THE ETYMOLOGICAL SUBTEXT OF DAIMON AND SATAN IN JOHN MILTON’S PARADISE LOST

by

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To Laken, “We go together like Keats and Yeats, bowls and plates, days and dates”

To Cora, in the hope that education changes your life, too

To my mother, for your faith; to my brother, for your storytelling; to you both, for your love

To Howard Bahr, for being there during a dark time
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ABSTRACT

In *Paradise Lost*, John Milton invokes the etymologies of both the Greek *daimon* ("demon") and the Hebrew *satan* ("satan") to bolster Satan’s narrative role of modeling one’s severance from God’s love. Milton’s multilingualism in the epic’s subtext enhances the English poetry. *Daimon* serves as a hypogram—an implied poetic word—that directs a reader toward Satan’s first, unseen moment of seductive narcissism. The moment, though “offstage,” can exist in the poem because Milton silently exploits the nuances of “demon” from Hesiodic, Platonic, Septuagintal, and New Testament literature. Satan replaces God’s love with love of himself as if in a marriage with an idolatress, as per Milton’s divorce tracts. To signify the symptomatology of this self-idolatry, Milton next deploys the word, *satan*, from the Hebrew Bible into his epic explicitly and implicitly to convey emotional trauma, divine prosecution, and militaristic opposition. If one “satans” (per the verbal root of the word), the universe “satans” one back—i.e., hatred and assault, instigated by abandonment of God, provoke a divine trial in Milton’s etymological subtext. With secondhand etymologies, the poetic subterranean of *Paradise Lost* answers discrepancies of Satan’s didactic purpose in the story.
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ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES OF MILTON’S WORKS

Areop—Areopagitica

CD—De Doctrina Christiana (The Christian Doctrine)

CG—The Reason of Church Government Urged against Prelaty

Def I—Johannis Miltoni, Angli, pro populo Anglicano defensio contra Claudii Salmasii
defensionem regiam (A Defense of the People of England ... against Salmasius)

DDD—The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce

Nat—On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity

Patrem—Ad patrem (To His Father)

PL—Paradise Lost

PR—Paradise Regained

Prol VII—Prolusiones oratoriae (Academic Exercises VII)

QNov—In quintum Novembris (On the Fifth of November)

Tetr—Tetrachordon

ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES OF LITERARY WORKS CITED IN THE NOTES

NOTE: Biblical abbreviations are not included.

Plt.—Plato, Statesman

Symp.—Plato, Symposium

Tim.—Plato, Timaeus
INTRODUCTION

yet all his good prov’d ill in me,
And wrought but malice
—Milton, Paradise Lost

A reader of Paradise Lost might relate with much of Satan’s self-confusion. Satan cannot understand his decision to separate himself from God, and consequently, he is miserable. A reader’s sympathy can muddle some of Satan’s subsequent deplorable acts because he resembles the reader. As C. S. Lewis explains, “Heaven understands Hell[,] and Hell does not understand Heaven, and all of us, in our measure, share the Satanic … blindness.”¹ Evil and suffering are relatable to readers who struggle to picture perfect good. Kenneth Grossman describes the phenomenological experience of a pitying reader by expressing what a reader might feel: “I [the theoretical reader] like to think about Satan because Satan is the only character in the poem who thinks, or in whom I best recognize what it feels like to think (though this may only mean, of course, to think like Satan).”² The critical issue for readers, though, is Satan’s sanity. His emotional torment arises from his irrationality. But the reader struggles with understanding Satan’s didactic role within the poem because of the fallen angel’s complexity, and a less-than-admirable God often overpowers one’s ability to decipher what is right or wrong. However, throughout his epic, Milton engages in etymological wordplay that is intended to render


Satan as an entity who chooses to seduce himself, abandon God, and consequently endure impairment. Satan’s words express his awareness that God’s good proves “ill” in him because either love of God or love of Satan must reign: there is no room for two. Spiritual malalignment, then, of Satan loving Satan, brews his “malice” because he is straying from God’s universal structure. Satan’s hatred is a symptom of his apostasy.

Milton is able to amplify his characters with an etymological subtext because he wields an advanced multilingualism of ten, maybe eleven, languages. He actively distills the strengths from each to enhance his own English. On record, Milton knew English, Latin, Hebrew, Greek, Aramaic, Syriac, Italian, French, Spanish, Dutch (or German), and perhaps Old English. Milton grew up learning languages extensively, with a classic Renaissance-schoolboy’s regimen of Hebrew, Latin, and Greek during the “golden age of Hebrew studies in England.” All three languages, though, held importance in the seventeenth century due to exegetical tradition, as they were the primary languages of the Old Testament, New Testament, Vulgate, and Septuagint. Interest in etymologies flourished from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance where etymologization

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“straddle[d] incipient science and ancient magic.” Hebrew etymologies, in particular, held the key, according to some scholars, to Adam’s pure, God-gifted language. As a sixteen-year-old schoolboy studying at St. Paul’s, Milton already possessed high fluency in both Greek and Latin, and he was starting to learn Hebrew (though Thomas Young, a tutor, might have taught him earlier).

Languages filled Milton. At Cambridge, students were whipped or persecuted for speaking anything other than Hebrew, Latin, or Greek, and the students practiced extensive translations of one into another as a way to study the classics. Milton exceeded the typical education, though, by adding Aramaic and Syriac to his repertoire. His father, John Milton, Sr., a scrivener by trade and musician by practice, is to thank. He inspired his son’s interest in the arts and financially supported him for a good part of his life. Appropriately, Milton himself praised his father for encouraging and supporting his acquisition of Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, and Italian (*Patrem* 77-85). Thus, years

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10 All quotations from Milton’s works, unless otherwise indicated, are from John Milton, *Complete Poems and Major Prose*, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (Indianapolis: Hackett
later, while working as Secretary of Foreign Tongues (or Latin Secretary) under Oliver Cromwell, Milton had thoroughly sharpened his multilingualism. By the time he began to write *Paradise Lost*, Milton’s Muse sang poetry bolstered by a lifetime of study.

Not only did Milton seek to be an epic poet, but he also desired to be a *vates*, or poet-prophet, and to defend God by clarifying for others what he believed to be God’s word. Thus, the conceptualization and appeasement of his God involved blending languages into prophetic poetry. Milton believed that the language of scripture portrayed God as best as possible and that “in condescending to accommodate himself [God] to our capacities, he has shewn that he desires we should conceive [of him]” (*CD* 905).

Scripture permitted deific visualization, albeit limited. By at least the age of twenty-one, Milton realized that he aspired to write divine poetry as a poet-priest, to “breathe out Jove,” as the classic poets had done before him (*El VI* 78). 11 “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity” was, perhaps, Milton’s first attempt. Age did not diminish Milton’s prophetic desire, either. On his path to become a voice for his God, Milton was motivated and influenced by several poets. Milton’s syncretism—his merging of diverse tenets in a multilingual environment—enhanced his Christian poetry. While deciding a genre in which to construct his epic masterpiece, he admitted his preference for Virgil, Tasso, Homer, and Job (*CG* 668). But he particularly favored Virgil’s and Dante’s epic voice—

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Publishing Company, Inc., 2003). References to specific works will be made parenthetically using the “Abbreviations of Titles of Milton’s Works” provided by Hughes, xv-xvi. The dating of “Ad Patrem” is unknown, so as to when Milton acquired French and Italian is speculative.

11 The elegy is addressed to his best friend, Charles Diodati.
Virgil for his grand style, Dante for his multilingualism. In the end, he chose the epic genre, and within it, he wielded not only other poets’ talents but also their languages to elevate English to an acceptable medium, to “justify the ways of God to men” (*PL* 1.26).

To convey “Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhyme” in his epic, Milton harnesses the latent power of ancient languages through their etymologies (*PL* 1.16). As Thomas Newton, one of Milton’s earlier critics, notes about such etymological emphasis, Milton “uses words in their proper and primary signification.” Newton describes the effect of revitalizing older denotations within Renaissance vernacular. Milton reaches back into a word’s original language to activate all of its historical senses—and occasionally in a single, poetic usage. Further, he conveys these hidden meanings sometimes with a broadscale, thematic intent—e.g., for the transition from prelapsarian into postlapsarian states; the emphasis of the fallen angels’ fruitless rebellion; and, especially, the affirmation of Satan’s self-idolatry leading to his own insanity and his hatred of God.

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12 See Hale, 150-57.

13 See Milton, “The Reason of Church Government,” 668, for Milton publicly speculating over an epic for his purposes. See Chapter 3, also, for details on a later Milton potentially believing *Paradise Regained* held more importance than *Paradise Lost*.


15 See Chapter One.
Analyzing the effect of a word, therefore, becomes difficult for a reader because one must investigate what senses of the word are appearing and how they are working. Christopher Ricks, two hundred years after Newton, would dignify this type of meticulous hunting for Miltonic wordplay for the Milton community. Ricks was responding to oppositional critics, such as F. R. Leavis, who attacked Milton for his only-powerful (and never-subtle) writing style. Ricks, however, emphasized Milton’s subtlety more. And the influential Stanley Fish later augmented Ricks’s ideas to enlighten a majority of Miltonists on how Milton employs subtle, prelapsarian language to provoke readers’ perverted, “fallen” mind states by luring them into tempting, though wrong, connotations of certain words. Now, modern critics accept Milton’s etymological wordplay as the norm, although scholars still find new terrain to examine. Peter C. Herman, for example, interestingly argues that Milton’s metaphoric language is unwieldy to the point of incertitude, and thus Milton’s allusions are unreliable. Regardless, the

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18 See Peter C. Herman, *Destabilizing Milton: “Paradise Lost” and the Poetics of Incertitude* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
wordplay is there, and my study of Milton’s Satan would not be possible without the scholars who have keenly observed and discussed such instances in his works.

My methodology rests confidently upon Milton’s ability to employ etymological wordplay, particularly Greek and Hebrew, to indicate Satan’s initial mistake before falling, his continued actions afterward, and other characters’ roles in response to his apostasy. Of course, how much I am finding in *Paradise Lost* versus how much Milton purposely employed is a delicate topic. And Milton perhaps may have been nestling hidden meaning unconsciously—the idea is not unfeasible, considering his language expertise. Either way, due to the contextual environment of what I am extracting from the text, Milton’s etymological implications seem intentional, or, at least, extraordinarily coincidental. Among the subtle implementations of Milton’s languages in *Paradise Lost*, Latin occurs the most, and prominently in the syntax. However, Greek and Hebrew serve important roles. Milton utilizes Greek to enhance epic style and epistemology and Hebrew to etymologize names. Hale notes, multiple times, that Greek might have been Milton’s most accurate language, even over Latin. Milton’s Hebrew also is strong, and he typically bolsters names with it. His rabbinical readings inform *Paradise Lost’s*

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19 See Hale, 121-25.


21 Even when Milton was blind, he “liked to be read to from the Hebrew every morning (his version of press-ups or cornflakes).” In *Paradise Lost*, he generally avoids
And he enjoys blending both Greek and Hebrew. For example, the title *Samson Agonistes* exemplifies Hebraism reinforced by Graecism: a Greek epithet replaces Samson’s biblical ones to emphasize Samson, the protagonist, “suffering” as a “champion” (*agonistes*) within a Hebraic narrative. One language interacts with another beneath the text’s surface impression. Milton’s epic, as well, coalesces Hebraic and Hellenistic topics. In *Paradise Lost* Book 1, Milton frequently alludes to Greek legends—Typhon, Titans, Jove, etc., all upon a bed of Homeric-epic similes—and employs the Hebraic Leviathan along with prophetic, eschatological language. Overall, Milton’s allusions emphasize his primary Hebraic theme—mankind’s “First Disobedience, and the Fruit / Of that Forbidden Tree”—adumbrated by Greek tragedy and epic (*PL* 1.1-2).

Hebraisms involving diction and syntax, though, and sticks with appellative usage. See Hale, *Milton’s Languages*, 123.


See Hale, *Milton’s Languages*, 180-93, for a more in-depth look at Hebrew and Greek merging throughout *Samson Agonistes*.

Milton dynamically invigorates both the explicit and implicit elements of Satan’s name (satan) and the implied ghost word, “demon” (daimon), to reinforce God’s subtle, retributive response to anyone who rejects His love. Milton explores the nuances of the term satan—e.g., adversary, obstruction, persecution, destruction, hatred, and envy—throughout Paradise Lost to amplify Satan’s unhealable state, emotional aggression, and endless trials. But what causes Satan’s turmoil is more opaque. The Greek daimon (“demon”) serves as an unspoken word that etymologically models the first moment of Satan’s downfall outside of the poem. It exposes corrupted rationality, perverse marriage, scriptural idolatry, and demonic insanity. Both words, satan and daimon, comingle within Satan’s character and project his past, present, and future.

In Chapter One, in order to prepare the reader for how Milton activates lexis within Satan, I overview Milton’s poetic techniques, particularly those that employ diachronic manipulation. I analyze figurative language to preface Milton’s etymological communication, and I utilize examples from the Hebrew Bible to explore Milton’s syncretism. Because Milton emphasizes precise language that conveys meaning beneath the text’s surface impression, I employ the linguistic ideas of Plato and Saussure to compare the science of etymologies with their possible poetic manipulations. Next, I elaborate on modern methodologies that bridge both forms of etymologization to contrast the Renaissance’s understanding of prelapsarian language. I analyze passages from Paradise Lost to expose the intricacies of Milton’s subtext: the words’ histories interact

(New York: Routledge, 2007) for thorough footnotes, particularly in Book 1; and A Milton Encyclopedia, s.v. “Hebraism, Milton’s.” See n19 in Chapter 1 for Milton’s integrating of epic heroes.
beneath the text for a purpose beyond paronomasia. After examining some of Milton’s poetically employed word histories, I introduce his subtler methods of theme to build a case related to Satan’s internal self. In particular, I focus on how Milton carefully situates words so that their etymological details signal the fallen angels’ demoralization and Adam and Eve’s fall. I conclude by comparing Milton’s Satan with Mastema from the Book of Jubilees to explain how a character might go beyond allegory and eponyms to fulfill an alien role of symbolizing that character’s name, not merely mirroring its denotations.

In Chapter Two, I establish that Satan has an inner, conflicting self that he either creates or merely acknowledges. His inner rationality is corrupted and seduces him, which leads him to an idolatrous, narcissistic marriage that severs him from God’s love. Milton reveals this separation from divinity and continued idolatry by contextually directing the reader toward an unwritten “demon” (daimon) throughout Paradise Lost. I illustrate this by examining Milton’s continuous hinting and referencing to literary instances of “demon.” I begin with Plato’s Socrates’s daimonion, an inner voice of reason from both Apology and Phaedrus, and then compare it with Satan’s mind state in his first soliloquy in Book 4. I next stress Milton’s belief that reason is a spiritual tool that combats evil, something that Satan has relinquished, and I use Milton’s polemical tracts and virtuous-characters’ pedagogy to reinforce the poetic idea. Next, I unveil Milton’s Hesiodic and Platonic integrations of daimon that spring to life as soon as Satan dissents: the Greek word appears with the good angels’ protective response against Satan’s mutinous crew. I ultimately pierce the mysterious heart of the poem—Satan’s first unseen moment of sin—by expounding on how Milton employs a satirized Love from Plato’s
Symposium (a daimon) that reveals Satan’s secret, incestuous narcissism. I concatenate Platonic usage with the Septuagint’s idols (daimonia) to reinforce Milton’s objection to this self-love, a love that is idolatry. I expand the etymological significance of Satan’s corrupted relationship with himself by accenting Milton’s beliefs of a marriage with an idolatress. I conclude by depicting Hell as a landscape of idolatry, signaled by the “place of demons” (Pandaemonium) and the idolatrous fallen angels, who act as false heroes (daimones). Milton reverberates “demon” silently to emphasize every moment of Satan’s corruption and eventual fate.

In Chapter Three, I unveil Milton’s explicit and implicit usage of the Hebraic satan, which accentuates what Satan (or anyone in Milton’s universe) feels, does, and endures when he or she separates from God. I uncover the word’s nuances of opposition, hatred, and legal persecution, particularly in contexts from the Hebrew Bible, to underscore how they permeate Satan’s character and the environment that entraps him. After analyzing Milton’s understanding of the word, I show how Milton contextually integrates the allusory eyes of Yahweh—recalling a Joban satan—to anticipate an apostate Satan. I reveal the Genesis satam (a verbal form) of Esau’s hateful envy for Jacob to explore how Milton uses the Hebraic word to signify anomalous emotional turmoil (i.e., the word linguistically heralds emotional symptomatology). Next, I compare Davidic opposition from the Hebrew Bible to expound on satan’s transference into military tactics in Paradise Lost. I unveil Milton’s implementation of the word to subordinate Satan into a Persian spy (the “eyes and ears,” or satans, of the historical kings). And finally, the implicit sense of the word emerges as an oppositional trial, signifying a divine court case with an accuser who tests the prosecuted one way or
another. The original sense of *satan*, here, is in Job, where the satan challenges the order of God’s world (i.e., the satan asks whether or not righteous men serve God for no reason other than rewards). Milton merges this idea with Christ’s responses against the Pharisees and His teachings with his disciples—the “sifting” of others, to place them for or against God. Not just Satan suffers these trials: all God’s creatures do (even Adam and Eve in *Paradise Lost* and Christ in *Paradise Regained*). Ultimately, I strive to show how *satan* is a symptom of dissent and how anything might oppose the rebel to force him or her back onto a righteous path.

In the Epilogue, I conclude that Milton’s etymologies affirm the critical response defending Milton of actively ridiculing Satan. The words communicate for themselves ideas formed from the constituents of literary history and mostly show that Satan exemplifies a poor role model. For further study, though, I estimate research of symbols as valuable since Milton, in some lines, blends both *daimon* and *satan*—the effect is that of symbols creating other symbols. The words take a lexical form and interact with each other, and, almost mathematically, they convey meaning beyond the basic depiction of the text.

When Milton presents a scene, he rests it upon a foundation of language that expresses ideas secretly. From whence a word originated suddenly becomes a critical tool for excavating the underlying message that Milton has planted. And Satan’s depth of character illumines a world of potential. Words, spoken or not, affirm Milton’s moral tirades from his polemical tracts as woven into *Paradise Lost*’s universal laws, and Satan unlocks these ideas lexically. Because Satan is the first to separate from God, Milton’s etymological wordplay dominates exegesis, then, by demanding that its reader see
characters’ mistakes in a certain light. The diachronic associations seemingly dictate Satan’s poor decisions and degrade him as much as his own actions do. A reader must acknowledge the effect once the wordplay surfaces. And the two words, daimon and satan, exist from the beginning—seemingly disproving Milton losing control of his character and repressively degrading him as a consequence. Rather, from the start, Milton rouses etymologies that speak against Satan’s moral character. Recalling the assertive symptoms of satan through words that stimulate its Hebraic etymology, Satan “it was, whose guile, / Stirr’d up with Envy and Revenge, deceiv’d” Eve (PL 1.34-35; emphasis mine). And presenting the mask, per se, of self-idolatry (a Septuagintal daimonion), Satan’s “pride / Had cast him out from Heav’n,” as if he exudes false heroism (as a satirized Homeric daimon). His mindscape already seethes with irrationality: Satan “trusted to have equall’d the most High [i.e., as if because of a satirized Platonic daimonion] / If he oppos’d [i.e., satan, a verbal form]” God (PL 1.40-41). Milton weaves the two words throughout Satan’s literary presence in Paradise Lost. Waiting for a reader’s detection, Satan’s mystery hides in a world of concealed meaning.
CHAPTER I: A HIDDEN, ETYMOLOGICAL WORLD OF MEANING

In *Paradise Lost*, Milton poetically withdraws etymologies from words to underscore his major ideas. His technique deepens the significance of the poem because literary comparisons emerge after the reader recognizes a word’s new denotations and connotations. He extracts hidden meanings from his lexis to clue his reader to major themes, comparisons, and mysteries, and these instances of wordplay shape and heighten the overall poem. Scholars still find and debate over his supra-paronomasia because each usage of Milton’s wordplay ostensibly elucidates his ideas. Therefore, his hidden meanings are as important as his present ones in *Paradise Lost* because the subtext conveys as much as the observable text does.

The authority of the poem’s covert wordscape parallels the felt presence of God as recollected by Mammon in Hell—as a commanding display robed by darkness. Mammon recalls God sitting with “Majesty of darkness round / Cover[ing] his Throne; from whence deep thunders roar[ed] / Must’ring thir rage, and Heav’n resemble[d] Hell” (*PL* 2.266-68). Although obfuscated, God’s glory remains “unobscur’d” because His hidden influence overwhelms His onlookers (*PL* 2.265). Milton’s words act similarly: a surface meaning presents itself while Milton’s etymologies secretly inform the poetry. Once detected, the whole of a word’s history must be imagined within a limited, poetic context. Milton does not merely pun; rather, he utilizes a word’s diachronic range to evoke multiple ideas to achieve one direct purpose. He does more than “bring together two (or more) meanings” in a context that “gives both meanings significance.”

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language challenges readers to envision a range of meanings all at once to complete a whole, ambitious moment. And, within his characters, names interact with the surface impression of the text from a separate subterrane of meaning throughout the entire narrative. The implied word histories of these characters’ names sculpt traits, actions, functions, histories, personalities, and even destines. Inclusively, such is Milton’s Satan.

Poetic language, in general, goes beyond conjuring multiple connotations and denotations. An author might use figurative language to manifest something that straightforward speech cannot. For instance, Hebrew Bible prophets frequently personify abstractions, cities, and conditions, such as when the prophet Habakkuk depicts disease heralding God’s approach after Babylon’s wickedness. Habakkuk portrays pestilence and plague as extensions of an avenging God Whose sight terrifies all: “Before [God] pestilence [deber] goes, and plague [resheph] comes forth at His feet. He halts, and He makes the earth rock, looks, and makes nations leap” (Hab. 3:5-6).² One must imagine the influence of God’s destruction as living things. Habakkuk’s petition profits from metaphoric language because it grants his readers the ability to comprehend God marginally by visualizing God’s agency through the lens of linguistic trickery.

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Hebrew Bible prophets also evoke sublime imagery to propel language beyond literal speech, and Milton borrows this technique. In Job, God mocks Job with condescending examples of His overwhelming, creative might after Job laments his misfortunes. God boasts of His king of beasts, Leviathan, and lures Job into the incomprehensible: “[Leviathan’s] eyes are like the eyelids of dawn” (Job 41:10). Metaphoric eyelids that recall the sun rising overpower one’s imagination. God continues: “[Leviathan] makes the deep boil like a pot … Behind him glistens a wake, he makes the deep seem hoary” (Job 41:23-24). One cannot quite picture an entire ocean boiling from, dwarfed to, and rippling with Leviathan’s enormity. The sensory destination goes unreached, so fear arises from inconceivability to the point of sublimity. These examples of Hebraic poetry attempt to bridge what an audience grasps with what it cannot fathom for a literary purpose that the authors and prophets exploit for more scope than plain language permits.

Milton knows this Hebraic-poetic power well and wields it in representation of Satan in an epic simile when the Arch Fiend floats on Hell’s lake as “that Sea-beast / Leviathan, which God of all his works / Created hugest that swim th’ Ocean stream” (PL 1.200-2).

As John Hale argues, Milton “chooses an ancient exemplar and metre, and pours into that mould thought of his own.” He brandishes others’ styles and languages to enhance English poetry, and Hebrew proves an ample resource.

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3 For more on Milton’s implementation of Leviathan’s eyelids, see Steadman, Milton’s Biblical and Classical Imagery, 136-40.

4 Hale, Milton’s Languages, 43.
Even simpler metaphorical language shares the same principles of conveying enhanced meaning, and the base mechanics assist with interpreting Milton’s works. When one figuratively states, “I’m sweating like a sinner in church,” one creates a comparison to enhance literal language. The overall intent is simply to imply that the speaker is sweating more than usual, but when the speaker compares him- or herself with a traumatized, doctrinal offender, the speaker reinforces the idea of sweating by borrowing a preloaded environment. The idiom, and here also a simile, carries another experience’s impressions. The language cheats. And then it acquires heightened meaning, phenomenology, cultural context, and theme. In the end, both experiences—the speaker’s and the sinner’s—fuse in the listener’s mind as one idea. Milton borrows from other references so much that sometimes his meanings conflict with themselves, so understanding the spirit behind the usage becomes the workload of interpretation. For instance, Milton compares Satan with Briareos, but Briareos has both positive and negative histories (PL 1.199).⁵ When Milton activates etymological meanings, he capitalizes on wordplay so that an erudite reader must suddenly organize and associate loaded, interactive comparisons beneath the initial impression of the description.

