself makes such effective use of emotional language in the last sections of his lecture. In writing of “American

bloodlust", of Americans' "calling for the heads of Iranian mullahs", (p.596) of the Turkish government's use of U.S. equipment in "ransacking ...looting...killing...and loading a group of already bloodied men," (p.599) and in his linking "the American flag" with "slaughtered Indians...beheaded Filipino insurgents...[and] women and children in a mass grave at My Lai," (p.605) Buzzanco is indeed appealing to the "heart." (p.607) I share Bob Buzzanco's outrage at much of the legacy of U.S. policy. Yet as the experience of the New Left in the streets demonstrated, the arousal of emotion can be motivating, and fun, but emotional rhetoric helped make the antiwar movement unpopular and foster a backlash. Moreover, emotional thinking can also be used by the right to promote repression and militarism. Given the conjunctions of power in both academe and in U.S. society, the left is particularly vulnerable in "the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake" (p.607). In pondering how the United States might transcend the tragedy of its diplomatic and social system, William Appleman Williams advocated not the noisy emotion of a crusade, but quiet, forceful reason.

Frank Costigliola  
University of Connecticut

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## ANNOUNCEMENTS

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### U Conn Seminars

The Foreign Policy Seminar at the University of Connecticut has announced the following lectures for the 1999-2000 year. Two of the lectures have occurred by "press time" but two remain to be heard. Faculty and graduate students in New England are cordially invited to attend. They are held at 4:30 pm in Wood Hall on the U Conn campus. Please contact Frank Costigliola, Department of

History, U-103, U Conn Storrs, Conn. 06269, telephone:860-486-4356, email: costig@uconnvm.uconn.edu

On Friday, 25 February 2000, Christina Klein of MIT will speak on "Cold War Sentimentalism: The Middlebrow Culture of Collective Security."

On Friday, 7 April 2000, Robert K. Brigham of Vassar College will speak on the Vietnamese experience during the Vietnam War.

### **Bernath Lecture**

The Bernath Lecture Committee has asked that the membership be reminded to submit nominations for the 2000 Lecture Prize. The details are in the Bernath Awards, Prizes, and Grants section, p. 43.

### **U.S. Army Center of Military History Dissertation Fellowships**

The fellowships will support scholarly research and writing among qualified civilian graduate students preparing dissertations in the history of war on land. The Center offers two fellowships each year which carry a \$9,000 stipend and access to the Center's facilities and technical expertise. For purposes of this program, the history of war on land is broadly defined, including such areas as biography, military campaigns, military organization and administration, policy, strategy, tactics, weaponry, technology, training, logistics, and the evolution of civil-military relations. In the selection of proposals for funding, preference is given to topics on the history of the U.S. Army. Topics submitted should complement rather than duplicate the Center's existing projects.

Obtain applications from: Executive Secretary, Dissertation Fellowship Committee, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Bldg. 35, 103 3d Ave., Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-

5058. Tel: (202) 685-2278/2709, Fax: (202) 685-2077, E-mail: BIRTLAJ@hqda.army.mil. Applications can also be downloaded from the Center's web site: <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg>. Applications and all supporting documents for the Dissertation Fellowships must be postmarked no later than 15 January each year; none are accepted when mailed after that date.

### **International Intelligence History**

The newsletter of the International History Study Group, *IHSG - NEWSLETTER*, Vol 6, No 2, is now available in a WWW version at: <http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de>

### **Truman Materials Online**

To make the Harry S. Truman Library's extensive collection of research documents available world-wide, the Library has digitized and placed several of the highest-priority oral history interview transcripts and descriptions of archival collections of personal papers and records on their Web site.

The new online materials are found on the "Research" page of the Truman Library's Web site, located at [www.trumanlibrary.org](http://www.trumanlibrary.org). Most of the new online materials focus on international affairs, including oral history interviews with Dean Acheson, Clark Clifford, and W. Averell Harriman. Other materials of interest concern the recognition of Israel — oral histories of A.J. Granoff, Abraham Feinberg and Fraser Wilkins and descriptions of the papers of Granoff and Truman friend and advocate of recognition, Edward Jacobson. Issues of the immediate Post-World War II era are also documented in an interview with Commissioner for Displaced Persons Harry Rosenfield and in the papers and oral history transcript of Treasury official Bernard Bernstein. The latter materials have attracted international interest as a result of the Nazi war assets controversy.

Regina



Books

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SHAFR MEMBER DISCOUNT

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**CHARTING AN INDEPENDENT COURSE: Finland's Place in the Cold War and in U.S. Foreign Policy.** T. Michael Ruddy.

