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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

NAFTA AND MEXICO (AND THE UNITED STATES)

by
Seth Fein

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Having recently returned from a year of research in Mexico, I am struck by the degree to which the Mexican ruling regime's advocacy for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is assumed to represent a Mexican consensus on economic alliance with the United States. In fact this is not the case. What seems to be left out of the current U.S. debate about NAFTA, which focuses exclusively on its environmental and economic possibilities and drawbacks from the perspective of the United States, is what concerns large sectors of Mexico's lower-classes: its potential impact on Mexican society. Although U.S. foreign policy has rarely been primarily concerned with the well-being of third-world nations, future popular social and political development in a large, complex neighboring country is a matter of national security for the United States.

These days the most intense and unpredictable Mexican opposition to NAFTA is expressed in popular protests in Mexico City and elsewhere. In contrast to Mexican opposition political leaders and intellectuals, who express dismay at the decreased Mexican sovereignty NAFTA portends, popular sectors — organized, unorganized, and unemployed workers, poor or landless peasants — object to the way NAFTA will affect or not affect their everyday lives. For these groups, NAFTA is a catalyst for resentment over the perception that the aggregate economic growth promised by the agreement will mostly benefit economic and political elites and only a very small percentage of the lower-classes.

From this perspective, most of Mexico's needy will not gain from the free trade agreement and are actually losing ground owing to major institutional and legal restructuring popularly perceived as preparation for the pending agreement. Many view these changes as directly or indirectly dictated by Mexico's growing alliance with the United States.

A few recent events reveal the impact of this NAFTA-U.S. connection on popular political consciousness. On May Day, tens of thousands of workers, peasants, and students demonstrated against NAFTA in front of the U.S. embassy, burning a U.S. flag before facing down riot police who tried to prevent their peaceful demonstration through force. The August termination, by government decree, of a labor dispute between automobile workers — striving in part for more democratic union policies freeing them from government manipulation — and Volkswagen was popularly viewed as the regime's attempt to prove to U.S. business that the Mexican government intends to side with capital and not labor in conflicts involving foreign corporations.

For several weeks this summer, the central plaza facing Mexico's National Palace was the site of a tent city of thousands of workers abruptly dismissed from the state-owned petroleum industry (PEMEX) protesting the illegal denial of compensation, benefits, and job security. They too saw their situation as caused by the government's need to restructure the Mexican economy and society to facilitate integration with the United States rather than to protect and promote Mexicans' interests. And students of the National Autonomous University of Mexico have been actively protesting attempts to make their institution more expensive, exclusive, and business-oriented. Students from the state university of Sonora recently staged a march on Mexico City against similar proposals for their institution.

Beyond Mexico City, there have been parallel demonstrations — often not well-covered even in the Mexican media — relating everyday local misery to the policies of the ruling regime (the PRI) influenced by the United States through NAFTA. Recently, for example, in the capital of the central rural state of Tlaxcala, I watched a sizable group of peasants protesting illegal invasion of their land, allegedly orchestrated by corrupt local PRI officials, manifest their opposition to proposed constitutional changes that threaten to reverse existing agrarian reform. They blamed the NAFTA process, which in their eyes stemmed from U.S. imperialism, for eroding their historical and legal rights.

These few examples do not represent simple, reflexive anti-Americanism. Instead they are well-articulated, if too-little-noticed in the United States, cries of frustration against government policies — involving repeal of constitutional labor, agrarian, and education rights stipulated in the nation's popularly revered 1917 constitution — that appear to many Mexicans as the real meaning of NAFTA and U.S. foreign policy here.

At the same time, the ruling PRI faces significant popular political protests calling for democratization. The most publicized challenge being the recent violent stand-off, between the PRI and the liberal Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), over the governorship of the important western state of Michoacan. But in other places, still further from the eye of national and international media, there are similar manifestations, such as I recently observed in San Andres Tuxtla, Veracruz, where courageous peasants protested against abusive local PRI politicians who employed violence and intimidation to deter opposition voting.

The regime has demonstrated its recognition of this crisis in two very different but very related ways. First, in order to reestablish the ideological social compact between the state and popular sectors, President Salinas has headed a paternalistic program of public works known as *Solidaridad*. Second, the recent publication of new history textbooks by the government (required to be used in all public and private elementary schools) have sparked a national debate over the abrupt shift in official ideology. Among the most noticeable changes is the de-demonization of the thirty-five-year dictatorship preceding the 1910 revolution that oversaw deep U.S. economic penetration — the Porfiriato — popularly-perceived and, until recently, officially characterized as a period of domestic repression and U.S. imperialism.

On both sides of the Rio Grande, NAFTA has never simply been about free trade but also aimed to make Mexico more attractive for long-term U.S. investment. Such change, however, will not be beneficial to U.S. NAFTA supporters (most prominently certain corporations and the Clinton administration) and could be counter-productive for the overall interests of U.S. citizens if the agreement is perceived by the majority of poor Mexicans as benefitting the few to the detriment of the many, as strengthening an authoritarian political system rather than promoting political freedom. Even the large sectors of the middle-classes who represent the treaty's most vocal supporters clearly do so contingently, operating on the assumption that the U.S. economy will not continue to decline. Therefore it is perhaps instructive, despite the risk of historical over-simplification, to recall that previous periods of close U.S.-Mexican economic and diplomatic collaboration masking local and national political and social discontents have been preludes to popular unrest, economic dislocation, and violent political upheaval — most

notably during the long epoch prior to the Mexican Revolution.

While it is unlikely that such dramatic consequences lay ahead, it is important to note the social tensions beneath the seemingly placid surfaces of Mexican politics and U.S.-Mexican relations in the 1990s. Therefore, North Americans should consider the long-term ramifications of NAFTA for Mexican development as a key issue in understanding the agreement's meaning for U.S.-Mexican relations and United States interests as we continue to evaluate this proposal for the future of our hemisphere.

THE CONGER PLEDGES AND THE HUKUANG RAILWAY LOAN: A FOOTNOTE TO TAFT'S DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN ASIA

by

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For government employees anticipating the sweltering summer months of Washington, D.C., the spring day was one to savor. Bright, clear and comfortable, May 24, 1909, was also Monday, the beginning of another work week for the new administration of William Howard Taft, and thus not an unusual time to find three young and ambitious officials of the Department of State — Chief of the Far Eastern Division Willard Straight, Assistant Secretary F. M. Huntington Wilson, and Third Assistant Secretary William Phillips — huddled together over various matters of State. But this particular day witnessed more than the handling of routine

matters. The three men composed and sent a telegram to the U.S. Legation in China that initiated the fascinating and complex history of what came to be called Dollar Diplomacy in East Asia.¹ The telegram directed the American Minister, William W. Rockhill, to demand from the Chinese government assurances of American financial participation in a railway loan reportedly being negotiated by a combination of English, French and German banking groups. Thus began the long and thorny negotiations to finance the so-called Hukuang railways in central China.² Not until May 23, 1910, did the three European powers agree to terms for American participation in the Hukuang loan, thereby creating the first, or four-power China Consortium, and not until May 20, 1911, did the Chinese government concur in a loan agreement with the four-power group.³ In the meantime, the Taft administration moved dramatically to encourage American investments in China in order to accentuate an expanding Open Door policy. Entering the first Consortium was one manifestation of this policy; so too was the abortive

¹Knox to Peking (tel.), May 24, 1909, File 5315/208, U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited with file number followed by RG59, NA). Weather report courtesy of Environmental Sciences Services Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

²"Hukuang" is the geographical name for the provinces of Hupei (or Hupeh) and Hunan. Hence, the "Hukuang railroads" are those running through these two provinces, which include a line from Hankow south to Canton and a line from Hankow west to Szechuan province.

In this essay the older Wade-Giles spellings of Chinese words will be used (as they were in the sources cited) rather than the currently widely accepted Pinyin spellings.

³John V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921) I, 886-87, 866-67.

neutralization proposal made by Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox in late 1909, as well as the expansion of the Consortium by an agreement of November 10, 1910, to have it include all Chinese railway loans.⁴

Policy makers in 1909 demonstrated an unusual audacity and persistence. These young men in the Department of State, determined to see a significant U.S. presence in East Asian financial affairs, insisted that America's right to participate in loans rested on solemn government to government promises. That is, they argued that U.S. bankers were to be allowed into the first Consortium on the basis of principle and legality. This argument of 1909, which has often reappeared in accounts of these fascinating if puzzling events, is open to serious challenge.

Since the Opium War China had been subjected to concession hunting on the part of the great powers. Initially a few ports for trade were opened to Europeans. Then, during the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s, British and Americans assumed the collection of customs duties for the Chinese government. The system was eventually regularized, extended

⁴See John Allphin Moore, Jr., "From Reaction to Multilateral Agreement: The Expansion of America's Open Door Policy in China, 1899-1922," *Prologue: Journal of the National Archives* 15 (Spring, 1983): 23-36. Also see Charles Vevier, *The United States and China, A Study of Finance and Diplomacy* (New Brunswick, 1955); and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, *American Participation in the China Consortiums* (Chicago, 1931).

