

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations



NEWSLETTER

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REPORT OF FINANCE COMMITTEE, DECEMBER, 1982

It has been a good year. The committee was created in August to oversee SHAFR's funds, which now include the Stuart L. Bernath Accounts: the Book Award, the Speaker/Article Award, the Supplementary Fund, and the Bernath Charitable Annuity Account. In addition, there are the SHAFR Endowment and two new prize accounts in the names of W. Stull Holt and Norman and Laura Graebner. This makes a total of seven separate accounts.

The Endowment Fund is especially noteworthy. It includes the payments of life members plus some surplus accumulations over the past seven years. It was supplemented by gifts of \$2,648.50 plus interest. It now has \$6,810.51, which should yield around \$750.00 in 1983. If the Endowment Fund can grow, as Council envisages it, with additional gifts and interest left to accumulate, it will meet the goal of keeping dues down while enabling SHAFR to pursue its many projects.

SHAFR TRUST, PRIZE, AND ENDOWMENT PORTFOLIO

December 15, 1982. Bonds and notes are listed at face value.

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December 15, 1982. Bonds and notes are listed at face value.			
Stuart L. Bernath Book Award			
Federal Notes	10,000.00		
Bank Account	179.24		<u>10,179.24</u>
Stuart L. Bernath Article/Speaker Award			
Federal Notes	6,000.00		
Bank Account	1,005.63		<u>7,005.63</u>
Stuart L. Bernath Supplementary Account			
Federal Notes	17,000.00		
Corporate Bonds	10,000.00		
Vanguard Account	3,031.67		
Bank Account	2,543.21		<u>32,574.88</u>
Bernath Charitable Remainder Annuity			
Corporate Bonds	20,000.00		
Bank Account	32.12		<u>20,032.12</u>
SHAFR Endowment			
Corporate Bonds	3,000.00		
Bank Account	3,810.51		<u>6,810.51</u>
Holt Fellowship			
Federal Notes	10,000.00		
Bank Account	2,215.92		<u>12,215.92</u>
Graebner Prize			
Bank Account	800.00		<u>800.00</u>
Total:			<u>89,618.30</u>

Gary Hess, Warren Kuehl, Paul Varg

SHAFR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS REPORT

The SHAFR Committee on Government Relations met at the Sheraton Hotel in Washington on December 27, 1982. Committee members present were Milton Gustafson (Chairman), Wayne Cole, Betty Unterberger, and Ronald Spector. Also present were a new committee member for 1983, Waldo Heinrichs, and the incoming and outgoing presidents of SHAFR, Ernest May and Lawrence Gelfand. Others present included Bob Gelman, staff of the House Subcommittee on Government Information and Privacy; Alan Adler, attorney for the Center for National Security Studies; Anna Nelson, representing the OAH Access Committee; and Basil Rauch, Barnard College.

Acting on a request from Council, the Committee decided to recommend continued financial support for the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History (NCC). The agenda for discussion included the following items: the National Archives and Records Service, its budget, limitations on personnel, and possible independence from the General Services Administration; the Office of the Historian of the Department of State; Executive order 12356 on national security information; possible amendments to the Freedom of Information Act; and the opening of the 1950-54 records of the Department of State in the National Archives.

Last year the National Archives was faced with a 16% cut in its budget for FY 1982. After well-publicized House hearings in March, GSA decided to reduce the amount of rent that NARS must transfer to the Public Buildings Service to maintain the Archives Building and the Presidential Libraries; later in the year Congress voted additional funds for the National Archives. All of that came too late to save the jobs of 175 NARS employees (everyone with less than three years of service), and other NARS employees resigned, transferred, or retired. This year the problem is personnel, not funds. GSA wants NARS to reduce its staff by an additional 6%, and hiring new employees to fill vacancies has been suspended until a final decision has been made. Although there was legislation introduced in 1982 to establish a National Archives and Records Administration independent from GSA (the National Archives was an independent agency from 1934 to 1949), no action was taken before Congress adjourned. No one knows what will happen in the 98th Congress.

The State Department's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation meets in November each year. There was discussion about the report of the 1981 meeting, prepared by Professor Arnold Taylor of Howard University, and the agenda and other materials prepared by the Office of the Historian for the 1982 meeting. There are three SHAFR members on the Advisory Committee--Gary Hess of Bowling Green State University (Chairman), Ernest May of Harvard, and Gaddis Smith of Yale.

The new Executive order on declassification of national security information took effect on August 1, 1982. In general, it continues and

extends the trend since 1978 of keeping more documents closed longer. The Committee decided to draft a statement on this subject for submission to the SHAFR Council.

Despite the desires of the Administration and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to revise and tighten the Freedom of Information Act, nothing was done in the 97th Congress. It is presumed that new legislation will be introduced in the 98th Congress.

Certain files of the Department of State for the 1950-54 period are now available for research at the National Archives. More information is printed in the January 1983 issue of **AHA Perspectives** (page 6). A list of the specific decimal files and post files available for research can be obtained from the Legislative and Diplomatic Branch, National Archives, Washington, DC 20408.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Regina Books (Box 280, Claremont, CA 91711) has agreed to set aside a portion of its proceeds from the sale of the volumes in its TOPICS IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY series for the Laura & Norman A. Graebner Prize Fund at SHAFR. Regina Books will donate \$1.00 from the sale of any cloth (library) volume, and \$.50 from the sale of any paperback edition.

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The editors are pleased to announce plans for the publication of **Holocaust Studies Annual**. A distinguished editorial board has been assembled, and the requisite financing has been arranged. The first thematic issue, scheduled for publication in late 1983, will focus on "America and the Holocaust, 1939-1945". The editors seek original scholarly contributions addressing any aspect of the stated theme. Please send all inquiries to Professor Jack Fischel, Co-Editor, Holocaust Studies Annual, Department of History, Millersville State College, Millersville, PA 17551.

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U-2 Affair Featured in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Volume for 1960

Volume 12 of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's "Historical Series" covers events of 1960, including the shooting down of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over Soviet territory. The new volume contains testimony by Secretary of State Christian Herter on the collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting. CIA Director Allen Dulles, NASA Deputy Director Hugh Dryden, and Defense Secretary Thomas Gates offered explanations for the U-2 flight and its equally ill-fated cover story.