Perhaps the ineptness of language sparks a speaker’s interest in metaphorical expressions; the idiom, then, makes up for the linguistic lack. For Ferdinand de Saussure’s student-compiled lecture notes, language (langue) unsuccessfully attempts to encapsulate the “shapeless and indistinct mass” of thought with sound.⁶ In particular,

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⁵ See Herman, 27-42, for more on such “incertitudes.”

figurative expressions mislead us: they “end up giving us a false idea in some way” and are “traps, which await us at every turn of phrase.”\(^7\) The signifier (signifiant) and the signified (signifié) of the signification (signification) from Saussurean-structuralist ideologies always fall short of true clarification because they cannot truly name something for what it is, though the words possess varying degrees of value.\(^8\) The sounds that speakers utter are deceptive because they attempt to express unidentifiable things. Plato’s Socrates debates a similar idea with Cratylus, that words are inadequate when they attempt to name something’s essence with just a sound. He ultimately concludes he will not invest in words when he seeks truth: “[N]o one with any understanding will commit himself … to names, or trust them and their givers.”\(^9\) Language is never clear enough, so figurative language lessens the murkiness, especially when an author demands


\(^8\) See Saussure, *CGL*, 107, 110, for chess analogies involving value and 115 for a words-as-coins example.

powerful imagery. Therefore, when Milton etymologically enlivens his poetry, he does so to heighten language—so much so that some have argued that he imitates Adamic, prelapsarian language.¹⁰

Outside of poetic manipulation, however, the science of etymology disappoints those who want an accurate approach to the chaos of language—a chaos that poets, contrariwise, embrace. Scientifically, etymologies fail to clarify meanings because of the fickleness of words’ evolutions. “Folk etymologies,” or fake etymologies, are a prime example. The word “plant”—which illustrates the problem perfectly—has Latinate roots with “cutting” (planta) but along the way was confused with vegetation; now, English speakers are stuck with the error.¹¹ Saussure detected the science of etymology’s faults and despised how his contemporary linguists, the Neogrammarians, handled them.¹² Saussure noticed the subjective romanticizing of word histories and thus anticipated the inevitable capitulation of the etymological methodology.¹³ However, poetry like Milton’s

¹⁰ I discuss this in a moment.


¹² In the 19th century, the Neogrammarians were a school of linguists in Leipzig who promoted sound laws as indicators for Germanic words’ origins. Saussure did not completely reject their ideas, however. See Anna Morpurgo Davies, “Saussure and Indo-European Linguistics,” *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure*, ed. Carol Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 9-29.

¹³ See Pourciau, *The Writing of Spirit*, 68-97, for an explication on Saussure’s “dream,” or goal, of language science being perfectly accurate.
bypasses such problems because it makes use of words aesthetically, not scientifically—although an erudite Milton could bridge these worlds.

Words hold power in the Renaissance, and Milton conjures meaning almost spiritually because of it. His craft anticipates middle grounds of poetry and etymologization from modern scholars. One, Davide Del Bello, examines etymologies as a factor of the “allegorical mindset,” balancing himself between poetic manipulation and scientific derivation. “Etymegorizing,” or “allegorical etymology,” then, is the process that concatenates both poetry and science when a speaker attempts to judge an object’s appellation as appropriately named—or even when any signifier is written or read allegorically based off its “possible meaning(s).”14 In relation to Milton, a Greek-based love of spiritual etymologies resurfaces in the Renaissance, where exists “the idea that words are in some way autonomous and constitute a ‘word-world’.”15 Milton participates in this rejuvenation of tongues, in which poetry summons precise language. Therefore, *Paradise Lost*, as Ruthven notes through the eyes of a Renaissance reader, is “a

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correction of our language.” Here, poetry empowers grammatology, and vice versa. Milton unifies a word’s past with its present to reincarnate defunct significance.

When Milton unleashes a word’s entire history of meaning poetically to invoke heavy, linguistic signification, he does so for a purpose. For instance, he might simply want to write a perfect word. In Paradise Lost, Satan, rising from Hell’s lake of fire after God cast him from Heaven, endures flames that erupt from his body. Milton’s instance of “horrid” is technically perfect: “on each hand the flames / Driv’n backward slope thir pointing spires, and roll’d / In billows, leave i’ th’ midst a horrid Vale” (PL 1.222-24; emphasis mine). As William Kerrigan, John Rumrich, and Stephen Fallon detect, “horrid” signifies “bristling, spiky.” The OED adds “causing horror or aversion … abominable” and addresses the Latin horridus and horrēre; the latter denotes “to stand on end (as hair), to bristle” and has roots in the English “abhor.” Milton galvanizes all denotations and connotations: “pointing spires” activates spikiness from “horrid”’s etymology and thus raises the “Vale” into spiky flames and mountainous smoke. “[O]n each hand” triggers “horrid”’s hair-bristling potential; fiery arm hair undercuts the reader’s view of rising smoke from a conflagrating Satan etymologically. “Horrid”’s surrounding context excavates the word’s polysemous potential dormant beneath the surface meaning of “abominable, horrible.” The word “horrid” cinches the poetic lines’ references to empower the frightful image of the ruined archangel, the tactuality of arm-

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16 Ruthven, “Poet as Etymologist,” 14. See also Bello, 166-34, for a perspective of the linguistic shift from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance: encyclopedically utilized etymology transitions into scientific and occultic syncretism.

bristling combustion, and the sublimity of towering mountaintop-smoke as Satan “rears from off the Pool / His mighty Stature” (PL 1.221-22). Milton’s intentional references awaken a reader’s Latin background. The reader next struggles to hoist the entire image to the imagination.

In another poetic instance of “horrid,” Milton not only utilizes polysemy but also prophesies Satan’s moral outcome. The veiled meanings achieve more than perfect denotation. After Satan leaves Pandaemonium to scout Earth, Milton’s narrator limns an unphased Satan’s resentment in response to a threatening Death when Sin and Death obstruct Satan’s escape from Hell. Satan seethed “like a Comet burn’d, / That fires the length of Ophiucus huge / In th’ Artic Sky, and from his horrid hair / Shakes Pestilence and War” (PL 2.708-11). With epic-hero-simile tradition (the comet comparison) and proleptic-serpentine reference (the Ophiucus allusion), the lines, in relation to “horrid,” strive for perfect meaning again, but with an intent.\(^{18}\) In what Kerrigan, Rumrich, and Fallon label as Milton’s “etymologically instructive wordplay,” “horrid”’s signification of “dreadful” blends with metaphoric “bristling” now: Satan horrifyingly bristles with anger.

But the connection goes deeper. The OED etymologizes comet as the once Greek “long-haired star.” Milton does not just pun on “hair” here—he coalesces major themes and images covertly to cultivate Satan as a stubborn, angered epic hero on a quest

\(^{18}\) See Alastair Fowler, ed., John Milton: Paradise Lost, revised 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007); Hughes, Complete Poems and Major Prose; and Kerrigan, Rumrich, and Fallon, Complete Poetry and Essential Prose, for footnotes on Satan’s anticipatory serpentiform via “Ophiucus” and also the epic hero’s tradition with comets. Fowler also notes the “[e]tymological wit” on the previous “Incensed” and “fire.”
through hellish horrors. “Horrid” and “comet” trigger classical allusions, metaphoric emotions, and fierce trajectories and then uphold Satan as an agent who nobly resembles cosmic fire but who ironically anticipates serpentine effect with a nod to Satan’s eventual, degrading connection with snakes. Satan’s grandeur burns out before it truly flares up. Milton, therefore, on an etymological level, pits two ideas of Satan against each other and then suggests one’s victory: this hero degrades in the end. Without such linguistic precision, whether one detects the semantics or not, the scene merely produces a dampened effect of a tense confrontation between supernatural adversaries. The hidden textual interplay animates another linguistic world, guides instinctual readership, and strengthens the scene’s framework so that the reader might deepen his or her comprehension of Milton’s characters contextually.

Milton’s etymologies also rely on allusions for poetic power. After Satan departs from Pandaemonium’s council, Earth-bound, fallen angels empty out into the wastelands of Hell to pass time and stave off lunacy, where “sad choice / Leads [them] perplexed” (PL

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Some fall victim to passionate fury and cyclonically tear Hell’s landscape apart: “Others with vast Typhœan rage more fell / Rend up both Rocks and Hills, and ride the Air / In whirlwind” (PL 2.539-41). Milton’s heavy neologism “Typhœan” almost snaps the poetic line. And the context, again, proves Milton has actually used any polysemy. “Typhœan,” further cued by an earlier allusion, signifies the Greek creature Typhon (sometimes Typhoeus), best known from Hesiod’s Theogony. Born from Earth and Tartarus, Hesiod’s Typhon burdens the planet, cows the heavens, frightens the Titans, flaunts a hundred snakeheads, speaks animalistic tongues, breathes smoldering fire, and threatens to enslave both men and the gods—until Zeus flings him into Tartarus; the ruinous battle and descent melts the land. From Typhon’s burial, evil winds curse the earth. The Greek monster parallels the fallen angels (both their current and eventual states). They both share: subterranean imprisonment after expulsive smiting; furious, animalistic temperament; serpentine embodiment; and corruption of wind. The word

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20 The syllabic stress, as well, in “vast Typhœan rage” steals the attention from the rest of the line much in a way that John Creaser might emphasize as Milton’s prosodic technique forcing the reader to recognize important themes.

21 See PL 1.199 for Typhon’s first reference.

22 Hesiod. Theogony and Works and Days, trans. M. L. West (Oxford UP, 2008), 819-69. See OED and Kerrigan, Rumrich, and Fallon for notes of other versions of Typhon as a giant, not just a monster (though Fowler’s footnote comments, “the races were often confused”); Hughes’s 1.199 footnote notes Natale Conti’s allegorization of Typhon as “symbolizing ambition that assails even heaven itself”; See Fowler’s footnote for an elaboration on Typhon’s connection to serpents and deceptiveness.

23 Hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, 870-80.

24 See Ephesians 2:2 on demons and air. See Jeffrey Burton Russell, Satan: The Early Christian Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 49-50, 64n22, 67-77, 97-100, 133, 156, 179, on patristic father’s beliefs of demonic aeriality. Milton also might
“Typhœan” bolsters the “rage” of the fallen angels through classical association. The comparison highlights the temperaments of conquered, eschatological beings and nods to serpentine and irrational hubris again. But as of yet, only Milton’s allusory weight encumbers the meaning here. Denotations are next.

Milton’s contextual “rage,” “whirlwind,” and hellish environment demand more from “Typhœan,” and the usage, beyond the mimetic display, ultimately points toward the angels’ ethical weaknesses.\(^25\) Lexicographers of Greek disagree on the etymology of “Typhon” although they claim that the word evolves from the personification of varying denotations of \(\text{typhos}\).\(^26\) However, they do agree upon the overall sense of the word. “Typhon”’s derivatives connote varying forms of “fever,” “stupidity,” “foolishness,” “haughtiness,” “insanity,” “vanity,” “pride,” “whirlwind,” “smoke,” “fire,” “smoldering,”

be syncretizing both Typhon’s corruption of the winds with the Hebraic Watcher’s offspring—\(\text{nephilim} \) or \(\text{gibborim}\), debatably, based on the grammatically confusing reference in Gen. 6.1-4. Other apocryphal works are more explicit. These creatures become evil spirits after their deaths from the Flood in various apocryphal literature. See Archie T. Wright, \(\text{The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6:1-4 in Early Jewish Literature}\), revised ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 73-96, for an excursus on the Hebrews and Greeks sharing an oral tradition that relates these giant myths.

\(^25\) See Michael Riffaterre, \(\text{Semiotics of Poetry}\) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 1-22, for how I am using “mimetic” here: as signs via text forming an eidetic scene that points toward an inner significance, or core meaning—i.e. some of “Typhon’s” derivatives support literal imagery (mimesis), others the personality traits of the angels that reveal their mistakes and thus why they are in Hell.

\(^26\) See \(\text{Etymological Dictionary of Greek}\), ed. Robert Beekes, vols. 1-2 (Brill, 2016); \(\text{The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek}\), ed. Franco Montanari (Brill, 2018); and \(\text{A Greek-English Lexicon with a Revised Supplement}\), eds. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott (Clarendon Press, 1996). Liddell asserts the personified “fever” or “stupor,” Beekes “whirlwind,” and Montanari “vanity, conceit”; Beekes further claims the root word is \(\text{typhomai}\), “to smoke, smoulder, glow.”
and “befoggedness.” The *OED* renders “typhon” as “whirlwind, cyclone, tornado; … hurricane,” all potential precursors to the English “typhoon.” “Rage,” as well, can also denote a “fierce blast of wind,” and even senses of “foolishness,” “fury (of natural forces),” “madness, insanity,” and even “martial or heroic spirit”—usages of which Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Spenser all dabble. Milton’s connotative nuances are overwhelming, almost banishing themselves into Saussurean “associative relations.” To Saussure, words conjure infinite associations like a star in a star-map: “A particular word is like the center of a constellation; it is the point of convergence of an indefinite number of co-ordinated terms.” But Saussurean linguistics cannot encapsulate Milton. Readers must imagine what Milton demands they imagine, and here, when the hidden wordplay lumbers toward didacticism next, all senses converge at a near-breaking point.

One could organize Milton’s evocative mess as such: the reader deciphers an etymological usage first. This happens when contextual clues recall a word’s older senses (e.g., “spires” recalls “spiky” from “horrid”). Next, one conjures up all meanings during a

\[27\] The last hints at the confusion of old, deluded men.

\[28\] The *OED* speculates “typhoon” derives from either Greek or Asianic influences.

\[29\] See *OED*, s.v. “rage.”


\[31\] Saussure, *CGL*, 126.

\[32\] Random associations are obviously natural, but not all of them apply in one’s analysis, hence the major problem language science has with classifying poetic expressions—i.e., authorial, poetic intent sifts a reader’s psychological “associative relations.”
rereading. One attempts to unify them as one scene. Allusions blend with denotations and connotations, and the strength of each word’s contextual importance situates the signs hierarchically. But even with concentration, sometimes reimagining is impossible. But as Hale believes, Milton is so at home with languages that this linguistic manipulation might not be a conscious decision: “Paradise Lost is not Finnegans Wake.”33 And for Milton, “[i]t is the English with which his other tongues can most readily intersect.”34 His nine (or more) other languages uniquely enrich English where it poetically lacks, but sometimes his dovetailed references overpower the imagination.

Milton’s first line, in the above poetic example, signals destructive, hateful emotion: “Others with vast Typhœan rage more fell.” Milton introduces a “more fell [i.e. vicious]” category of angel and associates their mindless rage with a universe-threatening Typhon. Viciousness blends with Graecisms. Impressions of pride subsequently trail Typhon’s challenging presence. Milton next relieves the angels’ pent-up anger by commanding them to wreak havoc: “[They] Rend up both Rocks and Hills, and ride the Air.” Allusory gigantomachia surfaces from the mountain rending, and nightmarish witchcraft and medieval demonism from the harnessed aeriality.35 Because allusions coalesce with connotations, the scene resonates with maniacal despair. The last adverbial image, “In whirlwind,” unifies the passage by its aftereffects: tornadic wreckage stirs Hell’s landscape and should—if one lives up to Milton’s expectations—sweep the reader

33 Hale, Milton’s Languages, 66.

34 Hale, Milton’s Languages, 66.

35 See Forsyth, Satanic Epic, 35, for the witch observation.
back to the wind-evoking “Typhœan” again. Riffaterre, digressing on poetic interpretation after the reader senses purposeful “ungrammaticalities,” describes a “second reading,” i.e. a decoding process, as “tak[ing] place in the reader’s mind.” The reader recognizes that the textual mimesis (the initial description) hides the text’s core significance (the underlying meaning). Milton’s poetry prompts as much, but the reader must reimagine the angelic sequence to decode the cumbersome message. One must detangle the languages to envisage the scattered imagery.

“Whirlwind” might first indicate any play at all since it explicitly denotes a sense of *typhos*. But what order a reader grasps the wordplay might be subjective. The KJV’s “whirlwind” of Job’s God, for example, seems as likely as *typhos*’s hurricanic connotations; interpretation relies on readership. But because of the extensive etymological context—the Typhon allusion, the gigantomachic destruction, the wounded pride, the smoke and fire of Tartaric hell, the wind-swept terrain—Milton more than likely intended Graecisms. In a second reading, then, “vast Typhœan rage” retains destructive, prideful outbursts, but then, hellscape gales gust stronger because the surrounding language activates the reader’s etymological knowledge. “Rage” (“blast of wind,” “force of nature”) blends with “Typhœan” (“whirlwind,” “tornado”) not only to strengthen imagery but also to augment angelic aeriality. Wind tinges with “rage”’s and “Typhœan”’s emotions. Personified deities fuse with natural forces because of Typhon’s full scope of meaning. Milton demands his readers grasp it all: he smelts the whole polysemous pile. But the scene’s weight only initiates after the reader notices the

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linguistic hint of “In whirlwind,” which points at “vast Typhœan rage.” Allusions, emotions, and denotations blend in ways that are nearly impossible to comprehend.

The effect is too much for some readers. Hale, defending *Paradise Lost’s* wordplay as both colloquial and interlingual, notes that Milton’s Latinisms, as one example, are the “felt presence of Latin diction … within the English,” and “[m]ost readers of *Paradise Lost* [feel] it, and [like] or [loathe] the poem accordingly.”37 Samuel Johnson ambivalently describes the same experience, that of detecting Milton’s “Babylonish dialect” within his well-crafted poetry: “we find grace in its deformity.”38 Regardless of one’s taste, however, Milton’s condensed semantics imitate Mammon’s mnemonic God—they influence with unseen authority. The poetry yields a secondhand, secret imagery that readers never quite envision, although they feel its presence.

Milton’s potential didacticism surfaces next. The angels’ rage is not just prideful and terrifying; it is “feverous,” “stupid,” “foolish,” “haughty.” Even worse, it is “insane” and stems from their “vainglory.” It “befogs” them just as delirium claims the elderly. It incites animalism and irrationality and is symptomatic of their psychological imprisonment: they are “in wand’ring mazes lost” (*PL* 2.561). They rend the land “with vast Typhœan rage” because they are lowering themselves below even the animals. The subtle etymological snubbing (again) of the fallen angels’ striking presence smacks of a young Cantabrigian Milton’s seventh Prolusion, “Learning Makes Men Happier than


Does Ignorance.” Milton personifies “Ignorance” as a being lost within confusing mist: “I perceive … she is in a fog, and in terror and retreat. She is looking everywhere for a way of escape” (Prol VII 626). She believes one’s own glory promotes immortality: “She murmurs that men are stimulated in the main by glory; … that while … [a] course of years has glorified the illustrious men of the past, we are borne down by the world’s decrepit old age” (Prol VII 628). Ignorance’s “fog” and “glory” etymologically recall *typhos* within Milton’s disapproval.

Therefore, *Paradise Lost*’s etymology satirizes fallen-angel impressiveness when Milton counters Ignorance: “to set no value on glory when you have done well, that is beyond all glory” (Prol VII 628). Ignorance ultimately lowers her victims below the animals, who are at least “too intelligent to admit Ignorance to their company …; they put [Ignorance] lower down” (Prol VII 629). Ignorance is lower than even the rocks since oracles use them for learned purposes (Prol VII 629). And not even “non-being” will accept her because “what is worse, what is viler, what is more wretched, what is lowest, should be Ignorance” (Prol VII 629). The allowance of her existence at all makes one “the most despicable of all things” (Prol VII 629). In these senses, she decays her victims and, proleptically, also the rebels.

The fallen angels of *Paradise Lost* emotionally erupt because they are rotted with their own irrationality, and the etymological subterrane parades it. Forsyth—recalling Martin Luther’s ideas of a “stench of wind” in relation to Satan—reminds readers of the odor of *Paradise Lost*’s Hell.39 Satan, ejected from Hell’s lake, stands on grounds similar

39 Forsyth, *Satanic Epic*, 34.
to Etna, the mountain under which Typhon lies in some myths: “combustible / And fuell’d entrails” reach the air and singe it with “stench and smoke” (PL 1.230-38). Hell smells of brimstone, hinting the potential word “flatulence,” which can denote “inflated or puffed-up, ‘windy’; empty, vain, pretentious,” much like typhos. Forsyth keenly observes that “vast Typhœan rage,” later, could indeed be Milton “mak[ing] fun” of the angels, then, with “scatological language.”40 Suddenly, “rage”’s “fierce blast of wind” disengages the fallen angels from fear-evoking “Typhœan” “whirlwinds” and stinks up their demonic glory.

When Milton signifies multiple references with wordplay and then engineers them to guide readers, he sometimes divides and isolates a word’s etymology to emphasize mankind’s fall from prelapsarian language into postlapsarian in Paradise Lost. Christopher Ricks comments, while quoting one of Milton’s immediate critics, “one of the reasons why Milton often uses ‘words in their proper and primary signification’ (Newton) is because he can thereby re-create something of the pre-lapsarian state of language.”41 One example Ricks maintains is “wanton,” which, if one unbiasedly examines its diachrony, may denote “undisciplined, ungoverned; unmanageable, rebellious” and “[I]lustful; not chaste, sexually promiscuous” along with the contrary “playful; unrestrained in merriment, jovial”; “lively; exuberant”; and “robust,

40 Forsyth, Satanic Epic, 34.

vigorou...n. “Wanton” has both positive and negative connotations. Milton capitalizes on the dualism to describe Eden and Eve’s current states.

Ricks highlights several examples. Eden’s nature before the fall is “[w]anton’d as in her prime, and play[s] at will / Her Virgin Fancies” (PL 5.294-95). Prelapsarian Eden, therefore, is “lively,” “exuberant,” “robust,” and “vigorous” in her purity. Adam describes its sylvan lushness to Eve as a “wanton growth” that demands continual attention (PL 4.629). And Eve’s innocence in Eden, before Satan seduces her, resounds from her physicality: her “[d]ishevell’d” hair hangs by her waist in “wanton ringlets”; it “impli[es] / Subjection,” which she “yield[s] with coy submission” to Adam (PL 4.306, 307-8, 310). To emphasize prelapsarian innocence, Milton exclusively uses “wanton” in its positive connotations. Hell, however, already had tainted the word in Book 1 when Milton catalogs both the fallen angels’ and their followers’ “wanton rites” and “wanton passions” (PL 1.414, 454). Satan, as Ricks argues, later “brings fallen wantonness to the seduction of Eve, so that the word is infected before our eyes.”

Introducing himself to Eve, Satan as serpent “[c]url’d many a wanton wreath in sight of Eve” (PL 9.517). And after Adam and Eve taste the apple, they ogle each other lecherously: “hee [Adam] on Eve / Began to cast lascivious Eyes, she him / As wantonly repaid; in Lust they burn” (PL 9.1013-15). Their fall brings about “wanton’s” “grimmer meaning.”

Milton effects one positive sense to promote the good of Eden and Eve but then flaunts the same word’s

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42 The OED cites more, some relating to excessiveness and self-indulgence.

43 Ricks, Milton’s Grand Style, 112.

44 Ricks, 112.
negative sense to elevate his subject of fallenness. This is not just a pun but rather an ambitious use of language that reciprocally invigorates thematic meaning.

Milton broadens his etymological methodology when he embeds words—implicitly and explicitly—into characters, particularly Satan. Milton pushes against K. K. Ruthven’s definition of two major etymological conceits: “those which explore the meaning of names and those which presume an acquaintance with the original meanings of the foreign loan-words.”45 Milton also exploits a word to convey characters’ personae, functions, and fates. He does not just “explore” and “presume” meanings.

As a simpler example that prefaces Milton’s Satan, the Hebraic figure Mastema also activates etymological significance beyond basic personification and denotative exploration.46 He is a fallen angel interwoven throughout the Book of Jubilees, an apocryphal retelling of the Torah—from Genesis to Exodus’s middle—that an angel relates to Moses. Mastema acts much like the (lowercased) satan in Job, as an adversary who antagonizes mankind with God’s permission.47 He appears, as Elaine Pagels notes, in the “turmoil of the first-century Palestine” as Christianity was first developing.48 The character could be a tool used to expose opposition. Calling attention to concepts of demons as literary responses against the “othering” of a group of people, Pagels asserts


46 See Bello, 56-7, though, who might overlook the literary significance to oversimplify Mastema’s name to an “eponym.”

47 See Chapter 3 for more on Job’s satan.

that the author of Jubilees actively separates himself from the Gentiles. The author
“attributes [internal Jewish] conflicts to that most intimate of enemies” named “Mastema
(‘hatred’), Satan, and Belial.”49 To Pagels, biblical and apocryphal authors employ
demonic figures narratively for political reasons, as in the case of Mastema—personified
“hatred.”

Mastema’s character evinces the etymology of the Hebrew word, mastema, much
as Satan from Paradise Lost boasts his own.50 As the Comprehensive Etymological
Dictionary of the Hebrew Language purports, mastema in general denotes “enmity,
aminosity” and shares the same stem etymon with one verbal form of satan—“to hate,
cherish animosity.”51 Hebraic lexicographers largely agree.52 Jubilees’s Mastema

49 Pagels, Origin of Satan, 53. See also The Complete Apocrypha with Enoch,
Jasher, and Jubilees: Literal Standard Version (LSV) (Covenant Press, 2018), 238—the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Ethiopian Jews (Beta Israel) consider Jubilees
canonical, despite how Jews, Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Eastern Orthodox
Churches reject it as pseudepigraphal. See Michael Segal, The Book of Jubilees:
Rewritten Bible, Redaction, Ideology, and Theology (Atlanta: Society of Biblical
Literature, 2007), 1-2, for the importance of Jubilees: it unveils sectarian interpretations
of the Torah during the Second Temple period of the Jews. See Todd R. Hanneken, “The
Book of Jubilees,” Early Jewish Literature: An Anthology, vol. 1, ed. Brad Embry,
Ronald Herms, and Archie T. Wright (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Press, 2018),
510, for an agreement with Segal that Jubilees’ author “infuses” other biblical elements
with the Torah throughout its strictly structured time sequence to solve exegetical
problems.