Much has been written on U.S.-China relations; of note here are Michael Schaller's brief but helpful recent text, *The United States and China in the 20th Century*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1990), and Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship; The United States and China to 1914* (New York, 1983), especially Part Three. Readers should also be reminded of A. Whitney Griswold's venerable *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938).

to all treaty ports, and given a staff under a British Inspector General. The evident weakness of the Manchu dynasty attracted further European imperialism and by the 1890s Britain and France began to carve out spheres of influence. Japan's victory over China in 1895 was perhaps the most damaging blow to the Chinese. Not only did it result in the loss of Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, and the establishment of various concessions in North China, but it further confirmed the impotence of the central government. By the turn of the century Russia had lodged herself on the tip of Liaotung peninsula where she built a naval base at Port Arthur, and Germany had acquired a naval base and railway terminus at Tsingtao on Shantung peninsula. Loans and railway concessions were the most popular forms of penetration, and Britain, France and the other great powers competed in Peking for the right to finance and construct railways within their various spheres of influence.⁵

The scramble for concessions in China did not go unheeded by American capitalists. In 1898 a U.S. firm, the American China Development Company, obtained a concession to build a railway from Hankow to Canton. Later, Belgian capital bought control of the company. Partly in response to the Chinese, who complained because the company was no longer American, the firm of J. P. Morgan purchased the majority stock and ultimately sold out to the Chinese government for a sizeable profit. In the meantime, China undertook to construct a railway from Hankow to Szechuan province. When approached by British and American investors, Peking

⁵Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 4th ed. (New York, 1990), 313-451; Chien-nung Li, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928* (Princeton, 1956), 12-143; Henry McAleavy, *The Modern History of China* (New York, 1967), 36-151.

insisted that indigenous Chinese capital could finance the road. Twice, once in 1903 and again in 1904, American capitalists made fruitless application through the U.S. Minister to China to participate in the Hankow-Szechuan loan.

Five years elapsed with little accomplished in railroad construction; and then, during the winter of 1909, a German banking syndicate began negotiations with Peking to finance and construct railroads in central China. Upon learning of these negotiations, British and French banking groups, supported by their governments, demanded shares in the proposed loan. Negotiations were proceeding among the three European groups and China when, as we have seen, Washington, in late May, 1909, demanded participation for U.S. bankers. But the German, French and British groups, and their governments — as well as the Chinese themselves — were eager to resolve matters without further complications. In fact, on June 6, within two weeks of the American demand, the three groups and the Chinese concluded a contract and a memorandum of agreement respecting further railway loans to China.⁶

Although Americans were apparently frozen out, Washington nevertheless boldly proceeded with its attempts to enter the loan agreement. By June 11, 1909, an American group was formed, made up of J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, the First National Bank, and the National City Bank, all of New York City. The Taft government then decided upon a dramatic *démarche* to exert pressure on the negotiators at Peking: a personal telegram from the President to Prince Chun, Regent of the Chinese Empire, declared

⁶MacMurray, *Treaties*, I, 880-85, 833-35.

America's intense desire to share equally in the Hukuang loan.⁷ The Regent instructed the Foreign Office to make an arrangement with the Americans, and the Chinese ultimately agreed to American participation. To Peking's agreement for American inclusion was added Washington's continuing diplomatic pressure on the three major powers. As a consequence, London, Paris and Berlin eventually agreed to have their respective banking groups commence talks with the Americans.⁸ Difficult negotiations proceeded until early 1910 when the American group finally joined the four-power Chinese Consortium.

Washington had evinced an unbending hectoring in its determination to move into the high tension financial diplomacy of East Asia, and, at least publicly, the administration argued that it must be accorded its share of the proposed loan because of undeniable promises made to the U.S. government. It is instructive to analyze the American case for participation in the Hukuang loan as it developed during 1909.

The case rested upon alleged promises the Chinese government gave in 1903 and 1904 to the American Minister at Peking, E. H. Conger. Supposedly, Peking had assured him that if indigenous capital were unable to finance the projected Hankow-Szechuan railway (now part of the proposed Hukuang railroad system), American and British capitalists would be notified and given first opportunity to bid for any

⁷Taft to Prince Chun (tel.), July 15, 1909, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909* (Washington, D.C.). (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.)

⁸Walter V. and Marie V. Scholes, *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration* (Columbia, 1970), 142-45.

foreign loan.⁹ The subsequent development of the American position derived primarily from these pledges to Conger.¹⁰

The British did not dispute this contention in 1909. But they argued that since Americans had shown no interest during the preceding four years in investing in Chinese railroads, the other bankers had gone ahead without them, and that it was now too late to admit any Americans. There was some justification for this contention. During the summer of 1905 the question of financing the Hankow-Szechuan railroad had arisen. The British Foreign Office instructed Ambassador H. M. Durand at Washington to inquire whether American capitalists desired participation. The State Department told Durand that, despite publicity regarding the loan, no Americans had demonstrated interest. London and Paris then gave notice that their banking groups would proceed with the loan, and Washington did not object. In December, 1905, London gave a copy of the Anglo-French agreement to the United States Embassy. No loan was made at that time. But by early 1909, the British, along with German and French groups, and the Chinese government, had spent considerable

⁹Knox to Peking (tel.), May 24, 1909, 5315/208, RG59, NA. For information on Conger's background and diplomatic career, see Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship*, 176-77, 193-96, 232, and 362 n.65.

¹⁰The Conger pledges were emphasized and re-emphasized in correspondence and discussions concerning the Hukuang loan. See, for example, Huntington Wilson to London, June 2, 1909, *FRUS*, 1909, 146-48; Huntington Wilson to London, Berlin, Paris, and Peking (tel.), June 7, 1909, 5315/217, Knox to London (tel.), June 9, 1909, 5315/226B, RG59, NA; Knox to Peking (tel.), June 12, 1909, The Papers of Willard Dickerman Straight, Cornell University; Fletcher(Peking) to Secretary of State (tel.), July 13, 1909, 5315/347, RG59, NA. Also see Willard Straight, "China's Loan Negotiations," in George H. Blakeslee (ed.), *Recent Developments in China* (New York, 1913), 127.

time and effort reaching an accord and they resisted reopening negotiations with the Americans.¹¹

Nonetheless, Washington tried to counter the British argument. The State Department insisted that nothing done by the British and French groups over the past few years in any way abrogated American rights as set forth in the Conger pledges.¹² Whitelaw Reid, U.S. Ambassador at London, added another element to the American position. Twisting historical chronology considerably, he explained to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, that the earlier (1905) American lack of interest in the railway was due in part to the approaching financial panic of 1907! He also argued that no court of international law would support the British. When two nations received from a third nation "a joint concession," Reid insisted, one of the concessionaires could not declare that the other's right to participate had lapsed simply because for some three or four years it had not put up its money.¹³ This latter argument pleased Washington, which used it extensively.¹⁴

¹¹British Foreign Office Memorandum, June 7, 1909, 5315/256, enclosed in Grey to Reid, June 8, 1909, 5315/255, RG59, NA.

¹²Phillips to Knox, June 10, 1909; "The Chinese Loan," unsigned memorandum dated September 30, 1909, The Papers of Philander Chase Knox, Yale University.

¹³Reid to Knox (tel.), June 11, 1909, 5315/228, Reid to Grey, June 12, 1909, 5315/292, RG59, NA. Scholes, *Taft's Foreign Policies*, 137, calls this a "telling counter blow" to the British position.

¹⁴Knox to London (tel.), June 12, 1909, 5315/228, Knox to Paris (tel.), June 12, 1909, 5315/230, RG59, NA; Knox to Peking (tel.), June 12, 1909, Straight Papers.

In September, 1909, when negotiations for American participation were languishing, the State Department combined Reid's argument with its contention about the assurances to Conger. The Department asserted that despite the unresponsiveness of American capitalists in 1905 American rights could not be extinguished "by the secrecy and speed with which the negotiations were pressed and concluded." Since, in any event, the Chinese (not the British) were bound to apply in the first instance for American capital, the United States government had every right to treat the agreement of June 6 (between China and the three European powers) as non-existent.¹⁵

The Americans further attempted to bolster their case with reference to a 1903 treaty between the United States and China by which Washington promised to help China abolish *likin*, an internal tax on goods in transit between provinces.¹⁶ The tripartite agreement of June 6, 1909, pledged revenue from *likin* of the Hukuang provinces as loan security. The Taft government emphasized that it was consequently impossible for China to carry out her earlier promise to abolish the internal tax.¹⁷ Since the Hukuang loan was to be secured on *likin* revenues, the State Department argued that it was of the greatest importance that the United States

¹⁵"The Chinese Loan," unsigned memorandum dated September 30, 1909, Knox Papers.

¹⁶"Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the Commercial Relations Between Them," in William Woodville Rockhill, *Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904 Together with Various State Papers and Documents Affecting Foreign Interests* (Washington, 1904), 135-46. Article Four referred to *likin* abolition. The treaty was signed October 8, 1903 and proclaimed January 13, 1904.

¹⁷Phillips to Knox, May 18, 1909, 5315/208, RG59, NA.

participate in the loan so that control of likin would not pass into the hands of those uncommitted to its abolition, and so that the United States would be able to support China in such reform endeavors in the future.¹⁸

Having underlined the assurances to Conger and the likin agreement, Washington became specific in its demands. In accordance with the Conger pledges, the State Department declared, U.S. participation in the Hukuang loan must be on the basis of complete equality.¹⁹ Claiming that “positive and unequivocal” assurances to Conger had envisaged for the United States a half share (two countries being involved) in the Hankow-Szechuan line, Huntington Wilson said that American bankers would be satisfied with a twenty-five percent participation in a four-power Hukuang concession. This came to mean an equal, or fourth, share in the financing and providing of materials for the whole road as well as in the number of engineers and auditors.²⁰ Such equal participation is what President Taft solicited in his telegram to the Prince Regent of July, 1909. In an earlier cable, the State Department instructed Chargé H. P. Fletcher in Peking to “solemnly warn” China that the United States would accept nothing less than “equal participation in the present loan.”²¹

¹⁸Knox to Peking, London, Berlin, Paris (tels.), June 12, 1909, 5315/227, 228, 229, 230, RG59, NA.

¹⁹Knox to London, Berlin, Paris (tels.), June 9, 1909, 5315/226B, RG59, NA.

²⁰Huntington Wilson to London (tel.), July 9, 1909, 5315/338; also see Fletcher to Knox (tel.), July 14, 1909, 5315/348, E.C.B.(Far Eastern Division) to Huntington Wilson, July 29, 1909, 5315/385, Grenfel to Morgan and Company (tel.), July 27, 1909, 5315/390, RG59, NA.

²¹Taft to Prince Chun (tel.), July 15, 1909, *FRUS, 1909*, 178; Knox to Peking (tel.), July 15, 1909, 5315/348, RG59, NA.