Other issues discussed in the volume include United States relations with Cuba, the Eisenhower administration's revised economic program for Latin America, concern over the independence of the former Belgian Congo, and reports on the negotiations toward a nuclear test ban treaty. This volume concludes the "Historical Series" coverage of the Eisenhower years; a two-part volume for 1961 will be published next year.

Due to budget considerations, only a limited number of copies of volume 12 are available. Historians who are interested in the series but are not already on its distribution list are encouraged to contact the Committee soon, before the supply is exhausted. Copies are available at no charge from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. 20510.

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1983 NEH Summer Seminar: "A Generation of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1975"

University of Connecticut; Director: Thomas G. Paterson

This National Endowment for the Humanities seminar of twelve members will meet at the University of Connecticut from June 12 to August 5. Besides reading and discussing scholarship in the history of recent American diplomacy, including such topics as the origins of the Cold War, containment doctrine, Sino-American relations, Korean War, Eisenhower-Dulles and the Third World, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam, participants will pursue an individual research project or reading program. The seminar is intended for teachers at two-, four-, or five-year institutions. Although specialists in American diplomatic history are urged to apply, teachers in other fields who would profit from membership in the seminar are eagerly invited to submit applications. Each participant receives a stipend of \$2,700 for the two-month program. The deadline for applications is April 1; announcements of awards will be made on April 19, 1983. For a detailed description of the seminar, and application materials, please write to Professor Thomas G. Paterson, Department of History, U-103, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268.

* * * * *

Joint NARS/Smithsonian Study Begun

A special task force has been appointed by the Archivist of the United States, Dr. Robert M. Warner, to undertake a comparative study of the organization and operation of the Smithsonian Institution and the National Archives and Records Service (NARS). The eight-member study team will include three officials from NARS' parent agency, the General Services Administration (GSA), as well as five members of the National Archives staff.

The study has been launched at the request of the Administrator of General Services, Gerald P. Carmen. Carmen stated at a recent meeting

of the National Archives Advisory Council that "...an objective and comparative study would be useful for further discussions of NARS' organization and operations..." Carmen further stated that although he does not now support separation for NARS he indicated the study would lead to further dialogue and possible adjustments of his current position.

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Research Service in the UK

Angela Dexter writes that she and a colleague, (graduates with extensive experience in academic and scientific fields) who have specialized in conducting research for university departments and learned societies, offer their services to historians who can not travel to Great Britain. Ms. Dexter offers to "undertake extended research projects, check facts and references and locate and photocopy pictures, articles and manuscript items." For anyone interested contact Ms. Dexter at Wiltones, London End, Beaconsfield, Bucks, HP9 2 JB, United Kingdom.

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On March 17 and 18 the United States Capitol Historical Society, in cooperation with the United States Congress, will sponsor its sixth annual symposium. Entitled "Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783," the meeting will be held in the Senate Caucus Room, #318, of the Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. The program will consist of four sessions and a concluding lecture followed by a reception. All proceedings will be open to interested persons free of charge. For information write to: Professor Ronald Hoffman, History Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

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Princeton University has announced its Modern Diplomacy Studies Seminar for the Spring Term 1983. The seminar will deal with American-East Asian relations in the 1920s and the career of John Van Antwerp MacMurray. Among those scheduled are SHAFR members Akira Iriye (University of Chicago) on April 12 and Charles E. Neu (Brown University) on April 26. For information contact Arthur N. Waldron, 211 Jones Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

FORUM

Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana University) has written this office wondering whether members of SHAFR have interest in agitating the profession. His concern is with graduate programs in history. His recommendation is that an appropriate organization assume responsibility for certifying graduate programs in history. The **Newsletter** will be pleased to serve as a forum for the members on this issue.

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

Eighth National Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, August 5-7, 1982, Boston University: Report by Lloyd E. Ambrosius (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), Chairman, Program Committee

One of the distinctive features of the 1982 program was the participation of several foreign scholars. Besides those who contributed papers in the regular sessions, four distinguished scholars from around the world served on a panel on the opening night of the conference. At this panel on "Foreign Perspectives on the History of American Foreign Relations," they offered their views on historiography as well as on the American role in world affairs. Professor Göran Rystad (University of Lund, Sweden) explored the relationship between the trends in historiography and other contemporary developments in his paper on "The Politics of American Historiography." Critical of both extremes of cold-war and revisionist interpretations of recent American foreign policy, he urged historians to adhere to scholarly standards instead of shifting with the political winds. Mr. Zhao Jinglun (Beijing, People's Republic of China) offered a different perspective in his personal assessment of the "History of Sino-American Relations." In contrast to Rystad, he stressed the importance of moral judgments in history. Called by **Newsweek** (Sept. 20, 1982) "An Oriental Tocqueville," Zhao focused on contemporary difficulties, especially over Taiwan, in the relations between the United States and China. He blamed Washington now as in the past for creating obstacles to détente and for driving Beijing closer to Moscow.

Professor Klaus Schwabe (Institute of Technology, Aachen, Germany) and Professor Tadashi Aruga (Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan) developed similar themes concerning the relations between the United States and other nations across the Atlantic or

Pacific. Emphasizing "the interdependence of American-Western European relations" in his paper on "Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Western Europe, 1914-1960: A New Assignment?," Schwabe noted the growing body of historical literature on interdependent Atlantic relations. "Seen from the scholarly point of view," he concluded, "a multilateral and simultaneously a more detached historical perspective is an approach which requires no special justification. Its merits seem self-evident. But beyond that such an approach may also prove salutary to the contemporary political atmosphere, as it may help in the endeavor to combat the provincialism which seems to be on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic." In his paper on "America's East Asia Policy: A Historiographical Overview," Aruga observed that the scholarship on U.S.-East Asian relations has tended to concentrate on China, but that some notable works have recognized the importance of the Pacific countries beyond the mainland of Asia. While Schwabe emphasized the Atlantic connection, Aruga placed the United States within the context of "Asia-Pacific" international relations. "Reflecting on the history of U.S.-East Asian relations," he concluded, "it is interesting to note that several events in East Asia caused drastic change in U.S. global policy. Japan's attack in 1941 made the United States a full-fledged participant in the World War; the Korean War became the catalyst to militarize U.S. cold war policy; and America's failure in Vietnam precipitated its attempt to seek detente with China and the Soviet Union. In an overall view, American stakes in East Asia may have been less important than its stakes in Europe. But the events in this region have had great impact upon the general orientation of American foreign policy. Furthermore, it is only in this part of the world that the United States has fought three wars in the past forty years. "It seems to me that no American historians have fully explored this paradoxical character of U.S.-East Asian relations."