(1998) 228pp

The authors succeed in dispelling many of the stereotypes surrounding the Finns and their strategic postures in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and they provide ample support for the indictment against American scholars for overlooking Finnish history." *Choice*

Cloth \$32.95, Paper \$14.95

**SHAFR Price (paper) \$8.00**

**INTO THE DARK HOUSE: American Diplomacy & the Ideological Origins of the Cold War.** Joseph M. Siracusa. (1998)

288pp.

"...Siracusa describes with care the 'intellectual world' of the West's Cold Warriors....Among his more interesting conclusions are that [Frank] Roberts and Kennan influenced one another in Moscow in 1946, that NSC 68 did not represent a dramatic break with NSC documents drafted two years earlier, and that the outbreak of the Korean War made it impossible to resolve the Cold War at an early stage." *Choice*

Cloth \$36.95, Paper \$17.95.

**SHAFR Price (paper) \$9.00**

**BALKAN CURRENTS: Studies in the History, Culture & Society of a Divided Land.** Lawrence A. Tritle. (1998)160pp

The essays in this volume give equal weight to Finland and the Finnish situation as well as the Cold War and the role of the United States. The goal is to shed new light on Finland's place in the Cold War and in American foreign policy.

Cloth \$21.95

**SHAFR Price (cloth) \$13.00**

**AMERICA'S AUSTRALIA/AUSTRALIA'S AMERICA.**

Joseph M. Siracusa & Yeong-Han Cheong (1997) 160pp

"[This is] the best available introduction to relations between these two continental, British-begotten, frontier-shaped, Pacific powers....The writing is robust, at times delightfully so." *Journal of American History*

\$21.95 cloth, \$12.95 pap

**SHAFR Price (paper) \$7.00**

SHAFR MEMBER DISCOUNTS

**The Cuban-Caribbean Missile Crisis of October 1962.** Lester H. Brune. (1996) 160pp. \$12.95 paper      SHAFR Price (pap) \$8.00

**America and the Indochina Wars, 1945-1990: A Bibliographical Guide.** Lester H. Brune & Richard Dean Burns, eds (1992) 352pp. \$39.95      SHAFR Price (cloth) \$13.00

**Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion.** Norman A. Graebner. (1983) 278pp. \$14.95 paper      SHAFR Price (paper) \$9.00

**Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries.** Raymond Esthus. (1982) 165pp \$12.95      SHAFR Price (paper) \$8.00

**Panama, the Canal and the United States.** Thomas M. Leonard. 144pp. \$10.95 paper      SHAFR Price (paper) \$6.00

<b>Siracusa.</b> <i>In the Dark House</i> ,,,	\$ 9.00	—
<b>Ruddy.</b> <i>Charting an Independent Course</i> ,,,	\$ 8.00	—
<b>Tritle.</b> <i>Balkan Currents</i> ,,,	\$13.00	—
<b>Siracusa.</b> <i>America's/Australia</i> ,,,	\$ 7.00	—
<b>Brune.</b> <i>Cuban-Caribbean Missile Crisis</i>	\$ 8.00	—
<b>Brune.</b> <i>Amer. &amp; the Indochina Wars</i> ,,,	\$13.00	—
<b>Graebner.</b> <i>Empire on Pacific</i> ...	\$ 9.00	—
<b>Esthus.</b> <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	\$ 8.00	—
<b>Leonard.</b> <i>Panama, the Canal</i>	\$ 6.00	—

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CALENDAR

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2000

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
- January 6-9 114th annual meeting of the AHA in Chicago.
- January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
- February 1 Deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- April 15 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- March 30-April 2 The 93rd meeting of the OAH will take place at the Adam's Mark in St. Louis.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 24-27 SHAFR's 26th annual conference will meet in Toronto. Program chair: Jeffrey Smith, History Dept., Queen's U, Kingston, Ontario. See: [www.ryerson.ca/shafr2000](http://www.ryerson.ca/shafr2000)
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

The AHA will meet in Boston, January 4-7, 2001. Proposal packages should be sent to: Michael Bernstein, Co-chair, AHA 2001 Program Committee, Dept. of History, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., LaJolla, CA 92093-0104 (See page 42 of *AHA Perspectives*, Sept 1999. Subsequent meetings: San Francisco, January 3-6, 2002; Chicago, January 2-5, 2003; and Washington, January 8-11.

The 2001 meeting of the OAH will take place at the Westin Bonaventure in Los Angeles, April 26-29. The 2002 meeting will be held in Washington, April 11-14, at the Renaissance Hotel.