50 “…Satan (for I glory in the name, / Antagonist of Heav’n’s Almighty King)”
(PL 10.386-7). For more on Satan fulfilling his name’s implications, see Chapter 3.

51 A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the Hebrew Language for
Readers of English, ed. Ernest Klein (Carta Jerusalem: The University of Haifa, 1987),
s.v. “mastema.” See Chapter 3 for more information on the etymology of satan.

52 See the New Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, ed. James Strong
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1996); The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and
English Lexicon, eds. F. Brown, S. Driver, and C. Briggs (Hendrickson Publishers
develops from his word’s denotations just as Milton’s Satan eventually develops into his new role’s insinuations (so much so that Satan’s original name is completely lost).

The Hebrew Bible’s *mastema* occurs only twice, though, and only as the word, not a character, but the effect of the word emphasizes the character’s potential origins. Hosea, while refuting political infrastructures of Northern Israel, attacks his critics’ animosity (in the third person): “The prophet [Hosea] is witless, the man of spirit crazed by all your [Israel’s] crimes, all your hate [*mastema*] … [A] snare [*pah*] is laid in all his [Hosea’s] ways, hate [*mastema*] in the house of his God.” Hosea associates his enemies with hatred. Rivkah Kluger, one of Carl Jung’s students specializing in Semitic studies, stresses the biblical wordplay: the “hostility” of *mastema* parallels strongly with the *pah* in the same passage (the “bird-catcher’s net,” or “snare”). She thus targets snare’s relationship with *mastema* to enhance her argument of how each various satan of the Hebrew Bible—who accuses, tempts, and entraps—evolves into figures from the

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53 See *PL* 5.658-59, 5.760-62, and 10.425-26. “Lucifer” is just a reference to what he was; i.e., it alludes to the idea of his previous rank, not his original name.

denotations and connotations of their Hebraic word-parallels.\textsuperscript{55} An etymology might eventually inspire the birth of a character, while the denotations and connotations form the character’s functions. But as with Jubilees’s Mastema and Milton’s Satan, simple eponymic techniques can outgrow their own allegories.

How a word becomes a character, however, is still a speculative topic. Digressing on how a Hebrew audience associates a word with a similarly named deity, John Walton expresses that the “difference between metaphysical demonization and literary personification can be difficult to determine” and that the “etymological correspondence of a Hebrew term to an ancient Near Eastern deity does not necessarily mean that the referent is still conceived as a personal entity in Israelite cosmology.”\textsuperscript{56} An exegete cannot utilize an etymology to place a deity in a historical context because the original audience could still have referenced the god or goddess in a figurative manner. Walton capitalizes on a modern example: one might allude to Cupid when discussing courtship without actually believing in Cupid’s reality.\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, Mastema’s historical context is may be impossible to distinguish definitively, but his hate-evoking appellation certainly nods toward an implied narrative nature at least.

With ancient texts, especially, authorial intent will always remain cryptic. Todd Hanneken asserts that scholars agree that the author of Jubilees “[draws] on and


\textsuperscript{56} Walton, \textit{Demons and Spirits}, 68.

\textsuperscript{57} Walton, 68.
rework[s] multiple sources” to achieve a goal but are unsure what that goal may be.\textsuperscript{58} J. W. Henten believes that Mastema evolved just as Abaddon did: “a noun for a certain concept is first connected with an angel whose role is linked up with the concept and afterwards becomes the proper name for this angel.”\textsuperscript{59} Paul Ricoeur, in his study on how mankind naturally defines evil through an innate sense of defilement and guilt, stresses myths are an extension of our realities and that they attempt to make sense of our situation: “the myth tries to get at the enigma of human existence … [and] accounts for this transition [from the fundamental reality of innocence to the actual reality of guilt] by means of a narration.”\textsuperscript{60} Mastema in his myth could then be a symbol that seeks to answer philosophical inquiries. Neil Forsyth believes Mastema has no certain origin but that he still aligns himself with Satan as a Second Temple-period-Jewish solution to the problem of evil.\textsuperscript{61} Therefore, Mastema would be an agent who elucidates theodicean perplexities—i.e., he clarifies why evil exists.

Jubilees’s Mastema and Milton’s Satan both profit from a word’s nuances as the senses associate themselves with a character when the character functions reciprocally with its nomination inside a narrative. If political ideologies motivate the author, then the

\textsuperscript{58} Hanneken, “The Book of Jubilees,” 510.


etymological connection between word and character strengthens to fulfill an objective (e.g., for Mastema, as a mythographic image symbolizing a concept that demonizes a faction or as a universal symbol determined to answer philosophical quandaries).

Although outsiders looking in cannot fully decipher a character’s intrinsic nature through its etymological associations alone, linguistic analysis still serves a purpose. Milton’s Satan, who is pieced together with etymologies, serves Milton’s purpose of demonstrating a bad role model, so to speak—as someone who rejects God’s love, even though stuck in God’s system (daimon)—but who suffers the consequences, regardless (satan). 62

Milton’s Satan’s explicit satan and implicit daimon uphold the unity between character and lexis to achieve a didactic goal. 63 Jubilees’s Mastema establishes a similar supra-eponymic relationship but for different reasons. He exists as a hateful entity that destroys and assaults (i.e., he fulfills his allegorical role), but he also broaches God’s mystery, upholds universal laws, and is a living entity, a real character—something that allegory cannot maintain once one decodes the allegory. Mastema does not just partially represent his name, then, either; his roles always nod back to how “hatred” persists in God’s universe, in this religious context—whether Mastema acts hatefully or not—because his “mastemic” vocation upholds his modus vivendi with God.

In the Book of Jubilees, Mastema plays several roles: he is an accuser who haggles successfully with God, a personified misfortune who brings about natural

62 For specific details of daimon and satan, see Chapters 2 and 3 accordingly.

63 This is briefly discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1 and further advanced in Chapters 2 and 3.
disasters, a tempter who leads men to sin, and a tool that extends destruction from God. Mastema’s functions interplay with his name’s etymology (“hatred,” “hostility”) while maintaining his characterial realness and spreading his universal destruction. Mastema never strays from the implied core of his nature while distancing himself from allegorical depersonalization. In light of Riffaterra’s theories, Mastema’s actions signal a hypogram; they are “variant[s]” of Mastema’s role in the “matrix,” i.e. the core of the text, or “significance,” within the context of the Book of Jubilees.\textsuperscript{64} The relationship between him and his name is more than eponymous, much like Milton’s Satan.

In the text of Jubilees, Noah wished God would ward his family against the evil spirits of the Watchers.\textsuperscript{65} In immediate answer, the angels, with God’s permission, capture these “created” evil beings for “the place of judgment” (\textit{Jub.} 10:1-7).\textsuperscript{66} In response to the imprisonment, “Mastema, the leader of the spirits,” comes to beseech from God a tenth of the evil spirits for his control (\textit{Jub.} 10:8).\textsuperscript{67} He claims, without the spirits, he will not “be able to exercise the authority of [his] will among humanity” because the spirits are intended for the “destroying and misleading [of man] before

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Riffaterra, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{65} For more on the myth of the Watchers, see James C. VanderKam, \textit{Jubilees: A Commentary}, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2018), 282-7, and Wright, et al.
\item \textsuperscript{66} VanderKam, \textit{Jubilees}. All translations of the Book of Jubilees are taken from VanderKam, unless otherwise noted, and are provided parenthetically.
\item \textsuperscript{67} His interlocutory approach to God recalls Job’s satan, as well, and, at one point, he is even identified as “the satan.” See VanderKam, 407. VanderKam elaborates on the Book of Jubilees as exclusively preserved in Ethiopic—thus, “saytan” is used. He also surveys critics arguing about the textual inconsistencies between the “satan” and “Mastema” as mistakes in the translation or original narrative.
\end{itemize}
[Mastema’s] punishment because the evil of humanity is great” (Jub. 10:8). God allows his request but takes precautions (Jub. 10:9-10). Mastema’s implied role, from his name, pushes past chaotic hostility here. Because of the diplomatic exchange, he evolves from allegorical violence into a being who wields hatred for God’s purpose. If his name were merely an eponym, as Plato’s Socrates debates about gods, his name would not define his narrative role but rather prompt playful possibilities about his nature that stray from his narrative purpose. The same applies to Milton’s Satan, who incites his name while being more than it. He is not just a flat satan—a one-dimensional accuser, as he is in Paradise Regained—but rather a living entity who struggles to comprehend his own anguish, malice, and mistakes, all while still descending into his etymology.

Both characters narratively fulfill lexical functions while maintaining a characterial reality. As the Angel of the Presence relates the Torah to Moses, Mastema appears sporadically—as a force of nature, an instigator of God’s tests, the embodiment of a wrathful pharaoh, and an extension of deific destruction. The effect is dizzying: after Mastema’s discourse with God, the Angel of the Presence limits Mastema to a peripheral effect. The persuasiveness of the character lives only mnemonically while his continued role pervades the text. Mastema encourages idolatry that further provokes sin and bloodshed (Jub. 11:4-5). He commands ravens to destroy crops (Jub. 11:11). And he serves as a replacement for the God of Exodus Who randomly “sought to put [Moses] to

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68 See Plato, “Cratylus,” 402d-404e, for Socrates demonstrating etymegorization of Pluto, Poseidon, and Hades.
death” for not circumcising his son (Exod. 4:24). In Jubilees, the Angel of the Presence explicitly tells Moses, instead, that Mastema tried to kill him, not God (Jub. 48:3). Mastema advances “hatred” by relieving God from responsibility while still evoking the original diplomacy. Milton’s Satan furthers his eponym, as well.

Satan from Paradise Lost unleashes etymological significance when he, “inflam’d with rage, came down, / The Tempter [satan] ere th’ Accuser [satan] of man-kind,” to Earth (PL 4.9-10; emphasis mine). He hovers between his fallen-angel background and his serpentine seduction on both an etymological and narrative level. Milton “glosses the name as, etymologically, a role.” But he also evolves the character with it because Satan’s emotional response to his situation still invigorates satan’s senses beyond a Christian foe. Both Mastema and the Satan of Paradise Lost kaleidoscope their names, despite the limiting factor of their name’s histories.

Both characters embody darker moments of God. Mastema ultimately fulfills the theodicean role in the Book of Jubilees’ variation of the Akedah. Originally, in Genesis 22, Abraham proves his loyalty to God by attempting the life of his son Isaac, but in

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69 Alter claims, “This elliptic story is the most enigmatic episode in all of Exodus. It seems unlikely that we will ever resolve the enigmas it poses.”

70 See VanderKam, 1152, on Mastema’s exegetical role of replacing God in the narrative.

71 The situation parallels Hebrew Bible moments. Cf. 2 Sam. 24:1 and 1 Chron. 21:1, where the chronicler switches the Yahweh of 2 Sam. with a satan when David fails to resist numbering his people via census.

72 Hale, Milton’s Languages, 136.

73 See Chapter 3.
Jubilees, Mastema, Job-like, provokes God and accuses Abraham of idolatriziing Isaac. God must prove to Mastema (not Himself) that Abraham is righteous because God knows “Abraham was faithful in every difficulty” (Jub. 17:17). Here, in Jubilees, Mastema seems faintly reminiscent of God’s psychological unconscious that Jung and Kluger identify as the Satan of the Hebrew Bible. Satan, in Jung and Kluger’s understanding, is an entity inside God who communicates in a way to unveil God’s own insecurities about His creations’ loyalties. Satan is a part of God and causes Him to doubt. Therefore, God is merely seeking assurance when He tests His creations instead of utilizing His own omniscience. 74 “Hatred,” through Mastema, appears within God’s mind now and is past simple eponymy. And Milton’s Satan, perhaps because of a similar theological situation, also evokes hateful rejection of God while being a part of God. 75

Still invoking “hatred,” Mastema coalesces with Pharaoh and extends God’s destruction, just as God uses Satan in Paradise Regained. At one point in Jubilees, Mastema embodies Pharaoh: “the prince of Mastema … cried out to the Egyptians to pursue [Moses] with all the Egyptian army” (Jub. 48:12). For a moment, the evil spirit acts as and is an enraged Pharaoh; they fuse. Mastema serves as the left hand of God

74 In the New Testament, however, God represses this Satan by casting him into Hell, which, from a Jungian perspective, explains why the New Testament Satan is more demonized than the accuser of the Hebrew Bible: God drives Satan into villainy by choosing not to listen to him anymore. See Carl Jung, “Answer to Job,” Jung on Evil, ed. Murray Stein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 119-73, and Kluger, 105-32. In Jubilees, the unconscious realization of God “seems faintly reminiscent” because God admits Abraham has been loyal. Why He needs to prove that to Mastema is more palatable to most readers than God finding out for Himself.

75 See Chapter 2 for why Satan rejects God’s love, as cued by the hypogram “demon.”
and—coalesced with his subordinate spirits—is “sent to kill every firstborn in the land of Egypt” (Jub. 49:2). He transitions from possessing Pharaoh to executing God’s final plague.\(^\text{76}\) In his final moments, Mastema is a part of God, a part of the spirits that he himself commands, yet exists as an action—a variant of his name. His role anticipates the New Testament Satan, as well as recalling the ones of the Hebrew Bible.\(^\text{77}\) And Milton plays on this sense in Paradise Regained when a sequel Satan, talking to Christ, admits eventual subservience to God’s will: “For what he [God] bids I [Satan] do” (PR 1.378). The multifaceted, nominative functions from both characters expand both of their significances beyond the initial impression of the text.

Mastema’s appellative relationship adumbrates Milton’s Satan’s. But Satan does not just manifest his obvious etymological roots (satan); he also whispers an implied word (daimon) to reveal his moral corruption. As Leonard notes about Milton’s implied words, “Milton’s withholding is often as significant as his giving of names … Sometimes the names we do not hear are more important even than those we do.”\(^\text{78}\) Herbert Marks, for example, discovers the Hebrew Bible’s helel, the same word the Vulgate translates into “Lucifer.”\(^\text{79}\) He notes a brief etymology: “to shine,” “to boast,” and “to praise”—the

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\(^{76}\) See VanderKam, 1173-75, on an excursus of critical commentary involving Mastema conflicting with his role within the narrative as both a servant of God and adversary of God. VanderKam counters that Mastema does not contradict his function because he serves God by fulfilling the role God instilled in him: being against God (strangely).

\(^{77}\) The author even puns on “accusations” in 48:15, a denotation associated with satan. See VanderKam, 1161.

\(^{78}\) Leonard, Naming in Paradise, 21.

\(^{79}\) See Isa. 14:12. The Hebrew word is only used once in the Bible.
latter related to the verbal “praise” in “hallelujah.” Relying on modern poetic theory, Marks concludes that the clandestine word helel is a hypogram that also parallels Freud’s “verbal bridge”: helel is a “nodal point of ambiguity exploited within the poem’s figurative system for purposes of condensation and disguise.” Since the word has a duality to it—“radiance” and also “vanity”—Marks targets Milton’s implications. As one example, when Raphael recounts the heavenly battle to Adam, he asserts that he will not name glorious or infamous angels—the former type needs no praise; the latter “to glory aspires / Vain-glorious” (PL 5.383-84). Marks adduces that both “praise” and “dispraise,” “renown” and “ignominy,” involved with the Latinate punning of gloriari in the same context, are all “a cover for the missing Hebrew name[, helel].” The contextual environment clues the etymological connotations of helel inside Satan.

However, Satan’s textual interplay goes further and enlivens his past, present, and future by profiting from two primary words: daimon and satan. Daimon, one of Greek’s most complicated words, implicitly signifies Satan’s internal confusion and irrationality. The word pinpoints and references Satan’s original form (he is a daimon) and how he longs to separate himself from God through idolization of himself (as if a Septuagintal


81 Marks, “Blotted Book,” 214.

82 Marks, 214.

83 For all information about to be stated involving daimon and satan, see Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
daimon). He also triggers other angels to act as protectors (as Hesiodic and Platonic daimones) because of his rebellion. Satan’s inner daimon satirically mirrors other Platonic usages, such as Symposium’s Love (a daimon). It is an implied word in Milton’s Satan that symbolizes the dysfunctionality of his inner voice of reason (his satiric Socratic daimonion), which encourages him to deform himself into an idol, shown materially through Sin and Pandaemonium (the “place of demons”).

The Hebrew satan, then, evokes Satan’s symptomatology after abandoning God. The word represents what he does when he is corrupted but also what happens when the universe prosecutes him. Satan’s immediate etymology is Satan’s rebellion against God: he becomes an adversary, an opponent, and then his opponents refer to him by a new name. His adversarial hatred recalls the Hebrew word. He leaves Hell’s council to spy on Adam and Eve, much like the satan in the speculated history surrounding Job where a satan serves as the eyes and ears of a Persian king to accuse and deceive others. Milton also plays on God’s eyes, which roam (shuwt, a potential root of satan). Thus, Milton’s Satan stimulates the spy-like, accusatory, and deceptive elements of the Hebrew word. A satan might obstruct someone or something, or might imply an act of resistance, of withstanding. Milton’s Satan physically and metaphorically obstructs others, especially when he deceives Eve and hinders himself with destructive idolization. And yet all of Heaven, and even Eve, knowingly or unknowingly counter-obstruct Satan, as if in a legal trial, to allot redemptive chances. Eventually, the word becomes a symptom of anyone who strays from God.

Satan is (and has) a daimon and becomes a satan—he symbolizes and is composed of the hypograms from which his narrative role profits. His narrative being
courses with etymological precision that defines who he is, what he does, why he erodes, and what he will become. Milton’s Satan is the pinnacle of *Paradise Lost*’s linguistic subterrane.
CHAPTER II: THE CORRUPTED DAIMON

Milton’s nephew and biographer, Edward Phillips, quotes the beginning of Satan’s first soliloquy, from Book 4 of *Paradise Lost*, as the start of a tragedy that Milton initially intended to write (*Life of Milton* 1034-35).\(^1\) Milton eventually implemented Satan’s speech into *Paradise Lost*, and its placement invites readers to analyze an isolated Satan for the first time.\(^2\) On earth and near Eden, insecurities wrack Satan as he mentally wrestles with himself before spying on Adam and Eve. Fowler describes the moment as a “[d]ramatic interior duologue between better and worse selves.”\(^3\) Conflicted, Satan labors to resolve his rebellious motives and struggles to calculate his redemptive chances. Because of Milton’s compositional preference for beginning with Satan’s mental turmoil, the scene holds a special importance for the thematic aftereffects of one’s separation from God. Milton makes a spectacle of the intricate details of a fallen angel “in wand’ring mazes lost,” one—as Milton notes of those in Hell—who argues “good and evil much” with “Vain wisdom all, and false Philosophie,” which “charm[s] / Pain for a while” (*PL* 2.561-62, 565-7). For Milton, therefore, confliction signifies separation from God.

The soliloquy has stirred critical controversy for over a century, primarily because Satan appears as a completely different character from the glorious-rebel Satan of Books

\(^1\) While citing lines 4.32-41, Phillips misquotes “matchless” as “glorious.” See Hughes, 1035. But Fowler argues that Phillips might have been citing from an earlier edition. See Fowler, 4.41n.


\(^3\) Fowler, 4.32-41n.
Away from his fallen comrades, he exhibits emotional vulnerability rather than heroic obstinance and demonstrates a patterned, cyclic failure to redeem himself. Regina Schwartz, from a Freudian perspective, elaborates that Satan’s pattern, i.e. his repetition of failure, stems from his refusal to confess appropriately. She clarifies that when one cannot put the past in the past, one cannot relieve “the pressure to repeat compulsively,” and thus Satan’s selective “memories … become prophecies of his future.” He will never reconcile his mistake, so he repeats the traumatic episode eternally. Andrew Barnaby, on the other hand, attacks Schwartz’s neglect to address Satan’s core, created urges: “Schwartz never clarifies either why Satan feels compelled, initially, to deny his origins or in what sense he experiences the debt he feels to God as a burden.” Thereby, Satan does not refuse to submit but is unable to. Whether God or Satan is responsible for the internal nature that challenges Satan soteriologically, Satan faces his inner being, his daimon (“demon”), on Mount Niphates but suffers defeat. He cannot conquer his own impulse that separates him from God and engages in self-worship instead. His daimon is 

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corrupted, and Milton rouses the Greek word’s etymology throughout *Paradise Lost* to emphasize Satan’s routine shortcomings.\(^7\)

In one sense of the word, *daimon*, Milton parodies Socrates’s *daimonion*, an inner voice that guides one to choose correctly. Satan recognizes the paradox of paying God back the debt of one’s creation but then does not trust the solution to his predicament. Temporarily out of sight, Satan acknowledges that service to God is the “easiest recompense” and that God deserves it (*PL* 4.46-47). He claims, though, that something inside him is wrong and does not co-mingle well with God’s goodness: “yet all his good prov’d ill in me, / And wrought but malice” (*PL* 4.48-49). He identifies an inner, conflicting nature. He next concludes that he possesses the same power to resist temptation as others have: “Hadst thou [Satan] the same free Will and Power to stand? /

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\(^7\) Some may question the absence of the word *diabolos* (devil) here, especially since Milton in *Paradise Lost* employs “devil” frequently but “demon” (*daimon*) only three times, and never in its base form: “Pandemonium” twice and “Demoniac” once (*PL* 1.756, 10.424, and 11.485), the latter added with the 1674 ed. (see Hughes 11.485n). Simply, the Hebrew *satan* swallows the semantics of the Greek *diabolos*; they etymologically overlap (see Chapter 3). As an insightful example, the Septuagintal translators generally employ *diabolos* for the Hebrew Bible’s *satan*. And the New Testament, of course, formalizes these devilish connotations almost exclusively into one entity: Satan, the Devil. *Diabolos* derives from *dia* (“through,” “across”) + *ballo* (“to throw,” “hit”); subsequently, *diabolos*, from *diaballo* (“to throw across”), eventually denotes varying forms of “false accusation,” “slander,” “enmity,” “gossip,” and “enemy,” much like *satan*. Interestingly, *bolos* can also denote a “throwing net.” See Liddell, *Greek-English Lexicon*; Montanari, *Ancient Greek*; and Beekes, *Etymological Dictionary*. For the 22 variant forms of *diabolos* in the Septuagint—some in the same line and not directly translating the 39 variances of *satan* from the Hebrew Bible—see Alfred Rahlfs and Robert Hanhart, *Septuaginta*, revised ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006), 1 Chr 21:1; Est 7:4; 8:1; 1; Mc 1:36; Ps 108:6; Jb 1:6, 7, 9, 12; 2:1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7; Wis 2:24; Zec 3:1, 2. The extensive occurrences in Job are instructive: the translators almost exclusively implement *diabolos* for the assaulting *satan*. For the New Testament occurrences of *diabolos*, see Strong, *Concordance*, G1228.
Thou hadst: whom hast thou then or what to accuse, / But Heav’n’s free Love dealt equally to all?” (*PL* 4.66-69). The reader feels compelled to trust the unreliable character because he echoes God’s same assertion to the Son earlier: “I created all th’ Ethereal Powers / And Spirits [as I did mankind], both them who stood and them who fail’d; / Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell” (*PL* 3.100-2). But Satan will deny his rationality.

He faces the uncomfortable truth of his severance from God and next loses emotional control, an indicator that he rejects his inner voice of reason. He accuses God’s love: “Be then his [God’s] Love accurst, since love or hate, / To me alike, it deals eternal woe” (*PL* 4.69-70). Not satisfied with this slander, he next blames himself: “Nay curs’d be thou; since against his thy will / Chose freely what it now so justly rues. / Me miserable!” (*PL* 4.71-73). Here, Satan exposes his true self, who chooses “freely” for him and whom he does not understand. It reigns over his decisions and dictates his separation from happiness. Next, he identifies it and the outcome that it brings him: “Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell” (*PL* 4.75). Satan’s inner self is a ruinous Hell, and he suffers because he, or it, cannot, or will not, pay God the “debt immense of endless gratitude” (*PL* 4.52). Repentance is not a choice because “Disdain forbids [him]” his submission (*PL* 4.82). Once his nature hinders him, his reasoning falters. Predicting his crew’s ridicule and his inevitable relapse, he eventually buckles under an ultimatum and professes, “Evil be thou my Good” (*PL* 4.110). Or, in C. S. Lewis’s reading, “Nonsense

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8 Cf. also Raphael’s pedagogy (*PL* 5.535-43).
be thou my sense.”9 Satan hears a voice of reason but shrinks from his nature’s backlash—he succumbs to the corruption of his mental demon.

