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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

RESEARCH NOTE:
FRANK CHURCH VISITS SOUTHEAST ASIA 1962

by
Mary Jane Hogan
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In November 1962, at the beginning of his second term as Senator from the state of Idaho, Frank Church made a month-long fact finding visit to Southeast Asia. The places he visited — Samoa, Australian New Guinea, Bali, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaya, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Taiwan — were in various stages of political and economic disarray. Church maintained a diary while on this trip to note his impressions of scenery, policy-makers, and policies.¹

The trip diary is important for two reasons. First, the document provides timely observations about countries and personalities that would soon impact U.S. policies in Southeast Asia. Secondly, Senator Church was about to become a prominent congressional foreign policy leader. His career highlights included membership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1959-80 (Chair 1979-80); stewardship of the Church Committee investigations of the CIA and FBI (1975);² and floor leadership of the Panama Canal treaty (1979). Church was one of the first Senate "doves" to publicly question U.S. policy in Vietnam and co-sponsor of the Cooper-Church amendments (1969 and 1970) prohibiting the

¹Accompanying Church on the November 18-December 21, 1962 trip was his wife, Bethine, and Senators Gale McGee of Wyoming and Frank Moss of Utah and their wives. The trip diary is in the Frank Church Collection, Boise State University, Series 8.2, Box 1, Folder 36.

²See Select Committee report *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (Washington: U.S. Government, 1975).

use of ground troops in Laos and Thailand.³ Yet Church remains an elusive leader to analyze, in part because few personal documents exist in the otherwise substantive Frank Church collection, which is housed at Boise State University.⁴ In the absence of other memoirs, the handwritten 1962 trip diary provides an important clue to Church's patterns of thinking — how he processed information and made decisions — and how he privately viewed the expanding U.S. role in this region. The trip diary provides an important benchmark for any assessment of Church's public record, especially regarding the expanding U.S. role in South Vietnam.⁵

³Church first went public on his reservations on Vietnam in a September 1964 interview for *Ramparts* magazine that was featured by the *New York Times*, December 11, 1964.

⁴Church originally donated his papers to Stanford University in 1980. They were transferred to Boise State University in 1984, and opened to scholars in 1988. The collection includes 776 linear feet of manuscript materials, plus an extensive audio-visual component. See Ralph W. Hansen and Deborah J. Roberts, *The Frank Church Papers: A Summary Guide* (Boise State University Special Collections Department, 1988).

⁵Church was defeated in his bid for a fifth Senate term in 1980 by Steve Symms by 4,262 votes. He practiced international law in Washington, D.C. until his death April 7, 1984 from pancreatic cancer at the age of 59. When elected in 1956 at the age of 32 he was the youngest member of the Senate and the fourth youngest Senator ever elected. The youngest, Henry Clay, Kentucky Whig, was seated in 1806 at the age of 29.

Writings about Frank Church include: Gustaf J. Brock, "The Doves Have Won': Senator Frank Church and the Vietnam War" (M.A. Thesis, Washington University, August 1989); F. Forrester Church, *Father and Son* (New York: Harper, 1985); Ron Hatzembuehler and Bert Marley, "Why Church Lost: A Preliminary Analysis of the Church-Symms Election of 1980," *Pacific Historical Review* 56 (February 1987), pp. 99-111; Mary Jane Hogan, "Frank Church and Interamerican Security 1956-80," (SHAFR Conference paper, June 1988); Loch Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985).

Stylistically the trip diary reads like an old-fashioned "Travel Tale." Much of the narrative describes the culture and history of the various countries. The pages are unnumbered, unedited, and hastily written on a steno notepad, yet Church's phrasing demonstrates a natural gift for eloquence:

The palaces and temple at Phnom Penh, built with the assistance of the French to give added prestige to the monarchy, through which France exercised control, are splendidly designed to awe the onlooker — glistening tile roofs of vivid orange, red, and gold, beautiful gardens and vistas of Versailles-like symmetry....

BALI. A day of enchantment at the gateway to the Orient, densely populated, of Hindu faith in an otherwise Moslem country. Here is the eastward limit of the migration out of India and through Malaya which stopped short of New Guinea. Never have I seen a place more laden with carving — intricately carved stonework on temples in every village, stylized demon gods standing watch over each major intersection, processions of colorful offerings moving toward the temples. Each home exhibits a set of shrines, and the religious practices engulf the life. The farmland is expertly and intensely cultivated, but Bali, with some 1300 people per square mile, cannot feed its own.

Church's purpose was to learn about the governments of the various countries he visited, and he continuously analyzed the information he gathered during briefings and excursions. His frame of reference was communist containment, a policy he

did not question.⁶ But Church struggled with the image of a communist monolith in Southeast Asia, and soon discarded this notion to accept a variety of political and economic systems — from Hong Kong's freewheeling capitalism to Indonesia's socialism. Church concluded that an understanding of situational variables would be critical to any strengthening of the U.S. position in the region. For instance he observed in Indonesia:

The rationale for our present aid program is that communist dominion over Indonesia would represent a major shift in the balance of power in the Orient.... The Communist Party here is the largest and most effective political party in Indonesia. It has downgraded the ideology of Marxism, and stands for whatever Sukarno wants. It wants to emphasize its independence from Moscow and its major interest in Indonesian nationalism; hence it championed the claim to West Asia [West Irian ?] and was the force behind the original drive for independence. Today the power is divided between the Communists and the army. Sukarno plays one against the other to stay in power between the two.... Still there are no Communists in the cabinet of the government, yet Sukarno apparently wants to appoint some. Chinese are disliked by the Indonesians because of their long period of cooperation with the Dutch. Now many of these — even merchants — look to the Red Chinese Embassy for

⁶Although Church was known as a "dove" during most of the Vietnam War, his position was more complex and he did not refute the concept of containment *per se*. As pointed out by Brock, *op. cit.*, Church continued to support President Johnson and to vote in favor of military appropriations. His argument was not for a withdrawal from Southeast Asia, but instead for restraint in the expansion of the war.

protection. Moreover, the Communist Party gets a big subsidy from Red China on the undercover, which is another reason for its strength. Russia has dealt through the established government only....

Of particular interest in the trip diary are accounts of Church's meetings with key foreign statesmen. On December 2, 1982 Church met President Diem in Saigon:

A French city with the feel of Paris. Here we face our greatest test. Our country team is first rate. Ambassador Nolting and 4-star General Harkins and their associates seem to be working closely together. They feel the picture is slowly brightening....

President Diem received us in Saigon. He spoke for 30 minutes. We listened. He stressed his praise of Nolting and seemed concerned that we might think we were backing 'a lone horse,' hence he talked about Australia, New Zealand, UK, and Malaya help to his country. Diem lives in an armored city. Extraordinary precautions are taken to protect him. He talks reform and apparently believes that the people of the countryside must be serviced with land reform and a better life if the struggle against Communism is to be won.

Church learned about the new U.S plan to fortify rural areas with "strategic villages":

The plan is to occupy the countryside village by village...rather like an old western stockade, with a village guard trained to defend it, and communications to call for help in case of attack. The army has set up a whole series of training camps to train the village guards and special 'strike forces' which will do patrol

work and more advanced military assignments. The plan — based on Malay's experience — calls for schools, providing better agricultural methods, and better medical care, etc. to win over the support of the peasants. The villages, it is hoped, will starve out the Viet Kong [sic].

Church visited both a training camp and a newly built strategic village of about 800 inhabitants. His assessment of the settlement was that it was:

Very primitive, the people were living like the poorest and dirtiest of American Indians at the time of our own migration West....⁷

⁷Bethine Church, who accompanied her husband on this tour, states that she and Frank "knew we were in trouble" as soon as they saw the model strategic village. (Interview 2/6/91, Pocatello, Idaho). Church returned to the U.S. with misgivings about the strategic hamlet program, yet without any viable alternative to this policy. A letter dated January 16, 1963 (Frank Church Collection 2.2/26/18) to Vietnamese National Assembly member Nguyen Phuong Thiep states:

My recent visit to your country gave me some reason to hope that the Viet Cong may ultimately be defeated and driven from the countryside.... So much depends upon the success of your Government in furthering programs that will give to the people at large positive reason to accept and support the government against the communist guerrillas. In this I am confident we share agreement....

A March 28, 1963 response (Frank Church Collection 2.2/26/18) to constituent Eli Oboler's question whether the U.S. was at war was equivocal:

Are we at war? no. The upheaval in South Vietnam is lacking in those sharp definitions which make categorical answers possible.... We find ourselves in the rather vague position of arming and training the government forces, as well as assisting the government in establishing the strategic villages which are

The next day Church flew to Vientiane and a luncheon with Souvanna Phouma who "seems to be obsessively non-communist and dedicated to making his troika-type neutralist government work." Souvanna Phouma "seems Western oriented, i.e. a French wife, education, and property holdings. He keeps saying that if things don't improve, he will resign and he could easily return to France and live in comfort there."

Souvanna Phouma told Church about the Laotian situation:

He said he used to have his trouble from our side; now he has it from the Pathet Lao. He says that the PL are controlled by Hanoi not Peking, and that Ho Chi Minh wants to make Laos a satellite for Viet Nam (North) for settlement of her excess people. He believes Ho Chi Minh, in turn, has become a puppet of Red China, on whom he must depend....

The economic situation in Laos was deteriorating:

No foreign exchange and no internal source of revenue that even begins to pay the cost of government. We

necessary to protect the people in the countryside from guerilla attack.... If the communists refuse to pursue their cause by orthodox warfare, then we shall have to counter the tactics they employ with measures designed to cope with this.... I don't know, Eli, whether we will be successful in our efforts....

A June 6, 1963 letter (Frank Church Collection 2.2/26/18) to Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman showed that Church was still perplexed a half year after his visit to Vietnam:

I do not think that such a war can be won by any government lacking popular support. Perhaps the strategic village concept will yet provide a basis for winning over the Vietnamese people in the jungles to the side of the Diem government....

continue to pay these bills — at the tune of \$40 million a year, which is about half of what it previously cost us. Russia has agreed to give Laos a Red hospital, a cotton gin plant, and a hydroelectric plant. Souvanna Phouma said this was the kind of aid we should give — which would show and add to the productivity of the country. He said there was nothing to show for all the aid we had given the regime. I said we would now be glad to exchange roles with the Russians if they would agree to finance Laos' foreign exchange. Ambassador Unger readily agreed....

Church concluded that the shaky military situation was due to the Vietnamese infiltration of the Pathet Lao and a yet-to-be implemented demobilization plan:

If the international inspection teams can get into their country, and if the demobilization plan (30,000 troops, 1/3 from Rightist, neutralist, and P.L.) is carried out, and if confidence is restored in the new arrangement, maybe it will work. The alternative is return to civil war, which the communists were winning. We could have had this arrangement in 1960, had we backed Souvanna Phouma then. Now we have had to settle for 4 communist ministers, instead of only 2. Souvanna likes to rub this in....