These four papers stimulated a lively discussion in which the audience of 75 persons participated by directing questions to the panel and making comments. Lloyd Ambrosius (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) served as the moderator for the panel and the ensuing discussion. One central theme in the papers and throughout the discussion was the importance of interpreting the history of American foreign relations within a global context. By recognizing foreign as well as American perspectives, this kind of scholarship will place the United States in the framework of an interdependent world.

After the Friday luncheon William V. Shannon (former United States Ambassador to Ireland during Carter's presidency and currently a professor at Boston University) delivered an address on the "Triangular Relationship of the United States, Ireland and the United Kingdom." After dinner that evening Professor Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana University) gave an address, illustrated with slides, on "Harry S. Truman and the Imperial Presidency." Following the Saturday luncheon Professor Ernest R. May (Harvard University) delivered an address on "The Uses of History."

One new feature of the 1982 program was a session on Saturday afternoon. Sponsored by the American-East Asian Relations Committee, in cooperation with SHAFR, this symposium focused on "Teaching of American-East Asian Relations." Akira Iriye (University of Chicago) served as moderator of a panel of distinguished scholars, including John K. Fairbank (Harvard University) and others.

The success of this national meeting depended upon the capable and efficient handling of local arrangements by Arnold A. Offner (Boston University). I wish as well to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of my colleagues on the Program Committee, who helped in numerous unseen ways. For their contributions I wish to thank Charles DeBenedetti (University of Toledo), Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University) and Peter P. Hill (George Washington University).

The 1982 program featured six sessions with scholarly papers and commentary. For summaries of these sessions I am indebted to the moderators, whose reports I have edited slightly to contribute to uniformity in style.

INTERWAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

(Moderator: Richard Dean Burns)

In his opening remarks, Richard Dean Burns (California State University, Los Angeles) pointed out that the period from 1918 to 1936 is a particularly fertile era for studying arms control and disarmament techniques. This is because (1) there were more than two dozen agreements reached, (2) the negotiations leading to these agreements gave definition and parameters to the term "disarmament," and (3) the negotiations also examined all of the basic political and military issues of arms control/disarmament. In the post-1945 era, technology has changed but the basic political and military issues are essentially the same.

In his paper, "President Wilson, the Mandate System and Postwar Colonial Disarmament," William Martin (Florida Junior College at Jacksonville) placed the use of **demilitarization** and **international inspection** (two arms control techniques) within their proper political perspective. While critics of the mandate system have criticized it as disguised imperialism, Martin believes that in many ways the mandate system was innovative. "It was a dynamic system in that it provided opportunities for a change in status for colonies. It required international accountability in managing the mandates and gave the League the right of inspection and intervention."

As far as arms control techniques are concerned, Article III under the Class "C" mandates stated that "the military training of the natives, otherwise than for purpose of internal police and the local defense of the Territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the Territory." Although he did not follow the history of the mandates, Martin contends that there were few violations, especially of the Pacific mandates.

In his paper, "The United States and Latin and Central American Arms Control During the 1920's," Thomas M. Leonard (University of North Florida) focused on the 1923 Central American Conference held in Washington, D.C., and the Fifth International Conference of the American States held in Santiago, Chile in 1923. According to Leonard, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and other American officials envisioned arms control as contributing to regional stability by lessening the likelihood of military aggression toward their neighbors, by contributing to the promotion of constitutional government, and by reducing the economic pressure on each nation's budget if military expenditures were cut. Buoyed by the successful naval limitation conference just concluded in Washington, D.C., U.S. officials urged general (air, naval and military) arms limitations on the Central American states at the Washington meeting, and naval limitations on the ABC nations at the Santiago session.

The results were mixed. The U.S. persuaded the five Central American nations to agree to a general arms limitation agreement, but at Santiago divergent national interests rendered agreement on naval limitations impossible. But American governmental practices seemed to run counter to its stated arms limitation objectives: U.S. diplomats encouraged Latins to purchase American military hardware, and the Navy sent a mission to Brazil.

In his paper, "Faith, Hope, and Parity: the Interwar Naval Limitation Conferences: a Historiographical Assessment," Thomas H. Buckley (University of Tulsa) took issue with Barbara Tuchman's cryptic observation that the 20th century disarmament undertaking has been "a long, painful, repeatedly frustrated, always futile effort," and that the effort has been "spectacularly unsuccessful." Buckley reviewed various major books and interpretations which related to four naval conferences: Washington, 1921; Geneva, 1927; London, 1930; and London, 1935. This resulted in a number of general observations: (1) arms control did not result from altruistic or philanthropic reasons; (2) naval limitation was achieved when competing nations believed there was an important advantage in agreeing to limitations; (3) the most successful limitations were those placed on weapons whose value was declining; (4) arms control proposals which can mobilize public opinion must be simple and understandable as at Washington in 1921; and (5) arms control treaties cannot be negotiated outside the political web of which they are a part.

In their critiques of the three papers, Lawrence Wittner (S.U.N.Y. at Albany) and the moderator raised a number of questions about the general utility and intentions of the various undertakings. One point, however, drew most of the attention of the audience and panel: how does one measure success (or failure) of arms control agreements? Is longevity enough? How significant are evasions? This is a question that deserves further examination.