The Greek word, *daimon*, even with its supernatural and metaphysical senses, pertains to one’s rationality or irrationality, especially Socrates’s *daimonion*.10 When *daimon* implies a surveying spirit or an intermediary figure between mankind and the gods, the word still recalls a spiritual force that guides one toward choosing wisely. And, in its generic cases of “divinity” and “religion,” the word connotes wisdom or, negatively, superstition, notions that also linger in the Septuagint’s empty idols, or *daimonia*.11 In relation to godly beings, it can mean penurious creatures who act accordingly to their natures, such as the *daimon* Love from Plato’s *Symposium*. Even etymologically, Plato and Eusebius conjecture that *daimon* is from either “to know” or

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11 For surviving denotative examples in the New Testament, see Acts 25:19, where Festus describes a charge against Paul involving confliction with Jewish religion (*deisidaimonias*); Acts 17:18, where a crowd accuses Paul of the worship of foreign gods (*daimonion*); and Acts 17:22, where Paul, after noting idols, addresses a crowd’s superstitious religion (*deisidaimonesteros*). I discuss the idols of the LXX later.
“to fear”—both implying a mentality, though considered folk etymologies now.\(^{12}\) And from the New Testament, demonic possession strongly correlates with “insanity.”\(^{13}\) The Greek word *daimon*—despite diachronically spanning fate, celestial messengers, gods,

\(^{12}\) In a discussion on types of *daimones*, Plato’s Socrates speculates if good people are the same as wise people and concludes they are because of the etymological significance of *daimon*: “It is principally because daemons are wise and knowing (*daēmones*), I think, that Hesiod says they are named ‘daemons’ (‘*daimones*’).” See Plato, “Cratylus,” 398b. Eusebius, redefining the Greek *daimones* as sources of evil instead, refutes that, etymologically, the word even signifies problems: “[B]ut the daemons, if indeed it behoves us to declare the origin of their name also, are called according to their nature daemons, not as the Greeks think in consequence of their being knowing (*daēmones*), and wise, but because of their fearing and causing fear (*deimainein*).” See Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, 4.5.142, http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebius_pe_04_book4.htm. For modern speculation on the correct etymology of *daimon*, particularly involving the root “to divide,” as well, see *Greek-English Lexicon*, *Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*, and *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*. For a discussion on Milton’s *haemony* from *A Mask*, its relation to *daimon*, and Milton’s access to Greek Renaissance lexicons, see John Steadman, *Milton’s Biblical and Classical Imagery* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1984), 148-52.

surveying spirits, imperfect creatures, divine wisdom, empty idols, and demonic possession—generally signifies something with a component of wisdom or absurdity, and this significance is the etymological cornerstone upon which Milton builds the demonic self of Satan.

Like Plato, Milton personifies reason as an entity that guides one to choose wisely. It is the fruit of the soul, as well, and Raphael counsels Adam as such: “the Soul / Reason receives [as nourishment], and reason is her being” (PL 5.486-87). Michael correspondingly counsels a postlapsarian Adam about reason, but more harshly: “Since thy original lapse, true Liberty / Is lost, which always with right Reason dwells,” and “since [mankind] permits / Within himself unworthy Powers to reign / Over free Reason, God in Judgment just / Subjects him from without to violent Lords” (PL 12.83-4, 90-93).

Reason is a materialized choice that comes from within and that prevents calamity and tyranny. N. K. Sugimura, discussing Raphael’s dialogue about the intellectual spirit, claims that the archangel means to separate the rational soul from the entity containing it. Raphael thus defines “the rational soul in terms of an independent (nonphysicalist) substance.”¹⁴ One taps into it for guidance. She confirms angelic reasoning aligns with goodness, as well: “to choose evil is not a rational choice for the good angels because rationality and godliness are implicitly one.”¹⁵ Reason is the pinnacle of the upright mind. Logic empowers any sentient creature to choose wisely, and thus to be happy. As

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¹⁵ Sugimura, Spiritual and Material Substance, 194.
Raphael imparts to Adam, “That thou art happy, owe to God; / That thou continu’st such, owe to thyself” (PL 5.520-1). Choosing rightly maintains one’s happiness.

Milton consistently upholds rationality as an instrument for spiritual battle. God pronounces the importance of free will and reason: “Not free [to choose to serve Me], what proof could they [humans or spirits] have giv’n sincere / of true allegiance” (PL 3.103-4). He next defines reason as “choice” (PL 3.108). And Milton, in Areopagitica, notes that after the Adam of Genesis intermingled good with evil, “[anyone] that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian” (Areop 728; emphasis mine). Virtuous reason sifts evil. And trial then cleanses the persecuted: “that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary” (Areop 728). To use one’s reason is to go into spiritual warfare, to endure a trial, so that one may determine good from evil and choose wisely. Milton here anticipates Satan’s inability to pass his own trial. When Satan proclaims, “Disdain forbids me” to submit, his poignant personification (“Disdain”) implies a manipulative, separate entity to which Satan has somehow given power, and thus replaced reason, or that Disdain has ruled from the start.

In Plato’s Apology, Socrates’s enigmatic daimonion is a “voice” (phonê) or “sign” (semeion) that “opposes” (enantionomai) the philosopher so that he acts accordingly to wisdom—i.e., contrariwise to Milton’s Satan. The voice has fostered Socrates’s trust

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16 Raphael’s assertion is reminiscent of a form of daimon—eudaimonia (“happiness, success”). Luc Brisson defines this literally as “whose daimon (the intellect) is in a good shape.” See Luc Brisson, “What is a Daimon for Porphyry?,” Neoplatonic Demons and Angels, ed. Luc Brisson, Seamus O’Neill, and Andrei Timotin (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 87.
since his childhood because it reliably shepherds him.\textsuperscript{17} During Socrates’s trial, Socrates does not even accuse the voice of erring when it neglects to warn him of his execution. Rather, he trusts that “[w]hat has happened to me may well be a good thing” (Ap. 40a-c).\textsuperscript{18} He knows the \textit{daimonion} guides his well-being, even if it leads him toward death; its decision is sound. Milton rejuvenates the same premise when God replies to the Son’s questions of man’s redemption: “And I will place within them as a guide / My umpire conscience, whom if they will hear, / Light after light well used they shall attain, / And to the end persisting, safe arrive” (PL 3.194-97). God acts as an inner voice of reason. Irene Samuel posits that the only difference between Plato’s reason (generally speaking) and Milton’s reason is that Milton asserts the extra criterion of God’s involvement—the two reasons are founded by the same principles otherwise.\textsuperscript{19} While Socrates submits to the


\textsuperscript{18} All quotations from Plato’s works, unless otherwise indicated, are from \textit{Plato: Complete Works}, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), and references to specific works will be made parenthetically from it. Abbreviations follow those listed in \textit{Oxford Classical Dictionary}.

\textsuperscript{19} Irene Samuel, \textit{Plato and Milton} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 129. “When reason beholds the Good, Plato would say, every part of the soul has its appropriate satisfaction, and enjoys the happiness of justice. Milton, converting the principle, would rather maintain that, in order to satisfy reason as well as every lesser faculty, the soul must live in God, and thence receive the only knowledge that can lead to happiness.”
voice, Milton’s Satan resists his *daimonion*, whether granted by God or not, and buries it with illogicalities because it irritates him with uncomfortable truths and reminds him he cannot defeat his passions.

Despite the strangeness of the requests of Plato’s *daimonion*, if one chooses to listen to it, one profits with righteousness. In Plato’s *Phaedrus*, the same voice warns Socrates not to agree with Phaedrus about an argument’s respectability, that Socrates, after already having concurred with Phaedrus, needs to atone “for some offense against the gods” (*Phdr*. 242c). He halts the interlocution, and with new momentum of amended dialogue, he crafts, among other ideas, the masterful tripartite-soul-as-charioteer analogy.20 The voice uncomfortably rectifies Socrates’s error and subsequently leads him to an enlightened path. Therefore, Socrates’s inner sign unifies itself with the rational power that swells from within the philosopher so that Socrates may demystify moral ambiguity. His fate and way of life even inspire Milton’s Christ in *Paradise Regained* to compare him with Job in a retort against a different Satan: “Poor Socrates (who next more memorable [than Job]?) / By what he taught and suffer’d for so doing, / For truth’s sake suffering death unjust, lives now / Equal in fame to proudest Conquerors” (*PR* 3.96-99).21 This voice of reason, syncretized with Christian wisdom, sets the foundation of Milton’s doctrine of reasonably choosing to remain in goodness—a choice Satan is not

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21 See Samuel, *Plato and Milton*, 29-33, for more on Milton’s thoughts of Socrates. Cf. Samuel, 124-29, as well, to analyze Christ countering the *PR* Satan’s attempt at using Socrates against Him.
willing to make, or debatably is unable to, in *Paradise Lost*. And the hypogram “demon” etymologically signifies Satan’s ethical failure by parodically recalling Socrates’s *daimonion*.

The word “demon” never appears in *Paradise Lost* but rather spectrally exposes Satan’s faults, so a reader must grasp Satan’s original motivation to catch the wordplay—a moment that is difficult to pinpoint. True to its etymology, *daimon* “divides” Satan from his redemption. And a reader perceives the effects of the word through Milton’s contextual environment. Unfortunately, Satan’s original, private moment of separation from God (before the Son’s promotion) does not occur in the poem; rather, the reader pieces it together from biased accounts. In order to connect Milton’s etymological references of *daimon* with Satan’s sense of self further, I will first survey the troublesome free-will and deterministic interpretations of Satan, before offering a deeper analysis.

One must infiltrate Satan, Sin, and Raphael’s recollections of the rebellion to understand why angels would resist a seemingly omnipotent creator. If the reader accepts pride as Satan’s downfall, one must next contemplate Satan’s source of pride.

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22 Some speculate that derivations from *daimon* imply dividing destiny or fate; see the *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, s.v. “demon.” Others note the root of the verb *daiomai*, “to divide, to feast,” with implications of food, separation via carving, and even divided land; see the *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*. The etymology even has roots in banquets and priests and occurs in the *Iliad* with sacrificial food, thus tying all these diverse ideas back into ritualistic ideologies. One must be careful with pinning the root of the word’s meaning down scientifically, though (see chapter 1 for Davide del Bello’s “etymegorizing”). As elaborated earlier, though, in chapter 1, scientific analysis does not prevent Milton’s poetic manipulation.

23 I choose “seemingly” to acknowledge critics who debate God’s omnipotence within *Paradise Lost*. For one example of such, see William Empson, *Milton’s God* (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1961), 36-146.
Satan acknowledges that he could resist its temptation, but from whence does it come? The reader never witnesses another prelapsarian angel struggle likewise, except against the discernment of truth in Satan’s syllogisms. Satan’s personal conundrum involves the Son’s vice-regency but does not exclusively encompass it. The Messiah seems more of a catalyst to Satan’s pride than the actual problem—the Son exacerbates the issue but does not create it since Sin’s recount of Satan fornicating with her seems to precede the Son’s promotion. Therefore, the Son’s elevation could be God provoking Satan’s rebellion or calling out Satan’s divine detachment. Nonetheless, within Milton’s universe, God creates everything, so implicitly even one’s nature. Therefore, in a Devil’s-advocate line of argumentation, the text could also imply that God creates Satan and his alluring self, intends him to indulge in it, and then, because of Satan’s forbidden pleasure, nudges him into mutiny. As one can see, Satan’s resultant pride divides readers into either free-will or deterministic camps, into either blaming Satan or blaming God. But the word daimon still prevails in either camp because Satan’s mentality underscores each perspective.

24 See Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost, Second Edition with a New Preface (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), xxx-xxxii and xxxin21, for highlights of critical debates involving the “space of free will.” Some, including Fish, believe there is no answer to why someone chooses something—that merely is the paradox of free choice. But others object that if one separates from a prior mental state to make a choice, as if in a new mindset, then the chooser is not the same self and thus not actually choosing for him- or herself; i.e. something else temporarily chooses. The tempting counter to this is that the chooser weakens his or her mental defenses first to let in a foreign invader (or to unlock it from within), but then the previous choice that allowed intrusion to begin with is just another choice under the same free-will criteria. Also, where does the entity come from if God makes everything? Maybe, creatures, as agents of free will, are gifted with powers beyond God (allowed paradoxically due to God’s love) to create things that will ruin themselves, but then, the line of reasoning returns to the original question: why would a creature choose to ruin itself? Such is the unsolvable dilemma of Satan and his free will.
To further aggravate *Paradise Lost*'s crypticity, no characters give accurate, comprehensive accounts of the original source of the angelic fall, only complicated verisimilitudes.²⁵ Most would agree Satan cannot consistently be trusted, but Raphael is not reliable either: he relates a story as if he is omniscient, though he is not, and his account conflicts with both Satan’s and Sin’s interpretations.²⁶ Sin is another problem: she should have no reason to lie, but she exists both allegorically and materially—so is she even real?²⁷ Satan does not remember her (*PL* 2.737-45). And Raphael never mentions her, despite how she claims she has tempted heavenly residents (*PL* 2.761-67). She proposes a different moment from Raphael for when Satan first knew pain.²⁸ She also claims that God granted her the key to Hell to guard against escapees, yet the idea is not supported elsewhere (*PL* 2.774-77).²⁹ Furthermore, all these characters’ stories prevail through a biased narrator: he embellishes the deceptiveness of the fallen angels’

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²⁵ Once again, I will emphasize important details later; I am merely prefacing Milton’s etymological wordplay with *Paradise Lost*’s interpretive problems.

²⁶ See Peter C. Herman, *Destabilizing Milton: “Paradise Lost” and the Poetics of Incertitude* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 119, for a belief that the reader is the only omniscient being, even considering God, in *Paradise Lost*.


²⁸ Cf. *PL* 2.752 with *PL* 6.236.

²⁹ The key, passively, is “giv’n,” but the reader naturally assumes God grants it since the key allows Sin power over Hell’s recipients. One questions God’s choice here, but perhaps, as Samuel Johnson might agree, the allegory is not mixing well with reality.
counselling when some angels make accurate points; his excessive details clash with
God’s oversimplification; and he is wishy-washy when he describes God in general.\textsuperscript{30} In
light of these characters’ stories—and because the Son’s promotion aggravates Satan’s
problems rather than creates them—Satan’s critical moment before dissent unfortunately
lies in impenetrable mystery. One can only conclude that a drastic change of mind occurs
and then only speculate as to why. Milton’s etymologies, however, might provide a clue.

Before one can approach the source of Satan’s pride, though, Milton relies on
daimon’s etymology to adumbrate Satan’s being and aberration from it, most
straightforwardly in a depiction of what he is: an angel. Milton subtly evokes Plato’s
Timaeus in the depiction of the angel’s hierarchies and Son’s promotion. Raphael’s story
mystifies the reader with a temporal space between the angels’ creation and the Son’s
authority. On a day “[a]s Heav’n’s great Year brings forth,” God, “by Imperial
summons,” calls the angels before the throne to reveal he has “begot” (i.e. promoted) his
“only Son” (\textit{PL} 5.583-84, 603-4).\textsuperscript{31} The angels, then, exist when the Son is not yet vice-


\textsuperscript{31} Despite how “begot” may merely denote “create,” Milton defines the seemingly elusive word elsewhere as a figurative creation, i.e. a promotion: “it will be apparent from the second Psalm, that God has begotten the Son, that is, has made him a king” (\textit{CD} 933). And he clarifies that Messiah is not coeternal with God but rather is perpetual: “Yet it does not follow from hence that the Son is co-essential with the Father, for then the title of Son would be least of all applicable to him, since he who is properly the Son is not coeval with the Father, much less of the same numerical essence, [sic] otherwise the Father and the Son would be one person” (\textit{CD} 933-34). And also, “Thus the Son was begotten of the Father in consequence of his decree, and therefore within the limits of time, for the decree itself must have been anterior to the execution of the decree, as is
gerent. And their banners and hierarchies admit their established way of living (PL 5.587-96). The scene recalls the Demiurge, from Timaeus, crafting the daimones, lesser gods, who eventually shape man. Milton’s Son’s elevation changes things, but the angels are still god-like beings who enjoy power from God, Who refers to them as “Gods” (PL 3.341). And as an angel of goodness, Satan’s role might have been to herald the Son’s vice-regency, as implied by the metaphorical transition of their titles—“Lucifer” into “Son” (i.e., “morning star” into “sun,” twilight into dawn). John Leonard, who originally observes this divine usherance, puts it aptly:

Lucifer’s office is to be a harbinger of dawn. Just as the morning star must fade before the sun, Lucifer the angel must yield precedence to the rising Messiah … To have ushered in the Son’s Dawn would have been the fulfilment of Lucifer’s being.

Satan’s original purpose could have been the most renowned of angelic tasks: the direct invoker and ultimate instrument of the godhead, a role similar to the Dawnbearer of Timaeus.

sufficiently clear from the insertion of the word to-day” (CD 934; emphasis his). Of course, using De Doctrina Christiana to explain the metaphysics of Paradise Lost is risky, but see Fowler, 5.603-6n; Kerrigan, Rumrich, and Fallon, 5.603n; and Hughes, 5.603-15n for scholarly agreement.

32 See Empson, Milton’s God, 102, for the Son’s vice-regency as God provoking Satan.

33 For a chart and excursus on Milton reading Timaeus and implementing it in his works, see Samuel, Plato and Milton, 22-25, 39, and 113.

Milton’s Heaven recalls Platonic metaphysics, which enliven an environment in *Paradise Lost* for “demon” to thrive. Timaeus, speaking to Socrates, describes the Demiurge begetting “for himself” the world as “a blessed god”—much as Milton’s God does with the Son (*Tim.* 34b). The cosmic craftsman next weaves time and brings about the astral bodies. Along with the planet Mercury, the “Dawnbearer (the Morning Star, or Venus) … he [the Demiurge] set to run in circles that equal the Sun’s in speed … As a result, the Sun … and the Dawnbearer alike overtake and are overtaken by one another” (*Ti.* 38d). The scene suggests Milton’s syncretism with Isaiah’s “Lucifer” (*helel*) and, subsequently, the possibility of Satan’s original purpose: to usher in Christ’s ascent to power just as Plato’s Sun cyclically overtakes the Dawnbearer.  

Next, Plato’s Demiurge issues commands so that he can shift blame to others for their decisions, much as Milton’s God does: He “set[s] out all these ordinances to [his subservient creatures]—which he did to exempt himself from the responsibility for any evil they might afterwards do” (*Ti.* 42d). When Milton’s God frees himself of blame extensively in Book 3, hints of Plato’s Demiurge show. And finally, the revolution of time in *Timaeus*—where a year is “when the Sun has completed its own cycle” (*Ti.* 39c)—resembles Milton’s “Heav’n’s great Year” when the Son rises to power. Thus,  

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35 Pertaining to God’s decision to create the Son, Milton decides God does not make Messiah out of necessity but rather because God has free will (*CD* 934). Thus, we return to the earlier argument of the motivation within free will; see n24.

36 See Isa. 14:12.

37 See *PL* 3.93-99 and 111-18, for example.

38 See also Hughes, 5.583n.
Paradise Lost’s echoes of Timaeus reveal potential allusions to Greek astral bodies dictated by divine creation. So, naturally, because of Milton’s contextual clues, when Plato’s Demiurge produces the lesser gods (daimones) next in Timaeus, Milton’s angels’ celestial ranks align with Milton’s Platonic allusions.

Timaeus’s depiction of the lesser gods, the beings Heaven and Earth create—Cronos, Zeus, and below—parallel Milton’s Satan’s angelicity and mentality. The Demiurge commands the daimones to imitate his creative power so that they can fashion mankind, and he suggests the daimones implement complicated emotions into humans (pleasure, pain, love, fear, and spiritedness) so that the humans must restrain their own confictions: “And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust” (Ti. 41a-42c). Justness leads to the soul’s alignment with the stars, but unjustness leads to continuous degradation, with “no rest from … toilsome transformations,” until one breaks the troubled pattern by “subdu[ing] that turbulent, irrational mass by means of reason. This would return him to his original condition of excellence” (Ti. 42c-d). The daimones complicate matters for humans so that mankind must rely on their reason to overcome trials, which returns mankind to “excellence.” The idea should immediately evoke Satan: he is both a daimon—a lesser god directly from a creator who should interact with man—and a recipient of a daimon—a daimon-affected creature who battles confictions with reason.

Satan demonstrates one state of a daimon fallen into another. While tempting a third of the angelic host, and in shock from Abdiel’s assertion, Satan recapitulates what is new to him, that the angels were made by the Son, not God: “That we were form’d then say’st thou? and the work / Of secondary hands, by task transferr’d / From Father to his
So? strange point and new!” (PL 5.853-55). 39 Plato’s Timaeus places the corrupted Satan where humans are—as the work of “secondary hands” (the imitating daimones), filled with complex emotions. And thus, Satan, once originally a daimon by Timaeus’s standards, lowers himself now to represent the Demiurge’s failing, irrational mankind, ones under guidance from daimones yet in “toilsome transformations.”40 These daimon-guided souls seek to escape cyclic wickedness to return to excellence just as Satan ruminates over his loss of status and decision to fall.

Both Milton’s Satan and the souls from Timaeus confuse right from wrong. As the daimones in Timaeus mix the souls during their creation, the souls move about “without rhyme or reason” so that reality’s truths seem inverted—left seems right, and right seems left—proving one is “misled and unintelligent” (Ti. 43e-44a). Education remedies the confusion. Without it, one will “limp his way through life and return to Hades uninitiated and unintelligent” (Ti. 44c). Timaeus’s warnings against foolishness anticipate Michael hewing Satan’s irrationality from his rationality—both literally and symbolically, his left side from his right—by “shear[ing] / All [Satan’s] right side” during the war in Heaven (PL 6.326-27). At this symbolic moment, Satan’s consciousness chooses the left—unintellectuality—and consequently, also Hell. Stella Revard stresses Satan’s determined fate while still in Heaven: “Satan is fallen intellectually as we first glimpse him resolving to leave the throne of God unworshipped and unobeyed.”41 Milton associates Plato’s

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39 See Andrew Barnaby, 195-204, for this moment being a source of trauma for Satan.

40 The idea recalls Milton’s Ignorance again, as well, from his seventh Prolusion.

unintelligent beings with Satan. They both interpret left as right, refuse lessoning themselves, and perpetuate their miserable existences. Therefore, Satan’s corrupted daimon contextually appears when Milton’s Platonic allusions signal the hypogram “demon.” It etymologically signifies Satan’s core ruined from poor reasoning—once god-like, now diminished.

Plato’s daimones reveal themselves again within Satan as from the “Vision of Er” in Book 10 of the Republic. Socrates relates to Glaucon that Er—a temporarily dead man who reports the afterlife to the living—describes dead souls presented before the three Fates—the daughters of Necessity—and how the souls choose their daimones (guiding spirits) and new lives. The daimones are guardians, in a sense, but Socrates emphasizes that choosing rationally is still the responsibility of the soul, despite having the benefit of a spiritual guide. The daimon is not “assigned to [one] by lot; [one] will choose him … The responsibility [of virtue] lies with the one who makes the choice; the god has none” (Res 617d-e). Platonic reason depends on the soul and is a spiritual righteousness that comes from within, though guided by outside spirits. Plato’s souls have a duality to them, then—an intuitive guide with a final arbiter. Milton’s Satan aligns but with a debased guide—he wrestles with an inner self, and, influenced, makes a continuous choice: “Evil be thou my Good” (PL 4.110). Satan embodies the advocate of poor decisions on all spectra of Platonic metaphysics and echoes the negative connotations of “demon” etymologically. Under the guidance of irrationality, he resists submission to wisdom and brings misfortune upon himself.

Milton’s good angels caution and guard mankind much like several extant Greek works’ straightforward celestial protectors (daimones). Consequently, Satan’s decision to
fall and demonize himself lures these good angels’ Greek agency from their roles. Satan effects “demon” secondhandedly. The angels, after Adam and Eve’s creation, communicate between God and mankind and then guard Adam and Eve with heavenly warnings, counsel, and protection. The angels would have none of these roles without Satan’s rebellion. Satan himself declares that the satanic crew’s banishment precedes man, which repairs the apostates’ absence: God “hath driv’n out his Rebel Foes / to deepest Hell, and to repair that loss / Created this new happy Race of Men / To serve him better” (PL 3.677-80). And because of mankind’s existence, the good angels fulfill a new purpose—to be daimones for them.

For example, when Ithuriel and Zephon in Book 4 catch Satan in Eden oneirically seducing Eve, Gabriel’s battalion subsequently arrives to repel Satan. And Raphael, with a squadron “Squar’d in full Legion,” wards against the gates of Hell to prevent demonic interference while the Son creates Earth (PL 8.231-36). Angels, also, enhance Eden’s defenses after Satan’s intrusion (PL 9.60-69). They swarm about Adam and Eve to maintain their safety. And, as noted earlier, Raphael and Michael counsel Adam and Eve to impart wisdom that emboldens them against Satan’s attempts and that prepares them for the fallen world. The angels relay God’s word directly, bridging a gap of

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42 Although, they are quite inept at this latter, judging by Satan’s constant entry into Eden and ultimate seducing of Adam and Eve. See Sugimura, 165-74, for an explication as to angels being weaker when they are physically separated from God, though. She also speculates that Satan demonstrates a fallen intellectuality when he cannot intercept news in Heaven as quickly as good beings can during the war.

