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Committee Election and Rotation

Show simple item record Smith, Daniel J. 2018-09-04T14:13:44Z 2018-09-04T14:13:44Z 2018-08-29
dc.description.abstract Can committee election and rotation (CER) for public office supplement formal terms and term limits to achieve more frequent office rotation without incurring, to the same extent, the associated turnover costs of a term limit set to the equivalent length? This paper provides a theoretical description of CER where two or more individuals are elected to serve individual terms for the same public office, with the exclusive right to exercise the public office rotating amongst the committee members at intervals shorter than the term length. CER would be most likely to emerge among a factional electorate, as CER would enable shorter rotations in office to be achieved without lower turnover costs. A case study of three high-level public offices using CER in the Republic of Venice, controlled by factional patricians, provides evidence of the historical structure and operation of CER. The tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined as a modern day application of CER among a factional electorate. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher SSRN Working Paper en_US
dc.subject Public Choice en_US
dc.subject Term Limits en_US
dc.subject Venice en_US
dc.subject Economic History en_US
dc.title Committee Election and Rotation en_US
dc.type Article en_US

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