INTERNATIONALISTS, REALISTS AND REVISIONISTS

(Moderator: Manfred Jonas)

This Friday morning session drew an audience of 55 and proved to be a spirited and lively affair. John Braeman (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) gave a paper on "Power, National Interest and American Foreign Policy during the Age of Normalcy: A Re-evaluation," which was basically designed to counter Realist critiques of American foreign policy during the years from 1921 to 1933. A good portion of it was devoted to an analysis of American military strength and planning during the period and offered the conclusion that these matters were by no means neglected. Subsequent portions of the paper suggested that the United States played a far more active and successful role, particularly with respect to Europe, than is generally conceded, and that the military confrontation with Japan was no foregone conclusion for which specific preparations should have been made. The United States, he concluded, thus played a role entirely appropriate to its "unique combination of great power and isolated position."

Priscilla M. Roberts (England) gave a paper on "The American 'Eastern Establishment' and Foreign Affairs: A Historiographical Void?" She essentially surveyed the largely journalistic literature which dealt in whole or in part with the presumed role of an "American Eastern Establishment" in the making of foreign policy and pointed out the absence of serious scholarly studies which focused on the "Establishment." After offering a series of reasons for this apparent void (American reluctance to accept the notion of an inherently undemocratic "Establishment," the general acceptance up to the middle 1960s of the foreign policy aims and ideals of the "Establishment," etc.), she urged that "Establishment studies" be undertaken by diplomatic historians.

Sally Marks, (Rhode Island College) praised both papers as "very well grounded in the monographic literature," but took Braeman to task for defining power too narrowly and largely in military terms. She further noted that he failed to distinguish clearly between real and perceived national interest, a point made again by Manfred Jonas (Union College). In the final analysis, Marks supported Braeman's contention that the United States "did not entirely—or even largely—abandon the responsibilities of a great power." With respect to Roberts' paper, Marks suggested that any American "Establishment" was likely to be far more amorphous than its British counterpart and raised doubts about its supposed "eastern" character. She concluded with a series of questions which would have to be examined as part of any serious study of the "Establishment," questions which had not been suggested by Roberts.

Jonas praised Braeman's paper as a welcome corrective, but concluded that it did not really uncover a basic flaw in the Realist indictment. Granting all that had been said, Jonas maintained, did not change the fact that American policy was one of "involvement without commitment" and that such a policy, though not naive, was probably

unwise. Jonas took less kindly to Roberts' paper which he labelled "an enjoyable and not uninformative tease." His major objection was to the absence of any definition of "Establishment." He pointed to the difficulties in composing any such definition and cast doubt on the viability or usefulness of the proposed "Establishment studies."

After brief and effective responses from Braeman and Roberts, a lively discussion ensued, with numerous questions from the floor carrying the session well beyond its appointed close. Most questions and comments dealt with Roberts' paper. A clear majority of these supported her call for "Establishment studies," through with varying suggestions as to what the focus might be. A good time was had by all.

STYLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

(Moderator: Lawrence S. Kaplan)

In many ways, observed Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State University), this panel is an extension of a colloquium begun at the SHAFR meeting in Washington last summer on style in American diplomacy. The focus then was on the founding fathers—Franklin, Adams, and Marshall—but the questions are roughly the same as will be asked of this more disparate group of diplomatists: Is there a distinctive American style—and by implication, a distinctive goal in American diplomacy—that sets both American foreign relations and the methods of conducting them apart from those of European nations? All of them were seeking a world fit for the United States to occupy, each in his own way. What those ways were and how successful they were is the substance of the papers.

There is an aura of failure, or at least of disappointment, in the specific experiences of each of the diplomatists under discussion. In the case of Theodore Roosevelt it is created by his naiveté that articulated an American imperialism without recognizing its reality. In Woodrow Wilson's experience the trouble was a defect of vigor when full attention to the Russian problem might have made a difference. Wilson was not the imperial president contemporary scholarship has made him out to be. George Bancroft's failures are less important if only because the position of the United States in the world and hence the positions of diplomats abroad in the mid-nineteenth century were less meaningful.

Professor Richard C. Rohrs (Oklahoma State University) claimed that the abilities and interests of an administration is a major determinant of the effectiveness of its diplomatic representatives. In Bancroft's case Polk's preoccupation with domestic and Latin American affairs detracted from European concerns and left Bancroft to his own devices as minister to England. Beyond furthering his own historical researches nothing much was accomplished. He contrasted this record with the more active Seward and Fish State Departments twenty years later which employed Bancroft more usefully in his ministry to Prussia.

Serge Ricard (University of Provence, France) and Linda R. Killen (Radford University) dealt with more familiar diplomatic figures and yet

provided angles of observation which make the reader and listener look forward to the completion of their studies. Ricard presented an argument for an interpretation that has been with us since TR was in office, namely that of "militia diplomacy" (a term perhaps more valid for TR than for John Adams) in service of an expansionist America. He represented, the author argued, the least attractive features of the American psyche, and without actually mentioning it seems to make the American dream no different and certainly no more elevating than the Pax Britannica or the French civilizing mission of the era. Many of the problems with Latin American relations today stem from the Roosevelt diplomacy of "righteousness."

Killen's Wilson is not the Wilson either supporters or opponents usually find. He is the inattentive rather than the imperial president. Or if he was an imperialist there were severe limits to his imperialism which undercut his objectives. A concern for private enterprise, or a fear of excessive use of power helped to ensure failure of his Russian policies.

Criticisms of William Widenor (University of Illinois) centered on the role of "style" and the limits to which it may be stretched before losing all meaning.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA

(Moderator: Thomas G. Paterson)

One of the Friday afternoon sessions, this meeting was attended by twenty-five people. Mark T. Gilderhus (Colorado State University) presented the first paper, titled "Wilson, Carranza, and the Monroe Doctrine." He argued that President Wilson sought to multilateralize the Monroe Doctrine to make it an effective instrument as an international police power. Seeing a compatibility of interest with Latin American nations, Wilson hoped to construct a stable community and to curb European meddling in the Western Hemisphere. But Wilson also wanted to perpetuate United States hegemony in the region and hence jeopardized his call for a multilateral Monroe Doctrine by taking unilateral actions. Mexico was the major obstacle to Wilson's experiment, for the revolution there challenged United States hegemony and a multilateralism dominated by the United States. Wilson ultimately failed to understand the misgivings of Latin American leaders like Carranza.