43 See Empson, Milton’s God, 147, for a counter to this, though: “Adam and Eve would not have fallen unless God had sent Raphael to talk to them, supposedly to strengthen their resistance to temptation.”
communication. Milton’s angels extend God’s authority, offer protection, and intercede between divinity and mankind just as classical daimones do, and Satan’s demonic decisions directly invoke these roles.

Milton angelologically syncretizes protective Greek daimones from a range of sources. Hesiod potentially inspires him. The first recorded occurrence of the word daimon appears in Hesiod’s Works and Days and portrays protective spirits risen from the deceased Golden Age men. Retelling the origin of gods and men, Hesiod relates how the first men of the Golden Age were happy but died suddenly, as if sleeping. Their spirits suddenly protect mankind: “Since the earth covered up that race, they have been divine spirits (daimones) by great Zeus’ design, good spirits (daimones) on the face of the earth, watchers over mortal men, bestowers of wealth.” Plato adapts the tale and utilizes protective daimones in both the Statesman and Symposium, of which Milton knew. In

44 Barbara Lewalski places Milton’s Hesiodic studies at St. Paul’s and speculatively also at Cambridge. Milton would have read Hesiod at St. Paul’s during Greek grammar lessons in which he also translated Greek into Latin. At Cambridge, he might have studied Hesiod after thorough Aristotelian lectures. Scholars ostensibly conclude Milton’s Cantabrigian knowledge because of Directions for a Student in the Universitie, an outline of student lessons by the Emmanuel tutor Richard Holdsworth. See Barbara Lewalski, The Life of John Milton: A Critical Biography and Revised Edition (Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 10, 252n15.


46 In particular, Milton thoroughly understood Plato’s Love from Symposium, which I expound on later: “Hence it is that Plato in his festival discourse brings in Socrates relating what he feigned to have learned from the prophetess Diotima, how Love was the son of Penury, begot of Plenty in the garden of Jupiter” (DDD 710); cf. Symp. 203. For speculation on Raphael as a Neoplatonic angel that corrects Adam based on ideas of love from Symposium, see Clay Daniel, “Milton’s Neo-Platonic Angel?,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 44, no. 1 (Winter, 2004): https://www.jstor.org/stable/3844664.
the former, a visitor lectures a young Socrates on the primordial patterns of universal rotation and on lesser gods, or divine spirits (daimones), who “divided [living beings] between themselves, like herdsmen, … each by himself providing independently for all the needs of those he tended, so that none of them was savage, nor did they eat each other, and there was no war or internal dissent at all” (Plt. 271d-e). The spirits guide mankind and prevent animality and rebellion. In Symposium, Socrates remembers his teacher, Diotima, for an audience in a debate on what love is, and Diotima defines the daimones: “They are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the two conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring commands from the gods and gifts … Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all” (Symp. 202e-203a). The spirits are intermediary figures, i.e., lines of communication between mortals and immortals. And such are Milton’s angels and what Satan would have been if God had made man before Satan indirectly brought about these heavenly roles through his decision to revolt against God.47 Because of his corrupted daimon, Satan etymologically heralds the other roles of God’s daimones.

Apart from Milton’s etymological referencing to Satan’s being, the most poignant moment of hypogrammatic wordplay, as defined in Chapter 1, lies in Satan’s moment of corruption: his love of self substituting for his love of God—a type of idolatry. A reader unveiling this hidden usage of daimon during Satan’s moment of sin elucidates Satan’s inner self. One of the major controversies of Satan’s revolt includes the narrative discord

47 See Empson, Milton’s God, 56-57, on a speculative interpretation of the rumor of Earth occurring before the angels’ rebellion, as well.
between Raphael’s and Sin’s accounts. Raphael claims Satan foments sedition the night
after the Son’s promotion, and war occurs the next morning. For Raphael, their uprising
is a one-day event. Sin, though, professes that Satan birthed her at an “assembly” of
treason—perhaps the one with Abdiel, perhaps not—but then she introduces a span of
time during which the mutineers, including Satan, sexually interact with her. War, to her,
breaks out later after she is already pregnant.\textsuperscript{48} Her tryst during the rebellion is a severa-
day (or more) event, or the reader is to overlook the time because Sin is partially
allegorical.

Either way, the timeline does not affect Milton’s etymological referencing. A
moment occurs when Satan sexually enjoys something that he creates that appears like
himself: Sin says, “full oft / Thysel [Satan] in me thy perfect image viewing / Becam’st
enamor’d, and such joy thou took’st / With me in secret” (\textit{PL} 2.763-66). He loves himself
through her, and she has come from his mind: Sin purports, “Out of thy head [on the left
side] I sprung” (\textit{PL} 2.758).\textsuperscript{49} She provokes revulsion, at first, from those who see her—
“back they [the angels] recoil’d afraid” (\textit{PL} 2.759)—but with time, they enjoy her, as

\textsuperscript{48} The simplest explanation is that Milton nodded. But respecting his timeline,
despite how a gap seems heavily implied, Fowler believes war is intermingled with Sin’s
pregnancy because of her transitional “Meanwhile.” See Fowler, 147n747-68. Fowler
might be implying the pregnancy was instantaneous, then, which is not farfetched,
considering Milton is coalescing allegory here. See Fowler 148n761-7. A quick gestation
might repair Milton’s equivocality. Empson, however, believes the time disjuncture
means the assembly to which Sin is referring is not the one with Abdiel, but rather a
private one held before the Son’s promotion; i.e., the angels had been planning rebellion
for a while. See Empson, 58-59.

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. both Athena springing from Zeus’s mind and James 1:14-15, in which
desire gives birth to sin, which gives birth to death.
And her name allegorically implies her nature and distinction from God. She epitomizes the irrational left-as-right souls of *Timaeus*, a demonized Socratic *daimonion*, and the Septuagint’s *daimonia* (worthless idols). “Demon” reverberates from Sin’s narrative involvement with Satan.

To indicate that Satan’s original sin is idolatry, which leads to pride and envy, Milton silently employs “demon” from Septuagintal translations: “demon” as idol. The Septuagint (LXX) employs the blanket-term “demon” for five Hebrew words. Generally, the sense refers to idols, false gods, and sacrificial instruments for worship—though, occasionally, the LXX’s “demon,” in various gendered declensions, denotes arcane Hebraic creatures, ones King James notably speculates about. As one example of

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50 Even if one interprets Sin’s birth as the moment of the rebellious gathering with Abdiel—and thus directly before the battle—it does not change the intent of Satan’s sin: that he indulged in something wrong, and then war further separates him from God. Narratively speaking, one must wonder, though, whether God wants “to drive into the open the insubordinate angels” with the grand summons of the Son’s promotion. See Empson, 57. And an objection against me might be that Satan indeed indulges in Sin directly after she is born during the Abdiel exchange (best explained allegorically), giving Satan and his crew only a few moments to enjoy her before going to fight—basically, the time it takes Abdiel to report to God. This, then, would call into question Satan’s original sin of self-love and whether the Son’s promotion was an instigating tactic or not. One might continue, then, that mysterious pride is Satan’s first sin instead and that God, by free will, promotes the Son only because He wants to. Ignoring divine omniscience for a moment, I would counter that pride is a side effect of self-love, though, and that if Sin is born during Abdiel’s meeting, she is just the apotheosis of Satan’s self-love that now fully culminates narratively because Satan has just acted on challenged pride (he feels his precious self is threatened). Pride and envy are aftereffects.

51 *elil* (Strong’s concordance number H457), *gad* (H1409), *tsiyyi* (H6722), *sa’iyr* (H8163), *shed/shud* (H7700, H7736).

52 “ZIIM and IIM [his transliterations], which are the proper Hebrewe names for these Spirites.” See both Isa. 34:14 and James I, *Daemonologie* (Edinburgh, 1597), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/25929/25929-pdf.pdf, 46. For an excellent overview of demons and angels’ history, see Dale Basil Martin, “When Did Angels Become
“demon” employed as “idol” in the LXX, the psalmist, in a celebration of God’s kingship, claims Yahweh strikes fear in other gods: “For great is the Lord and most praised, / fearsome is He over all the gods. / For all gods of the peoples are ungods (elilim), / but the Lord has made the heavens” (Ps. 96:5). The LXX renders the Hebrew elilim (“worthlessnesses,” “idols,” “false gods”) as daimonia. The usage might imply that the translators intended to denigrate Greek belief. And these idolic demons become the New Testament’s spiritual aggressors that inflict insanity, which Milton certainly knew. He utilizes both demons within his Satan: idolization and insanity. Satan, thus, idolizes the absurdity that also possesses him.

Milton, even at a young age, preaches against idolatry. In “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” a 21-year-old Milton catalogs the destructive effects of Christ’s birth on old-world idols. “Lars and Lemures moan” as the Flamens quake with fear about their urns (Nat 189-96). “Peor and Baalim / Forsake their Temples,” and at one point, “sullen Moloch, fled, / Hath left in shadows dread / His burning Idol all of blackest hue” (Nat


53 Alter claims elilim, his “ungods,” is “a polemic coinage that appears frequently elsewhere, punningly formed on ’al, (‘no,’ ‘not’) and ’el (‘god’), to which a diminutive or pejorative suffix is appended. The standard meaning of the term in all subsequent Hebrew is ‘idols.’” See Alter, 96:5n5.

54 In fact, daimon probably would have been a better word for the malak Yahweh (“messenger of God”) of the Hebrew Bible rather than aggelos (“messenger”) because daimon denotes a good, celestial intermediary figure already, whereas aggelos lacks any divine connotations. The LXX’s scrupulous avoidance of such a translation certainly appears influenced by an agenda.

55 See PL 11.485.
The poem’s concluding momentum emphasizes Christ’s obliterating of the old gods’ uselessness, a direct nod to biblical idolatry. And he highlights idolatry again when he ranks the fallen angels in Hell in *Paradise Lost*. Moloch appears once more, with “grim idol”; Peor enjoys “wanton rites”; Astoreth is paid with vows to his “bright image”; Solomon falls victim to “idols foul”—these ideas of “dark idolatries” still linger in an older Milton (*PL* 1.396, 414, 438, 446, 456). Barbara Lewalski asserts that Milton, alongside the traditional Puritan belief of idolatry as the worship of false gods, “insist[s] that anything could be made into an idol.”56 This insistence of prevalent idolatry as evil—and implicitly demonic—empowers Milton’s *Eikonoklastes* (“image-breaker”) against Charles I’s ghost writer and then later flourishes in *Paradise Lost*. Milton stands firmly against placing anything where God should be.

Idolatry for Milton can be shunned by reason, though, because idolatry is “the internal servility involved in worshiping anything that is not God.”57 Satan worships himself, and his reason does not reject it; therefore, he creates, and then is enslaved by, evil. He places himself—i.e. his “demon,” supra-paronomastically—between him and God. Revard, recalling patristic fathers’ exegesis, agrees. Revard readies Augustine’s exegesis to compare with Milton’s understanding of Satan: “[p]ride commences in the exaltation of self in place of the exaltation of God and ends ironically in the cutting off of self from the true source of its being. Pride thus directs the choice that vitiates primal

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57 Lewalski, “Milton and Idolatry,” 218.
goodness and confirms the creature in evil." 58 I disagree only in that Satan does not first exalt in himself with pride but rather is first enticed with narcissism. 59 The difference between pride and narcissism is subtle, but, in my interpretation, narcissism varies with an extra component of seduction, of not being proud of one’s achievements yet because he or she is enticed. Pride excludes this isolated, young-lover infatuation and rather connotes a sense of accomplishment from having seen what one can achieve; thus, glorification emerges. Narcissism is passive obsession while pride is active exaltation.

So, Revard’s reading implies worship, then pride—mine seduction, then worship, then pride. Satan, before Sin, falls victim to himself and then loves himself. He loves the inner self that later flaunts its victory over him on Mount Niphates. It is a being, a demon, whom he turns inward to face, that could have been rebuked only by Satan’s divine reason—i.e., only God’s gifted intuition would have permitted Satan to deny his evil desires. 60

Others also note Satan’s self-worship but do not refer to its potential Platonic etymological implications. Stanley Fish, using Raphael’s explication to instigate other characters’ mistakes in Paradise Lost, defines Satan’s sin as idolatry: to “look for

58 Revard, War in Heaven, 42.

59 Schwartz, from a Freudian perspective, also agrees that the source of Satan’s “[d]oubling” is “narcissism.” See Schwartz, 99-100.

60 Satan’s moment of narcissism is comparable to Eve’s (her moment of creation even alludes to Narcissus peering into water). Her reflection, “with answering looks / Of sympathy and love,” would have held her enraptured forever “with vain desire, / Had not a voice thus warn’d [her],” i.e. a voice of reason, daimonion (PL 4.464-67). Eve seems to be modeling what Satan should have done: listen to God’s warnings.
meaning in the phenomena [of the world without seeing God in it] … is to mistake that which has been created for the creator, and the name of that mistake is idolatry."61 And for Satan specifically, “[w]orship of the secondary is at bottom self-worship because it accepts as full and complete—as godly—the limited perspective of the worshipper.”62 Satan does not know his creation; therefore, he idolatrizes himself through his limited viewpoint. And as Satan chooses to think himself into impairment (as Fish proposes), the reader cannot answer why Satan chooses this fate “without [the reader] pointing to some cause or prompting” outside Satan that also “well[s] up from within [all Milton’s characters]” (emphasis his).63 He is correct—a reader must speculate about Satan’s external and internal promptings—but Milton’s etymological wordplay points to it outside the poem. Since Sin allegorically and biologically is a byproduct of willful abandonment of God’s love and since Satan’s nature—interacting with itself—created Sin, then love of the self denotes to slack on one’s reason and be susceptible to seduction. The seducer is within Satan, who impregnates himself. The Son’s vice-regency merely provokes Satan’s pride because Satan has already fallen.64 Milton here etymologically

61 Fish, Surprised by Sin, xvi

62 Fish, xvii.

63 Fish, xxix-xxx.

64 See Revard, 79-85, for a valuable explication on Satan’s envy caused by Messiah’s “radiance of love” and Satan’s ideology of rank coming from a misinterpretation of Messiah’s radiance as a symbol of power rather than His being.
invokes “demon” from Plato’s *Symposium’s daimon*, Love, a needy creature who longs to give birth in the presence of beauty to feel a sense of wholeness.65

Satan is comprised of two parts—an internal and an external self, one that tempts and one that resists. He either creates the second, deceivingly beautiful self or contains it all along and then seeks its beauty. Either way, he confuses the internal self as something more than it should be, severs himself from divine rationality, and sinfully yields to imperfection—“quit[ting] / The debt immense of endless gratitude” (*PL* 4.51-52). The second, internal self, a *daimon*, has a nature—to seduce—and the first, external Satan, a *daimon*, also has a nature—to swoon. These two entities act on their natures, and once one succumbs to the other, they marry, in a sense.66 And to Milton, as per his divorce

65 As a side note, if Satan’s seduction of himself is seen as a spiritual infection, he could spread spiritual sickness if others unpreparedly engage with him elenchically. The recipient, to recall Satan’s speculation, would be “mean [i.e. weaker]” and “Drawn to [the corrupted one’s] part” (*PL* 4.62-63). Unfortunately, this line of thought is beyond the scope of this thesis, because it entails Proclus’s *daimon* and Neoplatonism in general. In his commentary on *Alcibiades*, Proclus claims that to engage in *elenchus*, one’s *daimon* must be suitable enough to engage with another’s *daimon*—i.e., education is spiritually engaging. Milton could be playing on the process of *elenchus*, then, after Satan morally falls. Satan engages in this back-and-forth questioning with those he tempts: Beelzebub (or his second in command), a third of the angelic host, himself, and Eve. When Gabriel engages in it with Satan, Satan exposes himself as a liar (i.e., he is not suitable against Gabriel, his spiritual and intellectual better). A similar moment happens with Abdiel. And of course, Satan avoids conversation with God altogether, only sending Abdiel, at one point, to relay a message of revolt.

66 The idea of “marriage” also parallels the Roman equivalent of *daimon*: the “genius,” which also recalls the *agathodaimon*, “good demon,” and its snake symbols. Milton mentions “Genius” elsewhere. See *Lyc* 183. Unfortunately, research into Roman household gods and literature along with Milton’s Latinate background, to boot, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
tracts, God ordained marriage as a prophylaxis to “the evils of solitary life” (DDD 103).67 Evil comes from us, as if we endlessly hammer “out our hearts, as it were out of a flint, sparkles of new misery to our selves, ‘til all were in a blaze again” (DDD 102-3). We “burn” in passion (DDD 113). And God gave us this desire: it is the “desire which God put into Adam in Paradise before he knew the sin of incontinence” and “which God saw it was not good that man should be left alone to burn in” (DDD 113). Perhaps Satan felt this same desire but created his own partner without requesting one from God.68 Maybe he married mistakenly because he was lonely.

As applicable to Satan, marriage, to Milton, is a “prevention of loneliness to the mind and spirit,” not just to the body (DDD 109). And if the new partner does not suit the man “while he went to rid away solitariness,” the man will worsen his own “dejection of mind” and be a danger “to the commonwealth” (DDD 110). Such is Satan. The souls of a pure couple should blend with “inbred desire of joining to itself,” a desire “properly called love,” which is “stronger than death” (DDD 114; emphasis his, yet still appropriate in this situation). Satan’s impure union, in contrast, is monstrous and yields to Death. A debased, etymological “demon” grows as Milton next directly compares pure

67 All quotations from Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1644) are from John Milton, The Divorce Tracts of John Milton: Texts and Contexts, eds. Sara J. van den Berg and W. Scott Howard (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2010) and will be cited parenthetically.

68 To those who would object that this desire pertains to mankind and not angels, I would counter, as per the linguistic-play of the text, that Satan is a special case. Milton has already etymologically lowered Satan to the mankind surveyed by daimones. And he depicts Satan’s turmoil as he does Adam’s in Book 10 (see also Chapter 3). Milton seems fine blending human ideas with an archangel who perverts Heaven with evil.
love’s needful, pneumatic blending with Plato’s daimon, Love (DDD 114). But if a bad relationship binds the man, “[t]hen enters hate, not that hate that sins, but that which only is natural dissatisfaction” (DDD 115). There is no sin if “he be worthy to understand himself” (DDD 115). But Satan, in his internal marriage, seeking to subvert loneliness, does not understand himself—as seen on Mount Niphates. Consequently, he creates Sin, the incestuous product of him and his inner demon.

Satan is an exemplar of a being locked within what Milton believes is a corrupt relationship. Because of his sinful love, Satan “despair[s] in virtue” and “mutin[s] against divine providence” (DDD 116). Satan has married an “idolatress,” who “alienate[s] his heart from the true worship of God” and who “perverts him to superstition by her enticing sorcery,” until he is driven “to thoughts of atheism” (DDD 120). And because he does not divorce her, he sets his “marriage above God and charity, which is the doctrine of devils” (DDD 120). His children are the products of an “ill-twisted wedlock,” the “children of wrath and anguish” (DDD 119). His incestuous prodigies symbolize a perverted “inbred desire.” He cannot escape, cannot understand himself, and cannot ease his mind with “peace and love”—the mind’s goals in a good marriage (DDD 111). He is doomed to “heap up more injury”—i.e., “Heap on himself damnation” (PL 1.215)—because he cannot “bring forth love” from an “acceptable union as God ordained in marriage” (DDD 115). He has married incorrectly.

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69 See n46 again.

70 Satan’s “atheism” is proclaiming to be “self-begot, self-rais’d / By [his] own quick’ning power” (PL 860-1).
Angelic union should be pure, though, because, as Milton appreciates, “[t]o the pure, all things are pure” (*Areop* 727). In contrast to Satan, Raphael describes a positive, sexual intermingling of spirits for Adam: as if air, “Total they [the angelic spirits] mix, Union of Pure with Pure / Desiring” (*PL* 8.627-28). Satan, on the other hand, intermingles perversely with his own self and then continuously rejects the memory: “Ah wherefore [did I rebel]? he [God] deserv’d no such return / From me” (*PL* 4.42-43). However, he still recognizes an internal problem: “yet all his [God’s] good prov’d ill in me, / And wrought but malice” (*PL* 48-49). He forgets that God’s love soured in him when love of himself won. If one stretches this concept to a marriage between Satan and God, then, Satan divorces God first, perhaps, or God eventually divorces him because of adultery.\footnote{This odd extension of the marriage concept stirs new questions: if he was married to God, was Satan unhappy in the relationship and thus committed adultery (i.e., he worshipped another out of discontent)? Or did he simply commit adultery because his own, interdicted creation seduced him?} Ultimately, as if demonically possessed by insanity (*daimonizomai*), he attempts the impossible alongside his intellective, impure spouse: “Warring … against Heav’n’s matchless King” (*PL* 4.41).\footnote{The idea also recalls the Macbeths.} Once Satan speciously determines the inner self will fulfill feelings of incompleteness, he creates Sin and Death.\footnote{Cf. Proverbs 8:36: “all who hate me [Wisdom] love death.”} As Schwartz notes, Milton is obsessed with beginnings.\footnote{See Schwartz, 1-3.} He surely understands how Satan falls, and for whatever reason, he places Satan’s iniquitous moment outside *Paradise Lost*. But with
etymological hints, he directs his reader to another answer that aligns with corrupted marriage: Plato’s demon, Love.

As Plato’s Socrates in *Symposium* brings the house down with a peroration about love from his teacher Diotima, he also depicts Love as a spirit (*daimon*) always in need. He is “tough and shriveled,” “homeless,” born from Poros (“resource”) and Penia (“poverty”) on Aphrodite’s birthday—and so Love always serves Aphrodite (*Symp.* 203b-d). He is “far from … beautiful” and harnesses a duality: though always needing something, as his mother (poverty), his father (resource) genetically grants him bravery and cleverness; therefore, he employs snares and schemes in his pursuit of beauty to create beauty (*Symp.* 203d). He is an in-between creature, between mortals and immortals, wisdom and ignorance, beauty and ugliness. And because of his perpetual intermediacy, he seeks to end his struggle by finding goodness, and thus happiness: “every desire for good things or for happiness is ‘the supreme and treacherous love’ in everyone” (*Symp.* 205d). To love is to be in need, and in *Paradise Lost*, a crafty, needy Satan seeks to satisfy his own whims instead of trusting God to satisfy them.

Milton satirically parallels Plato’s Love by depicting Satan birth corruption. To Socrates, the search for happiness (*eudaimonia*, a form of *daimon*) equates with “giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul” (*Symp.* 206b). Diotima, as the philosopher

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75 Diotima primarily equates beauty with philosophy, the love of wisdom, but the qualifiers change based on what one is in love with.

76 See *Plato: Complete Works*, 489n41: “The preposition is ambiguous between ‘within’ and ‘in the presence of.’ Diotima may mean that the lover causes the newborn (which may be an idea) to come to be within a beautiful person; or she may mean that he is stimulated to give birth to it in the presence of a beautiful person.”
remembers, clarifies that “all of us are pregnant, … and … we naturally desire to give birth” (*Symp.* 206c). She continues that reproduction is a beautiful, godly act for mortals and that “it cannot occur in anything … out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly. Beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine” (206c-d).

Therefore, creatures in love, and Love himself, seek to relieve the pain of pregnancy (the pain of needing) by giving birth “in beauty” (206e). Comparatively, Satan, out of harmony, gives birth to Sin after impregnating himself, but satirically not in the presence of beauty. Diotima further defines beauty as something in and of itself that a lover must learn: it is “but itself by itself with itself” that takes one form (211b). And when the lover “looks at Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen,” he can finally “give birth not to images [*eidola]* of virtue (because he’s in touch with no images [*eidolou]*) but to true virtue” (*Symp.* 212a). The one ready to love recognizes Beauty as divine, not as an *eidolon* (“illusion,” “phantom,” “image,” “idol”). Satan, though, incestually idolatrizes himself and, in his moment of dissent, therefore, parodically recalls Plato’s demon.

Milton demonizes Plato’s Love. Satan, a crafty being who eventually feels “impair’d,” seeks beauty outside of God. He looks inward, to his demon, which he either creates out of loneliness or merely acknowledges. He abandons God’s love—a state of perfect love and fulfilled need—and loves himself instead, which cannot fulfill this need. Now, because all are pregnant, per se, and wanting to birth what lies within, Satan can no longer achieve his potential (to usher in the Son). He is a Platonic Love who has sought the wrong beauty, another demon, which reflects his past angelic rank, marked by the allusion, “Lucifer.” Milton syncretizes it with the Romans’ Venus, and thus the Greeks’
Aphrodite, whom Plato’s Love serves, as well. Therefore, Satan, in a sense, commits fornication on Aphrodite’s birthday when he loves and serves himself, a Lucifer. We remember, to Milton, God’s love fulfills the extra criterion of Plato’s wisdom—of reason finding goodness. So, Satan becomes a “homeless” thing without God, reasonless, “out of harmony,” and so, hideously, he loves something foolish while attempting to seek happiness (eudaimonia), virtue, and wisdom.