As for Vientiane, Church found it "a forlorn place, clouds of dust rise from the streets, and the markets reminded me of Africa. The country is in hopeless poverty. It will have to go somewhere for rations, and we seem destined to supply them."

Next on Church's itinerary was a visit to Chiang Kai Shek in Taiwan:

We had nearly an hour with the Generalissimo. I talked to him about my previous Chinese experience.⁸ He asked me how I regarded Red China. I told him I thought China was the most belligerent nation of the world, therefore the greatest threat to world power. He said he thought China's attack on India was due to Mao's desire to injure Nehru's prestige and demonstrate China's primacy in the Orient. He believes they drew back for three reasons: 1. Thought Nehru would sue for peace. 2. Didn't figure on such quick aid from U.S. and England. 3. Had greater logistical problems than they had anticipated. I said to Madame Chiang that I was glad there still was a 'free China.' She replied 'There will always be a free China.'

Church was unenthusiastic about the U.S. military presence in Taiwan, which he termed a policy of continuing "to pay for an old man's dreams of reconquering a continent." His appraisal of Chiang's leadership was harsh, and he considered methods to cut back the U.S. military obligation to Taiwan:

His military force of 600,000 is larger than that of South Korea, which has no moat of open sea between her and the Communists and has no 7th Fleet to provide an effective shield. The force is well beyond reasonable needs for defense...[and] demonstrates the degree to which we are not the masters of our

⁸From 1943-46 Church served as a military intelligence officer in the China-Burma-India theater.

situation.⁹ I see no way to force Chiang's hand. The best we can do is to reduce progressively the level of our own support to Chiang's forces, trimming our commitment to the size of ground force reasonably needed to defend the island, in combination with adequate air cover and the 7th fleet. Our continual refusal to do this seems to be a symptom of weakness. Perhaps the only way it can be forced is through substantial Congressional reductions in the overall size of the military assistance program, which this year has caused some cutbacks in the fiscal 63 program for both Taiwan and Korea.

A recurring and unresolved consideration for Church was how the pockets of U.S. capitalism he found in Southeast Asia could be expanded in order to combat communism. In Kuala Lumpur he described a country that "has not only retained the capitalist system, it boasts of it — an island of free enterprise in a socialist sea." In Hong Kong he saw "a show window of free enterprise — an Adam Smith economy right next door to a Leninist system." In Indonesia he learned that bureaucratic red tape imposed by the socialist government interfered with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts to "seed" independent businesses. More complex was the situation in Singapore where "We are only beginning to understand that neutralism doesn't necessarily work against

⁹This theme — the U.S. not being the master of its own fate — would reappear in Church's major foreign policy addresses. For instance, a 1963 resolution against U.S. support for Vietnam stated: "The Great American Republic is no longer the master of her own course in South Vietnam but has become the servant of the Mandarin autocracy which governs them." (Frank Church Collection, Series 10.6, Box 8, Folder 1). See also Frank Church, "It's Time We Learned to Live with Third World Revolutions," *Washington Post*, March 26, 1984.

American interests." He observed yet another variant in Cambodia, where "Prince Sihanouk regards Communism as the wave of the future, and therefore despairs that he can guarantee his country's independence. Now he seeks an international guarantee of Cambodia's neutralism." The diary reveals a less serious side to Frank Church, who obviously enjoyed recording a humorous story, whether at his expense or the expense of another. He tells of speaking with the aid of an interpreter at a ceremonial gathering of chiefs in Samoa:

Often the ceremony was interrupted with applause. I invariably joined in. Afterwards the interpreter would explain. Following my own remarks, I applauded with gusto after an interlude in the native tongue. The interpreter then explained that the applause in which I had so enthusiastically participated had been in response to his interpretation of my speech.

Church recounted a "Bad Russian" story told to him in Indonesia:

Even Khrushchev has offended sensibilities here. On the occasion of this visit, he chose a time when Sukarno's daughters were dancing for his entertainment to ask for a briefing on the day's news, which was delivered to him in a loud whisper that went on for 20 minutes to the embarrassment of everyone present.

In Taiwan he noted:

A story circulates here that Chinese merchants keep a picture of Chiang Kai Shek back to back with Mao Tse Tung. As affluent patrons approach, they turn it one

way or the other, depending on who is next to be served!

The Frank Church Southeast Asia trip diary reveals the author's unedited perceptions of the that region in November-December 1962. It is a significant source for understanding the challenges and options facing U.S. policy makers at a critical time and place in U.S. diplomatic history. As Frank Church records and analyzes the array of situational variables he encounters, we can retrospectively appreciate the significance of his task.

ENDING A NIGHTMARE: KOREA'S QUEST FOR REUNIFICATION

by

James I. Matray

NEW MEXICO STATE

On November 20, 1990, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev headed the list of world leaders representing over thirty countries who signed the Charter of Paris. This historic document declared an end to the "era of confrontation and division in Europe" known as the Cold War. "We are closing a chapter in history," President Bush proclaimed. The signators agreed to work in the future for democracy, human rights, and economic freedom in "a peaceful and stable Europe." But while the Paris summit witnessed Europe's liberation from its tragic postwar legacy, the Cold War continues on the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. Since 1945, a nation once known as the "Hermit Kingdom" has had two governments, each claiming to represent the entire country. Four decades ago, the nationalist drive for reunification resulted in the outbreak of the Korean War. Today, while much of Europe celebrates the opening of a new era of unity and peace, Korea hardly resembles what 19th Century traders and missionaries called the "Land of the Morning Calm."

Koreans have watched recent events in Europe with great interest and increasing envy. In fact, an atmosphere of excitement and anticipation prevailed throughout the peninsula for most of 1990 as the people thought Korea soon would emulate Germany and achieve reunification. But despite a series of meetings between the prime ministers of the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north last fall, there has been little real

progress toward a reconciliation. The DPRK insists that the United States government is responsible for perpetuating the partition of Korea. Surprisingly, leading politicians in the ROK share this judgment. This essay will attempt to explain why so many Koreans blame the United States for Korea's continuing Cold War. In addition, it will summarize the current state of negotiations between Seoul and P'yongyang, highlighting the differences between the divisions of Germany and Korea in an effort to show that the two cases are far from analogous. Finally, it will offer a prediction about the likely future course of events leading to Korea's eventual reunification.

Korea's contact with the outside world has almost always led to unhappy experiences. Geography provides probably the most important explanation for this historical pattern because the Korean peninsula constitutes the strategic focal point of Northeast Asia. As a result, the Korean people have been the long-suffering victims of great power rivalry throughout most of their history. Traditionally, Russia, China, and Japan — Korea's more powerful and aggressive neighbors — participated in the contest to establish control over the peninsula. China had been directly involved in Korea's internal affairs for hundreds of years prior to Korea's emergence as a united nation in the 7th Century. Thereafter, Korea was a tributary state of the Tang and Sung dynasties, until the Mongols conquered the peninsula in the 13th Century.

Japan was still a young nation when it first challenged China for control over Korea. In the late 14th Century, the legendary Hideyoshi mounted two massive invasions of the Korean peninsula that witnessed unprecedented levels of brutality, death, and destruction. For the next four hundred years, the Japanese were preoccupied with domestic politics and the Koreans enjoyed a rare period of freedom from outside interference. But following Japan's Meiji Restoration

in 1868, the Sino-Japanese competition for dominance in Korea resumed. Ultimately, Japan and China went to war over the peninsula in 1894. The militarily superior Japanese won an easy victory and eliminated Chinese influence from Korea. However, Russia then challenged Japanese hegemony over the peninsula, leading to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Japan's military triumph was quick and complete, confirming its preeminent position in Korea. The Japanese formally annexed Korea in 1910, systematically integrating the peninsula into its imperial structure during the next decade. While enslaving the people and attempting to destroy Korea's cultural heritage, Japan brutally suppressed any evidence of dissent.

Given Korea's history, it is not surprising that it is an ancient *Korean* proverb that laments "A shrimp is crushed in the battle of whales." But Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 created new hope among the Koreans that their nation soon would enjoy a restoration of independence and self-government. This was because the United States now joined the competition to determine Korea's destiny, ending a century of indifference. Ironically, in 1882, the United States had been the first Western nation to sign a treaty with Korea. In addition to commercial provisions, the accord included a pledge that in the event "other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices...to bring about an amicable arrangement." When the Japanese annexed Korea, however, Washington did nothing. Realizing that he could do little to preserve Korea's freedom, President Theodore Roosevelt, in the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, acknowledged Japanese hegemony in Korea, in return for Japan's acceptance of American dominance over the Philippines.

Roosevelt's decision to ignore American treaty obligations, though legally indefensible, nevertheless reflected a proper understanding of the extent of American interests in Korea.

The distant Asian peninsula was neither politically nor economically vital to the United States. Korean nationalist leaders, however, denounced Roosevelt for committing an unforgivable act of abandonment. Today, most Koreans no longer blame the United States for *acquiescing* in Japanese annexation. Instead, they believe that Roosevelt *authorized* Japan's conquest of Korea. President Woodrow Wilson's unwillingness at the Versailles Conference after World War I to insist on a restoration of Korea's sovereignty only confirmed and deepened the feeling of bitterness and betrayal among the Korean people. Consequently, when the United States declared war on Japan in 1941, Koreans expected President Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue a public declaration that Korea's independence was a major war aim. Success would constitute nothing less than an American act of atonement. Unfortunately, Japan's defeat would bring not Korea's liberation, but military occupation and seemingly permanent partition.

Anti-Americanism in Korea today thus has its roots in the perception that the United States has often followed policies detrimental to the Korean people. For Koreans, Americans have perceived Korea as a subject state and engaged in behavior reflecting attitudes of arrogance, racial superiority, and contempt. Many believe that Korea must gain redress for the pattern of unfairness and discrimination in Korean-American relations. Viewed in this way, anti-Americanism emerges as an attempt to remedy a traditional Korean sentiment known as *han*, or a smoldering bitterness about past wrongs. This profound Korean unhappiness and dissatisfaction derives from the mistaken conviction that Korea has been and should be the most important priority in U.S. national security planning. Koreans simply have failed to understand or accept as reasonable American policy toward Korea since 1941. For the past half-century, the United States has sought stability on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in

East Asia. Rhetorically, Washington has supported democratic principles and national self-determination, but these objectives have been a secondary concern having only a tangential relationship to the more basic considerations of security and power.