Thus Washington pressed its case for participation in the Hukuang loan. How valid was this case? It was based primarily upon the so-called Conger pledges, described by the State Department as a "solemn obligation."²² Huntington Wilson called them "positive and unequivocal assurances," and William Phillips referred to "the agreement between the United States and China of 1904."²³ Commentators at the time and some later historians did not materially question such contentions. J. O. P. Bland, a British contemporary with considerable experience in financial diplomacy in China, observed that Washington's case properly rested upon an American right to a half share in the financing of the Hankow-Szechuan railroad. Frederick V. Field, in a detailed and complete study of the Chinese Consortiums, maintained that the tripartite agreement of June 6, by including the Hankow-Szechuan line in the Hukuang loan, was directly contrary to the promises given to Conger by the Chinese government. And Henry F. Pringle, in his study of the Taft administration, referred to the Conger pledges as "the 1903 treaty, reiterated the following year," by which "China had promised that American capital would be granted equal opportunity with that of England and the European countries."²⁴

²²Knox to Peking (tel.), June 12, 1909, Straight Papers.

²³Huntington Wilson to London (tel.), July 9, 5315/338, RG59, NA; Phillips to Knox, June 10, 1909, Knox Papers.

²⁴J.O.P. Bland, *Recent Events and Present Policies in China* (Philadelphia, 1912), 273; Field, *China Consortiums*, 16; Henry F. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft* (New York, 1939) II, 689; Herbert Croly, *Willard Straight* (New York, 1924), 290. Later studies have also reported the pledges and their use in the American case; see Scholes, *Taft's Foreign Policies*, 124-47, and Paolo E. Coletta, *The Presidency of William Howard Taft* (Lawrence, 1973), 194.

The Chinese made the first of the putative Conger pledges in 1903. On August 12 of that year Minister Conger called the attention of Prince Ch'ing, head of the Foreign Office, to an article in the London *Times* stating that certain British firms had applied to the Chinese government for a concession to build a railroad from Hsin Yang (in Hunan province) via Hsiang Yang (Hupeh province), to Ch'eng-tu (Szechuan province). The Chinese responded that native Chinese capital would finance the proposed road. The British in turn asked for preference should foreign capital subsequently be required. Conger protested this latter solicitation on the basis of earlier requests by American interests for a similar concession.²⁵ The Chinese Foreign Office sent the first of the "pledges" to Conger three days later. Since it was so important to the American case, it should be quoted at length:

Our board finds on examination that with respect to the building of the Hankow-Szechuan Railway an English company had applied in the year of Kuanghsu [1898] for such a concession, which was not granted; afterwards, in the fourth moon of the present year, the British charge, Mr. Townley, had several times requested that the concession be given to British companies, and at that time our board replied that it had originally been proposed that the Chinese should themselves construct this road; that if in the future it should appear that the capital was not sufficient or that foreign capital ought to be borrowed,

In his careful 1955 study, *The United States and China* (see especially pp. 94-110), Charles Vevier correctly demurs; while not elaborating on alleged "pledges," Vevier nonetheless finds the American position flimsy; 102: "[Chargé] Fletcher admitted that the Conger correspondence...was none too favorable to the American cause. But the Chinese recognized the Conger assurances as valid, thus permitting Fletcher to plead Washington's case."

²⁵Conger to Prince Ch'ing, August 12, 1903, 5315/438, RG59, NA.

since British and American companies had successively applied for concessions to build the road, when the time came applications *could be made* to the British and American companies. In short, when companies of various nationalities apply to China for railway concessions, it must always remain with China to decide the matter. It is not possible to regard an application not granted as conferring any rights or as being proof that thereafter application must first be made to the persons concerned.²⁶

This was the substance of the first pledge to Conger. Evidently it amounted to no more than a rejection of an American entreaty without ruling out the possibility of a future loan, providing China wished to contract one. The further "pledges" involved requests on the part of Conger during 1904 on behalf of two American firms, the Hankow and American Syndicate, represented by Thurlow Weed Barnes, and the China Investment and Construction Company, represented by A. W. Bash. Each petition concerned the proposed Hankow-Szechuan railway. The Chinese Foreign Office refused consideration of these applications and referred Conger to the note quoted above.²⁷

Actually there had been no pledges. The American position of 1909 rested upon earlier appeals rebuffed by China. Thus Ambassador Reid's argument that international law would

²⁶Chinese Foreign Office to Conger, August 15, 1903, 5315/408, RG59, NA. Italics added.

²⁷Conger to Prince Ch'ing, January 20, 1904, 5315/439, Same to Same, July 6, 1904, 5315/441, Chinese Foreign Office to Conger, January 30, 1904, 5315/440, Prince Ch'ing to Conger, July 18, 1904, 5315/442, RG59, NA.

uphold the American position was invalid, because there was no concession for international law to uphold. The confusion of the State Department while developing its case only underscored the tenuousness of the American position. Even before the Taft administration entered office, Minister Rockhill (who, interestingly, had edited a monumental collection of agreements with and concerning China and Korea),²⁸ reported that the Chinese apparently had made assurances to the British government regarding the financing of railways in central China. But Rockhill did not mention an American claim. Significantly, the new Secretary of State, Philander Chase Knox, showed little initial distress over the omission of any confirmed American rights.²⁹ It was William Phillips who first recalled the "ledges."³⁰ Even then, the Department had only the vaguest notion as to what these pledges were. At various times it referred to the "pledges of 1903" and "pledges of 1904," apparently unaware that there was any kind of continuum to the Conger correspondence. As late as July 6, 1909, in fact, Washington could not find any of the Conger notes! Huntington Wilson was in a frenzy. "It is shocking," he lectured Peking Chargé Fletcher, "that such important documents were not all copied at the time."³¹ Meanwhile, Ambassador Reid and the representatives of the American group in London pressed Washington for copies of the Conger promises so as to bolster the American position in negotiations among the various

²⁸See Rockhill, *Treaties*.

²⁹Rockhill to Elihu Root (Secretary of State), January 7, 1909, 5315/183, Knox to Rockhill, May 12, 1909, 5315/184; also see Rockhill to Root, December 28, 1908, 5315/174, RG59, NA. Needless to say, the Conger correspondence is not in Rockhill, *Treaties*.

³⁰Phillips to Knox, May 21, 1909, 5315/208, RG59, NA.

³¹Huntington Wilson to Peking, July 6, 1909, 5315/323, RG59, NA.

banking groups then taking place in England.³² This further vexed Huntington Wilson. He answered Reid that the Conger pledges had no place in the London negotiations; they were simply a matter between China and the United States.³³

But the Acting Secretary was only playing a delaying game, for on the same day as his response to Reid, he sent a long cable to Peking demanding the immediate transmission of "the exact substance of the earliest Chinese assurances.... Frame a careful telegram [he instructed], indicating clearly *whatever is necessary to confirm the Department's understanding* of the exact assurances given by China."³⁴ Chargé Fletcher cabled the desired information (containing the essence of the August 12, 1903, request by Conger and the Chinese answer of August 15, 1903, noted above) on July 7, 1909, and two days later Washington sent it on to London. Huntington Wilson understandably insisted that "The text of China's promise does not directly concern the banker's.... The pledge...and its interpretation are official matters of the United States and of China."³⁵

In a letter written to soothe the Acting Secretary's irritation over the Legation's dilatoriness, Fletcher disclosed the labors it took to obtain this less than hoped for pledge. The Chargé had had considerable difficulty in acquiring the corresponden-

³²Reid to Knox (tel.), June 29, 1909, 5315/308, Same to Same(tel.), July 7, 1909, 5315/324, Same to Same (tel.), July 8, 1909, 5315/337, RG59, NA.

³³Huntington Wilson to London (tel.), July 6, 1909, 5315.324, RG59, NA.

³⁴Huntington Wilson to Peking (tel.), July 6, 1909, 5315/323, RG59, NA. Italics added.

³⁵Fletcher to Knox (tel.), July 7, 1909, Huntington Wilson to London (tel.), July 9, 1909, 5315/338, RG59, NA.

ce from the Chinese government. He had "only had it long enough to read it to the stenographer, and would not have been able to get it at all if the parties interested had known of our intentions."³⁶ This odd comment is difficult to assess since, as Fletcher himself pointed out, the Chinese, under increasing U.S. pressure, had finally agreed to American participation in the loan. What matters is that the American case, as based on the Conger pledges, had no substance. Fletcher revealed as much when he finally cabled the notes to Washington. The Chinese, he admitted, "acceded to our request as much on the ground of friendship and policy as by reason of these assurances."³⁷

Furthermore, the added argument regarding likin reform depended upon a strange reading of that earlier agreement. Perhaps the United States should have protested the terms of the loan or at least demanded a loan security other than the internal tax. Instead, the Americans accepted likin as security. Some critics protested, contending that Washington's obligation was to help end likin, not perpetuate it. The State Department's response was curt. "This objection," a Department memorandum of late September insisted, "is based more upon a question of policy than upon one of right and can be disposed of by the mere statement that the Government is at perfect liberty to change its policy at any time it sees fit to do so." This remark is striking since it is the only reference to the likin issue in an otherwise long

³⁶Fletcher to Knox, July 8, 1909, 5315/498, RG59, NA.

³⁷Fletcher to Knox (tel.), July 7, 1909, 5315/338.

defense of Consortium policy.³⁸ Apparently the likin issue was a liability rather than an asset to the American case.

In the end, U.S. diplomatic pressure, not a legal case, succeeded in obtaining American participation in the first Chinese Consortium. In addition to Taft's personal cable to the Prince regent, the State Department applied constant pressure on Peking, warning that it might reconsider its past policy of friendliness and cooperation with China, and going so far as to threaten an end to the remission of the Boxer indemnity.³⁹ The European groups and their governments, pressed constantly by Washington and anxious to avoid a break, finally succumbed. The groups also came to believe that it would be difficult to enforce their own "shadowy loan guarantees" in China if they now denied America's claims.⁴⁰

There were cogent reasons for embarking on an expanded policy in Asia,⁴¹ yet the curious recourse to a legally binding pledge when there was so little basis for it, detracted from what otherwise may well have been an understandable diplomatic activity. The legitimacy of international law and the maintenance of principled relations among nations are goals to be sought and used. But this policy initiative derived originally from perceived national interests and geopolitical considerations, not from a preliminary legal right.