This beauty is not true virtue. But it is still “itself by itself with itself” (echoing “inbred desire” again), now explicitly incestual. Satan gives birth, again, after birthing what he believes is beauty (himself) but does not give birth to divine beauty (what he could have been). Rather, Sin is a malformed duality between beauty and ugliness: “Woman to the waist, and fair, / But ended foul in many a scaly fold” (PL 2.650-51). She represents that which only could be reproduced by inharmoniousness. Her fairness, we remember, is Satan seeing his own “perfect image,” but her serpentiform anticipates Satan’s degradation (PL 2.764). His offspring is the antithesis to his potential. She is both Satan’s old and new self, a child not born “in beauty” or of “harmony” but rather, satirically, in horrors and of incest. In his neglect to see real Platonic beauty while corruptly married, he produces a deformity, a child of “anguish,” another lesser version of himself. He crafts with “secondary hands,” much as how both the daimones of Timaeus and, to him, the Messiah do. He cannot make true beauty.

77 In the biblical context of Isa. 14:12, though, the Septuagint translates helel as Heosphoros; the Vulgate, Lucifer. Milton, no stranger to syncretism, seems to merge all these instances.
Satan’s evil is cyclical, as well. As Socrates’s Diotima professes, a lover continues to give birth after investing in what he or she loves: “the lover is turned to the great sea of beauty, and … gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom” (Symp. 210d). And with time, the lover will eventually reach the goal of love: to “catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful in its nature” (Symp. 210e). Knowledge of what one loves is goalward, and, we remember, Satan does not understand what he loves (himself). When Satan seduces Eve and scurries back to Hell triumphantly, Sin and Death greet him from their new bridge. Sin praises Satan’s delusional virtue and wisdom: “Thine now is all this World, thy virtue hath won / What thy hands builded not, thy Wisdom gain’d / With odds what War hath lost” (PL 10.372-74). This virtue is merely the “image,” or idol, of virtue, the eventual product of Satan’s original self-idolatry. Milton ricochets “demon” off itself continuously. The opposite of Diotima’s lover, Satan always is mysterious “Hell” (PL 4.75). Yet his love births continuously—his serpentine temptation, his new kingdom of peril, his perpetuity of stifled joy. Satan loves wrongly, births iniquity, glories in lies, and prolongs evil. He exhibits a demonized Platonic Love—who marries incorrectly and who exposes his source of pride, his separation from God, and his eternal sin—through the unspoken “demon.”

If one were to accept Schwartz’s Freudian reading of Satan—that he is one doomed to repeat his mistakes—Satan’s moment of corruption might actually be loosely described by Satan himself at one point. As a serpent and seeking Eve’s downfall, Satan

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78 In other words, he might be psychologically projecting a symbolized instance through a fake story.
spins a believable tale about the powers of the tree of knowledge to entrap Eve. Satan lies to her that animals, “[l]onging and envying,” looked up at the fruit (PL 9.593).

“Tempting,” it lured them, but the serpent, through craftiness, scaled the trunk and obtained “such pleasure till that hour / At Feed or Fountain never had [he] found” (PL 9.595-97). It “[s]ated at length,” and before long, he “perceive[d] / Strange alteration” in himself, “to degree / Of Reason in [his] inward Powers” (PL 9.598-600). Something forbidden lured him, and once he indulged in its intellective influence, he noticed beauty that he previously had not. He “turn’d [his] thoughts” to “Speculations high or deep” and with “capacious mind / Consider’d all things visible in Heav’n” (PL 9.602-4). And then, he recognized all this good in Eve’s “Divine / Semblance, and in [her] Beauty’s heav’nly Ray / United” (PL 9.606-8). She held “no Fair … / Equivalent or second, which compell’d / [Him] thus, though importune perhaps” (PL 9.608-10). And ultimately, her beauty—finally recognized after succumbing to his desires—effected “worship” from him (PL 9.611). Eve, in this fraudulent tale, could very well be Satan’s metaphorized inner self, and the sight of Eve, then, is his self’s winning of him.\(^\text{79}\) Through his cyclical

\(^{79}\) I want to reiterate “loosely” here again because the “longing and envying” part might invoke a knee-jerk interpretation of Satan metaphorically looking to the Son in longing. It is possible, but upon closer inspection, however, the other animals, not the serpent, seem envious, though they all share the same desire: “Round the Tree / All other Beasts that saw, with like desire / Longing and envying stood, but could not reach” (PL 9.591-93). Satan can reach, though. The “desire,” then, perhaps is the longing to separate from God and be self-reliant. In other words, Satan obtains his self and, indeed, relies on himself from henceforth. He gets his fruit, which awakens something inside him that he worships.
self-temptation, he draws others to the same trauma of his original mistake, as he is stuck in the memory of his temptress (himself) and suffering permanent consequences for it.

With Milton’s only use of a form of “demon”—as per the 1667 Paradise Lost—narcissism drives Satan to erect Pandaemonium, the neologized “place of demons,” in Hell.\(^80\) It becomes an idol to insanity flooded with demons, who kindle idolatry hereafter on Earth. Milton’s linguistic scope of daimon, at this point, is exhaustive. Satan has forfeited his Greek daimon—his voice of reason, his love, and his angelicity—and, though not yet “Dragon grown,” has transitioned into New Testament demonism by the segue of LXX idolatry (PL 10.529). His path parallels “demon”’s sad linguistic diachrony. Hell exemplifies a demonic mindscape, a shrine to the inevitable consequences of worshipping oneself. Hell is where one has hewn curative love and now wanders in mazes. Satan will remain the same: he is “[o]ne who brings / A mind not to be chang’d by Place or Time” (PL 1.252-53). And his eventual serpentiform recalls a satirized Agathos Daimon, “good demon,” which Greek households worshiped and also symbolized with a snake.\(^81\) His demon (and his god) forbids his release and molds his new form.

Milton perpetuates “demon” through Satan’s surroundings. Satan’s monument to his daimon attracts more symbolic gestations of thoughts, i.e. his demonic comrades. They flutter with mindless heroism (epic-hero daimones) and specious counsel (irrational

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\(^{80}\) See n7 again for “Dæmoniac” added in the 1674.

As an aside, Harold Bloom insists, “Ethos is the daimon in Satan, even though pathos is his glory.”

There is no room for logos. When a daimonion-checked Socrates in Plato’s *Phaedrus* relates the tripartite-charioteer analogy of the soul, he allegorically delineates a heavenly rider harnessing two horses: one white and calm, one black and wild (*Phdr. 253d*). When the rider “looks in the eye of love,” the black one bucks with desire while the white one maintains the course—the rider must control both to control himself (*Phdr. 253e-254e*). But Satan cannot do either. As Abdiel proclaims, Satan is “to [himself] enthrall’d” (*PL* 6.181). And whether Satan choosing “to be himself at the highest possible price” is noble or not, as Bloom considers, Satan and his crew etymologically illustrate the direct inverse of all that is rational and good through an unspoken hypogram, “demon.”

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84 Bloom, *Ruin the Sacred Truths*, 110. Sadly, choosing to be oneself, in Milton’s universe, is merely choosing to be enslaved by a new master.
CHAPTER III: SATAN AS SYMPTOM

Even if a wound refused to close, the body would still attempt to heal itself to prevent infection or death. Colorful infections, grotesque swelling, and acute pain could result from the body’s struggle to fight decomposition. When Satan concludes that he would return to his previous state of mind if he repented to God, he explains: “For never can true reconcilement grow / Where wounds of deadly hate have pierc’d so deep” (PL 4.98-99). Satan not only references the Hebrew word, satan (“deadly hate”), as what wounded him but also identifies satan as what prevents healing—“Disdain [i.e., ‘scorn,’ satan] forbids me [my submission]” (PL 4.82). His “satanic” condition thus perpetuates his irreparable relationship with God. Satan, then, indicates both Satan’s injury and unhealability because he has made himself vulnerable by worshipping himself instead of God.¹ He symptomatizes his severance from the Almighty both lexically and narratively.

Upon recognizing his hopeless condition and his refusal to submit, Satan immediately attempts to relieve his self-induced pain by accusing God of determinism: “This [my unavoidable relapse] knows my punisher; therefore as far / From granting hee, as I from begging peace” (PL 4.103-4). In doing so, he only displays more symptoms of satan: “accusation.” Linguistically, Milton accentuates Satan losing against the decay of evil. Therefore, Satan’s name in Paradise Lost denotes more than “adversary.”² Satan

¹ See Chapter 2 again.

² The most common observation of Satan’s Hebraic name being prevalent in Paradise Lost is through the denotation “adversary” or “opponent”—though “hatred” has also been noted. Patrick Hume, Milton’s first critic to issue commentary, notices Milton’s etymological employment: “Satan an Adversary from [satan]; to be against, to hate, the Enemy of God and Man.” See Patrick Hume, Annotations on Milton’s Paradise Lost (London: Jacob Tonson, 1695; Kessinger Publishing), 9n82. Neil Forsyth, a modern
“satans”—as per the verbal root of satan—and the universe “satans” him back. The system within which Satan struggles seeks to sift him from his iniquity, but his resolute stubbornness accumulates moral putrefaction forever. In these senses, satan functions in a two-fold manner. Because Satan may still repent, God’s universe attempts to divert Satan from evil; but also, because the wound of Satan’s decisions festers, he assaults others and suffers as a side effect.

Milton seems to appreciate the etymology of satan and employs it actively. He acknowledges the biblical Satan’s multifaceted name in De Doctrina Christiana: “Hence he [Satan] has obtained many names corresponding to his actions” (CD 992; emphasis mine). And Milton catalogs them much like a simple, Hebraic lexicon would: “an enemy or adversary … the false accuser … the destroyer” (CD 992). Satan himself eventually vaunts his new name’s validity after he seduces Adam and Eve: “Satan (for I glory in the name, / Antagonist of Heav’n’s Almighty King)” (PL 10.386-87). A name, for Milton, can denote one’s role and nature. And because the fallen angels’ names were “blotted out and ras’d / By thir Rebellion,” Milton’s narrator insists that the fallen angels eventually acquire “new Names … / Through God’s high sufferance for the trial of man” (PL 1.362-3, 365-66). Satan not only serves as an instrument for this trial, but he also is under trial himself. Therefore, the Hebrew word infuses all his active elements. As Hale observes, satan, in Paradise Lost, “is verb, noun, then a title, then (as [Satan] becomes over-

scholar, also notes the embodiment of Satan with his etymology, but only the oppositional factors again: Satan “is what his Hebrew name implies, the Adversary,” and he thoroughly projects his rebellious, contrary state against “divine decree.” See Neil Forsyth, “Satan,” The Cambridge Companion to Paradise Lost, ed. Louis Schwartz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 24-25.
zealous at his work, and is poisoned by it) his individuating name. It becomes Milton’s frequent practice in *Paradise Lost* thus to etymologize names.”

Satan’s Hebrew supra-eponym imbues his choices and how his environment reacts.

Because Milton wanted to reveal the consequences of one who severs himself from God, Satan’s name symptomatizes the progression of his apostasy, not just the teleology (i.e., it shows the path of someone’s consistent dissent, not just God’s ultimate purpose for evil). Thus, to show only a deceptive, debased character would merely exhibit the final face, per se, of evil and would not present the process of immorality that carried one there. The reader must experience God’s foe forging the newness of evil. Therefore, *Paradise Lost*’s detailed, satanic course is unique among Milton’s corpus.

For instance, Milton’s first Satan from “In Quintum Novembris” takes part in the Spenserian heritage of an Archimago-like (i.e., old-man-disguised) deceiver. A young-Milton’s Satan—in a “bitterly propagandic” version of the Gunpowder Plot, as Hughes describes—relates a Satan stirring up “wild tempests in mid air,” as per Eph. 2:2, and who “instigates hatred,” as per the verbal form of *satan* (*QNov* 15; emphasis mine). This Satan, a “master of guile” (triggering satanic “deception”), seeks only to corrupt humanity, to hunt his “trembling prey,” nodding to Job’s *satan* (*QNov* 15-6). He stands “beside” his victim, as the Zech. 3:1 *satan*, and disguises himself similarly to Spenser’s Archimago, with “grey hairs” and “a long beard” (*QNov* 17). Milton merely highlights this Satan’s thematic deception by alluding to Archimago and certain biblical satans/Satan. With his first poetic Arch Fiend, Milton visualizes a deceiver ossified in

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3 Hale, *Milton’s Languages*, 64.
evil, not an etymologically two-fold being of significance. Although heavily loaded with allusions, he is a plot device, not a complex character.

Comus, though not named Satan, promotes similar, though advanced, villainy. His elaborate, crafty lineage from Bacchus and Circe is new—and could anticipate the hidden Platonic Love of Paradise Lost’s Satan (Comus 46-77). Comus’s goals of debasing victims into animalism unfurls more from Milton’s archetypal villain than the Gunpowder Plot Satan, as well. Comus directly entices victims away from humanity with sorcery (Comus 64-78). Through the Lady, Milton models how to resist such an evil—with the “freedom of [one’s] mind” (Comus 663). So, when Comus kidnaps her but she withstands his temptations, he activates protagonistic virtues by empowering his oppositional role as a foe who “[w]ould think to charm [one’s] judgment” (Comus 758). Evil reveals how good characters must act to remain pure. Thus, though a more-developed villain than Milton’s “Novembris” Satan, Comus still serves the narrative purpose of offhandedly promoting Christian values. He is still, mostly, a plot-device, per se, because he is the final form of a debased creature.

In Paradise Regained, a wearied Satan returns from the complexity of Paradise Lost to these archetypes. However, he holds some lingering emotional appeal when Christ rebukes one of his temptations: “Satan had not to answer [Christ’s counterargument], but stood struck / With guilt of his own sin, for he himself / Insatiable of glory had lost all” (PR 3.146-48). Even at Satan’s worst here, Milton still alludes to Satan’s relinquished grandeur, a tactic that he chiefly disregards with earlier prototypes.

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4 See Chapter 2 again.
Perhaps a more jaded, blind Milton developed his ideas of how one becomes such an embarrassment. *Paradise Regained*, then, could seek to demonstrate how ultimate evil eventually reduces a character’s significance into a mere plot device, and one, here, for God’s usage: “For what he [God] bids I [Satan] do” (*PR* 1.378). In other words, one who chooses evil thus consequently removes one’s own freedom. This flaunting of God’s victory through Satan’s mouth inverses *Paradise Lost*’s flaunting of Satan’s victory over Adam and Eve—where, out of narrative necessity, Satan’s serpentine curse provides proof that God triumphed. In *Paradise Regained*, though, Milton starts with Satan’s fate and ultimate role. A reader observes only a Satan invested in his issued vocation. With all three examples of Milton’s flat antagonists, each villain allegorically accents the resister (the protagonist) more than himself (the tempter). In *Paradise Lost*, however, Satan is both a tempter and resister, so his narrative function highlights his name’s etymology and invigorates his character’s complexity beyond these corrupted deceivers’ predictable roles.

The Hebrew word, *satan*, presents itself most importantly in the Hebrew Bible, in which the word varies significantly.⁵ It has both noun and verb forms and does not denote

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⁵ See the *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, s.v. “Satan.” Because the -an of *satan* is not a suffix, and thus eliminates several possibilities of root words, the “meaning of the noun [*satan*] must be determined solely on the basis of its occurrences in the Hebrew Bible, where it occurs in nine contexts.” (The word itself, in both verb and noun forms, occurs 39 times.) This would classify *satan* as a “triconsonantal” verb, not a “biconsonantal.” See *Basics of Biblical Hebrew Grammar*, 3rd ed., eds. Gary D. Pratico and Miles V. Van Pelt (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2019), 115-16. This is important because if it were biconsonantal, then other tempting etymological options would appear: “to stray,” “to revolt/fall away,” “to be unjust,” “to burn,” “to seduce.” See the *Dictionary of Deities and Demons*. Milton’s acquaintance with these varying roots and their potentials, though, is speculative. In other words, he very well could be poetically
an arch-enemy but rather “an opponent,” “adversary,” “accuser.” As a verb, it means “to withstand,” “to bear a grudge against,” and “to cherish animosity.” Most Hebraic lexicons agree on this point, but certain biblical pericopes connote more within their contexts. For example, senses of “assaulting,” “hunting,” “destroying,” “persecuting,” “deceiving,” and “acting as an accusatory or false judge” are all possible. The *Concise Dictionary of Classical Hebrew* defines the word as “supernatural adversary,” and more literally, as “earthly adversary,” “military, political enemy,” and “judicial opponent, accuser.” The *Catholic Bible Dictionary* agrees that the Hebrew *satan* “is … a legal term for an ‘accuser’ or ‘adversary,’” and that in Hebrew scripture “the adversary might be of a terrestrial origin or … heavenly.” The *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible* clarifies that in five contexts of the Hebrew Bible, the word “refers to human beings[, and] in four it refers to celestial beings.” And the word’s nuanced senses of legality and

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6 As a verb, it is imperfect *Qal*, masculine. See *Basics of Biblical Hebrew Grammar*, 116-23, for an overview of verbal mechanics.

7 See both the *Concise Dictionary of Classical Hebrew* and *New Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible*.

8 For examples, see Gen. 49:23; Job 16:9, 30:21; Zech. 3:1-2; and Ps. 109:6 respectively.

9 The *Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon* agrees with the *Catholic Bible Dictionary* for the definition of “satan” as adversary.
trial, as when a satan accuses one in a metaphoric or literal court case, hold importance for Milton because of the biblical “sifting” of someone.\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{Satan} is not a name in the Hebrew Bible, though.\textsuperscript{11} In relation to the Hebrew Bible, the \textit{OED} cites the meaning of “satan” as “adversary, one who plots against another,” though observing the word “occurs (chiefly with definite article) as the designation of an angelic being hostile to mankind, who tempts men to evil and accuses them to God.” Etymologically, whether satan was a noun or verb first is uncertain, but the \textit{Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the Hebrew Language} speculates it might derive from \textit{shuwt} (“to go about, go to and fro, rove”), which would emphasize the verb

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} The “sifting” metaphor comes from Christ’s words to his disciples at the Last Supper: “Satan has demanded [or, acquired permission] to sift all of you like wheat” (Luke 22:31). The general sense is that someone under trial, per se, must be exposed to a satan, who “sifts” the stubborn or persecuted person one way or another. I will occasionally choose to use “sift” in this way and will discuss Milton’s beliefs regarding the process later. All translations from the New Testament are taken from \textit{The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version with Apocrypha}, 5th ed., ed. Michael D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), unless otherwise noted, and will be cited parenthetically.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Although, one could argue that 1 Chron. 21:1 contains a name, where satan does not have a prefixal, definite article. In other words, because there is no “the satan,” just “satan,” the usage could indicate a name. There are, at least, two counters: a named “Satan” does not occur anywhere else in the Hebrew Bible, nor does any background of fallen angels working against mankind (within the Hebrew Bible), so who would this sudden character be who tempts David within this limited context? “Lucifer” from Isa. 14:12 is not an answer because no satan appears there, only a metaphoric “bright one [\textit{helel}],” which Jerome translated as “Lucifer” in the Vulgate. The snake that tempts Eve in Genesis is just a snake (\textit{nachash}). And Job’s and Zechariah’s satans both have definite articles. In Hebrew, a noun without a definite article can be translated with or without an indefinite article, as well. So, in other words, since there is no “the,” satan could be either “Satan” or “a satan” at 1 Chron. 21:1. See also n70 from Chapter 1 again for the satan of 1 Chron. 21:1 covering for the Yahweh of 2 Sam. 24:1.
\end{itemize}
as original.\textsuperscript{12} Diachronically, the action of satan could have morphed into an opponent or obstacle, and then both senses could have merged to become a narrative tool that opposes mankind. Regardless, sometime during or after the intertestamental period, satan finally evolves into an appellation, Satan, and is put into full force with the New Testament’s transliterated Satan and Satanas.\textsuperscript{13} Milton’s Satan, however, embodies the full scope.

Though the first moment of Satan’s separation from God is not in \textit{Paradise Lost}, the moment when Satan feels the effects of his spiritual misplacement is, and Milton etymologically evokes satan to herald its approach. In Raphael’s account of Satan’s fall, Satan hears God claim that the Messiah is His “only Son” (\textit{PL} 5.604). And quietly afterward, “[a]ll seem’d well pleas’d, all seem’d, but were not all” (\textit{PL} 5.617). To Raphael, no angel but Satan disagreed with God’s decree. While other angels slept, Satan suffered silently and was “fraught / With envy against the Son of God” (\textit{PL} 5.661-62). He “could not bear / Through pride that sight, and thought himself impair’d” (\textit{PL} 5.664-65). And on line 666—of all places—Raphael stresses Satan’s emotional state further: “Deep malice thence conceiving and disdain,” Satan “resolv’d / … to dislodge, and leave / Unworshipt, unobey’d the Throne” (\textit{PL} 5.666, 668-70). All emotional emphasis here connotes satan, even “envy,” which pertains to the biblical Esau and Jacob (discussed

\textsuperscript{12} Shuwt is triconsonantal, as well, so it is possible. The wordplay is important in Job. For a still-widely accepted etymological study of satan, including an excursus on the denominal state of the word, see Kluger, \textit{Satan in the Old Testament}, 25-53

\textsuperscript{13} In this chapter, I will not devote much time to Milton’s acknowledgement of the New Testament Satan because so much of it is either obvious or discussed already by critics. For Milton on “evil angels” and their New Testament passages, see \textit{CD} 992. For Milton implementing the patristic-father Lucifer (helel) of Isa. 14:12 or the New Testament Satan, see Leonard, 86-191, and Revard, 108-28.
below). The poem embellishes Satan’s first symptoms of dismemberment from God not only within the story—i.e., through Raphael’s brief foreshadowing and explicating of Satan’s mentality—but also through the construction of the actual poem, by sounding satan against itself both implicitly and explicitly.

In this same episode, Milton alludes to the roaming eyes of Yahweh (God) to preface the renaming of Satan, whose “former name / Is heard no more in Heav’n” (PL 5.658-59). The eyes poetically serve as a foreboding storm cloud, per se, of satanic etymology. All angels sleep, except both Satan and “the unsleeping eyes of God” (PL 5.647). Milton’s following syntax intermingles Heaven’s cloudy night exhaling, the “roseate Dews” putting all to rest, and God’s eyes wandering within the somnolent mist (PL 642-57). God’s vision recalls the Hebraic shuwt, a potential etymon for satan: “to go about, go to and fro, rove.” In the Hebrew Bible, God’s eyes roam (shuwt) several times. As one example, in 2 Chronicles, one of the Judahite kings, Asa, following Solomon’s death, does well to eliminate idols and rely on God for combative victory during kingship. In his thirty-sixth year, however, he succumbs to making a pact with the king of Aram, Ben-Hadad, so that he might drive Baasha, an antagonist, from his lands. The seer Hanani scalds Asa for relying on something other than God and then emphasizes God’s omnipotence by depicting His scouring omniscience: “For the Lord—His eyes roam [shuwt] through all the earth to lend strength to those wholeheartedly with Him” (2 Chron. 16:9).14 God’s eyes peer from the Hebrew text as soon as Asa strays from God.

14 The full instance is meshotetowt, but due to the lack of Hebraic-consonantal visuals from transliterations, I will denote verbs by their root words. See the Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia for passages’ full verbal forms. Cf. also Zech. 4:10, for God’s seven-fold eyes, and Jer. 5:1.
And Milton matches this ocular, Hebraic imagery to anticipate the already-straying Satan, who is preparing for war. The movement of Milton’s God’s eyes recalls dissent etymologically.

Milton’s wordplay also brings about the wandering of the adversary of Job.

“[O]ne day,” in Job, the angels gather before God, but “the Adversary [hasatan], too, came among them” (Job 1:7). God asks, “From where do you come?” (Job 1:7). And the satan answers, “From roaming [shuwt] the earth and walking about in it” (Job 1:7). He is a creature who appears, perhaps jealously, after the narrator lavishes praise on an innocent Job, and the Hebrew poet plays on satan with shuwt as much as Milton does. Job’s God discovering a new enemy parallels Milton’s God watching Satan before the revolt. Milton’s God finds Satan and etymologically recalls a potential root of satan (shuwt) as Satan enviously morphs into a satan after God lavishes praise on the Son.

Satan’s envy and pride emerge from a sense of the Bible’s first usage of satan—satam, a secondary verbal form. When Satan intuits that God’s begotten Son has claimed a position of power, Satan’s jealousy, as Revard postulates, stems from his misunderstanding of the Messiah’s natural “radiance of love” as a benefit from rank rather than from His being. The scene’s power emanates from Satan’s triggered feelings

15 The ha is merely a definite article and clearly separates this satan from a named entity, though translations abound with just “Satan.” Robert Alter here chooses a middle ground with capitalization and translates with “Adversary.”

16 Alter expresses that, to him, the satan here is not an “agent working for God” but rather an “element of jealousy” and “cynical mean-spiritedness.” See Alter, Hebrew Bible, vol. 3, 466n6.