A few key American policy decisions after World War II continue to infuriate even the most moderate Koreans. President Roosevelt's support for a postwar trusteeship in Korea heads the list. Also, Koreans have never forgiven the United States for dividing their country in 1945 and indeed blame the Truman administration for Korea's partition. They consistently refuse to accept the fact that the alternative to division was a united Korea under Communist rule. This attitude reflects the tendency of Koreans to overestimate the power of the United States to control events in world affairs. Perhaps surprisingly, many Koreans consider the continued presence of American troops on the peninsula the greatest barrier to reunification. Ironically, some of these same people view U.S. military withdrawal from Korea in June 1949 as an act of abandonment that invited the North Korean invasion exactly one year later. Few Koreans appreciate the extent of U.S. commitments in South Korea prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.

South Koreans naturally are grateful to the United States for committing ground troops to prevent North Korean forces from conquering the peninsula in 1950. Anger and disappointment lingers, however, as a consequence of Washington's refusal to fight for reunification following Chinese military intervention. Older Koreans in particular have no trouble insisting that an attempt to achieve Korea's reunification was worth the risk of another world war. Until recently, Koreans generally have supported the alternative of retaining U.S. combat forces in Korea after the armistice in 1953. For the United States, a permanent American military presence on the peninsula after the Korean War has been vital

to the preservation of stability in Northeast Asia. This explains the continued deployment of 43,000 American soldiers in Korea today. But a growing number of Koreans not only doubt that renewed war is probable, they also refuse to believe Washington's promise to comply with a South Korean request for military withdrawal. A poll of university students in 1988 revealed that nearly half thought that the continued presence of U.S. forces made "the division of Korea permanent."

Obviously, the unpredictable behavior of North Korea provides more than sufficient justification for an American military presence in Korea. P'yongyang has maintained a large military establishment since the end of the Korean War. It has shown its determination to achieve reunification through force of arms on countless occasions, with the last major border incidents occurring in October 1981. Subsequently, the DPRK has resorted to terrorism to destabilize the ROK. In October 1983, North Korean army commandos exploded a bomb in Rangoon killing nineteen people, including four ROK cabinet members. As recently as November 1987, North Korean agents were responsible for the bombing of KAL flight 858. Even though the threat of war seemed to recede in 1990, the ROK still has hesitated to request a withdrawal of U.S. troops. Korean radicals have pointed to this policy position as proof that neither the United States nor the South Korean government genuinely desires reunification.

Most young Koreans neither trust nor respect the United States. In contrast to their parents, they reject the favorable postwar image of the United States as *the* nation in Korean affairs. This earlier perception was consistent with the traditional Asian view of international relations. In the Korean language, the word *sadae* describes a relationship between two nations reflecting the Confucian family system in which the younger brother served his elder brother, while the "senior" brother recognized a duty to provide help and

guidance to his "junior." To an extent, current anti-Americanism derives from Korea's unfulfilled expectations in this relationship. For example, Koreans are unable to understand recent changes in the U.S. economy and resent Washington's efforts to open Korea's markets to American goods, especially beef, cigarettes, and automobiles. Militant students have not hesitated to attack the U.S. embassy and U.S. Information Service centers. They have also staged firebomb and stone assaults on U.S. military bases and family housing facilities. Burning the American flag, carrying banners denouncing the United States, and chanting anti-American slogans have become standard features at student demonstrations regardless of the issue.

American behavior during the Seoul Olympics in 1988 further damaged this *sadae* relationship and tarnished the image of the United States in Korea. Many Koreans were offended when American athletes, marching into the Chamshil stadium during the opening ceremonies, broke ranks and held up signs for the television cameras. They felt insulted when Carl Lewis shoved Korean security guards on arrival at Kimp'o Airport and Matt Biondi refused a glass of tap water for fear of becoming ill. A worse incident occurred when two American swimmers stole a statue from a Seoul hotel. Koreans agree that NBC's coverage of the Olympics was distorted, devoting too much time to a defeated Korean boxer's refusal to leave the ring and a coach's physical attack on a referee for alleged unfairness. From the Korean perspective, NBC provided detailed coverage to China's records, while not giving a full account of Korea's accomplishments. Finally, Koreans found particularly humiliating non-sports coverage of sweatshops, prostitution, and foreign adoption of Korean children.

But American involvement in South Korea's domestic politics arguably has generated most of the hostility toward the United States since the Korean War. Koreans charge that the

United States has sponsored military dictatorship in Korea, thus delaying the achievement of democracy. From the American perspective, United States tolerance for eighteen years of the dictatorial regime of Park Chung Hee was not difficult to understand since this was consistent with U.S. objectives since World War II. Park brought political stability to the ROK. Also, his leadership in the economic field drove South Korea down the road to economic development. At the time of Park's assassination in October 1979, the U.S. no longer had to look at South Korea as a financial burden dependent for its very survival on American assistance — amounting to \$12.5 billion in economic and military aid by 1976. But from the Korean perspective, American backing for Park was indefensible. The United States, critics charged, was responsible for perpetuating military rule in South Korea.

President Jimmy Carter was sensitive to these complaints. During the political turmoil following Park's assassination, Carter seemed to identify the achievement of democracy as the most important U.S. interest in Korea. As a result, Washington pressed the new government under Chun Doo Hwan to lift martial law and commute the death sentence imposed on dissident leader Kim Dae Jung. To accomplish this objective, the U.S. suspended economic development talks with the ROK and persuaded the Asian Development Bank to halt plans for loans to South Korea. Although Chun relented and lifted martial law in December 1979, American tactics were risky because they might have produced even greater instability south of the 38th parallel, thus inviting an attack from the north. Already, Carter had begun to realize that the most important American interest in Northeast Asia was preventing a new war, which required deterring North Korea. In July 1979, after a visit to South Korea, he had declared, in a reversal of his previously announced intentions, that there would be no reduction of the American military presence on the peninsula.

Ronald Reagan's election as president in 1980 signaled an end to what had been a brief, aberrant period in U.S. policy toward Korea. For the past decade, stability rather than progress toward democracy has been Washington's primary concern. For example, Chun Doo Hwan was the first head of state to visit President Reagan after his inauguration. Not only did Reagan laud Chun's leadership, he also announced that there would be no reduction of U.S. troop strength on the Korean peninsula. As one U.S. official declared at the time, "security is the uppermost element in our minds.... It's not the intention of this administration to go into the internal state of affairs in the ROK." In February 1983, Secretary of State George Schultz visited Korea and stated flatly that American troops would not leave the ROK until there was a fundamental change in North Korean behavior. For the Reagan administration, the ROK's economic development during the 1980s constituted a tremendous policy victory. In 1982, the U.S. was elated that more than half of Korea's imports came from the United States, double the amount received from Japan. While helping the American economy, South Korea was providing proof of the superiority of capitalism over communism as a model for development in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

At the same time, the ROK's record with respect to progress toward democracy remained an embarrassment. In May 1980, Chun sent a detachment of South Korean special forces to the southwestern city of Kwangju to suppress anti-government protests against the imposition of martial law. In the violence that followed, government troops killed about two hundred people. Student dissidents immediately blamed the United States for the Kwangju incident, pointing to the fact that under an agreement dating from the Korean War, South Korean troops were under U.S. operational control. If the United States was not guilty of complicity, American approval for the Chun government's request to release the troops meant

that at least it was indirectly responsible for the tragedy. Most young Koreans still believe that the U.S. "master-minded" the Kwangju incident as part of a policy to strengthen Korean authoritarianism. In response, Washington pressed Chun to allow more political freedom, persuading him in January 1982 to end the thirty-seven year old midnight to 4:00 a.m. curfew. In November 1983, Reagan visited South Korea and called for greater respect for human rights in the ROK. Later, in 1986, Washington voiced support for the petition-writing campaign that eventually persuaded the ruling party the following year to permit a revision in the constitution providing for popular election of the president. By the summer of 1988, opposition parties even had gained control over the National Assembly.

Progress toward democracy has fundamentally changed the nature of political protest in South Korea. In place of the push to end military dictatorship, dissidents now struggle for independence from foreign intervention in internal affairs and for real progress in negotiations for reunification that began almost two decades ago. During the early 1970s, both the ROK and the DPRK advanced proposals leading toward reconciliation, but none held much chance for success. P'yongyang's consistent position was that there could be no positive movement in the negotiations until the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula. In addition, the DPRK demanded talks directly with the United States, while the ROK insisted upon bilateral discussions and rejected U.S. military withdrawal as a precondition for negotiations. During the 1980s, South Korea's steadily improved world position has placed rising pressure on the increasingly isolated North Korean regime to compromise. In 1983, representatives from the People's Republic of China arrived in Seoul for the first time to resolve a hijacking incident, opening the way for "tennis diplomacy" the following year as a South Korean team traveled to China. Then, in 1988, both China and the Soviet

Union participated in the Seoul Olympics. In June 1990, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's meeting Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco moved the ROK and the Soviet Union even closer toward a normalization of relations.

Another Korean proverb — *tong-sang i-mong* — aptly describes the current state of negotiations regarding reunification. It means "same bed, different dreams." When the two Korean prime ministers met for the first time in Seoul early last September, there were some areas of agreement. Both sides accepted proposals for a public declaration of non-aggression, installation of hotlines between military commands, an end to slander and vilification, and removal of all military equipment from the demilitarized zone. However, the North Korean delegation made further progress contingent upon resolution of three issues. First, the DPRK demanded that the ROK drop its proposal for the admission of both Koreas to the United Nations, accepting instead the North Korean plan for sharing a single seat. Second, P'yongyang insisted upon the release of a student dissident and two clergymen convicted of violating a South Korean law prohibiting visits to the north. Finally, the North Koreans called for termination of the annual U.S.-ROK joint military exercises known as "Team Spirit."

South Korea refused to satisfy North Korean demands, but did advance an alternative proposal consistent with its previous emphasis on the need for "confidence building" measures in the reunification process. The ROK proposed shelving plans to seek admission to the United Nations in return for agreement on gradual increases in the exchange of people and economic cooperation. "This," South Korea's prime minister declared, "should involve the opening of southern and northern societies to each other, leading to expanding... cooperation to build the social, cultural, and economic foundations of a single national community." Specifically, P'yongyang and Seoul would agree to direct inter-Korean

trade, the joint development of resources, and the reconnection of roads and rail lines between north and south. In addition, the ROK advocated free travel by dispersed family members older than 60, mutual public access to radio and television, and the establishment of liaison missions in P'yongyang and Seoul. Finally, South Korea believed that both governments should agree to recognize and respect each other's political and social systems until the achievement of reunification. Following these measures for *political* "confidence-building", *military* "confidence-building" would begin, leading to arms reduction. In response, North Korea reiterated that South Korea would have to satisfy its three conditions before the start of substantive negotiations on a plan for reunification.