³⁸"The Chinese Loan," unsigned memorandum, dated September 30, 1909, Knox Papers. It is of note, however, that Willard Straight urged finding a substitute for likin. See Scholes, *Taft's Foreign Policies*, 130.

³⁹Scholes, *Taft's Foreign Policies*, 139.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 143.

⁴¹See John Allphin Moore, Jr., "The Expansion of America's Open Door Policy in China," *Prologue* 15 (Spring 1983).

Because America's "dollar diplomacy" in Asia is such an important part of the story of U.S. foreign relations in the twentieth century, history should record clearly its origins.

DETECTING AGGRESSION ABROAD OR AT HOME?: A REJOINDER TO "FDR'S DAY OF INFAMY"

by

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This rejoinder takes issue with Frederick W. Marks III's recent contention that the American public would have supported a defense buildup in order to deter German and Japanese aggression, and that Roosevelt's defense program fell short despite public support for increased appropriations. Evidence for this thesis is opinion polls which reveal that as early as 1936 ninety percent of Americans wanted a larger air force while seventy percent favored an expanded navy.¹ Without doubt, opinion polls of the late 1930s reflect such views. Between 1935 and 1940, a large majority of Americans, 75% in 1935 and 65% in 1940, favored increased government expenditures for the navy, army, and air force.² Moreover there were a number of Congressional, military, and church leaders, as well as academicians who argued that the U.S. needed to be militarily prepared for war.

¹Marks, "FDR's Day of Infamy: Fifty Year's Later," *SHAFR Newsletter*, 23:3 (September 1992):41.

²Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion, 1935-1946*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951):939-943.

However, could Roosevelt have worked within the “parameters of American public opinion, and...the requirements of the New Deal domestic agenda” to create a viable deterrent to German expansion? The answer is no. Roosevelt would have had to make a convincing case that a German takeover of Poland threatened American security and justified a military buildup. This was almost impossible in the years preceding World War II. Americans were unsure if Germany even presented a threat to the U.S. When asked by pollsters if they thought the United States would have to fight Germany again in their lifetime, forty-six percent responded “yes” in March 1938, and by May 1939, the percentage had dropped to thirty-nine. Not until May 1940 did sixty-five percent of Americans believe Germany would attack the United States if it defeated England, France, and Poland. It would still require the fall of France in June 1940 to convince Americans that U.S. and British security were linked, and that providing Britain with military aid was a deterrent to German expansion against Britain as well as the U.S.³

If it took Americans so long to perceive German expansion as a threat, then why did many Americans support a military buildup? The answer is simple: the ultimate goal was defense of the U.S. proper and its territories, not deterrence of aggression in some other part of the world. Although most Americans approved of Roosevelt’s handling of the defense

³Ibid., p. 774; American insecurity was reflected in the fact that in June 1940, eighty-five percent of the public did not believe the U.S.’s armed services were strong enough “so that the United States is safe today from attack by any foreign powers.” In August, 88.3% believed the U.S. should “arm to the teeth at any expense to be prepared for any trouble” if Germany and Italy won the war in Europe. Ibid., p. 942.

program between 1938-41,⁴ it is doubtful that Roosevelt would have had support for his rearmament program if it was linked with deterring aggression elsewhere. Public support for a general buildup is not the same as one premised on deterrence abroad. Americans placed no constraints on Roosevelt's defense buildup as long as the goal was to protect U.S. security. It was not the isolationists who sought to prevent war by foregoing military preparations that limited Roosevelt's maneuverability, but those who argued for preparedness to prevent attack against the U.S. Some opposed a "New Deal in national defense," railed against the "Merchants of death" and profits from blood, and opposed intervention abroad. But the consensus among many Americans was that a stronger defense would insure America's security and keep America out of some foreign conflict.⁵ If

⁴In 1938 63.6% of those polled approved of Roosevelt's rearmament policy. After Roosevelt asked for an increase in the defense budget of twenty-eight percent in 1940, sixty-eight percent thought this was "just right." Eighty-six percent of Americans approved of Roosevelt's \$1 billion increase over the \$2 billion already set aside by Congress to buildup the respective military services. When Roosevelt ran for a third term, fifty-one percent of those polled in October believed Roosevelt would do a better job at arming the country. Only 28.2% held the same view of Wendell Willkie. Throughout 1941, seventy percent of Americans approved of Roosevelt's defense policies. See, *Ibid.*, pp. 940-943.

⁵For views from a very conservative magazine, see, Wm. McDonnell, Jr., "Preparation Against War," *National Republican*, 21:5 (September 1933):15-16; Editorial, "Time to Think of National Defense," *Ibid.*, 21:8 (December 1933):11; Edward A. Hayes, "U.S. Obligation for Defense," *Ibid.*, 21:9 (January 1934):1-2,30; Col. Roy F. Farrand, "Peace By Preparedness," *Ibid.*, 22:1 (May 1934):3-4,30; Bruno Kleeman, "National Defense for Peace," *Ibid.*, 22:7 (December 1934):21,26; Clark H. Woodward, "Propaganda Injures Defense," *Ibid.*, 22:8 (January 1935):1-2; George H. Dern, "Armies Do Not Start Wars," *Ibid.*, 22:11 (March 1935):1-2,22; For arguments against a "New Deal in national defense," see, General Johnson Hagood, "Should America Have a New Deal in National Defense?," *The Congressional Digest*, 13 (April 1934):111,113,115; George H. Dern, *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 109; Editorial, "Pacifistic Piffle," *Scientific American*, 154 (February 1936):64; Johnson Hagood, *We Can Defend America*, (Garden City:

Roosevelt had sought a defense buildup in order to possibly deter Hitler from invading Poland, there would have been a backlash against Roosevelt very much like what happened in 1937 after his Quarantine Speech in Chicago. The concern for most Americans throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s was that Roosevelt might lead the country into war. Numerous critics of the administration made such charges, and the issue was used by some isolationists against Roosevelt in the 1940 election campaign.⁶ Even when Americans supported Roosevelt's lend-lease, they did so out of belief that it would prevent U.S. entry into another European conflict.

Thus it is clear that Americans were not in favor of deterring aggression in far off lands before late 1940, but only in preventing attack against U.S. possessions. If this was the case, why were there not more demands for a defense buildup in order to deter attack against America's West Coast and

Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1937); Stephen and Joan Raushenbush, *War Madness*, (Washington, D.C.: National Home Library Foundation, 1937):53; Bernard M. Baruch, "Be Prepared!," *Review of Reviews*, 95:4 (April 1937):59; Arthur Brisbane, "Peace Through Default of Military Talent," *Ibid.*, 95:1 (January 1937):73; "Demosthenes and Hiram Johnson Advocate a Bigger, Better Navy," *Golden Book Magazine*, 20:118 (October 1934):438-440; R. Ernest Dupuy and George Fielding Eliot, *If War Comes*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937):328-331.

⁶See the liberal critique by John T. Flynn, *Country Squire in the White House*, (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1940):98-107; For remarks from conservatives, Hugh S. Johnson, *Hell-Bent For War*, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941); Herbert C. Hoover, *Shall We Send Our Youth to War?*, (New York: Coward-McCann, 1939); Finally a Marxist analysis by Lawrence Dennis, *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*, (New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940); According to Herbert Parmet, "any crisis that could be interpreted as indicating that FDR wanted to lead the country into battle could carry Willkie to the Presidency." See Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, *Never Again: A President Runs for a Third Term*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968):252.

Pacific territories? Again the answer is simple. Concern over Japanese expansion⁷ did not translate into action or calls for preparation in the Pacific because Americans did not perceive the Japanese as a threat for much of this period. In fact Japan continued to be viewed by some as a friend and not a potential enemy.⁸ In May 1939, only twenty percent of Americans believed that the U.S. would "have to fight Japan within the next ten years." Only twenty-five percent felt that Japan and the U.S. would go to war in their lifetime. Even when asked if Japan would pose a "serious threat to the peace of the United States" over the next fifty years, only twenty-six percent said "yes." By December 1939, more Americans believed that there would be a war between the U.S. and Germany, or the U.S. and Russia than Japan.⁹ There was not an even overwhelming majority of Americans who favored

⁷For public opinion before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, see Eleanor Tupper and George McReynolds, *Japan in American Public Opinion*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937):283-370; For public opinion afterward, see Cantril and Strunk, *Public Opinion*, p. 1081.

⁸For the argument that America's economic interests, except for tobacco and cotton, in the Far East were not vital, see Miriam S. Farley, *America's Stake in the Far East*, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936):12-13, 37; For economic cooperation, see, William J. Baxter, *Japan and America Must Work Together: A Program For American Recovery That Will Work*, (New York: International Economic Research Bureau, 1940); Some saw Japan as an ally against communism. See Ralph Townsend, *Asia Answers*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1936):244-245, 248-249; For the argument that expansion was necessary for Japanese livelihood, see, Miriam S. Farley, *The Problem of Japanese Trade Expansion in the Post-War Situation*, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940):69-70; Boake Carter and Thomas H. Healy, *Why Meddle In The Orient? Facts, Figures, Fictions, and Follies*, (New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1938); There were those who did view Japan as a threat. See for example, Wayne Francis Palmer, "Islands, or Else--," *New Outlook*, 163 (February 1934):37-41; William Henry Chamberlain, "Naval Bases In The Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, 15:3 (April 1937):484-494.