17 Revard, War in Heaven, 79-80.
of impairment. He deduces that his Father has placed a nonreturnable blessing upon another (a potential brother, in a sense), and so his wounded pride and jealousy surface when he misconstrues seeming nepotism. In Genesis, a similar situation arises when the son of Abraham, Isaac, in old age and near-blindness, requests his eldest son, Esau, to fetch him a last meal before granting a death-bed blessing. Meanwhile, Rebekah, Isaac’s wife, convinces Jacob, Esau’s younger twin, to steal Isaac’s blessing by disguising himself with furs—seeming as his hairier brother—to confuse his blind father. The plan works. Upon Esau’s return and discovery of being robbed, Esau “seethed with resentment [satam] against Jacob” (Gen. 27:41). He pledges to murder him: “and Esau said in his heart, … ‘I will kill Jacob my brother’” (Gen. 27:41-42). Here, the verb satam connotes envious hatred. With etymological agency, Milton’s Satan resonates with similar vengeful malice over being wronged by nepotistic promotion. This feeling, derived from the Son’s promotion, motivates his revolt. Hatred, narratively and etymologically, is an emotional symptom of Satan’s apostasy.

As war brews, Milton transitions the sense of satan from emotional turmoil to militaristic opposition. As Satan gathers a third of the angelic host, “th’Eternal eye, whose sight discerns / Abstrusest thoughts,” saw “Rebellion rising, saw in whom, how spread / Among the sons of Morn, what multitudes / Were banded to oppose his high Decree” (PL 5.711-12, 715-17; emphasis mine). Milton’s Hebraic eye of God roams again to discern new senses of satan—“Rebellion” and “oppose”—which signify Satan’s

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18 The KJV simply renders “And Esau hated Jacob.…”
loss of favor and transition into enemy, much like militaristic usages of satan in the Hebrew Bible. In 1 Samuel, an elusive David acts as a double agent for a jealous, unknowing Saul against the Philistine king, Achish. Eventually, Achish, with David’s forces, meets a Philistine army outside Saul’s location, where David would be forced to fight against Saul. Instead, the Philistine leaders fear David’s treachery: “[L]et him [David] not come down with us into battle, so that he become not our adversary [satan] in battle” (1 Sam. 29:4). The soldiers avert David’s potentially traitorous, militaristic opposition (satan) during combat. Saul, having lost favor with God, commits suicide during the hopeless fight. These senses of an oppositional God and an oppositional traitor, through satan, thematically parallel Milton’s Satan losing favor from God and hopelessly opposing Him via warfare. Satan’s name is put into action.

Satan’s satanic transition drowns out Heaven as a subtler satan, though: universal goodness attempts to separate Satan from new evil and return him to good. When God announces His Son’s vice-regency, He must know of Satan’s new self-love and future reaction to the hierarchical shift. God’s response to Satan’s spiritual corruption induces malintent from Satan, but not from anyone else, according to Raphael.19 Satan reacts as someone who has had an infection pressed: pain erupts when it would not have otherwise. So, because Satan is infected, or out of sorts, he smarts emotionally. Empson is partially correct, then, in saying Heaven is “a forcing-house” for Satan’s pride—but not in the negative sense that Empson implies.20 God draws out Satan’s sin in a way that

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19 Not until Satan convinces them, that is.

20 Empson, 109.
would not have provoked Satan had he been spiritually sound. The Son serves as a sifting tool, a satan, against Satan, while Satan accuses (satan) the Messiah of undercutting the angels’ power and of demanding unnecessary worship (PL 5.775-84). As one “satans,” so does the other, in response.

This humbling of Satan recalls Milton’s defense of divorce in Tetrachordon, when he expounds on why Christ seemingly contradicted Moses’s law of separation against the Pharisees. In Matthew, the scheming Pharisees ask Jesus, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause?” (Matt. 19:3). The apparent answer is “yes” because Moses pronounces that if a man’s wife “does not find favor in his [the husband’s] eyes,” the husband may divorce her (Deut. 24:1-4). Jesus, though, disregards this passage to counter them with God’s creation of Adam and Eve. God made man and wife male and female, and so they became “one flesh” when married (Gen. 1:27, 2:24). When the Pharisees reveal the card up their sleeves next about Moses’s law, Christ chides them: “It was because you were so hard-hearted that Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another commits adultery” (Matt. 19:7-9). The way Christ handles the Pharisees’ spring-loaded arguments becomes a staple for Milton’s reading of how to handle those who abuse God’s laws for their own purposes. The sense aligns with how God utilizes a satan to direct one toward good again: since direct teaching usually will not change a sinner’s mind, an alternative method is needed.
In *Tetrachordon*, Milton explains that Christ’s tactic of defending himself is “not so much a teaching as an entangling” (*Tetr* 295). If the righteous detect an assault, they react “not to instruct the unworthy and the conceited who love tradition more than truth, but to perplex and stumble them purposely with contrived obscurities” (*Tetr* 296). Milton provides the contextual background of Matthew 19 by clarifying how the Pharisees secretly were luring Christ into an argumentative trap—“to *ensnare* him within compass of the same *accusation* which had ended his [Christ’s] friend[, John the Baptist]” (*Tetr* 297; emphasis mine). They had in mind a story “out of Josephus” about Herod, who lusted after another’s wife and so divorced his own to marry again, in blatant disregard of the spirit of the law behind Moses’s edict (*Tetr* 296-97). John the Baptist was put to death by rebuking the act (*Tetr* 297). Christ, therefore, to Milton, detected the Pharisees’ accusatorial intent and reacted appropriately harsh to call out this abuse of law because it immorally justified sinful behavior.

To Milton, one must not only baffle stubborn enemies, because teaching is out of the question, but also humble them: “And to school a proud man we labor to make him humble, not magnanimous” (*Tetr* 296). Law cannot inspect a person’s internal motives, so a righteous man, as Christ here, seeks to “rectify” the “secrecies” of “conscience” with these entangling methods (*Tetr* 298). The same of *Paradise Lost*—Satan’s secret evil, his

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21 Milton’s Satan in *Paradise Regained* even acknowledges how he seeks to sift Christ, i.e. force Christ to choose either good or evil: “I here have had / To try thee, sift thee, and confess have found thee / Proof against all temptation” (*PL* 4.531-33). And, of course, Stanley Fish makes much of this teaching-entangling quotation for his own purposes in *Surprise by Sin*.

22 Both “ensnare” and “accusation” have roots in *satan*. See Chapter 1 again for “ensnare,” or “snare [pah],” with *mastema*. 
narcissism, emerges when God perplexes Satan with the Son’s promotion. It is a rectifying move aimed to humble Satan. The Son, after Satan puts his plans into action, even acknowledges His “Regal Power / Giv’n [Him] to quell thir [the rebels’] pride” (*PL 5.739-40*). The Son is a satan to Satan, to force him back to good. But Satan’s consistent resistance only fosters more problems.

Another biblical example of sifting exists in Luke, where Christ, at the Last Supper, declares, “Satan has demanded to sift all of you [disciples] like wheat” (Luke 22:31). Peter boasts, “Lord, I am ready to go with you to prison and to death!” (Luke 22:33). But Christ prophesies Peter’s eventual tripartite denial of Him.23 According to Walter Wink, because Peter was not “conscious of his frailty and flightiness,” he led himself into a situation in which even Jesus could not have saved him. Instead, he must be tested.24 Satan, then, serves as a divine tool that exposes a spiritual problem, and this God-employed Satan also appears in *Paradise Regained* (*PR* 1.378). To Wink, a satan is “the distillate precipitated by the actual existential experience of being sifted.”25 A satan forms from one’s unconsciousness during a trial. If one expands Wink’s ideas of “unconsciousness” to anything that stands in one’s way, his explication applies to *Paradise Lost*, as well: “When God cannot reach us through our conscious commitment, 

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23 The three denials occur in Luke 22:54-62 after Judas escorts the soldiers who capture Jesus. Christ chastises Peter with a look that drives Peter to weep “bitterly.”


sometimes there is no other way to get our attention than to use the momentum of our unconsciousness to slam us up against the wall.” What Wink does not discuss, though, is one who stubbornly endures unending slamming. And the perpetual state of Milton’s Satan is never-ending sifting, eternal plunging into worse Hells—ones to “which the Hell [he currently] suffer[s] seems a Heav’n” (PL 4.78). Each level lower erodes him further.

Milton unfurls another trial-like “sataning” when Abdiel and Satan interact before the war. Abdiel’s righteous pedagogy directed toward Satan, though unsuccessful, models the failure of one who tries to teach the obstinate rather than entangle them, but Milton linguistically indicates another trial’s success: Abdiel’s own. After Abdiel resists Satan’s persuasion and reprimands him for his treason, Abdiel escapes with Satan’s lingering threat to God (PL 5.809-907). Because Abdiel’s scolding holds no sway, Satan must be sifted further: “O alienate from God, O Spirit accurst, / Forsak’n of all good; I see thy [Satan’s] fall / Determin’d” (PL 5.877-79). He will fall lower. But Abdiel, “with retorted scorn [i.e., satan],” made his way through the hostile crowd (PL 5.906; emphasis mine). He defies Satan’s allurement and subsequently functions as a satan against the mutineers, hinted by Milton’s etymologies. Both Heaven’s applause and God’s approval upon Abdiel’s return signify further Hebraic-etymological significance as God stimulates the Hebrew of Abdiel’s name: “Servant of God, well done” (PL 6.29; emphasis mine). Hale, noticing the Hebraic activation first, purports, “Milton here shapes his most completely Hebraic theophany” because Abdiel has “lived up to [God’s]

26 Abdiel was tested because he went to Satan’s Mountain of the Congregation in the first place, which implies there might have been some sort of iniquitous appeal.
name.” And specifically, Abdiel serves God because he withstands the lure of satanic enticement. He passes his trial. The etymology of satan delineates Abdiel’s counterattack, achievement of faithfulness, and prosecution against his enemies.

Abdiel next transitions the Hebraic senses of a resistive satan into a physically obstructive and spiritually legal one as he addresses Satan full-on before both armies. Satan’s hope, as Abdiel charges, “was to have reacht / The hight of [his] aspiring unoppos’d [i.e., without a satan]” (PL 6.131-32; emphasis mine). But God’s balanced martial decision (i.e., employing an equally numbered army) halts Satan’s progress, so Abdiel’s rebuke preludes Michael’s “huge two-handed sway” (PL 6.251). Heaven “satans” Satan. Michael’s presence will put several on trial spiritually because God (Abdiel continues) could have ended Satan’s army “at one blow / Unaided” (PL 6.140-41). Therefore, evil’s permitted presence welcomes everyone’s free-will response, and thus a trial for all, even from those who prefer “Faith” and “Piety to God” (PL 6.143-44). As Milton proclaims in Areopagitica, “I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue … that never sallies out and sees her adversary [satan]” (Areop 728). Because “we bring not innocence into the world,” but rather evil, trials purify us, “and trial is by what is contrary [satan]” (Areop 728). Thus, the possibility of straying from God equates to entering divine litigation. In this court case, one is accused by a satan, who is either a separate

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27 Hale, 139.

28 The idea is reminiscent of how John Carey speculates that Satan, in his Mount Niphates soliloquy, is already faintly evil as he “speaks the truth and curses himself as God curses him. He and God are in accord.” Once he curses God, there is an appropriate response. See Carey, “Milton’s Satan,” 163.
entity or oneself. And ultimately, the trial will sift one’s moral ambiguity one way or another.

Peggy Day offers that the covenant between Israel and Yahweh could be summed up as such a legal contract, a “contractual … arrangement” in which “human contravention of the agreement could be expressed in terms of legal offense.” One’s choice of separation prompts God, through legal prosecution, to ask, “Are you sure of your decision?” One suffers the trial to decide whether to burn a bridge or not, per se, with God. Therefore, as Satan in Paradise Lost insanely launches a hopeless attack, he openly communicates, “I am sure.” Therefore, both Abdiel and Michael momentarily embody satans of God against Satan by both etymologically maintaining the connotation of “Military prowess” and vivifying the physically obstructing presence of the satan of Numbers (PL 6.45).

The heavenly battle in Paradise Lost could be described as the eschatological conflict of Revelation, but written upon a palimpsest of Numbers 22. Naturally, the militaristic sense of satan resonates throughout Milton’s angelic war as Milton scatters hateful, adversarial, destructive, and resistive nuances of satan. Michael identifies Satan’s deeds as “hateful strife, hateful to all” (PL 6.264; emphasis mine). Satan has “instill’d / [His] malice into thousands” (PL 6.269-70; emphasis mine). Raphael names Satan “The


30 See Rev. 12:7-12, where Michael combats Satan after Christ is enthroned. For the various roles of Michael throughout biblical, apocryphal, and pseudepigraphic literature, see Craig R. Koester, The Anchor Yale Bible: Revelation, a New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 547-48.
Adversary” directly (PL 6.282; emphasis mine). Satan hastes “to withstand” Michael’s “destruction” and so “oppos’d” with his shield (PL 6.253-54; emphasis mine). And Satan’s first downfall pivots upon Michael’s blade being unopposable: “neither keen / Nor solid might resist that [Michael’s] edge: it met / The sword of Satan … / …and in half cut sheer” (PL 6.322-25; emphasis mine, except “Satan”). Through Homeric and Hebraic allusions, Milton bolsters the war in heaven, in which “Michael and his angels fought against the dragon” and the “dragon and his angels fought back” (Rev. 12:7). But as Milton loads his language with the implied satan, faint hints of the adversary, who stands before the Hebrew Bible’s Balaam, glimmer through the eschatological imagery of Book 6. The obstructing Hebrew-angel’s role epitomizes both Abdiel’s and Michael’s task in Paradise Lost to break subtlety and match force with force.

The sword-wielding satan of Numbers barbarically obstructs Balaam, a man who goes against God’s commands, and Milton capitalizes on Balaam’s disobedience when he refutes Salmasius—a French, anti-Protestant, polemical writer funded by Charles II—in the first Defense of the English People. Earlier in Numbers, Balak, a king who abhors Moses’s people near the Promised Land, sends for a sorcerer-for-hire, Balaam, to curse them. God denies Balaam to go, but Balaam eventually succumbs to remuneration.31 To emphasize his mistake, “the Lord’s messenger [malak Yahweh] station[s] himself in the road as an adversary [satan] to him” (Num. 22:22). The armed, invisible angel blocks

31 Although, God seems to contradict Himself about allowing Balaam to leave with Balak’s men (Num. 22:20-21). Alter calls it a “source of puzzlement” and proceeds to overview critical commentary that leans toward inductive interpretation—i.e., God’s seeming allowance was not actually permission. See Alter, 558n22.
Balaam’s donkey several times and eventually reveals himself. Balaam throws himself prostrate in reverence.\(^\text{32}\) This satan serves as a physical hinderance and, previously, even attempts to kill Balaam, admitting, “Had she [the donkey] not swerved away from me, by now it is you I would have killed” (Num. 22:33). Balaam allows himself to stray from God’s direct warning, and a satan consequently corrects his faulty path. Milton utilizes this betraying magician not only to attack Salmasius polemically but also to breathe allusions through the Book 6 apocalyptic battle.

Milton, though not acknowledging the satan in his polemical tract, does note that Balaam is “enticed” to curse God’s people and to “exclaim against the judicial dispensations of his providence” (Def 1 582).\(^\text{33}\) Balaam goes against what God provided for him. Milton equates Salmasius with Balaam because Salmasius accepts enticing money from the king and slanders Protestants (i.e., to Milton, God’s people). Salmasius intends “to spit out the most bitter poison” by saying that the Protestants crept “out of hell” (Def 1 587). And to Milton, Salmasius’s accusations (recalling satan) lower him to a “mercenary slanderer” and “apostate” (Def 1 587). Ultimately, Milton changes his mind and couples Salmasius to Balaam’s ass, instead, since Salmasius yields to his wife (i.e., she rides him). Next, Milton extends his metaphor: Salmasius’s wife atop Salmasius

\(^{32}\) The donkey, however, which talks, does not persuade him.

resembles the whore of Babylon and “that beast in Revelation” (Def 1 596). In this instance, Balaam, to Milton, is as apostatic as Satan in *Paradise Lost*, and Milton’s apocalyptic language wielded against Salmasius anticipates *Paradise Lost’s* Satan’s dissent adumbrated by the Hebrew pericope.

Milton likely viewed the biblical satan against Balaam as a corrective device. When Milton shames someone for blasphemous behavior (especially publicly), he more than likely regards himself as a good satan. So, in light of *Paradise Lost*, a foe unchecked does not slide with Milton. He slips into elevated, eschatological language to rebuke the iniquitous. In regard to this passage in Numbers, the scholar Day asserts that the impeding-angel’s confession—that he has “come out as adversary [satan]” against Balaam (Num. 22:32)—denotes Balaam’s lack of consulting with God: if “the announcement of divine wrath is a paralegal expression, then Balaam in verse 32 stands charged with undertaking a journey without divine consent.”

Forsyth agrees: “If the path is bad, an obstruction is good.” The angel is a corrective device because Balaam has turned his back on God. Therefore, in *Paradise Lost*, both Abdiel and Michael serve as similar satans against Satan. They are responses to apostasy and are fulfilling their responsibilities to God by rising against evil. Abdiel stands before Satan and smites him with “a noble stroke” (*PL* 6.189). Michael, also, combatively impedes one who refuses to consult with or submit to God.

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35 Forsyth, *Old Enemy*, 113.
And, as the final affirmation of Satan’s stubbornness, even a terrifying Son, acting as a satan, does not persuade him to repent. As the Son rushes to end the rebellious crew, Satan embodies his name further. Raphael, still puzzled by the memory of obstinate angels, rhetorically asks Adam, “In heav’nly Spirits could such perverseness dwell?” (PL 6.788). The mutineers “[s]tood reimbattl’d fierce,” despite the odds, and to “final Battle drew, disdaining flight, / Or faint retreat” (PL 6.794, 798-99). They recall the resistive elements of satan. The image evokes sublimity that undoubtedly haunted the Romantics later. But to Milton, Satan’s foolish separation from what he envies resolves the permanency of his new name: “Satan” is here to stay. Thus, Milton orchestrates Satan’s fate etymologically by pitting other satans against him while he “satans,” here especially with the Messiah.

Milton’s Satan suffers afflictions and turns against others while enduring the remedial force of God’s universe, and Milton’s linguism empowers Satan’s didactic purpose of modeling one separated from God. When Satan leaves Hell for Earth, Milton next evokes connotative nuances of the satan from Job—Satan as both an adversary and a sufferer of one. Satan’s major shifts in the first two books range from Titanian-sized to councilman to espionage agent, and he tactically adapts his nature by becoming deceptive. Allusory Persian kings intermingle with Satan’s transformation: Satan is a “great Sultan,” and upon his Pandaemonic throne—“which far / Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind, / Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand / Show’rs on her Kings Barbaric Pearl and Gold”—Satan sits “exalted” (PL 1.348, 2.1-5).

The etymological wordplay here might solve the issue of conflicting similes, as Peter C. Herman notes about these lines in relation to Charles I and Eikonoklastes: the
connection prepares a potential play on the eyes and ears of Persian kings, as discussed by Herodotus and named as “satans” by the Hebrews.37 Beyond Milton’s basic familiarity with Herodotus, he also corrects Salmassius’s knowledge of Persian Kings from Herodotus’s accounts.38 It is probable that he was familiar with the satans of the kings, who were spies who accused others for royal purposes. In Paradise Lost, before Satan feels Joban anguish, he qualifies as such a Persian spy, undertaking a reconnaissance mission to Earth, and Milton activates the etymology with contextual emphasis.

As Milton’s fallen angel races to challenge God’s world order, Persian allusions and divine vision signal attributes of the spy-like adversary of Job. Milton relates elsewhere that he wishes to be a “relater of the best and sagest things … in the mother dialect,” just as “the greatest and choicest wits” of other countries, especially “those

Turkish empires are emphasized for tyranny, but several foes called each other “Turks” historically, apparently. See Herman, 37.


38 He divulges this in his first Defense and particularly discusses Herodotus’s Cambyses consulting with judges and Persian law in regards to marrying his own sister.
Hebrews of old” (CG 668). And Job might serve as one of his models (CG 668).

Therefore, Milton galvanizes the etymological associations of Job’s God’s eyes, again, to clue his reader in to Satan’s lexical connections to the Hebrew epic. God “bent down his eye” and “first beheld / Our two first Parents” (PL 3.58, 64). The “Sanctities of Heaven”—as God rolls his eyes—“from his sight receiv’d / Beatitude past utterance” (PL 3.60-62). He surveys “Hell and the Gulf between, and Satan there,” who is “ready now / To stoop with wearied wings and willing feet / On the bare outside of this World” (PL 70, 73-74). And before a lengthy discussion of the ostensible justice of allowing Satan’s “desperate revenge” on mankind (PL 3.85), God displays more omniscient vision: “Him God beholding from his prospect high, / Wherein past, present, future he beholds” (PL 3.77-78). At its metaphoric climax, Ithuriel and Zepho propel the ocular imagery further and serve as satans not only to confront Satan but also as God’s eyes themselves.39

The two angels symbolically and literally function as God’s vision and invoke the prologue of Job. As Satan prowls the Garden of Eden, Ithuriel and Zepho—“Discovery of God” and “Lookout,” in Hebrew—“with wing’d speed / Search through this Garden, leave unsearcht no nook” (PL 4.788-89; emphasis mine). “In search of whom they sought,” they eventually find Satan “[s]quat like a Toad” at Eve’s ear (PL 4.799-800; emphasis mine). The angels move just as God’s eyes do and operate as sentient beings coalesced with omniscient visuality. The wordplay animates the characters almost as

39 As Carl Jung also proposes about Job’s satan and God’s eyes, the satan “is presumably one of God’s eyes which ‘go to and fro in the earth and walk up and down in it’ (Job 1:7).” And he also associates the satan as one of Yahweh’s sons and doubting thoughts: “[i]n Persian tradition, Ahriman proceeded from one of Ormuzd’s doubting thoughts.” See Jung, “Answer to Job,” 170n30.
anomalously as how Sin and Death exist both materially yet allegorically. And when Ithuriel’s spear touches Satan “lightly,” Satan is “[d]iscover’d and surpris’d” because “no falsehood can endure / Touch of Celestial temper, but returns / Of force to its own likeness” (PL 4.811-14). God’s eyes here have discovered Job’s adversary, in a sense, who now is subject to interrogation. The eyes of God (Ithuriel and Zephon) question Satan as God does in Job: “Which of those rebel Spirits adjug’d to Hell / Com’st thou[?]” (PL 4.823-24). Satan, unfamiliar with his Joban role, echoes his name: “Know ye not then said Satan, fill’d with scorn” (PL 4.827; emphasis mine, except “Satan”). And following the universal pattern of Satan met with a satan, Zephon answers “scorn with scorn” and elucidates the crypticity of Satan’s “likeness” from earlier—that Satan now resembles his “sin and place of doom obscure and foul” (PL 4.834, 840). The symptoms of Satan’s satanic state come to the forefront of his physicality now, not just his mentality, when Milton conjures the eyes of the Joban Yahweh, peering for an adversary, in Paradise Lost, and he is subsequently questioned about his previous whereabouts.

The Satan of Paradise Lost challenges the world order of God and laments his condition, much as the adversary of Job tests Yahweh’s universe’s design and as Job suffers a satan. How Milton understands Job, however, might be extrapolated from Paradise Regained, a work that Milton maybe upheld as his most important. His nephew,  

John Guillory has an interesting understanding of Ithuriel’s spear as a tool that not only knocks Satan out of his form but also clarifies ambiguities for the reader, as well, since one still does not know what Satan’s “likeness” is until Ithuriel interacts. See John Guillory, Poetic Authority: Spenser, Milton, and Literary History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 149-50.
Edward Phillips, tells us that many peers claimed *Paradise Lost* was better than *Paradise Regained*, but Milton “could not hear with patience any such thing when related to him” (*Life of Milton* 1036). And, within the text, Milton’s narrator claims that he once sang “happy Garden” (i.e., *Paradise Lost*) but now sings “Recover’d Paradise” (*PR* 1.1, 3). In other words, as John Rogers argues, Milton, “or at least the poem’s narrator,” might be forgetting *Paradise Lost*’s epic form—intentionally or not—and is (mistakenly) labelling it a pastoral, which, in the Virgilian tradition, puts *Paradise Lost* as a simpler, first poem on the poet’s quest to compose a masterful epic.\(^{41}\) If true, *Paradise Regained*, to Milton, could serve as his magnum opus, and the subject matter is that of Christ’s success over the temptation of Satan, as per the account in the gospel Luke. Regardless, the scene expounds on the base mechanics of Milton’s universe’s solution to salvation.