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## PERSONALS

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Michael Hogan (Ohio State) has just stepped up to become Interim Dean of Humanities at his university.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones(Edinburgh) has been elected chair of the newly-formed Scottish Association for the Study of America (Website: <http://www.arts.gla.ac.us/CAS/sasa/>). He has also been granted a research leave award by the (British) Arts and Humanities Research Board to work on a book, "Hyperbole, Public Relations and the History of US Secret Intelligence."

Detlef Junker is leaving the German Historical Institute in Washington and returning to his post at the Historisches Seminar der Universität Heidelberg.

Rafael Medof (SUNY) has been named Associate Book Review Editor of "American Jewish History", the premier scholarly journal in that field.

Tom Schoonover has been named the SLEMCO/Board of Regents Support Fund Professor of the Liberal Arts at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.

Robert Shaffer (Shippensburg University) has been awarded the Charles DeBenedetti Prize of the Peace History Society for his article, "Cracks in the Consensus: Defending the Rights of Japanese Americans During World War II," which appeared in *Radical History Review*, Fall 1998.

PUBLICATIONS

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Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds., *John F. Kennedy and Europe*. Louisiana State University Press, 1999. ISBN: 0807123323, \$60.00.

Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955*. Hardcover: ISBN 0807123102, \$47.50; Paperback: ISBN 0807124095, \$22.50.

William Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*. UNC Press, 1999. Hardcover: ISBN 0807824283, \$49.95; Paperback: ISBN 080784747X, \$18.95.

Charles T. Johnson (Valdosta State), *Culture at Twilight: The National German-American Alliance, 1901-1918*. New York and Bern: Peter Lang, 1999. ISBN 0820444227, \$49.95.

Judith A. Klinghoffer, *Vietnam, Jews, and the Middle East: Unintended Consequences*. St. Martin's Press, 1999. ISBN 0312218419, \$45.00.

Kenneth D. Lehman, (Hampden - Sydney), *Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership*. Univ of Georgia, 1999. Cloth: ISBN 082032115X, \$55.00; Paper: ISBN 0820321168, \$20.00.

Fred Logevall (California - Santa Barbara), *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam*. Univ of California, 1999. ISBN 0520215117, \$35.00.

Dean B. Mahin, *One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War*. Brassey's, 1999. ISBN 1574882090, \$29.95.

Nancy Mitchell (N.C. State), *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America*. U. of North Carolina Press, 1999. Hardcover: ISBN 0807824895, \$49.95, Paperback: ISBN 0807847755, \$19.95.

Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller (Naval Historical Center), *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War*. Naval Historical Center, 1999. ISBN 0160494761, \$59.00.

Emily Rosenberg (Macalester), *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*. Harvard Press, 1999. ISBN 0674000595, \$45.00.

W.R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over West Germany*. St. Martin's, 1999. ISBN 0312066058, \$39.95.

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## AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

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### THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

#### The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

**DESCRIPTION:** This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

**ELIGIBILITY:** The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and

works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

**PROCEDURES:** Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Doron Ben-Atar, Department of History, Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458.

Books may be sent at any time during 1999, but should not arrive later than February 1, 2000.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 1999 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 2000.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1993 Elizabeth Cobbs	1996 Robert Buzzanco
1994 Tim Borstelmann	1997 Carolyn Eisenberg
1995 James Hershberg	1998 Penny Von Eschen
Reinhold Wagnleitner	

**The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize**

**DESCRIPTION:** The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The winner of the 2000 competition will deliver a lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

**ELIGIBILITY:** The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent

excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

**PROCEDURES:** Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 2000. The Chairperson of the Committee is: Kathryn Weathersby, 1920 N. Ode Street., Arlington, VA 22209.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1994 Diane Kunz	1997 Elizabeth Cobbs
1995 Thomas Schwartz	1998 Peter Hahn
1996 Douglas Brinkley	1999 Robert Buzzanco

**The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize**

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

**ELIGIBILITY:** Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1999. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

**PROCEDURES:** All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 2000. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Anders Stephanson, History, Columbia Univ., NY, NY 10027. The award is given at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the OAH annual meeting.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1995 Heike Bungert	1998 Nancy Bernhard
1996 David Fitzsimons	1999 Robert Dean
1997 Robert Vitalis	Michael Latham

**The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant**

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications, in triplicate, must include:
  - (a) applicant's vita;
  - (b) a brief dissertation prospectus focusing on the significance of the thesis (2-4 pages will suffice);
  - (c) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value;
  - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
  - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately to the selection committee chair.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1,500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to: Susan Brewer, History, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, Stevens Point WI 54481. The deadline for application is November 1, 2000.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1994 Delia Pergande	1997 D'Arcy M. Brissman
1995 Amy L. Staples	1998 Max Friedman
1996 David Fitzsimons	

**Georgetown Travel Grants**

The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee also administers grants to be funded from the SHAFR Georgetown fund to support travel for research in the Washington area. The amounts are determined by the committee.