During October 1990, the Korean prime ministers met for a second time in P'yongyang. North Korea acknowledged that real progress would require an elimination of mutual distrust. However, the DPRK stressed the importance of rejecting any action that confirmed the existence of two Koreas. Also, P'yongyang insisted that the military component was an integral part of the reunification process. North Korea's prime minister emphasized that the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the peninsula was "an indispensable element to easing the high military tension." The South Koreans remained inflexible during subsequent negotiations. This allowed the North Koreans to pose as patriotic nationalists and champions of *juche* or self-reliance in resolving Korea's problems. The ROK's determination to apply for separate membership in the United Nations implied that it wanted to perpetuate Korea's division. At the same time, South Korea's refusal to budge on the "Team Spirit" issue gave Seoul the appearance of favoring a continuation of foreign military occupation of the country. Finally, the ROK's unwillingness to release the visitors to P'yongyang

raised questions about the extent of democratic freedom and individual liberty in South Korea.

For South Koreans, the inability to achieve reunification came as not just a disappointment, but something of a surprise. In their search for an explanation for the failure of the prime minister meetings, many once again have pointed an accusing finger at the United States. Nearly half of all university students consider the United States "the greatest impediment to Korea's reunification." Since all Koreans desperately want national unity, foreign involvement provides a simple explanation today, as it has in the past, for Korea's ongoing national tragedy. Few Koreans understand that the inability to accomplish quick reunification results from the fundamental and profound differences separating the two Koreas. In North Korea, there is a socialist economy, a regimented society, and a totalitarian political structure. In sharp contrast, South Korea boasts a market economy, an open society, and a pluralistic political system. A merger of these thoroughly different models of development would be nothing short of a miracle requiring divine intervention.

Germany's reunification has created unrealistic expectations among the Korean people. The two situations are entirely different, especially with respect to the issue of political legitimacy. In 1945, the Soviet Union imposed a political, social, and economic system on East Germany without regard to the will of the people. Arguably, the vast majority of East Germans never truly accepted the legitimacy of Communist rule. Once Moscow decided that it could live with German reunification, East Germany's reason for existence disappeared and its citizens were able to fulfill their long-standing desire for amalgamation with West Germany. By contrast, the Communist rulers in North Korea came to power in 1945 with widespread popular support. There can be no question that the DPRK has a greater claim to legitimacy than does the ROK. Significantly, Soviet troops have occupied East

Germany throughout the postwar period, while the Red Army withdrew from Korea before the end of 1948. For more than forty years, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung has enjoyed genuine popular support because the people believe, for better or for worse, that Communist rule is in their best interests. This removes any necessity for the DPRK to compromise in the negotiations for reunification since it does not rely directly upon the Soviet Union for its survival.

There are other important differences. First, members of the left in East Germany had far less to fear from reunification than will those in North Korea. West Germany has tolerated leftist political activity and the Social Democrats possess both widespread popular support and considerable political power. Since 1948, the South Korean government, following a pattern existing under American military rule, has outlawed and brutally suppressed all leftist political activities. Second, the East German people have always known more about life in West Germany than do North Koreans about circumstances in South Korea. Contributing to this disparity was the existence of West Berlin in the heart of East Germany. Surely the presence of a South P'yongyang after the Korean War would have made more difficult the Communist task of maintaining political dominance. Finally, Germany was able to achieve reunification only after its European neighbors, especially France and the Soviet Union, decided that a united Germany no longer constituted a security threat. In Korea, the division continues although only China and Vietnam have objected to reunification. Thus, domestic rather than international factors explain Korea's inability to emulate Germany and achieve rapid reunification.

Nevertheless, Germany's reunification offers some important clues for predicting the future course of developments in Korea. Some Koreans talk about the coexistence in a united Korea of both systems, but this can never work. One Korea inevitably will absorb the other and no one expects the DPRK

to survive. Once the North Korean people gain access to complete information about events outside of Korea and become aware of the superior quality of life in the south, there can be no doubt that, given a free choice, they will opt for amalgamation with South Korea. Even defenders of Kim Il Sung acknowledge the failures of the northern system. The P'yongyang regime has been guilty of a massive fabrication of history, while purposely isolating its people from outside contacts. Not only are North Koreans suffocating under a failed socialist economic system, they labor in a totalitarian society that denies any opportunity for self-expression. Eventually, Communist leaders will no longer be able, as they have in the past, to exploit hatred and fear of the United States as a means to preclude dissent and mobilize the people behind national goals. Top party officials undoubtedly are aware that the dream of reunification has become a nightmare. Recently, a Soviet diplomat reported that the pressure of increasing isolation has begun to create strains in the North Korean leadership. Speculation now centers on what will happen in North Korea after the death of the "Great Leader," Kim Il Sung, who is eighty years old and has groomed his son as his successor.

Korea will achieve reunification at some point in the future. When this occurs, it will end the most tragic era in its long history. Last fall, one of my Korean friends described to me the meaning of a word in the Korean language that characterizes well the last century of Korea's history. It derives from a city near the east coast and just north of the 38th parallel called Wont'ong. In July 1953, several South Korean combat units left Wont'ong to fight in the last battles of the Korean War although the negotiators at P'anmunjom already had agreed on terms for an armistice. These soldiers experienced a deep sense of anger, bitterness, and resentment because they expected needless death to rob them of the chance to fulfill their hopes and aspirations. Since then,

Koreans have used the word *wont'onghada* to describe situations of extraordinary tragedy in which fate forces an individual to make a choice involving unfairness and waste. The United States bears much responsibility for making the last half century of Korean history *wont'onghada*. But today, no foreign power blocks Korea's path to national unity, prosperity, and democracy. If the Korean people fail to realize these goals, they will at long last have only themselves to blame.

EISENHOWER, CLAUSEWITZ, AND AMERICAN POWER

by
William Pickett
ROSE-HULMAN

Leadership in large undertakings stirs controversy about what was accomplished. Dwight D. Eisenhower's leadership has been no exception. Despite early criticism, historians discovered that Ike deserved his public acclaim as commander of victorious Western forces in World War II. Similarly, as the archives opened in the 1980s and new information became available about American and Soviet actions, scholars have revised and then revised again their estimates of the Eisenhower presidency.¹

¹The father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, Andrei Sakharov, in memoirs recently published posthumously, said that any movement by the United States toward unilateral nuclear reductions or concessions Soviet leaders would have regarded as weakness and an advantage to exploit. Andrei Sakharov, "Sakharov Memoirs," *Time* (May 14, 1990), p. 46.

It is difficult to realize that all this is about the abilities of a youth from Kansas who became an army officer in the second decade of the twentieth century.

Why such present-day interest? Apart from Eisenhower's prominence, perhaps it was because he loved history. The people and events of the past so intrigued him, he recalled, that his mother, wanting help with household chores, had to lock his books and hide the key. All to no avail. He found the key. One of his heroes was Hannibal the Carthaginian who crossed the Alps and defeated vastly superior Roman forces in 216 A.D. at Cannae. Hannibal was the underdog, and Carthage lost the war.² The youth also read about George Washington, who kept his army together and, working with the French, avoided battle until the proper place and time. The American, Eisenhower learned had "stamina and patience in adversity," along with "courage, daring, and capacity for self-sacrifice."³

As an army major and chief of staff to the commander of the Panama Canal Zone Eisenhower read about Napoleon and the nineteenth-century philosopher of war Karl von Clausewitz. Eisenhower took to heart the latter's axiom that war — "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" — is merely a means to an end, "a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means."⁴

²Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (New York: Avon Books, 1967), p. 46.

³*Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 183; William B. Pickett, "Eisenhower as Student of Clausewitz," *Military Review*, LXV (July, 1985), pp. 21-27; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.

These along with other lessons brought a capacity to excel. At the Command and General Staff College he graduated first in his class and his performance caused General John J. Pershing to ask for his services. Everywhere he went he drew upon the ideas of Clausewitz, especially the importance of ends and means.⁵ Eisenhower's ultimate purpose (ends) during this earlier time, later as supreme commander in Europe during World War II and, finally, as president of the United States was to preserve democracy and free enterprise.⁶ His method (means) was strength — weapons and troops, certainly, but also economic prosperity, allies, and the spiritual ingredient — national unity, the will to prevail.⁷

135; Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., *Carl Von Clausewitz On War*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.

⁵Clausewitz had written that the political object as the original motive of the war will be "the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made." Roger Ashley Leonard, ed. *A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), p. 48.

⁶Gaddis, pp. 136, 160.

⁷For Clausewitz the stronger form of war was the defensive. He considered it essential, however, not to allow the existence of any weakness or, as he called it, "center of gravity" the enemy could exploit, whether it be the army, public opinion, allies, or the personalities of the leaders. Howard and Paret, p. 596. As for morale, Clausewitz used a sword metaphor. "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed sword." *Ibid.*, p. 185.

Three lessons of Clausewitz were in an age of nuclear weapons especially relevant. First, in war nothing is certain. Second, the violence, while moderated by the conditions of battle, tends to escalate. And, third, the means of conducting war can bring unintended results. "War," said Clausewitz, "moves in an atmosphere composed of danger, physical effort, uncertainty and chance. Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult, and these difficulties, largely unforeseen or

Any appraisal of Eisenhower as president must consider first of all that he had become a candidate for the office reluctantly and in large part because in 1953 policy seemed in disarray. Containment had failed in China and resulted in war in Korea. Some Americans advocated extending the conflict to the mainland. Others like Robert A. Taft, Republican leader in the Senate, sought to cut such foreign involvements as aid to Europe. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was hunting subversives in Washington and elsewhere. Eisenhower believed that the world wars had taught international responsibility and that Western Europe was the first priority.⁸

unpredictable, accumulate and produce friction, a retarding brake on the absolute extension and discharge of violence." Leonard, pp. 7-8. "The political object...must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective, the latter always retains a prior right to consideration." *Ibid.*, p. 57. In 1943 Eisenhower wrote to his son, John, about unforeseen contingencies in war. "No situation is ever the same in war as was foreseen or anticipated. You must be able to think as the problem comes up.... The only thing possible in practice is logical thinking, a clear conscience, and a determination to do your duty." This was one of the most important, and most subtle, of Clausewitz's lessons. Fred I. Greenstein, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Leadership Theorist in the White House," in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 81. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 141-143. In an age of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers meant striking first, if feasible considering the risks, was difficult to decide upon. It required that a leader persuade his nation and allies of its justification and then be ready to move both air and ground forces quickly and powerfully and all perhaps to no avail. War, he wrote in 1956, "no longer involved contest in the classical sense of producing winners and losers but rather total destruction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves. DDE to Dick, April 4, 1956, DDE presidential papers, Whitman drafts series, box 3, Jan.-May 1956.

⁸Eisenhower, pp. 350-352.