⁹Cantril and Strunk, *Public Opinion*, p. 774.

declaring war on Japan if the Japanese expanded into the Dutch East Indies or Singapore. Not until September 1940 did fifty-one percent of Americans support risking war to “keep Japan from becoming more powerful,” and not until October 1941, did 33.8% of Americans hold the view that “Japan has gone far enough and we should place our fleet across her path and tell her another step means war.”¹⁰

If there was a growing insecurity vis-à-vis Japan, why did Americans fail to call for a buildup prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor? One reason is because Americans believed that the U.S. already had sufficient power to defeat Japan. When asked in November 1941 if the U.S. navy was “strong enough to defeat the Japanese navy,” seventy-three percent said “yes” while only three percent said “no.”¹¹ Another reason is because of American contempt for the Japanese and Japan’s attempt to create economic autonomy for itself. Many in the U.S. government, as Marks points out, advocated stronger defenses, but they were skeptical at the same time that Japan would attempt and win a naval race against the U.S.¹² Racial prejudice blinded Americans to the possibility of a Japanese strike against the U.S. in general, and Hawaii in particular.¹³ Even if the administration believed that Japan posed a threat, it is doubtful that it could have made a persuasive argument for building up defenses in order to deter a Japanese attack.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 961, 1076.

¹¹Ibid., p. 942.

¹²Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares For Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987):63.

¹³David Kahn, “The United States Views Germany and Japan in 1941,” *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before The Two World Wars*, ed. Ernest R. May (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986):476-478, 496-497.

Marks claims that it "seems inescapable, therefore, that it was FDR, and FDR alone, who sabotaged the nation's chance for preparedness."¹⁴ Such a conclusion is too harsh in light of the evidence presented above. Americans approved of Roosevelt's defense policy right up to 1941, and there is little evidence that suggests that Americans wanted the defense program to expand beyond Roosevelt's proposals. With regard to Japan, Americans were confident, maybe too confident, that enough was being done to protect the U.S. from attack. Defense at home, not deterrence abroad, was the publicly supported U.S. policy until almost the beginning of the war. If one must assign blame, Roosevelt should not share the onus alone.

POWER IN THE COLD WAR: A POP QUIZ

by

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(SHAFR members are invited to test their knowledge of "power" by identifying the authors of the titles below. Answers and "power ratings" appear at the end.)

Throughout the twentieth century America has had *A Covenant with Power*, but in the Cold War historians have focused on *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*. The problem of *American Power* emerged under Harry Truman and led to a conflict over *Truth and Power* in the early Cold War.

¹⁴Marks, "FDR's Day," p. 41.

As Truman faced *The Awesome Power* of the Presidency, he tried to merge *Power and Diplomacy* to contain *Soviet Power*. Although it held *A Preponderance of Power* in the world, the United States soon discovered *The Limits of Power*. Although the 1950's were still *The Time of Power* for Washington and John Foster Dulles sought *The Road to Power*, increasingly Dwight Eisenhower struggled with *The Ordeal of Power*.

John Kennedy accepted both *The Obligations of Power* and *The Discipline of Power* while Lyndon Johnson demonstrated *The Exercise of Power*. American involvement in Vietnam, however, revealed *The Arrogance of Power* and led to *The Diffusion of Power* forcing Richard Nixon to preside over *The Retreat of American Power*.

While Henry Kissinger understood *The Uses of Power*, he also suffered *The Anguish of Power* and his actions in Chile finally forced him to pay *The Price of Power*. *The Crisis of Power* under Nixon led to the Watergate scandal, *A Witness to Power* abuses in the White House.

Gerald Ford's diplomacy was limited by *Oil Power*, but Jimmy Carter hoped to offer *Morality, Reason, and Power* by combining *Power and Principle*. *In the Absence of Power* Carter was unable to overcome the influences of *The Power Peddlers* in Washington.

Since World War II American Policy has combined *Presidents, Public Opinion and Power*. Leaders have shown *The Faces of Power* forcing historians to deal constantly with *The Riddle of Power*.

The Answers - Authors and Titles List

- 1) Lloyd Gardner, *A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan* (1984).
- 2) Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (1990).
- 3) John Taft, *American Power: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Globalism* (1989).
- 4) Hans Morgenthau, *Truth and Power* (1970).
- 5) R. F. Haynes, *The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander-in-Chief* (1973).
- 6) Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (1958).
- 7) Jonathan Steele, *Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign Policy* (1983).
- 8) Melvin Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, Truman, and the Cold War* (1992).
- 9) Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (1979).
- 10) Richard Goold-Adams, *The Time of Power* (1962).
- 11) Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power* (1982).
- 12) John Emmett Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (1963).
- 13) Harlan Cleveland, *The Obligations of Power* (1966).
- 14) George Ball, *The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure* (1968).
- 15) Rowland Evans and Richard Novak, *Lyndon Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (1966).
- 16) J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (1966).
- 17) W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay on Recent History* (1972).
- 18) Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (1973).
- 19) David Landau, *Henry Kissinger: The Uses of Power* (1972).

- 20) John Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (1976).
- 21) Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power* (1983).
- 22) John Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power* (1987).
- 23) Carl Solberg, *Oil Power* (1972).
- 24) Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (1986).
- 25) Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (1982).
- 26) Haynes Johnson, *In the Absence of Power* (1988).
- 27) Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, *The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold American Foreign Policy* (1977).
- 28) Terry L. Deibel, *Presidents, Public Opinion, and Power: The Nixon, Carter, and Reagan Years* (1987).
- 29) Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson* (1968).
- 30) Robert Shogan, *The Riddle of Power: Presidential Leadership from Truman to Bush* (1991).

Power Rating

25-30 correct. **POWER EXPERT** (You know and love power! You may be strangely attracted to Henry Kissinger.)

18-24 correct. **MODERATE POWER** (You appreciate power, but do not lust for it. You may become an Assistant Secretary of State.)

12-17 correct. **MINOR POWER** (You need to improve your knowledge of power. Review the life of Averell Harriman.)

0-11 correct. **POWERLESS** (You have no real interest in power. Consider moving into social history.)

STANLEY K. HORNBECK AND JAPANESE AGGRESSION, 1941

by

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In the forty years after 1945, American foreign policy leaders frequently invoked lessons from the World War II era in order to justify and explain American cold war policy. One of the lessons often cited was the need to avoid the repetition of events such as the Munich Conference, which represented an appeasement of German aggression. Appeasement, it was argued, brought about more aggression and, eventually, a very large war. The lesson, therefore, was to stand up to aggression and, thereby, deter further aggression and avoid a larger war. All of us can cite American cold war exercises which invoked this lesson from the past.¹

What seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle of analogies is the fact that the World War II period also provides cases in which arguments calling for standing firm against aggression turned out to be formulas for enlarging aggression and bringing on a general war. An instructive example of this kind of argument can be found in Stanley Hornbeck's recommendations in 1941 about how to deal with Japan.

¹For a recent analysis of the influence of historical analogies on Vietnam War policy, see Yuen Foong Khong *Analogies at War* (Princeton, 1992). See also Ernest May *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: 1973). Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976).

In 1941, Stanley Hornbeck held the position of Adviser on Political Relations (Far East) in the United States Department of State. Hornbeck had headed the department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs from 1928 to 1937. He was a major adviser on East Asian issues to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

The purpose of this analysis is neither to locate Hornbeck's place in the foreign policy process nor to examine his conception of American interest in East Asia. These topics have been examined elsewhere.² Instead, the purpose here is to take Hornbeck's 1941 views on Japan as an example of the hard line against aggression and to demonstrate how this particular hard line argument was seriously flawed.

Hornbeck's recommendations about standing firm against Japan in 1941 originated in his views about the nature of Japanese foreign policy in the period between 1904 and 1941. Hornbeck held that "militant militaristic elements" took control of Japanese policy in 1931 and continued to hold sway in 1941. These militarist elements, he claimed, were responsible for the decade-long pattern of Japanese aggression. While the militarists of the 1930s were an especially aggressive bunch, the diplomacy they inspired was very much in line with that practiced by Japan throughout the early twentieth century. This diplomacy, Hornbeck argued, was a "diplomacy backed by threats, implied threats, or inferred

²James C. Thomson, Jr., "The Role of the Department of State," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.), *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941* (New York, 1973) 81-106; Michael Barnhart, "Hornbeck Was Right: The Realist Approach to American Policy Toward Japan" in Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray (eds.), *Pearl Harbor Reexamined* (Honolulu, 1990) 65-74.

threats of force.” According to Hornbeck, Japan had gained a great deal by employing the diplomacy of threat.³

It was imperative, Hornbeck contended, for other nations to stop rewarding this Japanese diplomacy. Negotiations with Japan which sought to reach some kind of accommodation were just such a reward and, as such, seriously mistaken. Japan viewed negotiations with the United States as providing cover for additional aggression and deflecting American opposition to such aggression. This being the case, Hornbeck argued, conversations with Japan’s militarist leaders would only encourage Japanese aggression and detract from American security interests.⁴

Hornbeck so thoroughly convinced himself of the futility of negotiating with Japanese officials that he dismissed all Japanese proposals that promised to alter Japanese policy. After the United States froze Japanese assets and initiated an oil embargo against Japan in mid-1941, Japan proceeded to make a series of proposals which, if implemented, would have headed off certain Japanese acts of aggression. These proposals held the promise of curtailing a further Japanese southward advance as well as a move northward against the Soviet Union in exchange for a resumption of trade and a diminished American commitment to China.⁵ Hornbeck would have none of it. He remained steadfast in his insistence

³U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941: The Far East*, IV (Washington, 1956), 147, 192. (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.)

⁴*Ibid.*, 162, 190, 212-13.

⁵Ike Nobutaka, ed., *Japan’s Decision for War* (Stanford, 1967) 136, 209-211; U.S. Department of State, *FRUS: Japan, 1931-1941*, II (Washington, 1943) 637-640, 709-710, 716, 755-756.

that any agreement with Japan's 1941 leaders would simply perpetuate the source of Japanese aggression. Hornbeck went so far as to assert that even if Japan offered to withdraw from China, which the Japanese never did, the United States would be unwise to accept such a settlement.⁶ He took the position that Japan had to do more than change policy in order to satisfy the United States.