The second paper, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths: Cuba in the 1960 Campaign," was given by Kent M. Beck (Pennsylvania State University, Erie). Beck surveyed the Cuban issue, arguing that John F. Kennedy actually showed more caution on the subject than is generally known. His urging of assistance to the Cuban exiles was an "accidental overreaction" to Republican tactics. And Kennedy retreated from his bold statement on aiding anti-Castro forces. Nixon, argued Beck, was deceptive and tried to depict Kennedy as reckless. Secretly Nixon was

pushing for an invasion of Cuba before election day to improve his chances of winning. In the end, the Cuban issue was not decisive in the election.

William H. Becker (George Washington University), the first commentator, praised Gilderhus for revealing again Wilson's penchant for worrying about the form and organization of international relations. As for shortcomings, Becker thought that Gilderhus should have considered further the relationship between Wilson's attitude toward foreign investment and his call for multilateralism. Becker suggested that Wilson's experiment may have been a way of protecting American investments and mollifying business opinion in the United States. In his comments on Beck's paper, Becker wondered what influence the business community, angry with Castro, had on the Cuban issue in 1960. Perhaps what Kennedy said about Cuba was aimed at bankers and industrialists.

In his commentary, Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut) suggested that Gilderhus explore further whether Wilson really believed in a compatibility of interest with Latin America and whether he had much of an attachment to multilateral methods, because whenever United States hegemony seemed challenged, Wilson abandoned notions of harmony and resorted to unilateral behavior. Paterson noted that Beck's paper was based largely on published sources. Rich materials await inspection in the John F. Kennedy library. Paterson also recommended that Beck provide a broader context for the election of 1960 and that he reconsider his claims that the Cuban issue emerged late in the campaign and mostly in Florida. Paterson also challenged the view that Kennedy retreated from his call for aid to the exiles. Finally, he urged Beck, in revising the paper for publication, to demonstrate more fully that President Eisenhower made Cuban policy in the fall of 1960 with an eye to its favorable impact on the Nixon campaign (such as recalling the ambassador and ending the sugar quota).

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

(Moderator: Sandra Taylor)

This panel on Saturday morning featured two papers. The first, "American Liberals and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1937-1941," was delivered by Prof. James R. Roebuck, Jr. (Drexel University). Roebuck examined the coverage of the Far East crisis in the journals **The Nation** and **The New Republic** over the five-year period. He concluded that these magazines initially opposed steps that might lead to war with Japan; they disliked militarism generally and Roosevelt's naval building program particularly, and they viewed Japan as a weak and easily defeated enemy. However, as Japan's war against China progressed and France and the Low Countries fell, the threat of fascist world domination prompted them to change their tune. By late 1941 they accepted rearmament and the risk of war with Japan. Roebuck pointed

out that the magazines differed on various issues, such as their reaction to the Quarantine speech and an embargo of Japan. Commentators Jonathan Utley (University of Tennessee) and Sandra Taylor (University of Utah) criticized the paper for its lack of a broad contextual framework and clear definition of liberalism. It was unclear if these journals represented liberal opinion or in fact helped formulate it, and in cases where they disagreed with one another, which represented majority opinion. Did their disagreements split the liberal community or reflect a split within it? Taylor also questioned the omission of any discussion of a racist bias; why did both journals dismiss Japan with such contempt?

A second paper was presented by Prof. Richard L. Lael (Westminster College), entitled "War Crimes Policymaking in the Far East: Preparing for Yamashita." Narrower and more controversial than the first paper, Lael's work attempted to exonerate General Douglas MacArthur from accusations by liberals that the General "stacked the deck" against his old antagonist by trying him in a military tribunal in the Philippines rather than later in Tokyo, and that he speeded the case through as rapidly as possible, thereby denying Yamashita the same constitutional guarantees as civilians tried under American jurisdiction. Lael was concerned only with the preparations made for the trial. He proved that MacArthur was pressured by civilian and military officials in Washington to act speedily; he was allowed to set the procedure to be followed, and he abided by precedents set elsewhere. Only in his emphasis on the concept of command responsibility did the General exert originality. Both commentators challenged Lael's vindication of MacArthur. The speed of the trial, the many procedural irregularities, and the General's obvious desire that Yamashita be convicted and executed quickly, without a review of the case by the Supreme Court, all pointed to a case of "victor's justice." Utley pointed out that introducing the command responsibility charge guaranteed Yamashita's guilt, since all the extenuating circumstances surrounding the breakdown of his authority over Japanese troops in the Philippines would thereby be irrelevant. He also pointed out that the desire for speed appeared to be the result of competition with the Allies over who would try Japanese war criminals. As the discussion of both papers ranged far beyond the rather narrow confines of the original topics suggested, the papers were too restricted in scope, Utley remarked.

Thomas M. Lansburg neither attended the conference to give his paper on "Townsend Harris and Sir Rutherford Alcock, Pedagogues of Progress in Tokugawa Japan," nor submitted it to be read.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

(Moderator: Theodore A. Wilson)

At this session Saturday morning, the small audience—some twenty persons present at one or another stage of the proceedings—

apparently reflected the winding down of the conference and the late hours experienced by many the previous evening. Theodore A. Wilson (University of Kansas) chaired the session and offered informal if not informed comments. Two papers had been scheduled for this session. Unfortunately, Michael Dunne (University of Sussex) was unable to attend because of illness and did not submit his paper, entitled "The United States and the World Court During the 1920s and 1930s," to be read.

However, Robert Keyserlingk (University of Ottawa) delivered a polished and carefully reasoned paper on the subject: "Annexation or Occupation: The United States View of Austria, 1938-1945." The paper first provided a thoughtful review of the historiography of this question. Keyserlingk's principal point was that the United States recognized in effect the assimilation of Austria by Germany. Only late in the war did considerations of postwar political and economic advantage cause the Americans and British to backpedal from acceptance of the legitimacy of the **Anschluss** as an act of annexation. Both Wilson and J. Samuel Walker (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), who offered a perceptive comment on the theme of recognition policy and the role of international law, found the argument persuasive. Walker did question whether FDR's intentions and the trend of American thinking on postwar issues were as clearcut as suggested by Keyserlingk. An outstanding dimension was the extensive research in U.S., British, German, and Austrian records which informed the paper.

