The mission of the Political Economy Research Institute is to engage undergraduate and graduate students with faculty in research that will further the understanding of business and economic principles and their impact on regional, national, and international financial conditions and the well-being of society. Our working and policy paper series collect and promote the research being done by scholars and students affiliated with the Political Economy Research Institute
Browsing Political Economy Research Institute by Author "Smith, Daniel J."
Can committee election and rotation (CER) for public office supplement formal terms and term limits to achieve more frequent office rotation without incurring, to the same extent, the associated turnover costs of a term limit set to the equivalent length? This paper provides a theoretical description of CER where two or more individuals are elected to serve individual terms for the same public office, with the exclusive right to exercise the public office rotating amongst the committee members at intervals shorter than the term length. CER would be most likely to emerge among a factional electorate, as CER would enable shorter rotations in office to be achieved without lower turnover costs. A case study of three high-level public offices using CER in the Republic of Venice, controlled by factional patricians, provides evidence of the historical structure and operation of CER. The tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined as a modern day application of CER among a factional electorate.
(SSRN Working Paper, 2018-08-29)
Smith, Daniel J.; Crowley, George R.; Lequizamon, J. Sebastian
Can informal term limits place binding constraints on executives? And, are there conditions under which an electorate would forego formal term limits in favor of informal term limits? Formal term limits face three primary problems: they can be dispensed by powerful executives, they limit electorate discretion on term length, and they artificially shorten an executive’s time horizon. This paper extends the literature on term limits by building a model of informal term limits which overcomes these deficiencies. Our model demonstrates that an electorate could use the death of a lifetime-appointed executive, based on their projected life expectancy, to enforce binding, informal term limits. Informal term limits would enable the electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths when considering the tradeoff between the expected benefits of regime stability, such as experience, and the expected costs of long tenures, including the possibility of tyranny. In addition, this informal term limit would be congruent with an executive’s natural time horizon. Informal term limits would be most advantageous to an electorate fearful of both internal (tyranny) and external (military conquest) threats. A historical case study of ducal elections in late Middle Age and Renaissance Venice provides evidence of an electorate in this circumstance, the patricians of Venice, imposing informal term limits on their executives utilizing the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates at election.