According to Stanley Hornbeck, Japanese leaders had to go. Aggressive Japanese policy was the result of bad Japanese leaders, and the bad leaders could no longer be tolerated. "So long as the element which has controlled Japan during recent years remains in control of Japan," Hornbeck argued, "there is no chance whatever of Japan's becoming a peaceful state, of there being created and maintained the conditions of peace in the Far East, and of there being real security in the Pacific Ocean."⁷ The United States had to take the hard line against Japan and resist the temptation of negotiated settlement in order to see to it that the "cancer of militant militarism" was "destroyed and eliminated in Japan."⁸

The United States could afford to take this kind of hard line, Hornbeck reasoned, because Japan would not move directly against the United States. Hornbeck believed that the long war with China had left Japan "half beaten" and "substantially exhausted."⁹ Japan simply did not possess the means to attack the United States. There was no reason, then, to fear

⁶U.S. Department of State, *FRUS: 1941, The Far East*, IV, 191, 346-347, 399, 428, 512, 568-569.

⁷*Ibid.*, 415.

⁸*Ibid.*, 398-399.

⁹*Ibid.*, 412.

that a tough United States policy might back Japan into a corner and produce a desperate Japanese attack against the United States. "The Japanese government," Hornbeck announced at the end of August, "has no intention of making war on the United States."¹⁰ By the end of November of 1941, Hornbeck was confident that the American hard line, which continued the oil embargo and required that Japan leave China, carried no great danger. He still insisted that Japan would never wage war against the United States.¹¹ When Hornbeck drew these conclusions, Pearl Harbor was less than two weeks away.

Hornbeck's mistaken assessment of Japanese military ability and intent was just the most obvious flaw in his analysis of Japan in 1941. Several other general shortcomings in his perspective also deserve mention.

Hornbeck's analysis managed to disassociate a policy of firmness from the reasonable goal of such a policy. Presumably the purpose of a hard line foreign policy is to influence or alter the behavior of another nation-state. In the case of Japan this meant deterring and diminishing Japanese aggression. Hornbeck simply refused to budge from the position that negotiating any agreement with Japan was a mistake. Such agreements would have provided a test of the Japanese willingness to alter their behavior. Hornbeck's refusal to tolerate any agreement represented, in effect, an unwillingness to examine closely if the policy of firmness was actually working.

¹⁰Ibid., 414, 108, 419, 427.

¹¹Ibid., 672-674.

Hornbeck, instead, insisted that Japanese leaders had to depart before any agreements were forged. It was reasonable in 1941 to be concerned about the designs and practices of Japan's leadership. The record of Japanese aggression was clear, and it was far from certain that this aggression had reached its limits. Hornbeck, however, took reasonable suspicions and turned them into an unproductive intransigence. The chances of altering Japanese behavior without a general war were diminished greatly by insisting that "militant militarists" had to be eliminated in Japan. It would not have been easy under any circumstances to gain a change in Japanese behavior. But insisting that Japanese leaders had to pass muster by the United States before serious negotiations took place was a formula for disaster. Nation-states are simply not inclined to accept significant foreign interference in their internal affairs. Leaders of nation-states do not respond kindly to foreign calls for their own elimination. Hornbeck's approach required Japan to do both of these distasteful things.

Hornbeck also failed to demonstrate any empathy for the position of Japan's leaders. He refused to consider seriously the possibility that the oil embargo could corner Japan and cause that nation to strike out against the United States. As early as March of 1941, Hornbeck asserted that such a concern about economic sanctions was simply "nonsense".¹² He maintained this position through the remainder of the year. Hornbeck also did not appreciate how difficult it was for Japan to withdraw quickly from China. The Japanese aggression there represented an enormous commitment of men and resources. No Japanese government, militarist in nature or not, would have been able to implement a policy which

¹²Ibid., 108.

failed to somehow redeem this great commitment. Japanese leaders of every stripe were unable to admit fault in China and quickly withdraw. Japan, in this regard, was evidencing how difficult it can be for a major power to withdraw from a major commitment. Hornbeck was unable to appreciate this difficulty.

In sum, the basic problem with Hornbeck's analysis was not its opposition to Japanese aggression, but its inflexibility and insensitivity. Hornbeck's determination to oppose Japanese aggression extended to the intransigent point of insisting that changes in Japanese behavior should not satisfy the United States. Negotiations had to be preceded by nothing less than a transformation of Japanese politics. Hornbeck's point of view also reflected the belief that a hard line policy and empathy were incompatible. This is a most dangerous position to take. Imagine, if you will, what the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis might have been if John Kennedy's appreciation of Khrushchev's position had been like that of Stanley Hornbeck's toward Japan. Hornbeck lost sight of the fact that empathy is often a pre-requisite for a successful hard line policy. Hornbeck's kind of hard line advocacy, characterized by inflexibility and insensitivity, was a formula for general war and mass destruction. It serves as an instructive example of how not to carry out a hard line against aggression.

MINUTES

The meeting opened at 8 p.m. Council members present were John Gaddis, George Herring, Linda Killen, Warren Kimball, Robert McMahan, Michael Schaller, Robert Schulzinger and Allan Spetter. Others present were Henry Brands, William Brinker, Daniel Helmstadter, Walter Hixson, Joan Hoff, Michael Hogan, Page Putnam Miller, Wilson Miscamble, Geoffrey Smith, William Walker, Ralph Weber, and Betty Unterberger.

1. Page Putnam Miller reported to Council about ongoing deliberations related to declassification of government documents and asked Council to endorse a resolution related to the issue. Council unanimously endorsed the following resolution:

Resolved, that the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History urges President-Elect Bill Clinton to revise the executive order on classification/declassification to streamline the declassification process to ensure that all but the most sensitive records over thirty years old are available to the public and to scholars; and

Resolved, the National Coordinating Committee send copies of this resolution to those Congressional leaders who have oversight responsibilities for information policy.

2. Henry Brands reported to Council that the Bernath Dissertation Award Committee had chosen Ms. Shannon Smith of Cornell University to receive the award for 1992.

3. Joan Hoff reported to Council that the Myrna Bernath Fellowship Award for 1992 also would be presented to Ms. Shannon Smith of Cornell University.

4. Joan Hoff then informed Council about efforts by the Publications Committee to obtain proposals from presses interested in publishing *Diplomatic History*.

5. John Gaddis informed Council about an additional \$25,000 gift from Dr. Bernath. The gift will be used to finance publication of another edition

of the *Guide*. Any remaining money will be added to the Bernath Scholarship Support Fund in honor of Dr. Bernath.

6. Michael Hogan presented his annual report on the activities of *Diplomatic History*. He asked Council to approve three new members of the editorial board: James F. Goode, Gerald K. Haines and Dennis Merrill. Council approved the additions to the editorial board. Hogan then asked Council to approve a resolution thanking Ohio State University for its support of *Diplomatic History*. Council approved the resolution. Finally, Hogan asked that Council approve new guidelines covering policy and procedures for reprints from *Diplomatic History*. Council approved the following guidelines:

I. Reprint Permission Policy

The editorial office will notify authors that their articles are being reprinted and of their right to one-half of the reprint fee. Of course, we would continue to encourage authors to contribute their half of the fee to the Rappaport Journal Fund.

II. Photocopy Reproduction Fees for Educational Purposes

SHAFR will now charge \$.05 per page to all applicants wishing to bulk photocopy *DH* articles for instructional use. It would be understood that permission is granted for *one-time* use only, and that use in any future photocopy packet must be requested anew. Under this arrangement the charge to the applicant is nominal and yet would add to the Rappaport Journal Fund.

7. Daniel Helmstadter of Scholarly Resources distributed copies of a new brochure and explained how it will be used to publicize *Diplomatic History*.

8. Allan Spetter, acting for Doug Little, chair of the program committee for the 1993 summer conference, distributed copies of a report from Little indicating that there will be some 33 sessions between Thursday evening (June 17) and early Sunday afternoon (June 20).

9. Council approved having the 1994 summer conference at Bentley College in Boston.

10. John Gaddis reported to Council that he had taken steps to begin the process of establishing continuity on the program committee for the summer conferences.

11. Allan Spetter then reported the election results to Council. The new vice president is Mel Leffler, new Council members are Lloyd Ambrosius and Joyce Goldberg, and the new member of the Nominating Committee is Bob Schulzinger.

12. Allan Spetter then presented the proposed operating budget for 1993 and the financial report for the year ending Dec. 15, 1992. He explained that with a rapidly increasing membership approaching 1,600 and the new dues structure, there should be a budget surplus in the coming year. Spetter informed Council that both the CPA who prepares SHAFR's tax returns and the insurance company which currently provides a performance bond for all officers of SHAFR, taking note of the growth in the various endowment funds, have recommended that there be a review of how finances are handled, with an emphasis on accounting procedures and money management. Council agreed that the Finance Committee should conduct such a review and make recommendations.

13. Warren Kimball, incoming president, informed Council that he planned to create two *ad hoc* committees: one committee will review the nomination process; the other committee will explore what SHAFR can do to increase minority representation in the field of diplomatic history.

The meeting adjourned at 10:15 p.m.