Stanley L. Falk (US Army Center of Military History), "Gaps in the Published History of the Air Force: Challenge for Historians," **The Historian**, vol. XLIV, No. 4 (August 1982), pp. 453-65.

This article surveys neglected areas of Air Force history and proposes a broad range of topics for research and publication. The author, former Chief Historian of the Air Force, describes reasons for the relative lack of published scholarly work as well as recent developments conducive to the exploitation of now-readily available source materials. The list of potential research areas is extensive. It starts with the need for an overall history of the Air Force and an even more ambitious study of the impact on American society of the development and growth of military aviation. Other subjects include organizational and doctrinal developments, logistics, roles and missions, leadership, technology and technology transfer, air medicine, Air Force-community relationships, military education and training, tactical and strategic doctrine and operations, and even Air Force intelligence. The article also includes a brief guide to research collections.

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Lester H. Brune (Bradley University), "An Effort to Regulate Aerial Bombing: The Hague Commission of Jurists, 1922-1923," **Aerospace Historian**, 29 (September, 1982), 183-185. When a special Washington Conference Subcommittee disagreed on air regulations in future

warfare, the Five Power Treaty signatories provided for a special commission to prepare air war regulations. Delegates of the Five Powers plus the Netherlands met at The Hague between December 11, 1922 and February 18, 1923. The principle issue was defining the bombing of combatant and non-combatant targets, the same question dividing American Army and Navy experts at the Conference. Eventually, under John Bassett Moore's guidance, the commission adopted traditional naval regulations; namely, restricting aerial bombs "within bounds of mobile operations directed against combatant forces." One additional clause prohibited "aerial bombing for the purpose of terrorizing civilian populations." The Hague aerial rules were never ratified. Japan accepted them but the European powers had excuses for delaying approval. President Coolidge could not decide: the State Department favored the rules; the War Department rejected them. When the Europeans qualified their acceptance, the State Department placed the report in the "Dead File," noting that any agreement on air war required a second Hague Conference.

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Kenneth R. Stevens (Papers of Daniel Webster, Dartmouth College), "James Grogan and the Crisis in Canadian-American Relations, 1837-1842," **Vermont History**, 50 (Fall 1982), 219-226. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful Canadian uprising of 1837-38, hundreds of rebels who had fled to the United States used the border towns to launch raids back into Canada. Among the malcontents was James Grogan, whom Canadian authorities believed guilty of several crimes. While relations between the U.S. and Britain were already strained as a result of the MeLeod Affair, Canadian troops kidnapped Grogan in Alburg, Vermont, with the intention of placing him on trial. But British officials disavowed the act and released Grogan. The episode reveals that in the midst of an unstable period in Anglo-American relations, responsible leaders could and did act with sensitivity to each other's legitimate grievances. The incident also pointed out the need for an Anglo-American extradition agreement, which was achieved the following year as part of the Webster-Ashburton treaty.

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David Reynolds (Caius College, Cambridge University), "Roosevelt, the British Left, and the Appointment of John G. Winant as US Ambassador to Britain in 1941," **The International History Review**, IV/3 (August 1982), 393-413.

In February 1941 FDR appointed Winant to succeed Joseph P. Kennedy as US Ambassador to Britain. Typically, the President had more than one motive for his choice. Winant, unlike Kennedy, was an ardent supporter of aid to the Allies. He also seemed more resistant than his predecessor to British blandishments. And his Republican background accorded well with the Administration's increasingly bipartisan image. But, as contemporaries suspected and British and US archives now confirm, Roosevelt had another reason for the

appointment. Winant had developed close ties with the British Labour Party through his earlier work at the International Labour Office in Geneva. Ernest Bevin and Harold Laski both wanted him as the new ambassador and Laski's request, at least, reached the President. Like many in Washington in 1940, FDR believed that British society had taken a marked and permanent swing leftward during the Battle of Britain - a shift reflected in Labour's growing importance in the Churchill coalition. He considered Winant a suitable observer of wartime change in Britain and also spoke of him privately as an early contact with the leaders of a post-war socialist government. (If this seems surprising in view of his famous friendship with Churchill, we need to remember that their relationship was much more hesitant in 1940-41 than is often believed.) In fact, Winant did not prove as important as Roosevelt envisaged, but his appointment is an interesting example of the subtlety of FDR's diplomacy and a reminder that the Roosevelt-Churchill connection, central though it may be, is only one part of the complex Anglo-American relationship of World War II.

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J. Garry Clifford (University of Connecticut), "A Note on the Break Between Senator Nye and President Roosevelt in 1939," **North Dakota History**, 49 (Summer 1982), pp. 14-17. The note details the background of the critical meeting between FDR and the Senate Military Affairs Committee on January 31, 1941, one of the few occasions prior to Pearl Harbor when Roosevelt tried candidly to persuade key isolationists that the Axis threat required fundamental changes in American policy. It was at this meeting that the President allegedly said that America's first line of defense was on the Rhine. A memorandum of the meeting in Nye's papers shows that the North Dakota Senator made up his mind that FDR sought war **before** the President's press conference a few days later, at which he apparently blamed Nye for leaking the statement about the Rhine frontier.

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-----"Senator John A. Danaher and the Battle Against Intervention, 1939-41" a paper delivered at a meeting of the Association for the Study of Connecticut History, at Eastern Connecticut State College, Willimantic, CT, November 13, 1982. The paper elaborates on the constitutional and legal arguments used by Danaher in his opposition to Roosevelt's foreign policy. Overlooked by students of isolationism, Danaher was particularly important because he had "inside information" about interventionist activities from his acquaintances in the Republican party in Connecticut. This paper is based in part on interviews with Danaher, now age 83.