**The Myrna F. Bernath Book and Fellowship Awards**

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 2000 and 2001 will be considered in 2002. Submission deadline is November 15, 2001. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Katherine Sibley, History Dept., St. Joseph's University, 5600 City Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19131.

**PREVIOUS WINNERS**

1991 Diane Kunz and Betty Unterberger  
1996 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Katherine Sibley, Department of History, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA 19131. Submission deadline is November 15, 2000.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1992	Shannon Smith	1997	Deborah Kisatsky
1994	Regina Gramer		Mary Elise Savotte
	Jaclyn Stanke		
	Christine Skwiot		

**THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP**

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research

on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 2000, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 2000 to: Elizabeth McKillen, History Dept., 5774 Stevens Hall, University of Maine, Orono ME 04469-5774.

Holt Memorial Fellowships carry awards of \$2000, \$1500, and \$1000. Announcements of the recipients will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowships will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used. A version of the report of the first-place winner will subsequently be published in the *SHAFR Newsletter*.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1997 Max Friedman

1998 (1st) Christopher Endy

(2nd) Richard Wiggers

(3rd) Xiaodong Wang

1999 (1st) Michael Donoghue

(2nd) Gregg Brazinsky

(3rd) Carol Chin

**THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD**

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

**CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD:** The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession.

Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: James Matray, History, Box 3H, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, 88003-8001. Phone: 505-646-1515, Fax: 505-646-8148, email: [jmatray@nmsu.edu](mailto:jmatray@nmsu.edu)

The deadline for nominations is March 1, 2000.

**RECENT WINNERS:**

1988 Alexander DeConde	1994 Wayne Cole
1990 Richard W. Leopold	1995 Walter LaFeber
1992 Bradford Perkins	1998 Robert Ferrell

**THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD**

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1999 and 2000. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 2001. Current Chairperson: Mel Small, History, Wayne State U., Detroit MI 48202.

**PREVIOUS WINNERS:**

1987 Harold Josephson

1988 Melvin Small

1991 Charles DeBenedetti and  
Charles Chatfield

1993 Thomas Knock

1995 Lawrence S. Witner

1999 Frances Early

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE  
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Mary Giunta, NHPRC - Room 300, National Archives, Washington DC 20408.

**PREVIOUS WINNERS** 1991 Justus Doenecke

1996 John C.A. Stagg

**THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND**

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact: Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

**ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE**

This is competition for a book, published in 1998, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 2000.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Current chairperson: Robert Johnson, History, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Bedford Ave. and Avenue H, Brooklyn NY 11210-2889.

**PREVIOUS WINNERS:**

- |                                    |                         |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1992 David Anderson and Diane Kunz | 1996 Norman Saul        |
| 1994 Mel Leffler                   | 1997 Robert Schulzinger |
| 1995 John L. Harper                | 1998 Jeffrey Kimball    |

**NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD**

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742

# The SHAFR Newsletter

**SPONSOR:** Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

**EDITOR:** William J. Brinker, Box 5154, Cookeville, TN 38505  
Tel. (931) 372-3332; e-mail Wbrinker@TNTECH.edu; FAX (931) 372-6142.

**EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Heather White and Sara Wilkerson.

**BACK ISSUES:** The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of many back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$2.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$3.00).

**GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION:** The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Papers and other submissions should be typed and the author's name and full address should be noted. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 3½" diskettes. A paper submitted in WordPerfect is preferred. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* goes to the printer on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should arrive at least four weeks prior.

## FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- |   |                                       |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)          | 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State) |
| 1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara) | 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)          |
| 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)    | 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)    |
| 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)          | 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut) |
| 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)        | 1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)          |
| 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)             | 1989 George Herring (Kentucky)        |
| 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)          | 1990 Michael Hunt (North Carolina)    |
| 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (CA-San Diego)    | 1991 Gary Hess (Bowling Green)        |
| 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)             | 1992 John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio)         |
| 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)           | 1993 Warren Kimball (Rutgers-Newark)  |
| 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)                | 1994 Melvyn Leffler (Virginia)        |
| 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)        | 1995 Robert Dallek (UCLA)             |
| 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)          | 1996 Mark Gilderhus (Colorado State)  |
| 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)      | 1997 Emily Rosenberg (Macalester)     |
| 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)           | 1998 Arnold Offner (Lafayette)        |
| 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)              |                                       |