BUDGET

Proposed SHAFR Budget for 1993

SHAFR's anticipated revenue sources for 1993 are as follows:

Membership dues from 1,100 regular members	\$33,000
Membership dues from 300 student members	5,000
Membership dues from 100 institutional, retired and unemployed members	1,000
Interest on Regular and Money Market checking accounts	700
Sales of Guides and Mailing Labels	<u>1,000</u>
	\$40,700

SHAFR's anticipated expenditures for 1993 are as follows:

<i>Diplomatic History</i> (Scholarly Resources)	\$21,500
Copy editor for <i>Diplomatic History</i>	2,500
General operating (postage, stationary, supplies, telephone, xeroxing, secretary-treasurer expenses)	2,500
Contribution to National Coordinating Committee	2,500
Convention expenses (AHA, OAH)	1,000
Susan Shah (to manage endowment accounts, pay expenses)	1,500
Tax preparation	750
Printing labels	<u>750</u>
	\$33,000

Financial Report for SHAFR-Dec. 16, 1991 to Dec. 15, 1992

Carryover from 1991:

Checking Account	\$3,229.81
Money Market Account	<u>31,226.95</u>
	\$34,456.76

Receipts:

AHA Luncheons, 1991-1992	1,386.00
Back Issues, <i>Diplomatic History</i>	300.00
Bernath Awards Reimbursement	6,300.00
Bernath Student Subsidy	2,255.50
Bernath Trust Reimbursement	828.60
<i>Diplomatic History</i> Subsidy	2,000.00
Dues	24,803.94

Endowment Contributions	3,833.00
Ferrell Award Reimbursement	1,000.00
Graebner Award Reimbursement	1,000.00
<i>Guides Sold</i>	270.00
Holt Award Reimbursement	1,500.00
Interest	1,167.68
Link Award Reimbursement	970.00
Mailing Labels Sold	600.00
Summer 1991 Conference	2,151.37
Summer 1992 Conference	<u>28,910.00</u>
	\$113,732.85

Disbursements:

AHA, 1991	1,254.69
Bernath Awards	6,300.00
Bernath Trust	828.60
CPA	910.00
<i>Diplomatic History</i> , Copy Editors	5,925.00
<i>Diplomatic History</i> , Supplies	444.85
Endowment	3,833.00
Ferrell Award	1,000.00
Gift to Dr. Bernath	118.81
Graebner Award	1,062.26
Holt Award	1,500.00
Insurance	151.00
Link Award	970.00
Mailing Labels	737.01
National Coordinating Committee	2,500.00
Ohio Fee, Bernath Trust, 1991	100.00
Operating Expenses (WSU)	1,000.00
OAH, 1991	250.90
Roster and Research List	40.80
Scholarly Resources (<i>Diplomatic History</i>)	21,356.78
Susan Shah, Fee and Expenses	1,205.34
Summer Conference, 1992	26,812.62

Cash on Hand:

Checking Account, Citizens Federal	3,383.69
Money Market Account, Citizens Federal	<u>32,047.50</u>
	\$113,732.85

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR Guide Alert

The last copies of the *SHAFR Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700* are on sale for \$30.00 to SHAFR members. The *Guides* are available through Allan Spetter, Dept. of History, Wright State, Dayton, OH 45435.

Conference on Vietnam, 1961-1964

A conference on "Vietnam: The Early Decisions" will be held at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas, October 15-17, 1993. Focusing on the years 1961-1964, the conference will examine the early decisions in Vietnam against the general background of the Cold War and the immediate pressure of both the turmoil in Vietnam and the presidential transition in the United States. Speakers will include Larry Berman, Larry Cable, Robert Divine, William Duiker, William Gibbons, George Herring, Andrew Krepinevich, John Newman, Brian VanDeMark, and Lloyd Gardner, who organized the conference. For more information and a registration form, contact Ted Gittinger, LBJ Library, 2313 Red River St., Austin, Texas 78705 (Phone: 512-482-5137; FAX: 512-478-9104). Registration will be free and will include a reception Friday evening, October 15, a luncheon on Saturday, and the closing luncheon on Sunday.

Arkansas Historical Association

Persons desiring to learn more about the history of the home state of President Bill Clinton will find the *Arkansas Historical Quarterly* a stimulating source of information. Published by the Arkansas Historical Association for the past fifty-one years, the journal for 1993 will include articles on a wide range of topics including the end to the convict lease system in Arkansas, photographs taken at Cummins Prison Farm in the 1930s, the transformation of the cotton culture as a result of the cotton picker, and the famous Rust brothers, inventors of the cotton picker. Members of the Arkansas Historical Association, which is dedicated to the furtherance of the research and publication of the history of the state, costs

\$16 per year. The journal and a newsletter are published quarterly and members receive both free of charge. If you wish to join the Association, send \$16 to the Arkansas Historical Association, Department of History, 416 Old Main, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701.

Excerpts from NCC News

Congress Passes Law to Clarify Fair Use of Unpublished Copyrighted Material. Just prior to adjourning, the Senate passed H.R. 4412, a bill to clarify the "fair use" of unpublished copyrighted material, which had been passed by the House in August. The Senate had passed a similar bill almost a year ago; but in the interest of getting something passed before the end of the 102nd Congress, the Senate agreed to the House version. H.R. 4412 states: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that section 107 of Title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 'The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the factors set forth in paragraphs (1) through (4).'" Paragraphs 1 through 4 provide four statutory factors that the courts are instructed to consider in making "fair use" judgments. These are: purpose and character of use; nature of copyrighted material (whether published or unpublished); the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and effect of the use on the market value of copyrighted work. House Report 102-836, which accompanied H.R. 4412, however, concerned scholars, for it seemed to approve only very limited use of copyrighted unpublished material.

With passage of this legislation, the courts will be instructed to make a carefully reasoned and complete consideration of each of the fair use factors set forth in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.

Call for Papers

The second in a series of conferences on America's greatest presidents, "FDR After 50 Years," will be held at Louisiana State University in Shreveport. The Selection Committee welcomes papers and panelists on the general theme of the life, times and legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. All topics and approaches considered, among them are: FDR's Foreign

Policy and FDR's International Impact. Proposal Deadline: October 1, 1994. For more information contact Dr. William D. Pederson, Department of History and Social Sciences, Louisiana State University in Shreveport, One University Place, Shreveport, LA 71115-2301, (318) 797-5337 or 797-5351.

Call for Papers

October 23, 1993, New England Historical Association Fall meeting at Brown University. **Call for papers or proposals on any topic, area or period, by June 15.** Contact Peter Holloran, NEHA Executive Secretary, Pine Manor College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167.

OBITUARY

John Gimbel died July 16, 1992, in Arcata at age 70. A native of Hazelton, N.D., he was a resident of Arcata.

He received his bachelor's degree, *summa cum laude*, in history and German from Luther College, Decorah, Iowa, in 1949; his master's degree in history from the University of Iowa in 1951; and received his doctorate in history, economics and political science from the University of Oregon in 1956. He commenced teaching with an instructorship at Luther College, and he taught subsequently at the University of Maryland; University of Alberta; University of Saskatchewan; Indiana University; Universität Düsseldorf, Germany; and retired as a professor from Humboldt State University in Arcata.

John was the author of several books, *A German Community Under American Occupation*, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military*, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, and, most recently, the 1990 Stanford University publication, *Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitations and Plunder In Postwar Germany*. His important contribution to an understanding of the American occupation of Germany is well documented in Jean Edward Smith's feature review "American Exploitation of Postwar Germany" in *Diplomatic History*, Winter 1993.

The day before he died Gimbel had returned to Arcata after a six-month Fulbright grant where he completed research in Halle, Germany, for another book.

A strong supporter of SHAFR and its activities, John recently finished a three-year term as council member.

His honors, distinctions, and awards include an honorary doctor of letters from Luther College; an Annual Book Prize, American Historical Association; selection as an outstanding professor, California State Universities and Colleges; and numerous fellowships and research grants.

He is survived by his wife, Gisela Gimbel of Arcata; a son, and two daughters.

LETTERS

[The following letter was received by Michael Hogan, Editor of *Diplomatic History*, and was directed to the SHAFR Newsletter. — Editor]

In the Summer 1992 issue of *Diplomatic History* James Matray in his article on Korea states (page 474) "American intervention in Korea thus appeared justified in terms of international law and justice, especially after the United Nations *sanctioned* what many writers portrayed as a noble venture." (My emphasis). Although it is true that many people including historians have attempted to legitimize Truman's intervention in Korea by pointing to the U.N. "sanction" the fact remains that the vote was a violation of the U.N. Charter. This violation should not go unchallenged in a SHAFR publication.

In rereading the Charter of the U.N., article 27 paragraph 2 states "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members *including the concurrent votes of the permanent members.*" (My emphasis). This is very clear and leaves no room for "interpretation." An absence or an abstention does not qualify as an affirmative vote. The only change that has occurred in article 27 is that the Security Council has been enlarged to fifteen members and now

requires nine affirmative votes *including* the votes of the permanent members of the Security Council.

[The June 27, 1950 U.N. resolution “sanctioning” intervention in Korea was carried by only *seven* votes. It just got by. — an amendment by Mr. Schulman addressed to the SHAFR *Newsletter*.]

However, this was not the only violation of the U.N. Charter. Truman’s reliance of the vote of Nationalist China in the Security Council as the representative of the hundreds of millions of the Chinese people, when in fact they had so recently been defeated on the mainland, was ludicrous then and hard to believe now. The U.S. recognized that fact in 1971 when it agreed to the removal of Nationalist China from the Security Council.

Further, the attempt to justify Truman’s intervention rings more hollow when you consider that he had already authorized the commitment of the U.S. Navy and the Air Force to intervene in Korea even *before* the Security Council had met.

Last but not least, Truman’s action in intervening in Korea was a violation of Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution. Truman justified this by claiming his intervention was a “police action.” It is interesting to note that Truman borrowed the term “police action” from the Netherlands, which coined the term to describe its effort to reimpose its colonial rule in Indonesia after World War II by suppressing the indigenous forces fighting for independence.

In the April 1992 issue of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Bruce Cumings, on page 22, reiterates his plea for Korea, “liberty as a nation, and liberty for its people to be what they want to be.” Surely this isn’t asking too much now that the Cold War is over. What possible justification can there be in maintaining some 40,000 odd U.S. troops in South Korea when you consider that South Korea has double the population of North Korea and further, three to eight times the gross national product of North Korea. Perhaps this is Bush’s way of providing jobs, jobs, jobs.

Sincerely yours,

Ephraim Schulman

REGINA BOOKS

Vietnam Conflict Special

America and the Indochina Wars, 1945-1990: A Bibliographical Guide. *Lester H. Brune/Richard Dean Burns*

This basic work supplements Burns and Leitenberg—*The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographical Guide* (1984)—focusing on the consequences of that involvement on American politics, society and strategy.