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Von V. Pittman, Jr. (University of Iowa), "Patrick A. McCarran: Cold Warrior" a paper delivered at the meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, August, 1982. During the period of the Truman administration, a basic consensus developed in support of the U.S. political, diplomatic, and military strategy that became known as "containment." Right-wing critics of containment, who questioned the Truman administration's basic assumptions, were generally dismissed as "neo-isolationists." Yet they actually advocated a forceful use of American power and, ultimately, had a major impact on the shaping of the containment strategy. They, too, deserve the title "cold warriors." This paper is a case study of Senator Pat McCarran's (D-Nevada) role in the development of U.S. policy toward Spain. At the end of World War II, Franco's Spain was a pariah. By 1952, Spain was generally recognized as an ally in the containment of the USSR. While McCarran certainly did not achieve this complete reversal by himself, as Spain's chief spokesman in the Senate, he definitely prepared the way. In the case of Spain, as well as several other instances, McCarran helped shape postwar policy.

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Michael Schaller (University of Arizona), "Japan, China and Southeast Asia: Regional Integration and Containment, 1947-50" a paper delivered at the MacArthur Memorial Conference, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, October 21-22, 1982.

For some time scholars have speculated on the connections, if any, between policy towards Occupied Japan and the American confrontations with China and Southeast Asia. Despite many references in the post-1950 policy record to concern over the impact of the Vietnam War on Japan, we still know little about how policymakers developed the belief in the importance of Southeast Asia to Japan. This paper examines how, between 1947 and 1950, a group of mid- and high-level policy planners inherited many of the economic, political and military assumptions advanced by their Japanese counterparts since the early 1930s. These Americans made a series of decisions to restore Japan's central role in East Asia which, inevitably, involved the United States in a program which resembled Tokyo's earlier campaign to establish hegemony throughout the region. Staving off revolution in Southeast Asia and isolating the Chinese Communist regime were key aspects of this policy, devised before the outbreak of the Korean War.

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-----, "War Reporting in China: The Case of the Stilwell Recall," a paper delivered at the "China War Reporting Conference," Arizona State University, Phoenix, Arizona, November 18-19, 1982.

The recall of General Stilwell in October 1944, most observers agreed, marked a turning point in Sino-American relations. In many ways, the event had as great an impact on both countries as the Pearl Harbor attack or the Yalta agreements. Aside from the official reactions to the command crisis, the recall grabbed American news headlines to a greater degree than all other war stories from China. Despite problems

of U.S. and Kuomintang censorship, American journalists did a remarkably thorough job reporting the subject. Most carefully explained how it fit into the larger problem of Chinese politics and indicated how dismal it boded for the future. Even "conservative" outlets, such as the Luce publications, acknowledged the great importance of Stilwell's recall and looked upon it as the beginning of an American-Soviet-Kuomintang-Chinese Communist context for control of China. In sum, the journalistic community reported the complexity of Chinese politics far more effectively than the American government.

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Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh), "Lord Lothian and American Democracy," a paper delivered at the Bedford College, London-Universita degli Studi di Pavia Marquess of Lothian Centenary Colloquium, 23 November 1982. The paper considered the tradition, established by Bryce and Lothian, that British ambassadors in Washington should understand American democracy. It demonstrated that Americans inside and outside the Roosevelt administration expressed reservations about Lothian's understanding of their country, and suggested that these doubters were not always being overcritical. Lothian succeeded as intermediary between Roosevelt and Churchill in spite of his overconfident assumptions and didacticism, not because of his erudition.

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Richard W. Turk (Allegheny College), "A Sea Change in Naval History: Retrospect and Prospect, 1776-1982," presented at the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association meeting, August 13, 1982, in San Francisco, surveys some of the literature which has appeared over the past decade. The paper divided the work into six categories: reference and resource material, intra-institutional studies, extra-institutional studies, biographies, force and diplomacy, and revisionist works. Although much of real value has appeared, more could be done in such areas as Navy Department bureaus and their chiefs, relations with other branches of the armed forces and with diplomatic and consular personnel, and with naval and civilian representatives of other nations. This will call for a great deal of multi-archival work in a variety of areas. There also is a tendency for naval historians to treat the naval establishment in isolation. Naval officers and institutions do not exist in a vacuum, but are subject to influences from the society around them, from other government agencies, from the business community, from foreign navies, and from the broader maritime experience of which they form a part. Finally, there is an urgent need for a new one-volume study of the Navy, such as Allen Millett has done for the Marine Corps or Russell Weigley for the Army.

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Raymond James Raymond (University of Connecticut), "The United States, Ireland and NATO 1948-1950: A Reassessment," paper read at the Southern Historical Conference, 3 November 1982. On 7 January

1949 the United States invited Ireland to become a member of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Irish government replied "no." Although further diplomatic exchanges took place between Dublin and Washington in May and June 1949, this initial Irish reply sealed the fate of the American invitation. The reason why Ireland did not participate in NATO was Partition — at least that was the official explanation at the time. In fact, new evidence from British, Irish, and American sources now indicates that Partition was **not** the main reason why Ireland stayed out of NATO.

This paper focuses on the Irish government's decision and argues that a whole set of considerations including financial exigencies and political expediency combined to keep Ireland out of NATO. Partition was merely a legitimization of a policy dictated by other factors.

PERSONALS

Von Pittman (formerly Acting Director of the Office of Continuing University Studies at Washington State University) has accepted the position of Director of the Center for Credit Programs, in the Division of Continuing Education, at the University of Iowa.

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Warren F. Kimball (Newark College of Rutgers University) has been appointed the British International Studies Association Visiting Lecturer for 1982. His speaking engagements included the American Studies Conference of the University of Wales (Gregynog), Swansea, Durham, Leeds, L.S.E., and the War Studies Seminar at Cambridge University. He will speak on various aspects of Anglo-American relations during World War II.