"Weakness," he had written in 1948, would "alarm our friends, earn the contempt of others, and virtually eliminate any influence of ours toward peaceful adjustment of world problems. The lessons of 1914 and 1939 remain valid so long as the world has not learned the futility of making competitive force the final arbiter of human questions."⁹

In late spring of 1953, after Stalin's death in March, Eisenhower called a conference of policy advisers to develop his strategy. The Soviet menace, the conference (code-named "Solarium,") would conclude, remained.¹⁰ The Soviet Union might try to expand, but an attack was not likely if the United States was strong.¹¹

The New Look came from these deliberations. The Soviet leaders believed time on their side, that "free people cannot preserve their way of life and at the same time provide enormous military establishments."¹² Eisenhower's response seemed paradoxical. First, because he desired to protect a way of life, he cut military spending. Second, because he

⁹Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 476.

¹⁰William B. Pickett, "The Eisenhower Solarium Notes," *Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter*, Vol. 16 (June, 1985), pp. 1-9.

¹¹"Basic though they [nuclear weapons] were to his strategy," said one historian, "the whole idea of [using] such weapons offended his soldier's sense of the need for economy and purpose in war. As Eisenhower said in 1956 'arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues.'" Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 192.

¹²Gaddis, *Strategies*, pp. 139-140.

hated war, he relied on nuclear weapons.¹³ The keys to the strategy (and the paradox) were limited ends — even in retaliation the United States should render the Soviet Union incapable of imposing its views — and a definition of American strength that included economic and spiritual rehabilitation. This meant a balanced budget, prosperity without inflation, and an end to Red-baiting.¹⁴ Abroad, the United States would send economic aid to Western Europe, the Middle and Far East — the lion's share to West Germany

¹³As for the nature of the beast, a scientific study in 1955 reported that "the important discontinuity between conventional and nuclear weapons lies not in the mechanism of energy release but in the energy released from a given weight of weapon and in the cost of obtaining energy release at the target. This cost is primarily that of maintaining the delivery capability, and is proportional to the weight of the weapon. Thus the factor of 8000 times 250--2,000,000 in energy release per ton between high explosive and fission-fusion is reflected in a decrease by a factor of about 1,000,000 in cost of energy release on target." Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack, Vol. I, Feb. 14, 1955, WHO, OSANSA, NSC series, subject subseries, box II, Technical Capabilities Panel, pp. 5-7, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. II, National Security Affairs*, part I [hereafter cited as *FRUS*] (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1984), 591, 593, 595-596.

¹⁴Eisenhower always thought in terms of process and how his actions might affect an opponent and vice versa. In 1953 he wrote a note to himself after hearing about the Soviet hydrogen bomb. "The new discovery by men of nature's principle of nuclear fusion is of itself no possible danger to mankind. Every invention is susceptible of good or bad use, depending upon the intentions of those possessing it. The danger confronting us, therefore, is to be examined from two aspects. The first of these is comprehension of the extent of the destructive power now transportable in a single bomb; the second is determination of the objectives and purposes of the men or nations to whom this destructive force is available." DDE handwritten draft, n.d., Whitman drafts series, box I, drafts 1953 (4).

and Japan. As these regions became self-sufficient, American troops would withdraw.¹⁵

It was a strategy that embodied boldness and restraint. The United States (as had Hannibal at Cannae and Washington during the Revolution) would determine the timing, location, and magnitude of any response. Keeping the initiative, it would exploit communist vulnerabilities using overt and covert means. In the Far East, such activities would include supporting anticommunist forces in Indochina.¹⁶ But the strategy included conciliation. When nuclear weapons became plentiful, a "slackening of revolutionary zeal in the Soviet Union, along with popular pressure for consumption goods and willingness to make concessions" might occur.¹⁷

It is now possible — with the availability of the Solarium documents and passage of time, especially the past three years — to re-evaluate Eisenhower's performance in foreign and defense policy. He did not, it is now clear, as John F.

¹⁵*FRUS*, pp. 591, 593-595.

¹⁶The United States, for example, might announce what it considered to be Soviet advances and take actions of "a limited scope, involving moderately increased risks of general war." The President approved NSC 162/1 on October 30, 1953. Its emphasis was on strategic capacity, alliances, economic strength, and through negotiations, a dialogue with the communist bloc. The chief concern was Western Europe, especially N.A.T.O. and Germany, then Middle East oil. Next was Asia, protection of Japan and, on the continent, resistance to the era's aggressive communism. Finally, Latin America, important as a supplier for American industry and market for goods, but impoverished and unstable. *FRUS*, pp. 440-441; James Lay, Jr. memorandum to NSC, July 22, 1953, White House Office, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC series, Subject subseries, box 10, Project Solarium (1), Eisenhower Library, pp. 9-10, 12-15. Pickett, pp. 5-6.

¹⁷The conclusion was influenced most heavily by a subgroup led by the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow and author of the containment policy, George F. Kennan. *FRUS*, pp. 440-441, 580-581.

Kennedy charged, risk war with the People's Republic of China for the small, offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. He committed the U.S. to defending Formosa, continuing Truman's policy after outbreak of war in Korea.¹⁸ He did not endanger American security, allowing the United States to fall behind in missiles — the so-called missile gap. A gap existed but, as Kennedy discovered upon taking office, it favored the United States.¹⁹ In Vietnam he did not commit the United States to what later became a most unfortunate intervention. He sought (unsuccessfully it turned out) a stable, non-communist government in Saigon.²⁰ The U-2 incident and later — after his successor took over — the Bay of Pigs disaster were policy failures but did not result from carelessness by Eisenhower. The reaction of Nikita Khrushchev to the U-2 incident, which Eisenhower saw as to some extent understandable, did destroy an opportunity for a test-ban treaty, but the Soviet leader inadvertently had approved aerial reconnaissance after launching *Sputnik* three years earlier. And while Eisenhower ordered preparations for overthrowing Castro, he had ordered no final plans nor made a decision to invade Cuba.²¹

¹⁸Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, pp. 135, 138-139.

¹⁹McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 352.

²⁰George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975*, Second Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), pp. 72, 75.

²¹For the precedent of aerial surveillance established by Khrushchev, see Bundy, 351; on the Bay of Pigs see Stephen A. Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 640 and John Prados, *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986), p. 180.

Eisenhower's strategy, preoccupied with competition and possible conflict and with American interests abroad, often ignored both the perceptions and needs of Central Americans, Africans, and Southeast Asians. The source of their problems, it mistakenly implied or asserted (perhaps most unfortunately in Vietnam), was not poverty, illiteracy, colonialism, corruption, and injustice (feudalism) but rather an expansionist Soviet Union and People's Republic of China.²²

Accordingly, the CIA's activities frequently interfered with the honorable ends, violating the very ideals — human rights, democracy, and self-determination — they were meant to uphold.²³

Other administration errors easily come to mind. Consider the CIA's summons at the very beginning of Eisenhower's

²²Herring, p. 72; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA from Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 268. The lack of understanding may have been more apparent than real, reflecting the parsimony and ignorance of Congress and Eisenhower's awareness of what was possible. Among his concluding remarks in *Crusade in Europe* were the following: "The areas in which freedom flourishes will continue to shrink unless the supporters of democracy match communist fanaticism with clear and common understanding that the freedom of men is at stake; meet Communist-regimented unity with the voluntary unity of common purpose, even though this may mean a sacrifice of some measure of nationalistic pretensions; and, above all, annul communist appeals to the hungry, the poor, the oppressed, with practical measures untiringly prosecuted for the elimination of social and economic evils that set men against men." Eisenhower, *Crusade*, p. 476.

²³Ranelagh, pp. 341, 346-347. In Guatemala, for example, the CIA's successful efforts to bring the overthrow of the Arbenz government were based on widely-held but erroneous perceptions that the threat to order came from communists rather than from the continued dominance of large landholders, including the United Fruit Company. Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 182-186.

presidency, for "liberation" of Eastern Europe. The phrase "massive retaliation," used by Secretary of State Dulles, rallied support among anticommunists and oversimplified the international situation.²⁴ When Soviet launching of *Sputnik* thus caused needless fear, and Khrushchev blustered that the Soviet Union was building intercontinental missiles (the Soviets had about twelve by 1962) and would "bury the United States," the domestic policy consensus Eisenhower had established by 1955 began to unravel. Senators Kennedy, Stuart Symington, Lyndon Johnson and others felt free to allege a Soviet lead. Eisenhower's negotiations — the search for a mutual nuclear test ban and arms reduction — seemed expressions of weakness.²⁵ Democrats, Pentagon supporters, and increasingly members of his own party, unaware of the reasons for his confidence and his prudent calculus of ends and means, wanted more weapons. Alas, Eisenhower was left with little else than to warn in his so-called farewell address of unwarranted influence by a growing scientific-military-industrial complex.

One must nonetheless conclude that the large objective of the United States during the Eisenhower years — a stable and congenial world — was achieved. Economic development and treaties made the United States stronger in Western Europe. A rearmed West Germany became the key of NATO defense, Berlin remained a western outpost, German reunification a goal. Between 1945 and the end of the Eisenhower years the American gross national product nearly doubled and its

²⁴Ranelagh, pp. 308-309.

²⁵Michael R. Bechloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), pp. 231, 375.

population increased by almost one third (40 million people).²⁶ McCarthyism subsided. Soviet leaders negotiated about ways to diminish the threat of surprise attacks and nuclear tests. Summit meetings became regular occurrences.²⁷

In the Middle East, with its resources vital to both Western Europe and Japan, Eisenhower balanced support for Israel with friendliness toward moderate Arab nations. After opposing the 1956 invasion of Suez by Israel, France, and Britain, he declared a policy of aid to Arab governments so as to thwart their violent overthrow. American intervention in

²⁶George Brown Tindall, *America: A Narrative History*, Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1988), pp. 1276-1277. As for Korea, while it is probable that Stalin's death rather than any American intimation of intent to expand the war if negotiations to end the conflict broke down was what brought the Korean armistice, Eisenhower kept an option for "extensive and strategic use" of nuclear weapons. Still, in what would become a theme in his handling of such situations he said or did nothing "that might in the end require him to carry out a nuclear attack or else be exposed as a paper tiger." Instead, in the words of McGeorge Bundy, he looked around to see "what major allies think and reminds himself that the hard question is not what these things may do to strictly military targets, but what they may do — as he had foreseen they would at Hiroshima — to everything else nearby. Both the probable reaction of the allies and the mixed character of most targets continue to weigh on the side of caution." Bundy, pp. 242-245. As another historian has discovered, Eisenhower was indeed circumspect in his Korea policy. He feared Soviet nuclear retaliation against Japan and while acknowledging the importance of speed and surprise in any nuclear attack by the U.S. he remained open to a summit meeting with the new Soviet leaders. Meanwhile, he did not send nuclear weapons or bombers to forward bases in the Pacific as had Truman in the crisis of April of 1951 and his communications with the Soviets were more appeals for cooperation than threats. Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security* (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 85-87.