Christ, who is compared with Job throughout *Paradise Regained*, is undeniably the protagonist in a work of major importance to Milton, modeled from Job and situated in two characters’ contest of wills. The ultimate virtue and salvation of mankind in the poem solely relies on one’s ability to resist temptation and thus eschatologically maintain the order of the universe. Job, in *Paradise Regained*, is praised for his “constant perseverance” and “patience” against Satan’s assaults in the Hebrew Bible, and Christ, a fortiori, serves “far abler to resist” Satan (*PR* 1.147, 426, 151). Christ is a perfection of

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\(^{41}\) John Rogers, “*Paradise Regained* and the Memory of *Paradise Lost,*” *The Oxford Handbook of Milton*, eds. Nicholas McDowell and Nigel Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 606. Rogers believes that “Milton appears to have forgotten that *Paradise Lost* was an epic, a poem featuring the epic subject of war.” He qualifies this assumption based on Milton beginning *Paradise Regained* with a “conventional, Virgilian gesture of self-consciously modest literary self-identification.”
Job’s resolute faith, which is the foundation upon which *Paradise Regained* sits.\(^{42}\) Satan, then—who must truly be a sequel character under these guidelines of Milton’s understanding of his own work—obstructs Christ to challenge God’s pronouncements, that all creatures are free to choose their own fates.\(^ {43}\) In other words, he obstructs as a plot-device would, recalling his etymology precisely, so that he can put the universe on trial, in a sense.

In Milton’s universe, the challenge against free will is important to Satan because it not only would sate his own confusion of his nature but also would prove that his fall was not his fault. Determinism would kill his repressed understanding of free will, which he momentarily reveals on Mount Niphates (while revealing a form of *satan*): “Hadst thou the same free Will and Power to stand? / Thou hadst: whom hast thou then or what to accuse, / But Heav’n’s free Love dealt equally to all?” (*PL* 4.66-68; emphasis mine). But later—once truth is buried deeply—Satan expresses his deterministic desires when he views Adam and Eve for a first time. He blames God for putting him up to evil: “Thank him [God] who puts me loath to this revenge / On you [Adam and Eve] who wrong me not for him who wrong’d” (*PL* 4.386-87). Satan here excuses “his devilish deeds” to avoid guilt (*PL* 4.394). His satanic symptoms overwhelm his ability to discern truth. And destroying God’s moral structure would save him from his decisions. His reasoning consistently resonates with the etymology of *satan*. As he retaliates against Michael

\(^{42}\) Rogers continues Barbara Lewalski’s studies from *Milton’s Brief Epic* by enforcing another central aspect of the poem: Christ remembering His pre-existent state in Heaven, as shown in *Paradise Lost*. See Rogers, “*Paradise Regained* and the Memory of *Paradise Lost,*” et al.

\(^{43}\) See *PL* 3.100-11, as one example.
during the war in Heaven, he expresses, “[W]e [the rebels] mean to win [glory], / Or turn this Heav’n itself into the Hell / Thou fabl’st, here however to dwell free, / If not to reign” (PL 6.290-93). Tearing down God’s universal order would relieve Satan with chaos, even if he could not wield the chaos with rulership, and the idea parallels Job’s satan and his challenge to universal order.

In Job, which Milton considered “a literal account,” the satan challenges God’s order by calling out Job’s righteousness as being dependent upon God’s blessings. The satan draws the problem directly to the forefront: “Does Job fear God for nothing? Have You not hedged him about and his household and all that he has all around?” (Job 1:10). Without hesitation, God grants the satan free reign to harm Job. For what follows, of Job being subjected to the horrors of chaos and adversarial power, one must focus on Job’s faithfulness to grasp the lesson. It is also what Milton cherished about the story: one serves God with or without incentive. The servitude recalls Milton on his blindness—“They also serve who only stand and wait” (Sonn 19 14)—and Christ when he ends Satan’s temptations once and for all—“Also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord

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44 The Milton Encyclopedia, ed. Thomas N. Corns (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), s.v., “Job.” As a side note, Milton, as usual, seems up to date on his research; he is aware that modern scholars are unsure of where Uz, Job’s home, is. See Walter MacKellar, A Variorum Commentary on the Poems of John Milton: Volume Four, Paradise Regained (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 148n94.

45 As Pope explicates, the satan here is being rhetorical because he is “confident that the answer is in the negative.” See Pope, The Anchor Bible: Job, 12n9b.

46 Peggy Day defends the story by expressing that the author intentionally places the prologue and epilogue in a fantasy—i.e., it is a fairy-tale God and accuser—but the human suffering is very real. See Day, 83-84.
they God; he said and stood. / But Satan smitten with amazement fell” (*PR* 4.560-62). No matter the circumstances, to Milton, one must trust and follow God, and thus, stand in faith. Otherwise, one succumbs to Jung’s literalist account of the story (before he finds an exegetical solution through the symbol of Christ) of God being “bamboozled” by the satan, despite His omniscience.⁴⁷ Job’s faith is the point.

Major thematic ideas of universal order brim with *satan* as Milton employs Joban structure. Loyalty and faith maintain world order in Job, *Paradise Regained*, and *Paradise Lost* because if a blameless man were to succumb to cursing God, the entire universe’s structure crumbles. As Day posits, if one without fault “is suffering, then retributive justice and the world order of which it is a part must have collapsed,” but Job maintains order when he “bends his knee to the god who created and maintains this amoral world, thus proving the accuser wrong.”⁴⁸ The accuser, therefore, puts God on trial as much as he does Job. And in *Paradise Lost*, Milton summons this difficult Christological lesson through his character Satan, both narratively and lexically, as Satan schemes to ruin mankind while suffering emotional trauma himself—“inflam’d with rage” while “horror and doubt distract / His troubl’d thoughts, and from the bottom stir / The Hell within him” (*PL* 4.9, 18-20). The cure to the wound of *satan* is for him to submit to and trust God, despite how God has designed a confusingly painful world. But Satan perpetuates his condition by rejecting this solution. He thereby hits every wall of

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⁴⁷ Jung, “Answer to Job,” 132.

⁴⁸ Day, 82-83.
redemptive chances, slinging accusations and opposing everything in his way, and his
name forges the way toward his fate.

Upon Satan’s return to Eden to tempt Eve, Milton harnesses the full arsenal of
satan both to tip Satan into ethical depravity and also to foreshadow Adam and Eve’s fall.
Having determined evil as his good, Satan still resists the urge to repent, even as he faces
Eve. As turmoil boils in Satan, satan bubbles to the surface: “so much more I feel /
Torment within me [Satan], as from the hateful siege / Of contraries; all good to me
becomes / Bane” (PL 9.120-23; emphasis mine). The internal struggle to maintain evil
linguistically flushes up from a hidden satan. Everything that was good now inversely
opposes him. Satan continues, and etymological precision rises: “Since higher I fall short,
on him who next / Provokes my envy, this new Favorite / Of Heav’n, this Man of Clay,
Son of despite, / Whom us the more to spite his Maker rais’d / From dust: spite then with
spite is best repaid” (PL 9.174-78; emphasis mine). Hate is an infection that spreads, even
across the syntax of Milton’s sentences.

Exuding satan more, Satan forgoes his last chance at redemption and ultimately
fails his trial. He sees a solitary Eve, who causes him momentarily to forget his hate: her
form overawes “[h]is Malice,” and “[t]hat space the Evil one abstracted stood / From his
own evil, and for the time remain’d / Stupidly good, of enmity disarm’d, / Of guile, of
hate, of envy, of revenge” (PL 9.461, 463-66; emphasis mine). Milton’s Hebraic
cataloging of satan is what Eve’s good relieves in Satan’s last moment of redemptive
potential. Once out in the open, per se, and away from the symptoms of hate that drive
him, he quickly gathers them back upon himself to ensure his damnation: “But the hot
Hell that always in him burns, / … soon ended his delight,” and “[f]ierce hate he
recollects, and all his thoughts / Of mischief, gratulating, thus excites” (PL 9.467-68, 471-72; emphasis mine). Milton etymologically enforces Satan slamming the door, per se, on God’s last extension of peace, as utilized through an unknowing Eve, the gentler satan in Satan’s final trial.

Satan is not the only character who endures the effects of satan—Milton plays on the word’s etymology extensively with both Adam and Eve as soon as they enter their spiritual trial. In the morning after Raphael’s cautioning visit, Eve proposes to Adam that they split the workload for the day. Adam, though acknowledging the productiveness, does not feel the decision is sound. As they both gently argue, satan ping-pongs between them: “malicious Foe / Envying our happiness,” “sly assault,” “his envy,” “an Enemy … who seeks / Our ruin,” “a foe / May tempt it,” “His fraud,” etc. (PL 9.253-89). Satan is reduced to a vocational caricature. Adam even discloses, etymologically, the word’s appearance within Eve, who might nobly try to “satan” against this tempter, though inevitably succumbing to Satan. After a theoretical temptation, Eve “with scorn / And anger wouldst resent the offer’d wrong [from Satan], / Though ineffectual found” (PL 9.299-301; emphasis mine). Adam presents an Eve failing a trial because of her own prideful initiation of spiritual combat. Therefore, Adam emphasizes that trial will undoubtedly come to them, thus there being no need to seek it and that Eve should stay with him. But Eve’s feelings mirror Satan’s next when Satan learns of the Son’s vice-regency—she feels impaired: “but Eve, who thought / Less attributed to her Faith sincere, / Thus her reply … renew’d” (PL 9.319-20). Feeling insecurity about her own ability to
resist evil, she separates from Adam just as Satan separates from God, a wound of prideful hate acting as the etymological wedge and thus recalling Genesis’s Esau again.49

“Dragon grown” and eternally ensconced in hate, Satan undergoes Christ’s serpentiform curse—his trial has concluded—while Adam writhes with new satanic conditions, curses “his Creation,” and hatefully accuses God and Eve (PL 10.529, 720-908). Adam is becoming Satan. Death “concludes” Adam “miserable” (compare Satan: “Me miserable!” [PL 4.73]), and only Satan is similar in “both crime and doom” (PL 10.839, 841). Adam claims that his conscience enslaves him: “O Conscience, into what Abyss of fears / And horrors has thou driv’n me; out of which / I find no way, from deep to deeper plunge’d,” just as Satan concludes of his own mind falling into bottomless Hell (PL 10.842-44, 4.75-78). Satan is a symptom, and anyone can suffer it, as Milton poignantly expresses in his etymological world. But when Adam is “as one disarm’d, his anger … lost” before Eve’s submission—paralleling Satan standing stupidly good before her—Adam contrariwise accepts his out and passes his trial (PL 10.945). Subsequent repentance releases the sinful burden. Adam avoids the satanic pit to accept submission’s restitution from God: “What better can we do, than to the place / Repairing where he

49 Of course, the blame is not entirely hers, as Adam grants her permission to go. As Diane McColley posits, “At the Fall these qualities [of Milton’s wide-ranged understanding of gender virtues] run to excess in Eve’s ambition and Adam’s ‘effeminacy,’ when he puts the immediacy of personal relations above the long-term claims of truth.” It is both equally their faults. See Diane K. McColley, “Milton and the Sexes,” The Cambridge Companion to Milton, ed. Dennis Danielson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 183. And Christ in Paradise Regained even emphasizes Eve’s inability to save herself: Satan’s rhetoric “won so much on Eve, / So little here, nay lost; but Eve was Eve” (PR 4.5-6).
judg’d us, prostrate fall / Before him reverent, and there confess / Humbly our faults, and pardon beg” (PL 10.1086-89). Submission heals the wound.

Harold Bloom’s statement that “[n]ot much trace survives in [Milton’s Satan] of the Satan of the Hebrew Bible” neglects the etymological subtleties of all the various usages of satan, then. Most hesitate to acknowledge Milton’s Satan in Paradise Regained as a sequel character from Paradise Lost, but Milton did not—so much so that he possibly valued Paradise Regained over Paradise Lost. If the situation is right, anything could be a satan in Milton’s universe because Milton employs both the positive and negative senses of the Hebrew Bible’s satan while also considering the word’s trajectory into the New Testament. Milton frequently activates this linguistic significance, and in totality, his Satan infuses both the New Testament and the Hebrew Bible characters through etymological wordplay.

In Paradise Lost, Milton enlivens all denotative and connotative nuances of satan from the Hebrew Bible—along with its transitional appellation, Satan, from the New Testament—as an etymological strategy to expose characters for their faults and emotional wounds. The word satan obstructs anyone who separates from God, and thus, it evokes divine legality. It seeks to push one back onto the path of righteousness so that

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50 Bloom, Ruin the Sacred Truths, 103. Bloom claims that Satan never accuses nor works in a heavenly court, which probably means that he is referring to the satan in Job accusing mankind of tenuous loyalty to God. Within the structure of Paradise Lost, Bloom is correct, though Satan does pretty much accuse everything else. But if one understands Paradise Regained as a true sequel, as Milton did, then Satan eventually does work for God, admits it, and then, actually is the Satan of both the Hebrew Bible and New Testament. Milton was writing, to him, the actual Satan, so every “trace” of any Satan in the Bible is in Milton’s Satan.
one might return to God and enjoy emotional wholeness. As soon as one strays, satan materializes out of the text as both a symptom and a corrective instrument. As Milton proposes in his divorce tracts, the heart is a source of “evil” (DDD 103). And when Adam and Eve repent, they send their confessions “from hearts contrite” (PL 10.1091). Milton’s God, then, despite controversial, is the only unit of stabilization in Milton’s universe that prevents beings from damning themselves. Choosing to forgo His offer of love thrusts one into absolute chaos and exposes one to anomalous, ruinous evil. And the exemplar of this etymological undertow is Satan.
EPILOGUE

Beneath the surface impression of *Paradise Lost*, Milton suggests meanings that appear only after being activated by their surrounding context. Not all wordplay is created equal, though. One of the most profound instances is Milton’s enhancement of meaning through a word’s etymology—including both its vernacular and literary insinuations. Milton wields a word’s history for an intended effect beyond the scope of basic paronomasia. Within his characters, Milton intensifies eponyms and hypograms to invigorate their literary significance. In the character of Satan, Milton stimulates the unspoken “demon” to direct the reader toward an off-screen moment of narcissistic corruption. “Demon” further maps the length of Satan’s sanity by stenciling the positive-to-negative line of *daimon*’s history—from Hesiod to Plato to biblical literature—within the gradual abasement of Milton’s Satan. Satan’s self-idolatry provokes demonism, so he ethically erodes, just as the word itself erodes when the Bible’s translators and writers employ it from Greek usage.

Next, Satan’s internal struggle results in debased actions, which evoke a response from the universe in the form of a trial. Thus, Milton follows Satan’s path of dissent by explicitly deploying the Hebrew word, *satan*. It becomes Satan’s name and accomplishes a two-fold purpose: it shows how Satan “satsans” (assaults, acts hatefully, suffers turmoil), and it seeks to sift apostasy (as if in a legal court case). Milton plays on the original sense of *satan* as well as the formal New Testament Satan/Satanas by showing God’s procedure in action after a rational creature strays from Him. The effect of the word, ultimately, is a display of torment from any character who deviates from righteousness. Naturally, Satan exemplifies this condition because he consistently and consciously
chooses to avoid returning to God. Hence, Milton models Satan as the poster child, per se, of poor decisions because Satan remains immured within God’s system even while he rebels against his creator. “Demon” incites “satan.”

Understanding Milton’s extensive wordplay is important to scholars seeking to discover how deep Milton’s etymological wordplay goes. It also ostensibly settles debates on Milton’s opinions of Satan as a character. The words indicate for themselves how and why Satan is the way he is, and they imply Milton’s conscious feelings toward them. In short, underneath the ambivalent surface of Satan’s character, the etymologies agree with scholars like C. S. Lewis, Merritt Hughes, Stanley Fish, Regina Schwartz, and Stella Revard, who all believe that Milton did not side with Satan and that Satan does not embody any moral conundrums within God’s universe. The wordplay, then, disagrees with those who speak otherwise, such as Michael Bryson, Andrew Barnaby, William Empson, and Harold Bloom, to name a few, for whom the real problem is Milton’s God, whose flat personification perhaps promotes Satan’s victimage. Milton’s intolerable divinity perhaps sparked the entire Satan debate in the 19th century. Percy Shelley’s “On the Devil, and Devils” demonstrates some of the critical, God-related issues from the period, though William Blake’s snippet about Milton “of the Devil’s party” is debatably the most over-quoted phrase in Miltonic scholarship.¹

Other scholarly work involving why readers appeal to Satan proves highly profound in the end—perhaps initiated by C. S. Lewis, but notably from Kenneth

¹ And it is mostly misquoted from its context since Blake’s Satan is citing it. See Joseph Wittreich, Jr., The Romantics on Milton (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970), 35n6.
Grossman, Neil Forsyth, Andrew Barnaby, and, of course, Stanley Fish. In general, this project would not be possible without the careful eye for detail from scholars who focus on etymological wordplay, such as Christopher Ricks, John Hale, Peter Herman, Herbert Marks, and John Leonard—and even some of Milton’s earlier critics, like Thomas Newton, Patrick Hume, Joseph Addison, and Samuel Johnson (even though Johnson had mixed feelings over the wordplay as much as T. S. Eliot did). A few ideas for further study come to mind, however: Saussurean linguistic value, Romantic symbolization, and Miltonic blended wordplay (e.g., “demon” + “satan”).

What makes Milton so exciting to study is that because he knew ten, or more, languages and because he openly admits to trying “Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhyme,” he might be a vital key to bridging the gap between the scientific milieu of linguistics and the subjective world of poetry. He does this by the mechanics of languages. Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics discusses the value of a word but does not elaborate on the details of “value.” The idea holds potential—a reader’s impression from a poetic expression could be loosely measured. Of course, this would vary with any reader, and this is not to endorse poetic analysis devolved into a number. But there is a reason Shakespeare is consistently taught, despite how education systems cannot put a Lexile number on poetry’s difficulty. The process of statistically charting poetic “value,” though, should induce a cringe, though it might serve as a temporary tool to dig into another world of meaning. Not all poets’ works could withstand this system, but most of Milton’s work could because the wordplay is so deliberate.

For example, a line like, “And [Eve] knew not eating death,” has stirred much debate (PL 9.792). Kerrigan, Rumrich, and Fallon detect four potential meanings: ““She
did not experience death while eating’; ‘She did not know death, which devours’; ‘She did not know she was eating death’; ‘She did not gain knowledge when eating death.’”\(^2\) And Fowler notes both an allusion and a Graecism: Sebastian Franck’s “all men ‘do eat death, and yet … think themselves to eat life, and hope to be Gods’” and Oppian’s “knew not hastening their death.”\(^3\) Fowler also acknowledges that “Eve’s eating resembles Death’s own” and that the Latinate phrase “mors edax (devouring death)” is present.\(^4\) Ideas of “sapience” abound, too. Milton demands his reader to recognize Greek syntax, Latinate phrasing, English polysemy, and various allusions. If one color-coded this line (instead of coldly developing a numerical system) and indicated that certain colors represented more levels of meaning, researchers could isolate areas of heavy poetic involvement for further analysis. In other words, value could be faintly mapped so that scholars could visualize areas of importance. Next, a reader could speculate over why Milton chose those areas and if they follow a pattern, which would lead back toward warm exegesis again.\(^5\)

Saussure studied anagrams, which grew into Michael Riffaterre’s hypograms, and Riffaterre anticipates something originally intended for this project: Milton’s loaded

\(^2\) Kerrigan, Rumrich, and Fallon, 540n792

\(^3\) Fowler, 516n791-2.

\(^4\) Fowler, 516n791-2.

\(^5\) In reality, there probably is not a pattern. The study would merely reveal that Milton unfurled a word’s or line’s potential because he was seizing an opportunity.
words as symbols. The history of the symbol would be an interesting study, especially since the English Romantics complicated the definition while modern linguists adapted their ideas. A symbol, in some definitions, interacts with what it is representing, and both “satan” and “demon” are doing this with the character of Satan. The purpose of this new project would attempt to form, or materialize even, these words as lexical objects, per se, inside the poem. They would have a form.

To elaborate, take Satan’s speeches in Book 1. If a reader believes that denotations are directly calling upon the etymology of “demon” or “satan” and thus are signaling a symbol inside Satan, then certain lines would interact more than usual. For the following examples, I will denote words relating with “demon” in bold, words relating to “satan” in italics, and both with both. Satan professes to Beelzebub, before rousing the rest of his crew in Hell, “All is not lost; the unconquerable Will, / And study of revenge, immortal hate, / And courage never to submit or yield: / And what is else not to be overcome?” (PL 1.106-9). If one invests in the histories of “satan” and “demon,” the denotations stick out, but who knows if Milton would agree with the above annotations. Either way, they strongly assert themselves, and they primarily occur when Satan talks or

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6 See Riffaterre, 46, where he calls a hypogram a symbol found by the reader from “the writer’s intentions.”

7 See Niklas Luhmann, “Sign as Form,” Problems of Form, ed. Dirk Baecker, trans. Michael Irmscher with Leah Edwards (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 61-63. Also, in the realm of forms, mathematics could hold a place to prove that despite how Milton’s Christ is perpetual and not eternal like God, he is identical in form to God and thus not “secondary hands.” If a form is identical to another, it can thus be factored out, in a sense, since it is identical (and in this Miltonic case, regardless of its origin). See George Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form (Bohmeier Verlag, 2011), et al.
acts. Even “study” subtly evokes the sense of “knowledge” and “skill” from Greek folk etymology of daimon, as discussed by Plato. And “courage” suggests the Homeric senses of daimones as god-like, fearless heroes. In the last line, “overcome” might even be an echo of “courage,” etymologically. “Immortal hate” is particularly poignant because “demon” and “satan” blend into a unified element of both Satan’s corrupted core and permanent state. If one were to read these as symbols, would that mean they are extensions of the symbol communicating within Satan? One imagines the voices of Chaos talking with itself. What is happening here exactly? Whatever it is, it is flooding into the text whenever Satan enters a scene.

As another example, Satan continues, “But ever to do ill our sole delight, / As being the contrary to his high will / Whom we resist” (PL 1.160-2). The “ever” recalls the immortality of guarding spirits—and only appearing because of its context among so many other etymological promptings—but is here perverted by the “satan” portion, “to do ill.” And “sole delight” evokes the punning eudaimonia (happiness) but ushers in the satanic, oppositional “contrary” (here, as an obstruction specifically against God) to stifle it immediately. The words interact with themselves to stress Satan’s current situation and project his intent. And later, when Milton alludes to gigantomachic legends, he utilizes both Greek and Hebrew etymologies where traditions merge. Therefore, when he compares Satan and his fallen angels to “heroes old,” “giant brood,” and “heroic race,” he plays on both the Watcher myth (including gibborim and nephilim, both easily

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8 See n11 again from Chapter 2. The word relates to “haemony,” as well, from Comus, which John Steadman studies. See n11.
confused and sometimes translated as either “giants” or “heroes”) from Gen. 6:1-4 and also the rebellious Titans and hundred-handers from Greek mythology (*PL* 1.552, 576, 577). Michael himself discusses Hebraic giants with Adam.\(^9\) Both thematically align as spirits: one as the evil spirits of the offspring of fallen angels and the other Greek *daimones*.\(^{10}\) The Watcher myth also inspired apocryphal and pseudepigraphal literature of fallen angels and is where Satan’s name potentially brews during the intertestamental period. “Satanael,” “Mastema,” and “Azazel” all align with forbidden, Promethean pedagogy. Either way, their mere presence evokes multilingual etymology.

The interaction of the two words, “demon” and “satan,” in relation to Satan’s character seem to parallel linguistic forms—where a sign and a signifier create signification. Where does the symbol fit into this, and what is the effect upon the poem? I would like to track how this poetic machine moves about with Satan’s character when it interacts with other characters, especially the angels, whose names also activate significance (primarily, righteousness). Can a reader see the symbols intermingling? For instance, Gabriel’s name means “Strength of God,” so because he is an angel who literally embodies this eponym (thus partaking in what he represents, to paraphrase Coleridge), is his name a symbol that displays this strength when he shuts down Satan’s attempt at deception? If so, both names interact symbolically.

Symbols birth other symbols, as well. John K. Hale finds an allusory *satan* in Satan’s address to the sun in Book 4: Satan speaks “with no friendly voice” (*PL* 4.36).

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\(^9\) See *PL* 11.638-99.

\(^{10}\) See n24 again in Chapter 1.
Hale posits that the Hebrew word appears from the merging of Greek and Latin here:

“Latin inimicus is the negating of amicus, friend, and the Greek aphilos works similarly. (‘He who is not with me is against me.’) For good measure, the litotes [‘with no friendly voice’] glances at Hebrew ‘Satan’: the Opposer, the Accuser, the Adversary, he who exposes human offences at God’s court.”

The words naturally come out of Satan, a being formed of etymological agency that communicates inside himself, a symbol made of symbols that births more symbols. This even happens literally with Sin, whom he births and who is a “sign / Portentous” (PL 2.760-61). Compare, also, Ithuriel and Zephon as God’s eyes looking for Satan, which I discuss in Chapter 3. These creatures are alive and allegorical. It does not really work, yet it is working, and the Romantic symbol seems apropos to compare. But besides “more meaning,” an investigation into exactly what is happening between interacting symbols, and how they change with context, would be rewarding. Symbolic extensions manifest in the text from a gestating symbol and then interact with others’ symbols. These creatures are breaking the rules of the actual poem.

Not knowing Milton’s languages will always be a barrier. Even with the assistance of modern study, one cannot catch all the nuances of interaction that the etymologies perform—and perhaps they are even happening on an unconscious level for Milton. Either way, no other English poet seems to do this to the extent of Milton. His poetry truly calls into question what poetry is and why words act as they do.

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11 Hale, *Milton’s Languages*, 64.
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