(1992) \$39.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-43-1] **SHAFR Discount \$23.00**

A Time for Looking Back: Putnam County Veterans, Their Families, and the Vietnam War. *William J. Brinker, ed.*

This volume is based upon forty-nine tape-recorded interviews with citizens of Putnam County, Tennessee. Conducted during 1989-1990, a majority of the interviews are with veterans of the Vietnam conflict and a few are with family members. (published by Tennessee Technological University, 1990). paper \$9.95

SHAFR Price \$6.00.

Teaching the Vietnam War: Resources and Assessments. *Written and compiled by Joe P. Dunn.*

These bibliographical essays critically review the literature of the Vietnam conflict generally, and include specific sub-themes. Includes class outlines. Paper \$8.95

SHAFR Price \$4.00.

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- #2 Lee. *U.S. and Japan* _____ **Brinker.** *Looking Back* _____
- #3 Post. *Ger. Unification* _____ **Dunn.** *Teaching Vietnam War* _____

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SPECIAL SHAFR
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Announcing the new **Monograph Series** issued by The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California. Regina Books is pleased to be the distributor of these informative volumes dealing with contemporary issues.

#1 THE KOREAN WAR: 40-YEAR PERSPECTIVES.
Edited by Chae-Jin Lee.

Essays by *William Stueck*, The Korean War in Historical Perspective; *P. Edward Haley*, The Korean War and United States Strategy; *Harlan W. Jencks*, Some Effects of the War on China; *Chongwook Chung*, The Korean War and Inter-Korean Relations; *B.C. Koh*, The Effects of the War on North Korea; and *Chae-Jin Lee*, The Effects of the War on South Korea.

(1991) \$10.95 paper [ISBN 0-930607-12-0] **SHAFR Discount \$5.00**

#2 THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: CHANGING RELATIONS. Edited by Chae-Jin Lee.

Essays by *Akira Iriye*, Fifty Years of U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1941-1991; *Mike M. Mochizuki*, U.S.-Japan Security Relations in a New Era; *Hideo Sato*, Japanese Relations with the United States in a Changing World; *Leon Hollerman*, Beyond Japan Bashing

(1992) \$9.95 paper [ISBN 0-930607-13-9] **SHAFR Discount \$4.00**

#3 GERMAN UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. Edited by Gaines Post, Jr.

Essays by *Rudy Koshar*, The Shock of "It Was": Memory and German Unification; *Thomas R. Rochon*, The Wall Within: Germans Cope with Unification; *Peter H. Merkl*, Six Groups in Search of a National Consensus; *Helmar Drost*, The Effects of Unification on East Germany's Economy; *Ronald D. Asmus*, National Self-Confidence and International Reticence; Commentary by *Katharina von Ankum*, *Christian Sjøe*, and *Robert G. Moeller*.

(1992) \$10.95 paper [ISBN 0-930607-14-7] **SHAFR Discount \$5.00**

Offer expires July 15, 1993—Individuals only!

PERSONALS

Kinley Brauer has been appointed Director of the International Relations Program of the Institute of International Studies at the University of Minnesota.

In February **Carol Ann Newman Gluck** (Columbia) was one of four alumnae honored by Wellesley College for outstanding achievement. Professor Gluck was cited for her work as "one of the world's foremost scholars and analysts in modern Japanese history and culture."

Warren Cohen has accepted appointment as a distinguished professor at the University of Maryland, Baltimore, to commence in the Fall, 1993.

On December 3-4, 1992, the *Mémorial* Museum, Caen, France, held its third annual *Colloque International* commemorating the 50th anniversary of World War II. This year's conference, entitled "*1942: Le Tournant*," included sessions on global strategy, great battles, intelligence, and Vichy France. The three Americans attending all gave papers. SHAFR member **Stanley L. Falk** discussed 1942 Pacific strategy and operations and also co-chaired the general strategy session. SHAFR member **Arthur Funk** covered aspects of Operation TORCH. Martin Blumenson read a paper on Allied strategy.

George Herring (Kentucky) spent the six months of May to November, 1991, in Dunedin, New Zealand.

Gary Hess (Bowling Green) is serving as the John A. Burns Distinguished Visiting Professor at Hawaii during the Spring Semester.

Christian F. Ostermann has received a dissertation scholarship by the Gerda-Henkel-Foundation for research on "US Policy and the German Democratic Republic, 1949-1961" and is currently researching in Washington.

During January **Thomas G. Paterson** (Connecticut) gave five lectures on the topic "The End of the Cold War and U.S. Foreign Relations" to several audiences in Venezuela. He also interviewed Venezuelan

politicians, including former president Rafael Caldera and academicians in politics and international relations.

William O. Walker III (sometimes of Ohio Wesleyan) is spending this academic year at the University of Miami.

The Kennedy Library Foundation has awarded research grants to the following SHAFR members, **Clark Bonilla** (S. Carolina), **Ge Chen** (Colorado), and **Jonathan Nashel** (Rutgers).

The Lyndon B. Johnson Library has awarded research grants to **Diane B. Kunz** (Yale) and **Robert J. McMahon** (Florida).

The Executive Secretary-Treasurer has announced that the following members have made contributions to SHAFR endowments.

Günter Bischof
Robert Branyan
Robert Butow
Wayne Cole
George Constantinides
Richard Davis
Calvin Davis
Vincent DeSantis
Nolan Fowler
Lawrence Gelfand
Rebecca Goodman

Edythe Groome
Gary Hess
David Hirst
Donald Johnson
Robert Jordan
Larry Kaplan
Jules Karlin
Linda Killen
Andreas Klose
Richard Leopold
J.K. McDonald
Delber McKee

Olav Njolstad
David Pletcher
L. Fletcher Prouty
Paul Roach
Carmela Santoro
Charles Stefan
J.A. Thompson
Daun Van Ee
Richard Weitz
Gerald Wheeler
Nevin Williams

The following members have become life members of SHAFR,

Richard Betts
Raymond Esthus
Masahiro Hosoya
Akira Iriye

Raimund Lammersdorf
Brian Moran
Fumiko Nishizak

John Reilly
Sayuri Shimizu
William Stueck
Kevin Wilkinson

PUBLICATIONS

- Jules R. Benjamin (Ithaca), *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation*. Princeton, 1992. New in paper, ISBN 0-691-02536-3, \$14.95.
- Thomas Borstelmann (Cornell), *Apartheid, Colonialism, and the Cold War: The United States and Southern Africa, 1945-1952*. Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0-19-507942-6, \$27.50.
- H. W. Brands (Texas A&M), *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*. Oxford, 1992. ISBN 0-19-507104-2, \$28.
- Noam Chomsky (MIT), *Deterring Democracy*. Hill and Wang, 1993. Paper, ISBN 374-52349-5, \$15.
- Bruce Cumings (Chicago), *War and Television*. Verso, 1992. ISBN 0-86091-374-0, \$29.95.
- Robert A. Divine (Texas), ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis*. Markus Wiener, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-910129-86-X, \$11.95; cloth, ISBN 0-910129-15-0, \$29.95.
- Robert A. Divine (Texas), *Eisenhower and Sputnik*. Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0-19-505008-8, \$24.95.
- Peter Edwards (Australian War Memorial, Canberra) with Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965*. Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992. ISBN 1-86373-184-9, \$45.
- Akira Iriye (Harvard), *China and Japan in the Global Setting*. Harvard, 1992. ISBN 0-674-11838-3, \$22.50.
- Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers) ed., *America Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Super-Power*. St. Martin's /Roosevelt Institute, 1992. ISBN 0-312-07957-5, \$39.95.

Thomas J. Knock (Southern Methodist), *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*. Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0-19-507501-3, \$27.50.

Walter LaFeber (Cornell), *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992*. McGraw-Hill, 1993. ISBN 0-07-035853-2, \$11.95.

Walter LaFeber (Cornell), *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. Norton, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-393-30964-9, \$12.95; cloth, ISBN 0-393-03434-8, \$22.95.

David Williams McFadden (Fairfield), *Alternative Paths*. Oxford, 1993. ISBN 0-19-507187-5, \$55.

Ernest R. May (Harvard) ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, Blueprint for American Strategy in the Cold War*. St. Martin's, 1993. ISBN 0-312-09445-0, \$35.

Ernest R. May (Harvard) ed., *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. Harvard, 1975. Paper, ISBN 0-674-54341-6, \$14.95.

Wilson D. Miscamble (Notre Dame), *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*. Princeton, 1993. Paper, ISBN 0-691-02483-9, \$16.95.

Joseph M. Siracusa (Queensland, Australia), *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists*, second edition. Regina Books, 1993. Cloth, ISBN 0-941690-46-6, \$19.95; paper, ISBN 0-941690-47-4, \$10.95.

Lawrence S. Wittner (New York), *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953*. (Vol. 1 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*.) Stanford, 1993. ISBN 0-8047-2141-6, \$29.95.

CALENDAR

1993

- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 15-18 The 86th meeting of the OAH will take place in Anaheim with headquarters at the Anaheim Hilton and Towers.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 17-20 The 19th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the University of Virginia.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.

1994

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 6-9 The 108th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in San Francisco. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1993 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1993 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- February 15 Deadline for the 1994 Bernath lecture prize.

The OAH will meet at the Atlanta Hilton and Towers in Atlanta, April 14-17, 1994. The deadline for proposals has passed.

The OAH will meet at the Washington Hilton and Towers in Washington, March 30-April 2, 1995; and at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago, March 28-31, 1996.

[Abbreviated notes describing the society's awards, prizes, and funds appear in the March and September issues of the *Newsletter*. Full descriptions appear in the June and December issues. — editor]

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The lecture, to be delivered at the annual meetings of the Organization of American Historians, will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for research and teaching. Each lecturer will address not specifically his/her own research interests, but broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award will be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies.

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowship

A research fellowship awarded every two years (apply in even-numbered years) for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project.

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship.

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author.