²⁷Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 196.

Lebanon allowed restoration, for a time, of peace and stability there.²⁸

In the Far East, the United States maintained its ties with Japan. North Korea signed an armistice that preserved an independent South. No other large war broke out. Communism gained in a few places, but the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China did not expand their territories.²⁹ Finally, as a sponsoring member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the United States became a participant in efforts to promote stability in the region.

To learn the problems of Latin America and assist those neighboring nations, Eisenhower sent his brother Milton to investigate, and welcomed similar studies by the Senate. Efforts to stimulate investment by encouraging economic progress moved toward what would become known as the Alliance for Progress.³⁰

Finally, and most important, considering the threat of nuclear annihilation that hung over the world during the generation after the Korean War, Eisenhower defined the American role in the strategic balance as possession of only those nuclear and conventional forces sufficient to deter aggression. He could not face down his critics after *Sputnik*

²⁸Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: The Linden Press, Simon & Schuster, 1981), pp. 403-404; Andrew J. Goodpaster, oral history, Aug. 2, 1967, pp. 87-88; Nathan Twining, oral history, Aug. 17, 1967, pp. 66, 210 — Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

²⁹Gaddis, *Long Peace*, pp. 182, 187.

³⁰In his second term he considered taking five billion dollars off defense spending for this new purpose, but there were no lobbies for it. Goodpaster, oral history, Apr. 25, 1967, p. 33; C. Douglas Dillon, oral history, June 28, 1972, p. 70; Milton Eisenhower, oral history, June 2, p. 6 and Sept. 6, 1967, pp. 99-100 — all at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

because he knew that discussing publicly the inferiority of the Soviet Union would make things more difficult for the United States, attracting attention to Soviet weakness, also compromising a covert surveillance program that he needed without a verifiable agreement to prevent surprise attack.³¹

All in all it was an impressive strategy. Some of it partook of the clearheadedness of the Kansas scene. Much more partook of what Eisenhower had learned from Clausewitz about means and ends.

³¹Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 187. Reaching some agreement with the Soviets to make possible armament reduction by 1958 had become his foremost concern. "Security through arms," he said, "is only a means (and sometimes a poor one) to an end. Peace, in a very real sense, is an end in itself." Goodpaster, memorandum of conference, Mar. 28, 1958, DDE diary, box 31, staff notes, Mar. 1958 (1). Beschloss, pp. 366-367. As one historian said, Eisenhower believed that "To maintain weapons irrelevant to the threat at hand — and Eisenhower put excess missile capacity in this category, as well as such other Pentagon favorites...was to expend limited resources carelessly, with the result that the nation in the end would be unable to afford what really was necessary." Gaddis, *Strategies*, p. 188.

CLEARING UP THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

by

R. C. Raack

CALIFORNIA STATE, EMERITUS

Historians dealing with contemporary history are facing a storm of information, with more soon to come in, from newly opened eastern European archives. Much of this information bears on central themes in recent diplomatic history: the coming of the Second World War and wartime and early post-war diplomacy. These same subjects are also central to understanding the Cold War, for whose history, beyond the 1940s, some archives are also now open.¹ Perhaps an account of some recent extensive discussion in international conferences, which took place in Europe, dealing with these subjects will allow historians on these shores to orient themselves to developments and research prospects which are certain to be basic to their own foreign policy interests. In what follows I shall follow press and other reports, including my own observations of the discussions where I was present. My reporting of the issues here is enhanced by information

¹As far as I know the following state archives have recently been opened to researchers: the Polish (thirty-year rule); the Czechoslovak (the cut-off date is unknown to me, but it is certainly 1950 or even after), the archive of the former East German Socialist Unity (and its German Communist Party progenitor) Party (cut-off date unknown to me, but certainly well after the war), and some Soviet archives. But for the Soviet Union there is no domestic archival law or rule of access, so conditions of admission will continue to be decided arbitrarily. On this see Karl-Heinz Janssen in *Die Zeit*, 26 July 1991, 8. Janssen reports that the Soviet archives are to be opened on a selective basis, but he does not suggest the ethical problems this raises for those admitted, as well as for those denied admission.

from my current and past research in British, American and Continental archival and other documentary evidence for the pre-war and wartime period, plus substantial reading in most recent Soviet and other former East Bloc periodicals. My account is centered on the vital importance to our understanding of the new evidence now becoming available, and some historically revolutionary assessments made, in conference and elsewhere, on the basis of it.²

At the biannual IAMHIST (International Association for Audio-Visual Media in Historical Research and Education) Conference in Göttingen, Germany (in July), "The Cold War in Retrospect. Film and Media Sources,"³ which I attended, some amazing artifacts of Cold War propaganda in audio-visual media representations were offered for showing by participants from the West as well as from the former East Bloc. Film historians and media-makers in history have been able to exploit the often easily accessible Western sources on

²I used a number of German press sources as well as personal accounts for this report, and do not cite them directly (as this account, a quick taking of stock, is intended for dissemination in a newsletter as an early indicator of research possibilities and trends). Admittedly the accuracy of what I tell depends not only on my qualities as a reporter, but, where I was not myself present, on the accuracy of the original reporters. But it seems to me better that historians interested in recent foreign policy get some notion of what happened, and get it rather quickly, and that they not have to wait for the generally ponderous mechanisms of academic publication to learn what I have to tell, as well as — obviously — far more than I have to tell here.

I would also like to thank Agnieszka Rudnicka and Melvin Lasky for culling information for this report about the conferences from the German press when I was not on hand to do it myself.

³IAMHIST meets biannually. The next conference is in Amsterdam in 1993, and the subject is World War I. Information on the organization and its publications from Dr. Stephan Dolezel, Institut für den Wissenschaftlichen Film, Nonnenstieg 72, D3400 Göttingen, Germany.

the subject for many years. So the most unusual films shown at the Conference this time were those heretofore the least available.

They ranged from Soviet wartime feature films, some previously unseen outside the Soviet Union, on key foreign policy subjects to likewise previously carefully guarded Soviet, Polish and East German newsreel clips. Many dated from the late 'forties. All of them excoriated, sometimes crudely, sometimes sophisticatedly, the Western powers and their allies. They were, for many participants not at home in the history of the former East Bloc, a first grim revelation of East Bloc Cold War propaganda. Since propaganda themes were centrally set in Stalin's Soviet Union (and presumably afterward likewise centrally set there and in the East Bloc nations as well), and the state controlled all the media, these themes were obviously important indicators of government policy.

What is without doubt most immediately important to historians is that the current availability of these materials makes them a ready historical source and an asset for media production on historical subject matter — provided, of course, in the latter case that would-be historian-producers can pay the sometimes astronomical fees asked for their use. Past experience suggests that network journalists, who frequently want a deep historical grounding and who have over the years collectively demonstrated a lack of sensitivity in the use of evidence, will get at them first. Only they seem to be able to find the wherewithal, as things stand, to bring these vital sources to television screens.

The debate at the Conference over one key question, when had the Cold War actually begun and ended, though taken up, was never resolved, indeed was never very seriously taken up. (But, then, when has it been?) One Polish colleague (a colleague perhaps not without memory of the work one of the earliest American Cold War writers, Denna F. Fleming; and

following, perhaps, George F. Kennan's injunction to historians to look backward from 1945 to find the Cold War's beginnings⁴) went way back to date its beginning at the East-West stand-off which began with the initial successes of the Russian Revolution. Others suggested its beginning came with the earliest inter-Allied discussions in the Second World War. At that time the sharp differences became manifest over restoration or reconstitution of governments and the territorial integrity of lands which Hitler and Stalin divided among themselves in the aftermath of their infamous 1939 "Non-aggression" Pact.

Robert C. Tucker, in the recently published second volume of his biography of Stalin,⁵ (must reading for Cold War scholars which appeared only a few months ago), has helped to clarify some long disputed historical issues — and therewith to prepare us for understanding additional evidence and revelations to come. He makes clear that Stalin evidently thought both before and after August 1939 that he had much more to gain from a turn toward Berlin than by making up with the West. In fact, the Western leaders were so shocked by the frigid Muscovite propaganda blasts (which both anticipated and followed Stalin's Pact with Hitler), by Stalin's obvious cold diplomatic shoulder, and his overt help for Hitler in the winter of 1939-40, that they were soon earnestly considering adding a war against the Soviets to their war against Hitler during the former's Finnish war. That war itself is a sometimes neglected aspect in histories of World War II, just as is the second Finnish war, not to mention the

⁴Denna W. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* (2v., Garden City, 1961); Kennan in "The View from Russia," in Thomas H. Hammond, ed., *Witnesses to the Cold War* (Seattle, 1982), 28.

⁵*Stalin in Power* (New York, 1990).

Hungarian and Rumanian wars, against the Soviet Union beginning in 1941.⁶

In any case, long before the end of World War II, Tucker's evidence, as well as that of other recent writers, and that presented made clear, Stalin had proved he could direct a "chill" westward as his needs required. So serious consideration, one argument at this IAMHIST meeting went, must be given to dates earlier than Yalta, or the Potsdam Conference, or the Berlin Blockade, the more traditional "turning points" accepted by most participants and other historians for fixing the beginning of the Cold War.

As for fixing its end, the discussion centered on 1985. Yet it became clear that most participants holding this view had not read the Cold War-impregnated historical report delivered by then General Secretary Gorbachev as part of his speech to the Supreme Soviet on the seventieth anniversary of the Revolution, in November 1987, or that he had given to Polish scientists in July 1988. It manifestly has taken several years since 1985 for the Soviet leadership and some local government-friendly historians to unlearn the historical vocabularies of the Cold War. Indeed, some of local historians have even recently and vigorously been throwing up

⁶Great Britain and France, allied from the spring of 1939 to the first victim of German-Soviet aggression, Poland, were certainly the subjects of a Stalin-directed "chill" put on diplomatic exchange with them even before the war, and even before the Polish alliance. This chill, my research in the pre-war British and French diplomatic papers indicates — certainly the British diplomats worried about it — was developed purposefully long before August 1939, as Stalin sought to cuddle up to his later German ally. Once the Pact was signed and the war began, the "chill" became a "freeze." Even would-be friends of the Soviets like Stafford Cripps were rebuffed in efforts (in 1939) to pacify the Soviet chieftain. Extensive good recent background on this: Steven M. Miner, *Between Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Origins of the Grand Alliance* (Chapel Hill, 1989).

dust to cover the Stalinist past, including that part of it connected with the Cold War.⁷

Whatever date one might set for the onset of the Cold War as such, its ultimate conflicts, as first mirrored in the wartime conference discussions, were certainly around issues already on the main line of diplomatic interest well before 1941.⁸ British, French and exile-Polish archival sources establish the latter. Hence the central importance of the German-Soviet war. It suddenly altered the original 1939 European war cast for the greater drama and conflict of the world war to come.