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At the end of December Stanley L. Falk will be retiring from the government. His 35 years of federal service were spent primarily as an historian with the Army, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as a dozen years as Associate Professor of National Security Affairs and Professor of International Relations at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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Four members of SHAFR were among the participants in a conference "The Presidency, Congress, and Foreign Policy" at the Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, November 10-11, 1982. Bradford Perkins (University of Michigan) was a discussant in a panel on the "Congressional View of Foreign Policy Determination" which included presentations by John Lindsay, Gale McGee, and Hugh Scott. Gary Hess (Bowling Green State University) was a discussant on a panel on the "Executive View of Foreign Policy Determination," which included presentations by President Ford, former Secretaries of State Alexander Haig, Dean Rusk, and William Rogers, and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. John Gaddis (Ohio University) presented

a paper at the other session, "Resolution of Conflicts in Foreign Policy Determination"; among the discussants on that panel was Melvin Small (Wayne State University).

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Robert Dallek (UCLA), Frank Freidel, and Gary Hess, (Bowling Green State University) participated in a series of programs in India as part of commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Franklin D. Roosevelt. They presented papers on Roosevelt at a conference of Indian scholars of U.S. history held at Jaipur, December 10 and 11. They also presented papers and participated in a seminar with another group of Indian scholars on the comparative leadership of Roosevelt and Jawaharlal Nehru, held at New Delhi on December 16 and 17. Between those two conferences Dallek lectured before audiences in Bombay, Freidel lectured in Madras, while Hess lectured in Calcutta. The programs were sponsored by the USIS and the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

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J. Samuel Walker (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has been awarded the William Best Hesseltine prize for the best article published in the **Wisconsin Magazine of History** in 1981-82. The article is entitled "Nuclear Safety, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the States." Congratulations Sam!

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Peter J. Beck (Kingston Polytechnic, England), a specialist in the international politics of the Falklands and Antarctic disputes, has given oral and written evidence on both questions to three official committees, which have studied these questions in the wake of the 1982 Falklands War. The committees concerned were the Franks Committee, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the House of Commons Education, Science and Arts Committee. Dr. Beck's oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee included material relating to US policy on both the Falklands and Antarctic issues.

PUBLICATIONS

Jerald A. Combs (San Francisco State University), **American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations**. 1982. University of California Press. \$40.00.

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Bradford Perkins (University of Michigan), **Prologue to War: England and the United States 1805-1812**. 1961. University of California Press. Paper \$5.10.

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Robert W. Love, Jr. (U.S. Naval Academy), ed., **The Chiefs of Naval Operations**. 1980. Naval Institute Press. \$28.95.

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Paul A. Varg (Michigan State University), **New England and Foreign Relations, 1789-1850**. University Press of New England. \$18.00.

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Aaron David Miller (Chevy Chase, Maryland), **Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949**. 1980. University of North Carolina Press. \$19.00.

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John Curtis Perry (Tufts University), James C. Thomson, Jr., and Peter W. Stanley, **Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia**. 1981. Harper & Row. \$17.50.

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Michael H. Hunt (University of North Carolina), **The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914**. 1983. Columbia University Press. \$27.50.

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David C. Hendrickson (Baltimore, Maryland) and Robert W. Tucker, **The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American Independence**. 1982. Johns Hopkins University Press. \$24.00.

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Kenneth Paul Jones (University of Tennessee at Martin), **U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941**. (1983 rev., Paper). ABC-Clio.

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Allan R. Millett (Ohio State University), **Semper Fidelis: The History of the U.S. Marine Corps**. 1980. The Free Press. \$12.95.

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Osamu Ishii (Hiroshima University, Japan), **Cotton Textile Diplomacy: Japan, Great Britain and the United States, 1930-1936**. 1981. Arno Press. \$45.00.

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Lester H. Brune (Bradley University), **The Origins of American National Security Policy: Sea Power, Air Power and Foreign Policy, 1900-1941**. 1981. Military Affairs/Aerospace History (MA/AH) Publishing. \$26.00.

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Thomas H. Etzold (U.S. Naval War College), **Defense or Delusion? America's Military in the 1980s**. 1983. Harper & Row. \$14.37.

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Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth College), ed., and Kenneth R. Stevens and Anita McGurn, assistant eds., **The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers**. 1982. University Press of New England. \$45.00.

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Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh, Scotland) and Bruce Collins, eds., **The Growth of Federal Power in American History**. 1983. Scottish Academic Press. Contains an essay by SHAFR member John A. Thompson (St. Catherine's College, Cambridge University).

SHAFR'S CALENDAR

- April 6-9 The 76th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Cincinnati with the headquarters at the Stouffer's Towers and the Cincinnati Convention-Exposition Center.
- April 6 8 - 11 p.m. Council Meeting
Commodore Room, Stouffer's Towers
- April 7 5 - 7 p.m. SHAFR Reception
Bamboo Room B, Stouffer's Towers
- April 8 12 - 2 p.m. Bernath Lecture and Luncheon
Ivory Room B, Stouffer's Towers
Melvyn P. Leffler, Speaker
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June **Newsletter**.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September **Newsletter**.
- August The 9th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Catholic University.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for December **Newsletter**.
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 9-12 The 49th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will meet at Charleston with headquarters at the Sheraton Charleston.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1983 Bernath Memorial lectureship.
- December 27-30 The 98th annual convention of the AHA will be held in San Francisco.

(The 77th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Los Angeles.)

Proposals should be sent to:

OAH Program Committee

University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742

Deadline for proposals is March, 1983.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1983

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1983. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. William Stinchcombe, Department of History, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1984.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$1,000.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutze (North Carolina) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA) |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (U of Arizona) |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Dept. of State) |
| 1982 | David Reynolds (Cambridge U) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1982. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR, Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1984. The Chairman of the Committee for 1984 is Sr. Rachel West, Department of History, Marian College, Indianapolis, IN 46222.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$300.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State University)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark U)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, N.J.)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1984 award from members of the Society agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1983. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Harriet D. Schwar, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

HONORARIUM: \$500.00 with publication of the lecture assured in **Diplomatic History**.

AWARD WINNERS

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| 1977 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute) |
| 1978 | David S. Patterson (Colgate) |
| 1979 | Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) |
| 1980 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1981 | Burton Spivak (Bates College) |
| 1982 | Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo) |
| 1983 | Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt) |