Once the two conquerors of east central Europe, Stalin and Hitler, fell to fighting, as they did in June 1941, it was inevitable that, given the likely defeat of one side, the pre-war and wartime gains of the defeated, perhaps the defeated power itself, would be parceled out — according to the plans of some or all of the victors. Over that reparceling there was likely to be, among the latter, whoever they were, considerable disagreement if not actual conflict. The coming of the German-Soviet phase of World War II, whose fiftieth

⁷Gorbachev in *Prawda*, 3 November 1987; also, *Inteligencja wobec nowych problemów socjalizmu. Spotkanie Michaila Gorbaczowa z przedstawicielami polskiej inteligencji* (Warsaw, 1988), 88.

⁸The early importance of east central European territories and governments as central Cold War issues was reflected in subjects which frequently occupied center diplomatic stage among the Allies. An example: in Polish Premier Władysław Sikorski's talks with British government officials during his initial visit to London in November 1939, long before the German attack on the Soviet Union (I refer here to materials in the British and Polish diplomatic papers for 1939). From the wartime conferences (starting in December 1941, when Stalin, in discussion with Anthony Eden, directly brought up the subject of keeping his take from the alliance with the Führer) of the strange allies of East and West, the same discussion subjects simply continued, the issues all the more sharply pointed, into the post-war conferences. One need only peruse their transcripts to see how consistently these concerns prevailed throughout the war.

anniversary we have just passed, changed dramatically the entire diplomacy, and the whole history, of the years which followed.

(In part two of this report, to appear in the next issue, the author will report on three international historical conferences and an exhibition held to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the coming of this part of World War II, and on new information from Soviet historians, reporting out of Soviet archival holdings, which relate to these and other key events of the war and its diplomacy.)

OBITUARY

Howard Schonberger

Howard Schonberger, professor of history at the University of Maine for the past 20 years died unexpectedly while attending a mid-October conference in Wisconsin.

Schonberger earned a B.A. from the University of Chicago in 1962, and an M.S. in 1964 and a PhD in 1968 from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Before teaching at Maine, he taught at the University of Wisconsin and at the Hampton Institute in Virginia. In 1975 he was a Fulbright Lecturer at Hiroshima University.

Professor Schonberger taught courses ranging from military history to diplomatic history. He was Director of Graduate Studies for several years and helped develop the Peace Studies at Maine.

The author of two books, *Transportation to the Seaboard: The Communications Revolution and American Foreign Policy, 1860-1900* and *Aftermath of War: Americans in the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*, Schonberger was working on a third book at the time of his death.

Some members may not know that Professor Schonberger died after the mailing of the ballot for officers of SHAFR. SHAFR regrets any confusion which may result from this circumstance.

— Allen Spetter, Executive Secretary Treasurer

PUBLICATIONS

Lloyd Ambrosius (Nebraska), *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I*. Scholarly Resources, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-8420-2394-1, \$13.95.

Thom M. Armstrong (El Camino College), *Politics, Diplomacy and Intrigue in the Early Republic: The Cabinet Career of Robert Smith, 1801-1811*. Kendall-Hunt, 1991. \$24.95.

Günter Bischof (University of New Orleans) and Charles S. Maier (Harvard) eds., *The Marshall Plan and Germany*. Berg, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-85496-306-5, \$9.95.

Lester J. Brune (Bradley), *Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations, The Reagan Years, January 21, 1981 to January 20, 1989*. Garland, 1991. ISBN 0-8240-5690-6, \$75.

Robert Dallek (UCLA), *Lone Star Rising, Volume 1, Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-19505-435-0, \$30.

Judith Ewell (William and Mary) and William H. Beezley (Texas Christian) eds., *The Human Tradition in Latin America: The Nineteenth Century*. 1989. Paper: ISBN 0-8420-2332-1, \$14.95.

_____ *The Human Tradition in Latin America: The Twentieth Century*. 1987. Paper: ISBN 0-8420-2284-8, \$14.95.

James A. Field, Jr. (Swarthmore), *From Gibraltar to the Middle East: America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882*. Imprint Publications, 1991 (with a new preface). Paper: ISBN 1-879176-05-X, \$16.95.

Robert Frazier (Nottingham), *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47*. Macmillan, 1991. ISBN 0-333-54973-2, £45.

George C. Herring (Kentucky), *Understanding the Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict, U.S. Policy, and Options for Peace*. 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-8420-2383-6, \$13.95.

Michael J. Hogan (Ohio State), *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Diplomacy 1918-1928*. Imprint Publications, 1991 (with a new preface). Paper: ISBN 1-879176-02-5, \$14.95.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Yale), *The CIA and American Democracy*. Yale U. Press, 1991. Paper: ISBN 05017-8, \$14.95; Cloth: ISBN 04149-7, \$24.

Ernest R. May (Harvard), *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay*. Imprint Publications, 1991 (with a new Introduction). Paper: ISBN 1-879176-03-3, \$14.95.

_____, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*. Imprint Publications, 1991 (with a new Introduction). Paper: ISBN 1-879176-04-1. \$15.95.

Thomas Schoonover (Southwestern Louisiana) ed. and trans., *A Mexican View of America in the 1860s: A Foreign Diplomat Describes the Civil War and Reconstruction*. Fairleigh Dickinson U. Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8386-3432-x, \$39.50.

_____, *The United States in Central America, 1860-1911: Episodes in Social Imperialism and Imperial Rivalry in the World System*. Duke University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8223-1160-7, \$32.50.

Grace Sevy (San Francisco, CA), *The American Experience in Vietnam: A Reader*. U. of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-8061-2390-7, \$12.95.

David Sheinin (Trent, Ontario), *Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan American Conference*. Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1991. ISBN 0-901145-74-2, \$14.

Marilyn B. Young (New York), *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990*. HarperCollins, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-06-092107-2, \$10.95.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR NOTICE

SHAFR officers wish to bring the recently-announced Robert H. Ferrell Prize to the attention of the members. The details are to be found on the last page of this *Newsletter*. The deadline for submissions is February 1, 1992.

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Society for Military History announces that its annual meeting will be held at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario on May 21-24, 1993.

Proposals for papers addressing the theme "Allies and Alliances" should be sent before December 15, 1992 to: Dr. W.A.B. Douglas, Director of History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2

CALL FOR PAPERS

Hofstra University announces the Ninth Presidential Conference to be held April 22-24, 1993 entitled "Ronald Reagan, 40th President of the United States." Hofstra welcomes papers dealing with the career, the person, and the policies of President Reagan.

A prospectus or letter of intent is requested by March 15, 1992, the deadline for submission of completed papers is October 15, 1992.

For information: Natalie Datlof and Alexej Ugrinsky,
Conference Coordinators, Hofstra Cultural Center, Hofstra
University, Hempstead, New York 11550

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Southern Historical Association which will meet in November 1993 in Orlando, Florida solicits complete panels or individual papers dealing with Latin American and U.S. Foreign Relations topics. The committee welcomes sessions which incorporate Florida into the content of the work — the Cuban or Haitian migrations, filibustering, or Florida and the Caribbean area.

Proposals with brief vitas of the participants and outlines of the proposed session papers or panel topic should be sent to: Thomas Schoonover, 172 Antigua Drive, Lafayette, LA 70503

ANNUAL MEETING

SHAFR is planning its usual functions at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association at the Hilton Hotel in Chicago. On Friday, December 27, at 8:00 p.m., Council will meet in private dining room #3. The reception will be in Boulevard Room C on Saturday, December 28, from 5:00 until 7:00 p.m.; and the SHAFR luncheon will be in Boulevard Room A from 12:15 until 1:45 p.m. on Sunday, December 29. The luncheon speaker will be President Gary Hess.

FULBRIGHT SCHOLARSHIPS IN HISTORY

Fulbright Scholarships (six months duration) will be available in the Department of History, Massey University, New Zealand, during 1992-1994. Preferred fields: U.S. History since the Civil War or the U.S. and the Asia/Pacific region.

Inquiries to Professor Barrie Macdonald, Department of History, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand (Fax (64) 6 350-5633; Tel (64) 6 356-9099) or Ms. Marguerite Hulbert, Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 3400 International Drive, N.W., Suite M.500, Washington, D.C. 20008-3097 (tel: 202-686-4025).

TEACHING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: CURRICULUM FOR A NEW CENTURY

What should be the focus of the security studies curriculum in the 1990s? This will be the subject of a faculty seminar in the summer of 1992. The seminar will be held from July 6-16, 1992 at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. It is being organized by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy's International Security Studies Program, Columbia University's International Security Policy Program, and the National Strategy Information Center.

Applications are invited from faculty of all ranks who either already teach in the field or intend to do so. The deadline for applications is February 1, 1992. It is anticipated that approximately 25 applications will be selected. Final notification will be given by mid-March, 1992. Participants will be provided with round trip travel as well as room and board at the seminar. For further information or application

forms, contact: Dr. Roy Godson, National Strategy Information Center, 1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20036

**EXCERPTS FROM THE NATIONAL COORDINATING
COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY
DIRECTOR'S REPORT
PAGE PUTNAM MILLER, DIRECTOR**

President Signs Into Law State Department's Foreign Relations Historical Series and Declassification Legislation. On October 28 after almost a year of discussion, negotiation, drafting and redrafting of legislative language, the President signed H.R.1415, the State Department Authorization Act of 1992 and 1993 which includes a section on the *Foreign Relations of the United States* and the State Departments policy for declassifying all but the most sensitive historical documents over thirty years old. This legislation marks the first time that Congress has legislated on the matter of systematic declassification, a policy that has previously been governed by executive orders. The law specifies one year for the establishment of a systematic declassification program and three years for bringing *Foreign Relations* volumes into compliance with the thirty-year time table. An extension to two years and five years respectively are permitted at the request of the Secretary.

Copyright Legislation on Fair Use of Unpublished Material Introduced. Representative Hughes recently stated that a case of significant harm resulting from the Current copyright law had not been adequately made. However, several court cases (particularly *Salinger v. Random House* in 1987 and *New Era Publications v. Henry Holt and Company*

in 1989) ignored the traditional canons of scholarly writing. The New Era Case stated that unpublished primary source materials "normally enjoy complete protection" from any fair use quotations and that "copying of 'more than minimal amounts' of unpublished expressive materials calls for an injunction" forbidding publication. While many scholars have experienced the "chilling effect" of these cases, Representative Hughes remains unconvinced that "fair use" legislation is needed and seeks additional evidence from authors and publishers of the negative impact of court cases. Page Miller would appreciate hearing from you of specific examples of the "chilling effect" and if you wish to receive an "NCC Briefing Sheet" on this issue.

Letters, telephone calls and personal visits to members of the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration are needed to urge their support of S. 1305. Subcommittee members are: William Hughes (D-NJ), chairman; John Conyers (D-MI); Patricia Schroeder (D-CO); Barney Frank (D-MA); Dan Glickman (D-KS); Charles Schumer (D-NY); Mel Levine (D-CA); Rick Boucher (D-VA); George E. Sangmeister (D-IL); Mike Synar (D-OK); Carlos Moorehead, Ranking Republican (R-CA); Howard Coble (R-NC); Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY); James Sensenbrenner (R-WI); Craig James (R-FL); and Tom Campbell (R-CA). Address: U. S. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 20515

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES AND DECLASSIFICATION
OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD

by

Warren F. Kimball, 1990-1991 Chair
State Department Historical Advisory Committee

Tucked away in the State Department authorization bill signed into law by the President on 28 October 1991 are provisions designed to restore the credibility of and public confidence in both the *Foreign Relations* series and the State Department's program for public access to the historical record. The legislation requires that thirty-year old State Department records be examined on a systematic basis for declassification, and sets a timetable for implementation of procedures. In addition, the law establishes a process intended to insure that the record published in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* includes relevant documentation from all government agencies involved in making and carrying out foreign policy — from the State Department to Treasury to the CIA.

The legislation authorizes the new and restructured State Department Historical Advisory Committee, composed of persons with "a demonstrable record of research" in the archives, to examine historical documents withheld from the public in order to assess the impact of such actions on the public's right and need to know. That includes examining non-State Department documents that were designated by the Historian for publication in *FRUS* but which were denied declassification by the other agency. Moreover, the Advisory Committee is responsible for providing the Secretary of State with advice on the overall Departmental program for declassification of the historical record.

To be effective, the legislation requires extensive involvement on the part of the Advisory Committee, as well

as the active cooperation of those who use the State Department archives and/or *FRUS*. The community of users must make the Advisory Committee aware of broad issues and concerns about access to the public historical record of American foreign policy.

There are limitations. This is not "open sesame!" Laws and procedures relating to privacy and national security will still pertain. The Advisory Committee cannot act as advocate for specific declassification appeals. This legislation does not affect, nor is it part of, current Freedom of Information laws. Problems of access to the archival records outside the State Department come under the jurisdiction of the specific agencies involved, even though the Advisory Committee is involved in the process of getting non-State Department records declassified for publication in *FRUS*.

This legislation, together with a State Department "Plan" written in the Historical Office earlier this year, should go a long way toward making the historical record of American foreign policy and diplomacy, whether published or in open archives, complete and free of the distortion created by the misuse of classification so as to hide from view documents that are only politically embarrassing or awkward. More detail on the process will be provided in the annual report to the Secretary of State of the outgoing Advisory Committee. That report is scheduled for preparation late in November, and can be expected to be made public shortly thereafter.

Knowledge, full and accurate, is essential to the functioning of a democracy. This legislation is a step in the right direction. To acknowledge by name the efforts of all those who made this happen — from inside the State Department, to Capitol Hill, to dozens of academics — is impossible. But a few deserve specific mention: Warren Cohen, Frank Sieverts, Jim Curry, Page Miller, Brad Perkins, and three others who are best left with the code names X, Y, and Z. We of SHAFR are in their debt.

Regina



Books

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Offer expires March 15, 1991

Individuals only, please

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Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns 370 pp. \$39.95

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ABSTRACTS

Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland), "George Bush and the Gulf War: A Just War or Just Another War." Paper read by invitation to the Tenth Annual Law in History Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, April 1991.

Comparing the just war rhetoric of the Bush administration with the just war criteria of Saint Augustine, the paper argues, among other things, that the strategic bombing of Iraq — its industrial structure — was utterly unnecessary, concluding that sanctions were never given a chance to work. In this sense Bush made not the slightest effort to avoid war.

David W. McFadden (Fairfield University), "Lenin's American Policy. 1917-1920." New England Slavic Association, April 1991.

The Bolshevik policy toward the United States from 1917 to 1920 was a consistent yet evolutionary policy set firmly in the context of the increasing realization that the world proletarian revolution was delayed and it was absolutely necessary for survival to deal constructively with the capitalist west. Within this framework, Lenin led in the development of a specific Bolshevik strategy for the United States. This strategy was open to concrete instances of cooperation, and committed to developing economic relationships which could lead to a political breakthrough.

Lenin's American strategy gave the United States preferential treatment among the allies, in the mistaken

assumption that the U.S. would be the first capitalist state to recognize the Soviets but in the correct belief that serious economic contacts could productively be developed. The Bolshevik leadership disagreed at times both about this overall policy and its detail, but Lenin's commitment to it overcame their objections and it prevailed through the Wilson period and beyond.

Based on exhaustive research in printed Soviet sources as well as western writings, this paper also develops totally new materials from the Central Archive of the National Economy (TsGANKh) in Moscow, which substantially revise current interpretations concerning the strength, depth, and detail of the Bolshevik's consideration of a separate economic strategy for the United States. The new archive material shows that Bolshevik leaders discussed such strategies as early as February, 1918.

PERSONALS

Günter Bischof (University of New Orleans) received the Jedlicka Prize of the Austrian government and was co-recipient of the Herald K. Gross Prize (Harvard) for his dissertation "Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation: Austria in International Politics 1940-1950."

Richard H. Immerman has accepted an appointment as professor of History at Temple University. He will be joining its faculty in September 1992. Along with Russell Weigley and David Rosenberg, he will help to launch a new program tentatively called 'The Center for the Study of the Problem of War.'

Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School) has been named Director of the Fletcher Roundtable on a New World Order, co-chaired by Elliot L. Richardson, Sir Brian Urquhart, Cyrus R. Vance, and Olara A. Otunnu. In May-June 1991, he was United Nations Development Programme Visiting Professor of Diplomatic History at the Foreign Affairs College, affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Beijing.

BONERS

"Iran was confronted with a serious shortage of trained bottlenecks as well as spiraling inflation."

Linda Killen (Radford University)

CALENDAR

1992

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1991 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1991 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 2-5 The 85th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Chicago with headquarters at the Palmer House.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 18-21 The 18th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park and Vassar College. David Anderson of the University of Indianapolis is in charge of the program.

- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- December 27-30 The 107th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Washington, headquarters at the Washington Sheraton and Omni. Deadline for proposals for individual presentations has passed. Deadline for complete sessions is February 1992. Send American or Oceanic proposals to Fred Hoxie, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL; European, Asian, African, etc. proposals to Jo Ann McNamara, Dept. of History, Hunter College, New York, NY.

The OAH will meet in Anaheim, April 15-18, 1993. The program co-chairs: Barbara Melosh and Roy Rosenzweig, History, George Mason U., Fairfax, VA 22030. Deadline for proposals is March 1, 1992.

The OAH will meet April 14-17, 1994, in Atlanta, and March 30-April 2, 1995, in Washington.

There will be no December 1993 meeting! The following AHA meeting will be held in January 1994 in a yet-to-be-designated-city. Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Professor Carol Petillo, Department of History, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02167.

Books may be sent at any time during 1991, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1992.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee.

The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

The 1991 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in April, 1992.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
- 1980 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
- 1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge)
- 1983 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
- 1984 Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1985 David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1986 Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
- 1987 Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory)
James Edward Miller (Department of State)
- 1988 Michael Hogan (Ohio State)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas)
- 1990 Walter Hixson (Akron)
Anders Stephanson (Rutgers-Newark)
- 1991 Gordon H. Chang (Stanford)

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

ELIGIBILITY: The lecture, to be delivered at the annual meetings of the Organization of American Historians, will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for research and teaching. Each lecturer will address not specifically his/her own research interests, but broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1992. The chairperson of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Linda Killen, Department of History, Radford University, Radford, VA 24142.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
- 1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)
- 1990 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
- 1991 H. W. Brands (Texas A&M)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1991. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1992. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Duane Tananbaum, Department of History, Lehman College, Bronx, NY 10468.

The 1991 award of \$300.00 will be announced simultaneously with the Bernath Book Prize at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1992.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
- 1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)
- 1989 Robert J. McMahon (Florida)
- 1990 Lester Foltos (Seattle)
- 1991 William Earl Weeks (San Diego State)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Prize

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
 - (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
 - (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,
 - (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,
 - (c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1000.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. The deadline is November 1, 1991.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1985 Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara)
- 1986 Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas)
Walter L. Hixson (Colorado)
- 1987 Janet M. Manson (Washington State)
Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington)
W. Michael Weis (Ohio State)
Michael Wala (Hamburg)
- 1988 Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford)
Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario)
- 1989 Thomas Zeiler (Massachusetts-Amherst)
Russel Van Wyk (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1990 David McFadden (UC-Berkeley)

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Details will be forthcoming.

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowship

A \$2,500.00 research fellowship awarded every two years for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student. Details will be forthcoming.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1991, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation, are required.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1992 to: Professor Mark Gallicchio, Department of History, Villanova University, Villanova, PA 19085.

The Holt Memorial Fellowship carries an award of \$1500.00.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1984 Louis Gomolak (University of Texas)
- 1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)
- 1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)
- 1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)
- 1991 Kyle Longley (University of Kentucky)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Waldo Heinrichs, Dept. of History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)
- 1988 Alexander DeConde (University of California at Santa Barbara)
- 1990 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern University)

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1989 and 1990. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1991. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee:

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A1
Canada

Harold Josephson
UNCC St. - History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 28223

Lawrence Kaplan
Dept. of History
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44242

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1987 Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)
- 1989 Melvin Small (Wayne State University)
- 1991 Charles DeBenedetti (deceased) and Charles Chatfield (Wittenberg University)

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) proudly announces the establishment of the Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing. The inaugural prize will be awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered thereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher.

PRIZE: \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented.

For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee.

W. F. Kimball, Chair
19 Larsen Road
Somerset, NJ 08873
tel: 201-648-5410

G. C. Herring
Dept. of History
Univ. of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

M. Giunta, Acting Dir.
NHRPC
Washington, DC 20408

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings from their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.

Procedures:

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Three copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to the committee chair: Professor Calvin Davis, Department of History, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708.

Books must arrive no later than February 1, 1992.

The award of \$1,000 will be announced at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the 1992 OAH convention in Chicago.

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Nanci Long and Katherine Fansler.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Send changes of address to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$1.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$2.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication should be typed, double-spaced; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5¼" or 3½" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford) | 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana) |
| 1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara) | 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State) |
| 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern) | 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) |
| 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana) | 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard) |
| 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia) | 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State) |
| 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland) | 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron) |
| 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan) | 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M) |
| 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (CA-San Diego) | 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut) |
| 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas) | 1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers) |
| 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane) | 1989 George Herring (Kentucky) |
| 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago) | 1990 Michael Hunt (North Carolina) |
| 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State) | |